XI.

DISINHERITANCE

DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners, 

vs. HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO
D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO,
SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D.
SEANGIO, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 140371-72             November 27, 2006 SECOND DIVISION

AZCUNA, J.:

FACTS:
Private respondents, Alfredo Seangio et. al. filed for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the late Segundo Seangio. Petitioners opposed said petition, contending that
Segundo left a holographic will disinheriting Alfredo for cause. The reason for the
disinheritance was due to Alfredo’s maltreatment to his father Segundo. In view of the
purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to
have a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by
the proceedings of the will. Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings contending that the alleged will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of
the estate of the deceased and that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor
instituted as heir. Devisee or legatee hence there is preterition which would result to
intestacy. Petitioners countered that the rule on preterition does not apply because
Segundo’s will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more
compulsory heirs. They argued that the testator intended all his compulsory heirs,
petitioners and private respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his
estate.

ISSUE:
Whether there was preterition in the HW of the decedent when it contains only a
disinheritance provision on the eldest son without the designation of other heirs.

RULING:
No. The compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. According
to the Supreme Court, it was Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his estate to all his
compulsory heirs with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir
to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the
petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir.
Her name was included only as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son,
Alfredo.
SC held that HWs should be liberally construed, taking into account the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the
testator. In this regard, the SC is convinced that the document, even if captioned
as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act
and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless
the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.
Cause for such disinheritance is found in the HW, thus:
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at
disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay
naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong
kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa
ibabaw.Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si
Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng
malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa
na mga custome[r] ng Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo
at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha mana.
 G.R. No. 143989.   July 14, 2003 FIRST DIVISION

ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as

“DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM”), respondent.

VITUG, J.:

FACTS:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In
1972, the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to
change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a
petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her pleas
and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and
continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities.  Prior to the institution of the case, in
1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of
adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of
care and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind
the decree of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Isabelita Lahom
filed said petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also
known as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided
that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter
after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopter’s
action prescribed.

RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law
governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity
of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By
then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the
Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the
adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could
no longer be pursued.
For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an
adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having
a share in the disposable portion of his estate. (See Art. 919 for valid grounds of
disinheritance)
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for
valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving
child, like denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him
from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
 JOSE BARITUA and EDGAR BITANCOR, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, NICOLAS NACARIO and VICTORIA RONDA NACARIO, respondents.

G.R. No. 82233 March 22, 1990 SECOND DIVISION

SARMIENTO, J.:

FACTS:
Bienvenida Nacario died in a tricycle accident with a bus driven by Edgar Bitangcor,
which bus is owned and operated by Jose Baritua. Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a
consequence of the extra-judicial settlement of the matter negotiated by the petitioners
and the bus insurer — Philippine First Insurance Company, Incorporated— Bienvenido
Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, received P18,500.00. In consideration of
the amount she received, Alicia executed on March 27, 1980 a "Release of Claim" in favor of
the petitioners and PFICI, releasing and forever discharging them from all actions, claims,
and demands arising from the accident which resulted in her husband's death and the
damage to the tricycle which the deceased was then driving. Alicia likewise executed an
affidavit of desistance in which she formally manifested her lack of interest in instituting
any case, either civil or criminal, against the petitioners
A year later, the parents of the deceased filed an action for damages against the
petitioners contending that they were promised by the petitioners indemnity for the death
of their son where the latter opposed on the ground that such promise was instead
contracted with the widow of the deceased.
It was also discussed whether estrangement is a legal ground for the disqualification
of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.

ISSUE:
Whether mere estrangement is a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving
spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.

RULING:
No, Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving
spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse. It is patently clear that the parents of the
deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a legitimate descendant. On the other
hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As it has been established that
Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the private respondents are
not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The petitioners
therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido
and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had been estranged
from Bienvenido.
Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief
and compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that the private respondents
loaned to Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the
expenses for his funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are but money claims
against the estate of their deceased son. These money claims are not the liabilities of the
petitioners who, as we have said, had been released by the agreement of the extra-judicial
settlement they concluded with Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, the victim's widow and
heir, as well as the natural guardian of their child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she
executed a "Release Of Claim" in favor of the petitioners.
 FILOMENA PECSON, as administratix of the last will and testament of Florencio
Pecson, et al., plaintiffs-appellants,  vs. ROSARIO MEDIAVILLO, defendant-appellee

G.R. No. 7890           September 29, 1914 EN BANC

JOHNSON, J.:

FACTS:
The last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was presented to the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Albay for probate. Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law,
opposed the legislation of the will on the ground that it had not been authorized nor signed
by the deceased. After hearing the respective parties, the Honorable Percy M. Moir (judge)
found that the will had been signed and executed in accordance with the provisions of law,
and denied the opposition. Rosario is and Joaquin was the grandchild of the testator,
Florencio Pecson. That Rosario, was disinherited by Florencio, according to clause 3 of the
will, because she failed to show him due respect and on a certain occasion raised her hand
against him Paragraph 3 of the will disinherited Rosario Mediavillo states:
I declare that one of my daughters, named Teresa, now deceased, left a legitimate
daughter named Rosario Mediavillo. I also declare that I disinherit my granddaughter,
Rosario, because she was grossly disrespectful to me and because on one occasion, when it
was I do not remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore, it is my will that the
said Rosario Mediavillo shall have no share in my property.
That the interested party did not commit such an act, and if perhaps she did, it was
due to the derangement of her mental faculties which occurred a long time ago and from
which she now suffers in periodical attacks. It also appears from the evidence that Teresa
(daughter of Florencio, mother of Rosario) also died. Her son Joaquin died, unmarried and
childless, before the death of the testator. The lower court found out that the evidence
shows that Rosario became insane in 1895, when she went to Nueva Caceres to study in
college, and it has been proved that it was previous to this date that she disobeyed her
grandfather and raised her hand against him. But since she was 14 years old, and shortly
afterwards became insane, she was not responsible for her acts and should not have been
disinherited by her grandfather. The court therefore decreed that  clause 3 of the will is
contrary to law and is set aside for being of no force or value whatever.  

ISSUE:
Whether when a parent disinherits his children, may inquire into the cause of the
disinheritance and decide that there was or was not ground for such disinheritance. 

RULING:
 Yes. The Civil Code (Art. 848) provides that disinheritance shall only take place for
one of the causes expressly fixed by law. Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that the
disinheritance can only be effected by the testament, in which shall be mentioned the legal
grounds or causes for such disinheritance. The right of the courts to inquire into the causes
and whether there was sufficient cause for the disinheritance or not, seems to be supported
by express provisions of the Civil Code. 
In the case,  It appears from the record that when Rosario Mediavillo was about 14
years of age, she had received some attentions from a young man – that she had received a
letter from him – and that her grandfather, Florencio, took occasion to talk to her about the
relations between her and the said young man.  It was upon that occasion when the
disobedience and disrespect were shown to her grandfather, and that was the cause for her
disinheritance by her grandfather. The record shows that after said event, she lost the use
of her mental powers and that she has never regained them, except for very brief periods,
up to the present time.
The lower court is correct in taking into consideration her tender years, that she
was probably not responsible for the disrespect and disobedience shown to her
grandfather in the year 1894 or 1895.