#31

People v. Buebos, GR 163938,

Mar. 28, 2008
FACTS

On January 1, 1994 around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, Adelina Borbe got up and saw Dante Buebos,
Sarmelito Buebos, Antonio Cornel, Jr., and Rolando Buelaoutside of her house. She saw that the roof of
her nipa hut was already on fire. She shouted for help wherein the four immediately fled. Olipiano
Berjuela heard the scream of Borbe and was able to identify the four men who fled the scene. Borbe filed
a criminal complaint for arson against the four men.

ISSUE

Whether or not the accused are liable for the crime of conspiracy

RULING

YES. The rule is well entrenched in this jurisdiction that conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it.
Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the
conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the
commission of the offense. Corollarily, it is not necessary to show that two or more persons met
together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or
the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. The rule is that conviction is proper
upon proof that the accused acted in concert, each of them doing his part to fulfill the common
design. In such a case, the act of one becomes the act of all and each of the accused will thereby
be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed. In the case at bench, conspiracy was evident
from the coordinated movements of petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos. Both of them stood
outside the house of private complainant Adelina. They were part of the group making boisterous
noise in the vicinity. Petitioners also fled together while the roof of Adelina’s house was ablaze.
These acts clearly show their joint purpose and design, and community of interest.

People v. Macabando, GR 188708,

July 31, 2013
FACTS
On Dec. 21, 2010 the accused burned his house. The fire spread to several other inhabited
houses in their barangay. The RTC convicted him with Destructive Arson. This finding was
based on the accused’s statement shortly before the fire that he would get revenge and burn his
house. Neighbors of the accused further testified that when they arrived at the accused’s burning
house he prevented them from putting out the fire and even threatened them with a gun. Defense
denied all the allegations and evidence of the prosecution, the accused alleged that he made no
such statements and threats, that the fire was accidental and occurred while he was sleeping.

ISSUES
Does the burning of inhabited houses or dwellings constitute Destructive Arson under Art. 320
of the RPC?

RULING
No, while the evidence of the prosecution is sufficient, destructive arson was not the proper
crime based on the factual findings of the court. Art. 320 of the RPC governing destructive arson
does not include the burning of any inhabited house or dwelling. Rather, it contemplates the
malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains,
vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by any
person or group of persons. In the instant case, the SC concluded that, based on the testimonies
of the witnesses and the accused himself, as well as the reports from the Bureau of Fire
Protection and the City Social Welfare and Development Department, the houses affected were
residential or used as dwellings. It further ruled that the fact that many families were affected
will not convert the crime to destructive arson, since the appellant’s act does not appear to be
heinous or represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness when compared to those acts
punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The established evidence only showed that the appellant
intended to burn his own house, but the conflagration spread to the neighboring houses.

#32

Lim v. People, GR 130038,

Sept. 18, 2000
FACTS
On August 25, 1990, petitioner bought various kinds of jewelry worth P300,
000.00 from Maria Antonia Seguan. She wrote out a check with the same
amount, dated August 25, 1990, payable to “cash” drawn on Metrobank and
gave the check to Seguan.

The next day, petitioner again went to Seguan’s store and purchased jewelry valued at
P241,668.00. Petitioner issued another check payable to “cash” dated August 16, 1990 drawn on
Metrobank in the amount of P241,668.007 and sent the check to Seguan through a certain
Aurelia Nadera. Seguan deposited the two checks with her bank. The checks were returned with
a notice of dishonor. Petitioner’s account in the bank from which the checks were drawn was
closed. Upon demand, petitioner promised to pay Seguan the amounts of the two dishonored
checks, but she never did.

On June 5, 1991, an Assistant City Prosecutor of Cebu filed with the RTC, Cebu City, Branch
23, two informations against petitioner for violations of BP No. 22.
After due trial, on December 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision in the two cases
convicting petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the CA, but the same was dismissed by the CA in its
October 15, 1996 Decision wherein it affirmed in toto the RTC’s Decision.

ISSUE

Whether or not Lim violated B.P. No. 22.

RULING

The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are: “(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply
for account or for value; “(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and “(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.” The gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the
act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its presentment for
payment. And the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its
payment within five banking days from notice of dishonor. The act is malum prohibitum,
pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Laws are created to achieve a goal intended and to
guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom the check was issued, and the
terms & conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks, are irrelevant in determining
culpability. Under BP No. 22, one need not prove that the check was issued in payment of an
obligation, or that there was damage. It was ruled in United States v. Go Chico, that in acts mala
prohibita, the only inquiry is, “has the law been violated?” When dealing with acts mala
prohibita –“it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with criminal intent. In many
crimes, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial…” This case is
a perfect example of an act mala prohibita. The first and last elements of the offense are
admittedly present. B.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second
element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are present. If not
rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction. To escape liability, she must prove that the second
element was absent. Petitioner failed to rebut this presumption and she failed to pay the amount
of the checks or make arrangement for its payment within 5 banking days from receipt of notice
of dishonor. B.P. No. 22 was clearly violated. Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta
est. The law may be exceedingly hard but so the law is written. However, the penalty imposed on
petitioner must be modified. In Vaca v. Court of Appeals [298 SCRA 658 (1998)], it was held
that in determining the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. No. 22, the philosophy
underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable
human material, and to prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. The prison sentence imposed on
petitioners is deleted, and imposed on them only a fine double the amount of the check issued.
Consequently, the prison sentences imposed on petitioner are deleted. The two fines imposed for
each violation, each amounting to P200,000.00 are appropriate and sufficient. The award of
moral damages and order to pay attorney’s fees are deleted for lack of sufficient basis.