Lee v.

Tambago
544 SCRA 393
FACTS:
Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B. Tambago, with
violation of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a
will that is alleged to be spurious in nature in containing forged signatures of his
father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses. In the said will,
the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee,
save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-
siblings of complainant.
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June
30, 1965.Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence certificateof the
testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5,
1962.Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his
signature as donor in a deed of donationwhich supposedly contained his
purported signature. Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased
father in the will and in the deed of donation were “in any way entirely and
diametrically opposed from one another in all angle[s].”
Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates
of the purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures
had likewise been forged and merely copied from their respective voters’
affidavits.
Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in
the archives division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA).
ISSUE:
Was the will spurious?
HELD:
Yes, thus Tambago violated the Notarial Law and the ethics of legal profession.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of
wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the
door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
guarantee their truth and authenticity.
A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of
the testator and of one another. The will in question was attested by only two
witnesses. On this circumstance alone, the will must be considered void. This is
in consonance with the rule that acts executed against the provisions of
mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself
authorizes their validity. The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. An
acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some
competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an
extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary
public that the same is his or her own free act and deed. The acknowledgment in
a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testator’s wishes long
after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner
that he intends it to be done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that
this particular requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with.
For one, there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence
certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment.
Similarly, the notation of the testator’s old residence certificate in the same
acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent
invalidated the will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to
faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of notarization. These
formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded.

People of the Philippines vs Madera

August 8, 2012
Share this... 57 SCRA
349 –
0 0 0 0 Legal
Ethics
–  Prosecutor Must Recommend Dismissal of Case If There is No Ground To Sustain It

In April 1970, while Elino Bana was sleeping in his house, he was shot by Raymundo Madera. Behind
Madera were Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres. Elino Bana died before he could be brought to the
hospital but he made a dying statement wherein he positively identified Madera as his shooter. Two of
Bana’s sons who were at the house when the shooting happened identified Madera as the shooter as
well as the two behind him. The trial court convicted the three for murder. They appealed. Then Solicitor
General Estelito Mendoza recommended the conviction of Madera but also recommended the acquittal
of Marianito and Generoso.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction is correct.

HELD: No, insofar as Marianito and Generoso is concerned – Madera’s guilt is proven beyond reasonable
doubt. But Marianito’s and Generoso’s guilt were not established. Their mere presence behind Madera
when the latter shot and killed Bana is not constitutive of their guilt without any showing that they
shared the criminal intent of Madera. It must be shown that they had knowledge of the criminal
intention of the principal, which may be demonstrated by previous or simultaneous acts which
contributes to the commission of the offense as aid thereto whether physical or moral. This was absent
in the case at bar.

The Supreme Court lauded the Solicitor General for recommending the acquittal of the two. The
Supreme Court also emphasized that the prosecutor’s finest hour is not when he wins a case with the
conviction of the accused. His finest hour is still when, overcoming the advocate’s natural obsession for
victory, he stands up before the Court and pleads not for the conviction of the accused but for his
acquittal. For indeed, his noble task is to prosecute only the guilty and to protect the innocent.

PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial
difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital
Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current
account with Central Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to recover
from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued a resolution declaring
GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of
GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.
Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the CFI praying for the
assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated
by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover
the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies.
Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint
for reversion, reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al.
PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by
them by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former
Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented as
their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG filed motions to
disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with
Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to
Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK which was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became
Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers
from accepting “engagement” or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in the said service. The Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to
prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former
function as SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan
group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.”
HELD
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03.
Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he
acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents et.al. before the
Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of whether there exists a
“congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from
representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the meaning of “matter”
and the metes and bounds of “intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond
doubt that the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in
the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said
bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of Manila.
The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to
liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that
“drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not
fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent
Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate
GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank.
The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration
cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and
liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged
intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the
matter involved in the Civil case of sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the
“intervention”. The applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of
Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence
the subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist
where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as
innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law.” The court
rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He
merely petitions that the court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK.
The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the
Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the
role of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of
government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A
lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ,
should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter
which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a
vehicle to promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on
certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this
restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public office.” A plain
reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the
government and 2. relates to his accepting “engagement or employment” in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the service.

TAN VS GALLARDO (1976)

FACTS: Petitioners in this case seek the annulment of respondent Judge’s orders in criminal cases denying
petitioners’ motion for respondent judge to disqualify or inhibit himself from hearing and acting upon their Motion
for New Trial. The SC issued a Resolution asking the respondent Judge to file his answer. Said Resolution also
issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the respondent from further proceeding with the criminal cases.

The Solicitor General informed the SC that they are "persuaded that there are bases for stating that the
rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolution on the motion for new trial were not free from
suspicion of bias and prejudice. The OSG further submits that the case should he remanded to the trial court for
the rendition of a new decision and with instruction to receive additional evidence proferred by the accused with
the right of the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence as may be warranted.

Private prosecutors submitted their Comment in justification of the challenged Orders of the respondent Judge
and objected to the remand of this case.

*contentions:
Petitioner claimed that the private prosecutor has absolutely no standing in the instant proceedings.
The private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear before this Court, to take part in the
proceedings, and to adopt a position in contravention to that of the Solicitor General.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private prosecutors have the right to intervene independently of the Solicitor General
and to adopt a stand inconsistent with that of the latter in the present proceedings.

HELD: NO. To begin with, it will be noted that the participation of the private prosecution in the instant case
was delimited by this Court in its Resolution of October 1, 1975, thus: "to collaborate with the Solicitor
General in the preparation of the Answer and pleadings that may be required by this Court." To
collaborate means to cooperate with and to assist the Solicitor General. It was never intended that the
private prosecutors could adopt a stand independent of or in contravention of the position taken by the
Solicitor General.

The role of the private prosecutors is to represent the offended party, with respect to the civil action for the
recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense. 'This civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party either expressly waives the civil action or reserves to institute it separately.
Therefore, although the private prosecutors may be permitted to intervene, they are not in control of the case,
and their interests are subordinate to those of the People of the Philippines represented by the fiscal.

It is evident, therefore, that since the Solicitor General alone is authorized to represent the State or the
People of the Philippines the interest of the private prosecutors is subordinate to that of the State and
they cannot be allowed to take a stand inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General, for that would be
tantamount to giving the latter the direction and control of the criminal proceedings, contrary to the
provisions of law and the settled rules on the matter.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court, Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 8502

CHRISTOPHER R. SANTOS … Complainant

versus

ATTY. JOSEPH A. ARROJADO … Respondent

PRESENT: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO*; DEL CASTILLO, ACTING CHAIRPERSON**;

JARDELEZA; TIJAM AND GESMUNDO***, JJ

Promulgated: JUN 27, 2018

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J:

Where a lawyer’s integrity is questioned through a disbarment complaint, this Court, as the
ultimate arbiter of such disbarment proceedings, is duty-bound to ascertain the veracity of the
charges involved therein. But, when the charges lack merit, the Court will not hesitate to
dismiss the case.

In an Affidavit1 dated December 7, 2009, complainant Christopher R. Santos (Complainant

Santos) sought the disbarment of respondent Atty. Joseph A. Arrojado (Atty. Arrojado) for
violation of Article 1491 of the Civil Code, by acquiring an interest in the land involved in a
litigation in which he had taken part by reason of the exercise of his profession.

Complainant Santos alleged that he was the defendant in the unlawful detainer case filed by
Lilia Rodriguez (Lilia) wherein the respondent lawyer, Atty. Arrojado, was the counsel for Lilia.
The case eventually reached the Supreme Court which resolved 2 the same in favor of Atty.
Arrojado’s client.

Complainant, however, claimed that on August 7, 2009, while the case was pending before
the Supreme Court, Lilia sold one of the properties in litis pendentia to Atty. Arrojado’s son,
Julius P. Arrojado (Julius) and that Atty. Arrojado even signed as a witness of that sale.
Believing that Atty. Arrojado committed malpractice when he acquired, through his son Julius,
an interest in the property subject of the unlawful detainer case in violation of Article 1491 of
the Civil Code, complainant instituted the instant complaint.

In his Verified Comment,3 Atty. Arrojado admitted: (1) that Lilia was a client of the law firm
wherein he was a senior partner; (2) that Julius was his son; and (3) that one of the subject
properties in the ejectment suit was purchased by his son from Lilia. Atty. Arrojado maintained
that he did not violate Article 1491 as he had absolutely no interest in the property purchased
by his son; and that the proscription in the said article did not extend to the relatives of the
judicial officers mentioned therein. He postulated that, when the sale took place, Julius was
already of legal age and discretion, as well as a registered nurse and an established
businessman; and that while it was through him (respondent lawyer) that Lilia and Julius met,
he did not at all facilitate the transaction. Respondent lawyer also pointed out that
complainant failed to cite a specific provision or canon in the Code of Professional
Responsibility which he had allegedly transgressed or violated.

Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

In his Report and Recommendation,4 Investigating Commissioner Winston A. Abuyuan of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (TBP-CBD), recommended
the exoneration of Atty. Arrojado.

In recommending the dismissal of the administrative case against respondent lawyer, the
Investigating Commissioner opined that:

Undeniably, [Julius] is the son of [Atty. Arrojado], counsel of the owners of the parcel of land
which was leased by [Santos]. The subject property was acquired by [Julius] while the
unlawful detainer case was still pending before the Supreme Court.

In an unlawful detainer case, the issue to be resolved is possession and not ownership of the
property in question. This is very clear. There is no showing that [Santos] is even claiming
ownership of the property in question. In fact, it appears that the issues that remain to be
resolved are [Santos’] obligation to pay the rentals due (as lessee) to the owner of the
property.

Did [Atty. Arrojado] take advantage of his fiduciary relationship with his clients when his son
bought the property in question? We rule in the negative.

There is no evidence to show that [Atty. Arrojado] had used his son as a conduit to gain the
property in question considering that [Julius] is a personality separate and distinct from his
father, herein respondent. He is quite capable of acquiring property on his own. x x x.
Moreover, a scrutiny of complainant’s arguments would reveal that he himself is even unsure
if respondent had indeed taken advantage of his fiduciary relationship with his client, as he
safely uses the words ‘it looks like’ or ‘we believe’. There is no established jurisprudence to
the effect that the prohibition applies to immediate family members. In fact, Article 1491(5) is
quite clear and explicit, stating in unequivocal terms that the prohibition solely applies to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights to the object in litigation. There is not even the
slightest inkling that the prohibition was qualified to extend to any family member.

xxx

There is even no proof presented to show that [Atty. Arrojado] had used his fiduciary
relationship with his client in order to obtain the property in question. What merely changed
was the ownership of the property, and the lease of [Santos] was not in any [manner] affected.
In fact, records would reveal that [Julius] was even thinking of allowing [Santos] to continue
leasing the property in question but the same was rejected by the latter. As can be seen, no
rights of [Santos] were prejudiced by this sale.

xxx

Considering that there is no proof presented by [Santos] to substantiate any of his allegations,
we have no other option but to dismiss the charges. 5

The Board of Governors (BOG) of the IBP, in Resolution No. XX-2012-359 dated July 21,
2012, adopted the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and his recommendation to
dismiss the complaint for lack of merit.6

Similarly, in Resolution7 No. XX-2013-306 dated March 21, 2013, the IBP-BOG denied
complainant’s motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the case in now before us for final action pursuant to Section 12(c), Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court.

Issue

Whether or not the prohibition in Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code against justices, judges,
prosecuting attorneys, clerks of court, and other officers and employees connected with the
administration of justice, as well as lawyers, from purchasing property and rights which may
be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession, extends
to their respective immediate families or relatives.

Our Ruling

It is complainant’s contention that respondent lawyer, as counsel of record in the ejectment

case in question, cannot acquire the property subject of litigation, either personally or through
his son, without violating the Civil Code and his ethical duties.

The Court does not agree.

For reference, Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code is reproduced below:

Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial
auction, either in person or through the mediation of another.

xxx

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other
officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in
litigation or levied upon on execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they
exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment
and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of
any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.

In Pena v. Delos Santos,8 we held that:

The rationale advanced for the prohibition in Article 1491(5) is that public policy disallows the
transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and
confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these persons. It is founded on public policy
because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and
ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client. x x x

Undeniably, Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code prohibits the purchase by lawyers of any interest
in the subject matter of the litigation in which they participated by reason of their profession.
Here, however, respondent lawyer was not the purchaser or buyer of the property or rights in
litigation. For, in point of fact, it was his son Julius, and not respondent lawyer, who purchased
the subject property.

Were we to include within the purview of the law the members of the immediate family or
relatives of the lawyer laboring under disqualification, we would in effect be amending the law.
We apply to this case the old and familiar Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
which means that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all
others. Stated otherwise, “where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not,
by interpretation or construction, be stretched or extended to other matters.” 9

As worded, Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code covers only (1) justices; (2) judges; (3)
prosecuting attorneys; (4) clerks of court; (5) other officers and employees connected with the
administration of justice; and (6) lawyers. The enumeration cannot be stretched or extended
to include relatives of the lawyer-in this case, Julius, son of respondent lawyer.

Concededly, Article 1491 provides that “[t]he following persons cannot acquire by purchase,
even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another x x x.”
However, perusal of the records would show that complainant failed to adduce any shred of
evidence that Julius acted or mediated on behalf of respondent lawyer, or that respondent
lawyer was the ultimate beneficiary of the sale transaction. The mere fact that it was Julius,
son of respondent lawyer, who purchased the property, will not support the allegation that
respondent lawyer violated Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code. As aptly noted by the
Investigating Commissioner, “[t]here is no evidence to show that respondent had used his son
as a conduit to gain the property in question x x x.” 10

In addition, it must be stressed that the “prohibition which rests on considerations of public
policy and interests is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client on
account of his fiduciary and confidential relationship with him.” 11 Again, we adopt the findings
of the Investigating Commissioner that “a scrutiny of complainant’s arguments would reveal
that he himself [was] even unsure if respondent had indeed taken advantage of his fiduciary
relationship with his client, as he safely uses the words “it looks like” or “we
believe”.12 Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner aptly observed that there was no
“slightest proof showing that [Julius] was used by respondent to acquire the property of his
clients. Affidavits executed by the owners, as well as [Julius] himself showed that respondent
did not even actively participate in the negotiations concerning the property.” 13 At most,
although respondent lawyer’s role or participation in the sale in question, if any, might ruffle
very sensitive scruples, it is not, however, per se prohibited or forbidden by said Article 1491.

WHEREFORE, the present administrative case is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 12121 (Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4322), June 27, 2018

CELESTINO MALECDAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. SIMPSON T. BALDO, Respondent.

DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 filed with the Office of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Baguio-Benguet Chapter (IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter) by Complainant Celestino
Malecdan (Malecdan) against Respondent Atty. Simpson T. Baldo (Atty. Baldo), for the latter's alleged
violation of Section 9 of Presidential Decree 1508 (P.D. 1508), otherwise known as the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, which prohibits. the participation of lawyers in the proceedings before the Lupon:
SEC. 9. Appearance of parties in person. - In all proceedings provided for herein, the parties must
appear in person without the assistance of counsel/representative, with the exception of minors and
incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers. (Emphasis supplied)
The Factual Antecedents

Malecdan filed a letter of complaint for Estafa, Breach of Contract and Damages against spouses James
and Josephine Baldo, before the Lupon of Barangay Pico in La Trinidad, Benguet.

On August 14, 2014, Atty. Baldo appeared as counsel of spouses Baldo during the hearing on the
subject complaint before the Punong Barangay.2

On August 18, 2014, Malecdan filed a Complaint-Affidavit (Complaint) before the IBP Baguio-
Benguet Chapter praying that proper sanctions be imposed on Atty. Baldo for violating Section 9 of
P.D. 1508.

On August 20, 2014, the Committee on Ethics of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter furnished Atty.
Baldo with a copy of the complaint and set the case for a conciliation conference on September 12,
2014.3

On September 15, 2014, the Complaint was endorsed to the Committee on Bar Discipline-IBP (CBD-
IBP) by the Committee on Ethics of IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter after the parties failed to agree on a
settlement.4

The CBD-IBP thereafter issued an Order5 dated September 17, 2014, requiring Atty. Baldo to submit a
duly verified Answer, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order.6

On January 14, 2015, the CBD-IBP issued a Notice7 setting the mandatory conference/hearing of the
subject complaint on February 18, 2015.8

On February 12, 2015, Malecdan filed his Mandatory Conference Brief.9

On February 23, 2015, the mandatory conference of the case was rescheduled to March 24, 2015 after
Atty. Baldo failed to attend the same.10
In his Answer11 dated February 23, 2015, Atty. Baldo admitted that he was present during the
proceedings before the Punong Barangay. He explained that he was permitted by the parties to
participate in the said hearing, to wit:
1. The allegation in the complaint is admitted. However, the rest of the truth to the matter is that, before
entering the barangay session hall, respondent asked permission from the officer-in-charge if he will be
allowed that before any hearing be conducted, he and the respondent in the said barangay case, his
uncle, James Baldo, be allowed to talk to complainant Celestino Malecdan as they may be able to
amicably settle the matter on their own, of which the officer in charge granted on the reason that the
proceeding was still in the dialogue stage;

2. Likewise, when he entered inside the barangay session hall where complainant and his companion,
Laila Alumno was waiting, respondent again asked permission from complainant and his companion,
Laila Alumno if the latter will allow the former to join them in the dialogue with James Baldo as the
parties may amicably settle the case on their own;

3. Since complainant already knew respondent as they had a previous meeting at the office of
complainant's lawyer, Atty. Melissa QuitanCorpuz concerning the same case against James Baldo,
complainant readily permitted and allowed that parties have a dialogue on their own with respondent
joining them and without the presence of any barangay officials.12 (Emphasis supplied)
In an Order13 dated March 24, 2015, Investigating Commissioner Eduardo R. Robles gave Malecdan a
period of fifteen (15) days to file a supplemental complaint where he can incorporate other facts and
circumstances which he failed to indicate in his complaint. Atty. Baldo was likewise given a period of
fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the supplemental complaint within which to file his supplemental
answer should he wish to do so.14

On March 31, 2015, Malecdan filed his Verified Supplemental Complaint Affidavit,15 wherein he
insisted that he vehemently objected to the presence of Atty. Baldo during the proceedings before the
Punong Barangay, to wit:
2. Using his influence as a lawyer, Atty. Baldo prevailed upon the Punong Barangay and the Barangay
Secretary to let him participate in the barangay proceedings intended for the settlement of our
grievance against Spouses Josephine Baldo and James Baldo on August 14, 2014.

3. He did this over my vehement objections. I told him that he was not supposed to be there but then he
insisted. It even got to the point that we were already arguing out loud. I resented the fact that he was
there assisting and representing his clients, the Spouses Baldo while I was not represented by counsel.
We were in a situation that Section 9 of Presidential Decree 1508 sought to prevent.16 (Emphasis
supplied)
After due proceedings, Investigating Commissioner Robles rendered a Report and Recommendation17
on June 2, 2015, recommending that Atty. Baldo be given a warning. Commissioner Robles found that
the language of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is not that definite as to unqualifiedly bar lawyers
from appearing before the Lupon, nor is the language that clear on the sanction imposable for such an
appearance.18 Commissioner Robles reasoned that the matter of appearance or non-appearance before
the Lupon is clearly addressed to a lawyer's taste of propriety:
x x x. The respondent ought to have known that his attendance thereat would have caused some ruckus.
That respondent chose to attend is some measure of his lack of propriety.

Although this Commission cannot legislate good taste or an acute sense of propriety, the Commission
can definitely remind the respondent that another act of insensitivity to the rules of good conduct will
court administrative sanctions.19
The dispositive portion of Commissioner Robles' Report and Recommendation reads as follows:
UPON THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent Atty. Simpson T. Baldo
be given a warning.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.20
On June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution21 reversing and setting aside the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and instead recommended that Atty.
Baldo be reprimanded, thus:
RESOLVED to REVERSE as it is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A", considering Respondent's appearance as counsel for Spouses James and
Josephine Baldo in a Katarungan[g] Pambarangay hearing, Thus, Respondent is hereby
REPRIMANDED.22 (Emphasis in the original and italics omitted)
The Court's Ruling

After a judicious examination of the records and submission of the parties, the Court upholds the
findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that the language of P.D. 1508 is mandatory in
barring lawyers from appearing before the Lupon.

As stated in the case of Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,23 Section 9 of P.D. 1508 mandates personal
confrontation of the parties because:
"x x x a personal confrontation between the parties without the intervention of a counsel or
representative would generate spontaneity and a favorable disposition to amicable settlement on the
part of the disputants. In other words, the said procedure is deemed conducive to the successful
resolution of the dispute at the barangay level."

xxxx

"To ensure compliance with the requirement of personal confrontation between the parties, and thereby,
the effectiveness of the barangay conciliation proceedings as a mode of dispute resolution, the above-
quoted provision is couched in mandatory language. Moreover, pursuant to the familiar maxim in
statutory construction dictating that 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius', the express exceptions made
regarding minors and incompetents must be construed as exclusive of all others not mentioned."24
(Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Baldo's violation of P.D. 1508 thus falls squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which provides:
CANON 1 -
A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 -
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes. A lawyer, to the
best of his ability, is expected to respect and abide by the law: and thus, avoid any act or omission that
is contrary to the same.25 A lawyer's personal deference to the law not only speaks of his character but
it also inspires the public to likewise respect and obey the law.26 Rule 1.01, on the other hand, states
the norm of conduct to be observed by all lawyers. Any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited
or unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is unlawful.27 Unlawful
conduct does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to
include such element.28

Here, Atty. Baldo admitted that he appeared and participated in the proceedings before the Punong
Barangay in violation of Section 9 of P.D. 1508. Atty. Baldo therefore violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR in
connection with Section 9 of P.D. 1508 when he appeared as counsel for spouses James and Josephine
Baldo in a hearing before the Punong Barangay, Barangay Pico, Municipality of La Trinidad in
Benguet.
All told, the Court finds that the evidence adduced is sufficient to support the allegations against Atty.
Baldo.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Simpson T. Baldo LIABLE for violation of Canon 1 and Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stem
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Senior Associate Justice, (Chairperson), Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[ A.C. NO. 11385, March 14, 2017 ]

ORTIGAS PLAZA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY
JANICE MONTERO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. EUGENIO S. TUMULAK,
RESPONDENT.D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
Under the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is sworn to respect the
law and legal processes, and any violation thereof merits condign disciplinary action against the lawyer.

The present complaint asks for the disbarment of Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak for his participation in the
forcible intrusion into the complainant's property.
Antecedents

Complainant Ortigas Plaza Development Corporation owned the parcel of land located in Ortigas
Avenue Extension, Pasig City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. PT-126797 of the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal (property).

The complainant alleges that at around 11:00 a.m. of November 29,  2012, Atty. Tumulak, accompanied
by uniformed guards of the Nationwide Security Agency, Inc., unlawfully entered and took control of
the entrance and exit of the property. It appears that prior to the incident, Atty. Tumulak had furnished
several documents to the complainant, including the deed of assignment executed by one Henry F.
Rodriguez as the administrator of the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes R. Rodriguez designating
Atty. Tumulak as an assignee.[1] The documents furnished by Atty. Tumulak were all related to the
intestate proceedings of the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez docketed as S.P. No. IR-1110
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch  34, in Iriga City (RTC), which involved the claim of the heirs of
the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez to several parcels of land situated all over the country, including
the Provinces of Rizal, Quezon, and Bulacan, and Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, Antipolo
City, Muntinlupa City, Parañaque City, Marikina City, Baguio City, Angeles City, San Fernando City
and Tagaytay City.[2]

The complainant charges Atty. Tumulak with deceit, dishonesty and fraud for claiming to have
coordinated with the proper government agencies prior to the illegal and forcible intrusion.[3] The
complainant manifests that as a lawyer, Atty. Tumulak ought to know that the claim of his principal in
the property was barred by res judicata due to the valid issuance of a Torrens title under its name.
Accordingly, his conduct constituted conduct unbecoming of a lawyer deserving of sanction.[4]

In his answer to the complaint,[5] Atty. Tumulak denies having been present when the security guards
of Nationwide Security Agency entered the complainant's property. He insists that the allegations
against him were pure hearsay because Ms. Montero, the representative of the complainant, had no
personal knowledge of the incident; that the documents he had furnished to the complainant included
records of the intestate proceedings in the RTC involving the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez and Antonio Rodriguez; that he had no hand in procuring the documents; that he did not
himself enter the property; and that the entry into the property was effected by the sheriff pursuant to a
writ of execution.
Report and Recommendation of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

After due hearing, IBP Commissioner of Bar Discipline Ricardo M. Espina submitted his Report and
Recommendation,[6] wherein he found Atty. Tumulak to have violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Commissioner Espina recommended the suspension of Atty.
Tumulak from the practice of law for two years.

On October 28, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXII-2015-57 adopting the
findings and recommendation of Commissioner Espina[7] viz.:
RESOLUTION NO. XXII-2015-57
CIBD Case No. 13-3707
Ortigas Plaza Dev't Corp. vs.
Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak

RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of facts and recommended penalty of 2 years

su5pension of Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak by the Investigating Commissioner.

Issue
Did Atty. Tumulak violate Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility  when he facilitated the implementation of the writ of execution and the entry into the
complainant's property?
Ruling of the Court

Atty. Tumulak deserves to be severely sanctioned for violating the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Pertinent portions of Commissioner Espina's Report and Recommendation, which adequately

illustrated Atty. Tumulak' s transgressions, are worth quoting verbatim, viz.:
We enumerate respondent lawyer's violation of the following rules/principles when he led
the forcible intrusion into OPDC office in Pasig City:

Atty. Tumulak knew, or ought to know, that property claims based on Spanish title can no
a) longer be cited as legitimate basis for ownership as of 16 February 1976 by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 892;
   
Respondent lawyer, as a long-time practitioner (admitted to the Bar in 1971), is presumed to
know that the Supreme Court has promulgated a case specifically addressing the fake
titles arising from spurious "Deed of Assignment" of the supposed Estate of Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez. This is the 2005 case of Evangelista, et al. vs. Santiago  [G.R. No.
b)
157447; April 29, 2005] where the same modus as the one adopted by respondent lawyer, was
used by an "assignee" in claiming properties located in Paranque, Las Pinas, Muntinlupa,
Cavitc, Batangas, Pasay, Taguig, Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Quezon City, Caloocan,
Bulacan, and Rizal, allegedly as part of the Estate of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez;
   
c) x x x x;
   
While respondent lawyer claims that the "deed of assignment" in his favor has a consideration,
unfortunately we did not see any agreed consideration in the document. If there is no monetary
d)
consideration, it will be treated as a donation with the corresponding payable taxes. Respondent
lawyer's documents don't show that taxes have been paid for the document to be legally binding;
   
Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally but can only be questioned in a principal action x x x.
If respondent lawyer thinks that OPDC's title on the Pasig property is questionable, he could have
e)
tiled an action to annul OPDC's title and not bring in the cavalry, so to speak, in the form of
uniformed security guards, to take over the property; and
   
f) We find respondent's actions highly questionable and contrary to legal protocol; (i) the court
documents were issued by the RTC-Iriga City, Br. 94; (ii) it "affects" a property located in Pasig
City; (iii) respondent lawyer became the "assignee" of a Pasig City property; (iv) no taxes were
paid for the "assignment"; (v) assistance of the Sheriff of Pasig was not enlisted by respondent,
instead, he enlists the help of the Sheriff of Manila; (vi) all that the Sheriff of Manila did was to
 deliver the RTC-Iriga, Br. 34 court documents to complainant but with a twist; the Sheriff and
respondent lawyer were escorted by a phalanx of security guards; (vii) the uniformed guards,
obviously upon instruction, took over and/or controlled the gates of OPDC offices with attendant
force and intimidation. Respondent lawyer's claimed innocence cannot prevail over these
illegalities of which he, or his agents, had a hand.

With the above highly questionable acts totally irreconcilable with a seasoned practitioner
like respondent lawyer, we find Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak liable for violation of Canon 1,
Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 and 1.02 thereof. (Bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)

Commissioner Espina correctly observed that the Court in the 2005 ruling in Evangelista v.
Santiago[8] had already enjoined the successors and heirs of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez from
presenting the Spanish title as proof of their ownership in land registration proceedings, as follow:
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed title to the Subject Property by virtue of their actual
and continuous possession of the same since time immemorial, by themselves and through
their predecessors-in-interest. Yet, the Deeds of Assignment executed by lsmael Favila in
their favor, attached to and an integral part of their Complaint, revealed that petitioners
predecessors-in-interest based their right to the Subject Property on the Spanish title
awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.

There existed a contradiction when petitioners based their claim of title to the Subject
Property on their possession thereof since time immemorial, and at the same time, on the
Spanish title granted to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Possession since time immemorial
carried the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it
had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. If the Subject Property was
already private property before the Spanish conquest, then it would have been beyond the
power of the Queen of Spain to award or grant to anyone.

The title to and possession of the Subject Property by petitioners predecessors-in-interest

could be traced only as far back as the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
Petitioners, having acquired portions of the Subject Property by assignment, could acquire
no better title to the said portions than their predecessors-in-interest, and hence, their title
can only be based on the same Spanish title.

Respondent maintained that P.D. No. 892 prevents petitioners from invoking the Spanish
title as basis of their ownership of the Subject Property. P.D. No. 892 strengthens the
Torrens system by discontinuing the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage
Law, and by categorically declaring all lands recorded under the latter system, not yet
covered by Torrens title, unregistered lands. It further provides that within six months from
its effectivity, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their
land under what is now P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree.
Thereafter, Spanish titles can no longer be used as evidence of land ownership in any
registration proceedings under the Torrens system. Indubitably, P.D. No. 892 divests the
Spanish titles of any legal force and effect in establishing ownership over real property.

P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The successors of Don Hermogenes
 Rodriguez had only until 14 August 1976 to apply for a Torrens title in their name covering
the Subject Property. In the absence of an allegation in petitioners' Complaint that
petitioners predecessors-in-interest complied with P.D. No. 892, then it could be assumed
that they failed to do so. Since they failed to comply with P.D. No. 892, then the successors
of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez were already enjoined from presenting the Spanish title as
proof of their ownership of the Subject Property in registration proceedings.

Registration proceedings under the Torrens system do not create or vest title, but only
confirm and record title already created and vested. By virtue of P.D. No. 892, the courts, in
registration proceedings under the Torrens system, are precluded from accepting,
confirming and recording a Spanish title. Reason therefore dictates that courts, likewise, are
prevented from accepting and indirectly confirming such Spanish title in some other form
of action brought before them (i.e.,  removal of cloud on or quieting of title), only short of
ordering its recording or registration. To rule otherwise would open the doors to the
circumvention of P.D. No. 892, and give rise to the existence of land titles, recognized and
affirmed by the courts, but would never be recorded under the Torrens system of
registration. This would definitely undermine the Torrens system and cause confusion and
instability in property ownership that P.D. No. 892 intended to eliminate.[9]

Moreover, in Santiago v. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority,[10] the Court denied the petition of the
successors of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by applying the principle of stare decisis, ruling
therein that the applicable laws, the issues, and the testimonial and documentary evidence were
identical to those in the situation in Evangelista v. Santiago, thusly:
The present petition is substantially infirm as this Court had already expressed in the case
of Nemencio C. Evangelista, et al. v. Carmelino M. Santiago, that the Spanish title of Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez, the Titulo de Propriedad de Torrenos of 1891, has been divested
of any evidentiary value to establish ownership over real property.

Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago anchor their
right to recover possession of the subject real property on claim of ownership by Victoria
M. Rodriguez being the sole heir of the named grantee, Hermogenes Rodriguez, in the
Spanish title Titulo de Propriedad de Torrenos.

x x x x

Prescinding from the foregoing, the instant petition must be denied by virtue of the
principle of stare decisis.  Not only are the legal rights and relations of herein parties
substantially the same as those passed upon in the aforementioned 2005 Evangelista Case,
but the facts, the applicable laws, the issues, and the testimonial and documentary evidence
are identical such that a ruling in one case, under the principle of stare decisis, is a bar to
any attempt to relitigate the same issue.[11]

Finally, the 2011 ruling in Pascual v. Robles [12] affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
setting aside the amended decision rendered in S.P. No. IR-1110 by the RTC. This ruling should have
alerted Atty. Tumulak from taking the actions giving rise to the complaint against him inasmuch as he
has admitted to have derived his rights from the deed of assignment executed in his favor by Henry
Rodriguez as the administrator of the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez pursuant to said
amended decision. Moreover, Atty. Tumulak is presumed as a lawyer to know the developments in S.P.
No. IR-1110 not only by virtue of his becoming an assignee of the estate but also because of his being a
lawyer with the constant responsibility of keeping abreast of legal developments.[13]

Atty. Tumulak cannot shield himself from personal responsibility behind the deed of assignment. The
deed was doubtful on its face, as borne out by the text, to wit:
DEED OF ASSIGNMENT

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS

This Deed of Assignment is made and executed by and between

The INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE HERMOGENES R. RODRIGUEZ AND

ANTONIO R. RODRIGUEZ, represented by HENRY F. RODRIGUEZ, of legal age,
widower, Filipino, x xx Judicial Heir and Court-Appointed Administrator by virtue
of AMENDED DECISIONdated August 13, 19999 of Fifth Judicial Region, RTC Branch
34, lriga City in SPECS. PROCS. No. IR-1110 which settled the issue of Heirship,
Administratorship and Settled [sic] of the Estate of Hem1ogenes and Antonio Rodriguez y
Reyes Estate, hereinafter referred to as the ASSIGNOR;

-and-

EUGENIO S. TUMULAK, of legal age, widower x x x hereinafter referred to as the

ASSIGNEE:

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, the ASSIGNOR is the Court-Appointed Administrator and one of the

Judicial heirs of the Intestate Estate of the late HERMOGENES and ANTONIO
RODRIGUEZ y REYES Estate by virtue of AMENDED DECISION dated Augsut 13,
1999 of Fifth Judicial Region, RTC Branch 34, Iriga City in SPECS. PROCS. No. IR-1110
which settled the issue of Heirship, Administratorship and Settlement of the Estate of
Hermogenes and Antonio Rodriguez y Reyes Estate, thereafter, petitions for certiorari tiled
with the SUPREME COURT assailing the aforesaid Amended Decision
were DENIED and declared FINAL & EXECUTORY in G.R. Nos. 140271, 140915,
168648, 142477 and 182645, affirming the same Amended Decision;

Whereas, the ASSIGNEE has secured the property and actual occupant/s over the
same property they arc presently occupying and initiating steps for recovery of the
same parcel and has shown exemplary loyalty and faithfulness to the ASSIGNOR and
 also consistently protected the rights and interest of the Estate against intruder,
impostor, usurpers and false claimant with spurious title/s over the same property;

NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing, the ASSIGNOR has
agreed to execute this DEED OF ASSIGNMENT and the ASSIGNEE, has accepted
and both parties have mutually agreed to the following terms and conditions herein
stipulated;

A parcel of land situated in Ortigas Avenue corner Raymundo Avenue, Barangay Rosario,
Pasig City, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon, with containing an area of THIRTY-FIVE
THOUSAND EIGTH [sic] HUNDRED AND NINE[TY] ONE SQUARE METERS
(35,891) more or less technical description described below, to

x x x x

1. That the ASSIGNEE shall shoulder all the expenses in the performance of the task as
indicated x x x above such as payment for the real taxes, titling, researching, liaising with
government agencies, paying lawyers involved in the litigation, and other incidental
expenses relevant in the consummation of the said transaction;

2. That the ASSIGNEE shall secure and facilities (sic] all documents from Land
Registration Authority, DENR-LMB, DENR-LMS, Register of Deeds and such other
government agencies concerned for the completion of titling process subject to the existing
laws, rules and regulation in accordance to Land Registration Act;

3. That the ASSIGNEE shall perform the task of relocation and verification[,] land
survey, possessing, fencing, guarding, surveying and or reviving plans, paying taxes,
titling, selling, leasing, developing, segregating and mortgaging;

4. That the ASSIGNEE shall be the AD-LITEM representative of the ASSIGNOR, before
of [sic] any Court[,] Administrative and Quasi-Judicial body and to bring suit, defend, in
connection with the actions brought for or against the ASSIGNOR of whatever nature and
kind; and

5. That the ASSIGNEE shall report regularly to the ASSIGNOR per the above tasks and
accomplishment.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their respective signatures on the
date 22 March 2010 and place QUEZON CITY above written.[14] (Bold underscoring
supplied for emphasis)

Atty. Tumulak cannot deny his personal participation in the unlawful and forcible intrusion into the
property just because the complainant did not establish his physical presence thereat at the time. In fact,
such physical participation was not even necessary in order to properly implicate him in personal
responsibility for the intrusion after he admitted having furnished to the complainant the deed of
assignment and other documents as the source of his authority. Specifically, his duties under the deed of
assignment included "shoulder[ing] all the expenses in the performance of [securing the property x x x
and initiating steps for recovery of the same parcel] x x x such as x x x or payment for the real taxes,
titling, researching, liaising with government agencies, paying lawyers involved in the litigation, and
other incidental expenses relevant in the consummation of the said transaction;"and "possessing,
fencing, [and] guarding" the property.

It is notable in this connection that Atty. Tumulak had been discharging his role as the assignee since
the time of the execution of the deed of assignment on March 22, 2010. Considering that he had been in
charge of doing all the actions necessary to enforce the interest of his principal since March 22, 2010,
and that the forcible intrusion complained about occurred on November 29, 2012, or more than two
years from the execution of the deed of assignment, he is reasonably and ineluctably presumed to have
coordinated all the actions leading to the intrusion.

Finally, even assuming that the amended decision was valid and enforceable, Atty. Tumulak could not
legitimately resort to forcible intrusion to advance the interest of the assignor. The more appropriate
action for him would be to cause the annulment of the complainant's title instead of forcibly entering
the property with the aid of armed security personnel.

All told, Atty. Tumulak was guilty of misconduct for circumventing existing laws and disregarding
settled rulings in order to commit injustice against the complainant. His conduct betrayed his Lawyer's
Oath "to support [the] Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein."  He breached Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL
PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 -A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

To the best of his ability, every lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law, and to avoid any act
or omission that is contrary thereto. The lawyer's personal deference to the law not only speaks of his
or her commendable character but also inspires in the public a becoming respect and obedience to the
law.[15]

The sworn obligation of every lawyer under the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility  to respect the law and the legal processes is a continuing condition for retaining
membership in the Legal Profession. The lawyer must act and comport himself or herself in such a
manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the Legal Profession.[16] Members of
the Bar are reminded, therefore, that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than
to seek exceptions as loopholes.[17] A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who
connives in violating the law commits an act that warrants disciplinary action against him or her.[18]

The suspension from the practice of law or disbarment of a lawyer is justified if he or she proves
unworthy of the trust and confidence imposed by the Lawyer's Oath, or is otherwise found to be
wanting in that honesty and integrity that must characterize the members of the Bar in the performance
of their professional duties.[19] Although the Court imposed a six-month suspension from the practice
of law on erring lawyers found violating Canon l, Rules 1.01 and 1.02,[20] we adopt the
recommendation of the IBP to suspend Atty. Tumulak from the practice of law for a period of two
years. Such penalty was appropriate and condign in relation to the misconduct he committed as well as
to the prejudice he caused the complainant.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. EUGENIO S.

TUMULAK guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath and Canon 1, and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility;  and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period
of TWO(2) YEARS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, with the STERN WARNING that any similar
infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.

This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to the
respondent's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in
the Philippines for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Mendoza,
Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires, and Tijam, JJ., concur.