Who Speaks for Western Muslims?

The
Problem of Representation of Muslim
Communities in the West and Its Political and
Security Repercussions

A Thesis
Presented to the Faculty
of

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The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
By
Lorenzo Vidino
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In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
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May 2010
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Dissertation Committee
Professor Richard Shultz, Chair
Professor Andrew Hess
Professor William Martel
 UMI Number: 3422101

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 ii

Lorenzo Vidino
Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Harvard University
79 JFK Street, Mailbox 134
Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA
Email 2: lorenzo_vidino@hks.harvard.edu
Cell: (001) 202-431-0090
Webpage: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/experts/2081/lorenzo_vidino.html

EDUCATION
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Medford, MA) March 2010
Ph.D., International Relations.

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Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Medford, MA) April 2007
Masters of Arts in Law and Diplomacy, International Security Studies
and Islamic Civilization. IE
Università degli Studi di Milano Law School (Milan, Italy) June 2002
Dottore in Giurisprudenza (Juris Doctor). Focus on international law.
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PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
Harvard University August 2009-
Belfer Center, Kennedy School of Government (Cambridge, MA)
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Fellow in International Security/Religion in International Affairs

United States Institute of Peace (Washington, DC) August 2009-

Peace Scholar

Tufts University (Medford, MA) Spring 2009

Lecturer in terrorism studies

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Medford, MA) August 2007- June 2009
Fellow in International Security Studies

Jebsen Center for Counterterrorism Studies May 2006-May 2007

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Medford, MA)
Research Programs Manager

The Investigative Project on Terrorism (Washington, DC) June 2002-August 2007

Terrorism Analyst/Deputy Director/Consultant
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TEACHING AND RESEARCH INTERESTS

• Terrorism and counter-terrorism, radicalization and counter-radicalization.

• Political Islam, particularly its developments in Europe and North America.
• Security studies (insurgency and counterinsurgency, armed non-state actors),
European and American foreign policy, transatlantic relations, international
organized crime, immigration, social movement theory.

ACTIVITIES

• Regularly briefs/consults for agencies and ministries in the United States (Office
of the Vice-President, FBI, CIA, Department of Defense, Department of Justice,
Department of Homeland Security….) and several European countries on issues
of terrorism and political Islam.
• Testified twice before the U.S. Congress.
• Regularly interviewed as a terrorism expert on several American and international

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media outlets, including The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Times of
London, El Pais…
• Regularly appears on American (NBC, PBS, CBS, CNN, FOX News, CNBC,
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MSNBC…), Middle Eastern (Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera International, Al Hayat
LBC…), and European TV programs. Regularly interviewed by international and
local radio stations, including NPR, Voice of America, BBC Radio…
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• Testified as an expert witness in court cases in the United States and France.
• Consults on a regular basis with private businesses, law firms, think tanks and
governmental entities on issues of terrorism and political Islam.
• Traveled to more than 20 countries in 4 continents (many of them several times)
for research. Spent at least 10 weeks every year traveling over the last six years.
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GRANTS

• United States Institute of Peace: Peace Scholar Dissertation Fellowship

(Jennings Randolph Fellowship), 2009/10.
• Smith Richardson Foundation: grant to conduct a one-year study of Muslim
community engagement efforts by Western governments, 2008/09 ($65,000).
• Ph.D. Fellowship, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2008.
• Earhart Fellowship, 2007.
• Jebsen Center, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, summer research grant,
2006.

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

• Italian and English (native/near native).

• German, Spanish, French (conversational).
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PUBLICATIONS
Books

• The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West, Columbia University Press, August
2010.
• Al Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of International Jihad, Prometheus,
2005 (403 pages). Published in Danish by Gyldendal (2006).

Congressional testimonies

• House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Europe and

Emerging Threats: Islamic Extremism in Europe. April 27, 2005.
• House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International
Terrorism and Nonproliferation: Algeria’s Struggle against Terrorism. March 3,
2005.

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Book chapters

• “From KSM’s Genius to Sheer Amateurism: The Post-9/11 Evolution of the

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Terrorist Threat in the United States,” in Bruce Hoffman and Fernando Reinares,
eds., Leader-Led Jihad, Rethinking the Global Terrorism Threat (Columbia
University Press, 2010), [forthcoming]
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• “The European networks of the Muslim Brotherhood,” in Edwin Bakker and Roel
Meijer, eds., The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe (Hurst/Columbia University
Press, 2010). [forthcoming]
• Two entries (“John Walker Lindh” and “Jose Padilla”) in Gus Martin, ed., The
Encyclopedia of Terrorism, 2nd Edition (Sage, 2011). [forthcoming]
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• “Islamist Terrorism: Assessing Threats to Democracy,” in Christopher K. Penny,

ed., The Administration of Justice and National Security in Democracies (Irwin
Law and the Federal Court of Canada, Ottawa, 2010)
• “Counter-radicalization and Europe's New Security Dilemma,” in Eric Patterson
and John Gallagher, eds., Debating the War of Ideas (Palgrave McMillan, 2010).
• “The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe,” in Barry Rubin, ed., Muslim
Brotherhoods: The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement
(Palgrave McMillan, 2010). [forthcoming]
• “The rising tide of Islamic radicalism,” in Marvin Perry and Howard E. Negrin,
eds., The theory and practice of Islamic terrorism: an anthology (Palgrave
McMillan, 2008).
• “Origins and characteristics of homegrown jihadist networks in Europe” in Franz
Eder and Martin Senn, eds., Europe and Transnational Terrorism: Assessing
Threats and Countermeasures (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008).
• “Den Nye Terrorisme” (“New Terrorism”) in Jakob Aahauge and Pelle Schierup,
eds., Terrorens anatomi (Rosenkilde, 2007, in Danish).
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Journal articles

• “London’s frantic quest for the Muslim holy grail: the post-9/11 evolution of the
relationship between Whitehall and the British Muslim community,” Religion
Compass, forthcoming.
• “Europe's New Security Dilemma,” Washington Quarterly 32, no. 4 (October
2009): 61-75.
• “Islamism and the West: Europe as a Battlefield,” Islamism, Totalitarian
Movements and Political Religions (Routledge/ Taylor & Francis), 10:1 (2009).
• “Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: A New and Occasional
Phenomenon?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 32, Issue 1, (January
2009).
• “Islam, political Islam and Jihadism in Italy,” Current Trends in Islamist
Ideology, August 2008.
• “The Hofstad Group: The New Face of Terrorist Networks in Europe,” Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 30, Issue 7, (July 2007).

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• “Aftermath of the Danish Cartoon Controversy,” Middle East Quarterly, Winter
2007 (with Pernille Ammitzbøll).
• “The Arrival of Islamic Fundamentalism in Sudan,” Al Nakhla, Fall 2006.
•
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“Aims and Methods of Europe’s Muslim Brotherhood,” Current Trends in
Islamist Ideology, November 2006.
• “Arab Foreign Fighters and the Sacralization of the Chechen Conflict,” Al Nakhla,
Spring 2006.
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• “Jihad from Europe,” Journal of International Security Affairs, Fall 2005.
• “How Chechnya Became a Breeding Ground for Terror,” Middle East Quarterly,
Summer 2005.
• “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Conquest of Europe,” Middle East Quarterly, Winter
2005.
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Other publications

• Panorama (leading Italian weekly), Cosi’ Finanziano la Striscia, Issue 6, January

30, 2009.
• Panorama (leading Italian weekly), Jihadisti Pentiti a Scuola di Non Violenza,
Issue 48, November 21, 2008.
• The Sentinel (West Point Combating Terrorism Center), A Preliminary
Assessment of Counter-Radicalization in the Netherlands, August 2008.
• “The Multi-layered Threat of Islamism to Europe,” Journal of Counterterrorism
and Homeland Security International, Summer Issue, Volume 14, 2008.
• In Focus Quarterly, The Tripartite Threat of Radical Islam to Europe, Winter
2007.
• Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Current Trends in Jihadi Networks in
Europe, October 2007.
• Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Italy's Left-Wing Terrorists Flirt with
Radical Islamists, September 2007 (with Andrea Morigi).
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• Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, The Danger of Homegrown Terrorism

to Scandinavia, October 2006.
• Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Is Italy Next in Line After London?
September 2005.
• Armed Forces Journal, The Enemy Within, January 2005.

Op-eds

• Foreign Policy, Toward a Radical Solution, January 5, 2010.

• Boston Globe, Keeping a Lid on Homegrown Terror, October 5, 2009.
• Opinio (Dutch cultural weekly), Islamitische Bondgenoten, May 18, 2007.
• Boston Globe, Finding Partners in Islam, May 9, 2007.
• Opinio (Dutch cultural weekly), De Vermomde Moslimbroeders, April 5, 2007.
• International Herald Tribune, How Would al Qaeda Fix Potholes? September 28,
2006.
• Boston Globe, Democracy in the Muslim World. September 24, 2006.

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• Washington Times, Europe’s Muslim Hoods. April 21, 2006.
• Washington Times, Dutch Get Tougher on Terrorism. March 15, 2006.
• Boston Herald, Tolerance Must Have Limits. February 20, 2006.
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• New York Sun, Credible Threat. August 5, 2004.
• In the National Interest, A Greek Tragedy? July 28, 2004.
• In the National Interest, Terror in Northeast Asia. January 20, 2004 (with Josh
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Lefkowitz).
• Wall Street Journal Europe, Al Qaeda’s New Recruits. August 23, 2003 (with Josh
Lefkowitz).
• Wall Street Journal Europe, Dutch Lessons. August 11, 2003 (with Erick
Stakelbeck).
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Published reports

• The Homegrown Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland, special report for the
Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, Spain, ARI 171/2009, December 18, 2009.
• Political Islam in Europe, report for the Centre for European Studies,
forthcoming.

PUBLIC PRESENTATIONS

• Italian Ministry of Defense (Istituto Alti Studi per la Difesa, IASD) and George C.
Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Rome: The Ideological
Dimension of Counterterrorism, April 15, 2010.
• Counter-Terror Expo 2010, London: Radicalisation - A New Security Dilemma for
Europe? April 14, 2010.
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• Harvard Institute for Learning in Retirement, Harvard University, Cambridge,

MA: De-radicalizing Homegrown Terrorists: Lessons from the Middle East and
Europe, April 2, 2010.
• Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, Harvard University,
Kennedy School of Government Cambridge, MA: Islamic Radicalization in the
U.S. Homeland: A Myth or Reality?, March 31, 2010.
• Islam in the West Workshop, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard
University, Cambridge, MA: The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, March 23,
2010.
• Politische Akademie der ÖVP/Centre for European Studies, Vienna (Austria):
Understanding Political Islam, March 22, 2010.
• Link Campus University, Department of Strategic Intelligence and Security, Rome
(Italy), three-hour course: Europe’s New Security Dilemma, December 19, 2009.
• Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael” and General
Intelligence and Security Service of the Dutch Ministry of Interior and Kingdom
Relations (AIVD), seminar on the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, The Hague,

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The European Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood: Myth or Reality?
December 4, 2009.
• George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Skopje (Macedonia):
Countering the Ideological Support for Terrorism, November 23, 2009.
•
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Fundación José Ortega y Gasset, Madrid (Spain), Terrorist Threats on Both Sides
of the Atlantic: Differences and Similarities, November 16, 2009.
• Legatum Institute, London: Terrorism in the United States, November 6, 2009.
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• British Association of Chief Police Officers, UK Office of Security and Counter
Terrorism, Home Office, Wilton Park (UK), Islamism and Shared Values,
November 4-6, 2009.
• U.S. Consulate, Barcelona (Spain), roundtable: Counter-Radicalization Efforts in
Europe and Europe’s New Security Dilemma, October 23, 2009.
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• Universidad de Granada (Spain), conference on European security: Counter-

radicalization efforts in Europe, October 22, 2009.
• Universidad Carlos III, Madrid (Spain): Europe's New Security Dilemma, October
20, 2009.
• Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid (Spain): lecture entitled Countering violent Islamist
radicalization: a preliminary assessment of the European experience, October 20,
2009.
• International Security Studies Section of ISA/International Security and Arms
Control Section of APSA Annual Conference, Monterey Institute of International
Studies and Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA: The Hofstadgroep as a
New Model of Terrorism in the West, October 16, 2009.
• Peace Scholars conference, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington D.C., Soft
Approaches to Counterterrorism: Counter-radicalization in Great Britain and the
Netherlands, October 5, 2006.
• Boston ROTC Consortium, Boston, MA: Current Trends in Terrorism, March 25,
2009.
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• U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, National Anti-Terrorism

Conference, Boston, MA: The Muslim Brotherhood: History, Methods, Aims and
Security Implications, March 20, 2009.
• King’s College, London, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and
Political Violence: The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe, December 9, 2008.
• Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2008 Fletcher Doctoral Conference:
Armed Groups: A Major 21st Century Security Challenge, October 17, 2008.
• U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and University of Texas, Austin,
TX: The Current Terrorist Enemies of the United States: Prospects for a New
U.S. Administration, September 17/18, 2008.
• Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Istanbul,
Turkey: Links Between Crime and Terrorism, June 28, 2008.
• Joint Special Operations University (SOCOM), Shirlington, VA: Terrorist
Networks and Beyond al-Qaeda¸ June 17, 2008.
• 16-hour course at the Tufts University’s Osher Lifelong Learning Institute:
Terrorism, Political Islam and U.S. Policies, March to May 2008.

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• Newton Public Schools Lifelong Learning, Newton, MA: The “War on Terror”:
Reasons and Goals, October 24, 2007.
• International Institute for Counter Terrorism, Herzliya, Israel: Homegrown
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Terrorism in Europe and the US, September 11, 2007.
• NEFA Foundation, Florence, Italy: The Muslim Brotherhood in the West, June 13,
2007.
• Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies (in association with the
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Canadian Supreme Court), Ottawa, Canada: International Terrorism: Assessing
Threats to Democracy and Law, June 11, 2007.
• Global Investigative Journalist Conference, Toronto, Canada: Investigating
Terrorist Organizations, May 25, 2007.
• Osher Lifelong Learning Institute, Medford, MA: The “War on Terror”: Reasons
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and Goals, April 23, 2007.

• Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, Washington DC: Jihad in
Europe, April 16, 2007.
• Jebsen Center for Counterterrorism Studies, Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Tufts University: Al Qaeda in the West, March 7, 2007.
• Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government, Belfer Center: Terrorism, a
European Perspective, March 2, 2007.
• CENTRA (organized by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agencies), Arlington VA:
The Muslim Brotherhood in the West, November 6, 2006.
• Italian Senate, Rome, The withdrawal of Italian troops from Iraq: and then? (in
Italian), June 28, 2006.
• CENTRA (organized by U.S. State Department), London: Muslim Radicalization
in Europe, July 26, 2006.
• INTERPOL, Lyon, Complex Asian Crime Symposium: The Links Between
Organized Crime and Terrorism, June 27, 2006.
• Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen: Jihad in Europe, June 9,
2006.
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• Johns Hopkins University, SAIS, Forum with Francis Fukuyama and Daniel
Benjamin: Islamic Fundamentalism in Europe: Transatlantic Perspectives, May
18, 2006.
• Osher Lifelong Learning Institute, Medford, MA: Al Qaeda, April 28, 2006.
• Simmons College, Boston, MA, lecture on terrorism in Europe, March 6, 2006.
• Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, EPIIC Symposium:
Identity Crisis: Europe, Immigration and “the Other”, February 25, 2006.
• University of Malta, Rome: Islamic Radicalism in Europe (in Italian), January 10,
2006.

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Abstract

Over the last twenty years, once it was commonly understood that a significant

number of Muslim immigrants had created a stable presence in the West, most European

and North American governments felt the need to find individuals and organizations that

could be identified as representatives of these new communities. The issue of finding

representative and reliable interlocutors in the Muslim community has become more

urgent in the post-9/11 environment, where integration and security issues have become a

priority. It is now widely understood among Western policymakers that it is crucially

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important for the security of their countries to improve relations with their own Muslim
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population and that to do so they must find counterparts who not only represent the

Muslim community, but who can also help the governments prevent terrorist attacks, by
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decreasing radicalization and alienation.
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The task of finding reliable and representative partners within the various Muslim

communities of the West has been an excruciatingly difficult one. Most Muslim

communities, internally divided by ethnicity, language, sect and political opinions, have

been unable to produce a common leadership. Most governments have found themselves

dealing with a vast array of organizations who viciously fight each other to become the

anointed representatives of the Muslim community and who are unwilling to share the

position with their competitors. Complicating the picture, organizations with links to

Islamic revivalist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood have managed to take

advantage of this anarchical setting and carve an important space for themselves. Even
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though their conservative interpretation of Islam is generally not shared by the majority

of Muslims residing in the West, Brotherhood-linked organizations have often managed,

through activism and foreign funding, to overshadow most other Muslim organizations,

become the favorite partners of most Western governments and, consequently, the de

facto representatives of most Muslim communities in the West. While some consider

them moderate and reliable partners that Western governments should use as assets in

fighting radicalization, others believe that, while maintaining a moderate façade when

dealing with Western establishments, in reality these organizations espouse a radical

ideology that shuns integration.

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Table of contents

Chapter 1: Who speaks for Western Muslims?..................................................................1

Chapter 2: The Western Brotherhood……………………………………………………25
Chapter 3: Aims and methods……………………………………………………………85
Chapter 4: The governments’ dilemma…………………………………………………151
Chapter 5: Great Britain……………………………………………………………...…180
Chapter 6: Germany…………………………………………………………………….234
Chapter 7: The United States………………………………………………………...…268
Chapter 8: The Brothers and terrorism: firefighters or arsonists?...................................322
Chapter 9: The way forward………………………………………………………..….361
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………...….367

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 1

Chapter 1

Who Speaks for Western Muslims?

No American Muslim leader ever had better access to the U.S. political

establishment than Abdurahman Alamoudi. After his arrival in the United States as a

student in 1980, the Eritrean-born biochemist involved himself in various American

Muslim organizations, assuming leadership positions in several of them. 1 By the end of

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the decade he had settled in Washington, where he began to develop an impressive

network of contacts within the upper echelons of the American political establishment. In
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1990, Alamoudi co-founded the American Muslim Council (AMC) and soon became a
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regular visitor to the White House, establishing cordial relationships with both

Republican and Democratic administrations. He held frequent meetings with members of

Congress and even managed to successfully lobby Congress to host, for the first time in
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history, the opening invocation from an Islamic leader. 2

By the mid-1990s Alamoudi had become a staple of Washington’s political life. 3

His organization planned events with interfaith groups, dealing with the country’s

Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish leaders at the highest levels. Representatives and

senators, bishops, and media personalities, eager to establish relations with American

Muslims, enthusiastically attended AMC’s events, which often were held in

1
Alamoudi’s resume, introduced as evidence in U.S. v. Abdurahman Muhammad Alamoudi, U.S.D.C. of
Eastern Virginia, Case 03-1009M. Before founding the American Muslim Council Alamoudi held
leadership positions in the Muslim Student Association (MSA) and the Islamic Society of North America
(ISNA).
2
American Muslim Council: Our First Five Years, report by the AMC, 1996. Page 5.
3
Mohamed Nimer, “Muslims in American Public Life,” in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, ed., Muslims in the
West: From Sojourners to Citizens. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Pp 176-7.
 2

Washington’s most prestigious hotels. 4 After extensive meetings the Department of

Defense put Alamoudi in the powerful position of training and vetting the imams who

attend to the religious needs of American Muslims serving in the military. 5 His

organization was praised by the FBI as “the most mainstream Muslim group in the United

States,” and the State Department even appointed him as goodwill ambassador, routinely

asking him to travel throughout the world representing American Muslims. 6

Washington’s establishment considered Alamoudi a successful, representative, and

moderate Muslim leader who could be a spokesman and model for the American Muslim

community.

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In 2003, however, an unexpected discovery during a routine customs screening at
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London’s Heathrow Airport undid Alamoudi’s accomplishments. Alamoudi was found to

have concealed $340,000 in his suitcase. An investigation revealed that Alamoudi had
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been illegally importing funds from Libya since 1995 and that part of the money was

intended to support a murky plot—conceived by the Libyan government and two

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London-based Saudi dissidents linked to al Qaeda—to assassinate Saudi Crown Prince

Abdallah. A year later Alamoudi pled guilty to all charges and was sentenced to twenty-

three years in jail. 7 The investigation also revealed Alamoudi’s financial dealings with

4
See, for example, “AMC Hosts Interfaith Heritage Banquet,” The AMC Report, Volume 6, Number 1,
January 1996.
5
“Arrested Muslim Activist Helped Pick Chaplains for U.S. Military,” Washington Times, September 30,
2003.
6
Joseph Braude, “Moderate Muslims and Their Radical Leaders,” The New Republic, February 27th, 2006;
Ahmed Yousef, American Muslims: A Community under Siege, (Springfield, VA: UASR Publishing Group,
2004).
7
Department of Justice press release on the sentencing of Alamoudi, October 15, 2004.
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U.S.-designated terrorist organizations such as Hamas and al Qaeda, for which the

Treasury Department accused him of fund-raising in the United States. 8

To many in Washington, Alamoudi’s ties did not come as a complete shock. Since

the 1990s, in fact, law enforcement agencies had been quietly monitoring his links to

elements authorities suspected of terrorist ties. 9 In addition, over the years, Alamoudi had

repeatedly made comments that clearly displayed his sympathies for Islamist outfits

banned in the United States. Once, authorities intercepted a phone conversation in which

Alamoudi told his interlocutor that the 1998 attacks perpetrated by al Qaeda against

American embassies in East Africa had been “wrong,” but only because “many African

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Muslims have died and not a single American died.” 10 In other cases Alamoudi had
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expressed his political views in public venues. In October 2000, speaking at a rally in

Washington’s Lafayette Park, just a block away from the White House, Alamoudi
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proudly proclaimed: “Hear that, Bill Clinton, we are all supporters of Hamas! I wish they

added that I am also a supporter of Hezbollah!” 11

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The case of Abdurahman Alamoudi and AMC raises a number of questions. In

1996 AMC claimed to have 5,000 members, out of a population of American Muslims

that AMC itself estimated, quite generously, at 7 million. 12 How is it possible that an

organization that by its own calculations represented no more than the 0.07% of the

American Muslim population, whose leadership had never in any way been elected by the

8
Treasury Department press release, July 14, 2005. Available at:
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js2632.htm
9
Interview with U.S. Department of Homeland Security official, Washington D.C., May 2008.
10
As reported in the affidavit of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Special Agent Brett Gentrup
in U.S. v. Abdurahman Muhammad Alamoudi, U.S.D.C. of Eastern Virginia, Case 03-1009M, September
30, 2003. In reality, twelve American citizens died on that day, even though the majority of the 224 victims
were citizens of Kenya and Tanzania.
11
Original speech available at: http://www.investigativeproject.org/article/218 (accessed October 14,
2008).
12
American Muslim Council. Page 9.
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Muslim community, had become the de facto spokesmen for American Muslims,

testifying before Congress and expressing views in the media on behalf of the whole

community? Moreover, the extraordinarily poor judgment of large segments of the

American political establishment requires some explanation. Why would U.S. authorities,

who were or should have been aware of Alamoudi’s views and ties to suspect groups,

embrace him and his organizations as a model for American Muslims?

Though the height of Alamoudi’s fall makes his case unique, the issues raised by

his case are hardly limited to him or to the United States. Rather, they highlight a

situation that is common to virtually all Western countries, whose governments have been

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attempting for the past twenty years to identify representative and, in their view,
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moderate interlocutors within their Muslim communities. While circumstances and

experiences vary from country to country, most display similar patterns and difficulties.
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Particularly after 9/11, the debate over what individuals and organizations Western

governments should engage as the representatives of their local Muslim communities has
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been intense and seemingly unending. As the story of Alamoudi dramatically shows, such

choices are not easy—for reasons that lie in the internal dynamics of Western Muslim

communities and in the intricacies of how Western governments decide such matters.

1.1 The birth of Western Islam

The year 710 marks the first contact between Europe and the then nascent Muslim

world. 13 Raiders led by the legendary commander Tariq ibn Ziyad crossed from Morocco

to Spain and began a drive into the continent that ended just twenty-two years later, when

Charles Martel defeated them in Poitiers. The following thirteen centuries have been
13
Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). Pp. 3-25.
 5

characterized by continuous tensions and conflicts between Europe and the Muslim

world. In the Middle Ages, when Europe was in a state of cultural and economic crisis

and Muslim civilization at its peak, Muslims seemed to have the upper hand. While they

never managed to penetrate into the heart of Europe, they occupied or battled in its

southern and southeastern extremities. By the seventeenth century, fortunes appeared to

reverse; the decline of Muslim influence began with the 1699 Treaty of Karlowitz, which

was signed by the Ottomans after their second unsuccessful siege of Vienna. European

powers slowly surpassed those of the Muslim world in economic, scientific, cultural, and

military achievements and began their expansion into Muslim lands. By the end of World

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War I, only few pockets of the Muslim world were free of their direct or indirect control.
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The end of World War II heralded a new era of Muslim-European relations.

European countries slowly came to realize that they could no longer afford empires and,
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more or less reluctantly, granted independence to their colonies in the Muslim world.

Moreover, the economic boom that followed the war created a need in European
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countries for cheap, unskilled labor—a need that they satisfied with immigrants who

came mainly from Muslim countries. Thus large numbers of Algerians, Tunisians, and

Moroccans found jobs in France, a country with which they had historical ties, as did

Pakistanis and Indians in Great Britain and Turks in Germany. Belgium, the Netherlands,

and the Scandinavian countries also attracted Muslim workers. Both sides envisioned this

migratory movement as a temporary and mutually advantageous solution to pressing

economic problems. The Europeans assumed that immigrant workers would stay for only

a few years, contribute to the region’s economic growth, and then go back to their

countries of origin. By the same token, migrant workers originally planned to use the
 6

fruits of their hard labor to build a new life for themselves in their home countries.

European governments did not feel the need to devise policies to accommodate and

integrate individuals who were assumed to be soon returning to their home countries, and

Muslims limited their religious life to a few makeshift mosques, leading some experts to

speak of “cellar Islam.” 14 Muslims, and consequently Islam, therefore remained in effect

an invisible presence in Europe. 15

The situation changed significantly in the 1970s. In the wake of the economic

downturn triggered by the 1974 oil crisis, most European countries restricted

immigration. 16 Yet, even as regulations reduced the influx of new laborers, family

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reunification laws enacted throughout Europe allowed migrant workers to be joined by
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their spouses and children. Rather than returning to their home countries, the vast

majority decided to settle permanently in Europe with their extended families. Since then,
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Europe’s Muslim population has grown steadily. To the first wave of immigrants has

been added a second and even a third generation of European-born Muslims, most of
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them citizens of their country of birth. As large numbers of asylum seekers have joined

legal and illegal immigrants, the Muslim presence has expanded to areas of southern

Europe where it had not previously reached. Today, virtually all European countries host

a Muslim minority, and the best estimates put the number of Muslims living in Western

Europe at between 15 and 20 million—making Islam the continent’s second religion. 17

14
Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany (New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Page 64.
15
Jørgen Nielsen, Muslims in Western Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), pp. vii, 8-
21, 24-7, 40-4.
16
Joceline Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the Unites States (New
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 11-16.
17
The exact number is highly debated and is virtually impossible to establish with certainty. 15 million is
the number estimated by the 2004 U.S. Department of State International Religious Freedom Report, as
 7

With the arrival of women and children, interactions between Muslims and non-

Muslims began to take place not only in factories but also in schools, hospitals, and

housing projects, with public administrations and local institutions. 18 Muslims began

expressing the need to build mosques, to have their faith taught in public schools, to

celebrate weddings and funerals according to Islamic tradition, to find halal butchers, and

so on. As Muslims transitioned from being temporary laborers to permanent residents and

then to citizens, Islam left the cellars and became more visible. 19 Having become a stable

presence in Europe, Muslims grew more vocal in demanding that their faith be

accommodated into European societies and that they be accorded the same rights as other

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religious groups.
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The history of Islam in North America is in some respects different from that of

Europe. A small Muslim presence had always existed in the United States, as some slaves
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from West Africa had Islamic practices that they maintained throughout their captivity. 20

From the late nineteenth century to the present, waves of Muslim immigrants from the
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Middle East, South Asia, and the Balkans have settled in North America, albeit in

numbers proportionally lower than those of most European countries. As a result, the

American Muslim population, currently gauged at between 3 and 5 million, is extremely

diverse, dominated by no single ethnic or national group. Particularly noteworthy is the

high number of converts—estimated to more than 40 percent of the country’s Muslim

well as by a 2005 study by the Pew Research Center entitled An Uncertain Road: Muslims and the Future
of Europe.
18
Nielsen, page 121.
19
This process is excellently described, for example, by Philip Lewis in his study of Bradford’s Muslim
community: see Philip Lewis, Islamic Britain: Religion, Politics and Identity among British Muslims
(London: IB Tauris, 1994).
20
Aslam Abdullah and Gasser Hathout, The American Muslim Identity: Speaking for Ourselves (Pasadena,
CA: Multimedia Vera International, 2003). Pp. 25-7.
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population. 21 A large percentage of the converts’ population is composed of African

Americans, who often adhere to particularistic forms of Islam, such as those espoused by

the Nation of Islam.

The distinctions between American and European Islam go beyond immigration

patterns and ethnicity. Whereas Muslim immigrants to Europe were and, for the most

part, still are uneducated and unskilled laborers, the vast majority of Muslims who have

settled in the United States and Canada are well-educated professionals, many of whom

initially left their homelands to study at American universities. Most belong to the middle

and upper middle class; unlike European Muslims, who generally languish at the bottom

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of measures of economic integration, the average American Muslim household’s income
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is equal to, if not higher than, that of the average non-Muslim American and the

percentage of Muslim college graduates is more than double the national percentage.22
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While large segments of European Muslim communities contend with deprivation and

marginalization, American Muslims generally have integrated more easily into the
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mainstream culture both socially and economically. Moreover, the American tradition of

religious freedom and diversity creates an environment in which the accommodation of

Islam presents fewer problems than in Europe.

Despite such differences, Islam in both Europe and North America has

experienced a remarkable surge in numbers and thus in visibility over the past three

decades. As large Muslim communities have formed in most Western countries,

21
Cesari, When Islam and Democracy Meet, page 16.
22
Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream, Pew Research Center, May 22, 2007. Pp. 24-
5; Western Muslim Minorities: Integration and Disenfranchisement, CAIR Policy Bulletin, April 2006.
 9

policymakers have had to address the governance of Islam. 23 All Western countries

recognize religious freedom, but each has adopted fundamentally different ways of

accommodating and regulating religion, most developed over centuries of often tense

interactions between various churches and the state. 24 The rights and obligations of both

parties have gradually been defined in models that range from the state churches of

England and various Scandinavian countries to the rigid separation (verging on

antagonism) between religion and state that characterizes the French system. Because

Islam, as a newcomer to the West, had to adapt to these different and long-established

patterns, its governance varies significantly from country to country. 25

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1.2 A leaderless community
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A major issue facing several Western countries is the legal status of Islam. 26
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While all states fully guarantee individual freedom of religion, they may take different

approaches to organized religion. In such countries as the United States, Great Britain, or
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the Netherlands, religious groups can constitute themselves and conduct their activities

without the need of any government authorization. But in several European countries,

only those that are recognized by the government can enjoy various legal and fiscal

benefits. Germany, Italy, Spain, and Belgium are among those that rely on a concordat
23
The term “governance of Islam” has been used by Marcel Maussen to describe “various ways and
patterns of regulation, steering and accommodation of Islam in Western Europe.” The same concept applies
to North America. See Marcel Maussen, The Governance of Islam in Western Europe: A State of the Art
Report, IMISCOE working paper No. 16, December 2006. Page 5.
24
See, for example, Matthias Koenig, “Incorporating Muslim Migrants in Western Nation States: A
Comparison of the United Kingdom, France and Germany,” Journal of International Migration and
Integration, 6(2): 219-234; Silvio Ferrari, “The Secularity of the State and the Shaping of Muslim
Representative Organizations in Western Europe,” in Jocelyne Cesari and Sean McLoughlin, eds.,
European Muslims and the Secular State (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).
25
Fetzer and Soper, pp. 1-21.
26
For a comprehensive overview of the different approaches adopted by each European country, see
Brigitte Marechal, “Dealing with European States,” in Brigitte Marechal, Stefano Allievi, Felice Dassetto
and Jørgen Nielen, Muslims in the Enlarged Europe (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2003). Pp. 153-80.
 10

system: religious groups must undergo a vetting process that ensures their compatibility

with the values of the state and must sign an agreement with the state to gain the rights

that have been traditionally granted to Christian churches. Few of the different

approaches taken to the legal recognition of Islam have been free of difficulties and

controversies.

Most other aspects of the governance of Islam in the West, particularly in Europe,

have also posed serious problems. With rare exceptions, Western countries are still

struggling to determine if and how to teach Islam to Muslim children in public schools.

The construction of mosques and Muslim cemeteries often spurs heated political

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confrontations because the relevant laws are unclear. Despite the efforts of some
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countries, the qualifications and legal status of most imams preaching in Western

mosques are unregulated, creating problems of inequitable treatment of Muslim clerics

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and allowing the infiltration of radicals.

The reasons for these problems are many—the massive increase in the number of
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Muslims living in the West during a relatively brief period; the tendency of any debates

concerning Islam to become politicized and unusually heated—particularly in the post-

9/11 world; and the resistance of various political forces to many, if not all, concessions

to Islam have all played a role. Another crucial factor, perhaps less obvious, is that nearly

all Western Muslim communities lack unified leadership. Most other religious

confessions, from minority Christian churches to Jewish and Buddhist groups, have

generally been able to identify leaders—often through umbrella organizations—who

could legitimately be seen as representative and who could speak to policymakers

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seeking to extend to them the legal and financial benefits that have traditionally been

granted to major Christian churches.

The task of finding interlocutors within the various Muslim communities of the

West, in contrast, has been excruciatingly difficult. Many governments have found

themselves dealing with a vast array of organizations fighting to become the anointed

representatives of the Muslim community and unwilling to cooperate with their

competitors. Which of the many Muslim organizations should sit at the table with the

government to negotiate issues such as regulating the slaughter of animals according to

the halal method or drafting legislation to allow Muslims not to work on Friday? Which

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should be asked to partner with the government to draft programs to teach Islam in public
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schools or to train imams? As one commentator stated, “When government officials look

for a responsible interlocutor, they find that the Muslim voice is a cacophony rather than
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a chorus.” 27

This cacophony is the direct by-product of the extreme diversity of Western

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Muslim communities, which are deeply divided by ethnicity, national origin, language,

sect, and political opinion. 28 Indeed, many wonder if it would be more appropriate to

speak of “Muslim communities” rather than a single Muslim community. 29 Though some

of these divisions (particularly those along ethno-linguistic lines) are slowly diminishing

as new generations of Western-born Muslims come of age, they are reflected in the high

27
Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2005). Page 81.
28
Carolyn M. Warner and Manfred W. Wenner, "Religion and the Political Organization of Muslims in
Europe," Perspectives on Politics, September 2006, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 457-479.
29
Jan Rath, Rinnus Pennix, Kees Groendendijk and Astrid Meyer, “The Politics of Recognizing Religious
Diversity in Europe: Social Reactions to the Institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands, Belgium and
Great Britain,” Netherlands Journal of Social Sciences, 35(1): 53-70; Lewis, page 52.