MOAZZAM KHAN LODHI

The Kashmir Dispute

26-10-1947

Maharaja Hari Singh writes the Letter of Accession to Lord Mountbatten:

I shriman Maharaja Hari Singh Ruler of Jammu and Kashmir State in the exercise of Sovereignty in
and over my said State do hereby execute this my instrument of Accession and

1. I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India with the intent that the Governor
General of India, Dominion legislature, the federal court and any other dominion authority
established for this purpose of the dominion shall by virtue to this my instrument of
accession…
 Doesn’t mention maharaja has taken permission from the people
 Doesn’t mention about the people of people of Kashmir, the population

In response to this on 27th October, 1947, Lord Mountbatten writes the letter:

My dear Maharaja Sahib,

Your highness letter dated 26th October has been delivered by Mr. V P Menon. In the special
circumstances mentioned by your highness, my government has decided to accept the accession of
Kashmir State to the Dominion of India.

In consistence with their policy that in case of any state, where the issue of accession has been a
subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided with the wishes of the people. It is
my Government's wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Jammu and Kashmir
and her soil cleared of the invader the question of the State's accession should be settled by a
reference to the people….

 This letter makes the accession conditional.

 Lord Mountbatten's remark and the offer made by the Government of India to conduct a
plebiscite or referendum to determine the future status of Kashmir led to a dispute between
India and Pakistan regarding the legality of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India.
 India claims that the accession is unconditional and final while Pakistan maintains that the
accession is fraudulent.
 The accession to India is celebrated on Accession Day, which is held annually on 26 October.

ISSUE:
 MOAZZAM KHAN LODHI

Historians are divided, they argue the date of the signing of the accession document by Hari Singh,
26th October, 1947 in Srinagar, it reaches Delhi, received by Lord Mountbatten, he responds to it
and the reply is received by Hari Singh on 27th October.

 Then there is a legal issue when India takes the matter to the Security Council under
chapter 6 of the UN Charter.
 On the Agenda of the UN Security Council, the title of the question is “The India Pakistan
Question”.
 Several years later India argues that it is a wrong title; it was not the dispute between 2
states. India further argues that it went to the Security Council complaining about the
invaders and the SC has by default alleviated the dispute as a dispute between 2 states, but
by the time it was 2 late.
 Indian authors are critical of this move by the Indian Authorities that India shouldn’t have
taken the matter to the SC and the SC according to its legal mechanism stated it as a dispute.

UNSC Resolutions: (Many resolutions passed from 1948 to late 1950s)

UNSC Resolution 39 (January 20, 1948, Creating UNCIP)

 This resolution offered to assist in the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir Conflict by setting
up a commission of three members; one to be chosen by India, one to be chosen by Pakistan
and the third to be chosen by the other two members of the commission. The commission
was to write a joint letter advising the Security Council on what course of action would be
best to help further peace in the region.
 The commission was to "investigate the facts" and to "carry out directions" given by the
Security Council. The investigations were to address the allegations made by India in its
letter of 1 January 1948, regarding the situation in Jammu and Kashmir.

Issues raised by Pakistan

 The Pakistani allegations were wide-ranging: that India was attempting to undo the
partition of India, that it was carrying out a campaign of 'genocide' against Muslims in East
Punjab, Delhi and other areas, that it forcefully and unlawfully occupied Junagadh, that it
obtained the accession of Jammu and Kashmir by 'fraud and violence', that it threatened
Pakistan with direct military attack.

Then other resolutions were passed and in 1 such resolution, the framework of conducting the
plebiscite was discussed.

Resolution of SC, 21st April 1948 (Resolution 47)

 In the first step, Pakistan was asked to use its "best endeavours" to secure the withdrawal of
all tribesmen and Pakistani nationals, putting an end to the fighting in the state.
 MOAZZAM KHAN LODHI

 In the second step, India was asked to "progressively reduce" its forces to the minimum
level required for keeping law and order. It laid down principles that India should follow in
administering law and order in consultation with the Commission, using local personnel as
far as possible.

 In the third step, India was asked to ensure that all the major political parties were invited
to participate in the state government at the ministerial level, essentially forming a coalition
cabinet. India should then appoint a Plebiscite Administrator nominated by the United
Nations, who would have a range of powers including powers to deal with the two countries
and ensure a free and impartial plebiscite. Measures were to be taken to ensure the return
of refugees, the release of all political prisoners, and for political freedom.

The Security Council refrained from taking sides in the dispute. It did not condemn Pakistan as the
aggressor, as India had requested. Neither did it touch upon the legalities of the accession of Jammu
and Kashmir. Korbel states that the Security Council could have requested the International Court
of Justice to give an advisory opinion on the legal issues. Had that been done, the Security Council
would have been in a stronger position to declare one of the parties to be in the wrong, and the
handling of the dispute would have been easier.

So, the plebiscite was the obligation on India, enabling the plebiscite. The withdrawal never took
place. The plebiscite couldn’t be conducted.

The UN Secretary General also sent some representatives to Kashmir, who gave suggestions on how
to implement the resolution, but it failed to be implemented.

 India changed its political strategy and established a “constituent assembly” in Indian held
Kashmir. They were presented by the document of accession and were told to ratify it. The
constituent assembly ratified it.
 Indian authorities argued that Lord Mountbatten’s letter and Pundit Nehru also wanted to
make an assessment on the wishes of the people of Kashmir and we have made that
assessment through the constituent assembly, which are the representatives of the people
of Kashmir, so the assessment is complete. So because the accession is ratified now UN
resolution of plebiscite is not needed.
 UN not only rejected it but passed resolution as well:

Resolution 91

“Affirming that the convening of the constituent assembly as recommended by the General
Assembly of the “All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference” and any action the assembly might
attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire state or any part thereof
would not constitute the disposition of the state in accordance with the above principle”.

 UNSC says anything a part form plebiscite will not be accepted. India abstained from voting.
 UNSC again passed a resolution on 24th January 1957 (122).
 MOAZZAM KHAN LODHI

It says: Reaffirms the affirmation in its resolution 91 and declares “convening of the constituent
assembly as recommended by the General Assembly of the “All Jammu and Kashmir National
Conference” and any action the assembly might attempt to take to determine the future shape and
affiliation of the entire state or any part thereof would not constitute the disposition of the state in
accordance with the above principle”.

 These 2 resolutions demolished the most important argument of India that yes “Affirmation
was taken”. Instead of plebiscite we are doing it through the constituent assembly.

Significance of UN Resolutions
The resolutions passed on Kashmir from 1947 to 1957 cannot be termed as recommendatory only.
What we need to be clear about is that, in its initial years, the practice of the UNSC was not to
mention the title of the chapter under which it was passing the resolution. During this time, it was
the content and the substance of the resolution that would determine the nature of implementation.
If one looks at the UNSC’s practice in its first decade of existence, only a handful of resolutions
mention the title of the chapter, whereas the majority of resolutions that were acted upon by the
member states did not mention any reference to a chapter of the UN Charter. The states’ practice
seemed to be that the nature of recommendations and measures suggested or decided by the UNSC
would be determinative of the chapter or chapters under which the resolution was passed.

The resolutions of UNSC passed in respect of the Kashmir dispute belong to this era of UNSC
practice. Hence one finds that, in the resolutions passed by the UNSC during 1947 to 1957 on the
Kashmir dispute, none makes a specific reference to the chapter under which it was passed. With
this background, to assume that all resolutions relating to the Kashmir dispute were passed under
Chapter VI would be an incorrect conclusion to draw. After all, there is no reference to either
Chapter VI or Chapter VII in any of the resolutions.

Most of the resolutions passed on the subject of the Kashmir dispute provide for very specific steps
to be taken by both India and Pakistan. For example, UNSC Resolution 47 (adopted on April 21,
1948) spans over four pages. It refers to the earlier Resolution 39 (adopted on Jan 20, 1948)
whereby the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was established and authorised to
investigate the dispute of the facts submitted for resolution to the UNSC.

The setting up of an independent body by the UNSC is a specific step that was acted upon, and it is
not possible to imagine a resolution that establishes a standalone body be viewed as being only
recommendatory in character. In Resolution 47, the mandate of UNCIP was extended and additional
powers were conferred on it. A clear and elaborate programme was laid down for the activities of
the commission. The resolution also addresses the governments of India and Pakistan, and directed
progressive demilitarisation. It also called for the establishment of a provisional government. The
resolution is very minute in its details and passed with a clear intention of leaving no specifics out.
The nature, intendment and impeccability of the resolution lead ineluctably to the conclusion that it
was meant to be implemented by both states.
 MOAZZAM KHAN LODHI

It will be defying logic to assume that the UNSC resolution establishing UNCIP (which, further
exercising delegated powers, passed a resolution on Nov 9, 1948, having three parts dealing with
the ceasefire line) is merely recommendatory — when the same has been acted upon! This
resolution led to the Cease-Fire Line Agreement (Karachi Agreement 1949). These later
developments confirm that the resolutions were binding in nature and were operationalised in a
manner that could only be imputed to binding resolutions.

Another way of confirming their mandatory nature is to view these resolutions as decisions of the
UNSC. The relevant portions of the said resolutions were binding on India and Pakistan under
Article 25 of the UN Charter which provides as follows, “The members of the United Nations agree
to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present
Charter”. The ICJ in its Namibian Advisory Opinion also supported the position that a UNSC
resolution would be binding where the language, discussion preceding the passage of the
resolution, and the provisions of the UN Charter referred to in the resolution indicated that it was
binding. Based on the ICJ’s opinion, to view resolutions on Kashmir as being merely
recommendatory places an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation that is belied by the specific
nature of measures which have been decided in these various resolutions on Kashmir.

It may be highlighted that the UNSC has now changed its practice and specifically mentions the
chapter pursuant to which it is passing or adopting the resolution. For example, UNSC Resolution
1373 of 2001 relating to terrorism mentions Chapter VII just before the operative paragraphs.
Likewise, Resolution 1267 of 1999 relating to Al Qaeda and the Taliban mentions in its preamble a
similar reference. Further, Resolution 1540 of 2004 addressing the issue of non-proliferation makes
it a point to state that it is acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. But this is a more recent
trend, which was not the case in the practice of the UNSC while passing resolutions during the first
few years after 1945.

Based on the above, the resolutions passed in the case of Kashmir have a binding character and
cannot be referred to as exclusively recommendatory in nature. Pakistan should approach the UN
with absolute confidence that it remains the responsibility of the UNSC to implement its binding
resolutions. Whether Pakistan has the political clout to have the resolutions enforced remains
another matter, but from a legal point of view Pakistan’s policymakers should be clear among
themselves that the UNSC resolutions on the Kashmir dispute should not be de-emphasised on the
grounds that they are simply recommendatory.

Pundit Nehru’s speech:

In a broadcast to the Indian nation on November 2, 1947, independent India’s first Prime Minister,
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, said,

“Let me make it clear that it has been our policy all along that where there is a dispute about the
accession of a State to either Dominion, the decision must be made by the people of the State. It was
in accordance with this policy that we added a proviso to the Instrument of Accession of Kashmir.”
– (White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir, p. 45)
 MOAZZAM KHAN LODHI

In his broadcast on All India Radio, the Indian Prime Minister also said,

“We have declared that the fate of Kashmir ultimately has to be decided by the people. That pledge
we have given, and the Maharaja (Maharaja Hari Singh) has supported it, not only to the people of
Kashmir but to the world. We will not, and cannot, back out of it.”

Prior to this, Nehru had assured the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, on October 31,
1947, that India’s pledge to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir on whether it should accede to India or
Pakistan “is not merely a pledge to your government but also to the people of Kashmir and to the
world.”

New development on Kashmir Dispute:

With the scrapping of Article 370 through a Presidential decree, it is now quite clear that Indian
answer to Kashmir question is simply to ‘colonize’ it. Inspired by their friends in Tel Aviv, Narendra
Modi and Amit shah are hell bent on ‘divide and annex policy’ in Kashmir. Such a gruesome tale of
BJP even puts ‘Fourth Reich of Nazi Germany’ to shame. For, repealing Article 35-A is clearly a
brazen daylight robbery. As Hindutva-driven BJP wants Kashmir not Kashmiris, the stage is set for
building a new ‘West Bank’ in Srinagar, a ghettoized ‘Gaza’ and ‘open sky prison’ in Jammu and
Kashmir Valley, ‘settler colonialism’ in Ladakh’ and potentially ‘holocaust’ of generation of
Kashmiris at the hands of fascist forces of Hindutva. It will have serious consequences on the region
and beyond.

Context
August 5th will not only be marked as shameful day for so called ‘biggest democracy in the world’
but will also be recorded as glaring example of the tyranny of majority that sealed the fate of 13
million Kashmiris without their consent. The move came after India increased 35 thousand troops
in Kashmir (more than half a million already present there), hastily ordered Yatris to leave the
valley, locked Kashmiris, started military and air force built on Pakistan’s border and intensified
ceasefire violations on Line of control. It was a calculated move to demonstrate the willingness of
BJP to deliver what it promised in election, in order to rally Hindu vote bank. The move also
manifested the Modi’s ‘final solution’ to ‘Kashmir problem’.

The move was celebrated by far-right followers and Islamophobes in India, mourned by Kashmiris
across the political spectrum and condemned by Pakistan, China, International Commission of
Justice (ICJ) and sane voices within India and international community.

Analysis of article 370

The article was enacted in 1949 as the basis of relations between India and disputed state of
Kashmir. Under the article, India could exercise powers in four matters: finance, defence,
communication and foreign policy. It also allowed Kashmir a separate flag and authority to make
 MOAZZAM KHAN LODHI

and enact different laws-related to property and citizenship to Kashmiri people- from the rest of
Indian Union.

Such type of arrangement in India was not exclusive to Kashmir but is present in 28 other such
territories.

Its repeal gives India greater control of Kashmir: land, people and resources.

Analysis of Article 35-A

It was introduced through a presidential order in 1954 and forbade outsiders to settle, buy land,
hold local government jobs or win educational scholarship or marry in Kashmir. Often referred to
as the Permanent residential law, it was first put in place by Mahraja Hari Singh in 1927 to bring
demographic changes in Kashmir to a halt and leave ‘Kashmir for Kashmiris.’

Rolling it back was always on the cards of BJP since it’s making in 1953.infact it has been the first
line of their manifesto. Landslide victory in 2019 elections, Moditva (personality cult of Modi), anti-
Muslim, anti-Pakistan and anti-Kashmiri sentiment and attempt to garner more support of
Hindutva brigades led to the final reversal of articles.

Legal Issues
The Presidential Order draws its authority from Article 370 (1). Article 370 (1) deals with the
power of the Parliament to make laws for the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It does not provide the
President the power to amend sundry provisions of the Constitution. An amendment to the
Constitution can only be made under Article 368. It requires a 2/3rd majority of Parliament,
present and voting. This has not been attempted, and leaves the legality of the Presidential Order in
serious doubt.

Further, assuming that the President did indeed have the power to pass the order under Article 370
(1), the same could only have done with the concurrence of the State Government. In fact, the order
itself begins by saying that it has been made “in exercise of powers conferred by clause (1) of Article
370 of the Constitution, the President with concurrence of the Government of State of Jammu and
Kashmir”.

Jammu and Kashmir has not had a government for months. Instead of consulting the government,
the President has consulted the governor. As is well-known, the governor is the representative of
the Union Government in the State. So in effect, the Union Government has consulted itself. It is
hard to see how this is legal.

According to A.G. Noorani, “This move is a violation of the procedure in any case and can be
challenged by the Supreme Court. Article 370 can only be managed by the government of Jammu
and Kashmir. So, this Parliament cannot abrogate it. This is what the law says.”
 MOAZZAM KHAN LODHI

Others believe that the provision that allows Article 370 to be altered by presidential order
requires the consent of the constituent assembly of Jammu and Kashmir and is therefore void
because the assembly was dissolved in 1956.

It is also said that a challenge could be brought to the Supreme Court, which would likely reject the
presidential order.

What are Reasons behind Modi’s move to revoke special status of

Kashmir?
In his independence speech, Modi said that the decision was taken to develop Kashmir, end
‘terrorism’ and bring prosperity to the region. The time will reveal that opposite will happen.
However, Modi’s August 5th decision to revoke Kashmir’s special status is driven by following
factors:

Firstly, on Individual level, he wished to demonstrate his decisiveness to the Hindutva

brigades that he is the leader Indians, or more precisely Hindus, should look up to. That, if he can
deliver on Kashmir, he can do anything! All the populist leaders walk this path to rouse passion in
their constituency. But, this is breathtaking betrayal by Hindutva brigades and nothing short of
‘legislative authoritarianism’ imposed on innocent Kashmiris in a bid to continue ‘occupation’ of
their land and resources

Secondly, ideological reasons, like Hindutva, motivated BJP to scrap the special
status. Bifurcation of (Indian occupied) Kashmir means rule of central Hindu leader over Muslims-
a revenge of centuries old Muslim rule. For Modi’s supporters, Hindu Rashtra is in making.!

Thirdly, BJP is highly unpopular on the economic front. Growth has slowed to 5.8 per cent in
first quarter, unemployment rate has risen to 6.1%, major corporations are downsizing and are on
the verge of bankruptcy. Jat airways went bankrupt, Air India suffered 7600 crores, Hindustan
aeronautics with over 30,000 emplyess is cashless and Tata is another story of disaster. Kashmir is
fine choice to divert attention.

Fourthly, the decision came at a time when Afghan peace process is underway and in
positive direction. Zero role of India does not augur well for her imperial ambitions in South Asia.
Playing ‘Kashmir card’ is carefully calculated way to get attention.

Fifthly, India, since 1972, has advocated the transformations of Line of control from de facto
to de jure border. The decision sums up India’s historic approach. In 1948, New Delhi made issue
‘international’, in 1972 ‘bilateral’ and in 2019 ‘internal’. It had long wanted to ‘colonize’ Kashmir. It
was just a matter of time.

Sixthly, the decision was taken unilaterally because the international environment is
drifting towards ‘unilateralism’. US unilateral decisions to pull out from ‘Paris climate Accord’,
withdrawal from Iran Nuclear deal and Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and Israel’s
 MOAZZAM KHAN LODHI

decades long disdain for multilateralism for ending illegal settlement in West Bank are role models
for India.

Its implications on the region and beyond

Constitutionally, the immediate implications are that occupied Kashmir will lose its flag, criminal
code and constitution.

Firstly, it led to downgrading of diplomatic ties between Pakistan and India. Moreover, it led
to suspension of bilateral trade, review of bilateral arrangements, matter was taken to United
Nations and August 14 was observed in solidarity with Kashmiris. It has also closed any possibility
of dialogue with India, at least in near future. Prime Minister Imran said: “There is no point in
talking to them. I mean, I have done all the talking. Unfortunately, now when I look back, all the
overtures that I was making for peace and dialogue, I think they took it for appeasement.”

Secondly, the move also ‘internationalized’ issue. Kashmir was back on UNSC agenda after 50
years. Maleeha Lodhi said: “This meeting has reaffirmed the validity of the UNSC resolutions
on the occupied state of Jammu and Kashmir.” It is also a big success of Pakistan on diplomatic
front since India tried hard for the meeting not to take place. India stood isolated-not otherwise.

Thirdly, India’s shaky position at diplomatic front and backlash at home makes Kashmir
‘Genocide risk area’ according to Genocide watch. This is likely to create regional consequences
as Pakistan would be under immense pressure to extend ‘material support’ to the movement. The
sword of IMF and FATF might fall on Pakistan, if Islamabad does so.

Fourthly, as the situation gets tense, hawks on both sides of the border will reign
supreme. The region is already pregnant with political extremism. Will Kashmir finally implode? In
the case of brute force, mass detentions, wishes of Hindu MPs to marry beautiful Kashmiri girls and
use of rape as state policy, it would!

Fifthly, there is serious risk of ‘limited nuclear war’. Indian defense minister’s statement on
review of ‘no first use policy’ might generate security dilemma and prepare the region for
irreversible consequences. It will compel Pakistan: to’ respond every brick with stone’, dominate
‘escalation ladder’, ‘surprise India and teach her a lesson at the time and place of its own choosing’
by demonstrating its ‘capability, will and resolve’.

Sixthly, Kashmir-led Kashmir-owned insurgency in Kashmir will gather momentum. Hizbul

Mujahideen will be the force to reckon with. Its ranks would swell. In recent days Al Qaeda and ISIS
have also opened their Indian chapters. This will really bring terrorism to the India that has been
the proverbial boy who cried wolf. Would India be able to sustain it? Munir Akram rightly
remarked: Kashmir will be India’s Afghanistan.

Seventhly, given the volatile nature of economies, the threat of economic recession in South Asia
looms large. In these ‘protectionist times’ it will be the bird of bad omen.
 MOAZZAM KHAN LODHI

Eighthly, Indo Pak water war is also in the making. Indian decision to use water as a weapon of
war is not new. The release of water into river Sutlej without prior notification reveals not only the
frustration of India to punish Pakistan but also her disdain for Indus water treaty.

Ninthly,Moditva marks final nail in the coffin of South Asian regionalism. India has already
created its own regionalism in the form of Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and
Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). This will create regional antagonism vis-à-vis SCO.

Tenthly, Indo-Pak crisis will impact peace process in Afghanistan. The fact is that talks have
been slowed as US attention is divided. Given Afghan elections next month, both parties are under
immense pressure to reach a deal. India is playing role of spoiler and enemy of regional peace.

Lastly, the guilty calculated silence of so called ‘Muslim world’ and UAE’s decision to confer
highest civilian award to Modi at a time when Kashmir is locked down are grim reminder of the
reality that blood is not thicker than water. Realpolitik and economic interests, not morality
defines relations between nations. An unholy alliance stands exposed!

Options for Pakistan

Firstly, it is commendable that Pakistan has so openly stood by the Kashmiris. It is even more
praiseworthy that foreign office will see the opening of Kashmir cell and embassies will open
Kashmir desk to highlight Kashmir cause and Hindutva atrocities on all diplomatic fronts.

Secondly, Pakistan should find avenues of cooperation with International media to expose
‘tyranny of the majority’ in occupied Kashmir and do its best to sway international public opinion in
the favor of Kashmir. Psychological war needs to be won. ISPR is already good at it!

Thirdly, my serious assessment of Indo-Pak crisis is that bilateralism cannot work- third
party can. Only US can pressure India to come to terms with Pakistan. August 5 decision is akin to
‘cock a snook’ to trump’s mediation offer. How effectively can Pakistan get reciprocal cooperation
from America in exchange of US-Taliban talks? Military diplomacy and creative work by foreign
office is the dire need of hour.

Fourthly, upcoming UNGA session should be used as an opportunity to awaken the

consciousness of humanity that Kashmir crisis is not just territorial but also a humanitarian
one. Protests across diplomatic capitals wherever Modi goes should be supported and ‘Hitler of
sub-continent’ should be exposed.

Fifthly, Muslim countries like turkey, Malaysia and Iran should be reached out to garner
more support for Kashmir cause beside OIC.

Sixthly, International court of justice must be knocked for highlighting human rights abuses
in Kashmir.

Seventhly, it must be noted that initiatives related to people-to-people contacts in the form
of Kartarpur corridor must continue. Hindutva hate can be countered by creating soft image of
Pakistan through people-to-people contacts and favorable Sikh sentiment in India.
 MOAZZAM KHAN LODHI

Eighthly, Pakistan must be ready for any adventure by India. Responding every brick with
stone can deter India. See, even Iran has stood up to American bullying!

Ninthly, Pakistan must expose Indian unilateralism and brutality of India in held Kashmir to the
international community. Islamabad can also knock at the doors of OIC working group of Kashmir,
SCO, EU and African union. For Foreign Service of Pakistan, this case is the litmus test.

Tenthly, there is a need to take regional approach to the current crisis. It is high time ‘the
dragon came in the room.’ China needs to take bolder step than mere condemnation. She must help
Pakistan’s efforts on all possible fronts. Dialogue and multilateralism must take precedence
over war and unilateralism. Pakistan should also condition her support for US withdrawal from
Afghanistan with amicable solution of Kashmir issue.

Eleventhly, Pakistan needs to start BDS movement against India. BDS-Boycott, Divestment and
sanction movement by Pakistan, her allies and Kashmiri diaspora to promote various forms of
boycott to delegitimize occupation and fulfill its obligation under International law.

Twelvethly, Kashmiris in India and Pakistan need to start non-violent ‘Million March’
towards working boundary. If the occupation had never been costlier for India, let’s make it now.
There is serious need to create diplomatic crisis through such means.

Lastly, there is need to unite resistance movement within Kashmir since New Delhi has
alienated the whole political spectrum in held Kashmir. Kashmiri youth can lead the resistance in a
more profound way.

Fight for Kashmir will decide the fate of Kashmiri and Future of Muslims in India. They must be
prepared to fight against Indian brutality even if world community maintains guilty silence due to
some petty corporate interests or other reasons. India is doomed, Kashmir is destined.

Arundhati Roy in her Book “The Ministry of Utmost Happiness” rightly said: “One day Kashmir
will make India self-destruct in the same way. You may have blinded all of us, every one of
us, with your pellet guns by then. But you will still have eyes to see what you have done to us.
You’re not destroying us. You are constructing us. It’s yourselves that you are destroying.

Jurisdiction of ICJ on Kashmir

Under Article 93 of the UN Charter, all member states are parties to the “Statute of the ICJ”. Article
36(1) of the ICJ Statute provides: “The jurisdiction of the court comprises all cases which the parties
refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties
and conventions in force.”

It is clear that the ICJ does not have automatic or compulsory jurisdiction in any matter. The statute
clarifies that the ICJ can assume jurisdiction in the following cases: (i) when the parties refer a
matter to it [Article 36(1)]; (ii) where it is specially provided for in the UN Charter [Article 36(1)];
(iii) where two or more states are parties to a treaty or convention in force and such treaty
 MOAZZAM KHAN LODHI

provides for disputes thereunder to be referred to and resolved by the ICJ [Article 36(1)]; (iv)
where a pre-UN treaty provides for reference of a matter to a tribunal instituted by the League of
Nations or to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) — the ICJ’s ‘predecessor’ court —
the reference will lie, as between the parties to the present statute, to the ICJ (Article 37); (v) it can
give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of a body authorised in accordance
with the UN Charter (Article 65); (vi) where the states have accepted as compulsory ipso facto and
without special agreement the ICJ’s jurisdiction [Article 36(2)].

The last category requires further elaboration. Article 36(2) of the statute enables states to declare
that they accept the ICJ’s compulsory and automatic (ipso facto) jurisdiction in legal disputes
involving treaties and questions of international law: “The states parties to the present statute may
at any time declare that they recognise as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in
relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the court in all legal
disputes concerning: (a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) any question of international law; (c) the
existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.”

The declarations under Article 36(2) were anticipated to be the basis of much of the ICJ’s work.
Such declarations are required to be deposited with the UN secretary general who “shall transmit
copies thereof to the parties to the statute and to the registrar of the court” [Article 36(4)].

Article 36(5) enables the continuation of declarations made under the earlier Article 36 of the PCIJ
Statute that are still in force for the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction.

And, Article 36(6) addresses the ICJ’s competence to decide disputes of jurisdiction: “In the event of
a dispute as to whether the court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the
court.”

As many as 73 UN member states have accepted the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction under Article
36(2) of the statute. India and Pakistan have both filed declarations under Article 36 accepting the
ICJ’s compulsory ipso facto jurisdiction. The Indian declaration dated Sept 15, 1974 substituted its
earlier declaration of Sept 14, 1959. Pakistan’s declaration dated March 29, 2017 substituted its
earlier declaration of Sept 12, 1960. Left at that, it would seem possible for either Pakistan or India
to take the Kashmir dispute to the ICJ. But India filed its declarations, in 1974 and earlier, with the
condition that its acceptance of the ICJ’s jurisdiction excludes “disputes with government of any
state which is or has been a member of the Commonwealth of Nations”. This exclusion is enabled by
Article 36(3) of the ICJ Statute: “The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or
on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain time.”

India, in its declaration, has thus excluded the competence of the ICJ to hear disputes involving
India with another member of the Commonwealth. To preclude any action by Pakistan to confer
jurisdiction on the ICJ in the Kashmir dispute by leaving the Commonwealth, India added in its
conditions of acceptance of the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction that such acceptance excludes disputes
with another member “which is or has been a member” of the Commonwealth. This completely
ousts the ICJ’s jurisdiction under India’s declaration.
 MOAZZAM KHAN LODHI

The restrictive and almost self-serving declaration of India under Article 36 is by no means unique
or unusual. Many declarations by states exclude the ICJ’s jurisdiction in ways that the declarations
are generally ineffective against the declarant state. Pakistan’s declaration has many conditions for
the acceptance of the ICJ’s jurisdiction, including the ouster of disputes that relate to the “national
security of Pakistan” or that fall essentially within Pakistan’s domestic jurisdiction. However, the
most notorious example is the US declaration by its then president Harry S. Truman on Aug 14,
1946, which, among others, in a self-judging provision excludes the ICJ’s jurisdiction in matters
which are essentially “within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as
determined by the United States of America”. The Trump administration recently, in 2018,
announced plans to re-evaluate (read further restrict) the US role before the ICJ.

The above analysis shows that Pakistan may not be able to invoke the ICJ’s jurisdiction in the
Kashmir dispute in view of the conditions imposed by India as enabled by Article 36(3) of the ICJ
Statute. An imperfect world. An imperfect international legal system.

Solutions to Kashmir:
To soften India, a plethora of alternative solutions have been proposed such as:

1. UN Resolutions: The Plebiscite Option

The UN Security Council resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949, proposed the
plebiscite option for resolving the Kashmir dispute. However, it is important to note that the
Government of India itself accepted plebiscite or referendum as a right of the Kashmiri people,
when it filed the initial complaint against Pakistan before the United Nations on January 1, 1948, as
pointed out in Part I of this paper. Beginning with Governor General Mountbatten, Indian leaders
like Prime Minister Nehru also repeatedly made the commitment to ‘the will of the Kashmiri
people’.

After India filed its initial complaint, the UN Security Council passed the two important resolutions
of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949. These resolutions laid down the principles and procedures
for a free and impartial plebiscite under UN auspices. Broadly, the resolution of January 5, 1949,
stated: ‘(a) the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India and Pakistan,
would be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite after the cease-
fire and truce agreement provided for in the Resolution of August 13 had been carried out; (b) the
Secretary General of the UN would nominate a Plebiscite Administrator, who would be appointed
by the government of Jammu and Kashmir and given powers which he considers necessary for
holding a free and impartial plebiscite; (c) on implementation of the ceasefire and the truce
agreement, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator would determine, in consultation with
the Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State Armed Forces, as well as the Forces
in Azad Kashmir (in consultation with the local authorities); (d) persons who had entered the State
 MOAZZAM KHAN LODHI

since August 15, 1947 would be required to leave the State, and citizens of the State who had left
the State on account of disturbances would be allowed to return.’

Both India and Pakistan accepted the above UN Resolutions. However, later, differences arose over
the interpretation of various clauses of the resolutions, especially on the issues of demilitarisation
and disbandment/disarming of the ‘Azad Kashmir’ forces. India gave its own interpretation to the
agreement and suggested that the Azad Kashmir forces be disbanded and the defence and
administrative responsibility of the region be given to India and Indian Kashmiri authorities.
Pakistan, on the other hand, was in favour of a complete and simultaneous withdrawal of armed
forces personnel by both the countries. On this issue, the President of the Security Council, General
McNaughton, in his proposal of December 22, 1949, in para 2, clarified that the Resolutions of 1948
and 1949 called for demilitarisation of the whole State of Jammu and Kashmir and not merely Azad
Kashmir: that ‘demilitarisation should include the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and
Kashmir of the regular forces of Pakistan; and the withdrawal of the regular forces of India not
required for purposes of security or for the maintenance of local law and order.’ The UN Security
Council passed Resolution on March 14, 1950, which called upon the Governments of India and
Pakistan ‘to prepare and execute within a period of five months from the date of this resolution a
programme of demilitarisation on the basis of the principles of paragraph 2 of General
McNaughton’s proposal, or of such modifications of those principles as may be mutually agreed.’
Pakistan accepted that Resolution as well, but India maintained its position as regards the
demilitarisation issue. Later, the UN Representatives continued discussions with the Governments
of India and Pakistan over various proposals.

Regarding the question of plebiscite, Pakistan was in favour of giving complete authority to the UN
for holding, organising and supervising the plebiscite. India, on the other hand, only wanted the
non-binding advice of the UN. Various UN mediators were appointed to resolve this issue, but no
one was successful in convincing India on a compromise. Sir Owen Dixon, the UN mediator, in his
report submitted in 1950, wrote: ‘In the end I became convinced that India’s agreement would
never be obtained to demilitarisation in any such form, or to provisions governing the period of
plebiscite of any such character, as would in my opinion, permit of the plebiscite being conducted in
conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse by
which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperiled.’ Dr. Frank P. Graham,
appointed UN representative for India and Pakistan in 1951, submitted five reports, up to March
1953, but his efforts at mediation also proved to be unsuccessful as India would not agree on the
size of the forces to be left on either side of the cease-fire line after demilitarisation. India,
therefore, consistently refused to take recourse to all proposals of various statesmen and UN
representatives for the holding of a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir. On the other hand, it is on
record that Pakistan supported all such international mediation and UN efforts.

Defending the Indian position on plebiscite, Sisir Gupta, an Indian scholar, wrote: ‘it became
obvious even at the early stages of the Kashmir dispute that a plebiscite - an “ideal” solution
according to some – because of the complexities in Kashmir was difficult to accomplish. Even as a
democratic solution, it had loopholes. Kashmir, clearly, is not composed of one people: in religion, it
has three major groups; in language, four. If there is a section which wants to secede from India,
 MOAZZAM KHAN LODHI

there are others who do not.’ However, the fact of the matter is that, right from the beginning, India
feared that if a plebiscite was held it would lose what it had already occupied. According to a
Kashmiri activist, Prof. Mrs. Shamim Shawl, ‘plebiscite is the most plausible solution of the problem.
This has been accepted in the Resolutions of August 48 and January 1949. It is these resolutions,
which confirm the disputed character of the problem and negate the Indian position that says
Kashmir is an irrevocable part of India. India is in fact challenging the rightful and legal authenticity
of the United Nations by delaying the implementation of UN resolutions.’

Keeping in view the basic genesis and nature of the dispute, the option incorporated in the then UN
resolutions is still valid. The UN resolutions are not time-barred, as observed in 1956, by the UN
Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold, who clarified the important principle that ‘the UN decision is
valid until it has been invalidated by the organ which took it.’

2. The UN Trusteeship Option

Generally, this option proposes that Kashmir should be placed under UN Trusteeship and then
plebiscite may be held for the final resolution of the dispute. It is argued that this will provide a
face-saving for India, and will also give Kashmiris, on both sides of the Line of Control, enough time
to come up with a joint option. The JKLF Chairman, Ammanullah Khan in December 1993,
proposed: (1) complete, simultaneous withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops and civil
administration, non-Kashmiri personnel from Jammu and Kashmir; (2) the reunification of Indian
and Pakistani-controlled parts of Kashmir; (3) placement of the State under UN control for five to
ten years; and (4) holding of a plebiscite.79 Well-known Pakistani economist, the late Dr. Mahbubul
Haq, in an interview he gave to an Urdu Weekly Hurmat, in 1994, proposed that only the Kashmir
Valley be placed under UN Trusteeship for ten years and then plebiscite be held in the Kashmir
Valley.

As India regards Occupied Kashmir as its integral part, it is obvious that it will never voluntarily
agree to the placing of the State, or the Kashmir Valley under UN trusteeship. Secondly, both the
above trusteeship options support the plebiscite option under the UN auspices, an option that has
been rejected by India even though in the early years of the dispute India committed itself to
holding of the plebiscite.

As regards Pakistan and the Kashmiris, since the above proposals support a UN role and the option
of plebiscite, in view of the already existing UN resolutions which provide the plebiscite option
under UN auspices, the above proposal would mean unnecessarily prolonging the solution beyond
five or ten years. Moreover, according to Article 76 of Chapter XII of the UN Charter one of the basic
objectives of the trusteeship system is ‘to promote the political, economic, social, and educational
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards
self-government or independence, as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each
territory and its peoples…’ The case of Jammu and Kashmir does not require placement under UN
trusteeship as the Kashmiris have, over the years, demonstrated their political will by waging an
indigenous movement in Occupied Kashmir for their right of self-determination, underscoring the
fact that their preferred option is self-determination.
 MOAZZAM KHAN LODHI

3. The Partition Option

Regarding the option of the partition of Jammu and Kashmir, this has largely been an academic
debate and various scholars have suggested different proposals. The first is a division-related
option for Jammu and Kashmir, based on the holding of regional plebiscites. This proposal was first
given by UN Representative, Sir Owen Dixon, in his report of 1950-51. Called the ‘Dixon Report’, it
proposed the idea of holding regional plebiscites, instead of a general plebiscite as proposed in the
UN resolutions. The Owen Dixon Plan proposed the division of the State of Jammu and Kashmir into
four main regions: Jammu, Ladakh, the Vale of Kashmir including Muzaffarabad, and Gilgit-
Baltistan. According to his plan the district of Poonch was to remain with Pakistan. He proposed
that of the four regions, Jammu and Ladakh should go uncontested to India and the Northern Areas
to Pakistan. He concluded that in the Valley a plebiscite might be held to decide about its future.
Pakistan, did not outrightly reject the proposal, but was in favour of a general plebiscite in the
whole of Jammu and Kashmir. India on the other hand regarded Jammu and Kashmir as a unit of the
Indian Federation and thus was not in favour of any regional plebiscite.

The second partition proposal is an option based on a ‘Trieste-type’ solution. The Trieste issue,
between Italy and Yugoslavia, arose as a result of the two World Wars. After World War I, Trieste
and the adjoining areas, including the whole valley of the Adige river and Istria, went to Italy, but in
1945 it was claimed by Yugoslavia on the grounds that Italy was guilty of aggression against
Yugoslavia. However, Trieste and its environs and the Gorzia region to the northwest (Zone A)
remained under Anglo-American control and the southern portion (Zone B) was under the control
of the Yugoslav troops. Finally, in 1954, Italy and Yugoslavia agreed to a partition and Zone A
(including Trieste) was given to Italy and Zone B to Yugoslavia. Italy agreed to maintain a free port
at Trieste. Later, the agreement was given a de jure status by the 1975 Treaty of Osimo between
Italy and Yugoslavia.

The ‘Trieste’-type option for Jammu and Kashmir proposes that the Valley along with some
adjoining parts of Jammu and the Pakistani side of Kashmir (Azad Kashmir), be made an
autonomous units, under India and Pakistan, respectively. The LoC would be a soft border between
the two autonomous units. The remaining areas on both sides of the LoC may be merged with India
and Pakistan, respectively. India and Pakistan would be required to withdraw their forces under UN
supervision. Again, this proposal lacks viability, as it does not address either the genesis of the
dispute, nor the complexities that have accumulated since then to date. The struggle in Jammu and
Kashmir is not for autonomy of any one region but for the right of self-determination to be
expressed by the Kashmiris, as granted to them under UN resolutions. Also, India and Pakistan
being parties to the dispute will continue to have a clash of interests in the proposed autonomous
regions; therefore, this would certainly not result in any stability in the region. Moreover, the
option implies that the existing Line of Control (LoC) may serve as the line of division. The LoC
remains the UN-recognised ceasefire line (CFL) and was not drawn with any basis for serving as a
permanent border, but with the intention of bringing about cessation of military hostilities.

The third partition proposal considers the conversion of the Line of Control (LoC) into an
international border. This means maintenance of the prevailing status quo. This option is in
principle supported by India. If it were accepted, India would take additional advantage by then
 MOAZZAM KHAN LODHI

propagating that it had conceded Indian territory to Pakistan and would try to emerge as a
peacemaker in the region. As assessed by Robert Wirsing, ‘by asserting the primacy of actual
military control over punitive legal entitlement, it tacitly acknowledges India’s dominant political
standing in the region. By requiring Pakistan to relinquish its claim of the coveted Valley of Kashmir
and the Kashmiri separatists their claim of independence, while at the same time entailing little or
no detachment from India of territories now in its possession, it leaves existing political and
economic arrangements essentially undisturbed. Thus, of the several conceivable forms of partition,
it is clearly among the most generous to India.’

However, the ‘the LoC as a border’ option has to take into account the fact that the LoC is merely a
ceasefire line, as well as take stock of the struggle for the right of self-determination that is going on
in the Indian-held Kashmir. Moreover, Kashmiris do not recognise the LoC. Prof. Mrs. Shamim
Shawl, a Kashmiri scholar from Srinagar, has argued that ‘the proposal of division is in
contravention of the basic principle that Jammu and Kashmir is an indivisible entity. It also violates
the fundamental fact that the Kashmir problem is basically the problem of the people of Jammu and
Kashmir. It is not a bilateral problem between India and Pakistan. Nor is it a territorial dispute.’
Secondly, the present LoC is an altered ceasefire line, whereby India acquired territory through
military aggression in 1971. Therefore, accepting LoC would mean legitimising Indian military
aggression. Thirdly, the LoC as accepted by both Pakistan and India at Simla in 1972 does not exist
anymore. Indian incursion into Siachen in 1984 has destroyed the sanctity of the ceasefire line.

Fourthly, some Western scholars have proposed the partition of Kashmir along ethnic/cultural,
religious, and linguistic lines. For example the Kashmir Study Group, a US-based group comprising
academics and diplomats from various countries as members, has made various proposals along
these lines in its report entitled, Kashmir: A Way Forward (September 1999). The proposals
suggested are as follows:

(a) Two hypothetical sovereign entities, self-governing in all aspects, established on both sides of
the Line of Control on cultural and linguistic grounds. According to the study, ‘On the Indian side of
the LOC every tahsil in Kashmir proper and in Doda district in Jammu, and Gool Gulab Ghar tahsil in
Udhampur district in Jammu would seek incorporation in the proposed state. All these areas are
imbued with “Kashmiriyat” or interact with Kashmiri speaking people. On the Pakistani side it is
conceivable that the whole of Azad Kashmir would opt to have a sovereign status. This is
predominantly Punjabi-speaking, wholly Muslim area’;

(b) A new sovereign state on the Indian side of LoC with no territorial exchange between India and
Pakistan. The state would include ‘within its maximum potential area the whole of Kashmir proper
as well as adjoining areas in which Kashmiri is either the majority language or that of a plurality of
the population’;

(c) Desirable territorial changes along and beyond the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir.
Viewing that ‘LoC is dysfunctional and has been violated innumerable times’, it proposes that a new
state be created with territorial exchanges between India and Pakistan. However, it proposes that
Pakistan gives almost twice as much area (7,366 sq. km) to India, than India ceding territory (4,501
sq. km) to Pakistan. The rationale given for such an exchange is ‘ overall, the territorial adjustments
 MOAZZAM KHAN LODHI

should not be excessively disruptive of the established order and yet should appear significant and
be of such a nature as to allow all parties to claim a victory.’

The above proposals are again not viable solutions, as they tend to complicate the situation in
Jammu and Kashmir and result in a further division of the region, rather than leading to a stable
solution. Moreover, the ‘Kashmir Study Group’s’ proposals make no provision for the right of self-
determination of the people of Kashmir to which presently a military struggle is underway by the
Kashmiris in Indian-occupied Kashmir.

4. The Independence Option

An option gradually evolved as a result of the impasse on the Kashmir issue is that of independence,
generally known as the ‘Third Option’. Under this option, the pre-Partition status of the Jammu and
Kashmir State is to be restored and an independent state established. The proposal is mainly
advocated by the JKLF. Its Chairman, Amanullah Khan, in one of his articles says, ‘the future
independent Kashmir is to be neutral, like Switzerland, with friendly and trade relations with all its
neighbours.’ According to Amanullah Khan’s proposal, ‘Independent Kashmir is to consist of five
federating units: Kashmir Valley, Jammu province, Ladakh, Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, each
enjoying considerable internal autonomy, having its own elected provincial government. At the
centre there will be a bicameral parliament.’ He further says, ‘the re-unification and independence
of the state can be brought about without making any drastic changes in the existing socio-
economic, political and administrative structures of any of the present three units i.e. Indian
occupied areas, Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.’

According to Indian scholars ‘independence, either for part or all of J&K, is equally unrealistic. They
maintain that although an artificial product of war, the Line of Control does follow a rough and
ready ethno-cultural divide in some measure. Further, “self-determination” within the two parts of
J&K could result in the Balkanisation of a mosaic put together by history, with every new ‘self-
determined’ minority being assailed for a newly-created majoritarianism, which lesser minorities
refuse to accept. Such an unravelling would be a recipe for strife, insecurity, and destabilisation of
the region.’

The option for an independent Jammu and Kashmir state does not seem to be a viable solution, as
the State would be land-locked and, therefore, permanently dependent on its neighbours. For India
the proposition would be unacceptable because it could lead to a similar unravelling in other areas
where separatist movements are going on in India.

As regards Pakistan, the ‘third option’ can be advantageous. An independent Jammu and Kashmir
state would have a preference for good relations with a neighbour that has consistently extended
its support to the principles of self-determination. Pakistan’s position on the ‘third option’ has been
that it should not confound the existent problems further, and, therefore, it stresses the need to
address the issue in the light of the Security Council Resolutions, as a first step in the resolution of
the dispute.
 MOAZZAM KHAN LODHI

5. Andorra model

Andorra was a unique co-principality (without any arbitrator), ruled by the French chief of state
and the Spanish bishop of Urgel for 715 years. Through a constitution, enacted in 1993, the
government was transformed into a parliamentary democracy with both French and Spanish heads
of state jointly wielding executive powers. When this solution was first proposed by Hurriyat
Conference (in 1974), President Musharraf supported it. However, all sections of the Indian media
termed this solution ‘Pandora’s box’.

6. Sweden-Finland Aland model

Swedish nationals in Finland controlled the island. They wanted to unite it with Sweden. But,
Finland did not allow them to do so. With the League of Nations appointed as an arbitrator in 1921,
the Asland was given the status of an autonomous territory. Finland retains nominal sovereignty
over the island with obligation to ensure linguistic rights (Swedish language) as well as culture and
heritage of Aland residents. The island enjoys a neutral and demilitarised status with its own flag,
postage stamps and police force.

On Dec 31, 1994, Aland joined the European Union voluntarily. Aland is a self-governing entity,
created without use of force, catering for the conflicting interests of rival communities.

7. Italy-Austria South Tyrol Model

South Tyrol was part of Austria. It was inhabited by three linguistic groups (70 per cent Germans,
26 per cent Italians, and four per cent Ladin). It was annexed by Italy in 1919. German majority
rebelled against Italianisation. An agreement between Austria and Italy provided an autonomy
framework, vouchsafed by Paris Peace Agreement, 1946 (also known as Gruber Degasperi
Agreement). Under the South Tyrol Package of 1969, Austria exercised mandatory protective
function vis-à-vis Italy for the Austrian and Ladin minorities in South Tyrol.

The package was meant to pave way for peaceful coexistence of German- and Ladin-speaking
communities of South Tyrol, particularly in the multiethnic province of Bolzano. The package
collapsed and gave way to a settlement in 1992 with the UN as the arbitrator.

The revised package still recognises Italian sovereignty but allows greater autonomy of legislation
and administration, recognition of cultural diversity, minority vote on issues of fundamental
importance, and proportional ethnic representation.

8. National Conference Autonomy Formula (2001):

The formula envisages return to 1953 position, abrogation of all central laws imposed on the state,
and an informal co-federal relationship between the parts of Kashmir.

9. Chenab Formula:

According to this formula the River Chenab will form the separation line between free (Azad) and
occupied parts of Kashmir. Some writers have discussed the Indus-basin-based formula, akin to it.
 MOAZZAM KHAN LODHI

10. Kashmir Study Group Formula:

It envisages division of the state into two self-governing entities, enjoying free access to one
another. The entities would have their own democratic constitutions, citizenship, flag, and
legislature (minus defence matters jurisdiction). Defence would be the joint responsibility of India
and Pakistan.