Quantum-Mechanical Statistics

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Quantum-mechanical Statistics and the Inclusivist Approach to the Nature of

Particulars
Article in Synthese · January 2006

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-004-6216-4 · Source: DBLP
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QUANTUM-MECHANICAL STATISTICS AND THE INCLUSIVIST APPROACH TO
THE NATURE OF PARTICULARS
Francesco Orilia
Università di Macerata
Dipartimento di Filosofia e Scienze Umane
via Garibaldi, 20
62100 Macerata
Italy
Ph. number +39-0733-358306

Fax number: +39-0733-358333
orilia@unimc.it
Quantum mechanics and inclusivism
QUANTUM-MECHANICAL STATISTICS AND THE INCLUSIVIST APPROACH TO

THE NATURE OF PARTICULARS
ABSTRACT. There have been attempts to derive anti-

haeccetistic conclusions from the fact that quantum mechanics
(QM) appeals to non-standard statistics. Since in fact QM
acknowledges two kinds of such statistics, Bose-Einstein and
Fermi-Dirac, I argue that we could in the same vein derive
the sharper anti-haeccetistic conclusion that bosons are
bundles of tropes and fermions are bundles of universals.
Moreover, since standard statistics is still appropriate at
the macrolevel, we could also venture to say that no anti-
haecceitistic conclusion is warranted for ordinary objects,
which could then tentatively be identified with substrates.
In contrast to this, however, there has been so far no
acknowledgement of the possibility of inclusivism, according
to which ontological accounts of particulars as widely
different as those can possibly coexist in one world picture.
The success of the different statistics in physics at least
calls for a revision in this respect.
1. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing body of literature suggesting that quantum

mechanics (QM) favors an anti-haeccetistic conception of
particulars. According to Van Fraassen (1991, p. 430), it was
Reichenbach (1957) who first noticed this potential
implication of QM, and thereafter many writers, including Van
Fraassen himself, have discussed the matter (Castellani
1998). In particular, Redhead and Teller (1991, 1992, Teller
1998) have argued that an anti-haecceitistic ontology
accounts for the fact that in QM non-standard statistics is
preferred to the standard one, the so-called Maxwell-
2
Boltzmann (MB). Haecceitism can be conceived of in different

ways, but roughly its basic intuition, as it is understood in
most of the literature in question, is that a particular such
as an ordinary object or a physical particle should be
identified with (or should be taken to involve) a peculiar
non-qualitative haecceity, or substrate, as I prefer to say,
in a way that grants its self-identity over time. In short,
let us call this approach ST (from "Substrate Theory"). In
contrast with it, anti-haecceitism jettisons such
haecceities, thereby making the identity of particulars over
time a matter of convention or something like that.
Although, of course, talk of haecceities and the like
is inimical to Quine, such an attempt of connecting to
science the ontological issue of the nature of particulars --
typically discussed in mostly a priori fashion by
philosophers over the centuries -- is certainly in the spirit
of a Quinean naturalistic approach to philosophy, according
to which there is no proposition whose status is a priori
immune from revision in the light of empirical observation.
Or, more moderately, even if some propositions might have an
a priori status, the borderline between a priori science and
a posteriori philosophy is nonetheless vague and/or subject
to possible revisions (Putnam 1983). In this perspective,
philosophical disputes can be affected by natural science:
the Euclidean conception of space, considered as a priori
true by Kant, can be abandoned from the perspective of
relativity theory and even logic can be modified to face the
paradoxes of QM, as Quine 1953 has noted and Putnam 1975 has
investigated in detail. Similarly, works such as the above
mentioned ones by Redhead and Teller suggest that in view of
QM we should shape in the anti-haeccetistic direction our
conception of particulars. Not everybody agrees. For example,
Van Fraassen 1991 warns us about the perils of deriving
ontological conclusions from QM (and from science in general)
3
and Huggett (1997, 1999) argues on the one hand, that the
very notion of haecceity is of dubious intelligibility (so
that we had better frame the discussion in terms of the
alternative way in which Lewis 1986 (p. 221) defines
haecceitism and anti-haecceitism1), and on the other hand,
that no specific anti-haecceitistic conclusion can be drawn
from QM, since classical mechanics might as well be
interpreted in an anti-haeccetistic way. Here, I do not wish
to settle these disputes, although I shall take for granted
the notion of haecceity and that it makes sense to infer
ontological conclusions from QM.2 I would rather like to
focus on a point that seems to have gone unnoticed. In order
to highlight it, let me recall two facts. First, the
philosophical tradition recognizes two different anti-
haeccetistic accounts of the (non-Lewisian) sort outlined
above. The bundle of tropes theory (BTT), based on the idea
that particulars are bundles of tropes,3 and the bundle of
universals theory (BUT), which views particulars as bundles
of universals. Second, QM acknowledges two different non-
standard statistics, Bose-Einstein (BS) and Fermi-Dirac (FD),
which deal with bosons and fermions, respectively. Now, the
point I wish to focus on is that these two facts suggest not
simply an anti-haeccetistic stand, but more precisely an
identification of bosons with bundles of tropes and fermions
with bundles of universals. These identifications contrast
with a thesis that current ontology (Armstrong 1978, 1989,
Loux 1998) appears to tacitly assume, in a sort of a priori
or even dogmatic fashion, without considering the possibility
that it could be challenged on empirical grounds. This thesis
vacillates even more, if we are willing to admit that the
quantum world somehow coexist with a macrolevel of classical
objects (Penrose 1989, ch. 6) which are best identified, one
could suggest, with substrates, rather than with bundles. Let
me call exclusivism the tacit thesis in question, since it
4
asserts, once it is made explicit, that the disjunction is

exclusive in a claim such as: particulars are substrates or
bundles of universals or bundles of tropes or ... (where the
disjunction could be completed by appealing to other
characterizations of particulars coming from ontological
theories that can be found in ontological treatises, beside
ST, BTT and BUT). Call then inclusivism the opposite view,
according to which two or more of these different categories
of particulars coexist in the correct ontological inventory.
In other words, by assuming exclusivism a priori, the
traditional ontological accounts of the nature of particulars
are totally incompatible in the sense that each corresponds
to a world view, a specific conception of how the world is,
or more generally of how possible worlds are, a conception
that has no place for the other rival accounts. If, on the
contrary, we assume the possibility of inclusivism, these
accounts are partially compatible in that two or more of them
could find their own domain of application, each one in a
proper subset of the particulars that there happen to be.4,5
If at least two of the above mentioned inclusivist
identifications can indeed be supported on empirical grounds,
the ontologist faces a dilemma. Either she makes room for the
possibility of inclusivism on such a posteriori grounds, in
line with a Quinean ontological methodology, or acknowledges
an a priori acceptance of exclusivism as a sort of
metaphysical necessity, thereby going some distance from a
strictly Quinean methodology. In the latter case, the
ontologist owes us an alternative account of the empirical
data and explicit reasons to rule out inclusivism as
metaphysically impossible. The primary purpose of this paper
is to confront the ontologist with this dilemma and press the
issue in favor of the first horn, by arguing that the
puzzling fact that the three different statistics coexist in
physics can indeed be viewed as empirical support for
5
inclusivism. Secondarily, on the assumption that the first

horn has been secured, the paper also suggests that
inclusivism can be accorded at least some initial
plausibility, as part of an account of how the world actually
is.
2. THREE ONTOLOGICAL THEORIES
To make the argumentation clear, it is important to present

ST, BTT and BUT in a way that allows for their intertheoretic
comparison in the light of the relevant data. In particular,
it is important to have a notion of property attribution to
particulars that applies equally well in all three
approaches.6 With this in mind, I shall now review some well-
known points, in order to fix a terminology appropriate for
our purposes (see the ontology textbooks cited above for more
details).
Depending on whether properties are universals or
tropes, that two properties P and P' are the same means here
either that P and P' are numerically identical or that P and
P' perfectly resemble each other (or to put it otherwise,
that P and P' belong in the same natural class (kind,
category) of perfectly similar tropes).
A particular, e.g. an ordinary object or a physical
particle, is an entity that can have or possess properties,
but it is not a property (or relation). According to ST, as
here understood, particularity is primitive and thus
particulars are irreducible substrates which are said to
7
instantiate the properties in question and that are not
themselves properties.8 The peculiar haecceity that any given
particular is differentiates it non-qualitatively (since it
is not a property) from any other particular at any given
time. Thus, leaving epistemological problems aside, the
6
substrate it is could in principle allow us to keep track of

a particular across different times9 or possible worlds.
According to the bundle-theoretic approaches, on the
other hand, particularity is somehow reducible to the
bundling of either universals or tropes by means of some
"compresence" relationship. Hence, a particular is
constituted by either tropes or universals, linked by
compresence, depending on whether we look at the matter from
the point of view of BTT, or BUT, respectively.
When a particular a possesses a property P we say that
there is a certain state of affairs, i.e., 'a has property
P'. From the point of view of ST, this simply means that a
instantiates P. From the standpoint of BUT, it amounts to a's
being a bundle with P as one of its members. As regards BTT,
it must be read as the fact that the bundle of tropes, a,
contains a trope, smallcase p, belonging in the natural
class, capital P, of perfectly resembling tropes ('a has
property P ', as so understood, must not be confused with the
state of affairs 'a has trope p ', which is the state of
affairs to the effect that bundle a contains, as one of its
members, trope p. I use capital and smallcase letters to make
the distinction clear.) We shall also be interested, in the
same intertheoretic fashion, in what we could call the state
of a particular d at a given time. We can think of this as a
conjunctive property, P1 & ... & Pn, that supervenes on the
basic properties, P1, ..., Pn, of d at the time in question.
To say that d is in state P (which we shall abbreviate as
"Pd") then amounts to saying that the conjunctive state of
affairs 'd has P1 & ... & d has Pn' obtains. The conjuncts
here must be understood in one of the three different ways
explained above, depending on which of the three theories in
question is at issue. (Given the distinction between basic
and supervenient properties we can think of bundles as made
up only of basic properties).
7
In line with the tradition, let us say that two

particulars, a and b, are indiscernible (at a time) iff they
have (at the time in question) the same basic properties,
i.e., they are in the same state. The principle of the
identity of indiscernibles (II) then runs as follows: there
cannot be two distinct, indiscernible particulars (at a given
time). Its denial, which we shall call Anti-identity of
indiscernibles (A-II), claims that it is possible that there
be (at some time) two distinct but indiscernible
10
particulars. As is well known, A-II is in line with the
substrate theory, since, by assuming a unique primitive
haecceity corresponding to each particular, we can thereby
always find a difference between two qualitatively alike
particulars (if we assume there are any). As regards the
bundle-theoretic approaches, they part company here. BUT goes
hand in hand with II, whereas BTT should reject it. In fact,
in this approach, we can have in principle two bundles that
are qualitatively alike in that all their tropes are pairwise
perfectly similar, but are numerically different in that each
of them is constituted by its own "private" tropes.
3. TIME AND CHANGE OF PROPERTIES
In each of the three accounts outlined above, change of

properties of particulars over time is best described in
alternative ways. Depending on these ways, we should count
differently the state of affairs types (situations) that at
each time can occur with equal probability in a certain part
of a world (call it a system, to be in tune with the
physicist's terminology that will be appropriate for the next
section) wherein at each time there are always the "same" n
particulars and m alternative states11 in which one or another
of these n particulars can be.12 For reasons that will be
8
explained below the sameness in question will have to be

understood in different ways, depending on the account under
consideration, and it need not be strict numerical identity.
As we shall see, from the point of view of such a strict
identity, the n particulars present in a system at a time t
may be different than the n particulars present in the system
at a later time t'. For the sake of the point I wish to make,
however, we have to assume that the overall number of
particulars involved in the evolution of the system over time
is the minimal one compatible (i) with the general
constraints that I am in the process of specifying and (ii)
with the particular ones that I am about to offer for each
ontological theory at issue. Moreover, we must rule out laws
or facts that influence the system in question in a way that
might modify the prima facie assignments of probabilities
that can be taken to descend from the ontological theories in
question. I shall illustrate the differences among the three
theories by considering toy systems with two particulars and
two states, T and H, at each time.
In ST, as we have seen, substrates are taken to endure
self-identically through time, even when changing their
properties. Hence, all we need for our toy system is two
substrates that never cease to exist (as long as the system
subsists) and that can be in one or another of two states.
Since each such substrate is identified independently of its
properties, it makes sense to use two labels, "a" and "b", to
distinguish them. If we consider the evolution over time of
this system, we can expect the following alternation of four
situations, each with probability 1/4:
(1) Ha & Hb;
(2) Ta & Tb;
9
(3) Ha & Tb;
(4) Ta & Hb.
Call situations such as these, describable by means of

labels, labelled situations.
Let us turn now to change in BTT. Note that (i) tropes
are typically described as tied to one specific particular,
in such a way that the same trope cannot be in two different
particulars. Further, note that (ii) in a bundle theory,
change is naturally viewed as replacement of some member of a
bundle by a different member, so that, strictly speaking,
change over time does not preserve numerical identity of
particulars. By putting ideas (i) and (ii) together, it is at
least an option to be taken into account that BTT should be
committed to what we might call the zero self-identity view
(ZS), according to which, the passage of time involves the
replacement of all tropes by brand new ones, and consequently
the replacement of all particulars by new ones in such a way
that there is absolutely no numerical identity of particulars
over time. For consider a change from a situation with a
particular's having property P to one with the "same"
particular with a different property Q. This must involve the
passage from a bundle of tropes {p, h1, ...., hn} to another
bundle {q, h1', ..., hn'}, where p belongs to class P, and q
belongs to class Q. Then, p ≠ q, and thus the two bundles are
numerically different. If we assume that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, some
hi, is not replaced by a brand new trope, so that hi = hi',
we would have one trope, hi, in two different bundles. I am
not saying that ZS is the only option for BTT, but it can be
naturally associated to it, and for the sake of the point I
wish to make, I find it simpler to assume that BTT involves
ZS. In this picture, to recapture how we commonsensically
speak of identity through time, we can of course say in the
10
"loose and popular sense", as Chisholm and Bishop Butler

would put it (cf. Chisholm 1984, ch. 4), that a given
particular of time t "is identical" with a certain particular
of time t' (in spite of their numerical diversity, due to
ZS), but we can hardly say that there is a fact of the matter
here, since it all depends on which standard for "identity"
we assume. With this in mind, consider again the simple
system with two particulars and two states, H and T. Since
all tropes are at each time replaced by new ones and there is
no real self-identity of particulars over time, it doesn't
make sense to have labels that pick up the same particular at
different times. Accordingly, there can be only these three
possible situations, which can alternatively occur at one
time of another, each with probability 1/3:
(1') two particulars in state H;

(2') two particulars in state T;
(3') one particular in state H and one in state T.
For obvious reasons, we can call situations such as these

unlabelled. Given ZS, each unlabelled situation among (1')-
(3') is at any one time realized in the same way, i.e., by
the annihilation of the tropes of the previous time and the
simultaneous creation of brand new tropes of the kind
appropriate to bring about (1'), (2') or (3'), as the case
may be.
It is crucial to note that, whereas labelled situations
do not exist from the point of view of BTT, for we ruled out
labels for particulars in this approach, unlabelled
situations must be acknowledged from the standpoint of ST,
for clearly in the latter account (1) and (2) can be seen as
less abstract specifications of the more abstract situations
(1') and (2'), respectively, and, more importantly, (3) and
(4) can be seen as two distinct specifications of the one
11
more abstract situation (3') (so that in ST (3') has

probability 2/4 and (1') and (2') have 1/4 each). As this
latter case shows, labelled situations outnumber unlabelled
ones, for an unlabelled situation can correspond to more than
one labelled one, so that in general we have a one-many
mapping of unlabelled onto labelled situations.13
In BUT, as is well known, change is naturally viewed as
due to the fact that in a given bundle, {U1, ..., Un}, some
universal, e.g. U1, is replaced by a different universal, U',
so that in fact the old bundle yields to a numerically
different one. In typical cases, to be sure, the new bundle
is "partially identical" to the old one in that it will
contain at least some of the universals of the old bundle and
we might then call this account of change the partial self-
identity view (PS). But partial identity is no numerical
identity any way and thus, just as in BTT, we might want to
resort in this picture to the loose and popular sense of
identity. For instance, consider a change from a situation
with two bundle-particulars, {BLACK, ROUND}, {WHITE, SQUARE}
at time t followed by one at time t' with two bundle-
particulars, {BLACK, SQUARE}, {WHITE, ROUND}. We might want
to say, e.g., that the black and round particular of time t
changed shape and thus "is" the black and square one of time
t', or that it changed color and thus "is" the white and
round one of time t'. But clearly there is no fact of the
matter. More simply, two particulars were replaced by two
distinct, albeit partially identical, particulars. Going back
with this in mind to our toy system, we should then say, just
as for BTT, that it does not make sense to label particulars
independently of their properties, and we should accordingly
accept only labelled situations. Moreover, the commitment of
BUT to II also rules out the case of two particulars in the
same state, which we have admitted for BTT, and this forces
us to eliminate the labelled situations (1') and (2'). We are
12
then left in our toy system with only one possible situation,
namely (3'), which keeps reoccurring (so to speak) with
probability 1/1. Of course, with more particulars or states
available, the possible changes are more interesting and the
number of equiprobable situations increases (and clearly each
of them has probability less than 1). For instance, with
three states, H, T and U, and two particulars available, we
can have an unlabelled situation with two particulars in
states H and T, respectively, which could be followed, e.g.,
either by one with an H and a U or by one with a T and a U.
4. THREE STATISTICS
By adapting in obvious ways the terminology of physics

textbooks to the ontological terminology used in the previous
sections, we shall now review how statistical mechanics deals
with the issue of counting the number of a priori
equiprobable situations in a system with n physical
particulars and m alternative states that can be occupied by
such particulars, as the system evolves in time. We can limit
ourselves to the typical case, where the particulars are
mutually "identical" in the sense that they share all their
"intrinsic" properties, those which remain constant in time,
but can differ from each other in terms of their "dynamical"
properties, those which can change over time (Hilborn and
Yuca 2002, p. 361).14 The three statistics mentioned in the
introduction correspond to three different ways, envisaged by
statistical mechanics, of counting these situations15.
In MB statistics, we are allowed to label the
particulars independently of the states they occupy. Thus,
for example, if the particulars are two coins and the states
are, for simplicity's sake, just Heads (H) and Tails (T), we
can label the coins as, say, "a" and "b", thereby
13
distinguishing four possible labelled situations,

representable again by (1)-(4), above, already used for the 2
particulars/2 states system as viewed from the standpoint of
ST. This is not surprising, for in ST we also allowed
ourselves the labelling of particulars, in view of their
being haecceities. In general, when this labelling is
allowed, the general formula for computing the number of
equiprobable situations, given n particulars and m states, is
mn, a formula that we should then accept for counting
situations in ST as well.
BE and FD statistics differ from the standard one by
their not allowing a labelling of the particulars under
consideration. Moreover, they differ from each other in that
the latter, but not the former, assumes, in line with II,
that no two particulars can be found in exactly the same
state at a given time. Thus, if we consider again the simple
case of the two coins, the two (3) and (4) situations of the
previous approach reduce in BE statistics to one (with
probability 1/3), representable by (3') above, which we have
found in dealing with BTT. Again, this is not surprising,
since BTT, because of its refusal of haecceities, admits only
unlabelled situations, just as the BE statistics. Since no
constraint is imposed on BE statistics by II, there are of
course two other options with probability 1/3, i.e. (1') and
(2') above, just as in BTT (which in fact accepts A-II). In
general, the BE formula for counting equiprobable situations,
given n particulars and m states is (n + m - 1)!/n!(m - 1)!,
which of course is acceptable from the standpoint of BTT as
well, in view of the analogies we noted. In FD statistics, on
the other hand, just as in BUT, the acceptance of II leads us
to rule out the (1') and (2') situations and we are thus left
with one situation with probability 1/1, namely (1') (but of
course, as we have seen in BUT, we would have more
situations, given more particulars and/or more states
14
available). In general, the FD formula for counting

equiprobable situations, given n particulars and m states, is
m!/n!(m - n)!, a formula we should accept from the
perspective of BUT as well.
In principle, the observation of statistical
frequencies can favor one or another of these approaches
(Huggett 1999, p. 14). In line with what we have seen in
comparing ST, BTT and BUT, it is clear that MB statistics, by
acknowledging labelled situations, automatically acknowledges
the unlabelled ones of BE statistics, which can be put in an
obvious one-many correspondence with the former. Suppose we
can only observe unlabelled situations and we wonder whether
this is just an epistemological limitation, since in fact an
observed unlabelled situation may hide several labelled ones.
We could settle the matter by observing the frequency with
which the labelled situation in question occurs. This can be
illustrated with the two coin case. If there are labelled
situations, then situation (3') corresponds, in light of what
we have noted above, to the two labelled situations (3) and
(4), whereas (1') and (2') correspond to one each, i.e., (1)
and (2), respectively. Hence, (3') should be assigned
probability 2/4 and the remaining 1/2 should be equally
subdivided between each of (2') and (3'). Situation (3')
should then tend to occur more frequently. If in fact we
observe that (3') occurs more frequently, we can legitimately
suppose that there are two hidden labelled situations behind
it, and more generally that there are labelled situations. We
should then prefer the MB statistics, if we wish to make
correct predictions. If, on the other hand, the (1')-(3')
situations occur with similar frequency, we have no reason to
suspect that there are unlabelled situations and we should
then prefer the BE statistics. Finally, if the only situation
to occur is (3'), we have reason to think not only that there
are no labelled situations, but also that only some of the
15
unlabelled ones subsist, namely those envisaged by the FD

statistics, which should then be preferred.
5. TWO INCLUSIVIST OPTIONS
Given the noted analogies in the treatment of a system with n

particulars and m states by ST, BTT and BUT on the one hand
and the MB, BE and FD statistics on the other hand, it is
reasonable to think that one of these three ontological
theories we have considered (or some other theory in the same
ontological tradition) could have empirical evidence in its
favor. For if we found, in the way outlined above, that one
of the three statistics is best used to make predictions, we
could at least tentatively infer that we should count
situations in the way indicated by the prevailing statistics
and then accordingly prefer an ontological theory that leads
us to count situations in that way. Some such strategy has
been used to argue that an anti-haecceitistic ontology should
be preferred in view of the fact that in QM non-standard
statistics is preferred to the standard one (Redhead and
Teller, 1991, 1992).
Now, it is true that experimental results suggest that
non-standard statistics should be used in dealing with
quantum particles. In fact, as is well known, we cannot
measure simultaneously position and momentum of a quantum
particle and consequently we cannot expect to label it so as
to keep track of its trajectory over time. But it should not
be forgotten that experimental results also suggest that both
non-standard statistics have their own domains of application
in QM, for (i) BE statistics is best used in dealing with
bosons (e.g., photons),16 for which it is in fact assumed that
two of them can be in exactly the same state, and (ii) FD
statistics best fits fermions (e.g., electrons and protons),
16
which are in fact assumed to obey the so called Pauli

17
exclusion principle , ruling out that two fermions can be in
exactly the same state.18
The differences between bosons and fermions, emerging
from their requiring the BE and FD statistics, respectively,
can be highlighted by quoting Peter Simons's (1994, p. 380)
way of summing up what some quantum experts19 say on these
matters:
[we cannot] trace the histories of fermions across

different interactions; If two electrons settle down
into a helium shell and then leave again, we have no way
to say which is which, even though they were in
principle distinguishable while superposed ... The
difference between fermions and bosons is ... that while
fermions can in principle be distinguished at a time if
not over time [given the Pauli exclusion principle],
bosons cannot always even be distinguished at a time
[for two of them can be in exactly the same state].
In other words, a boson and a fermion are alike in that for

neither there is (at least in an empiricist perspective) a
fact of the matter regarding their identity over time, which
surfaces in the fact that in both cases we must abandon MB
statistics in favor of a statistical approach wherein
particulars are not labelled. Similarly, we have seen that
bundles of tropes and bundles of universals are alike in that
for neither there is a fact of the matter regarding their
identity over time. On the other hand, bosons and fermions
differ in that the former but not the latter fail to obey the
Pauli exclusion principle, which surfaces in the fact that
the former are associated to the BE statistics and the latter
to the FD statistics. Similarly, bundles of tropes favor A-
II and thus two of them can be in the same state at a time,
17
whereas bundles of universals obey II and thus two of them

cannot be in the same state at the same time.
Patently, this could at least suggest a version of
inclusivism, but this possibility - like inclusivism in
general - seems to have gone unnoticed. Simons, with his
attention to both QM and the bundle-theoretic line of
thought, is a paradigmatic example of this. In fact, in line
with the exclusivist tradition, he looks for a way to
accommodate all the data within a version of BTT, e.g. by
suggesting that the Pauli exclusion principle is a constraint
on the formation of bundles of tropes (p. 381). Contrariwise,
if we free our mind from the exclusivist dogma, we can take
at face value the evidence in favor of both kinds of bundles
and claim that bosons are bundles of tropes and fermions
bundles of universals.
But perhaps we could be even more inclusivist, for the
quantum-theoretical success of non-standard statistics does
not rule out that MB statistics is still fit when one deals
with ordinary objects such as coins, and more generally with
items that can be treated as classical objects. In fact, in
classical physics, it is standardly assumed that an object
can be labelled in such a way as to keep track of its
trajectory over time. Moreover, it could be added that
ordinary experience, wherein presumably we deal with ordinary
objects, suggests the use of MB statistics (as the above
example with ordinary coins suggests). Now, as we saw, MB
statistics points toward the substrate theory and we could
then at least tentatively suppose that, beside the bundles
that bosons and fermions are, there are also substrates,
i.e., ordinary objects. Of course, it is far from obvious
that in the end the classical success of MB statistics is
best cashed ontologically in this way (Huggett 1999, Gordon
2002), but it must be conceded that it at least invites to an
inclusivist theoretical leap.20
18
To give a little more plausibility to the forms of

inclusivism that we have considered, it may not be amiss to
at least sketch from an ontological point of view a way in
which the two kinds of bundles can coexist, and then how they
can coexist with substrates. First of all, even after
admitting two kinds of bundles, we can limit ourselves to the
postulation of a single compresence nexus, which can link
together either tropes or universals into a bundle. The "or"
is exclusive here, for there is no need to suppose that
tropes and universals can go together into a single bundle.
On the other hand, we can allow for relational states of
affairs involving both kinds of bundles as constituents, for
once we have admitted that compresence has generated the
bundles in question, what should preclude that? Nor should we
deny that the two kinds of bundles can causally interact,
for, e.g., we can view causation as a relation between states
of affairs, and the states of affairs in question may very
well involve bundles of the two kinds as constituents. Let us
turn now to the coexistence of the bundles with substrates.
Given the suggested identification of ordinary objects with
substrates and the widespread intuition that the macrolevel
somehow supervenes on the quantum world (Horgan 1982), one
option that suggests itself is that substrates and the states
of affairs involving them supervene on the states of affairs
with just bundles. To be sure, if supervenience is
interpreted à la Armstrong, as an "ontological free lunch"
that does not imply the existence of the supervenient
entities (1997, p. 12), this would not be the right choice
from the inclusivist perspective. For then the substrates,
qua merely supervenient, would not really exist along with
the bundles. But there is no good reason to follow Armstrong
here. Although he finds the "free lunch" idea plausible, he
himself admits (1997, p. 12) that "it is not clear how the
thesis that what supervenes is no addition of being is to be
19
proved". And since the thesis is not proved, the best course,
it seems to me, is to stay with the more plausible view that
the supervenient is indeed an addition to being (as well
argued, e.g., in Castañeda 1990, ch. 2).
I think we can grant that an ontological picture along
these lines can make sense, for it does not seem in principle
worse than the exclusivist frameworks that we are accostumed
to see in ontological treatises such as the ones by Armstrong
and Loux mentioned above. We could then reasonably propose
for consideration that all of the following abductive
inferences to the best explanation (or the like), or at least
the first two of them, be simultaneously accepted:
bosons obey BE statistics

BTT predicts the success of BE statistics
___________________________________________________
bosons are bundles of tropes.
Fermions obey FD statistics

BUT predicts the success of FD statistics
___________________________________________________
fermions are bundles of universals.
Ordinary objects obey MB statistics

ST predicts the success of MB statistics
_________________________________________________
ordinary objects are substrates.21
To admit that the simultaneous acceptance of (the first two

of) these inferences is worth serious consideration is in
fact to grant (a) the possibility of inclusivism. Moreover,
even though it is of course not enough to claim its truth, it
suffices to claim that (b) at least the particular forms of
inclusivism that have been considered here (two kinds of
20
bundles together or two kinds of bundles plus substrates in

one fell swoop) provide hypotheses with some initial
plausibility regarding the way the actual world happens to
be.
6. SOME POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
I shall now discuss some arguments22 that might be put forward

against (the possibility of) inclusivism, as considered in
general or in one or both of its two particular forms
considered above (the context should make it clear what
counts as target of each specific objection). These
objections might generate the impression that one or both of
the conclusions (a) and (b) at the end of the previous
section are not well-warranted after all, but I shall try to
push this feeling aside, at least to some extent.
First, it is natural to think, allow me the pun, that
inclusivism is rather unnatural, or to put it otherwise,
counterintuitive or implausible. In fact, this is witnessed
precisely by the fact that ontologists have repeatedly failed
to even take it into consideration. But since the above
argument in its favor has some legitimacy, to label its
conclusion as "unnatural" cannot be the end of the matter. At
best, this labelling merely poses a challenge, namely that of
trying to pinpoint exactly where the feeling of unnaturalness
comes from. Its source may turn out to be a real problem, but
perhaps it may also be put to rest. Let us then move to more
specific objections, some of which may possibly account for
the unnaturalness feeling.
One may object to inclusivism in the light of Ockham's
razor, for clearly exclusivism is prima facie strikingly more
economical than its rival is. But consider the paradigmatic
case of the Australian black swans. Before discovering them,
21
to postulate black swans would have been a multiplication of

(kinds of) entities, beyond necessity. But not so, after
observing them. On empirical grounds, we can (indeed sometime
must) admit new kinds of entities in our ontological
inventory, even though, before the relevant empirical
observations, this move might have seemed unnecessary and
unmotivated.
It could be further objected however that inclusivism
is counterintuitive on more specific empirical grounds. For
there are properties, such as electric charge, which are
possessed by both bosons and fermions and which should then
be considered, according to inclusivism, as tropes on the one
side and universals on the other side. This much must be
admitted, but why precisely is it counterintuitive? I suspect
that, when pressed, this charge leads us back to Ockam’s
razor. In fact, as Armstrong reports (1978, vol. I, pp. 85-
86, and 1989, p. 17), ontological theories that admit both
tropes and universals have been proposed on a priori grounds.
In these accounts, for any natural resemblance class of
tropes there is always a corresponding universal grounding
the unity of this class, which allows, e.g., positive
electric charge to be viewed as both trope and universal.
Now, Armstrong finds no way of criticizing these theories, if
not by appealing to Ockam's razor, on the ground that they
are a priori less economical than approaches that just admit
tropes and dispense with universals or viceversa. To be sure,
Armstrong may be right in this critique as long as we judge
the matter a priori, but the point is that, according to my
argument, we seem to have good reasons to postulate both
tropes and universals, on empirical grounds.
It might be retorted however that this much is true
only for some of the properties, namely those that we find in
both fermions and bosons and that it is precisely this
disparity that sounds strange. Despite this, however, once we
22
allow for an ontology driven à la Quine by empirical

considerations, any uneasiness must be put aside here.
Similarly, what Putnam (1975, ch. 20) has proposed as regards
existence claims in mathematics might seem prima facie
strange. Namely, that there exist in fact only some sets
(those needed for reconstructing the mathematics actually
used in physics), among the transfinitely many ones whose
existence can be conceived of from standard set theory. At
first glance, it is indeed natural to be more radical and say
either that the nominalist is right and none of them exist or
that the Platonist is right and all of them exist. And yet,
once we concede to Quine that existence claims should always
be empirically motivated, we begin to see that Putnam’s
proposal is not as outrageous as it might seem. In the same
vein, an empirical basis has been proposed here, which tells
us that only in some cases we should admit both tropes and
universals, even though a priori we might tend to be radical
one way or another (either by always admitting both tropes
and universals or by never admitting more than one of these
categories, when it comes to property attribution to
particulars).
But even if we are willing to swallow in some cases
both tropes and universals, the opponent of inclusivism might
insist, surely we should not want to admit that a trope can
become a universal, for that would sound like a category
mistake. Yet, there are reactions among quantum particles,
which give rise to fermions from bosons in a way that
preserve properties that are common to both kinds of
particle. For instance, electric charge is preserved in the
creation of particles and anti-particles from photons or of a
lepton and an anti-neutrino from a W-boson. Thus, inclusivism
seems to force us to say that the electric charge of the
boson changes from trope to universal in passing to the
fermions. It can be said in reply, however, that there is no
23
need to suppose that a property changes from trope to

universal. When in a reaction a boson b with property P gives
rise to two fermions f1 and f2 with property P, all we have
to admit is that "P" corresponds on the one hand, to a
natural class of tropes, and on the other hand, to a
universal of which the tropes in question are "perfect
instances", or something like that (as it is said in those
theories that admit a priori both tropes and universals). We
can then say that a certain trope p, which was both a member
of the bundle-boson b and a member of the natural resemblance
class in question has been annihilated (as required by the
view that tropes depend for their existence on the very
particular that they contribute to constitute) and that the
corresponding universal has come to contribute (by the
compresence relation) to the constitution of two new bundles
of universals, the fermions f1 and f2.
Finally, let us consider the worry that in spite of the
above replies the feeling of unnaturalness is not fully
removed, so that physicists or even ontologists will never
consider inclusivism as a serious option for the real world.
This cannot of course be ruled out. But in itself it should
not prevent philosophers from admitting at least the
possibility of inclusivism and from exploring it in more
detail in comparison with exclusivism. Similarly, Everett's
many world interpretation of quantum mechanics has been
judged as "metaphysically extravagant" and Putnam’s quantum
logic approach as "hard to understand, let alone believe"
(Stairs 1998, p. 893) and physicists have hardly sponsored
either proposals. Nevertheless, they have been judged worth
of serious consideration, if not to accept them, at least
because it is important to compare them with the
alternatives, pinpoint exactly why we want to reject them or
in order to incorporate ideas inspired by them in more
24
plausible proposals (see, e.g., Van Fraassen 1991 and Hughes

1989).
7. CONCLUSION
Inclusivism can be viewed as analogous to Quine's (1953) and

Putnam's (1975) proposals regarding non-Euclidean geometry
and quantum logic. That is, as a theoretically or
metaphysically possible option regarding the way the world
is, which has been neglected or considered impossible,
because the relevant empirical data were unconceived of or
missing or at least not yet put in the appropriate
perspective. I have offered no argument of course to claim
that inclusivism offers, all things considered, the best way
to accommodate the data about our world. Other adjustments in
the overall web of beliefs, to put it in Quinean terms, could
of course be made. But I hope to have shown that it is a
viable path and therefore, before dismissing it, one should
argue that its theoretical costs are higher than what other
alternatives can offer.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I first thought of inclusivism (dubbing it as pluralism),

while working with Mauro Dorato on a joint presentation about
the relationship between physics and commonsense ontology,
"Folk Realism and Scientific Realism", for the Third National
Conference of the Italian Society of Analytic Philosophy in
Bologna, 1998, and the Third European Conference in Analytic
Philosophy, Maribor, Slovenia, 1999. The basic theme of this
paper was thus first proposed in these two contexts, although
it was at that time based on Lewis' (1986) notion of
haecceitism. It was first presented in some detail and with
25
the version of haecceitism adopted here in the conference in

honor of David Armstrong, Properties, Modalities and States
of Affairs, Konstanz, January 2003, where professor Armstrong
and Barry Smith offered valuable comments and encouragment.
Claudio Garola has patiently clarified for me some physical
matters and provided bibliographic suggestions. Two anonymous
Synthese referees insightfully criticized a previous version
of this paper.
NOTES
1
Lewis does not appeal to the notion of haecceity and
defines haecceitism and anti-haecceitism in terms of possible
worlds without touching on the issue of identity across time.
2
At any rate, I think that Teller 1998 convincingly replies
to Van Fraassen and Huggett's points are nicely countered by
Gordon 2002, who also replies to other attempts to deflate
the anti-haecceitistic ontological significance of the
empirical success of non-standard statistics in QM.
3
As is well known, tropes are properties conceived of not as
universals, but as themselves individual entities, just as
the particulars, such as ordinary objects or physical
particles, of which they are properties. Tropes themselves
could then legitimately be called "particulars," but here I
shall restrict this term to what may be called standard
particulars, i.e., ordinary objects and physical particles.
4
Loux notes (p. 99), to be sure, that Berkley accepts the
bundle theory for ordinary objects and the substrate theory
for minds, but does not give it much emphasis and does not
explicitly draws from it the inclusivist moral I wish to
point out. In any case, a path for inclusivism very different
from the Berkleyan one, i.e. a posteriori and compatible with
a physicalist perspective, will be followed here.
26
5
I had originally used the term "pluralism" instead of
"inclusivism." I resorted to the latter, once an anonymous
referee pointed out that my proposal could be confused with
the "ontological pluralism" discussed in Dupré 1993. Even
after my choice of a new name, it might be worth dwelling on
the difference. Dupré's pluralism results from combining
Quine's view according to which one's ontological commitments
are implied by what one's theory quantifies over with the
anti-reductionist stance that different overlapping theories
(such as quantum mechanics, ordinary physics, chemistry) must
coexist to give an exhaustive description of the whole of
reality. In this view, one is committed to the entities
implied by each of the accepted theories. In contrast,
inclusivism does not necessarily arise from an acceptance of
different mutually irreducible theories. The idea is rather
that there may be one single overall (correct) theory that is
committed for empirical reasons to entities that standard
ontology has conceived of as incompatible.
6
Properties can be conceived as either (i) fine-grained
concepts or meanings of predicates in such a way that any
predicate is assumed to have, in a basically a priori
fashion, its own corresponding property-meaning, or (ii)
"sparsely" (cf. Lewis 1986), in such a way that it is an
empirical matter, to be decided with the help of natural
science, which property, if any, corresponds to a predicate.
I think the two pictures can coexist, for example in the way
proposed by Bealer 1982, who distinguishes concepts on the
one side and qualities on the other. In any case, here I
shall be concerned with sparse properties, or qualities in
Bealer's terminology, and thus talk of properties in the
following is to be understood in this way. For simplicity's
sake, I neglect relations as much as possible, thereby
27
concentrating on properties, but what I say about them can be

generalized to relations, when appropriate.
7
Whether universals or tropes, as the case may be; here we
could distinguish two sub-theories (see Armstrong 1989, p.
114), but it is not important for present purposes.
8
Loux (1998, ch. 3), like some other ontologists, puts it
differently: particulars are not substrates but are
constituted by substrates as well as by properties
instantiated by the substrates. For present purposes, we can
leave this version of the substrate view aside.
9
For the aims of this paper we can assume numerical self-
identity of substrates over time, rather than some
"genidentity" grouping together distinct temporal parts, each
of which counts as a substrate in its own right (on this
option, see, e. g., Armstrong 1997, § 7.2 and Loux 1998, ch.
6).
10
There are of course non-modal versions of II (no two
particulars are indiscernible) and A-II (there are
indiscernible particulars). For present purposes we need not
be concerned with them.
11
The states are alternative in the sense that a particular
can be in only one of them at a time.
12
If one wishes to avoid this talk of systems, typical of
physics but unusual in ontology, one can assume that we are
considering mini-worlds involving just n particulars and m
alternative states, rather than different time sections of a
system with n particulars and m alternative states somehow
encapsulated in a complex world. With appropriate but obvious
adjustments and terminological modifications, the point I
wish to make would surface any way.
13
In BTT, situation (3') has probability 1/3, whereas it has
1/2 in the substrate theory, essentially because we can
expect that one of the other two options can evolve into (3')
28
in only one possible way: by replacement of all tropes. But

if we did not assume ZS, there would be other options and to
settle how we should count equiprobable situations would
become murkier. For example, if we assume that tropes can be
replaced by new ones only in the case of a qualitative
change, i.e. only by tropes belonging in a different class,
then there are two possible evolutions of a (1')-situation
realized by two bundles {h'} and {h"} into a situation with
one H and one T: (i) h' remains and h" is replaced by a new
trope t, or (ii) h" remains and h' is replaced by t.
14
A state of a particular at a time can be seen, as in the
previous section, as the conjunction of all the basic
properties (whether intrinsic or dynamic) of the particular
at the time in question.
15
All the technical details on the three statistics and their
application to physics can be found in ter Haar 1995. For a
more philosophical treatment see Van Fraassen (1991, ch. 11,
and also 1984, which proves to be a good not very technical
introduction to the topic.)
16
As shown paradigmatically by the phenomenon of black body
radiation (Feynman et al. 1965, p. 4-8).
17
Which is seen at work for example in the way electrons
behave in helium and lithium atoms (Feynman et al. 1965, p.
4-13).
18
More precisely, quantum physicists speak of systems
involving particles and "observables" that can take up
different values in different experimental observations. In
this way of putting matters, the T or H option assumed for
the coins corresponds to an observable that can take two
values, where T and H correspond to the two values in
question. For instance, in a hypersimplified example
parallelling the above case of the two coins, we could
imagine a two particle system and the observable 'spin along
29
the z axis', which is assumed to have two possible values,

"Up" and "Down". If the two particles are bosons and we
arrange an experimental setup for the determination of the
values that this observable can take, we have three possible
results: (a) two particles with spin Up, (b) two particles
with Spin Down, (c) one particle with spin Up and the other
with spin Down. They correspond to the (1')-(3') situations
envisaged above for the coins. On the other hand, if the two
particles are fermions, because of the Pauli exclusion
principle, the only possible result is (c). (Thanks to
Claudio Garola for suggesting this example and the
appropriateness, for clarity's sake, of relating the
physicist's terminology to the one I have used here.)
19
Simons discusses Feynman et al. 1965, Mittelstaedt 1986 and
Van Fraassen 1991. These texts can be consulted for more
details on the quantum-theoretical ideas that I have
exploited here.
20
Of course, to argue for inclusivism, it is enough to admit
simultaneously two kinds of bundles. Nevertheless, to also
appeal to classical physics in order to advance for
consideration a more complicated form of inclusivism is not
out of order. For it is a fact of the matter that, although
in some areas of macrophysics (e.g., superconductivity),
quantum mechanics is used, in most cases classical physics
still provides the best tool to deal with the phenomena. As
Roger Penrose puts it, at the end of ch. 6 of The Emperor’s
New Mind (1989), "We know that at the submicroscopic level of
things the quantum laws hold sway; but at the level of
cricket balls it is classical physics." As is well-known, of
course, it is far from clear how the classical and the
quantum picture can coexist. In fact, Penrose goes on adding
that "we need to understand ... how the quantum world merges
with the classical." Needless to say, it is far beyond the
30
scope of this paper to even sketch an overall solution to

this gigantic puzzle in a way that goes beyond the simple
proposal of a version of inclusivism wherein bundles and
substrates coexist. For my purposes, it is enough to admit,
with Penrose, that quantum physics (for fermions and bosons)
and classical one (for ordinary objects such as cricket balls
and coins) coexist in current total science. I might add,
however, that I am sympathetic with the view that the
classical world is linked to the quantum world by some sort
of supervenience relation (Horgan 1982), probably of the
"global" kind (Kim 1987, § 5). (See more on this below.)
21
Perhaps this point in favor of substrates can be reinforced
as follows. As is well-known, the bundle-theoretic option is
a typical empiricist move. The point is, empiricists claim,
that we have no experience of substrates and thus we have no
reason to postulate them. The attempt to defend a bundle
theory on the basis of QM is similarly empiricist in spirit:
since we have no evidence of primitive haecceity in quantum
particles, we should not postulate anything that reinstates
them as a metaphysical axiom, independently of empirical
evidence. If this use of QM is correct, and if indeed we have
no empirical evidence of substrates, we should rule out
substrates, if we want to be empiricists, as far as possible.
But it can perhaps be claimed that in ordinary perception we
do have evidence in favor of substrates. For example,
Armstrong 1997 (p. 96) argues as follows:
Now consider the content of a perception. Basic

perceptions (as opposed, for instance, to perceptions of
absences, which are more sophisticated) would seem to
take the form 'This has certain properties' and/or 'This
has certain relations to that'. In a visual case it may
be a matter of an object having a certain shape and
31
color and having a certain spatial relation to other

things. Will it not be natural to take the 'this' and
the 'that' to referring to particulars which are not
wholly constituted by their properties and relations? If
so, then it can be claimed that the peculiarity of
particulars, the fact that they are not exhausted by
their properties and relations, is part of the content
of perceptions.
22
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out most of
them.
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Chisholm, R.: 1989, On Metaphysics, University of Minnesota
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Dupré, J.: 1993 The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical

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View, Clarendon Press, London.
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Quantum-mechanical Statistics and the Inclusivist Approach to the Nature of

Article in Synthese · January 2006

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Ph. number +39-0733-358306

QUANTUM-MECHANICAL STATISTICS AND THE INCLUSIVIST APPROACH TO

ABSTRACT. There have been attempts to derive anti-

There is a growing body of literature suggesting that quantum

Boltzmann (MB). Haecceitism can be conceived of in different

asserts, once it is made explicit, that the disjunction is

inclusivism. Secondarily, on the assumption that the first

2. THREE ONTOLOGICAL THEORIES

To make the argumentation clear, it is important to present

substrate it is could in principle allow us to keep track of

In line with the tradition, let us say that two

3. TIME AND CHANGE OF PROPERTIES

In each of the three accounts outlined above, change of

explained below the sameness in question will have to be

(1) Ha & Hb;

(2) Ta & Tb;

(3) Ha & Tb;

(4) Ta & Hb.

Call situations such as these, describable by means of

"loose and popular sense", as Chisholm and Bishop Butler

(1') two particulars in state H;

For obvious reasons, we can call situations such as these

more abstract situation (3') (so that in ST (3') has

By adapting in obvious ways the terminology of physics

distinguishing four possible labelled situations,

available). In general, the FD formula for counting

unlabelled ones subsist, namely those envisaged by the FD

5. TWO INCLUSIVIST OPTIONS

Given the noted analogies in the treatment of a system with n

which are in fact assumed to obey the so called Pauli

[we cannot] trace the histories of fermions across

In other words, a boson and a fermion are alike in that for

whereas bundles of universals obey II and thus two of them

To give a little more plausibility to the forms of

bosons obey BE statistics

Fermions obey FD statistics

Ordinary objects obey MB statistics

To admit that the simultaneous acceptance of (the first two

bundles together or two kinds of bundles plus substrates in

6. SOME POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS

I shall now discuss some arguments22 that might be put forward

to postulate black swans would have been a multiplication of

allow for an ontology driven à la Quine by empirical

need to suppose that a property changes from trope to

plausible proposals (see, e.g., Van Fraassen 1991 and Hughes

Inclusivism can be viewed as analogous to Quine's (1953) and

I first thought of inclusivism (dubbing it as pluralism),

the version of haecceitism adopted here in the conference in

concentrating on properties, but what I say about them can be

in only one possible way: by replacement of all tropes. But

the z axis', which is assumed to have two possible values,

scope of this paper to even sketch an overall solution to

Now consider the content of a perception. Basic

color and having a certain spatial relation to other

Armstrong, D.: 1978, Nominalism and Realism and Universals

Dupré, J.: 1993 The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical

Putnam, H.: 1983 Realism nd Reason, Philosophical Papers,

Van Fraassen, B.: 1991, Quantum Mechanics, an Empiricist

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