Writ of Habeas Corpus and Writ of Amparo
Arrest issued in the case of People vs
1.Datukan Malang Salibo v. Wardeneto po i.s. number
XV-02-INQ-21H-03069 pkiindicate sa reso form at
referral slip tas pdf send sa yahoo for final
ocpcaloocan2020@yahoo.com po pasend n po agad
salamat
Facts:
Butukan S. Malang, one of the accused in the
Maguindanao massacre,had a pending warrant of arrest
issued by the trial court in People vs Ampatuan Jr. et. al.
When Datukan Malang Salibo learned that the police
officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao
suspectedhim to be Butukan S. Malang, he presented
himself to clear his name.Salibo presented to the police
pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes and
other documents tending to prove that a certain Datukan
Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia when the massacre
happened. The authorities, however, apprehended and
detained him. He questioned the legality of his detention
via Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA,
maintaining that he is not the accused Batukan S. Malang.
The CA issued the writ, making it returnable to the judge
of RTC Taguig. After hearing of the Return, the trial court
granted Salibo’s petition and ordered his immediate
release from detention.
On appeal by the Warden, the CA reversed the RTC ruling.
The CA held that even assuming Salibo was not the
Batukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest,
orderly course of trial must be pursued and the
usual remedies exhausted before the writ of habeas
corpus may be invoked. Salibo’s proper remedy, according
to the CA, should have been a motion to quash
information and/or warrant of arrest.
On the other hand, Salibo believes that the Warden erred
in appealing the RTC decision before the CA. Salibo argued
that although the CA delegated to the RTC the authority
to hear the Warden’s Return, the RTC’s ruling should be
deemed as the CA ruling, and hence, it should have been
appealed directly before the SC.
Issue 1: W/N Salibo properly availed the remedy of a
petition for writ of habeas corpus
Held: Yes. Habeas corpus is the remedy for a person
deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such
cases, the person is not under any lawful process and
is continuously being illegally detained.
First, it was Butukan S. Malang, not Salibo, who was
charged and accused in the Information and Alias
Warrant of 
Ampatuan. Based on the pieces of evidence presented,
Salibo sufficiently established that he could not have
been Butukan S.Malang. Therefore, Salibo was not
arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an
offense, nor restrained under a lawful process or an order
of a court. Second, Salibo was not validly arrested
without a warrant. When he was in the presence of
authorities, he was neither committing nor attempting to
commit an offense, and the police officers had no
personal knowledge of any offense that he might have
committed. Salibo was also not an escape prisoner.
The police officers have deprived him of his liberty
without due process of law. Therefore, Salibo correctly
availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Issue 2: W/N a motion to quash information and/or
warrant of arrest is the proper remedy in cases where a
person with a mistaken identity is detained
Held: No, the CA’s contention is not correct. Salibo’s
proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information
and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a
Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if
petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect
he alleged could not have been cured by mere
amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of
Arrest. Changing the name of the accused appearing in
the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from “Butukan
S. Malang” to“Datukan Malang Salibo” will not cure the
lack of preliminary investigation in this case. Likewise, a
motion for reinvestigation will not cure the defect of lack
of preliminary investigation.
Issue 3: W/N the Warden correctly appealed the RTC
ruling on the Return before the CA
Held: Yes. An application for a writ of habeas corpus may
be made through a petition filed before CA or any of its
members, the CA or any of its members in instances
authorized by law, or the RTC or any of its presiding
judges. The court or judge grants the writ and requires the
officer or person having custody of the person allegedly
restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ. A hearing
on the return of the writ is then conducted.
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from
that which issued the writ. Should the court issuing the
writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made
returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide the
petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation,
the lower court acquires the power and authority to
determine the merits of the petition for habeas corpus.
Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision
appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction
over decisions of the lower court.
2. Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 568 SCRA 1
(2008) (GORO NOTES)
“While victims of enforced disappearances are separated
from the rest of the world behind secret walls, they are
not separated from the constitutional protection of their
basic rights. The constitution is an overarching sky that
covers all in its protection.” Thus the Court began its
decision in the first very petition filed for a Writ of
Amparo.
As to the Writ’s origin and nature, the Court said: “The
writ of amparo originated in Mexico. ‘Amparo’ literally
means ‘protection’ in Spanish.” Amparo “combines the
principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the
limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law
tradition which prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to
enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in
particular cases, but prevents them from using this
power to make law for the entire nation.” Through time,
adoption and adaptations in some other places, it has also
begun to assume different forms for different purposes –
(1) amparo libertad for the protection of personal
freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2)
amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the
constitutionality of statutes; (3) amparo casacion for the
judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a
judicial decision; (4) amparo administrativo for the
judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) amparo
agrario for the protection of peasants’ rights derived
from the agrarian reform process.
In the Philippines, before the adoption of the Amparo
Rules, we had the constitutional guarantee of right to
life, liberty and security under the Due Process Clause
and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
(Art. II, §§1 and 2), enforceable by means of the writ of
habeas corpus (Art. III, §15) as well as the Grave Abuse
Clause69 (Art. VIII, §1, ¶2). On the Grave Abuse Clause,
the Court said: “The Clause accords a similar general
protection to human rights extended by the amparo
contra leyes, amparo casacion, and amparo
administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the
remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of
the 1987 Constitution. The Clause is an offspring of the
U.S. common law tradition of judicial review, which finds
its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.” But the
means then available were obviously inadequate remedy
to pressing problems of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances which cried out for better solutions. Thus,
the writ of amparo. “While constitutional rights can be
protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through
remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule
102, these remedies may not be adequate to address the
pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to
resolve a petition for a writ of amparo through summary
proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim
and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid
writ of the common law and civil law traditions – borne
out of the Latin American and Philippine experience of
human rights abuses – offers a better remedy to
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and
threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief
as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only
substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs
available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine
criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
liability for damages requiring preponderance of
evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.”
In fine, amparo writ serves both preventive and curative
roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearnces. The Amparo Rule was intended
to address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings”
and “enforced disappearances.” Its coverage, in its
present form, is confined to these two instances or to
threats thereof. And what do you mean by those terms?
Extralegal killings are killings committed without due
process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings. On the other hand, enforced
disappearances are attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a
person by a government official or organized groups or
private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State
to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty which places such persons outside the protection
of law.
What reliefs are available? One would be the production
by the responsible officials and persons of all official and
unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in
connection with their case, all medical reports, records
and charts, reports of any treatment given or
recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to
include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military and
civilian) who attended to the brothers while in detention.
And, in this regard, the Court clarified the nature of an
amparo production order. “The production order under
the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search
warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutionalprovision is a
protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion
of the government, not a protection of the government
from the demand of the people such as respondents.
Instead, the amparo production order may be likened to
the production of documents or things under Section 1,
Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.”
Another relief is the disclosure of the present places of
official assignments of identified military personnel who
might have had something to do with the abduction,
detention and torture of the amparo petitioners. “The
disclosure of the present places of assignment of [two
military men] whom respondents both directly implicated
as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is
relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding
their areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure would
also help ensure that these military officers can be served
with notices and court processes in relation to any
investigation and action for violation of the respondents’
rights.”
And by way of final note, the Court declared: “The writ of
amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns
and prisoners behind secret walls.”
3. Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 (2009) and 612
SCRA 685 (2010) (GORO NOTES)
The remedy under the Writ of Amparo is a work in
progress, and we are all witnesses to the same.
In this case the Court further expounded on the nature
and importance of the Writ of Amparo. The Court said
that the Writ of Amparo “does not determine guilt nor
pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather,
it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for
the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.” The
Court further explained that “[i]n all these cases, the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary
goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of
the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are
restored. We highlight this nature of a Writ of Amparo
case at the outset to stress that the unique situations that
call for the issuance of the writ, as well as the
considerations and measures necessary to address these
situations, may not at all be the same as the standard
measures and procedures in ordinary court actions and
proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The
Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress,
as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through
time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws
that Congress may promulgate.”
In regard to the need for some adjustments, specially with
respect to matters of evidence, the Court explained that
flexibility is necessary under the unique circumstances
that enforced disappearance cases pose to the courts. To
have an effective remedy, the standard of evidence must
be responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. “Thus,
while we must follow the substantial evidence rule, we
must observe flexibility in considering the evidence we
shall take into account. The fair and proper rule, to our
mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in
their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise
inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is
consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other
words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of
reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the
issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of
adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be
admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.”
In keeping with the idea that the remedy under the Writ
of Amparo is a work in progress, take note of what the
Court said in Burgos v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 621 SCRA 481
(2010) – even as some of the named respondents had
retired or been reassigned elsewhere, they, as present
respondents, “shall continue to be personally impleaded
for purposes of the responsibilities and accountabilities
they may have incurred during their incumbencies.”
4.1 BURGOS V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO G.R. No. 183711
22 June 2010
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: Court of Appeals: Petition
for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
FACTS:
At around 1:00 in the afternoon of April 28, 2007, Jonas
Joseph T. Burgos – a farmer advocate and a member of
Kilusang Magbubukid sa Bulacan was forcibly taken and
abducted by a group of four (4) men and a woman from
the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant,
located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall,
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
On April 30, 2007, the petitioner, Edita Burgos, held a
press conference and announced that her son Jonas was
missing. That same day, the petitioner sought
confirmation from the guard if the person abducted was
her son Jonas. In a subsequent police investigation and
Land Transportation Office (LTO) verification, it was
discovered that plate number TAB 194 was registered to a
1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle owned by a certain Mauro B.
Mudlong. The said vehicle was seized and impounded on
June 24, 2006 for transporting timber without permit.
However, in May 2007, right after Jonas’ abduction was
made public, it was discovered that plate number TAB
194 of this 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle was missing, and the
engine and other spare parts were “cannibalized.” The
police was likewise able to generate cartographic sketches
of two of the abductors of Jonas based on its interview of
eyewitnesses.
On August 29, 2007, the Philippine National Police-
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG)
presented Emerito Lipio a.k.a. Ka Tibo/Ka Cris, Marlon D.
Manuel a.k.a. Ka Carlo, and Melissa Concepcion Reyes
a.k.a. Ka Lisa/Ramil to support the theory that elements
of the New People’s Army (NPA) perpetrated the
abduction of Jonas.
In its July 17, 2008 decision, the Court of Appeals (CA)
dismissed the petition for the Issuance of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus, denied the petitioner’s motion to declare
the respondents in contempt; and partially granted the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo in favor of the petitioner.
Essentially, the CA found that the evidence the petitioner
presented failed to establish her claimed direct
connection between the abductors of Jonas and the
military. It also found that the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the PNP did not fully exert their
effort in the conduct of investigation. The CA ruled that
the AFP has the burden of connecting certain loose ends
regarding the identity of Ka Ramon and the allegation that
Ka Ramon is indeed Jonas in the “Order of Battle.” As for
the PNP-CIDG, the CA branded its investigation as “rather
shallow” and “conducted haphazardly.”
PERTINENT ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of the PNP
and AFP to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful
investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the
performance of their duties is a fatal to the grant of the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo.
ANSWER: Yes.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
ON PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO
Effect of the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an
exhaustive and meaningful investigation and to exercise
extraordinary diligence in the performance of their
duties – Considering the findings of the CA and our review
of the records of the present case, we conclude that the
PNP and the AFP have so far failed to conduct an
exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the
disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the
extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their
duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires.
Because of these investigative shortcomings, we cannot
rule on the case until a more meaningful investigation,
using extraordinary diligence, is undertaken.
DISPOSITIVE:
In disposing of the case, the Supreme Court issued the
following directives:
1. DIRECTED the Commission on Human Rights to
conduct appropriate investigative proceedings,
including field investigations – acting as the
Court’s directly commissioned agency for
purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
2. REQUIRE the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police to make available and to provide
copies, to the Commission on Human Rights, of all
documents and records in their possession and as
the Commission on Human Rights may require,
relevant to the case of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos,
subject to reasonable regulations consistent with
the Constitution and existing laws;
3. DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG and its incumbent Chief
to submit to the Commission on Human Rights the
records and results of the investigation the PNP-
CIDG claimed to have forwarded to the
Department of Justice, which were not included in
their previous submissions to the Commission on
Human Rights, including such records as the
Commission on Human Rights may require,
pursuant to the authority granted under this
Resolution;
4. DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG to provide direct
investigative assistance to the Commission on
Human Rights as it may require, pursuant to the
authority granted under this Resolution;
5. AUTHORIZED the Commission on Human Rights to
conduct a comprehensive and exhaustive
investigation that extends to all aspects of the
 case (not limited to the specific directives as
outlined above), as the extraordinary measures
the case may require under the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo; and
6. REQUIRED the Commission on Human Rights to
submit to this Court a Report with its
recommendations, copy furnished the petitioner,
the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and the
PNP-CIDG, and all the respondents, within ninety
(90) days from receipt of the Resolution.
In light of the retirement of Lt. General Alexander Yano
and the reassignment of the other respondents who have
all been impleaded in their official capacities, all
subsequent resolutions and actions from the Supreme
Court were served on, and directly enforceable by, the
incumbents of the impleaded offices/units whose official
action is necessary. The present respondents shall
continue to be personally impleaded for purposes of the
responsibilities and accountabilities they may have
incurred during their incumbencies.
The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of the
petitions for Contempt and for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo with respect to President Gloria Macapagal
-Arroyo.
4.2 Burgos v. Macapagal-Arroyo July 5, 2011
Facts:
 At around 1:00 in the afternoon of April 28, 2007, Jonas
Joseph T. Burgos – a farmer advocate and a member of
Kilusang magbubukid was forcibly taken and abducted by
a group of 4 men and women from the extension of
Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of
Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth, Quezon City. On April
30, 2007, petitioner Edita Burgos, held a press conference
and announced that her son Jonas was missing. That same
day, petitioner sought conformation from the guard if the
person abducted was her son Jonas.
She eventually filed three aforementioned petitions – one
for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus, another for a
motion to declare the respondents in contempt, and
another for Writ of Amparo in her favor.
On July 17, 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,
denied the petitioner!s motion to declare the
respondents in contempt; and partially granted the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo in favor of the petitioner.
The CA found that the evidence the petitioner presented
failed to establish her claimed direct connection
between the abductors of Jonas and the military. It also
found that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and
the PNP did not fully exert their effort in the conduct of
investigation.
On June 22, 2010, a resolution was issued by the Supreme
Court which referred the present cases to the Commission
on Human Rights for the continuation of the investigation
and the gathering of evidence. The Court, in
that resolution, held that they could not rule on the case
“until a more meaningful investigation, using
extraordinary diligence" was undertaken. The Court also
affirmed the CA’s dismissal of the petitions for Contempt
and for the issuance of a Writ.
Issues and Ruling:
WON the CHR report on the disappearance of Jonas
Burgos is sufficient enough for the SC to issue a final ruling
and to:
1. Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus - Yes
The CA’s dismissal of the habeas corpus petition is set
aside and a writ of habeas corpus is issued returnable to
the Presiding Justice of the CA who shall immediately
refer the writ to the same CA division that decided the
habeas corpus petition. It is also required that Lt. Harry
Baliaga be impleaded as a party to the habeas corpus
petition and require him – together with the incumbent
Chief of Staff, AFP; the incumbent Commanding General,
Philippine Army; and the Commanding officer of the 56th
IB at the time of the disappearance of Jonas, Lt. Col.
Feliciano – to produce the person of Jonas and to show
cause why he should not be released from detention.I t
was established in the CHR’s investigation that Baliaga
was positively identified as among those who abducted
Burgos.
2. Declare the respondents in Contempt – NO
CA’s dismissal of the petition to dc"lare respondents in
contempt is affirmed, albeit provisional. Petitioner,
before the CHR report was posted, failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt  that respondents had custody of Jonas.
Pieces of evidence were only circumstantial. However,
with the findings connecting Baliaga to the abduction, the
affirmation of the dismissal of the contempt charge
against the respondents is only provisional, without
prejudice to future charges of contempt.
Former /resident Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo’s name is
also ordered to be dropped from the list of respondents
because of the unconditional dismissal of the contempt
charge against her.  As then President at the time of the
filing of the petition, she w as immune from suit.
4. Issue a Writ of mparo –NO
Court holds back in issuing a writ of Amparo and instead
refers the case back to the CA so that Baliaga and the
other respondents can file their respective comments and
replies to the case. It is also ordered by the SC that Baliaga
be impleaded as a party to the Amparo petition of which
the CA will continue with the hearing. The office of the
Judge Advocate General is also ordered to explain why he
should not be held for contempt of court for not
complying with the orders of the investigative body when
he failed to provide copies of documents requested by the
CHR.
5. Navia v Pardico
the alleged unlawful act or omission of the petitioners
constituting a violation of or a threat to Bens right to life,
liberty and security. And second, it cannot be deduced
from the evidence Virginia adduced that Ben is missing; or
that petitioners had a hand in his alleged disappearance.
On the other hand, the entries in the logbook which bear
the signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent proof that
petitioners released Ben on March 31, 2008 at around
10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus posit that the trial court erred
in issuing the writ and in holding them responsible for
Bens disappearance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of A Writ of Amparo is
proper?
HELD: RTCs decision is reversed and set aside.

FACTS: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: writ of amparo

A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo
Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore. The arrival
was promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal killings
of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore
and enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose
(Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were then both
is to provide an expeditious and effective relief "to any
staying in her house. When Lolita went out to
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated
investigate, she saw two uniformed guards disembarking
or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
where they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita could
individual or entity."
answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben
should go with them to the security office of Asian Land
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and
because a complaint was lodged against them for theft
Political Rights recognizes every human beings inherent
of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision. Shortly
right to life, while Article 9 thereof ordains that everyone
thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the
has the right to liberty and security. The right to life must
security department of Asian Land also located in Grand
be protected by law while the right to liberty and security
Royale Subdivision.
cannot be impaired except on grounds provided by and in
accordance with law. This overarching command against
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her
deprivation of life, liberty and security without due
husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of
process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.
Amparobefore the RTC of Malolos City. A Writ of Amparo
was accordingly issued and served on the petitioners. The
The budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in
trial court issued the challenged Decision granting the
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis when this Court defined enforced
petition. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
disappearances. The Court in that case applied the
which was denied by the trial court.
generally accepted principles of international law and
adopted the International Convention for the Protection
Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances definition of
petition. They contend that the writ of amparo is available
enforced disappearances, as "the arrest, detention,
only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by
violation or threatened violation of the aggrieved partys
agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons
right to life, liberty and security are clear. Petitioners
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of
assert that in the case at bench, Virginia miserably failed
the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
to establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on its
deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
face as it failed to state with some degree of specificity
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such
a person outside the protection of the law."
From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance,
thus, we can derive the following elements that constitute
it:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any
form of deprivation of liberty;  in the disappearance remains an indispensable element.
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;  principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not
(c) that it be followed by the State or political
organizations refusal to acknowledge or give information
on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the
amparo petition; and,  to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject
person from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.
As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective
writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the
persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It
must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence
that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention
of removing them from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an
amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the indispensable element of government
participation.
But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of
disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential
to establish that such disappearance was carried out
with the direct or indirect authorization, support or
acquiescence of the government. This indispensable
element of State participation is not present in this case.
The petition does not contain any allegation of State
complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to
show that the government or any of its agents
orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its
agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or
implicated in Virginia's amparo petition whether as
responsible or accountable persons.51 Thus, in the
absence of an allegation or proof that the government or
its agents had a hand in Bens disappearance or that they
failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating
his case, the Court will definitely not hold the government
or its agents either as responsible or accountable persons.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
a writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or
entity. But even if the person sought to be held
accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a
private individual or entity, still, government involvement
Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand
Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their
work for the government and nothing has been presented
that would link or connect them to some covert police,
military or governmental operation. As discussed above,
to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation
some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State
participation differentiates an enforced disappearance
case from an ordinary case of a missing person.
DISMISSED
Navia v. Pardico, 673 SCRA 618 (2012) (GORO NOTES)
In this case, the Court clarified, in conjunction with the
provisions of the Philippine Act on Crimes Against
International Humanitarian Law, Genocide and Other
Crimes Against Humanity (R.A. No. 9851), that for the
protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced
disappearance cases, allegation and proof that the
persons subject thereof are missing are not enough – it
must also be shown by the required quantum of proof
that their disappearance was carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the government
or a political organization, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of said missing persons. The petitioner must
be able to prove by substantial evidence the indispensable
element of government participation.
Here, guards of a subdivision invited two persons in
relation to a complaint against them for theft of electric
wires and lamps in the subdivision. The two, accompanied
by the mother of one of them, went to the security office,
and after some questioning by the guards, one was
allowed to leave while the other (Pardico) was left behind,
and he was subsequently reported by his wife as missing.
After the wife could not locate him, she finally filed a
petition for Writ of Amparo, which the trial court
eventually granted.
On appeal, the Court had to resolve the issue as to
whether the disappearance of Pardico as alleged by the
wife and proved during the summary proceedings before
the trial court fell within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
and relevant laws. The Court said no, and came up with
the following important points to consider in an amparo
proceeding, specifically in regard to enforced
disappearances.
“While Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s coverage,
said Rules does not, however, define extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances. This omission was
intentional as the Committee on Revision of the Rules of
Court which drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC chose to allow it
to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through
substantive laws as may be promulgated by Congress.
Then, the budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis when this Court defined enforced
disappearances. The Court in that case applied the
generally accepted principles of international law and
adopted the International Convention for the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance’s definition of
enforced disappearances, . . . Not long thereafter, another
significant development affecting A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
came about after Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No.
9851 on December 11, 2009. Section 3(g) thereof defines
enforced or involuntary disappearances as follows: (g)
‘Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons’ means
the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a
political organization followed by a refusal to
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give
information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons,
with the intention of removing from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.” Given the foregoing
definition, the Court held further: “Therefore, A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC’s reference to enforced disappearances should
be construed to mean the enforced or involuntary
disappearance of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of
RA No. 9851. Meaning, in probing enforced disappearance
cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation
to RA No. 9851.”
After setting forth the elements of enforced
disappearances, the Court concluded that “it is now clear
that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation
and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are
not enough. It must also be shown and proved by
substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried
out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of, the State or a political organization, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on
the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the
intention of removing them from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.”
In this particular case, while the Court basically believed
the version of the petitioner seeking the writ, it
nevertheless that “in an amparo petition, proof of
disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential
to establish that such disappearance was carried out with
the direct or indirect authorization, support or
acquiescence of the government. This indispensable
element of State participation is not present in this case.”
But is it not that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a
writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or
entity? Yes, “[b]ut even if the person sought to be held
accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a
private individual or entity, still, government involvement
in the disappearance remains an indispensable element.”
Here, the respondents were mere security guards at a
private subdivision, a private entity – they did not work
for the government and nothing had been presented that
would link or connect them to some covert police, military
or governmental operation. The Court reiterated: “As
discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-
12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must
be attended by some governmental involvement. This
hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced
disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing
person.”
6. De Lima v. Gatdula, 691 SCRA 226 (2013) (GORO
NOTES)
In this case, the Court clarified the the difference
between writ of amparo and the privilege of the Writ of
Amparo. “The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be
distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of
Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire
procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo. After examining the petition and its
attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence
presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should
detail the required acts from the respondents that will
mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the
threat to the petitioner’s life, liberty or security. A
judgment which simply grants ‘the privilege of the writ’
cannot be executed. It is tantamount to a failure of the
judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the
petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the
Writ of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete
circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically
symbolic or ritualistic as “granting the privilege of the Writ
of Amparo.”
The Court explained that “the issuance of the writ itself
sets in motion presumptive judicial protection for the
petitioner. The court compels the respondents to appear
before a court of law to show whether required to file a
Return after the issuance of the writ through the clerk of
court. The Return serves as the responsive pleading to the
petition. Unlike an Answer, the Return has other purposes
aside from identifying the issues in the case. Respondents
are also required to detail the actions they had taken to
determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved
party.” Thereafter, “[t]here will be a summary hearing
only after the Return is filed to determine the merits of
the petition and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If
the Return is not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte.
After the hearing, the court will render the judgment
within ten (10) days from the time the petition is
submitted for decision. If the allegations are proven with
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of
the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and
appropriate. The judgment should contain measures
which the judge views as essential for the continued
protection of the petitioner in the Amparo case. These
measures must be detailed enough so that the judge may
be able to verify and monitor the actions taken by the
respondents. It is this judgment that could be subject to
appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45. After the
measures have served their purpose, the judgment will be
satisfied. In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the
petitioner’s life, liberty and security cease to exist as
evaluated by the court that renders the judgment.
Parenthetically, the case may also be terminated through
consolidation should a subsequent case be filed – either
criminal or civil. Until the full satisfaction of the judgment,
the extraordinary remedy of Amparo allows vigilant
judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of
constitutional rights.”
Among the other significant points to consider:
• “It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading
for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The
requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention
of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose
right to life, liberty and security are violated or are
threatened to be violated.”
• “A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or
particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence,
the application of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure is seriously misplaced.”
• “The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to
frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be
done prior to the hearing, not after.”
• A memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo.
7. Caram v Segui
FACTS:
               Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship
with Marcelino and eventually became pregnant with the
latter’s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting
pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that
she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to
complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she
intended to have the child adopted through Sun and
Moon Home for Children in Parañaque City.
               On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby
Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical Center,
Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital
and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina
voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of
Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD.
               On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, a certificate
was issued declaring Baby Julian as “Legally Available for
Adoption.” On February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was
“matched” with Spouses Medina and supervised
trial custody was then commenced.
                On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her
mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWD
asking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption
proceedings. She also said she wanted her family back
together.
          On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent
Atty. Segui, sent a Memorandum to DSWD Assistant
Secretary Cabrera informing her that the certificate
declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had
attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months
after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment
which terminated her parental authority and effectively
made Baby Julian a ward of the State.
                 On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the
issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC seeking to
obtain custody of Baby Julian from DSWD.
ISSUE:
                Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is
the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority
and custody of a minor child.
HELD:
              The Court held that the availment of the remedy
of writ of amparo is not proper as there was
no enforced disappearance in this case.
             As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,”
the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the elements
constituting “enforced disappearances” as the term is
statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:
1. That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or
any form of deprivation of liberty;
2. That it be carried out by, or with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization;
3. That it be followed by the State or political
organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the
person subject of the amparo petition; and,
4. That the intention for such refusal is to remove
subject person from the protection of the law for
a prolonged period of time.
             The Court held that there was
no enforced disappearance because the respondent
DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian’s
whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the
DSWD’s Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian
was in the custodyof the Medina Spouses when she filed
her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in
her petition that the respondent DSWD officers presented
Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing. There is
therefore, no “enforced disappearance” as used in
the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth
elements are missing.
               Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of
forcibly separating her from her child and placing the
latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with
the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for
adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a
lost child but asserting her parental authority over the
child and contesting custody over him.
               Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that
what is involved is the issue of child custody and
the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all
intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward
of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
Caram v. Sequi, 732 SCRA 86 (2014) (Goro Notes)
A petition for a writ of amparo is not the proper recourse
for obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor
child. The mother’s directly accusing the Department of
Social Welfare and Development officers of forcibly
separating her from her child and placing the latter up for
adoption, supposedly without complying with the
necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption,
clearly indicated that she was not searching for a lost child
but asserting her parental authority over the child and
contesting custody over him. Since what is involved is the
issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights
over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been
legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule
cannot be properly applied.
8. SPOUSES SANTIAGO VS TULFO
G.R. NO. 205039
October 21, 2015
FACTS:
Spouses Rozelle Raymond Martin (Raymart) and Claudine
Margaret Santiago were in the airport awaiting for the
arrival of their baggage but were informed that it was
offloaded and transferred to a different flight. While they
were lodging a complaint before the complaint desk,
Raymart saw a man taking photos of his wife. He then
approached him and found out that it was Ramon “Mon”
Tulfo. The confrontation then, escalated to a brawl, which
came to a stop because of the interference of the airport
security personnel.
Days after the incident, the brother of Mon Tulfo aired on
their TV program comments and expletives together with
a threat that they will retaliate against the Santiagos.
Terrified by the gravity of the threats hurled, petitioners
filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of amparo against
respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the motion for the issuance of a writ of
amparo should be granted
HELD:
In our jurisdiction, the contextual genesis, at least, for the
present Amparo Rule has limited the remedy as a
response to extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, or threats thereof. "Extrajudicial
killings," according to case law, are generally
characterized as "killings committed without due process
of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings,"27 while "enforced disappearances,"
according to Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No.
9851,28 otherwise known as the "Philippine Act on Crimes
Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and
Other Crimes Against Humanity," "means the arrest,
detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a
political organization followed by a refusal to
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give
information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons,
with the intention of removing from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time." In Navia v.
Pardico,29 the Court held that it must be shown and
proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance
was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing
persons, with the intention of removing them from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
Simply put, the petitioner in an  amparo case has the
burden of proving by substantial evidence the
indispensable element of government
participation.30 Notably, the same requirement of
government participation should also apply to extralegal
killings, considering that the writ of amparo was,
according to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, who
headed the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of
Court that drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, intended to
"hold public authorities, those who took their oath to
defend the constitution and enforce our laws, to a high
standard of official conduct and hold them accountable to
our people. [In this light] [t]he sovereign Filipino people
should be assured that if their right[s] to life and liberty
are threatened or violated, they will find vindication in our
courts of justice."31 Stated differently, the writ
of amparo is an extraordinary remedy that is meant to
balance out the government's incredible power in order
to curtail human rights abuses on its end.
Consistent therewith, the delimitation of our current writ
of amparo to extralegal killings and/or enforced
disappearances, or threats thereof, is explicit from Section
1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, which reads:
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.
While the foregoing rule, as per Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-
9-12-SC's first paragraph, does state that the writ is a
remedy to protect the right to life, liberty, and security of
the person desiring to avail of it, the same section's
second paragraph qualifies that the protection of such
rights specifically pertain to extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof, which are
more concrete cases that involve protection to the rights
to life, liberty and security. The two paragraphs should
indeed be read together in order to construe the meaning
of the provision. Clearly applicable is the statutory
construction rule that "clauses and phrases must not be
taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole
and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a
harmonious whole. Every part of the statute [or, in this
case, procedural rule] must be interpreted with reference
to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
considered together with other parts of the statute and
kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment."32
In this case, it is undisputed that
petitioners' amparo petition before the RTC does not
allege any case of extrajudicial killing and/or enforced
disappearance, or any threats thereof, in the senses
above-described. Their petition is merely anchored on a
broad invocation of respondents' purported violation of
their right to life and security, carried out by private
individuals without any showing of direct or indirect
government participation. Thus, it is apparent that
their amparo petition falls outside the purview of A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC and, perforce, must fail. Hence, the RTC,
through Judge Singh, properly exercised its discretion
to motu proprio dismiss the same under this principal
determination, regardless of the filing of the May 23, 2012
Motion. The court, indeed, has the discretion to
determine whether or not it has the authority to grant the
relief in the first place. And when it is already apparent
that the petition falls beyond the purview of the rule, it
has the duty to dismiss the petition so as not to prejudice
any of the parties through prolonged but futile litigation.

Speedy Disposition
1. COMMO. LAMBERTO TORRES VS SANDIGANBAYAN
(OC.T 5, 2016)
FACTS:
From 1991 to 1993, petitioner Commo. Lamberto R.
Torres was the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff for
Logistics under the Flag Officer In Command of the
Philippine Navy. Sometime in July 1991 until June 1992,
the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a special audit
at the Headquarters of the Philippine Navy (HPN)
pertaining to the procurement of drugs and medicine by
emergency mode purchase, among others. On December
11, 1996, the Office of the Ombudsman commenced a
preliminary investigation against petitioner and several
others ~or Illegal Use of Public Funds and Violation of Sec.
3 ( e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
It was alleged that the purchase of additional drugs and
medicines worth P5.56 million was not properly
supported and accounted for, in which petitioner was
included as a respondent for being a signatory of the
checks involved.In another case, it was also alleged that
supplies and materials amounting to P6,663,440.
Petitioner was included as a respondent in the case
because he allegedly recommended the approval of the
purchase orders and signed the certificates of emergency
purchases.
These cases, however, were dismissed against petitioner
for lack of probable. A few years after petitioner's
retirement from the service in 2001, Tanodbayan Simeon
V. Marcelo issued an Internal Memorandum,
recommending a new fact-finding investigation and
preliminary investigation relative to other transactions in
other units and offices of the Philippine Navy.
Pursuant to this Internal Memorandum, a new Affidavit
Complaint dated February 22, 2006 was filed by the
Ombudsman against petitioner and several others, this
time, for violation of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019.
Notices of the new preliminary investigation were,
however, sent to petitioner's old address in Kawit, Cavite,
which he had already vacated in 1980. Thus, petitioner
was not informed of the proceedings in the new
preliminary investigation. Unknown to petitioner, eight (8)
Informations were filed by the Ombudsman against him
and the other accused before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner was thereafter allowed to file a Counter-
Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman, where he
prayed for the dismissal of the case on the ground that his
constitutional rights to due process and speedy trial were
violated by the inordinate delay of the case. In its
Resolution, the Ombudsman resolved to maintain the
Informations filed against petitioner due the fact that it
was based on a new investigation.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Informations before the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan denied his motion to quash.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's Motion to
Quash, anchored on the alleged violation of petitioner's
right to speedy disposition of cases.
HELD:
The petition is meritorious. There is grave abuse of
discretion when an act of a court or tribunal is whimsical,
arbitrary, or capricious as to amount to an "an evasion of
a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law,
such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Grave
abuse of discretion was found in cases where a lower
court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution,
the law, or existing jurisprudence.
In his Motion to Quash, petitioner invoked Section 3,
paragraph (d) of Rule 117, asserting that the Ombudsman
had lost its authority to file the Informations against him
for having conducted the fact-finding and preliminary
investigations too long. He raised a similar argument in
the present petition-that the Ombudsman had no more
authority to file the Informations since petitioner's rights
to speedy disposition of cases and to due process were
violated.
In the present case, the lapse of time in the conduct of the
proceedings is tantamount to a vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delay, which We find to be in violation of
petitioner's constitutional right to speedy disposition of
cases.
In the present case, petitioner has undoubtedly been
prejudiced by virtue of the delay in the resolution of the
cases filed against him. Even though he was not initially
included as a respondent in the investigation conducted
from 1996 to 2006 pertaining to the "overpricing of
medicines" procured through emergency purchase, he has
already been deprived of the ability to adequately prepare
his case considering that he may no longer have any
access to records or contact with any witness in support
of his defense. This is even aggravated by the fact that
petitioner had been retired for fifteen ( 15) years. Even if
he was never imprisoned and subjected to trial, it cannot
be denied that he has lived under a cloud of anxiety by
virtue of the delay in the resolution of his case.
Self- Incrimination Clause
1. VILLAFLOR V. SUMMERS
41 Phil. 62 (1920)
FACTS:
Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged
with the crime of adultery. The court ordered the
defendant Villaflor, herein petitioner, to submit her body
to the examination of one or two competent doctors to
determine if she was pregnant or not.
ISSUE:
Whether or not compelling a woman to submit her body
to be examined by physicians to determine if she was
pregnant violates the provision that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.
THE COURT’S RULE:
Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to the
request of the assistant fiscal for an examination on the
person of the defendant by physicians is phrased in
absolute terms, it should, nevertheless, be understood as
subject to the limitations herein mentioned, and
therefore, legal. The writ of habeas corpus prayed for is
hereby DENIED.
REASON:
1. Once again we lay down the rule that the constitutional
guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to
a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-
incrimination.
2. It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination
by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be
taken not to use violence and not to embarrass the
patient any more than is absolutely necessary.
2. BELTRAN V. SAMSON 53 Phil. 570 (1929)
FACTS: For the purpose of comparing the petitioner’s
handwriting and determining whether or not it was he
who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified,
the fiscal petitioned the lower court to order herein
petitioner to appear before the former to take dictation in
petitioner’s own handwriting. Petitioner then filed a
petition for prohibition seeking to enjoin the order of the
lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether the writing from the fiscal’s dictation by the
petitioner for purpose of comparing the latter’s
handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence
against himself within the scope and meaning of the
constitutional provision under examination.
THE COURT’S RULE:
Wherefore, we find the present action well taken, and it is
ordered that the respondents and those under their
orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from
compelling petitioner to take down dictation in his
handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for
comparison.
REASON:
1. As to its scope, the privilege is not limited precisely to
testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of
evidence.
2. It is the duty of the courts liberally to construe the
prohibition in favor of personal rights, and to refuse
permit any steps tending toward their invasion. Hence,
there is the well-established doctrine that the
constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to giving of
oral testimony but embraces as well the furnishing of
evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the
divulging, in short, of any fact which the accused has a
right to hold secret.
3. In the case at bar, the question deals with something
not yet in existence, and it is precisely sought to compel
the petitioner to make, prepare, or produce by this
means, evidence not yet in existence; in short, to create
this evidence which may seriously incriminate him.
* The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence,
while absolute when claimed, may not be waived by any
one entitled to invoke it.
3. ARNEL L. AGUSTIN vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005
FACTS:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante
sued Martins alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L.
Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the
Regional Trial Court. In their complaint, respondents
alleged that Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her
34th birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels
insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave
birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11,
2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City. The
babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as
the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital
expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for
Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity
and even suggested to have the child committed for
adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.
In his amended answer, Arnel denied having sired Martin
because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly
ended in 1998, long before Martins conception. He
claimed that Fe had at least one other secret lover. Arnel
admitted that their relationship started in 1993 but he
never really fell in love with (Fe) not only because (she)
had at least one secret lover, a certain Jun, but also
because she proved to be scheming and overly
demanding and possessive. As a result, theirs was a
stormy on-and-off affair. In his pre-trial brief filed on May
17, 2002, Arnel vehemently denied having sired Martin
but expressed willingness to consider any proposal to
settle the case.
Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order
directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of
Court. Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his
constitutional right against self-incrimination. He also
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of
action, considering that his signature on the birth
certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an
illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not
recognized by the putative father.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint
and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a
proceeding for support without violating petitioners
constitutional right to privacy and right against self-
incrimination.
RULING:
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of
compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the
results thereof as evidence. In that case, DNA samples
from semen recovered from a rape victims vagina were
used to positively identify the accused Joel Kawit Yatar as
the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction of
his blood sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing
itself, violated his right against self-incrimination, as
embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the
Constitution.
Nor does petitioners invocation of his right to privacy
persuade us. In Ople v. Torres, where we struck down the
proposed national computerized identification system
embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right
to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual
privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service
and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public
service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of
searches and seizures, and the infringement of privacy of
communication where the constitutional right to privacy
has been critically at issue. Petitioners case involves
neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right
against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.
His hollow invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no
sympathy here for the simple reason that they are not in
any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused
whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to
DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case,
petitioner herein who does not face such dire
consequences cannot be ordered to do the same.
The case of Wilson v. Lumb shows that DNA testing is so
commonly accepted that, in some instances, ordering the
procedure has become a ministerial act. The Supreme
Court of St. Lawrence County, New York allowed a party
who had already acknowledged paternity to subsequently
challenge his prior acknowledgment. The Court pointed
out that, under the law, specifically Section 516 of the
New York Family Court Act.
In R.E. v. C.E.W., a decision of the Mississippi Supreme
Court, DNA tests were used to prove that H.W., previously
thought to be an offspring of the marriage between
A.C.W. and C.E.W., was actually the child of R.E. with
whom C.E.W. had, at the time of conception, maintained
an adulterous relationship.
In Erie County Department of Social Services on behalf of
Tiffany M.H. v. Greg G., the 4th Department of the New
York Supreme Courts Appellate Division allowed G.G.,
who had been adjudicated as T.M.H.s father by default, to
have the said judgment vacated, even after six years, once
he had shown through a genetic marker test that he was
not the childs father. In this case, G.G. only requested the
tests after the Department of Social Services, six years
after G.G. had been adjudicated as T.M.H.s father, sought
an increase in his support obligation to her.
In Greco v. Coleman, the Michigan Supreme Court while
ruling on the constitutionality of a provision of law
allowing non-modifiable support agreements pointed out
that it was because of the difficulty of determining
paternity before the advent of DNA testing that such
support agreements were necessary:
As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy with which
paternity can be proven has increased significantly since
the parties in this lawsuit entered into their support
agreement(current testing methods can determine the
probability of paternity to 99.999999% accuracy).
However, at the time the parties before us entered into
the disputed agreement, proving paternity was a very
significant obstacle to an illegitimate child's access to child
support. The first reported results of modern DNA
paternity testing did not occur until 1985. ("In fact, since
its first reported results in 1985, DNA matching has
progressed to 'general acceptance in less than a
decade'"). Of course, while prior blood-testing methods
could exclude some males from being the possible father
of a child, those methods could not affirmatively pinpoint
a particular male as being the father. Thus, when the
settlement agreement between the present parties was
entered in 1980, establishing paternity was a far more
difficult ordeal than at present. Contested paternity
actions at that time were often no more than credibility
contests. Consequently, in every contested paternity
action, obtaining child support depended not merely on
whether the putative father was, in fact, the child's
biological father, but rather on whether the mother could
prove to a court of law that she was only sexually involved
with one man--the putative father. Allowing parties the
option of entering into private agreements in lieu of
proving paternity eliminated the risk that the mother
would be unable meet her burden of proof.
In Rafferty v. Perkins,[47] the Supreme Court of
Mississippi ruled that DNA test results showing paternity
were sufficient to overthrow the presumption of
legitimacy of a child born during the course of a marriage.
The foregoing considered, we find no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the public respondent for
upholding the orders of the trial court which both denied
the petitioners motion to dismiss and ordered him to
submit himself for DNA testing. Under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the remedy of certiorari is only
available when any tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[52] In
Land Bank of the Philippines v. the Court of Appeals[53]
where we dismissed a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65, we discussed at length the nature of such a
petition and just what was meant by grave abuse of
discretion:
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent
or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act
at all in contemplation of law.
The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors
of judgment. The raison detre for the rule is when a court
exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so
engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being
exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every
error committed by a court would deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a
void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of
justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or
question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness
of the decisionnot the jurisdiction of the court to render
said decisionthe same is beyond the province of a special
civil action for certiorari.
The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a
decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other
hand, if the error subject of the recourse is one of
jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by
a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules.
(emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown
any arbitrariness, passion, prejudice or personal hostility
that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Court of Appeals. The respondent court acted
entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its decision
and resolution, and any error made would have only been
an error in judgment. As we have discussed, however, the
decision of the respondent court, being firmly anchored in
law and jurisprudence, was correct.
4. Chavez v Court of Appeals 24 SCRA 663 (1968)
Facts: 
Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor
vehicle(thunderbird car together with accessories). An
information was filed against the accused together with
other accused,that they conspired, with intent to gain and
abuse of confidence without theconsent of owner Dy Lim,
took the vehicle.All the accused plead not guilty. During
the trial, the fiscal grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez
to be thefirst witness. Counsel of the accused opposed.
Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only
be an ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of
accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. But
the jugde ruled in favor of the fiscal.
Petitioner was convicted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self
– incrimination had been violated – to warrant writ of HC?
HELD:
YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate
himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain
silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right.
He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own
defense; he did not offer himself as a witness;
Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore
adverted to, make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot
stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his
guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the
privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection
– even to the guilty
Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is
traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to
release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such
as when the accused’s constitutional rights are
disregarded.  Such defect results in the absence or loss of
jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the
consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental
right was violated.  That void judgment of conviction may
be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the
function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if
another remedy which is less effective may be availed of
by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect
his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude
a recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a
judgment already final.  For, as explained in Johnson vs.
Zerbst, the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary
remedy must be liberally given effect so as to protect well
a person whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of the
writ was given the nod in that case, involving a violation of
another constitutional right, in this wise:
A court’s jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost
“in the course of the proceedings” due to failure to
complete the court — as the Sixth Amendment requires —
by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to
obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this
constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at
stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not
complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to
proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a
court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned
thereunder may obtain release of habeas corpus.
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to
the accused Roger Chavez whose case presents a clear
picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely
proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless
otherwise expressly provided by law, “to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody
of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto.