Advocacy:Opposition

Advocacy and Opposition
An Introduction to Argumentation
Seventh Edition
KARYN CHARLES RYBACKI

Northern Michigan University
DONALD JAY RYBACKI

Northern Michigan University
Allyn & Bacon

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Rybacki, Karyn C. (Karyn Charles),

Advocacy and opposition: an introduction to argumentation/Karyn Charles
Rybacki, Donald Jay Rybacki.—7th ed.
p. cm.
Previous ed.: 2008.
ISBN-13: 978-0-205-78118-8
ISBN-10: 0-205-78118-7
1. Persuasion (Rhetoric) 2. Debates and debating. 3. Proposition (Logic)
4. Reasoning. I. Rybacki, Donald J. (Donald Jay) II. Title.
P301.5.P47R93 2011
808.53—dc22
2010052058
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10—CRS—13 12 11 10
Allyn & Bacon
ISBN-10: 0-205-78118-7
ISBN-13: 978-0-205-78118-8
CONTENTS
Preface ix
CHAPTER 1
What Is Argumentation? 1
The Nature of Argumentation 3
The Nature of the Audience 5
The Historical Development of Argumentation 7
Ethical Standards for Argumentation 13
Clarity 15
Honesty 16
Efficiency 17
Relevance 17
Discourse Ethics 18
Learning Activities 19
References 20
CHAPTER 2
Where Do I Begin in Argumentation? 22
Fields of Argumentation 23
Presumption 24
Burden of Proof 28
The Prima Facie Case 30
References 34
CHAPTER 3
What Am I Going to Argue About? 35
The Nature of Propositions 35
Selecting Terms for Definition 36
Specifying Direction of Change 38
Identifying Key Issues 39
Summary of the Nature of Propositions 41
iii
iv Contents
The Classification of Propositions 41

Propositions of Fact 41
Propositions of Value 42
Propositions of Policy 43
Summary of the Classification of Propositions 44
Phrasing the Proposition 44
Summary of Rules for Phrasing Propositions 47
Defining the Key Terms 47
The Dictionary Problem 47
Rules of Definition 50
Summary of Rules of Definition 51
Terms Needing Definition 51
Summary of Terms Needing Definition 53
How to Define Terms 53
Summary of How to Define Terms 55
Definitional Arguments 56
References 58
CHAPTER 4
How Do I Analyze Propositions? 59
Locating Immediate Cause 59
Immediate Cause in the Parthenon Marbles Controversy 61
Investigating the History 62
History of the Parthenon Marbles 63
Questions of Fact, Value, and Policy 68
Defining Key Terms and Creating the Primary Inference 69
Key Terms in Factual Propositions 70
Key Terms in Value Propositions 71
Key Terms in Policy Propositions 73
Determining the Issues 74
Stock Issues for Factual Propositions 74
Stock Issues for Value Propositions 76
Stock Issues for Policy Propositions 78
References 83
CHAPTER 5
How Is a Unit of Argument Created? 85
The Toulmin Model of Argument 85
Claims 86
Contents v
Grounds 91
Warrant 94
Summary of the Elements of the Primary Triad 96
Backing 97
Qualifiers 97
Rebuttals 99
Summary of the Elements of the Secondary Triad 99
References 101
CHAPTER 6
How Do I Prove My Argument? 102
The Discovery of Evidence 102
Subject Heading Searches 105
Books 105
Periodicals 106
Newspapers 108
Government Documents 108
Fact Books, Encyclopedias, and Other Resources 109
Types and Tests of Evidence 110
Evidence of Fact 111
Evidence from Opinion 122
Summary of Types and Tests of Evidence 124
Recording Evidence 125
References 127
CHAPTER 7
How Do I Reason with My Audience? 129
Argument from Cause 130
Summary of Argument from Cause 133
Argument from Sign 133
Summary of Argument from Sign 135
Argument from Generalization 136
Summary of Argument from Generalization 138
Argument from Parallel Case 138
Summary of Argument from Parallel Case 140
Argument from Analogy 140
Summary of Argument from Analogy 142
Argument from Authority 142
Summary of Argument from Authority 144
vi Contents
Argument from Dilemma 145

References 146
CHAPTER 8
What Should I Avoid? 148
Fallacies in Reasoning 148
Hasty Generalization 148
Transfer 150
Irrelevant Arguments 153
Circular Reasoning 153
Avoiding the Issue 154
Forcing a Dichotomy 157
Summary of Fallacies in Reasoning 158
Fallacies of Appeal 158
Appeal to Ignorance 159
Appeal to the People 160
Appeal to Emotion 160
Appeal to Authority 161
Appeal to Humor 162
Appeal to Tradition 163
Summary of Fallacies of Appeal 164
Fallacies of Language 164
Ambiguity and Equivocation 165
Emotionally Loaded Language 166
Technical Jargon 166
Summary of Fallacies of Language 167
References 168
CHAPTER 9
How Are Factual Propositions Argued? 170
Advocating Propositions of Fact 171
Analyzing the Proposition 171
Building the Prima Facie Case 174
Preempting Opposing Arguments 174
Developing an Argumentative Brief 178
Argument in Action 178
Summary of Fact Advocacy 183
Opposing Propositions of Fact 184
Evaluating the Primary Inference 184
Contents vii
Establishing Strategy 185

Refuting by Denial and Extenuation 186
Responding to Preemptive Arguments 188
Summary of Fact Opposition 194
References 195
CHAPTER 10
How Are Value Propositions Argued? 196
The Nature of Values 197
Core American Values 198
Values in Conflict 201
Value Change 205
Advocating Propositions of Value 207
Defining the Value Object 208
Identifying the Hierarchy 209
Specifying the Criteria 210
Measuring the Value Object 212
Summary of Value Advocacy Strategies 217
Opposing Propositions of Value 218
Establishing Strategy 218
Examining Definitions and Hierarchy 218
Challenging the Criteria 220
Refuting Measurement 220
Summary of Value Opposition Strategies 226
References 228
CHAPTER 11
How Are Policy Propositions Argued? 230
Advocating Propositions of Policy 230
Advocacy of the First Stock Issue 232
Advocacy of the Second Stock Issue 234
Advocacy of the Third Stock Issue 235
Summary of Policy Advocacy 242
Opposing Propositions of Policy 242
Establish Strategy 243
viii Contents
Examine Definitions 244

Refute the Reason for Change 244
Refute the Consequences of Change 245
Offer a Counterproposal 248
Summary of Policy Opposition 255
APPENDIX A
What Are the Rules of the Game? 258
Debate Formats 258
Other Formats 260
Speaker Responsibilities 260
Burden of Clash 263
Cross-Examination 263
Flow Sheeting 265
Glossary 266
Index 270
P R E FA C E
I
n the first six editions of Advocacy and Opposition, our goal was to approach
argumentation in a way that preserved the essentials of theory and practice but
tailored those concepts to fit the needs of the student who is not a member of
the debate team. In this, our seventh edition, we remain committed to offering a
practical approach to critical thinking about important social issues for the begin-
ning student. For instructors who want something more than a traditional ap-
proach to policy debating in an argumentation or critical thinking class, Advocacy
and Opposition offers a theoretical view of the nature of argument in our society;
a discussion of ethical principles of arguing as a form of communication; a focus
on how arguments are created using the Toulmin model of argument; and a com-
plete view of fact and value, as well as policy, as venues of argumentation. For
those instructors whose focus is on debating, Appendix A, with rules and formats
for debate, is provided.
NEW TO THIS EDITION

This is the most comprehensive revision we have done in the last ten years. Every
single chapter has been touched in some way. Apart from minor changes such as
tightening the writing or updating references or examples, we have made six major
changes.
1. Chapter 4 on the process of analyzing topics has been completely reworked.
Use of a single topic with distinct factual, value and policy elements, the dis-
pute between Greece and Great Britain over custody of marble statuary and
friezes removed from the Parthenon in the early 1800s, instead of a series of
contrived artificial examples, makes the process more transparent. Chapter 4
shows students how examination of the immediate causes of a controversy, in-
vestigation of its historical background, defining the key terms in a proposi-
tion to create the primary inference, and determining the issues involved rela-
tive to that inference prepares them to argue either side of a question of fact,
value, or policy.
2. Chapter 6 on research techniques has been updated to include the latest devel-
opments in Web-based sources that supplement the resources available in the
library. In discussing the kinds of sources that potentially contain useful evi-
dence and types of evidence to be found, examples are drawn from online re-
sources as much as possible to show students the kind of research they can do
without setting foot in a library or resorting to the use of a general-purpose
search engine.
3. Chapter 9 on arguing factual propositions has received a total facelift. The
basic process of, and principles for, developing argumentative cases on either
side of a factual proposition remain, but the depth of the guidance given to
students about how to use them has been increased significantly. The process
ix
x Preface
and principles are illustrated by a case study of how a group of students ex-
ploring the question of whether a particular author was a feminist used them.
In addition, use of the Toulmin model for building units of argument is rein-
forced and illustrated in this chapter. As a result, students should be better
equipped to actually construct factual arguments, which will stand them in
good stead when they get to value and policy.
4. Chapter 10 on arguing value propositions has been completely revised.
Although our discussion is still informed by some of the foundational writ-
ings on the nature of values and how they change, our examination of core
values has been completely updated to include contemporary research and
commentary on what most Americans hold dear. Conclusions from the
World Values Survey are summarized to show how values differ from
country to country, and this, along with a discussion of generational, cul-
tural, and other differences in values within American society, demon-
strates how value conflict can occur and lead to argumentation over
propositions of value.
5. Argument in Action examples in Chapters 9, 10, and 11 are all new, and in
the form of argumentative briefs rather than transcripts of testimony be-
fore congressional committees. This makes the arguments themselves
clearer, and illustrates how students might organize their own argumenta-
tive cases. Factual argumentation is illustrated by a dispute over whether
Jane Austen was a feminist. Value argument is joined over the importance
of teaching the use of social media in college curricula. Policy argument re-
turns to the topic discussed in the analysis chapter, should Great Britain re-
turn the Elgin Marbles to Greece, demonstrating not only how a policy
proposition is argued but how the process of analysis relates to the finished
product.
6. Chapter 12 on how to present arguments and Appendix B on brief writing
have been eliminated. Because examples of Argument in Action now take the
form of argumentative briefs, Appendix B no longer had any purpose.
Chapter 12 was added after a reviewer of the first edition commented that it
would be nice to have such as chapter. Some material on the nature of the au-
dience and language has been moved to Chapters 1 and 3, respectively. The
rest, which always struck us as public speaking light, has gone away. We be-
lieve an instructor’s oral or written instructions relative to the expectations of
a particular assignment have greater utility for the student.
OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK

Chapter 1 defines argumentation in light of differing cultural interpretations
and discusses how it relates to persuasion using the Elaboration Likelihood
Model. It explains the relationship of contemporary argumentation theory to
rhetoric, dialectic, and logic and concludes with a discussion of ethics and
pragma-dialects in the context of cultural differences. Chapter 2 extends the
definition of argumentation to view it as a process based in fields of argument.
It explains the roles of advocate and opponent, the nature of presumption, the
Preface xi
burden of proof, and details the nature of a prima facie case. Chapter 3 dis-
cusses the nature of propositions; their classifications as fact, value, and policy;
and how to phrase and define the key terms of a proposition. Chapter 4 ex-
plains the process of analyzing a proposition in terms of locating the immediate
causes of interest in a topic, investigating its historical background, using the
definition of key terms to make a primary inference about the topic, and choos-
ing the actual issues to argue through application of the stock issues of fact,
value, and policy. Chapter 5 focuses on the Toulmin model as a system for cre-
ating individual units of argument that will be logically sound. Chapter 6 ex-
plains the strengths and weaknesses of print and electronic sources of informa-
tion. It develops a strategy for doing research and discusses types and tests of
evidence and how to record evidence. Chapter 7 teaches the student how to use
research in the reasoning process and discusses making the inferential leap from
evidence to a conclusion about that evidence. Reasoning patterns of cause, sign,
generalization, parallel case, analogy, authority, and dilemma are discussed and
illustrated. Chapter 8 examines breakdowns in the process by reviewing the
common fallacies in reasoning, as well as fallacies of appeal and language, that
are committed in creating arguments. Chapter 9 focuses on factual proposi-
tions, their use for testing hypotheses and for resolving differing interpretations
of fact. Strategies for developing arguments of advocacy and opposition over
fact are presented. Chapter 10 focuses on value propositions and the role of
core values arranged in value hierarchies, which may differ from one culture to
another, as the locus of argumentation. The use of criteria for arguing and op-
posing values is discussed. Chapter 11 focuses on policy propositions, how ar-
guing them rests on an underlying structure of fact and value arguments, and
emphasizes different systems for approaching policy development and strategies
for opposing them. Appendix A summarizes rules and formats in competitive
debate and discusses the duties of the speakers, the process of cross-examina-
tion, and techniques of flow sheeting.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank our reviewers, whose suggestions helped us shape this
revision: Kimberly Weismann, Dickinson State University; James Thompson,
College of the Sequoias; Lawrence Borzumato, State University of New York at
New Paltz; and Molly A. Mayhead, Western Oregon University. We thank Tom
Isaacson of Marquette University and our colleague Sarah Potter here at
Northern Michigan University for suggestions about Learning Activities and as-
signments that work for their argumentation students. We thank Brian Pesola,
manager, and the members of the Board of the Shiras Pointe Condominium
Association for their permission to adapt the policy on refraining from feeding
wild geese as the running example in Chapter 5. We thank students in the
Communication Criticism: The Rhetoric of Jane Austen class for getting into
the subject so deeply that they inspired the running example and briefs in
Chapter 9. We thank Samantha Rogers and Amber Snyder, students in one of
our argumentation classes, for allowing us to use their value briefs as the basis
xii Preface
for creating the examples of Argument in Action in Chapter 10. We also thank
the editors and production staff at Allyn & Bacon for both the support they
gave us as well as the expertise they contributed to making the book you hold in
your hands. We thank colleagues, too numerous to mention, who have used ear-
lier editions and offered their advice on what we might do to improve them.
Finally, we thank our students, who have never been shy about sharing their
thoughts about what they like and what they find frustrating. The input of all
these people has assisted us in developing what we hope is a better approach to
teaching and learning about the process of argumentation.
CHAPTER
What Is
Argumentation?
I
n our society, much of our ordinary use of the term argument envisions two
people engaged in interpersonal conflict. For example, we frequently say things
such as, “Yesterday, Rhonda and Janice had a terrible argument” or “Those
two are always arguing.” Argument thus becomes a synonym for verbal hostility.
During the first class meeting, we ask students in our argumentation class to in-
troduce themselves and tell us why they want to learn about argumentation. One
student said he and his girlfriend were always arguing and he wanted to learn
how to win these arguments. If, like this student, your definition of argument or
having an argument is based on verbal hostility and escalating emotions, it is our
intention to change your perception. In this textbook, we want to open your eyes
to the cooperative uses of argumentation as a means of discovering knowledge
and solving problems.
The ability to argue, and the process of arguing, is essential to our existence
as humans. We can imagine that in human prehistory our distant ancestors used
the techniques of argumentation to discover how to hunt more productively,
how to interpret seasonal signs, and how to regulate their social groupings. Some
of their arguing most certainly included verbal hostility and escalating emotions,
but humanity’s technological, social, and spiritual growth probably would not
have come about if our only definition of argumentation was based on verbal
hostility and escalating emotions. Advances in every field, from agriculture to
communication technology, represent the uses of argumentation by those inter-
ested in these fields.
The American tradition of argumentation emphasizes a debate over the two
sides of an issue—a verbal competition. The two people, or sides, in a debate use the
techniques of argumentation to convince someone, a judge or an audience, to accept
one side over the other. The techniques of argumentation, developed from this tradi-
tion, are the means we use to justify our opinions and express them to others.
Although argumentation as a debate between two sides is the legacy of our
Eurocentric culture, there is increasing interest in how people from differing cultures
1
2 CHAPTER 1 What Is Argumentation?
use argumentation. Increasingly, we are coming to appreciate that there are other
cultural perspectives on the uses of argumentation.
Rather than conceptualizing argumentation as a competition in which one side
must necessarily triumph over the other, Douglas Walton sees argumentation as “a
collaboration, [the] constructive working out of disagreements by verbal interactions
in order to resolve a conflict of opinions” (1992, p. xi). Native American (Coleman,
1997) and African (Moemeka, 1997) cultures, among others, emphasize the welfare
of the community and employ techniques of argumentation as cooperative knowl-
edge seeking rather than as a competition between individuals. The end sought is not
that one person’s views should dominate, but that all members of the community
should be allowed to contribute and reason together collaboratively. Scholars from
many nations recognize that argumentation is the means used by individuals and
communal groups to actually discover knowledge (Rowland, 1987).
Andrew Azukaego Moemeka (1997) explains the philosophy behind the
Afrocentric view, with its emphasis on communal knowledge.
The rationale is the cultural belief (proven over centuries) that communal welfare imme-
diately or eventually benefits all members of the community. This unspoken belief that
“the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” helps keep alive the ties that bind individ-
uals to the community. Subtly but firmly, it strengthens the feeling of oneness among peo-
ple, underscoring the bonds of common purpose and of a common destiny. (p. 174)
Many cultures share this view that communally acquired and shared knowledge
has great value.
Feminists have also questioned the traditional approach to argumentation as a
debate or contest on the basis that “conceptions of knowledge and truth that are ac-
cepted and articulated today have been shaped throughout history by the male-
dominated culture” (Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986, p. 5). Feminists
hold that male-generated theories of argument and reasoning lead to simplistic con-
clusions. Male-generated reasoning is incapable of accepting the possibility that
there might be more than one way to perceive the essence of things or situations.
Feminist thinking says that men use argumentation to make mono-causal position
statements and tests of knowledge, whereas women engage in “conversation, a
more inclusive technique, that invites all participants to share their experiences.”
Women are “connected knowers” who “tend to fuse ideas and opinions rather than
claiming one opinion is true and all others must therefore be false” (Rybacki &
Rybacki, 2002, p. 210). According to feminist theory, the notion is not that men are
incapable of being connected knowers, but that men and women are culturally con-
ditioned to use reasoning and argumentation in different ways.
So many scholars from so many diverse cultural backgrounds are investigat-
ing argumentation today that it is impossible to provide a simple answer to the
question: What is argumentation? Our purpose in this text is to introduce you to
some of the fundamental principles of argumentation that can be applied in a va-
riety of cultural contexts, whether you understand argumentation as a verbal con-
test between two sides or a communal experience of connected knowing. The
techniques of “advocacy” and “opposition” can also be profitably employed in a
communal experience of discovering knowledge as easily as they are employed in
a debate contest.
The Nature of Argumentation 3
THE NATURE OF ARGUMENTATION

All of us are consumers and creators of argument. Argumentation takes place all
around us in messages designed to influence our beliefs and behaviors. Some of
these messages will offer information and reasoning in their attempts to influence
us. Some messages will target our emotions, hopes, fears, prejudices, or supersti-
tions. Those we encounter—friends, family, teachers, employers, the mass media,
advertisers, editorialists, and politicians—often embed their arguments in persua-
sive appeals as they attempt to influence us.
We also author dozens of oral and written messages every day as we in turn at-
tempt to influence the beliefs and behaviors of others. If you have ever asked a
friend to loan you ten dollars, begged a teacher to let you turn in a paper a week
after it was due, or researched and reported on the advantages and disadvantages of
selling sweatshirts to raise money for social activities in your residence hall, you
have used the techniques of argumentation. Some of your attempts at influence
were no doubt aimed at the emotions of those you were trying to influence, but
some of your efforts targeted your audience’s reasoning abilities as you employed
the techniques of argumentation.
Argumentation is a form of instrumental communication relying on reasoning and

proof to influence belief or behavior through the use of spoken or written messages.
By examining this definition, we can begin to understand the purpose, targets,

and methods of argumentation and the relationship of argumentation to persua-
sion. First, consider your definition of instrument. You may think of a musical in-
strument, a surgical instrument, or the instrument panel of an automobile. In this
sense, instruments are tools or implements we use for doing something or under-
standing how something works. Now, think of an instrument as a set of concepts or
ideas that allows you to accomplish something. Language is an instrument for com-
municating with others. Mathematics is an instrument for counting and measuring.
Argumentation is an instrument for reasoning with others.
Argumentation is a set of concepts or ideas, what we have been calling “tech-
niques,” used to understand how we reason and how we convey reasons to others
as we try to influence them. As with the instrument of language, we use argumen-
tation to communicate with others. Argumentation is just a narrower set of con-
cepts and ideas that focuses on how reasoning is used in communication.
Human communication is multifaceted and includes everything from two
people communicating interpersonally to the multimedia campaigns launched in
support of presidential candidates. We use communication to express our feel-
ings, ventilate our emotions, and acknowledge that others are present. We also
use communication to ask for information, seek clarification, and participate in
group meetings. Franz van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, and Francisca Snoeck
Henkemans (1996) suggest that the “need for argumentation arises when
opinions concerning this subject differ. . . . Arguing makes sense only if there is
a listener or reader who entertains doubt about an opinion or has a diverging
opinion” (p. 2). Not every instance of communication calls for the use of
argumentation, because argumentation goes beyond simply reacting and re-
sponding to those around us. The techniques of argumentation require that we
pull information together, structure our ideas, and offer reasons for others
to consider.
Arguers are also persuaders. Persuasion is an attempt to move an audience to
accept or identify with a particular point of view. Argumentation is the reasoning
component of persuasion because “the very act of arguing involves an appeal, for
better or worse, to the audience’s reasonableness” (van Eemeren et al., 1996, p. 4).
The concept of reasonableness helps us understand the relationship between argu-
mentation and persuasion. We offer arguments for the consideration of listeners or
readers, our audience, in hopes of having some influence over them. Forms of in-
strumental communication that attempt to influence belief and behavior are acts of
persuasion. In introducing the techniques of argumentation, we are also introduc-
ing a significant aspect of persuasion.
What differentiates argumentation from persuasion—the larger form of in-
strumental communication—is that persuasion includes appeals based on both
emotion and reason. Recall our earlier point that all of us are consumers and cre-
ators of messages intended to influence the belief and behavior of others and that
these appeals might be directed toward emotion or reason. Some persuasive mes-
sages use appeals to both the emotions and reasoning. Other persuasive messages,
however, depend more on eliciting an emotional response from the receiver than a
rational one. Persuasion includes the study of the emotional properties of messages
and how the psychological makeup of an audience plays a part in determining the
extent to which they will, or will not, be influenced. The study of argumentation
focuses on how proof and reasoning are used to appeal to the rational side of
human nature. Although we will sometimes call attention to the use of emotional
appeals, it is our primary purpose to introduce you to the techniques for effective
argumentation—the rational subset of persuasion.
Richard E. Petty and John T. Cacioppo’s (1986) explanation of how persuasive
messages are processed by their receivers helps us understand the role of argumenta-
tion as a subset of persuasion. Their Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) suggests
that when you encounter a persuasive message and take time to actually process it,
your processing will take one of two routes. If you take the central route, you are in-
volved to a high degree. You find the message relevant and you are willing to supply
some of your own experience to help make sense of it; you think about the message.
What is important to you when you follow the central route is the quality of the ar-
guments, the soundness of the reasoning, and the believability of the evidence. If you
take the peripheral route instead, the message still has relevance for you, but “some
simple cue in the persuasive context” (p. 3), such as the credibility of the message’s
creator, serves as the basis for your involvement. The peripheral route of the ELM is
a shortcut. Rather than taking the time to fully process the message, we seize on
some cue from the message, context, or situation to do the thinking for us.
The ELM’s central route is at the heart of argumentation as instrumental com-
munication. Audience members are involved in a collaboration, thinking along
with the arguer as they are guided through a series of reasons to reach a conclu-
sion. The arguer places reasoning and evidence before the audience so they can see
(or hear) how the proof of each point takes place. This is the “high involvement”
of the ELM’s central route. Persuasion that takes this route is the “result of a per-
son’s careful and thoughtful consideration of the true merits of the information
presented” (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986, p. 3).
The Nature of the Audience 5
If you find yourself following the peripheral route of the ELM, it is not neces-
sarily “poor” thinking on your part. We use the peripheral route mostly “for pur-
poses of efficiency—we cannot investigate thoroughly all the issues on which we
must make decisions” (Campbell & Huxman, 2003, p. 193). As a college student,
your decision about what to buy for breakfast is probably based on the peripheral
cue of cost or taste. There is no need to spend time processing detailed messages
about whether oatmeal or raisin bran is more nutritious. You have better things
to do.
The audience is an important variable in any communication situation, and the
ELM is a theory about how audiences respond to messages. Audience motivation is
a key element in whether the central or peripheral route is followed in processing a
persuasive message. Argumentation makes demands on both the arguer and the au-
dience. The ELM’s central route focuses on audience members’ expectations and
willingness to participate. Audiences will be willing to take the central route with
you when they perceive a compelling personal interest in what you have to say.
Argumentation takes place in situations in which people disagree about
something or do not know, but want to know, what something is. Argumentation
is always characterized by controversy—either the controversy of opposing views
or the controversy of what is the best answer. Controversies tend to stir up high
involvement and the audience’s willingness to take the central route. Not every-
one who hears or reads your argument will automatically have a compelling inter-
est in the topic. But when people seek answers to questions and solutions to prob-
lems, they are usually willing to invest “the brainwork involved in participating in
messages—exploring and evaluating arguments and evidence” (Campbell &
Huxman, 2003, p. 194).
A final characteristic of argumentation is that it is rule-governed communica-
tion behavior. Whenever we communicate, we engage in rule-governed behavior.
One set of rules is found in the grammar of a language. In addition to the rules we
learn in acquiring our native tongue, individual communication contexts have
their own particular rules, which may be as broadly applicable as those that per-
tain to public speaking or as narrow as those that govern communication in a par-
ticular family. We learn these communication rules through formal instruction or
through informally modeling the behavior of those around us. Because argumenta-
tion may occur in a variety of communication contexts, the rules for effective argu-
mentation you will learn from this textbook will be appropriate in several contexts
beyond the classroom.
THE NATURE OF THE AUDIENCE

How will you know when you have followed the rules and succeeded in using
proof and reasoning to influence belief or behavior? Who decides what “good” ar-
gumentation is? This is where the audience comes in. We want our views to reach
others, so argumentation is always directed at this category of people we have been
calling the audience.
The audience for argumentation consists of one or more persons who are capable of
being influenced, who may accept or reject, the arguer’s message.
From the earliest theories on how argumentation works to the social-scientific

studies of today, one truism persists about arguers and their audiences: To succeed
in argumentation, you must adapt your message to the people who make up your
audience. In the end, argumentation is only as “good” as what the audience does
with it. Quality in argumentation is determined by the people who make up the au-
dience. How “good” your arguments have to be, to be deemed effective, is relative
to the “quality of the audience that carries out the evaluation” (van Eemeren et al.,
1996, p. 97).
Without knowing anything about the individuals who comprise your audi-
ence, you can begin adapting your message to them based on the field of argu-
ment in which you are both functioning. In field theory, a subject we will dis-
cuss more fully in the next chapter, people acting together in any context with
established rules of engagement under which arguments are created and pre-
sented (Toulmin, 1958; Toulmin, Rieke, & Janik, 1984) can be thought of as the
general audience. Fields such as law have very rigid rules and if they are not fol-
lowed a jury’s verdict may be overturned on a “technicality.” Rules of engage-
ment specify the degree of precision that an audience demands in the evidence
supporting arguments they hear or read. In scientific fields, these standards may
be rigidly predetermined while in artistic fields they may be more open to inter-
pretation by the arguers (Toulmin et al., 1984). How argumentation is con-
cluded, its mode of resolution, is also part of the rules of engagement. In the de-
liberations of a legislative group, the goal is usually to produce a majority
coalition voting for or against a piece of legislation. To be successful, you must
understand the unique demands of the field in which you are arguing but also
realize there can be lots of variation among the individuals who hear or read
your message.
This actual audience can be understood in terms of what else its members
share, beyond the context in which argumentation takes place. Demographic char-
acteristics such as age, sex, marital status, political affiliation, education, economic
and professional status, ethnicity, cultural heritage, or religious beliefs may repre-
sent the basis for common bonds. Psychographic characteristics can reflect com-
mon bonds based on shared attitudes, values, beliefs, or emotional states. Lawyers
prepare for trial by surveying individuals, selected at random from jury lists, about
their prejudices, understanding of evidence, or beliefs about issues to determine
how actual jurors might respond to various lines of argument. Political candidates
survey voters to determine their understanding of issues, what they believe
strongly, and what qualities a candidate must possess to obtain their vote. Given
the right conditions, a particular demographic or psychographic characteristic can
become the basis for a powerful bond, or create a serious barrier, between you and
your actual audience.
You can also characterize an audience in terms of its motive for using argumen-
tation as an instrument for making decisions. First, the audience may consist of some-
one who reads or listens to argumentation to find the knowledge or the solution to a
problem that comes from exploring and evaluating arguments and evidence. Second,
the audience may function as a nominally impartial third party, or judge, who decides
which arguer has made the better case. Third, the self may also be considered an au-
dience for argumentation. We frequently engage in an internal dialogue, listing the
pros and cons of accepting a particular belief or following some course of action.
Whether your audience is yourself or some other person, argumentation provides a

framework for helping the audience decide whether changing or maintaining existing
belief or behavior is more reasonable.
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

OF ARGUMENTATION
The formal study of argumentation began in ancient Greece. Citizenship in the
democracy of Athens required communication skills. Each male free-born citizen
might be called on to serve the state in the deliberative process of the assembly or
the judgmental process of the courts. He might also find himself acting as prosecu-
tor or defense attorney, because the Greek judicial system required each party to
the dispute to represent himself. The Greeks also engaged in public speaking on
ceremonial occasions and in competition at events such as the Olympics.
The study of rhetoric—communication skills necessary to fulfill these needs—
was an important part of formal education. The foundations of argumentation, as
we study it today, were laid in those ancient schools. Rhetoric was conceived as a
humane discipline, grounded in choice, that was primarily designed to persuade or
change the listener. The communicator’s purpose was to influence choice by devel-
oping meaningful probabilities, or arguments, in support of a claim that was being
contested. Emphasis was placed on the claims that commonly appeared in legal
cases, because so much speaking involved arguing one’s own case in court.
One of the greatest of the Greek rhetoricians, Aristotle, viewed the practice of
argumentation as central to human nature, “for to a certain extent all men attempt
to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves, and to attack
others” (Aristotle, n.d./1954, p. 19). Aristotle defined rhetoric as the ability to
find, in a given situation, all the means of persuading an audience to believe a
proposition. This involves more than just building workable arguments. The com-
municator is responsible for investigating everything the audience might be moved
by—emotions, political beliefs, and those sources of information that were most
respected. The responsible communicator would choose the most ethical, the most
probably true, of all these available means of persuasion.
Evolving from these ancient teachings, our understanding of how we reason
has flowed from three theoretical perspectives. Joseph W. Wenzel (1990) identifies
these perspectives as rhetoric, dialectic, and logic. We can think of these perspec-
tives as three different approaches to doing argument, three different ways of un-
derstanding how argumentation functions as an instrument of communication.
Each gives us a different focus on the structure and use of argumentation, and
most importantly, each gives us a different understanding of what is meant by
“good” argumentation.
First, the rhetorical perspective explores how we use communication to influ-
ence or change others. Theories of rhetoric explain “how arguments are made and
interpreted by people” (Wenzel, 1990, p. 15). Both the content and context of a mes-
sage are important to the rhetorical perspective. Argumentation takes place in situa-
tions where people have choices to make, often when there are good reasons for
making different choices. The rhetorical perspective on argumentation as an instru-
ment of communication focuses on the arguer’s strategies for creating arguments and
adapting them to the audience by relating content to context. Rhetorically, argumen-

tation is deemed “good” when it “effectively helps members of a social group solve
problems or make decisions” (Wenzel, 1990, p. 12).
Aristotle called rhetoric the “counterpart” of dialectic, by which he meant
that both approaches could be used to arrive at an understanding about the truth,
or probable truth, of some matter. Stephen R. Yarbrough (1999) says that
Aristotle’s rhetoric was concerned with specific and concrete “problems having
clearly defined parameters.” The arguer’s task from the rhetorical perspective “en-
tailed convincing an audience to accept a definition of the parameters most con-
genial to proving” the arguer’s message (p. 16). Yarbrough indicates that the ar-
guer’s work begins with defining or explaining the context in which arguments are
set. Thus, the rhetorical perspective views the audience as decision makers for
whom both the context in which argumentation takes place and the arguments
themselves are significant factors.
Second, the dialectical perspective explores the structure of conversations in
which people offer and analyze reasons (Walton, 1992). Dialectic is a plan for in-
teraction in which all sides of an issue or opinion are raised and resolved through
discussion. The dialectical perspective on argumentation as an instrument of com-
munication focuses on “principles and procedures” that encourage the give-and-
take necessary for the critical study of a topic (Wenzel, 1990, p. 15). Dialectic can
be used to address broad philosophical questions such as “What is a good life?”
The dialectical perspective views individual arguments as parts of the many
streams of thought that contribute to the completeness of an inquiry. In dialectic,
the presence of a formal structure such as a forum, discussion, or dialogue is the
key element of “good” argumentation, subsuming issues of both content and con-
text. Dialectically, argumentation is deemed “good” when the system for arguing
produces “the best possible discussions” (Wenzel, 1990, p. 12).
As Aristotle’s counterpart of rhetoric, dialectic takes the form of asking and
answering questions. The dialectical technique is said to produce opinions that are
thoroughly tested by asking every possible question about them. Where rhetoric
produces the uninterrupted exposition of a speech, dialectic produces a dialogue, a
conversation. Plato’s dialogues typify the dialectical form. The process begins by
defining terms, then analyzing all parts of the subject through a series of pro-and-
con questions and responses, and finally synthesizing what has been learned to ar-
rive at a plausible conclusion.
The dialectical perspective on argumentation views the audience as active par-
ticipants. No person, designated as “arguer,” stands apart from the audience, be-
cause the dialectical perspective promotes equality among participants. For dialec-
tic to function successfully in making “good” arguments, each person fulfilling the
role of audience–arguer–participant must be knowledgeable, have the capacity to
reason, respect all other participants, and be open to the ideas of others.
Participants in argumentation from the dialectical perspective may be the para-
mount users of the ELM’s central route, because each participates in the conversa-
tion and helps create arguments.
Third, the logical perspective offers a series of formal rules for distinguish-
ing sound arguments from unsound ones. From the logical perspective, an argu-
ment is thought of as a commodity or product to be tested by applying the rules
for determining what constitutes sound reasoning. The rules of “formal” logic
convert ideas into mathematical symbols, making formal logic seem very remote
from human communication. Logicians fixate on proving formal validity, that
something is, or is not, absolutely true. They pay little attention to the actual
reasoning as conveyed by the words of the arguer. The rules of formal logic are
designed to remove the uncertainty that humans bring to situations in which
there is a controversy over opinion or information. Although the logical per-
spective on argumentation derives principles of reasoning from formal logic, ar-
gumentation is described as “informal logic” because it does not lead to ab-
solute conclusions. Logically, “a good argument is one in which a clearly stated
claim is supported by acceptable, relevant and sufficient evidence” (Wenzel,
1990, p. 2).
The logical perspective relies on the audience’s knowledge of, and ability to
apply, logical patterns such as cause–effect or sign reasoning. In later chapters, we
will present information about how a unit of argument is created (Chapter 5), the
nature of evidence (Chapter 6), patterns of reasoning (Chapter 7), and fallacies in
reasoning to avoid (Chapter 8). The logical perspective emphasizes accuracy in
both proof and reasoning. The audience is expected to be proficient in judging
whether the logical development of arguments is “good” or “bad.”
The logical perspective does not consider the context in which argumentation
takes place. Its sole emphasis is on content, the use of proof and reasoning.
Audiences operating from the logical perspective frequently act as nominally disin-
terested, third-party judges who determine which arguer has made the better case.
Because the logical perspective focuses on specific standards for the use of proof
and the formation of reasons, it may be somewhat easier for audience members to
act as neutral, dispassionate judges. When you remove context from the argumen-
tative equation, you can make argumentation seem more like the process of scien-
tific discovery, devoid of the messiness of human emotions.
The distinctions across the rhetorical, dialectical, and logical perspectives on
argumentation are illustrated by examples from the legal field. So-called landmark
decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court commonly feature all three perspectives at
work in a decision. Most frequently, the U.S. Supreme Court acts as an “appellate”
court, meaning that it hears appeals on cases tried in lower courts and on decisions
made by federal regulatory agencies such as the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC). Acting in its appellate capacity, the U.S. Supreme Court func-
tions as an audience of decision makers for those who appear before it. Members
of the Court in turn function as arguers in expressing the supporting rationale for
its majority and dissenting opinions. Because it is a rare occasion when all nine jus-
tices concur on a decision, or even on the specific reasons for reaching that deci-
sion, many of the Court’s decisions resemble a debate or dialogue on the issue as
concurring and dissenting opinions are offered.
The U.S. Supreme Court is especially concerned with preserving free speech
and freedom of the press. The justices see their role as “jealously to guard against
encroachment on First Amendment freedoms” (Middleton & Chamberlin, 1995,
p. 298). In the case of the Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica
Foundation (1978), the Court supported an FCC decision concerning “indecent
speech.” A New York City radio station owned by the Pacifica Foundation aired a
twelve-minute monologue by humorist George Carlin, in the early afternoon, featur-

ing his list of the seven “dirty words” you can never say on the public airwaves.
The monologue aired on the FM station during part of a larger discussion about soci-
ety’s attitude toward language. The station warned in advance that the recording
included language that might offend listeners. Nevertheless, a man who apparently
missed the warning heard a portion of the monologue while driving with his young son.
He later wrote a complaint to the FCC, stating that, although he could understand the
“record’s being sold for private use, I certainly cannot understand the broadcast of
same over the air that, supposedly, you control.” (Zelezny, 2011, p. 474)
One of the FCC’s responsibilities is to oversee its licensees who must serve the
public interest as required by the 1934 Communications Act, which stipulates that
broadcast stations risk fines and loss of license if they air “indecent” program-
ming. Responding to the complaint, the FCC reviewed Carlin’s monologue.
The FCC said Carlin’s “dirty” words were indecent because they depicted sexual and
excretory activities and organs in a patently offensive manner. The commission said the
words were “obnoxious, gutter language” that were indecent because they “debased”
and “brutalized” human beings “by reducing them to their bodily functions.” (Middle-
ton, Trager, & Chamberlin, 2002, p. 370)
Pacifica appealed the FCC’s ruling through the federal court system; eventually, the
case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court. In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court up-
held the FCC’s ruling.
A rhetorical perspective emphasizes how an arguer adapts content to fit the
context in which argumentation takes place. In some cases, context becomes a
central issue in argumentation, as happened in the Pacifica case. Justice John
Paul Stevens, writing the majority opinion, demonstrated how content and context
are interrelated.
As the Commission itself emphasized, its order was “issued in a specific factual con-
text.” That approach is appropriate for courts as well as the Commission when regula-
tion of indecency is at stake, for indecency is largely a function of context—it cannot be
adequately judged in the abstract. (cited in Middleton & Chamberlin, 1995, p. 291)
Justice Stevens supported his point with reference to Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes’ celebrated statement that “the character of every act depends upon the
circumstances in which it is done. . . . The most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic”
(cited in Middleton & Chamberlin, 1995, p. 292).
Justice Stevens further developed the rhetorical perspective on context by ad-
dressing the problem of variations across contexts.
The constitutional protection accorded to a communication containing such patently
offensive sexual and excretory language need not be the same in every context. It is a
characteristic of speech such as this that both its capacity to offend and its “social
value” . . . vary with the circumstances. Words that are commonplace in one setting are
shocking in another. (cited in Middleton & Chamberlin, 1995, p. 293)
Justice Stevens’s emphasis on understanding why the Carlin monologue might be

shocking when encountered on radio in the company of one’s young child was at
the heart of the majority’s decision.
From a rhetorical perspective, “good” argumentation helps members of a so-

cial group, in this instance members of the FCC and the broadcasters they regulate,
make decisions about problems. The Pacifica case laid the groundwork for an un-
derstanding of how something may be “indecent” speech in a particular context
that continues to shape FCC policy. “[I]n 2001, the FCC issued guidelines . . .
[that] say a radio or television broadcast will be found indecent if, first, it describes
sexual or excretory organs or activities and, second, it is patently offensive to an
average viewer or listener” (Middleton et al., 2002, p. 373). FCC policy was “that
fleeting, unscripted airings of otherwise indecent language or images would not be
punished. . . . But in 2004 the commission changed course, saying that even fleet-
ing, one-time use of vulgar words could be deemed illegally indecent, depending on
context” (Zelezny, 2011, p. 481).
From a dialectical perspective, emphasis is placed on argumentation as a dia-
logue or conversation in which all of the views on a controversy are brought up.
U.S. Supreme Court decisions, particularly close ones such as the 5 to 4 Pacifica
case, often have a dialectical quality as the give-and-take of judicial decision mak-
ing unfolds in the Court’s statements of opinion. Concurring Justice John Paul
Stevens and dissenting Justice William Brennan wrote opinions that address a di-
alectical question: What is the nature of indecent speech?
In its appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Pacifica Foundation took issue
with the FCC’s definition of indecency. The FCC had classified as “indecent”:
[material that] describes or depicts, in terms patently offensive as measured by contem-

porary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities
or organs, at times of day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the
audience. (cited in Zelezny, 2011, p. 474)
Much of Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion is devoted to answering

Pacifica’s issues with this definition from the majority’s perspective. Principally,
“Pacifica contended that indecent language, like obscene language, must appeal to
the prurient interest before it can be punished” (Middleton et al., 2002, p. 370).
Justice Stevens argued that there is a distinction between “indecency” and “ob-
scenity,” clarifying the distinction between the two terms.
The plain language of the statute does not support Pacifica’s argument. The words
“obscene, indecent, or profane” are written in the disjunctive [separated by com-
mas], implying that each has a separate meaning. Prurient appeal is an element of
the obscene, but the normal definition of “indecent” merely refers to nonconfor-
mance with accepted standards of morality. (cited in Middleton & Chamberlin,
1995, p. 290)
In First Amendment cases such as Pacifica, a big issue is that any restraint
on free expression will necessarily lead to self-censorship by media and individ-
uals, thus undermining freedom of speech. Justice William Brennan, writing for
the dissenters, argued that the U.S. Supreme Court was attempting “to impose
its notions of propriety on the whole of the American people” (cited in
Middleton & Chamberlin, 1995, p. 295). Justice Brennan was particularly trou-
bled by the semantic games over definitions he thought the concurring justices
were playing.
Justice Brennan feared that the FCC’s overly broad definition of “indecent”
would lead to de facto censorship and felt the Court should really think of “cen-
sorship” as a dirtier word than any Carlin had uttered.
The rationales could justify the banning from radio of a myriad of literary works, nov-
els, poems, and plays by the likes of Shakespeare, Joyce, Hemingway, Ben Johnson,
Henry Fielding, Robert Burns, and Chaucer; they could support the suppression of a
good deal of political speech, such as the Nixon tapes; and they could even provide the
basis for imposing sanctions for the broadcast of certain portions of the Bible. (cited in
Middleton & Chamberlin, 1995, p. 299)
From a dialectical perspective, “good” argumentation should produce wide-

ranging discussions on controversies. The back-and-forth discussion over the defi-
nition of indecency is not the only example of the practice of dialectic to be found
in the Pacifica case. The structure of legal argumentation and the presentation of
concurring and dissenting opinions lend a distinctly dialectical flavor to U.S.
Supreme Court cases.
From a logical perspective, the emphasis is on standards of proof and rea-
soning. Much of what we think of as the law comes from case law, “the binding
principles and rules that originate from . . . case-by-case judicial decisions”
(Zelezny, 2011, p. 9). Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion demonstrates the use
of case law and the logical perspective in legal argumentation, relative to one of
the key issues: “the capacity of a radio broadcast to intrude into the unwilling
listener’s home” (cited in Middleton & Chamberlin, 1995, p. 295). Justice
Brennan used parallel case reasoning and compared the details of the Pacifica
case to a similar incident.
In 1971 the Court overturned the conviction of a war protester because the slogan on
the back of his jacket—“F_ _ k the Draft”—did not constitute fighting words [one of
the conditions for censorship]. In Cohen v. California, the Court said the slogan on
Cohen’s jacket, which he wore through a California courthouse, was a constitutionally
protected comment on the unpopular war the country was then waging in Vietnam.
Cohen’s message did not constitute fighting words because it presented no immediate
danger of a violent physical reaction in a face-to-face confrontation. No one, the Court
said, could regard the words on Cohen’s jacket as “a direct personal insult.” (Zelezny,
2001, p. 45)
Justice Brennan compared what the Court ruled in the Cohen case to the
specifics of Pacifica.
[A]n individual’s actions in switching on and listening to communications transmitted

over the public airways and directed to the public at large do not implicate fundamen-
tal privacy interests, even when engaged in within the home. Instead, because the radio
is undeniably a public medium, these actions are more properly viewed as a decision to
take part, if only as a listener, in an ongoing public discourse. . . . Although an individ-
ual’s decision to allow public radio communications into his home undoubtedly does
not abrogate all of his privacy interests, the residual privacy interests he retains vis-à-vis
the communication he voluntarily admits into his home are surely no greater than those
of the people present in the corridor of the Los Angeles courthouse in Cohen who bore
witness to the words “F_ _ k the Draft” emblazoned across Cohen’s jacket. (cited in
Middleton & Chamberlin, 1995, p. 296)
From a logical perspective, “good” argumentation meets the standards of effec-

tive use of proof and reasoning. Justice Brennan’s dissent challenges the logical con-
sistency of the conclusion reached by the majority in the Pacifica case on the basis
that it is at odds with a decision reached in a previous, purportedly similar, case.
Rhetoric, dialectic, and logic each contribute to argumentation’s ability to func-
tion as an instrument used to discover knowledge and influence belief or behavior.
[R]hetoric helps us understand and evaluate arguing as a natural process of persuasive

communication; dialectic helps us to understand and evaluate argumentation as a coop-
erative method for making critical decisions; and logic helps us to understand and eval-
uate arguments as products people create when they argue. (Wenzel, 1990, p. 9)
Viewing argumentation in this way, contemporary scholars are exploring argu-

mentation as an instrument for critical thinking and discussion that leads to con-
sensual decision making.
Douglas Walton (1990, 1998) and Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob
Grootendorst (1993) have paid particular attention to the possibilities offered by
the dialectical perspective. For them, argumentation is an instrument of communi-
cation to the extent that it functions as a social dialogue in which people articulate
their differences, open themselves up to the ideas of others, critically investigate
each argument offered, and work cooperatively to find answers or solutions. From
the dialectical perspective, arguers use the techniques of argumentation to learn
from each other. It embodies the essence of the ELM’s central route, along which
arguer and audience are completely engaged in the discussion.
In this text, we emphasize a model of argument developed by the English logi-
cian Stephen Toulmin, whose ideas were embraced by rhetoricians in this country.
When you argue, you make a series of statements using proof and reasoning to
draw conclusions that develop and clarify the stand you take on an issue. For cen-
turies, teachers and students of argumentation have struggled to find a way to put
into words, to visualize on the page or screen, how human thinking in argumenta-
tive form takes place. Toulmin’s model gives us a verbal and visual structure for
understanding how an argument is formed by putting proof and reasoning to-
gether and understanding how it might be interpreted by its audience.
Regardless of whether your experience as a creator of arguments is influenced
primarily by the rhetorical, dialectical, or logical perspective, your purpose will be to
influence belief and behavior. Success or failure in that endeavor can carry real conse-
quences for you as well as your audience. Because there is this potential for significant
consequences, those who engage in argumentation must pay special attention to the
ethical implications of the choices they make and encourage others to make.
ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR ARGUMENTATION

Ethics is the term we use to indicate the moral choices a person makes regarding
his or her behavior. Standards of ethics are devised in one of two ways. First,
teleological ethics are based on the outcomes, or ends, of communicating—the
purpose you achieve rather than the means you use to achieve it. Is the end you
seek in using argumentation a worthwhile one? A standard of teleological ethics is
at work when we say, “We should do that which produces the greatest good for
the greatest number of people.”
Second, deontological ethics is based on a set of absolutes, or rules of conduct,
that differentiate between right and wrong. Making a moral choice in the context of
deontological ethics is a matter of living up to the obligation to behave in the “right”
way. The set of absolutes, often presented as a “code of ethics,” identifies “right”
and “wrong” ways of behaving. Absolute standards of ethical behavior are found in
religion and ideology or are codified in sets of beliefs that are found in the ethical
code of the Public Relations Society of America or that of the National Association
of Broadcasters.
Because the audience for argumentation often lacks the time or resources to
verify every statement made, the creators of arguments bear a heavy ethical bur-
den: what is made to seem most probable or believable is most likely to gain ac-
ceptance. Like other forms of communication, argumentation can be used to ad-
vance the cause of good or evil. According to Richard L. Johannesen, Kathleen S.
Valde, and Karen E. Whedbee (2008), ethical standards are an issue when commu-
nication behavior “could have significant impact on other persons, when the be-
havior involves conscious choice of means and ends, and when the behavior can be
judged by standards of right and wrong” (p. 1).
Like other forms of communication, argumentation is a matter of making
conscious choices about what to say. In preparing argumentative messages, you
will research a topic, decide which claims and proofs to offer, and choose how to
arrange your materials for the greatest impact. Your audience will judge you and
your end product as ethical or unethical on the basis of the choices you have made
about the means and ends manifested in your argumentation.
Of particular importance in our society is the cardinal virtue of freedom of
thought and speech. Ethical communication behaviors protect freedom of
thought and speech for arguers and respect those same freedoms for their audi-
ences. Our society considers freedom of thought and speech to be universal
truths that apply to all people at all times. We have begun, however, to question
whether it is desirable, or even possible, to come up with such “one-size-fits-all”
ethical standards.
For much of human history, men and women were considered to have dif-
ferent virtues. Women were said to possess the “beautiful” virtues of modesty,
neatness, good-heartedness, and a pleasant-looking form. Men were assigned
the “noble” or “sublime” virtues of honor, justice, courage, and rationality. The
most a woman could aspire to was to be attractive to, and good company for,
the men in her life (McLaren, 2001). Women have struggled for centuries to
overturn this male-generated mind-set that characterizes them as incapable of
rational thought.
Contemporary feminists have developed ethical views questioning the belief
that rational thinking belongs to men alone, and feminists have offered feminist eth-
ical principles that emphasize women’s experiences. Carol Gilligan (1982) says that
women practice an ethic of care, derived from relationships and based on standards
of compassion and nurturing. Susan Frank Parsons (2002) holds that we need an
ethic of liberation. We need to liberate ourselves from the institutions and material
conditions that construct the genders of male and female. Tillie Olsen and Gillian
Michell (cited in Johannsen, et al., 2008, pp. 210–211) suggest that women are
forced to “tell it slant.” That is, women sometimes are forced to lie or use deception
to survive in a sexist society. In such circumstances, feminists would argue that
“lying” can be viewed as an ethical communication practice.
Our purpose is not to suggest that one can engage in deception with im-
punity, but rather to point out that a one-size-fits-all set of ethical principles does
not always work. There is not necessarily a common morality that applies to all
people in all situations. Clifford Christians (1997) suggests that old standards of
Euro-American Enlightenment ethics, absolutes about which behaviors are good
and right, are no longer morally and intellectually defensible. “The only legiti-
mate option is an ethics that is culturally inclusive rather than biased toward
Western hegemony” (p. 5). How, then, is it possible to devise ethical standards
for argumentation?
Contemporary argumentation scholars suggest that rather than searching for
some universal set of norms, we look instead at how people use argumentation
and develop an ethics based on argumentation as it is practiced. Edmund Arens
(1997) and Michael Traber (1997) indicate that there is one standard that seems
common across all cultures—an orientation to telling the truth. Both one-on-one
relationships and community structures are only “possible on the assumption that
people are telling the truth, whereby mutual trust is possible.” Although truth and
trust may be expressed in different ways across cultures and “telling it slant” may
be understandable in certain circumstances, “truth-telling nevertheless remains
the foundation on which relationships are maintained and cultivated” (Traber,
1997, p. 339).
The importance of truth telling and trust is illustrated in the aftermath of the
deceptions perpetrated by Bernie Madoff, whose Ponzi scheme wiped out the sav-
ings of thousands of retirees and the assets of many nonprofit foundations to the
tune of $50 billion by promising them consistent market-beating returns. “Many
of the alleged fraudster’s biggest investors—European industrialists, South
American socialites, well-connected American business people—believed that get-
ting Madoff to manage their money was like gaining admittance to a hoity-toity
club . . . this alleged fraud is the sort of thing you can ordinarily get away with
only if your victims are trusting friends and family” (Gross, 2009, p. 18).
The dialectical perspective on argumentation has a strong ethical dimension.
Participants in argumentation are obligated not to make “any moves which im-
pede the communication proceedings.” There is a “Principle of Communication”
that “is implemented by the maintenance of four standards: clarity, honesty, effi-
ciency, and relevance” (van Eemeren et al., 1996, p. 12). Whether your approach
to argumentation is based on the dialectical perspective of argumentation as con-
versation or the more traditional view that argumentation is verbal competition,
these four standards will serve you well as the basis for ethical participation and as
a means of facilitating truth telling.
Clarity
In the eighteenth century, rhetorical theorists developed “the doctrine of perspicu-
ity,” by which they meant a speaker or writer should strive for clearly expressed
ideas. Today, we speak of the quality of “clarity” in speaking and writing. The main
points you make in arguing should be easily comprehended by your audience.
Arguers have an ethical responsibility not to deceive their audiences or other ar-
guers by using obscure or ambiguous language, confusing patterns of organization,
or ideas encumbered by nonessential information or ideas.
Clarity is a matter of both language choice and the arrangement of reasons
and proof in the message. An audience decodes a message. Decoding is the inter-
pretive process that audience members and other arguers use to come to an under-
standing of what you mean. Decoding is not necessarily a simple process; it is easy
for a reader or listener to assign a different meaning or to completely misunder-
stand you. Therefore, the burden is on you, the arguer, to be clear, because the au-
dience may resist, or completely botch, “decoding unless claims are presented
clearly and made explicit” (Campbell & Huxman, 2003, p. 193).
Choosing the most concrete or specific language and having a clear structure
for your message increases the chances that your arguments will not be misinter-
preted. As an ethical responsibility, clarity is related to honesty. When you present
your arguments clearly, your audience will most likely form an impression of you
as an honest person who does not attempt to conceal things from them.
Honesty
The orientation toward truth telling is at the heart of honesty. Honesty is saying
what you believe to be the truth of the matter. Ethical communication behavior
demonstrates character, and a traditional component of good character is being
truthful with your audience. To achieve honesty, you must know your subject thor-
oughly. An ethical arguer diligently researches the subject to discover, insofar as
possible, what is probably true about it. Although no one expects you to learn
everything about a given subject, ethical argumentation requires that you be well
informed. You need to know the subject not only from your own point of view, but
from opposing viewpoints as well. And you need to realize that probable truth
may exist on both sides of a controversy. Issues in human affairs are seldom one-
sided. Indeed, we define something as a controversy when at least two conflicting
views exist, each of which possesses elements of probable truth. Just because infor-
mation does not fit your point of view does not mean it is a “lie.”
Being honest also requires that you use facts and the opinions of others accu-
rately. Remember that when you think through something you have witnessed,
read, or heard, you filter the information through your own cognitive maps of ex-
perience. You decide how you will interpret reality. In deciding, you have the abil-
ity to distort or confuse the facts. Your ethical obligation is to avoid consciously
distorting information to mislead your audience. What is wrong with some distor-
tion, especially if it is done in pursuit of a worthy goal? Simply this: If you violate
the trust an audience places in you by not being truthful with them, you risk not
being considered credible in the future.
Finally, beyond being honest in using facts and opinions, you should never
fabricate information. Making up information is deceptive and unethical. With in-
formation available on almost any subject, a diligent exploration of print and elec-
tronic sources will yield what you need to prove your arguments.
An orientation toward truth telling requires more than just being clear and
honest. Your ethical obligations also extend to being a competent arguer who
does not waste the time of others. Ultimately, your practice of clarity and honesty
in researching and preparing arguments will lead to the quality of producing effi-
cient arguments.
Efficiency
Efficiency as an ethical standard does not mean taking shortcuts or offering mini-
mal proof and reasoning in making your point. Efficiency is the obligation to de-
velop arguments that have the necessary rational power to make your point. The
connection between efficiency and rational power can best be understood in terms
of the ELM. In the ELM, “a better, stronger argument is one that engages audience
members, one that they collaborate in creating, translating it into their own words,
attempting to clarify what seems ambiguous” (Campbell & Huxman, 2003, p. 97),
extending on what the arguer has said by adding their own experiences and knowl-
edge. Involving the audience in the process of reasoning with you is key to efficient
arguing. What results is a “well-made” argument. If your approach is to ramble, to
include every bit of information you have discovered, or to fail to engage the audi-
ence, you will not have a well-made argument.
The ethical standard of efficiency also addresses your competency as an ar-
guer. Being efficient means being capable and competent and knowing how to do
the task at hand. An ethical arguer uses sound reasoning in the form of logically
sufficient arguments supported by facts and expert opinion. You are responsible
for the form and content of all your communication, whether the end product is
argumentation or something else, and the manner in which you discharge this re-
sponsibility is a reflection of your communication competence.
Achieving the competency necessary to create efficient arguments comes from
studying texts such as this one and then applying what you have learned. The re-
quirements for effective argumentation will be discussed in subsequent chapters on
research practices, constructing arguments, testing their quality, and organizing
them into a coherent message. Although you do not need to be a slave to the rules,
ethical argumentation requires that you know and be able to use them. Efficiency
is a standard of ethics that ultimately means you do not waste your audience’s time
by offering them a muddled or irrelevant message.
Relevance
In their development of the ELM, Petty and Cacioppo (1986) thought that one vari-
able, personal relevance, would have the greatest impact on the extent to which an
audience member would follow the central route in processing a message. If an
issue or idea does not relate to the listener’s or reader’s life, he or she will be less
likely to augment or extend on messages by supplying personal experience or
knowledge. The need to be relevant “underscores the importance of adapting argu-
ments to the audience and how essential it is to point out the relevance of issues for
those you seek to reach and influence” (Campbell & Huxman, 2003, p. 97).
The standard of relevance recognizes that audience members select which mes-
sages they will attend to and which they will ignore. Audience members selectively
expose themselves to messages that meet their needs. When people perceive that
something is of use to them, they are more likely to extend themselves, to expend
the psychic energy required to become involved in decoding messages about it.
The quality of relevance is especially important in a multicultural society.

Although an orientation toward truth telling is a core value, we live in a society
made up of many disparate cultures. Ethically, the goal is not to widen the culture
gaps, but to find ways to bridge them while respecting cultural differences. An eth-
ical arguer must have the welfare of the audience in mind. Arguments arise in re-
solving which policy is best, which course of action should be undertaken. A re-
sponsible arguer creates argumentative positions that emphasize what is
relevant—common values and common goals—to people who may come from di-
verse cultures. “Ideological differences or a lack of shared beliefs and attitudes are
serious barriers, but ones that can be breached by relevance, that is, if the recipi-
ents see a direct, personal use for the information provided now” (Campbell &
Huxman, 2003, p. 190). You are ethically responsible for investigating the cultures
of those in your audience or those who would be affected by your arguments so
you can find ways to attempt to bridge these cultural gaps.
As standards of ethics for argumentation, clarity, honesty, efficiency, and rele-
vance are personal qualities that all ethical arguers cultivate in themselves. These
are qualities you should strive to bring to the process of argumentation. Doing ar-
gumentation, the act of being involved in the process of argumentative discourse,
also has certain standards for ethical participation.
Discourse Ethics
Discourse ethics are not so much a set of norms for what constitutes “good” or
“right” behavior, but rather they address the attitude one should bring to the process
of engaging in argumentation. J. Vernon Jensen (1997) describes discourse ethics as
the embodiment of the spirit of dialogue. “Dialogue here refers to a spirit, an attitude,
a mind-set that is reflected by the techniques and behaviors, the verbal and nonverbal
cues, of those who are interacting” (p. 32). Respecting the process of dialogue, and
the people involved in it, is the ethical center of discourse ethics. As you will quickly
discern, if discourse ethics are not observed, truth telling cannot be assumed.
Advocates and opponents should not look on each other, or the people in their
audiences, as “objects” or “things” if they are truly concerned about discourse
ethics. Respect for the process of argumentation “implies showing a concern for
possible consequences and employing honesty, directness, frankness, and spon-
taneity.” Conceptualizing participation in the process of argumentation as a dia-
logue “reflects authenticity, inclusion, and confirmation but avoids manipulation,
pretense, self-centeredness, and defensiveness.” Jensen describes the ethical process
as one in which “self-scrutiny of claims, motives, reasoning, and evidence is un-
hesitatingly entered into, and there is a willingness to admit error if it is demon-
strated” (1997, p. 32).
Johannesen et al. (2008) say that the spirit of dialogue “is characterized by
such qualities as mutuality, open-heartedness, directness, honesty, spontaneity,
frankness, lack of pretense, nonmanipulative intent, communion, intensity and love
in the sense of responsibility of one human for another” (p. 52). Ultimately, these
qualities of discourse ethics suggest that an ethical arguer respects the personhood
of those involved in the process of argumentation. Traber (1997) tells us that our
concerns about ethics and multiculturalism have “brought to the fore the realiza-
tion that personhood transcends all cultures. . . . Personhood implies the capacity
of free choice, the ability to reflect and argue rationally, and the endowment of its
inner and intrinsic worth” (p. 337).
How can you maximize the potential to embody discourse ethics in your par-
ticipation in the process of argumentation? Franz Van Eemeren and Rob
Grootendorst (1992) combined the study of language and logic in the spirit of dia-
logue in what they called “pragma-dialectics.” They developed a code of conduct
for practicing argumentative discourse, a set of guidelines for ethical participation
in the process. “For example, you can ask someone to clarify their argument. You
must clarify your argument if asked to do so. The rules of pragma-dialectics can
also be used to evaluate encounters to determine why they failed to produce re-
sults” (Rybacki & Rybacki, 2009, p. 281).
The great value of argumentation is that it provides a reliable means of arriv-
ing at the probable truth of something. Seldom in human affairs is there a defini-
tive, absolutely right or wrong answer to a question or solution to a problem. We
need argumentation to find the most plausible and probable answers and solu-
tions. When we enter the world of probabilities, we open ourselves up to the risk
that probable truth may reside with something that challenges our belief structure.
Wayne Brockriede (1990) explains the risk in terms of how arguing may encourage
personal growth: “When two persons engage in mutual confrontation so they can
share a rational choice, they share the risks of what the confrontation may do to
change their ideas, their selves, and their relationship with one another” (p. 7). In
this way, argumentation can be a positive, healthy means of self-development.
Argumentation does have its limitations, because it is practiced by fallible hu-
mans whose motives may not always be above reproach. We are especially at risk
when it comes to our concept of time. Electronic communication has created a 24–7
mentality in which everything seems to happen in nanoseconds. Unfortunately, the
process of argumentation is time-consuming. It takes time to marshal sufficient evi-
dence to support a position and ensure its logical consistency. In subsequent chap-
ters dealing with the evidence and reasoning on which argumentation is based, we
will provide a set of minimal standards, rules for sufficiency. As a creator of argu-
ments, you should allow enough time to apply these standards rigorously in evalu-
ating your own work. As a consumer of argumentation, you should be equally rig-
orous in using them. Test what you hear and read to ensure it is not emotive
discourse masquerading as argumentation.
As we end this chapter, we want to focus on the idea that argumentation is a
process or a means of communication. Argumentation is not an end unto itself, but
a means to achieve consensus or make a decision. In your use of the means of ar-
gumentation, you may not always achieve the ends you seek. Although we all want
our argumentative efforts to succeed, the most important outcome of studying and
practicing argumentation is that of learning the process—a good means of reason-
ing with others.
LEARNING ACTIVITIES
1. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of using argumentation as a means of influ-
encing the belief and behavior of others. How will the advantages of argumentation im-
prove your ability to communicate your views in a controversy? How will you over-
come the limitations of argumentation?
2. Choose an editorial or opinion essay such as the “My Turn” pieces in Newsweek that you
perceive to be an effective piece of argumentation and respond to the following questions:
a. Why is this an example of argumentation? How is it instrumental communication?
b. What resources of reasoning and proof are used to develop the author’s opinion?
c. What evidence do you have that the author of the argument is fulfilling the ethical
responsibilities of arguing?
3. Think about your most strongly held opinions. On what are these based, the central or
peripheral route in the Elaboration Likelihood Model? Examine the sources of these be-
liefs for evidence of reasoning, emotions, prejudices, tradition, or authority figures.
4. Choose a current, widely discussed controversy. Find an editorial cartoon about the
controversy as well as a fully developed opinion piece on the subject. Discuss how the
cartoon is an example of the peripheral route of the Elaboration Likelihood Model and
how the fully developed piece is an example of the central route.
5. Develop a code of ethical standards for your argumentation class. What will you con-
sider to be ethical and unethical behaviors? How will your code accommodate cultural
differences?
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CHAPTER
Where Do I Begin
in Argumentation?
I
n Chapter 1, we told you that argumentation is instrumental communication. It
is used to influence the beliefs and behaviors of others. Principles of argumen-
tation have evolved over time, and the practice of good argumentation requires
that arguers maintain ethical standards appropriate to their society. This informa-
tion alone, however, is not enough to begin the process of arguing. As with any
rule-governed behavior, there are certain first principles, or conventions, you must
know as a prerequisite to participating.
We want you to think of arguing as participating in a process that leads to eth-
ical and effective uses of reasoning and proof. To understand how people get in-
volved in the process, it is helpful to extend our characterization of argumentation
as instrumental communication. Frans van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, and Tjark
Kruiger (1987) offer such an extension by explaining common characteristics of
the process:
䊏 Argumentation is a social activity.

䊏 Argumentation is an intellectual activity.
䊏 Argumentation is a verbal activity.
䊏 Argumentation is opinion stating, justifying, or refuting.
䊏 Argumentation is directed toward an audience.
Social, intellectual, and verbal activity directed toward an audience suggest

that argumentation takes place in a particular kind of context. Moreover, that ar-
gumentation involves intellectual and verbal activity suggests the content of com-
munication may be influenced, even constrained, by the context in which it takes
place. Opinion stating, justifying, and refuting suggest that behavior within this
communication context involves people enacting fairly specific roles governed by
expectations or rules.
If you have had other courses in communication, you probably found the
three preceding statements fairly unremarkable. The existence of a context that
influences the content of communication and involves role-bound, rule-bound
22
Fields of Argumentation 23
behavior on the part of communicators is hardly unique to argumentation. What

is unique about argumentation is the way in which context, content, roles, and
rules play out.
FIELDS OF ARGUMENTATION
Argumentation takes place in the context of a field that contains the arguer, a sub-
ject of controversy, and an audience. A field of argumentation is a social or profes-
sional context in which people argue to make decisions or build a body of knowl-
edge. Stephen Toulmin (1958) uses “field” as a metaphor for the figurative
territory in which arguers and audiences function. A field of argumentation is
much like an academic discipline such as history or biology. Theories, examples,
and interpretations in each academic discipline have evolved over time as succes-
sive historians and biologists contributed to their field’s body of knowledge and
formed opinions based on research about what something means in the historical
or biological context.
Each field has certain elements that are field dependent. These elements are
particular to that field alone. Definitions and terminology, a field’s jargon that may
be incomprehensible to anyone outside the field, are field-dependent uses of lan-
guage. Each field may also have its own standards for the rigor expected in proof
and reasoning, for what constitutes “sound” argumentation, and for what “makes
sense.” Standards for proof and reasoning can also be field dependent, because his-
torians and biologists, for example, discover information and create knowledge in
different ways.
To understand this aspect of field dependency, think about how the historian
and the biologist approach doing research in their respective fields. A question that
exists in many different fields, the answer to which is dependent on each field’s sub-
ject matter, is: What constitutes a sufficient number of cases upon which to base gen-
eralizations? (Lyne, 1990). A historian might be able to develop effective arguments
using as few as a half dozen cases or instances of the impact of railroads on the de-
velopment of the western frontier to draw a general conclusion about the impor-
tance of railroads. A biologist, on the other hand, would be considered irresponsible
for drawing a conclusion about cell behavior based on the study of only six cells.
We cannot provide you with an all-purpose list of everything that might be de-
pendent in every particular field because one does not exist. To participate in argu-
mentation, you must be knowledgeable not only regarding a field’s subject matter
but also about any special, field-dependent requirements for arguing in it. Through
research you will discover information about subject matter directly and begin to
discover, directly or indirectly, elements of a field that make arguing in it unique.
Not all elements of argumentation are dependent on a particular field’s subject
matter. Some elements, such as the basic mental structures of human reasoning and
the tests we apply to determine the quality of information used to prove argu-
ments, do not typically change as we move from field to field. These elements of
argumentation are field invariant.
The historian and the biologist both use the same understanding of the reasoning
process—that a generalization, for example, is made by examining instances of some-
thing and drawing a conclusion based on what those instances have in common. Both
24 CHAPTER 2 Where Do I Begin in Argumentation?
fields also share an understanding that good cases, on which a valid generalization
can be based, are representative of all existing cases. The only substantive, field-de-
pendent difference in how history and biology approach generalizing concerns how
many cases are considered sufficient to support a generalization.
Why is it important to your understanding of argumentation to know the dis-
tinction between field-dependent and field-invariant elements? We all potentially
participate in argumentation in several different fields. As a student, for example,
you may be taking courses from four different departments, which means you
must be able to function in the context of those fields. If each course requires you
to write a term paper, analyze case studies, or make comparisons on essay tests,
you will be participating in argumentation in four different fields. You must know
the field-dependent requirements. Are any special terms or language used? What
quality of proof is required? What unique restrictions or expectations exist in each
field? You need to know the answers to be successful as an instrumental communi-
cator in each of your classes.
To successfully participate in argumentation, it is also important to under-
stand the field-invariant elements of argumentation. For instance, there are some
field-invariant rules for language use. Whether you are writing for a history or a
biology professor, both will expect you to know how to spell, use appropriate sen-
tence structure, and organize a term paper according to a standard system for term
paper writing. There are also field-invariant rules for the major forms of reasoning
(Chapter 7) that apply across all disciplines, as suggested in our comparison of his-
tory and biology.
Fields are not static. A field is always in the process of evolving as new people
and new ideas modify it and add to its body of knowledge. You should be alert for
shifts that might have taken place. Something that was field invariant may become
field dependent, as often happens in the sciences when new subspecialties emerge.
Equally, some things that were field dependent in the past may become field invari-
ant in the future. Once the province of the hard sciences, the scientific method has
become ubiquitous with the emergence of the soft, or social, sciences.
Fields are inhabited by people whose ideas and experiences give them shape. We
can characterize the roles of these participants in argumentation and the rules under
which they participate. Those who favor change and those who oppose it assume
roles that carry with them responsibilities that must be fulfilled during the process.
We use the term advocate to refer to the person who communicates to encourage a
change in belief or behavior. The term opponent identifies the person who acts to dis-
courage the change supported by the advocate. The opponent plays the role of
spokesperson for the existing beliefs and behaviors in a field. Using sports as an anal-
ogy, the advocate plays offense, the opponent plays defense. The conventions of pre-
sumption, burden of proof, and prima facie case development identify the playing
field and obligate those who play on it to fulfill certain rule-based responsibilities.
PRESUMPTION
To begin the process of argumentation, you must identify the beliefs and behaviors
that a field presently favors. All argumentation takes place over a piece of figura-
tive ground occupied by existing institutions, ideas, laws, policies, and customs.
Presumption 25
This figurative ground represents the way things are at present. Presumption is the
term that specifies who occupies this ground at the beginning of the controversy.
Historically, the concept of presumption has reflected one of two viewpoints: arti-
ficial or natural.
The concept of artificial presumption in the legal system demonstrates how
presumption is influenced by a field. In the American legal system, every defendant
is presumed innocent until the probability of his or her guilt can be demonstrated
by the state, in the case of criminal law, or by the plaintiff, in the case of civil law.
This presumption of innocence is termed artificial because it is the result of argu-
mentative ground having been assigned arbitrarily to one side in the dispute be-
cause of a field-accepted belief. The Constitution and the accumulated experience
of those in the field of law create a field-dependent presumption in favor of “inno-
cent until proven guilty.”
So powerful is this presumption in the American psyche that it often carries
over into other fields, as when someone is accused of wrongdoing or malfeasance
that is not necessarily a criminal or civil violation of the law. An assumption of in-
nocence here is an artificial kind of presumption; law and custom could just as eas-
ily have assigned presumption as the French do: The accused is guilty until he or
she proves the probability of innocence.
All fields have their own institutions, ideas, rules, policies, and customs that
have been established as the field developed. These elements are often what defines
one field as unique from others. We can say that these elements create an order for
what is typical, or natural, for that field. Each field has its own natural order, and
participants in that field usually consider its institutions, ideas, rules, policies, or
customs effective and deserving of continuation until someone shows them good
and sufficient reasons to change.
Natural presumption derives from the observation of the natural order of
whatever field we find ourselves in at a given time. When an advocate challenges a
belief or behavior that is the consequence of something in the natural order of a
field—an institution, idea, rule, policy, common practice, custom, value, or inter-
pretation of reality—presumption automatically rests with the belief or behavior
being challenged. This presumption in favor of the natural order is automatic, be-
cause a field’s natural order is a product of the development over time of things
that work for that field. “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” is a bit of folk wisdom that
neatly expresses the concept of natural presumption.
Our understanding of natural presumption is drawn from the work of
Anglican Archbishop Richard Whately (1828/2010). In discussing presumption,
he used the analogy of a company of soldiers inside a fortress. Change would re-
quire these troops to march out to meet the enemy; natural presumption would
suggest that they remain secure inside their fortress rather than venture out onto
an unknown battlefield. Because natural presumption reflects accepted practices in
a given field, the natural order of things in the military field suggests that troops do
not normally abandon a secure position in favor of an open field. They leave it up
to the opposing force to attack their fortified position.
Pragmatically, presumption can serve as a decision rule for determining how
the audience will respond to a proposal for change if its advocate fails to offer
them good and sufficient reasons for making the change. Because presumption tells
us what the audience presently views as adequate and deserving of continuation, if
good and sufficient reasons are not given, the audience will usually reject a pro-
posal for change. Whately was particularly concerned that those who argue realize
what presumption means in preparing an argumentative case. He urged arguers to
begin by knowing where presumption lies and to point out who has the burden of
proving the change is reasonable and who has the benefit of endorsing the ac-
cepted institutions, ideas, rules, policies, and customs in a field. Thus, the conven-
tion of presumption helps us understand the responsibilities of the advocate and
opponent roles in argumentation.
Presumption is a communication convention with implications for audience
analysis. Whately also identified that for which the audience holds deference as a
source of presumption. The persons, practices, ideas, or sources of information the
audience accepts can be regarded as presumptively occupying the figurative
ground. Whether we think of a large field, such as the “American system of
democracy,” or a narrower field, such as the “genre of horror fiction,” those who
make up that field tend to favor the existing practices and ideas of the field. They
defer to the field’s institutions, authorities, opinion leaders, and body of knowl-
edge, all of which has evolved over time (Bruce, 1993).
The deference those in a field have for that which constitutes it is a natural
presumption. People in a field compose the audience for a proposal to change be-
lief or behavior in it. Knowing those things, especially those sources of information
and expert opinion, that the audience has deference for is the best way to discover
what will provide a basis for good and sufficient reasons for them to favor or op-
pose change. J. Michael Sproule (1976) suggests a series of questions to ask in
using natural presumption as an audience analysis device.
The arguer is advised to ask such questions as: (1) to what groups do members of the
audience belong? (2) to what sources of information (persons, books, groups) do audi-
ence members accord deference? (3) what is the popular and unpopular opinion on a
particular subject? (4) what information on a subject might hold the advantage of
novelty? Such queries would assist the [arguer] in selecting arguments and evidence
best fitted to persuading persons on a given subject. (p. 128)
There is a final perspective from which we may consider the convention of

presumption. Usually applied to argumentation as a process for seeking knowl-
edge, presumption can be thought of as a hypothesis to be tested. When people en-
gage in argumentation because their goal is to explore some new idea or reevaluate
an old one, to define the boundaries of a concept, or to determine whether some-
thing is or is not accurate, they phrase a proposal and test it. The result is argu-
mentation about whether to believe or not believe something (van Eemeren,
Grootendorst, Jackson, & Jacobs, 1993; Walton, 1992).
Argumentation to test hypotheses uses an artificial presumption.
“Presumption comes into play where there is an issue or question that is open in
the sense that the relevant, available evidence does not resolve the issue one way or
another with sufficient weight to close discussion of the issue” (Walton, 1992, p. 42).
The issue or question is phrased as a hypothesis, although we will use the label
proposition in Chapter 3. The hypothesis is given provisional, artificial acceptance,
and then argumentation takes place to determine whether that acceptance should
continue or should be rejected. Those who participate in such hypothesis testing
argumentation may take the traditional roles of advocate and opponent, in which
Presumption 27
one side supports the accuracy of the proposition and the other denies it. A hy-
pothesis may also be tested by using a format for argumentation in which all par-
ticipants play the roles of both advocate and opponent.
You may recognize this form of argumentation from your experience in sci-
ence or social science courses. The scientific method is a logical system for testing
a hypothesis, often through a study or an experiment. A social scientist proposes
that the lyrics in country-western music are more likely to contain negative charac-
terizations of marriage and fidelity than the lyrics of any other form of popular
music. She states the hypothesis: country-western lyrics suggest negative images of
marriage and fidelity to listeners. She then assembles evidence by studying the con-
tent of lyrics in country-western and non-country-western songs and publishes her
research in a social science journal.
Our first social scientist has initiated an argument about the content, and
likely impact on listeners, of the lyrics of country-western songs. Another social
scientist reads the article and believes it misrepresents the meaning of these lyrics.
He analyzes them and finds that the lyrics are more likely to suggest positive char-
acterizations, and he publishes his findings. Both researchers may continue their
debate over the hypothesis, analyzing more songs and publishing their findings.
They may also choose to work together to determine whether the hypothesis is ac-
curate by conducting a laboratory or field experiment to determine how country-
western fans characterize these lyrics.
The debate tournaments that high school and college students participate in
provide another venue for hypothesis testing. A debate topic is selected for the
school year, and students participate in contests to advocate or oppose the hypothet-
ical statement or proposition. The testing of the hypothesis occurs as affirmative (ad-
vocate) and negative (opponent) teams argue back and forth, with a judge (audience)
evaluating the strength of arguments, quality of evidence, and soundness of reason-
ing. In tournament debate, testing the hypothesis of the debate topic relies on artifi-
cial presumption. Presumption is automatically granted to the negative team at the
beginning of each debate, and the affirmative team has the burden of proving the
presumption should be overturned. Whichever team is most successful in convincing
the judge that its test of the hypothesis is most accurate “wins” the debate.
Whether artificial or natural, presumption grants initial possession of the fig-
urative ground to the person fulfilling the role of opponent. The opponent repre-
sents an existing institution, idea, law or rule, policy, practice, or custom and is re-
sponsible for denying that good and sufficient reasons exist to change it. We
assume that what exists should be maintained unless good reasons surface to
change it. Presumption simply describes what exists without making any kind of
judgment about its worth or effectiveness. Consider the following description:
The existing curriculum at Northern State University involves courses which are mostly
worth four credit-hours, although a few one-, two-, and three-credit courses exist. Stu-
dent schedules and faculty teaching loads are designed around the four-credit-hours-
per-course system. Some faculty and students would like to have the system converted
to a three-credit standard.
In this case, presumption states that a system of four-credit courses exists and
functions at Northern State University. Presumption does not suggest this is neces-
sarily good for learning or teaching, just that it is present and that in the field of
Northern State University no one presently sees any reason to change it.
Controversy over the credit-hour system would revolve around the efforts of advo-
cates to present a series of good reasons for changing the system and the efforts of
opponents who, using the benefit of presumption that the four-credit standard has
worked, defend the policy on the basis of its successful functioning.
In argumentation, the importance of the convention of presumption lies in the
responsibility it places upon the advocate. Because advocates do not have the ben-
efit of presumption, which favors no change, they must show good and sufficient
reasons why we can no longer rely on those beliefs or behaviors that are afforded
presumption because they presently exist. We may summarize presumption in the
following principles:
1. The term presumption describes a situation that currently exists and points
out a prevailing order.
2. The opponent initially occupies the figurative ground over which the argu-
ment will be contested.
3. Presumption is a decision rule that determines what the advocate must prove
in testing the proposition as a hypothesis.
4. Presumption identifies what sources of information and expert opinion consti-
tutes good and sufficient reasons for accepting or rejecting a proposed change
in belief or behavior.
5. Presumption only describes; it does not judge the value or lack of value of the
existing beliefs, institutions, ideas, laws or rule, policies, or customs presently
occupying the ground.
BURDEN OF PROOF
Once presumption has been determined, an advocate must discover and provide
good and sufficient reasons to support a change in belief or behavior. It is the re-
sponsibility of the person performing the role of advocate to provide these reasons
in order to fulfill the burden of proof.
Presumption describes the preoccupation of ground in argumentation by the
opponent; the burden of proof is the obligation of the advocate to contest the
ground by offering arguments that are logically sufficient to challenge presump-
tion. The process of argumentation is much like a balancing scale. Arguing is a
shifting or transferring of the weight of evidence and reasoning from one side to
the other (Walton, 1988). The audience for argumentation is part of the balancing
mechanism, as it may shift its support from opponent to advocate, or advocate to
opponent as each side’s arguments are presented. The scale is finally tipped when
the audience decides to accept or reject the proposed change based on which side’s
evidence and reasoning ultimately have more weight.
To fully understand what the burden of proof involves, recall that presumption
describes what exists without passing judgment on it. The advocate, in fulfilling the
burden of proof, both passes judgment on and criticizes present belief or behavior
and recommends a new belief or behavior. He or she begins by specifying or nam-
ing what it is that should not continue—the existing belief or behavior awarded
preoccupation of the ground by presumption. To fulfill the obligation of burden of
proof, the advocate must demonstrate why whatever presently occupies the disputed
Burden of Proof 29
figurative ground should not continue to do so. The content and scope of the bur-
den of proof are specified by the statement of the proposition argued.
The burden of proof may be thought of as the obligation of the complaining
party in a dispute. In civil law, this obligation would be identified with the responsi-
bility of the plaintiff to proceed first and make a case against the defendant, proving
the complaint by a preponderance of evidence. If you were dissatisfied with an auto-
mobile you had purchased and decided to sue the dealership, as the plaintiff you
would have to demonstrate through the introduction of evidence and testimony that
you had been harmed or damaged in some way as a result of the dealer’s actions. In
criminal law, the state acts as advocate and must prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused is guilty of the crime. This constitutes the state’s burden of proof.
In a controversy, the burden of proof always falls on the party who would lose
if the complaint were rejected or if a settlement did not occur. In the case of your
suing the auto dealer, as the person bringing the complaint, you would lose if you
could not demonstrate that you had been harmed or if you could not prove the
harm was a consequence of the dealer’s actions. In the example of criminal law, the
presumption of innocence means that if the prosecution was unable to demon-
strate the guilt of the accused at a sufficiently high level of probability, the state’s
case would be lost.
In some fields, the requirements for the burden of proof may not always be as
clear as they appear in legal argumentation. This is why audience analysis to deter-
mine presumption can be useful. It will help you discover exactly what your audi-
ence expects you to prove. If you were a student advocate addressing a Northern
State University policy-making body made up of faculty and administrators, you
might determine that their attitudes favored maintaining the four-credit-hour stan-
dard because faculty would be expected to undertake additional course prepara-
tion and demand a salary increase for the extra work load. You would have to
show that the greater good to students, obtained from changing to a three-credit-
hour standard, would justify the salary increase or the increased faculty workload.
Sometimes you have to make an educated guess regarding how much proof is
sufficient to fulfill your burden to support change. Those who already support the
change will require a simple affirmation of their beliefs; they require proof that
confirms change is good and shows them how to change. An uncommitted audi-
ence may be open to the change but may require substantial reasoning and infor-
mation to see that change is a good idea. An unbelieving audience may resist the
change no matter what proof is presented but may sometimes be reached by your
demonstrating that there are areas upon which agreement can be achieved. The
latter is a common practice in labor–management negotiations and diplomatic re-
lations. How many arguments are necessary and how much proof must support
them depend on an audience’s expectations and degree of commitment.
The burden of proof is the logical opposite of presumption. We may summa-
rize the burden of proof in the following principles:
1. The advocate has the responsibility to make a case of good and sufficient rea-
sons for change. This is the burden of proof.
2. In fulfilling the burden of proof, present beliefs and behaviors described by
presumption are judged and evaluated on the basis of the available evidence,
and an alternative pattern of thought or action is proposed.
How do you know when you have fulfilled your burden of proof? The advo-
cate’s responsibility to fulfill the burden of proof is discharged when a prima facie
case is presented.
THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

To overcome the presumption that a belief or behavior is adequate and deserving
of continuation, the advocate must present a fully developed case strong enough to
justify a change unless successfully challenged by countering arguments. Literally,
a prima facie case is one that “at first sight” or “on the face of it” is sufficient to
justify changing belief or behavior. A prima facie case causes us to suspend our re-
liance on presumption as a guide for belief or behavior. This suspension of pre-
sumption will either be temporary, if valid countering arguments are provided, or
permanent, if the opponent is unable to establish a reason to continue to rely on
the original presumption.
Because the dispute would be lost if a prima facie case were not presented to
fulfill the burden of proof and suspend presumption, the advocate normally initi-
ates the argument by speaking or writing first. This initial presentation must be
prima facie and sufficient to support the proposal for a change in belief or behav-
ior. The legal system once again provides an example to clarify the concept. To es-
tablish the guilt of a person accused of a felony, the prosecution must present an
indictment of this individual that suspends the artificial presumption of innocence.
This presentation must constitute a prima facie case.
Suppose Ralph is accused of auto theft. A prima facie case would consist, at
the very least, of evidence and testimony supporting the following arguments:
An automobile was reported missing from the dealer’s lot.
Subsequent to receiving this report, the city police apprehended Ralph with
the vehicle in question in his possession.
Ralph’s possession of the automobile was unlawful. He had not purchased it, nor
had he received consent of any dealer representative to take it for a test drive.
Proving these three arguments would constitute a prima facie indictment of
Ralph for grand theft auto. The presumption of Ralph’s innocence would be sus-
pended until his attorney had mounted a successful defense. The defense attorney
would have the responsibility of attempting to reestablish the presumption of Ralph’s
innocence by attacking the truth of one or more of these arguments or by introducing
argumentation that demonstrated extenuating circumstances mitigating Ralph’s guilt.
The advocate is responsible for developing a topical prima facie case. In the
field of an argumentation class or tournament debate, the advocate and her or his
opponent agree to a proposition that identifies the broad, general topic to be ar-
gued. In ordinary conversations, and in the argumentation that takes place in some
fields, it is easy to drift from topic to topic. When you want to make a specific case
for or against some proposed change, this is not a desirable quality. Sticking to the
topic you agreed to argue, the proposition, prevents the audience from becoming
confused about the issues.
If you had agreed to argue about changing Northern State University’s credit-
hour system, the proposition might be stated as: Northern State University should
The Prima Facie Case 31
adopt the three-credit-hour course as the university standard. In providing a prima

facie case, the advocate would not contest the amount a student pays per credit
hour or the manner in which fees are collected, because these issues are clearly out-
side the bounds of the proposition. Tuition constitutes a different topic requiring a
different proposition and has as much relevance to a discussion of the credit-hour
system at Northern as unpaid parking tickets would have to Ralph’s guilt or inno-
cence on the auto theft charge.
In addition to being topical, a prima facie case for a proposition of value or pol-
icy must demonstrate inherency. Argumentation is used to decide whether change is
justified. To justify change, the advocate must examine both the deficiencies in exist-
ing beliefs or behaviors and the reason for their existence. Inherency is concerned
with the nature of cause. Advocates propose changes in belief or behavior to remedy
problems or to fulfill the need for knowledge. They must identify what causes the
problem or the need for knowledge and demonstrate that the nature of the cause is
such that it can only be overcome by a change in belief or behavior.
We generally assume that if a problem’s cause cannot be found, we cannot de-
termine how best to remedy it, and if there is nothing to stimulate a quest for more
knowledge, we will not pursue it. If an advocate cannot identify cause, he or she
cannot develop a logically complete argument. Thus, inherency is a crucial part of
an advocate’s prima facie case. If the advocate fails to identify a cause for a prob-
lem or cause as a reason to seek knowledge, it will be impossible to determine if
there is a good reason to change our belief or behavior. Inherency establishes that
the problem exists as a direct result of existing belief or behavior. If cause is found
in behaviors that operationalize these beliefs, inherency is termed structural. If the
cause is found in the beliefs of a field, inherency is said to be attitudinal.
Finding the cause establishes that a problem or need exists as a direct result of
existing belief or behavior. If the cause is found in the institutions, laws or rules,
policies, and sometimes the customs of a field, inherency is structural. This is the
easier type of inherency to find through research because structures are typically
recorded or codified in constitutions, handbooks, court cases, legislation, and rules
of conduct. But not all structures are recorded. Unwritten customs and standard
practices may evolve in a field over time, and new members of the field must learn
them through experience. For example, rituals and superstitions believed to bring
good luck in the athletic field are seldom recorded or talked about, but they exist
with a very potent force for those in athletics.
Structural inherency results when fields adopt formal or informal systems that
operationalize a strong or widely held belief. Institutions, laws or rules, policies,
practices, and customs are the fabric that allow members of a field to engage in the
activities that typify it. Structural inherency argues that a problem’s cause is found
in the behavior these formal and informal systems require of people. In searching
for inherent causes, the advocate examines institutions, laws or rules, policies,
practices, and customs to see if their presence or absence is what has caused a
problem or need.
Inherency is attitudinal when the cause of a problem or need results from be-
liefs, ideas, or values that are central to a field. Attitudinal inherency is usually
found in the articulated opinions, feelings, or emotional reactions of the people who
compose a field. Attitudinal inherency may be more difficult to find through re-
search because we do not always verbalize beliefs, ideas, or values. More difficult
does not mean impossible to find. In meeting your ethical obligation to do research,
you can find many of these beliefs, ideas, or values by examining published mission
statements, ethical codes, or survey research results and by interviewing, or reading
essays by, opinion leaders in a given field.
Attitudinal inherency can be a powerful barrier to changing belief or behavior,
even when many in a field deem such a change necessary. To illustrate the power of
attitudes, consider the following examples. The opinion that women are less capa-
ble of mastering mathematics than men can keep women from pursuing careers in
many scientific fields. The view that college athletes are dumb jocks who receive
preferential treatment can make them exiles in the classroom. Emotional reactions
to the seeming unfairness of the tax system has led some to cheat on their taxes.
Attitudes are often difficult to identify, but they play a powerful role in causing us
to accept something as true or false, to value one thing over another, or to act or
refuse to act in a certain way.
In our example of argumentation concerning Northern State University, if the
principal reason we have for wanting to change Northern’s credit-hour system is
that the present system is (1) too restrictive of a student’s options in choosing
courses or (2) does not get maximum productivity from staff and facilities, we
would be citing problems that are built-in features of the existing four-credit-hour
system. Inherency in this case is structural; the problem is caused by the four-
credit-hour policy. This policy has been in effect for a number of years and is con-
sidered deserving of continuation by Northern’s policy makers.
Faculty members’ belief that a three-credit-hour system would increase their
workload also serves as an inherent barrier to change. If faculty members prefer
the four-credit-hour system, they have little or no inclination to change it. The
problems with the system perceived by student advocates could only be solved by
implementing a change that the existing power structure is ambivalent toward
putting in place.
The role of faculty attitude in preventing change illustrates that it is possible
for structural and attitudinal inherency to be present at the same time. It is a char-
acteristic of controversy that there may be several causes for a problem’s existence.
To solve a problem, however, it is necessary to remove its prime cause. The advo-
cate and opponent, in examining existing beliefs and behaviors, frequently dis-
agree over whose explanation most clearly represents the probable truth about
what causes a problem or need to exist. Conceptually, inherency is important in
determining whether a prima facie case has been presented because it forces ar-
guers to examine the reasons why things exist and to explore whether they will
correct themselves by the natural processes of change.
We may summarize the concept of prima facie argument with the following
principles:
1. The advocate has the responsibility of presenting a prima facie case, which at
face value justifies a change in belief or behavior.
2. The form and content of the arguments offered determine the face value of an
advocate’s case.
3. A prima facie case must be both topical and inherent.
4. Presentation of a prima facie case causes the suspension of presumption unless
it is successfully challenged.
The question may still remain: How do you know when you have discharged
your responsibilities as an advocate regarding the burden of proof? How will you
know what to oppose if you are the opponent? The content and scope of the bur-
den of proof are determined by the wording of the proposition that expresses the
change in belief or behavior the advocate proposes.
Further, what constitutes a prima facie case can be determined by the use of cer-
tain field-invariant stock questions that can be applied to propositions in any field.
Early theories of rhetoric developed a series of questions that were crucial in legal pro-
ceedings. These questions established the content and scope of the burden of proof for
legal propositions. They are similar to the questions the prosecutor considered in
preparing the case against Ralph. For fields of argument other than law, similar sets of
questions exist. They are commonly referred to as stock issues, the questions that lis-
teners or readers want answered before they will accept the advocate’s arguments as
sufficient to warrant a change in belief or behavior. These questions focus the contro-
versy and are naturally derived from the proposition being argued.
This chapter has covered conventions, roles, rules, and responsibilities that
shape participation in the process of argumentation. These conventions establish
the figurative ground over which argumentation takes place and some of the rules
arguers must follow for argumentation to be logically complete. An advocate, as
the person seeking a change in belief or behavior, must prove the case to overcome
presumption, which artificially or naturally favors no change. The playing field of
argumentation is regulated by the rule that advocates and opponents must not de-
viate too far from the topic. In making a prima facie case for change, the advocate
must prove that an inherent cause exists that serves as a good reason to make a
change in belief or behavior. The opponent has the benefit of the presumption that
existing elements in a field are considered adequate by the field and deserve contin-
uation in the absence of a prima facie case for changing them. The next chapter
examines the function and wording of argumentative propositions and expands on
what you must do to enter the process of argumentation.
LEARNING ACTIVITIES
1. Discuss what the three different views of presumption mean to the roles of advocate and op-
ponent in argumentation. Should we always assign the roles before determining presump-
tion? In which communication contexts might you use the view that presumption rests with
existing institutions? In which would it be appropriate to discover the beliefs of an audi-
ence? Which fields make extensive use of hypothesis testing as a form of argumentation?
2. Choose an ongoing controversy such as the rights of smokers versus nonsmokers, abor-
tion versus right to life, environmental protection versus the need for employment.
Which side in the controversy has presumption? Which has the burden of proving that
change should occur?
3. Scholars often argue over whether or not a proposed theory has accuracy or legitimacy
in their field. Two theories of communication—fantasy theme analysis and the narra-
tive paradigm—are examples of such argumentation. Choose one of the following de-
bates for examination:
a. Advocate: Ernest G. Bormann (1972, December). Fantasy and rhetorical vision:
The rhetorical criticism of social reality. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 58, 396–407.
Opponent: G. P. Mohrman (1982, May). An Essay on Fantasy Theme Criticism.
Quarterly Journal of Speech, 68, 109–132.
b. Advocate: Walter R. Fisher (1985, December). The narrative paradigm: An elabo-

ration. Communication Monographs, 52, 347–367.
Opponent: Robert C. Rowland (1987, September). Narrative: Mode of discourse
or paradigm? Communication Monographs, 56, 264–275.
How does the advocate identify presumption in the field of communication? Does he or
she present good and sufficient reasons for accepting the proposed theory of communica-
tion? How does the opponent deny the accuracy of the theory? Are his or her reasons ef-
fective enough to cause you as the reader to reject the accuracy of the proposed theory?
4. Find an editorial from a current newspaper or magazine that you believe is intended to
alter behavior. Analyze it in terms of the following:
a. What is the locus of presumption?
b. How does the arguer fulfill the burden of proof?
c. In your opinion, has the arguer succeeded in creating a prima facie case?
d. Assume that you will be the opponent and indicate what you might argue in response.
REFERENCES
Bruce, D. R. (1993). Argumentation and the reconstitution of desire: A Lacanian mediation of
presumption and ideology. In R. E. McKerrow (Ed.), Argument and the postmodern chal-
lenge: Proceedings of the eighth SCA/AFA conference on argumentation (pp. 113–118).
Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association.
Lyne, J. R. (1990). Argument in the human sciences. In R. Trapp & J. Schuetz (Eds.),
Perspectives on argumentation: Essays in honor of Wayne Brockriede (pp. 178–189).
Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.
Sproule, J. M. (1976). The psychological burden of proof: On the evolutionary development of
Richard Whately’s theory of presumption. Communication Monographs, 43, 115–129.
van Eemeren, F. H., Grootendorst, R., Jackson, S., & Jacobs, S. (1993). Reconstructing argu-
mentative discourse. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
van Eemeren, F. H., Grootendorst, R., & Kruiger, T. (1987). Handbook of argumentation the-
ory: A critical survey of classical backgrounds and modern studies. Providence, RI: Foris
Publications.
Walton, D. N. (1988). Burden of proof. Argumentation, 2, 233–254.
Walton, D. N. (1992). Plausible argument in everyday conversation. Albany: State University
of New York Press.
Whately, R. (1828/2010). Elements of rhetoric (Douglas Ehninger, Ed.). Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press.
CHAPTER
What Am I Going
to Argue About?
I
n Chapter 2 we stated that argumentation always takes place over a figura-
tive piece of ground in a given field and its limits are defined by a proposition
stating a change in belief or behavior. A clearly stated proposition is crucial to
establishing the responsibilities of advocate and opponent in the process of
argumentation. In this chapter, we define propositions, present three classifica-
tions of propositions, and offer guidelines for phrasing propositions and defin-
ing their terms.
THE NATURE OF PROPOSITIONS

The proposition identifies the limits of the topic of argument, places the burden of
proof on the advocate, and gives presumption to the opponent. Propositions are
formed about controversies in a field. A controversy is a dispute or difference of
opinion about something. In any field, several controversies may be occurring at
the same time. For instance, Alison Alexander and Janice Hanson (2005) identified
a series of controversies in the field of mass communication, which included:
䊏 Are American values shaped by the mass media?
䊏 Is television harmful to children?
䊏 Does the media’s emphasis on body image affect men as much as it does women?
䊏 Does entertainment television programming perpetuate stereotypes of African
Americans?
䊏 Has negative political advertising harmed the American political process?
䊏 Are American news media politically biased?
䊏 Should the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) do more to police the
public airwaves?
Note that each of these controversies is phrased as a question. In referring to a con-
troversy, we often use the phrase, “the question before us is. . . .” This signals a
lack of agreement, that there is no universally accepted answer to the issues posed
by the question.
35
36 CHAPTER 3 What Am I Going to Argue About?
Because controversies commonly occur over questions of “what happened,”

“what judgment shall I make in this situation,” or “what is the best course of ac-
tion to follow,” the boundaries of a given controversy must be identified so that
both advocate and opponent know how these boundaries shape the argumentative
ground. The proposition statement serves as the beginning point for the process of
argumentation.
The proposition is a statement that identifies the argumentative ground and points to a
change in belief or behavior.
The proposition defines the locus of disagreement in a controversy. This locus of

disagreement is the clash of positions—the point at which your position diverges
from someone else’s position.
Suppose that as you read the questions identifying controversies in the field of
mass media, you found yourself thinking about the connection between television
and children. Also suppose that the question about whether television is harmful
to children stirred up childhood memories of many positive experiences you had
with television, such as learning to count with Sesame Street and learning to be po-
lite to others with Mr. Rogers. Now suppose the person who sits next to you in
class has a four-year-old daughter. As he read the same question, he flashed on his
daughter’s favorite cartoon in which the characters frequently say rude things to
one another. He begins to form the position that some television programs may be
harmful to children. You could both voice your experiences with television, ex-
changing viewpoints with each other. If, however, you wanted to convince the
members of your class that your position is the better answer to the question “Is
television harmful to children?” you need to find a way to state the locus of your
disagreement so that the audience knows what the two of you are arguing about.
This is why the process of argumentation begins with a proposition.
Because argumentation is a communication process used to influence an audi-
ence, propositions are phrased in terms of a change in belief or behavior, stating
the locus of disagreement and whether that disagreement is over a proposed
change in belief or behavior. To argue effectively in ways that will offer sound rea-
sons to your audience, state the controversy in a way that readily identifies what
the argument is. By identifying the locus of disagreement in the form of a proposi-
tion, you will be able to fulfill three objectives for effective argumentation.
Selecting Terms for Definition

The first objective is to define the key terms that describe the argumentative
ground. We phrase the locus of disagreement as a proposition so that important
words and phrases that may need clarification are made more obvious to arguers
and their audiences. One question frequently arises: What do the advocate and
opponent mean when they use particular words or phrases? The proposition pro-
vides a semantic framework for argument and allows the advocate and opponent
to make interpretations of its key words and phrases. This interpretation is ab-
solutely essential to effective case construction because language use is a complex
human activity.
Kenneth Burke (1966) described a fundamental property of being human as
our proclivity to use and misuse symbols. He said that we use symbols to create
complex systems and, in turn, we make symbols using a complex process. Word-
symbols are our verbal system for assigning meaning to the objects, processes,
ideas, and experiences we encounter. The nature of human-symbol use underscores
the importance of selecting key terms and phrases in a proposition for definition.
Beyond the ability to exchange information with one another, we use language
to identify, categorize, and organize objects, processes, ideas, and experiences. This
is the denotative function of language use. We also use language to react to what
happens around us, to make judgments, and to express our feelings. This is the
connotative function of language use. A given word or phrase can function both
denotatively and connotatively for individuals in an audience. In communication,
language is said to act as a terministic screen; choosing a particular word sets lim-
its, directs attention a certain way, or creates a feeling based on the symbol chosen.
For example, if every reference to people in general used mankind, men, he, or
manpower, your word choices all function as a male terministic screen. Your audi-
ence may perceive that you view the world as male dominated and feel that only
men are important. Terministic screens are a product of the connotative dimension
of language, and, at a minimum, you would be guilty of using sexist language.
Further complicating the nature of language is that the assignment of meaning to a
word is arbitrary.
A “word” is a set of visual or auditory markings we assign to symbolize some-
thing. There is no necessary or direct connection between the word-symbol we
have for something and the thing itself. You are reading these observations on the
nature of language in the object that users of English identify with the word-sym-
bol “book.” There is no reason for calling this object a “book.” Users of English
could just as easily have agreed to call this object a “blomp” or a “krub.” The
word-symbol we use for something, and the meaning we assign that word-symbol,
are a matter of our experience of a thing and the word-symbol we assign to it. The
only connection between our word-symbol “book,” and the object you are read-
ing, is the ancient Teutonic word-symbol for the bark of the beech tree, “boc.”
This language is a source for many English word-symbols and beech bark was a
common material literate ancient Teutons wrote upon.
Let’s examine a sample proposition for argumentation and the key words and
phrases that need interpretation to clarify its argumentative ground: The federal
government should significantly strengthen the regulation of mass media in the
United States. This is a proposition for what is called “policy argumentation,” but
the objective of selecting key words and phrases for definition also applies to
propositions for other kinds of argumentation. The advocate has a burden of
proof to fulfill by developing a prima facie case. She begins to build this case by se-
lecting the key words and phrases that she will use to communicate her interpreta-
tion of the figurative ground. For this proposition, she selects three key phrases to
interpret the figurative ground as she wants her audience to understand it: (1) fed-
eral government, (2) significantly strengthen the regulation of, and (3) mass media.
The advocate has several options for defining these terms. The meaning she assigns
to them conveys her interpretation of the figurative ground and what her burden
of proof includes.
Although the opponent does not begin the process of definition, he too
should select key words and phrases for definition. He wants the audience to
view the figurative ground from his perspective. The opponent has the option of
using the advocate’s definitions or providing his own. In some instances, one of
the first points of clash between advocate and opponent is over what meanings
should be given to key words and phrases. Some instances of argumentation are
wholly a disagreement over what meaning should be assigned to something.
Once terms have been selected for definition, they must be defined in a way that
clarifies the interpretation of the figurative ground. Later in this chapter, we
offer some guidelines for determining which terms to define and techniques for
defining them.
Specifying Direction of Change

The arguers’ second objective is to identify the locus of disagreement with a propo-
sition sentence and to specify what belief or behavior the advocate wants to
change. If the arguers and their audience do not know what the locus of disagree-
ment is, the potential for confusion is immense. Stating this locus of disagreement,
along with clarifying the meaning of key words and phrases, can help avoid confu-
sion. Also, by identifying the change sought, the proposition identifies both the ad-
vocate’s burden of proof and the sort of presumption the opponent may use to
deny that this change is good or necessary.
Using the sample proposition, assume the advocate has offered these definitions:
federal government—the FCC
significantly strengthen the regulation of—impose a specific code of decency
standards for entertainment and sports programming
mass media—broadcast, cable, and satellite radio and television
These definitions suggest that the locus of disagreement will be over what consti-
tutes “decency” in radio and television programming. The advocate’s arguments
will have to further clarify what she means by “a specific code of decency stan-
dards,” but the disputed territory in the argumentative ground is beginning to take
shape. The advocate wants her audience to accept the necessity of having the FCC
empowered to do more to clean up the public airwaves. The opponent has the ben-
efit of presumption that the FCC and, possibly, other elements of the federal gov-
ernment are presently doing a good job of maintaining standards of decency in
radio and television.
Even without these definitions, the proposition points to the kind of change
the advocate is expected to support. Stating that the federal government should
significantly strengthen the regulation of mass media in the United States points
the advocate in the direction of greater control. The proposition identifies the
agency for change the advocate must employ—some aspect of the federal govern-
ment. It identifies the type of change—significantly strengthen regulation. It points
to the target of change—American mass media.
Change is also specified when the proposition is one of fact or value. The
direction of change specified in a proposition of fact is one of movement toward
accepting that something is true, acceptable, or probable. Propositions of fact
may also assert movement toward a new understanding of, or perspective on,
something. A fact proposition asserting that mass media play a significant role
in shaping the values of Americans asks the audience to orient their thinking
about American mass media toward the belief that there is a significant relationship
between media consumption and American value structures. In a value proposi-

tion, such as American entertainment television programming is morally defi-
cient, the direction of change involves the advocate’s evaluation of television on
the basis of some standard of morality that she must specify. In both of these
propositions, the audience is asked to make a mental commitment to a belief of-
fered by the advocate’s interpretation of the proposition’s figurative ground.
As with the policy proposition, even before definitions for key words and
phrases are supplied, fact and value propositions set general boundaries for the fig-
urative ground and direction of change toward which the advocate asks the audi-
ence to move.
Fact
Mass media play a significant role in shaping the values of Americans.
Direction of Change: The probability that a significant connection exists be-
tween mass media and the values we hold; the accuracy of the assertion
that mass media are a significant source of our values.
Benefit of Presumption: Whatever link might exist between mass media and
our values is not significant; other, presently agreed-upon sources of our
values are more accurately described as being significant sources of our
values.
Value
American entertainment television programming is morally deficient.
Direction of Change: Acceptance of the belief that entertainment television
programming does not measure up to a specified standard of morality.
Benefit of Presumption: Depends upon the audience’s knowledge of and be-
liefs about the moral standards depicted in programming. Value clash will
be over what moral figurative ground is most appropriate for evaluating
the entertainment programming delivered by television.
Our sample fact, value, and policy propositions are flexible enough to allow
both advocate and opponent opportunities for interpreting the figurative ground.
This characteristic—flexibility—is often found in propositions used for argumen-
tation class work and competitive intercollegiate debate. Flexibility may not al-
ways be present in propositions in other academic contexts and across many fields.
Fact propositions, for example, dominate the legal field. A jury is asked to accept
or reject the factual proposition that the defendant has violated a particular law or
statute. As a student, you may find yourself placed in the position of advocating
value propositions when you tell your parents “a study abroad experience would
benefit me” or “a summer internship will increase my value to a prospective em-
ployer.” In business, policy propositions shape decision making when a company
contemplates moving production facilities to another country.
Identifying Key Issues

The arguers’ third objective in framing a proposition is to aid the advocate and
opponent in the identification of key issues. In Chapter 4 we devote more atten-
tion to the identification of intrinsic or stock issues in a proposition; for now, it is
sufficient to say that issues are central questions suggested by the wording of the
proposition and the definitions provided for key terms. “An issue is an inherent
and vital question within a proposition: inherent because it exists inseparably and
inevitably within the proposition, and vital because it is crucial or essential to the
meaning of the proposition” (Mills, 1968, p. 96). Issues become the contested
points in argumentation, the areas of disagreement between advocate and oppo-
nent, the internal structure or framework for argumentation.
Earlier, we offered this policy proposition: The federal government should sig-
nificantly strengthen the regulation of mass media in the United States. We also
provided possible definitions for the key terms:
federal government—the FCC

significantly strengthen the regulation of—impose a specific code of decency
standards for entertainment and sports programming
mass media—broadcast, cable, and satellite radio and television
Our broad proposition has now come to mean something more specific: The FCC
should place restrictions on the transmission of indecent words and actions via
broadcast, cable or satellite radio and television in sports and entertainment pro-
grams. If the opponent accepts these definitions as reasonable, argumentation can
proceed on the issues that derive from the narrowed proposition. These issues be-
come the advocate’s burden of proof.
What might these issues be? They are questions that a reasonable person
might seek the answer to before accepting the change in the FCC’s role in regulat-
ing what we hear and see on radio and television.
What language and action found in sports and entertainment programs consti-
tute indecent content?
Does sports and entertainment programming on radio and television contain
significant amounts of indecent content?
Does some significant harm result from media transmission of indecent content?
What are reasonable standards of decency for sports and entertainment pro-
gramming?
Would there be specific advantages or benefits from imposing decency stan-
dards on sports and entertainment programming on radio and television?
Is the way the FCC presently regulates language use and behavior in radio and
television programming inadequate?
Is the FCC the best government agency to monitor and regulate decency for
radio and television?
What might the consequences be, in terms of the First Amendment’s guarantee
of freedom of speech and a free press, if the FCC is further empowered to
monitor and regulate decency?
These questions represent some of the issues that would give shape and structure
to the process of argumentation over the figurative ground of this policy proposition.
By locating areas of disagreement, potential and actual, the arguers clarify for each
other, and their audience, specific aspects of belief or behavior that are contested.
Issues, which sharpen the locus of disagreement, constitute the audience’s basis for de-
ciding whether to change or maintain their current position on the contested ground.
Selecting key terms for definition, specifying the direction of change the advocate
seeks, and identifying key issues are necessary objectives achieved by having a propo-
sition sentence that establishes the figurative ground at the outset, because they guide
you in your management of the figurative ground for argumentation. “Somebody
should do something” or “that’s just wrong” will not serve as effective guides for
meeting your responsibilities as an advocate or opponent. Equally, making a snap
judgment about what to do or what to believe can lead to poor decision making when
you are the audience for another’s arguments. Good, effective argumentation begins
with a clear answer to this chapter’s title question: What am I going to argue about?
Summary of the Nature of Propositions

1. The proposition specifies the scope of the controversy by setting up the
boundaries for the figurative ground over which argumentation takes place.
Defining key terms in the proposition helps to clarify these boundaries.
2. The proposition states the advocate’s goal, asserting the change in belief or be-
havior for which the audience’s assent is sought.
3. The proposition delineates the advocate’s responsibilities for the burden of
proof, the opponent’s opportunities resulting from the identification of pre-
sumption, and it suggests potential issues that constitute the figurative ground
for argumentation.
THE CLASSIFICATION OF PROPOSITIONS

We classify propositions according to the end an advocate seeks, a change in either
belief or behavior. There are three common classes of propositions: fact, value, and
policy. These classes correspond to common sources of controversy: (1) disputes
over what happened, what is happening, or what will happen; (2) disputes assert-
ing something to be good or bad, right or wrong, effective or ineffective; and (3)
disputes over what should or should not be done.
Propositions of Fact
Factual propositions seek to alter our beliefs. They assert that relationships between
things exist, that there are appropriate interpretations of the observable world, or
what is found in a quest for knowledge. Consider the proposition: The lyrics of
country-western music convey negative images of marriage and fidelity. This propo-
sition asserts a relationship between the word-symbols in lyrics from this music
genre and potential attitudes its listeners may develop as a result of listening to this
music. We may not accept the probable truth of this proposition without further ex-
planation. Proof of the asserted relationship would require analysis of the lyrics of
country-western songs to determine if such negative images exist in them.
Propositions of fact are further classified in terms of time frame—whether the
change in belief is about the past, present, or future.
Past Fact
The American entertainment media were an adjunct of the military during
World War II.
Life evolved naturally from existing conditions on earth.
Present Fact
The American mass media are relatively free from government regulation
compared to media in other countries.
Illegal immigration deprives U.S. citizens of jobs.
Future Fact
New technology will make the present system of broadcast regulation irrele-
vant by 2020.
Most large species of wildlife will cease to exist outside zoos and game pre-
serves in the next decade.
In each of these factual propositions, the controversy concerns the relationship
between something and what we are asked to believe about it. All factual proposi-
tions have the structural pattern of “something was/is/will be . . . something.” To
determine the truth of the relationship in the case of past or present factual propo-
sitions, the process is similar: Discover what is required to establish the probable
truth or the statement and proceed to verify it. Propositions of future fact depend
on discovering the probability that something will occur in the future. In Chapter
9, we explore proving propositions of fact in more detail.
Propositions of Value
Value propositions attempt to alter belief by examining our subjective reactions to
things and our opinions of them. The proposition of value establishes a judgmen-
tal standard or set of standards and applies them to the subject of the value
proposition sentence. Value propositions take one of two forms. A singular value
proposition is a straightforward evaluation of something based on a standard of
judgment the advocate supplies. A comparative value proposition suggests that
two things are measured or contrasted to determine which of them is more “valu-
able” in a given context or situation.
Singular Value
Reality television programming sacrifices quality for Nielsen ratings.
Comparative Value
The rights of endangered animal species are more important than the rights of
indigenous human populations.
Sentence structure is particularly important in understanding how the value
proposition sets up the figurative ground for argumentation. The subject of the value
proposition is the value object. The value object is the thing being evaluated. It names
some idea, person, action, agency, tradition, practice, or custom that exists or is pro-
posed. In singular value propositions, the value object is relatively easy to locate—
reality television programming—in our example, and often requires definition.
The sentence structure of a comparative value proposition can make determin-
ing the value object a bit trickier. In our example, the “thing” being evaluated by the
advocate is the abstract concept of rights, modified by two descriptors: endangered
animal species and indigenous human populations. In our example of a comparative
value proposition, the advocate and opponent have a two-part value object, the
rights of endangered animals and the rights of indigenous humans. This two-part
structure for a value object is typical of comparative value propositions, and the ad-
vocate will want to define what she means by a right. The opponent may have his
own ideas about what constitutes a right.
In value propositions, whether singular or comparative, there is a second term
or set of terms essential to the figurative ground and making value judgments. The
value judgment term, found in the predicate of the proposition, serves as the
source of criteria used to evaluate the value object. An important part of the advo-
cate’s burden of proof is to define the value judgment term in such a way that it
provides reasonable, appropriate standards of evaluation.
In our singular value proposition, the value judgment term is quality. The ad-
vocate will define quality to produce specific criteria she will use to evaluate how
reality television programming fails to meet her standards for quality television
programs and, in so doing, fulfill her burden of proof. The opponent is free to use
these same criteria or to define quality in terms of his own standards in defending
reality programming.
In our comparative value example, presumption suggests that when it comes
to whose rights take precedence, we currently believe that the rights of people who
live in an area are of greater importance than those of any endangered species who
share the area with them. The value judgment term is more important, and the ad-
vocate defines this term to produce the criteria she will use in fulfilling her burden
to prove that animal rights are more important than those of people in certain sit-
uations. The opponent may use her criteria or supply his own as he argues for pre-
sumption favoring people over animals.
For both advocate and opponent, it is important to determine which words in
the proposition represent the value object and make the value judgment in their
proposition’s figurative ground. In Chapter 10, we discuss the development of
cases for value argumentation in more detail.
Propositions of Policy
Whereas fact and value propositions are aimed at altering beliefs, policy propositions
recommend a change in behavior or create a call to action. They suggest that some-
thing should be done. Recall the series of controversies we identified earlier in the field
of mass media. Many of these controversies suggest problems that need remedies.
The policy proposition is common in most fields. It is characterized by the
word should, which suggests that something ought to be done, not necessarily
that it will be done. The word “should” requires that the advocate indicate the di-
rection of change she supports and prove that it is “necessary,” “desirable,” and
“viable” in meeting her burden of proof. It may have occurred to you that the
words “necessary,” “desirable,” and “viable” suggest making value judgments
about something. That is one of the secrets to successfully advocating or opposing
policy propositions: A prima facie case in policy argumentation is developed
through a series of fact and value subpropositions. These subpropositions func-
tion as the main points of case construction as the advocate (1) uses factual main
points to establish a rationale for believing problems exist, (2) evaluates existing
policies to determine what causes these problems, and (3) demonstrates why her
proposal is the superior policy option. The opponent uses factual main points to
encourage the audience to believe problems do not exist, uses evaluative main
points to characterize the strengths of existing policies, and uses value judgments
to demonstrate the weaknesses of the advocate’s proposal.
Policy propositions are commonly used as the topics for academic debates in
argumentation classes and intercollegiate debate competition, although some divi-
sions of intercollegiate debate use fact and value propositions. In our discussion of
presumption in Chapter 2, we indicated that academic debate typically takes the
form of hypothesis testing. Consider the following examples of policy propositions
that have served as the national topic for intercollegiate debate competition. What
aspects of fact and value do you find in these policy propositions?
Resolved: That the federal government should guarantee an opportunity for
higher education to all qualified high school graduates.
Resolved: That greater controls should be imposed on the gathering and utiliza-
tion of information about United States citizens by government agencies.
Resolved: That the Commander-in-Chief power of the United States President
should be substantially controlled.
Each proposition suggests issues that presently are of great concern to many
Americans, so it may surprise you to learn that some of these propositions are sev-
eral decades old. To see the entire list, and the year in which each was the national
topic, go to www.wfu.edu/NDT/HistoricalLists/topics.html.
The topics selected for intercollegiate debate competition have all considered
significant and highly complex political, economic, and social issues. If you were ad-
vocating or opposing one of these propositions, you would need to do a thorough
examination of underlying factual and judgmental issues to make your case. The
policy propositions for academic argumentation are phrased to offer students some
flexibility for interpreting them. Recall that in academic argumentation your role is
usually that of hypothesis tester. The goal is to evaluate which side, advocate (affir-
mative) or opponent (negative), does the better job of testing the hypothesis. Policy
propositions used in other contexts may be more focused and specific. Chapter 11
provides a complete discussion of argumentation over policy propositions.
Summary of the Classification of Propositions

1. Propositions of fact assert a relationship between things or between persons and
things; with the exception of propositions of future fact, the advocate’s burden of
proof is to prove by direct verification that the asserted relationship is probable.
2. Propositions of value make a singular evaluation of something or compare two
things to determine which is of greater value in a given context; the advocate’s
burden is to prove the evaluation probable through the application of criteria.
3. Propositions of policy assert that a course of action or behavior should be taken;
the advocate’s burden is to prove that the policy change is reasonable by using
subpropositions of fact and value in creating a prima facie case for the policy.
PHRASING THE PROPOSITION

When you phrase your proposition, choose language that will clearly establish
the argumentative ground. The importance of wording a proposition cannot be
overemphasized. Clear phrasing is needed to provide a meaningful basis for the
Phrasing the Proposition 45
process that follows. A failure in proposition wording is an invitation to misun-

derstanding and poor analysis of its component issues (Ziegelmueller, Kay, &
Dause, 1990).
First, the proposition should be phrased as a clear statement of the change in
belief or behavior the advocate seeks. Failure to clearly state the proposed change
confuses the assignment of presumption and the scope of the burden of proof.
Consider the problem with phrasing in this proposition: Something should be done
about strikes by professional athletes. This proposition fails to meet the first rule
for effectively phrasing a proposition. “Something” is vague, and determining the
burden of proof and presumption is very difficult. “Something” could involve tak-
ing steps to restrict the athletes’ right to strike by imposing a federal ban on strikes
by professional athletes, but it also could involve restricting the owners’ right to
use replacement players during a strike. If the idea of arguing this subject is to con-
sider the viability of a policy of arbitration that does not disrupt the professional
sports season, a more appropriate wording for this proposition would be: An inde-
pendent labor relations board for professional sports contract negotiations should
be created to arbitrate all labor–management disputes.
The second rule to observe in phrasing a proposition is that a proposition
should be phrased as a simple-declarative sentence. A simple sentence expresses
one complete thought. Its structure is subject–verb–object and it has one central
idea. A declarative sentence makes an assertion: “something is something” or
“something should be something.” A simple-declarative sentence makes an asser-
tion that something is a fact, something is valued in a certain way, or some action
should be taken. Your proposition should always be a straightforward assertion of
a fact, value, or policy. It should never have a dependent modifying clause attached
to it. If you violate this rule, you once again create potential problems for assign-
ing presumption and burden of proof.
Let’s see what happens when more than one central idea is included in a propo-
sition. An independent board should be created to arbitrate all labor–management
disputes and to mandate the use of video replay in professional sports. This is no
longer a single assertion of policy. It now contains two separate topics, related only
to the extent that both deal with professional sports.
A proposition with more than one central idea saddles the advocate with sep-
arate burdens of proof for each idea—mandatory use of video replay, along with
labor–management disputes—and the opponent now finds himself with two sepa-
rate areas of presumption to defend. Both topics certainly represent important con-
troversies in the field of professional sports, but trying to focus on both in one ar-
gumentative exchange unnecessarily complicates the process. Phrasing the
proposition as a simple-declarative sentence facilitates and improves the process of
analysis. As an arguer breaks down a proposition into its component issues, he or
she looks for questions that are central to it. If the proposition contains multiple
central ideas, identifying issues becomes more difficult and establishing an inter-
nally consistent argumentative position may prove impossible.
Attaching a dependent (subordinate) clause to the proposition sentence can
also create problems. The structure of the simple-declarative sentence,
subject–verb–object, conveys a sense absoluteness. It is natural inclination to
want to attach a dependent clause that modifies, sets limits, or provides descrip-
tions for our declarative sentences. Resist this temptation in phrasing the propo-
sitions or you may end up with something like this: An independent labor relations
board for professional sports contract negotiations, made up of people with no

involvement in professional sports, should be created to arbitrate all
labor–management disputes.
Why is attaching this clause a bad idea? Adding this clause limits interpretive
options for both advocate and opponent by indicating who may serve on this labor
relations board. Although it may turn out to be a good idea, analysis and research
may also suggest that experience with some aspect of professional sports would be
beneficial. Determining the specific provisions for who serves on this board is part
of the advocate’s burden of proof. She needs some flexibility in making those de-
terminations. The opponent’s thinking may also be hampered. He may be led to
think only about the drawbacks of board members having “no involvement in pro-
fessional sports” and neglect consideration of the broader implications of compul-
sory arbitration.
A dependent clause attached to the object of the proposition can also create
problems. An independent labor relations board for professional sports contract
negotiations should be created to arbitrate all labor–management disputes, such
as the 2004–2005 strike by National Hockey League players that ended the sea-
son before it could even begin. At first glance, this modifying clause may seem
like a good idea because it provides an example of labor–management strife in
professional sports. This modifier also has the potential to limit thinking. It leads
both advocate and opponent to focus on the rare instance of a season-ending
strike. Any modifier that limits thinking or directs research efforts too narrowly
may be problematic.
Phrasing the proposition is your starting point in the process of case develop-
ment. It is desirable and necessary to start with a topic sentence that clearly speci-
fies the direction of change the advocate seeks and gives the advocate and oppo-
nent enough specificity to enable them to identify key issues, but it must allow
room for analysis and critical thinking. Ideas about limits, examples, and other
modifiers that come to you while you are phrasing the proposition should be
recorded and saved. These ideas may turn into issues, areas for research, details for
a policy proposal, definitions for key terms, and the like. Avoid attaching them to
your proposition at the outset.
Propositions for class activities and competitive debate help develop skills and
test ideas. In intercollegiate competitive debate, the same proposition is used for
the entire academic year and is argued by thousands of debaters. These proposi-
tions need to be flexible enough to allow many people to argue them. When argu-
mentation is used to seek knowledge, the proposition is a provisional statement of
belief about the nature of things. The idea of controversy is artificially induced to
encourage open-mindedness in seeking knowledge. A starting point with limita-
tions and exceptions attached to it closes off certain channels of thought. Even the
more narrow applications of argumentation, such as the public-policy making that
takes place in city government, benefits from flexible starting points.
The final rule for phrasing propositions is that a proposition should be
phrased in neutral terms. The wording should favor neither side in a controversy.
The advocate might be tempted to express her feelings by using emotive lan-
guage: An independent labor relations board should set the terms of contract set-
tlements between greedy owners of professional sports teams and overpaid
players. Emotive language contains value judgments. These judgments should be
saved for the development of arguments about the proposition. In academic ar-
gumentation, we strive to phrase the proposition neutrally so that advocates and
opponents have equal opportunity to interpret facts and make value judgments
based on research and reasoning. Phrasing the proposition with emotionally
loaded language undermines that sense of equal opportunity. In other contexts,
neutral language is equally desirable so that the linguistic deck is not stacked
against one side or the other.
Summary of Rules for Phrasing Propositions

1. Propositions should be phrased to indicate the direction of change in belief or
behavior the advocate is responsible for supporting.
2. Propositions should be phrased as a simple-declarative sentence containing
one central idea.
3. Propositions should be phrased in neutral language so that neither advocate
nor opponent are given an unfair advantage.
DEFINING THE KEY TERMS

People normally do not make changes in belief or behavior until someone gives
them good and sufficient reasons for doing so. Because she seeks change, the advo-
cate has the initial responsibility for defining terms and providing these reasons.
The key terms in the proposition are defined to locate issues and to help the audi-
ence understand what the arguers mean in their use of these terms. Once you have
phrased the proposition appropriately, select the key terms that you believe need
clarification and then formulate definitions.
The definition of a key term may become a contested part of the advocate’s ar-
gumentation. The opponent may want the audience to understand a key term from
his perspective. Both advocate and opponent should be familiar with the rules and
techniques for defining terms. The need to define a key term, and disputes over
how a term should best be understood, also apply to key terms in the statement of
issues. The advice provided here can be used for all your definitional needs.
To meet those needs, we provide some general rules for defining terms, cate-
gories of terms that require definition, and techniques for defining. When asked to
define a term, most of us are likely to head for a print or online dictionary. These
“standard” dictionaries are useful, but using a standard dictionary can also pose a
problem when one is seeking the best way to define a key term.
The Dictionary Problem

As stated earlier, the meaning assigned to a word-symbol is arbitrary. What a word
or phrase means is based on people’s experience and their common usage of it. A
standard dictionary does not tell us the real meaning of anything; it just lists the
conventions of agreement among users of the language. A standard dictionary can
provide some useful information. It will tell you the “part of speech,” such as noun,
verb, or adjective, the word is most commonly used for. You can also discover the
historical origin of the word, its etymology. And, you can find the range of conven-
tional meanings that people have assigned to it. Using the proposition of fact, viral
video has significantly changed our concept of celebrity, let’s explore what we can
and cannot achieve using a standard Webster’s Unabridged dictionary.
Two key terms in this proposition need to be defined to help identify issues and
to clarify the contested ground: viral video and celebrity. Our Webster’s New
Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabridged, is from 1983, and the term, viral video
does not appear in it. Looking up each word, we found viral, “involving a virus,”
and video, “of, or used in television” neither of which are very helpful. However, a
very specific explanation viral video is provided by Time’s Lev Grossman.
One by one, then hundreds by hundreds, people started downloading the video, e-mail-
ing it, linking to it, sharing it, copying it and reuploading it . . . the little video went
viral—it multiplied and reproduced and spread out of control on the Internet like a
virus. (2006, p. 64)
Viral video is a new term created to refer to the practice of digitizing a video
file and posting it somewhere on the World Wide Web or spamming it through e-
mail. Standard dictionaries, even the newest unabridged ones, cannot keep up with
all of the new terms, especially those spawned by the latest developments in com-
puter technology. Search the news media or publications that are field specific.
Will a standard dictionary be of more help in defining our second key term,
celebrity? First, we tried two online dictionaries.
famous person: somebody who is famous during his or her own lifetime; fame:
the state of being famous (Encarta)
a person who has a high degree of recognition by the general population; a fa-
mous person; fame; renown; the quality of being a celebrity (Wiktionary)
Our Webster’s Unabridged tells us that common usage for celebrity is:
fame; renown; the distinction of honor publicly bestowed on one because of
noted character or exploits; a famous or well-publicized person (p. 290)
Webster’s also tells us that the historical origin of celebrity comes from two Latin
terms, celebritas, meaning a multitude or fame and celeber, meaning frequented,
populous, and fame. Because our proposition of fact asserts that the concept of
celebrity has changed as a result of using the Web to spread a video clip similar to
the way a viral illness is spread, standard usage and the etymology of celebrity
might serve our definitional needs.
Remember, however, that we also want the definition of key terms to help us
identify issues. What would happen if we looked for a definition of celebrity from
a more field-specific source? We turned to cultural studies scholar Graeme Turner’s
work, Understanding Celebrity. Turner defines celebrity as:
a genre of representation and a discursive effect; it is a commodity traded by the pro-
motions, publicity, and media industries that produce these representations and their
effects; and it is a cultural formation that has a social function. . . . (2004, p. 9)
We may want to paraphrase Turner’s definition for presentation to our audience,

but we can find several issues suggested by this definition from the field perspective
of cultural studies:
䊏 Celebrity is the generic system of exhibiting people.
䊏 A celebrity is a commodity that is both created and traded by the promotions,
publicity, and media industries.
䊏 Celebrity can be understood as an “industry” that exists to produce celebrities.

䊏 Celebrities are created from elements of a culture.
䊏 Celebrity has a social function.
We may not necessarily use all of these issues, but notice how this field-specific def-
inition helps generate potential issues we could use to argue whether or not the
phenomenon of viral video should cause us to change our thinking about what
constitutes a celebrity in our culture with its technology for instantly spreading im-
ages. A standard dictionary, whether print or electronic, would not have given us
this kind of head start on analysis.
There is one feature of standard dictionary definitions that you may find useful.
A standard dictionary, especially an unabridged one, provides a list of synonyms for
words, usually at the end of an entry. Defining the value judgment term in a value
proposition must be done in such a way that your definition provides the criteria you
will apply to the value object. Value judgment terms are frequently vague, abstract
concepts. They also have strong emotive, connotative properties. Field-specific dic-
tionaries and other sources may not instantly lead you to recognizing potential crite-
ria. An unabridged dictionary or a synonym finder can be useful for parsing one of
these value judgment terms.
Earlier we gave you this example of a value proposition: Reality television
programming sacrifices quality for Nielsen ratings. The value judgment term is
quality. What constitutes quality television programming is often a matter of per-
sonal taste. In Chapter 10 we discuss criteria discovery and criteria development as
methods for turning the value judgment term into the specific criteria used to eval-
uate the value object. This chapter gives you a few tips for using a standard dic-
tionary to aid in defining the value judgment term.
One technique for developing criteria is to use synonyms. A synonym finder
can give you an extensive list of words with similar usage. We looked up quality in
J. J. Rodale’s The Synonym Finder (1978, p. 971) and found dozens of synonyms.
From Rodale’s synonym list, these terms fit our personal notions of quality televi-
sion programming:
distinction kind
virtue tone
Notice that these synonyms for quality are themselves abstract concepts that
suggest emotive properties. They do give us some ideas for parsing our value judg-
ment term to develop specific, concrete criteria for evaluating television programs.
A quality television program achieves distinction when it is affirmed by parents
and educators.
A quality television program demonstrates virtue through the actions of its
characters.
A quality television program is one in which the characters are kind to one an-
other, and they engage in acts of kindness.
A quality television program has a tone of respect for people and ideas.
Arguers are obligated to make clear exactly what they mean when they use a
particular word or phrase. Knowing the limitations and uses of standard dictionar-
ies can help you find definitions for the key terms in your proposition. There are ad-
ditional guides to defining terms that we cover in the remainder of this chapter.
Rules of Definition
The Inclusionary Rule. Phrase definitions in such a way that they include things
that appropriately fall under the term. Recall our policy proposition: The federal
government should significantly strengthen the regulation of mass media in the
United States. The advocate defined mass media as “broadcast, cable, and satellite
radio and television.” Radio and television are generally recognized as two forms
of mass media. This definition automatically rules out print media and other forms
of electronic media. If both advocate and opponent agree that radio and television
constitute a suitable definition of mass media, there is no problem. The advocate,
however, should be prepared to defend narrowing the definition of mass media to
exclude magazines and newspapers if her definition is questioned by the opponent
because they are also forms of mass media.
The Exclusionary Rule. Phrase definitions to exclude those things not appropriate
to terms (just the opposite of the inclusionary rule). Your definition should not be
so broad as to include things that do not properly fall into the category of the term.
For instance, defining mass media as “communication” would include interper-
sonal and intrapersonal communication, types of communication not aimed at a
mass audience. Although the advocate and opponent may both be interested in
what constitutes “decent” communication in our culture, the proposition they are
arguing focuses their consideration on mass media. The language and behavior in-
dividuals engage in interpersonally is excluded from their proposition.
The Adaptation Rule. Phrase definitions so that the meanings are appropriate to
the proposition’s figurative ground. Definitions need to make sense to the audience
and the field in which you are arguing. Concerned parent and educator groups,
people in the mass media, and legislative bodies represent potential audiences for
argumentation about the regulation of the mass media. Although you can define
the federal government using the names of the FCC’s chairperson and members, it
probably would not make much sense to people in at least one of these potential
audiences to use such a definition if you are arguing about things the FCC ought to
regulate. Likewise, mass media might be defined in terms of technical specifica-
tions for the transmission of radio and television signals, but this definition may
not be appropriate for much of the figurative ground for arguments about signifi-
cantly strengthening federal regulation of decency.
The Neutrality Rule. Phrase definitions to avoid unnecessary emotionality. We

have already suggested that your choice of terms for phrasing propositions should
avoid emotionally laden language. The same is true for defining key terms from a
proposition. It would be inappropriate to define the federal government as “a
group of nearsighted reactionaries more concerned with protecting industry prof-
its than promoting the public good” or to define mass media as “the purveyors of
vulgar language and soft core pornography over the nation’s airwaves.”
Definitions should be descriptive of the term defined, not your feelings about it. In
arguing the actual issues of your case, you will have ample opportunity to make
criticisms, evaluations, interpretations, and the like through proof and reasoning
that will make your feelings very explicit.
The Clarity Rule. Phrase definitions so that they will be understood more readily
than the terms they define. To define federal government as “that central govern-
ment, commonly known as the United States government, to which the fifty states
have agreed to subordinate certain powers as specified in the U.S. Constitution”
does little to improve our understanding of the figurative ground for arguing the
pros and cons of increasing federal regulation of the mass media. Definitions that
use a term itself as part of the definition are both unclear and circular.
The problem of cloudy definitions is common, especially as arguers grapple
with the jargon and “insider” meanings of a field. In some fields, especially those
that involve rapid technological change, not everyone will be comfortable with the
jargon. You are part of the field of “higher education.” Do you know what a “hel-
icopter parent” is? In college-administrator speak, this is a parent who “hovers
over” every aspect of his or her child’s college experience, especially during his or
her freshman year.
Summary of Rules of Definition

1. Inclusionary Rule: Phrase definitions to include that which appropriately falls
within the scope of the term’s meaning.
2. Exclusionary Rule: Phrase definitions to exclude that which does not fall ap-
propriately within the scope of the term’s meaning.
3. Adaptation Rule: Phrase definitions to fit the field and the audience’s range of
understanding and experience.
4. Neutrality Rule: Phrase definitions with emotionally neutral language.
5. Clarity Rule: Definitions should make the meaning of the term more clear, not
less, and should avoid circularity.
Terms Needing Definition

Five categories of terms usually require definition: equivocal, vague, technical,
new, and coined terms. As an advocate, you define terms so that both the oppo-
nent and audience have a clear idea of what you mean. How you define key terms
shapes the issues and arguments that make up your case and helps you meet your
burden of proof. As an opponent, you also define terms so that the advocate and
audience will know your meanings. More importantly as an opponent, you may
want to contest the advocate’s definitions of key terms and provide your own ver-
sion of their meaning.
Equivocal terms have two or more equally correct meanings. Many common
words in the English language have more than one common-use meaning.
Consider the word bridge. Arguments in the fields of music, engineering, and den-
tistry may be about bridges, but each field has a distinctly different meaning for the
term. Also consider the word enemy. We normally think of an enemy as a foe,
someone who is hostile, an unfriendly agent. Can enemy be defined as something
more positive? For many years, a foreign-policy maxim, “the enemy of my enemy
is my friend,” has been used to define relationships with groups and individuals
that do not measure up to certain standards, but are perceived as useful allies be-
cause of who they oppose. This definition of enemies as friends has begun to carry
over into interpersonal and professional relationships. Sometimes the context in
which a term is being used will help determine which meaning best fits, but you
cannot always rely on context as a guide. When you encounter an equivocal term,
make clear the meaning you want people to assign to it.
Vague terms, also called “ambiguous” terms, have shades of meaning; they
lack clear-cut definitions, so that each person is free to supply his or her own
meaning. Consider the phrase freedom of speech, which can have as many mean-
ings as there are political views. Some terms, such as democracy, can be both
equivocal and vague. There are different versions of democracy, such as a “demo-
cratic people’s republic” and a “Jeffersonian democracy.” Even when Americans
use the term, what constitutes a democracy is subject to a great deal of variation.
Earlier we talked about the terms that express value judgments and how these are
frequently abstractions with emotive connotations. What does the term good or
inferior mean to you? Value terms, terms of ideology, and terms that express atti-
tudes are often vague. You need to define vague terms clearly so that you specify
the interpretation you want the audience to give them.
Technical terms include jargon or specialized terms that belong to a particular
field or profession. Every field has its own specialized jargon, but certain fields
seem to have an abundance of technical terminology. Many controversies are over
issues in medicine, energy production, computer technology, and other technical
fields. Understanding technical terminology and jargon is necessary to understand-
ing the issues and figurative ground of these fields. We often ask audiences to make
decisions about issues and problems in fields that require knowledge of technical
terminology. Exact definitions of a term, such as bioeugenics, is necessary for
meaningful argumentation and good decision making to occur.
Terms with a limited or specialized meaning should also be defined. Even
within a field, not everyone will know all of the specialized terminology. When
we are unsure of a term’s meaning, the natural inclination is to guess at meaning
from context or supply what we think the meaning should be based on our own
experiences. Have you pinged someone lately? If you did not know that
“pinged” is jargon for contacting someone via e-mail or instant messaging, you
might conjure up all sorts of possibilities. Providing definitions that clarify in-
sider jargon is especially important when concepts are stated as acronyms. An
HMO is a health maintenance organization, a form of PPGP, prepaid group
practice, not to be confused with HBO, a premium cable television service and
PPG, the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company. E-mail and instant messaging have
added a new wrinkle to the jargon problem.
New terms are additions to the language, words or phrases that do not exist in
the common vocabulary. These words may begin as jargon in a particular field and
then spread to other fields and general use. In Chapter 1, we referred to Bernie
Madoff’s fraud as a Ponzi scheme, named after Charles Ponzi, an Italian immigrant
who got people to invest millions of dollars from 1919 to 1920 by promising 50%
profits in 90 days. “Ponzi schemes—in which a swindler touts outsize returns . . .
and creates the illusion of solvency by paying off early investors with capital raised
from later entrants” (Altman, 2009, p. 18), did not originate with Charles Ponzi,
but his name has been linked to this type of scam for almost a century thanks to the
once new term used to describe.
Coined terms are those invented when a convenient term does not already
exist. Many coined terms are shorthand for complex ideas. Infobia is the fear
you will discard some bit of information that will later turn out to be useful.
Charitainment is the merger of charity and entertainment. It refers to the in-
volvement of high-profile celebrities in good works, such as Brad Pitt’s project
for building environmentally friendly, low-cost housing for residents of New
Orleans who lost their homes to Hurricane Katrina or George Clooney’s efforts
on behalf of African famine victims. Agritainment is the merger of agriculture
and entertainment, referring to tourist attractions and festivals that center on
farming culture.
Coined terms are also created to describe developments in an evocative man-
ner. Oprahtization was coined to describe how Americans use talk shows, such as
“The Oprah Winfrey Show,” as a source of information and opinions. It is used in
such contexts as “the Oprahtization of American politics” to describe the exten-
sive use of radio and television talk shows by political candidates. A person influ-
enced by this form of Oprahitization is characterized as part of the telectorate (half
television viewer and half voter). Coined terms often become part of standard
usage; television was a coined term long ago.
Summary of Terms Needing Definition

1. Equivocal terms have two or more equally correct meanings.
2. Vague (also called “ambiguous”) terms lack a clear-cut meaning or have
shades of meaning.
3. Technical terms are the jargon or specialized language of a field or profession.
4. New terms are recent additions that are not part of the common vocabulary.
5. Coined terms are invented terms, often an amalgam of existing words, or
evocative expressions.
How to Define Terms

Key terms, whether from the proposition or other statements you make during ar-
gumentation, are defined to clarify meaning. Your objective in defining key terms
is to name the properties that set your preferred meaning apart from all other po-
tential meanings your audience might assign to the term. In talking about phrasing
propositions and guidelines for selecting and defining terms, we have already
given you some ideas for how to define terms. In this section, we identify specific
methods for defining that are particularly useful.
Definition by Synonym. Terms may be defined by using a synonym—a more famil-

iar word similar to the term in both denotative and connotative meaning. This is
how standard dictionaries typically define terms. For the term celebrity, our
Webster’s Unabridged (1984, p. 290) gave us these synonyms: fame, honor, glory,
reputation, distinction, and renown. Earlier we discussed using a synonym finder
to help define the value judgment term in a value proposition. Synonym finders
will usually give you a more extensive list of synonyms than a standard dictionary.
Our synonym finder (Rodale, 1978, p. 154) gave some additional options for
celebrity: personage, notable, and dignitary. It also provided an extensive list of
more connotative synonyms, including big shot, lion, star, superstar, and from the
French, grand fromage (big cheese).
Definition by Authority. We have mentioned using “field-specific” sources for def-

initions that will be appropriate to the field in which you are arguing. One option
for finding a field-specific definition is to use an authoritative definition from a
source in the field of your topic. Scholarly studies, textbooks, research reports, and
a variety of publications relevant to a field can all provide authoritative defini-
tions. Searching through the literature in a field can be time-consuming, so you
may want to turn to a field-specific or specialized dictionary or encyclopedia.
You will find a variety of specialized dictionaries for scientific fields such as
the Dictionary of Genetics and the Dictionary of Virology. Many publishing
houses offer well-known specialty dictionaries, including the McGraw-Hill
Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms, The Cambridge Dictionary of Space
Technology, Black’s Law Dictionary, and The Blackwell Dictionary of Political
Science. Such dictionaries are compiled by experts in the field and are reliable
sources for field-specific definitions. Even the federal government creates field-
specific dictionaries such as the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms. Along with dictionaries (which usually have shorter en-
tries), a wide variety of field-specific and topical encyclopedias provide definitions
and background information. If you were working on a proposition concerning
mass media, you might find the Encyclopedia of New Media: An Essential
Reference to Communication and Technology helpful.
Definition by Example. Terms may be defined by providing a relevant example to

explain how something is to be understood. Explaining something by providing an
example is a common technique in textbooks, including this one. When you define
by example, you clarify meaning by giving a concrete, representative instance of
the term. In the proposition on strengthening media regulation, the scope of “reg-
ulation” was narrowed to the idea of a specific code of decency standards. The
most efficient way to clarify what the advocate means by decency might be to pro-
vide some examples. Two well-known examples were the stimulus for Congress
and the FCC to consider the need to cleanse the airwaves.
Live awards broadcasts, during which celebrities make off-the-cuff remarks, are a venue
for profanity. During the 2003 Golden Globe Awards, U2’s lead singer Bono proclaimed,
“this is really, really f__cking brilliant.” Later in 2003, Paris Hilton and Nicole Riche
dropped “f__k” and “s__t” into their banter several times during the Billboard Music
Awards. In response to complaints about both instances, the FCC initially decided that
using “f_ _k” or other profanity as an insult or an adjective was not “indecent use”
under their Pacifica ruling. (Cascerceri, 2003; Morast, 2003; and Zelezny, 2011).
As part of the 2004 Super Bowl half-time show, Janet Jackson and Justin
Timberlake performed a song-and-dance number that scandalized many viewers.
Timberlake grabbed the bodice of Jackson’s costume, exposing her breast in what was
subsequently called a “wardrobe malfunction” as millions of American families
watched the live broadcast. (Nikolai, 2004; Sanders, 2004; and Zelezny, 2011)
These two examples demonstrate important aspects of defining by example:

behavioral definition and definition by negation. When you are trying to define a
concept such as “indecency,” which involves specific behaviors, providing exam-
ples of those behaviors is an effective technique. There are also instances when the
clearest way to explain what something is will be to explain what it is not.
Although it would be possible to provide examples of people behaving “decently,”
it is more efficient and clearer to explain decency in terms of “indecent” behavior.

When you are searching for the best examples, especially for vague concepts, con-
sider using examples of behavior or negative examples.
Definition by Function. Terms may be defined by the function an object, instrument,

agency, or concept performs. Definition by function tells us how something works.
For the proposition, the federal government should significantly strengthen the regu-
lation of mass media in the United States, the advocate specifies that the FCC is the
appropriate agency of the federal government for media regulation. She clarifies this
further by providing a functional definition of the FCC as the federal agency respon-
sible for making and enforcing rules governing the operation of the broadcast system
in the United States; this is the FCC’s function as part of the federal government.
Defining by function can be particularly useful when you need to define an ab-
stract concept. The term theory is a good example of such abstraction. Our
Webster’s (1984, p. 1893) defines theory as “an idea or mental plan of the way to
do something.” A clearer definition would give the audience more functional in-
formation about this “mental plan” as in this definition of theory:
A theory begins by observing phenomena and then organizing concepts/variables to
explain what is observed. A theory organizes by isolating a set of relevant concepts/vari-
ables and specifying how they are related to one another. Organizing is an explanation of
a phenomenon; it tells us why things occur regularly. Models, or visual depictions of rela-
tionships, are often used to illustrate the organization/explanation of theories. A theory
allows for predictions; we anticipate what outcomes and effects will occur. Gravity pre-
dicts that if we throw a ball into the air, it will hit the ground and that the higher we
throw the ball, the harder it will hit the ground. (Heath & Coombs, 2006, p. 198)
Definition by Operation. When you want to clarify the meaning of a term by ex-
plaining it as the result of a series of steps, you might use an operational definition.
Operational definitions are similar to functional ones in that they can be used to ex-
plain how something works. They differ in that an operational definition focuses on
how you want the audience to understand the meaning you stipulate for the term.
An operational definition makes obvious your intention to assign a particular mean-
ing to a term through a series of steps or parts. Operational definitions are most fre-
quently used to define the policy term in a policy proposition. In defining what
significantly strengthen the regulation of mass media means, a dozen different advo-
cates could come up with a dozen different versions of what a policy of regulation
should be. Our advocate wants her audience and opponent to know exactly what
she means by “impose a specific code of decency standards,” so she would opera-
tionally define the policy of regulatory practices that she proposes having the FCC
employ in monitoring the media. This operational definition specifies the policy she
argues should be put in place, about which we will have more to say in Chapter 11.
Summary of How to Define Terms

1. Definition by Synonym: Using a denotatively or connotatively more familiar
term.
2. Definition by Authority: Using a field-specific definition or a definition by a
source deemed reputable by the audience.
3. Definition by Example: Providing a concrete, representative instance of some-

thing; negative and behavioral examples can be effective in some situations.
4. Definition by Function: Explaining what an object, instrument, agency or con-
cept is by telling how it works.
5. Definition by Operation: Explaining how something is to be understood in
terms of its steps or parts, most frequently used to define the policy term of a
policy proposition.
Definitional Arguments
We define terms to clarify meaning. The advocate and opponent do not always
agree about how the argumentative ground should be defined. When there is dis-
agreement over how a term should be defined, your definition is simply a claim
that must be proven. As we have suggested in this chapter, many terms do not
have a single, absolute definition. You need to be prepared to defend your defini-
tion as being the most appropriate or effective one for defining the argumenta-
tive ground.
An argument from definition specifies how something should be classified or
understood. To prove that your definition is the most appropriate or effective, you
must provide a clear explanation of the contested term—make sure your definition
really does clarify meaning. You must also demonstrate that your definition draws
from a source of knowledge common to the field in which you are arguing. For in-
stance, if you are defining a term by example, will your audience be familiar with
the example? Will it make sense to them? An example that is far removed from the
audience’s experience can be problematic, and a barrier to their understanding
what you mean. We have repeatedly referred to using field-specific sources to de-
fine terms. A primary reason is that the appropriateness of such a definition to the
given field will be self-evident. It would be difficult to prove that a definition from
a standard dictionary fits the terms particular to that field better than definitions
that come from sources in the field.
We titled this chapter “What Am I Going to Argue About?” because con-
ventional wisdom suggests that before you jump into argumentation, it is a
good idea to have some sense of what you are arguing about first. The propo-
sition states the central idea of the controversy, identifies potential issues, and
establishes the field in which the argumentative ground is set. Sometimes, as
with competitive debate, you are given a proposition phrased by someone else.
More frequently, it is up to you to come up with the actual wording of the
proposition. At this stage in the process, consider your phrasing as preliminary.
Propositions do not just spring forth. They grow out of situations, events, and
people’s experiences. As you research the topic, think about the issues and then
begin preparing your arguments. You may want to revisit the way you have
phrased the proposition.
This chapter has provided you with the principles of propositions; their func-
tion in argumentation; their classification as fact, value, and policy; phrasing them
appropriately; and defining their key terms. The proposition sets boundaries for
the argumentative ground and serves as the topic or thesis sentence for speaking or
writing. Propositions are accepted or rejected by the audience on the basis of
whether the advocate makes a prima facie case for them, or whether the opponent
offers effective counterarguments and a defense of existing beliefs or behaviors as

worth maintaining. The next step in the process of arguing is learning how to ana-
lyze the proposition to determine which specific issues you will argue.
LEARNING ACTIVITIES
1. Examine the following propositions. Identify the kinds of propositions—fact, value,
and policy—represented. Be prepared to discuss how each example does or does not
meet the rules for wording propositions suggested in this chapter.
Energy
a. Renewable energy sources are preferable to fossil fuels.
b. By 2020, the United States will run short of fossil fuels.
c. The federal government should implement an accelerated program of conversion
to renewable energy sources.
Ecology
a. The present system of environmental protection creates toxic waste dumps.
b. The United States should significantly improve its environmental protection policy.
c. The protection of the environment ought to take precedence over the expansion of
industrial production.
Law Enforcement
a. The judicial system should reform the system of juvenile and family courts.
b. Crimes by juveniles are the most serious crimes against persons.
c. The American judicial system unfairly favors the juvenile offender over the victim.
Foreign Policy
a. United States foreign policy commitments overextend the federal budget.
b. United States foreign policy commitments ought to reflect the American belief in
the principle of democratic government.
c. The United States should substantially reduce foreign aid to nations that fail to
protect the rights of their citizens.
Education
a. The quality of education in American public schools ought to be the nation’s first
priority.
b. The education of college professors does not place sufficient emphasis on teaching
techniques.
c. The Department of Education should create and maintain a core curriculum for all
public schools.
2. Taking the propositions in Activity 1, imagine you are listening to an advocate’s speech
on each topic. As a member of the audience, identify what words or phrases in each
proposition you feel would need to be defined.
3. Select a topic area that you might like to investigate in greater depth in completing fu-
ture assignments. Formulate specific fact, value, and policy propositions that the topic
area suggests to you. Search the reference section of the library for possible sources
within the field of the topic that provide definitions of key terms in your propositions.
Compare these definitions to those in standard dictionaries and discuss the similarities
and differences between them. What are the advantages of using specialized sources to
define key terms in your propositions?
REFERENCES
Alexander, A., & Hanson, J. (Eds.) (2005). Taking sides: Mass media and society (8th ed.).
Dubuque, IA: McGraw-Hill.
Altman, A. (2009, January 19). A brief history of: Ponzi schemes. Time, 173, 18.
Burke, K. (1966). Language as symbolic action. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Cascerceri, D. (2003, December 19). The blue tube. The Intelligencer (Philadelphia, PA).
Retrieved from www.phillyburbs.com/news/local/the_intelligencer.html.
Encarta. Dictionary. Retrieved from http://Encarta.msn.com/dictionary_/celebrity.html.
Grossman, L. (2006, April 24). How to get famous in 30 seconds. Time, 167, 64–66.
Heath, R. L., & Coombs, W. T. (2006). Today’s public relations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
McKechnie, J. L. (Ed.). (1983). Webster’s new twentieth century dictionary unabridged (2nd
ed.). New York: Simon & Schuster.
Mills, G. E. (1968). Reason in controversy (2nd ed.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Morast, R. (2003, December 23). Groups fear flood of dirty words on TV. Argus Leader
(Sioux Falls, SD). Retrieved from http://www.argusleader.com/.
Nikolai, G. (2004, February 18). Now what? Rockford Register Star (IL). Retrieved from
http://www.rrstar.com/.
Rodale, J. J. (1978). The synonym finder. Emmaus, PA: Rodale Press.
Sanders, J. (2004, February 15). Commentary. San Francisco Chronicle (CA). Retrieved
from http://www.sfgate.com/.
Turner, G. (2004) Understanding celebrity. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Wiktionary. Celebrity. Retrieved from http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Celebrity.
Zelezny, J. D. (2011). Communication law (6th ed.). Boston, MA: Wadsworth.
Ziegelmueller, G. W., Kay, J., & Dause, C. A. (1990). Argumentation: Inquiry and advocacy
(2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
CHAPTER
How Do I Analyze
Propositions?
A
dvocates and opponents need to know what specific arguments to use as
they prepare to capture the proposition’s argumentative ground. In this
chapter, we begin to consider the process of putting together the argumen-
tative package to advocate or oppose a proposition. This process is called case de-
velopment, and it begins with the analysis of the proposition.
The process of analysis is field invariant for all types of propositions.
Choosing specific arguments that you will use in constructing your case of advo-
cacy or opposition is usually field dependent, although certain ideas such as the
cost of something and its benefit may be used across several different fields. The ul-
timate goal of analysis is to discover the actual issues you will argue. Actual issues
are the questions central to the specific need for knowledge or differences of opin-
ion identified by the wording of the proposition you are preparing to argue. Actual
issues are found through a four-step process of analysis: (1) locating the immediate
cause of concern about the topic, (2) investigating the history of the topic, (3)
defining key terms and creating the primary inference for the topic, and (4) deter-
mining the actual issues in the controversy.
LOCATING IMMEDIATE CAUSE

Locating the immediate cause of interest or concern about a topic is done by moni-
toring media and paying attention to what people are talking about, both within a
field and across fields. Today, electronic technology and the capacity for seemingly
instantaneous communication about what is on people’s minds makes it possible to
find out what most concerns them at a given point in time. Mass media channels of
communication focus our attention on topics by rapidly disseminating stories about
them. Personal use of Web-based media such as blogs, Facebook, MySpace, Twitter,
and electronic discussion sites makes it easy to research immediate cause.
Analyzing the immediate cause helps you discover why the controversy ex-
pressed in a proposition is sufficiently important to justify argumentation. You will
59
60 CHAPTER 4 How Do I Analyze Propositions?
find indications of your proposition’s importance by examining your subject’s re-

cent history: Is it viewed as a controversy by mainstream or field-specific news
media? What are opinion leaders saying about it? Are people undertaking research
projects or reporting findings from them? Are commissions, task forces, or com-
mittees investigating the subject? Are influential groups or individuals issuing posi-
tion statements or white papers on the subject? Are people creating Web sites,
tweeting, blogging, or talking about the controversy online? When you discover
what is being said about questions that lead to propositions of fact, value, and pol-
icy, examine the opinions and interpretations that are being made.
People become involved in factual argumentation because something leads to a
difference in the interpretation of information or suggests the need to acquire
knowledge. A significant event, an unusual occurrence, or an observed circum-
stance may be an immediate cause for factual argumentation. To find the immediate
cause for a proposition of fact, examine what has recently taken place or been ex-
pressed that stimulates a need to make a fresh interpretation of existing information
or creates a desire to seek knowledge.
People engage in value argumentation to judge or evaluate a person, place, ob-
ject, event, policy, or idea. The immediate cause in value argumentation is that
which initiates the need to make a judgment. As a stimulus for value argumenta-
tion, immediate causes include questions about the saliency of a particular core
value, concerns about the criteria used to make a value judgment, the desire to
make a fresh evaluation of something, or a conflict between existing value judg-
ments. An important discovery or the development of new technology may also
initiate value argumentation.
People argue about changing a policy or creating a new one when someone or
some group believes a problem exists. In policy argumentation, immediate cause
stems from events or observations that suggest a problem exists. You should look
for significant, often harm-causing, events and explanations of why these events
occurred. Locating immediate cause is particularly important for proving in-
herency in policy propositions. Inherency arguments identify the cause of a prob-
lem. Advocates must identify what causes a problem in order to develop a prima
facie policy case, and identifying the immediate cause of a problem often reveals
the inherent reasons why a change is necessary. Locating immediate cause can help
you find inherent reasons for change in fact and value propositions, but it is essen-
tial to finding the structural and attitudinal basis for a policy change.
In addition to what people are talking about using social media, what news
and mass media choose to talk about can have a significant impact on what con-
cerns people at the moment. A topic covered in a news story may draw attention to
a controversy. Such was the case for us when we read a story in Newsweek that de-
scribed a new museum with the phrase, “it is architecture as argument, explicitly
meant to sway opinion” (McGuigan, 2009, p. 62). We will illustrate how to ana-
lyze propositions of fact, value, and policy with a controversy that was brought to
our attention by the opening of a new museum in Athens, Greece.
Most of us are familiar with the image of Indiana Jones removing an artifact
from the ruins of a temple in the opening scenes of Raiders of the Lost Ark, but we
seldom consciously consider arguments concerning the ownership of such artifacts.
Private collections and the world’s museums and galleries are stocked with treasures
and artifacts of ancient cultures. Who is the rightful owner of these antiquities?
Locating Immediate Cause 61
Argumentation on this question reached a peak in recent years, particularly follow-

ing the destruction of “blasphemous” pre-Islamic artifacts by the Taliban in
Afghanistan in 2001 and the looting of Iraq’s archeological sites and the National
Museum in Baghdad following the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. One longstand-
ing controversy over cultural artifacts was renewed in 2009.
Immediate Cause in the Parthenon Marbles Controversy

The British Museum is a popular stop for many tourists visiting London, and the mag-
nificent display of the Elgin Marbles is one of the “must see” exhibits. On June 21,
2009, the new Acropolis Museum opened in Athens, creating an immediate cause for
renewed interest in the controversy surrounding the Elgin Marbles. The Greek gov-
ernment wants the collection returned to Athens for display with the other surviving
sculptures from the Parthenon. The controversy surrounding the Elgin Marbles in-
volves issues of fact, value, and policy that go beyond which museum gets to display
them. We saw the Elgin Marbles in 1990 and were deeply touched by these magnifi-
cent works of art as a symbol of the excellence of ancient Athens, so our attention
was called to the controversy by the Newsweek article.
In addition to the opening of the Acropolis Museum, immediate cause is
found in a series of new publications specific to the Elgin Marbles and larger con-
cerns on cultural patrimony and museum collections, especially the role of the
world’s great encyclopedic museums.
䊏 In The Parthenon Marbles: The Case for Reunification, American journalist
Christopher Hitchens revised his earlier work on the Elgin Marbles and pub-
lished this edition in 2008 to coincide with the opening of the new Acropolis
Museum. He examines the moral, artistic, legal, and political reasons for re-
turning the Elgin Marbles to Greece.
䊏 In The Parthenon Sculptures, also published in 2008, senior curator of the
Greek and Roman antiquities collection of the British Museum, Ian Jenkins
makes the case that the Elgin Marbles belong to the world, not just to Greece.
䊏 In About the Elgin Marbles: Critical Essays on Cultural Property, Art, and
Law, published in 2009, John Henry Merryman, Stanford Law School expert
in art and cultural property law, examines the international debate on cultural
property policy and the specific claims of both sides in the Elgin Marbles con-
troversy, including why people are presently concerned about the marbles and
whether claims based on cultural heritage are sound.
Of the many Web sites devoted to the Elgin Marbles controversy, most of
which favor repatriation to Greece, three will illustrate the online presence that es-
tablishes immediate cause. The Committee for Reunification of the Parthenon
Marbles was begun in 1983 by a group of scholars, members of the British govern-
ment, journalists, and celebrities such as Judi Dench, Ian McKellen, and Emma
Thompson. Their Web site states: “We are a group of British people who having
considered the case for the reunification of the Parthenon Marbles strongly sup-
port it and wish to campaign to achieve it” (Committee for the Reunification of
the Parthenon Marbles, 2001–2002a). The site provides background information,
research, news articles, information about the new Acropolis Museum and its up-
coming events, and a forum for discussion.
There are many other reunification committees worldwide, one of which is

The American Committee for the Reunification of the Parthenon Sculptures, estab-
lished in April 2007. This group’s mission is to educate Americans on the issue of
returning the Elgin Marbles to Greece. Its Web site provides a history of the Elgin
Marbles, the case for returning them to Greece, and a visual exhibit, “All Sides of
the Parthenon,” along with detailed information about the public education cam-
paign (American Committee for the Reunification of the Parthenon Sculptures,
2007).
The two previous examples are Web sites of nonprofit organizations. Elginism
is an exclusively online presence created and maintained by “Matthew.” Instead of
the typical purpose statement or “who we are” description, the opening of this
Web site defines “Elginism” as:
An act of cultural vandalism. A term coined by the destructive actions of Lord Elgin
who illegally transported the Parthenon Marbles from Greece to London between 1801
and 1805. Now applies to other cultural objects. Usually refers to artifacts taken from
poorer nations to richer ones. (Matthew, 2005)
Matthew describes his site as one designed to educate people about the impor-
tance of the Elgin Marbles case and cultural property restitution as a whole. The
site offers an extensive data base of news articles, speeches, government and inter-
national institutional documents, research reports, and other material on both
sides of the controversy. Matthew offers his observations and posts comments by
anyone who wants to contribute. He also encourages activism by providing links
to reunification committees, suggesting ways for individuals to get involved, and
especially encouraging Facebook users to spread the word and campaign for reuni-
fication of the marbles using the site.
INVESTIGATING THE HISTORY

Every controversy and every quest for knowledge through the use of argumentation
has historical connections. Each new development in communication technology
from Guttenberg’s printing press to the “Twitter Revolution” has spawned debate
over what would be the impact of the new technology, how it should best be em-
ployed, and should it be regulated. The Twitter Revolution challenges established
media and has historical roots in the emergence of talk radio, the Internet as an “in-
formation superhighway,” the iPod and podcasts, and the emergence of blogs. In
turn, this “new media” is connected to earlier forms of communication such as the
emergence of the novel in sixteenth-century Europe and Thomas Paine’s pamphle-
teering in support of the American Revolution. All are antecedents of the Twitter
Revolution (Micek & Whitlock, 2008).
Investigating the contemporary and historical background of your proposi-
tion’s subject provides you with pertinent information that helps you find the is-
sues you will argue. The history of a given topic will help you understand the field
in which you are arguing and discover where presumption lies. Even instances
where the immediate cause of a controversy is obvious, the field of argument seems
very clear, an immediate cause only tells you why people are concerned about the
subject at the moment. Investigating the history of the controversy will give you a
deeper understanding of the issues of the controversy.
Some controversies and uses of argumentation as a quest for knowledge

have a more specific historical beginning, such as our example of the Elgin
Marbles controversy. Others, such as our reference to the Twitter Revolution,
may be less specific. Creating a profile of the historical background of your topic
will help you expand what you learned from locating the immediate cause.
Examine historical episodes and the evolution of dissatisfaction and conflicting
interpretations to build your knowledge of the controversy and the field, and to
find the specific issues.
History of the Parthenon Marbles

For two and a half millennia, the Parthenon has stood on the Acropolis, a hill domi-
nating the city of Athens. In 448 BCE, the Athenian Assembly voted to build a new
temple to their patron goddess Athena, replacing the one destroyed in the war be-
tween Greece and Persia. This was the age of Pericles, the height of Athenian democ-
racy and the influence of Athens as a center for art and culture. The Parthenon, as
Athena’s temple, was intended to symbolize Greek innovation and excellence. The
temple was decorated with friezes depicting themes from Greek history and mythol-
ogy. The sculptures that became known as the “Elgin Marbles” were decorations at-
tached to the Parthenon’s walls and architecture, plus a few sculptures from other
monuments on the Acropolis. The collection in the British Museum, now called the
“Parthenon Marbles,” is approximately half of the surviving sculptural detail of the
Parthenon, 247 feet of the original 524 feet of frieze, 15 of 92 metopes, and 17 figures
from the Parthenon’s pediment (British Museum, n.d.).
There are many surviving artifacts and structures from antiquity, but few dis-
play “the architectural complexity and artistic distinction of the Parthenon. And
none possess the rich associations and the symbolic values which the Parthenon
has acquired in the course of centuries” (Browning, 1997, p. 1). The Parthenon has
become a powerful symbol of democracy and liberty. Beyond the aesthetic value of
the marble sculptures that adorned the Parthenon, “Periclean Athens is valorized
as civilized and harmonious, and the source of western democracy” (Gillman,
2009, p. 168).
Lord Elgin’s Role. Controversy surrounding the Elgin Marbles began almost as
soon as they arrived in London in the early 1800s. Thomas Bruce, the seventh Earl
of Elgin, was a Scottish nobleman appointed British Ambassador to the Ottoman
Empire in 1799. At that time, Greece was part of the Ottoman Empire, and Athens
was a dusty outpost of little consequence to the Ottomans. Like many wealthy
men of his day, Elgin was enamored of classical art and architecture. Newly mar-
ried, he promised his wife he would build her a mansion in the classic Greek style.
Elgin took advantage of his position, as well as the British–Ottoman alliance
against Napoleon and France, to send a team of artists and craftsmen to Athens to
make drawings and molds of the art and architecture of the Parthenon and the
other Acropolis monuments.
Elgin found the buildings and their artworks in such a sad state that he deter-
mined to do more than just make drawings and casts. The Parthenon had been
used as a Christian church for centuries and many of the anatomical features of the
nude statuary had been removed. Under the Ottomans, it became a mosque and
more of the artwork was defaced. Later, the Turkish military used the Parthenon to
store gunpowder, and in 1687 Venetian artillery scored a direct hit on it, destroy-
ing more of the building and its sculptures. By the 1700s, wealthy European
tourists were removing statuary to grace their homes and gardens. When Elgin’s
team arrived on the scene, the locals were using the site as a quarry for building
materials and were burning marble to make lime for mortar. He maneuvered to get
permission from the Ottoman authorities to remove some of the surviving pieces.
Elgin believed he was not only rescuing the artwork from further degradation but
from Napoleon, who was busy stocking the Louvre by plundering the antiquities
of Rome and Egypt at that time, as well.
Reminiscent of the alleged curse on those who opened King Tutankhamen’s
tomb, a vengeful Athena, to whom the Parthenon was dedicated, seems to have
cursed Elgin for despoiling her temple. Returning home in 1803, Elgin was captured
by the French and held hostage until 1806. One of the ships carrying the marbles to
Britain sank, and he spent a great deal to have them recovered. Elgin’s career was in
ruins as British society, and the press suggested he “had abused his position as am-
bassador to remove and ship the sculptures” (Atwood, 2004, pp. 135–136), his wife
left him for another man, and the removal and transportation of the sculptures
wiped out his fortune. An illness, possibly syphilis, disfigured his once handsome
face, eroding his nose. Like the Parthenon, Lord Elgin was “defaced” (Wood, 2004).
In 1815, Elgin offered to sell the marbles to the British government, touching
off a fierce public debate over the legal ownership of the collection, the aesthetic
and moral questions concerning their display, and eventually whether the marbles
should be returned to Athens. In 1816, the sale was completed for a sum of
£35,000 on the condition that the collection be kept together in the British
Museum and be known as the “Elgin Marbles.” The sculptures went on display in
1817, and the British Museum continues to hold them in trust for the people of the
United Kingdom.
Immediate Reactions. Shortly after Elgin’s collection went on display, two giants
of English literature, John Keats and George Gordon, Lord Byron, entered the con-
troversy. From an impoverished background, Keats would not have had an oppor-
tunity to see the sculptures had they not been on display, free of charge, in the
British Museum. Keats made several visits and wrote “On Seeing the Elgin
Marbles” and venerated Greek art in “Ode to a Grecian Urn.” His epic poem,
Hyperion, returned to the glory of Greek art, none of which Keats would have seen
without the British Museum.
Lord Byron, a wealthy, rebellious, and flamboyant figure, visited Athens as
Elgin’s team was removing the last pieces they would take from the Parthenon. The
sight moved Byron to write “The Curse of Minerva,” denouncing Elgin for his de-
struction of the Parthenon. Byron also carved his initials and a rude remark about
Elgin into the Parthenon’s walls. Written later, the second canto of Byron’s epic
poem, Childe Harold, offers a lengthy accusation of Elgin as a vandalizer of Greek
art. Byron would go on to be a hero in the Greek war for independence from the
Ottoman Empire. He died from an illness contracted while fighting, and the Greeks
made him a national hero.
The poetic battle over Elgin’s marbles emphasized the controversy over
leaving the treasures of antiquity in their original context versus the kind of
British imperialism that justified wealthy collectors bringing them home as sou-
venirs or emblems of their good taste. Keats and Byron were among the first to
articulate the “wrangle” over the destruction of cultural property. “Reading the
opinions of Elgin, Byron, and their contemporaries, one is struck by how little
the terms of the debate have changed since. The Elgin Marbles have lost none of
their power to symbolize, for some the excess and rapacity of collectors, and for
others, the virtue of rescuing cultural treasures from neglect” (Atwood, 2004,
pp. 138–139).
In 1822, Greece proclaimed its independence as a modern state and the
Ottoman Turks were expelled from Athens. “As the fledgling Greek state fought
through the nineteenth century to unite the Greek-speaking nation dispersed
across the Aegean, the Parthenon became a riveting symbol of national redemp-
tion” (Atwood, 2004, p. 139). One of the first acts of independent Greece was to
ban the export of antiquities in 1833. In 1898, the Greek government made its first
formal request to Britain for the return of the marbles Elgin had removed.
Twentieth-Century Repatriation Efforts. The Parthenon was a symbol for the

Greek Resistance in World War II. The Nazis occupied Athens and a huge swastika
flag was displayed on the Parthenon as an emblem of Hitler’s “new order” in
Europe. Manolis Glezos, a Greek Resistance fighter, “tore the offending emblem
away on 31 May 1941, and thereby helped to ignite the Greek national resistance”
(Hitchens, 1997, p. 21). In March 1943, at a meeting between Greek and
American leaders, President Franklin Roosevelt observed, “Napoleon went to
Russia and Italy and stole works of art; Goering went to the Netherlands and stole
works of art. It will be just and proper to raise the question of restoration of all
stolen property at the peace conference” (Hitchens, 1997, p. 66).
At the end of World War II, the debate over the Elgin Marbles and the return
of allegedly “stolen” artworks “intersected with the nationalist, anti-Western rhet-
oric of the decolonization movement. Looting had become not just bad taste in the
eyes of some, but a potent symbol of cultural subjugation and imperialism”
(Atwood, 2004, p. 150). The newly formed United Nations began considering the
concerns of nations demanding an end to the looting of their cultural patrimony
(the new term for cultural property) and a return of stolen artifacts. The United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), charged
with dealing with concerns of cultural patrimony, chose the image of the
Parthenon as its visual symbol (Hitchens, 1997).
The UNESCO conference in Paris in 1970 created the treaty for the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership
of Cultural Property. The United States was a signatory to the treaty, the British
government was not, and the treaty has been extended many times. The objective
of the treaty was to stop the looting of archaeological sites and the trade in antiq-
uities. The treaty introduced the idea, which the restitutionists in the Elgin Marbles
controversy have adopted, that cultural objects belong by right to the culture that
created them and that cultural right overrides circumstantial ownership
(Greenfield, 2000).
Those advocating the restoration of the Elgin Marbles to Greece claim that
there should be no question that the Elgin Marbles are part of the cultural patri-
mony of contemporary Greece. “The sculptures were created for the Athenians, by
the Athenians and with uniquely Athenian themes. These are the people for whom
the Marbles were intended. They are a uniquely documented treasure. There is no
obscurity regarding their origins or ‘migration’” (Greenfield, 2000).
In 1981, actress Melina Mercouri became Greek Minister of Culture and
made the return of the Elgin Marbles her personal mission. She dubbed the display
in the British Museum the “Parthenon Marbles” to emphasize their origin. In May
1983, she “ran her fingers over the marbles in the chilly splendor of the British mu-
seum and, in front of television cameras, wept” (Atwood, 2004, p. 139). Mercouri
told a London newspaper, “The marbles are part of a monument to Greek identity,
part of the deepest consciousness of the Greek people: our roots, our continuity,
our soul” (Gillman, 2009, p. 168). Her “campaign added fuel to an international
debate over who owns cultural property” (New Acropolis Museum, 2009, p. 13).
Mercouri’s sentiments launched the campaign by The Committee for
Reunification of the Parthenon Marbles in Britain, who adopted her position on
Greek cultural patrimony: “The Parthenon is the most important symbol of Greek
cultural heritage and according to the declaration of human and cultural rights the
Greek State has a duty to preserve its cultural heritage in its totality, both for its
citizens and for the international community” (Committee for Reunification,
2001–2002b). World attention was again drawn to the restoration campaign when
Athens was named the site for the 2004 Summer Olympics, and the Greek govern-
ment again petitioned Britain to make the marbles available for display in time for
the Olympic ceremonies.
Broader Issues of Cultural Property. In March 2008, UNESCO, at a conference

held in Athens, revisited the issue of restitution of cultural patrimony. “Certain
categories of cultural property are irrevocably identified by reference to [the] cul-
tural context in which they were created (unique and exceptional artworks and
monuments, ritual objects, national symbols, ancestral remains, dismembered
pieces of outstanding works of art). It is their original context that gives them their
authenticity and unique value” (Committee for Reunification, 2001–2002b). The
conference was held at the new Acropolis Museum then under construction to un-
derscore the theme of the return of cultural property.
The history of the Elgin Marbles controversy is part of the history of the
controversies surrounding the world’s museums, especially large “encyclopedic”
museums found in Europe and North America. These great museums began in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from “the Enlightenment ideal of the
museum as a repository of things and knowledge, dedicated to the museum’s
role as a force for understanding, tolerance, and the dissipation of ignorance
and superstition” (Cuno, 2009, p. 28). Today, these museums “are dedicated to
the principle that access to the full diversity of human artistic industry promotes
the polymath ideal of discovering and understanding human knowledge, and
improves and advances the condition of our species and the world we inhabit”
(Cuno, 2009, p. 37).
The British Museum was created to foster a better understanding of the
world’s civilizations, not to serve as a museum dedicated to British sense and
British national citizenship. Its strategy was to display artifacts from all over the
world together so that visitors could see patterns of similarity and difference for
themselves (MacGregor, 2009).
The crux of the controversy is over who owns “culture” and its artifacts.
UNESCO’s proclamations and treaties were intended to help modern nation-states
protect what lay within their boundaries and maintain legal claim to artifacts
stolen by looters. More recent UNESCO declarations on “cultural patrimony”
were intended to help poor nations and indigenous peoples retain that which is
morally theirs, and refers to ownership of “the property of a culture. If you belong
to that culture, such work is . . . your cultural patrimony. If not, not” (Appiah,
2009, p. 73). The difficulty with the principle of “cultural patrimony” is that it can
be exceptionally challenging to determine whose culture is in dispute—ancient
peoples and their cultures are not modern states. “If the argument for cultural pat-
rimony is that the art belongs to the culture that gives it its significance, most art
doesn’t belong to a national culture at all” (Appiah, 2009, p. 79).
“Culture” and who, in the sense of contemporary nation-states, “owns” a
given culture is now at the heart of controversies involving museum collections,
large and small. “Modern nation-states claim culture for themselves. They nation-
alize it. They say it is important to their identity and they try to police it” (Cuno,
2009, p. 27). UNESCO’s support of cultural patrimony has had some disastrous
consequences in recent history, as many artifacts of earlier civilizations were de-
stroyed during the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
In February 2001, Mullah Omar issued an edict condemning all pre-Islamic
art, and the Taliban began destroying artifacts of ancient Buddhist culture found
within the borders of Afghanistan. Curators of the Afghan National Museum were
required to turn over pre-Islamic artifacts. “Here were drawers of extraordinary
Bactrian artifacts and Ghandara heads and figurines.” Taliban inspectors declared
them “blasphemous” and “responded to these extraordinary artifacts by taking
out mallets and pulverizing them” (Appiah, 2009, p. 81). Taliban religious funda-
mentalists also burned ancient Buddhist illuminated manuscripts and sanctioned
the demolition of the Bamiyan Buddhas in 2001.
Anticipating that this might happen when the Taliban initially came to power,
the Director of the Afghan National Museum had negotiated with a Swiss museum
for the removal of the endangered artifacts in 1999. Because Switzerland is a signa-
tory of the UNESCO treaties on cultural patrimony, the museum sought UNESCO
approval for the removal of artifacts from within Afghanistan’s national borders.
UNESCO refused to authorize shipment to Switzerland. At a UNESCO meeting,
“experts in Central Asian antiquities actually denounced” the Swiss museum direc-
tor “for trying to destroy Afghan culture” by removing the artifacts (Appaih,
2009, p. 81).
From the 1980s on, the Greek government has demanded “the return of
what it views as its stolen property at virtually every international cultural
forum, often with the support of countries that feel they, too, have been stripped
of their treasures by colonial powers” (Atwood, 2004, p. 139). John Henry
Merryman (2009) suggests that the controversy over the Elgin Marbles is the
predominant symbol for the entire body of claims against the world’s museums
and private collections. Egypt would like the British Museum to return the
Rosetta Stone, originally removed from Egypt by Napoleon, but taken as a spoil
of war by the British. Egypt would also like Germany to return the Bust of
Nefertiti from the Museum of Berlin. Peru has been demanding that Yale
University return thousands of artifacts that have been in its collection since the
early 1900s. Smaller museums, particularly those established by universities to

support scholarship, ponder the ethics of maintaining collections of artifacts of
indigenous peoples donated by Euro-Caucasian benefactors. The outcome of the
Elgin Marbles controversy will be precedent setting.
Questions of Fact, Value, and Policy

Obviously there is much more to be learned about the Elgin Marbles controversy
than can be presented here. We can, however, determine specific questions of fact,
value, and policy that can be pursued through argumentation.
Fact:
Who has the legal right of ownership of the Elgin Marbles?
Who has the moral right of ownership of the Elgin Marbles?
Value:
Which museum, the British Museum or the new Acropolis Museum, is best
suited for displaying the Elgin Marbles?
What is the value of the encyclopedic museum in retaining artifacts of sym-
bolic significance from diverse cultures such as the Elgin Marbles?
Policy:
Should the British government restore the Elgin Marbles to Greece for display
in the new Acropolis Museum?
How should museums respond to the claims of nation-states demanding the
return of their cultural patrimony?
As an advocate or opponent for argumentation on one of these questions, you
would use the stock issues of fact, value, and policy to help you find the actual is-
sues to be argued. You would also be concerned about the fields of argument in
which the controversy exists to help you determine presumption. The history of
the Elgin Marbles controversy suggests some possible fields of argument that in-
clude law, international relations, aesthetics, literature, and museums. Because
there are specific fact, value, and policy dimensions to the Elgin Marbles contro-
versy, as an advocate or opponent, you might narrow the choice of field, depend-
ing on the audience for your argumentation.
Concerns about audience and field of argument, and where presumption lies,
may be clarified as you investigate the history of your topic. In the Elgin Marbles
case, there is one overriding presumption regardless of whether the questions is
one of fact, value, and policy: The British Museum has held the Elgin Marbles in
trust for the people of the United Kingdom for almost two hundred years.
Finding the immediate cause and exploring the historical background of the
quest for knowledge or controversy will provide you with a frame of reference
from which to argue a proposition of fact, value, or policy. These two steps in the
process of analysis also give you some clues about your audience’s possible under-
standing of your proposition. To focus your own interpretation of the proposition,
the third step in the process of analysis requires that you define terms and use these
definitions to make a primary inference about its meaning.
DEFINING KEY TERMS AND CREATING

THE PRIMARY INFERENCE
Almost all propositions need some interpretation to clarify the exact change in
belief or behavior you seek from your audience. Although this can be done as
you develop individual arguments, effective arguers introduce their cases by
focusing the proposition in such a way that the individual arguments will collec-
tively make sense to the audience. The reason we define key terms in a proposi-
tion is to clarify what we mean and how we intend the audience to understand
the proposition. How you define terms also narrows the range of possible issues
to be argued.
Advocates must develop a case that on first hearing or reading seems logically
complete and that the audience will feel comfortable accepting as probable. This is
the concept of the prima facie case. Opponents may choose to defend what the
benefit of presumption has identified as deserving of continuation because it works
effectively: an existing idea, law or rule, policy, practice, or custom. Opponents
may also choose to attack each and every part of the advocate’s prima facie case.
In Chapter 3 we said that the key terms of a proposition are defined to locate
issues and to help the audience understand what the arguers mean in their use of
terms. Each side in the process of argumentation needs to define terms. The inter-
pretation of a proposition made on the basis of your definition of terms is called
the primary inference. An inference is a conclusion you have reached on the basis
of information you have examined. We make inferences by drawing a conclusion
from available information.
The primary inference is the conclusion you draw about what you believe the propo-
sition means based on the information contained in your definition of key terms.
How is a primary inference made from the definition of key terms? Recall that
arguing is part of rule-governed communication behavior and the nature of the
English language supplies some of the rules. In English grammar there are three
forms of sentences: simple, compound, and complex. A simple sentence has a sub-
ject, a verb, and a single independent clause (called the predicate). Our proposition
for factual argumentation demonstrates the simple sentence structure:
The nation-state of Greece (subject) has (verb) the right of ownership of the Elgin Mar-
bles (the independent clause that is the predicate of the sentence).
In Chapter 3 we said that propositions should be phrased as a single, declara-

tive sentence that has one central idea. A declarative sentence asserts the relation-
ship between the subject of the sentence and the independent clause. In our exam-
ple, there is an asserted relationship between the nation of Greece (subject) and a
right to ownership of the Elgin Marbles (independent clause). To avoid multiple
central ideas or confusing qualifications of the central idea, propositions should
not be phrased as compound or complex sentences. Compound and complex sen-
tences do have uses in argumentation, which we address in the next chapter. For
now, we want to focus on the simple-declarative proposition sentence and how we
use definitions of key terms to focus the argumentative ground and find specific
issues to be argued.
Key Terms in Factual Propositions

On the surface, a proposition of fact looks much like a true–false item on a test.
When you try to figure out if you should mark the item true or false, you do the
same thing an arguer does in making a primary inference. You look for the key
terms in the test item, define for yourself what the subject and predicate mean
based on the material you studied, and decide if your understanding suggests that
the statement is a true or false one. Unlike a true–false item, which has only one
right answer, either side of an arguable proposition of fact may be shown to have
some probable truth associated with it and it is the arguer’s job to determine which
side possesses the greatest probability.
Consider our proposition: The nation-state of Greece has the right of owner-
ship of the Elgin Marbles. Suppose that as the advocate, you have defined the key
terms as:
nation-state of Greece—the combination of a civil government with the his-

torically developed community of people who have a distinctive culture
and language as is found in contemporary Greece
right of ownership—a moral claim to possess the artifacts of a culture, created
by the people of the culture, for the people of the culture, as established
by the 1970 UNESCO declaration on cultural property
Elgin Marbles—the sculptures cut from the Parthenon and those taken from
its environs by Thomas Bruce, Lord Elgin, and removed to London be-
tween 1801 and 1806
Notice how these definitions focus the proposition and how they provide
clues to some of the specific issues that will form a prima facie case. First,
“Greece” is positioned both as the political entity that we recognize as the Greek
nation today and contemporary Greece is linked to the historic culture of classi-
cal Greece. Second, the definitions establish the UNESCO declaration on the
moral right to cultural property as the foundation for a right of ownership.
Finally, the definitions specify the cultural property in question is the collection
of sculptures Elgin removed from Greece. These definitions create the primary
inference: The people of contemporary Greece have a moral right to their cul-
tural property taken from Greece and removed to London by Lord Elgin. This is
a much different inference than if “right of ownership” had been defined as a
legal rather than a moral right. Why choose this strategy of definition? If re-
search tells you that a stronger case can be made for the moral right rather than
the legal right, it is advantageous to place the proposition in the field of ethics
rather than law.
The advocate’s study of the Elgin Marbles controversy tells her that Britain is
not a signatory to the UNESCO treaties on cultural property rights and there is
some evidence to suggest Elgin may have had legal permission from the ruling
Ottoman officials to remove the marbles and transport them to London. Her re-
search also tells her that there is a strong presumption today favoring the restora-
tion of the “cultural patrimony” of a presently existing culture with clear links to
antiquity such as those of Greece. Hence, her definitions produce a primary infer-
ence that helps her understand what must be proven to make the proposition prob-
ably true in the minds of her audience.
If you were the opponent for this proposition of fact, given what you know
about the presumption favoring the return of cultural patrimony, your strategy for
responding to the advocate’s definitions and primary inference might be to argue
the legal over the moral right of ownership, creating your own primary inference:
The people of the United Kingdom have a legal right of ownership of the sculp-
tures Lord Elgin rescued. You would emphasize the legal dimension in your defini-
tion of “right of ownership” and define “Elgin Marbles” to emphasize that Elgin’s
actions saved them from possible destruction.
Both the advocate and opponent must identify the primary inference that
evolves from how terms are defined, although they are not obligated to identify the
same one. If the opponent chooses to accept the advocate’s definition of terms, he
has tacitly agreed to argue her primary inference. Opponents are not obligated to ac-
cept the advocate’s definition of terms or agree to her primary inference as the best
interpretation of the proposition. An important strategy of opposition is determined
at this point in issues analysis: Should the opponent provide his own definition of
terms and argue that the advocate’s primary inference is flawed? Contesting the ad-
vocate’s definition of terms and possibly providing your own definitions is important
when you believe the advocate has unfairly or mistakenly interpreted the proposition
through her definitions. This is also true for value and policy propositions.
Key Terms in Value Propositions

In a value proposition, words or phrases in both the subject and predicate of the
proposition statement may require definition. One term in particular will always
require some definition, the value judgment term. In Chapter 3 we indicated that
a value proposition has two important elements: a value object term (the thing
you are evaluating) and a value judgment term (the source of criteria to make
your judgment). The essence of value argumentation is applying the criteria of
judgment to the value object. You get these criteria from your definition of the
value judgment term.
Value judgment terms have words such as desirable, useful, effective,
beneficial, injurious, disadvantageous, or wasteful that must be defined. The defi-
nitions of these value-laden terms are the source of the criteria you will use to
make value judgments as you develop the issues for your case. In some instances,
you may also want to define the value object term for clarity and to help you dis-
cover specific issues for case development.
Our value proposition from the Elgin Marbles controversy is: The new
Acropolis Museum is the best site for the Elgin Marbles collection. The advocate
chooses to define the value object as:
The new Acropolis Museum is a purpose-built facility for displaying and conserving the
sculptures from the Parthenon and artifacts from the other monuments of the Acropo-
lis of antiquity; the museum is located in close proximity to the Parthenon.
Why define the value object? Because the definition sets up some of the issues, she
will argue about why this new museum is a better site for the Elgin Marbles than
their current home in the British Museum.
The value judgment term in this proposition is best site. “Best” is the value-
laden term, but as a modifier for “site,” it is important for the advocate to define
best site in such a way that she will have a set of criteria to evaluate the new
Acropolis Museum on the basis of its superiority to the British Museum. Defining
the value judgment term creates the primary inference for what the advocate
means by best site. The primary inference produced by defining key terms in a
value proposition usually is a list of the criteria to be applied to the value object
rather than a simple-declarative sentence. The advocate defines a best site for the
Elgin Marbles collection as one that will:
䊏 provide state-of-the-art facilities for the conservation of the artifacts;

䊏 meet the fundamental principle for displaying artifacts—pieces that only make
sense as a whole should be kept together;
䊏 ensure historical accuracy in the display of artifacts;
䊏 provide for display of artifacts in an appropriate cultural context;
䊏 explain the symbolic value of the artifacts for the contemporary viewer; and
䊏 allow for international as well as local–national access.
How did the advocate come up with this list of criteria? We will have much
more to say about criteria in Chapter 10, but this list was generated from the ad-
vocate’s research on the historical background of the Elgin Marbles controversy.
Six criteria may be too many for effective case building and some of these criteria
may overlap and could be combined. In the issues analysis phase for value argu-
mentation, it is a good idea to generate a list of potential criteria that you can
choose from as you build your case.
In defining terms and creating the primary inference, the opponent’s options
are determined by whether the proposition is a singular value judgment or a com-
parative one. The value proposition in our example makes a judgment about one
museum. As a practical matter, however, the value judgment is that the new
Acropolis Museum is a better facility than the British Museum for the Elgin
Marbles collection; there is an implied comparison of the two museums. Value ar-
gumentation sometimes involves this kind of implied comparison making.
Comparative value phrasing of the proposition would obligate the opponent to
provide his own definition of the value judgment term, best site. The singular value
proposition gives him the option of accepting the advocate’s definitions and choos-
ing what he will or will not do with the presumption that the British Museum, which
presently has the Elgin Marbles, is an acceptable site for them. Even with the singu-
lar value proposition in this example, the opponent may opt to take a comparative
value approach for the strategic reason that he wants to use the benefit of presump-
tion to argue the advantages of keeping the Elgin Marbles in the British Museum. If
he chooses this strategy, he would define the British Museum as his value object.
The British Museum is an encyclopedic museum that emphasizes an understanding and
appreciation of the interconnections of the world’s diverse cultures across time and
place rather than focusing on a unitary culture determined by contemporary national
borders.
The opponent creates his own primary inference, that the British Museum is
the best site for the Elgin Marbles collection based on criteria that it presently:
䊏 offers a context for the marbles that enhances their value as shared history,
rather than one nation’s;
䊏 enables the marbles to serve as the focal point of Athenian excellence in

Western European culture and civilization;
䊏 promotes scholarship in the context of an encyclopedic museum’s varied
collections; and
䊏 displays the marbles in an aesthetically pleasing environment.
For both advocate and opponent, criteria specify the attributes the value ob-
ject must possess to be evaluated in a certain way and they serve to clarify the na-
ture of the figurative ground in which value argumentation takes place. As we dis-
cuss the stock issues of value argumentation, you will see how the advocate and
opponent’s definition of the value judgment term becomes a source of actual issues
for their respective arguments.
Key Terms in Policy Propositions

Because the most identifiable characteristic of a policy proposition is that it points
toward a change in behavior, some new course of action, defining that course of
action is one of the advocate’s responsibilities in case construction. If the advocate
fails to define what is meant by this new course of action, asking the audience to
adopt the action as their own will not be very convincing. They do not understand
what they are being asked to do. We do not usually change our behaviors when we
are unsure about what the change involves. Equally, decision-implementing bodies
are unlikely to support change if the details of the decision are unclear. This makes
selecting and defining the key terms of a policy proposition particularly important.
What are the key terms in a policy proposition? The term that names the
change being proposed and the term that identifies the persons or agency responsi-
ble for making the change are usually the key terms for definition. A policy propo-
sition to resolve the Elgin Marbles controversy is: The British Museum should re-
store the Elgin Marbles collection to Greece. The advocate has identified the key
terms in this proposition as:
Term for proposed change—restore the Elgin Marbles collection to Greece.
Term for the responsible agency—the British Museum.
Both key terms seem clear enough at first glance that most people should un-
derstand them clearly enough. The advocate’s research, however, tells her that def-
initions of these two terms are required in order for her to build a prima facie case
because the British Museum holds the Elgin Marbles collection in trust for the peo-
ple of the United Kingdom and the marbles cannot simply be given to the Greek
government and the new Acropolis Museum. The advocate must consider struc-
tural inherency in her case development. How she will address this inherency be-
gins with her definitions of the two key terms.
the British Museum—the Trustees of the British Museum who are empow-
ered by the British Museum Act of 1963 to lend items from the collec-
tions for public display to institutions both inside and outside the
United Kingdom.
restore the Elgin Marbles collection to Greece—the collection of sculptures
purchased from Lord Elgin in 1817 will be loaned to the new Acropolis
Museum for display with the other surviving Parthenon sculptures.
These are operational definitions that provide the advocate’s specific meaning
for the two key terms from which she will develop the details of the proposed loan.
There are many possible methods for defining the key terms of a policy proposi-
tion, but choosing to operationally define the term for the proposed policy change
is an efficient means of setting up the basis of what the change should be. The ad-
vocate’s primary inference is: The British Museum’s trustees can restore the Elgin
Marbles to Greece by loaning them for display in the new Acropolis Museum.
Remember, the definitions you choose for key terms are most important in de-
ciding what you want the proposition to mean as you plan your argumentative
strategy. Whether you are advocate or opponent, using your definitions of key
terms to make a primary inference helps you focus the topic and make decisions
about case development. Once you have made your primary inference, you are
ready for the final stage of issues analysis—determining the actual issues you will
use in case development.
DETERMINING THE ISSUES

Being thoroughly familiar with the available information on your topic is the pre-
requisite for effective analysis. Thus far in analysis, you will have discovered the
immediate cause that brings your topic to the audience’s attention, examined the
topic’s historical background, and used your definitions of key terms to make a
primary inference about the proposition. In doing this, you will already have some
ideas about specific issues for case development. More issues will be found by ap-
plying the stock issues for fact, value, or policy to your proposition.
In Chapter 2 we said that there are field-invariant stock issues that can be used
to analyze propositions. These “stock” issues are general questions that can be ap-
plied to the proposition and its subject matter to generate the actual issues that you
might use to develop a case for or against a proposition. These issues are “stock”
because they can be applied to any proposition regardless of its topic area.
Propositions of fact, value, and policy each have a set of stock questions that can
be used to determine what potential issues exist, from which you will choose the
actual issues to develop your case.
Stock Issues for Factual Propositions

The advocate’s selection of actual issues in a proposition of fact will be determined
by two factors: what constitutes her burden of proof in establishing a prima facie
case for the proposition and what can be demonstrated to be most probably true
with the resources of proof and reasoning available to her. Propositions of fact are
argued to decide whether the primary inference is probably true or probably false.
There are two stock issues to use in finding potential issues for building your
factual case:
1. What information confirms (or denies) the alleged relationship between the
subject and the predicate of the primary inference?
2. What techniques of reasoning (Chapter 7) should be used to demonstrate this
relationship?
The first stock issue asks you to meet your research responsibility by finding
out if there is enough available evidence to prove arguments about the probable
truth of the proposition. The second stock issue pertains to your responsibility to
reason with your audience. Arguing fact is at the very heart of the process of argu-
mentation. Notice the connection between the stock issues of fact and the defini-
tion of argumentation in Chapter 1. We said argumentation is instrumental com-
munication that relies on proof (stock issue one) and reasoning (stock issue two).
At first glance, the stock issues of fact seem very simple—find information and
use reasoning. This does not mean that factual argumentation is superficial or that
substantial cases cannot be created for propositions of fact. The issues for factual
argumentation in the Elgin Marbles controversy involve questions of ownership,
both moral and legal; the definition of an act, Lord Elgin’s removal and transport
of the sculptures to London; and questions about the cultural patrimony of the
contemporary nation-state of Greece in regard to these artifacts. The list of issues
for the proposition of fact was generated by researching the Elgin Marbles contro-
versy (see Chapter 6 for the discussion of doing research).
Issues of arguable fact for the proposition, the nation-state of Greece has the
right of ownership of the Elgin Marbles, include:
䊏 The removal of sculptures and artifacts from the Parthenon and the Acropolis
began in antiquity with the Romans.
䊏 Elgin had legal permission, a document called a firman, to remove the sculp-
tures from the Parthenon and other Acropolis sites.
䊏 Questions exist about whether the firman was valid legal permission under
Ottoman-Turkish law at the time of the removals.
䊏 Elgin’s removal of the sculptures was an act of “preservation” that saved them
from destruction, deterioration, and removal by others.
䊏 Contemporary laws and treaties for the “return” of “looted” artworks and ar-
tifacts are problematic: there is a legal difference between historically removed
objects and the contemporary market in stolen art and antiquities.
䊏 No one entity can legally or morally be said to own a public monument that is
central to so many contemporary nation-states and the whole of Western culture.
䊏 Treaties and resolutions from the UN General Assembly and UNESCO affirm-
ing the return of cultural property to its nation of origin create an interna-
tional legal mandate for the return of the Elgin Marbles.
䊏 The Elgin Marbles are undeniably Greek in origin and as such are the cultural
patrimony of the Greek nation-state.
䊏 The marbles are a symbol of Western civilization and not unique to the con-
temporary nation-state of Greece.
䊏 The British Museum Act of 1963 holds the contents of the museum in trust for
the people of the United Kingdom and prevents returning the Elgin Marbles to
the Greek government.
You might have noticed that the issues in this list are not designated as issues
for the advocate’s case or for the opponent’s. Some may seem to very obviously be-
long to one side or the other. When you generate an issues list in the process of
analysis, you should generate issues on both sides of the controversy. You need to
know where probable truth may be found on all potential issues.
As an advocate, identifying the issues the opponent may argue helps you un-
derstand where presumption lies, as well as helping you understand the case he
may build against the probable truth of the proposition. As the opponent, you
need to understand what information and reasoning supports the advocate’s side
of the proposition. If you only concentrate on the potential issues from your side of
the proposition, your case development may be deficient and superficial. This is
particularly important when you are using factual argumentation to seek knowl-
edge. Considering the potential issues on all sides of a controversy is also impor-
tant in the analysis of value and policy propositions.
Stock Issues for Value Propositions

Value propositions seek to establish the most acceptable evaluation of a particular
person, place, event, policy, or idea. You identify issues that will develop a prima
facie case for a value proposition by beginning with the stock issues particular to
value argumentation, vital questions that must be answered if the arguer’s case is to
be accepted. The three stock issues that shape value advocacy and opposition are:
1. In what value hierarchy is the value object of the proposition best evaluated?
2. By what criteria is the value object to be located in this value hierarchy?
3. Do indicators of effect, extent, and inherency show that the value object meets
these criteria?
Values are deeply rooted mental states formed early in life. They predispose us
to categorize something as existing somewhere along a continuum ranging from
highly positive to highly negative. A value held by an individual or a group may
not be verbalized until it comes into conflict with some other value about which a
judgment is going to be made. Values are not independent of each other. They exist
in a hierarchy, with some values deemed more important than others in a given set
of circumstances. This is why determining the value hierarchy in which the propo-
sition’s value object is best evaluated is the first stock issue for finding the actual is-
sues for value case development.
Advocates and opponents for value propositions will discover appropriate
value hierarchies and criteria for judging the value object by examining the imme-
diate causes for a value controversy and the relevant historical background of the
value topic. The immediate cause for the most recent value controversy over the
Elgin Marbles was the opening of the new Acropolis Museum with the belief that
the new Acropolis Museum is the best site for the Elgin Marbles collection. For
most of the controversy’s history, there was no question that the British Museum
was superior to an “old” Acropolis Museum. The political and economic circum-
stances of successive Greek governments left few resources for preserving the
Parthenon and other Acropolis monuments. The museum created in 1970 was in-
adequate and seldom open to the public. Value argumentation over whether the
British Museum or the new Acropolis Museum would be the better home for the
Elgin Marbles ensued as construction of the new facility began in Athens.
In the Elgin Marbles controversy, two value hierarchies come into conflict.
The advocate for the new Acropolis Museum operates from a hierarchy that places
the importance of the original historic location of the Parthenon in Athens at the
top of the value hierarchy. The British Committee for Reunification of the
Parthenon Marbles (2001–2002b) expresses this value hierarchy:
The Parthenon is the most important symbol of Greek cultural heritage and according
to the declaration of universal human and cultural rights the Greek State has a duty to
preserve its cultural heritage in its totality, both for its citizens and the international
community.
The opponent in the Elgin Marbles controversy operates from a different hier-
archy. James Cuno, director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, expresses the
value hierarchy as the promise of the encyclopedic museum to be:
A repository of objects, dedicated to the promotion of tolerance and inquiry and the
dissipation of ignorance, where the artifacts of one culture and one time are preserved
and displayed next to those of other cultures and times without prejudice. (2009, p. 1)
Neil MacGregor, director of the British Museum, links the British Museum to this
value hierarchy:
The British Museum was established very specifically for everybody, the whole world. . . .
It was established on the proposition that through the study of things gathered together
from all over the world, truth would emerge. And not one perpetual truth, but truth as a
living, changing thing, constantly remade as hierarchies are subverted, new information
comes, and new understandings of societies emerge, Such emerging truth, it was believed,
would result in greater tolerance of others and of difference itself. (2009, p. 39)
The advocate’s value hierarchy is based on the core values of nationalism and
cultural patrimony, the belief that today’s Greek nation-state has a direct cultural
link to those who created the Parthenon and the monuments on the Acropolis.
Today’s Greek State has the duty to preserve this and the new Acropolis Museum
was created to preserve it. Clashing with this value hierarchy is the opponent’s
value system derived from the Enlightenment principle of universal knowledge and
the interconnectedness of the world’s cultures as promoted by the encyclopedic
museum. Whereas the advocate’s core value is nationalism, the opponent’s value
system is the value of understanding the common ancestry of all humanity.
Earlier we gave you the definition of key terms and the primary inference cre-
ated by the advocate and opponent. The criteria each provided flow from their re-
spective value hierarchies. These criteria are then applied to their value objects as
each builds a case supporting her or his side of the proposition. The actual issues
in value argumentation are the criteria used to make the value judgment. The third
stock issue, indicators of effect, extent, and inherency, is used to find the specific
arguments to prove how the value object meets each criterion. We will have much
more to say about how this is done in Chapter 10.
Because our value advocate and opponent are each building a case in support of a
different museum facility, operating from clashing value hierarchies, and using differ-
ent criteria, we have separated the issues list into each side’s criteria of value judgment.
For the advocate, the new Acropolis Museum is the best site for the Elgin
Marbles because:
䊏 It provides state-of-the-art facilities for the conservation and display of the
Elgin Marbles collection; it was purpose-built with the newest technology and
methods for conservation of the artifacts; the curators know that the sculp-
tures were created by Athenians, for Athenians, with uniquely Greek themes.
䊏 It meets the fundamental principle of integrity in displaying artifacts by keep-
ing pieces together that only make sense as a whole; all surviving sculptures
from the Parthenon can be displayed in their original positions.
䊏 It ensures accuracy in the historical details of the display of the sculptures; the
Acropolis Museum has a Parthenon Gallery with the exact dimensions, orienta-
tions, and proportions of the Parthenon that will allow for display of the surviv-
ing sculptures in the exact order and arrangement of their original positions.
䊏 It will provide for display in the appropriate cultural context; the sculptures are
identified with the cultural context of the Parthenon and displaying them in
proximity to it gives them authenticity and restores the sense of their unique ar-
chitectural significance; they are displayed within sight of the Parthenon itself.
䊏 It accurately establishes the symbolic value of the sculptures; the Parthenon is
the definitive symbol of Greek civilization and the sculptures are uniquely
Greek symbols of concepts and events from classical Greek history that con-
tributes to Western civilization.
䊏 It allows for visitor access; today’s Athens is a major travel destination
with visitors from all over the world, particularly those interested in cul-
tural tourism.
For the opponent, the British Museum is the best site for the Elgin
Marbles because:
䊏 It offers a context for the sculptures that supports their value as shared his-
tory; as an encyclopedic museum, the British Museum challenges the narrow
concepts of nationalism and acknowledges the sculptures as part of everyone’s
shared history and their significance in world culture as the legacy of ancient
Athens to the whole of Western civilization.
䊏 The sculptures have greater importance when viewed in the context of the
British Museum’s varied collection as the focal point of Athenian excellence in
Western European culture and civilization that transcends their value as a
symbol of Greek nationalism.
䊏 It promotes scholarship; the British Museum has a long history of actively
promoting scholarship and extensive publication of research findings; the
British Museum is a unique world resource by virtue of the breadth and depth
of collections that encourage scholarly consideration of cultural identities and
the interconnectedness of the world’s cultures.
䊏 It displays the Elgin Marbles collection in an aesthetically pleasing environ-
ment; the new Acropolis Museum was designed by a postmodern deconstruc-
tionist architect and its architecture gets in the way of the exhibits—there is
too much “visual noise” with ugly yellowish artificial lighting.
From the two issues lists, you can begin to see the individual arguments that
will form the judgments that the advocate and opponent will make as they com-
pare the suitability of the two museums. Whether you are involved in compara-
tive values argumentation, or engaging in argumentation over a single value
judgment, you need to consider the issues from both the advocate’s and the
opponent’s perspective.
Stock Issues for Policy Propositions

We chose the Elgin Marbles controversy as the example for doing analysis of
propositions because there are very specific elements of fact and value in this con-
troversy. The essence, however, of the controversy is that today, the British
Museum has the collection of artifacts Lord Elgin removed from Athens and the
Greeks want them returned to Athens. Ultimately, this controversy involves policy.
Issues of fact and value, however, contribute to making the case for and against the
return of the Elgin Marbles to Greece. Many of the issues already identified for the
fact and value propositions would be appropriate to use in arguing the proposi-
tion: The British Museum should restore the Elgin Marbles collection to Greece.
Specific to policy argumentation are issues that concern the structural and attitudi-
nal impediments to returning the Elgin Marbles as well as the advantages and dis-
advantages of returning them for display in the new Acropolis Museum.
Policy propositions concern changes in behavior ranging from the passage of new
legislation or the creation of new institutions to a course of action an individual should
follow. Policy propositions imply that a critical decision to do something be consid-
ered. The stock issues for developing a prima facie case for a policy proposition are:
1. Is there a reason for change in a manner generally suggested by the policy
proposition?
2. Does the policy proposed resolve the reason for change?
3. What are the consequences of the proposed change?
In using the stock issues of policy propositions to develop a prima facie case, the
advocate must develop specific issues for all three areas. Applying the first stock issue
to the policy proposition will produce issues that point to a need for change in the way
something is done. Potential issues of a reason for change will identify problems in the
present way of doing things, the cause of these problems, and the impact of the prob-
lems on people, institutions, or environments. To meet her burden of proof in arguing
a policy proposition, the advocate must justify a reason to make the policy change.
Many of the issues from the list for the proposition that Greece has a right of
ownership to the Elgin Marbles could be used to argue the advocate’s reason for
change. To meet her burden of proof, she must reasonably demonstrate why the
collection should be returned to Greece.
The second stock issue is used to generate the details of the proposition’s pol-
icy change. If the advocate operationally defines key terms about what the policy is
and the agent or agency responsible for enacting it, she has met the requirements of
the second stock issue. Earlier, these definitions were provided:
the British Museum—the Trustees of the British Museum who are empow-
ered by the British Museum Act of 1963 to lend items from the collec-
tions for public display to institutions both inside and outside the
United Kingdom.
restore the Elgin Marbles collection to Greece—the collection of sculptures
purchased from Lord Elgin in 1817 will be loaned to the new Acropolis
Museum for display with the other surviving Parthenon sculptures.
Of course, the advocate will need to supply a few more details about this policy in
her prima facie case development, as we explain in Chapter 11. If she did not
operationally define the key terms to suggest the policy change, she would need to
do so now in applying the second stock issue.
The third stock issue is used to generate arguments to explain how the pro-
posed policy responds to the reason for change. Issues of fact are generated to
address how the policy overcomes or solves the problem. Issues of value are gener-
ated to consider the consequences of the proposed policy. The new policy becomes
a value object and the advocate uses criteria to evaluate why this policy is the best
solution to the issues identified by the first stock issue. The advocate may also use
value issues to show benefits or advantages that are unique to her proposal.
Using the first and third stock issues, potential issues emerge for developing
cases relating to the restoration of the Elgin Marbles collection to Greece for display
in the new Acropolis Museum. These potential issues are not identified as belonging
in the advocate or the opponent’s case, but most clearly favor one side or the other
and some are mutually exclusive. As was the case in arguing fact and value, it is a
good idea to generate potential issues on both sides of the controversy during your
analysis of the proposition in order to anticipate what the other side might argue.
䊏 The British Museum Act of 1963 mandates that the Elgin Marbles collection,
like other items housed in the British Museum, is the lawful property of the
people of the United Kingdom.
䊏 The British Parliament has the legal authority to pass a special act for com-
plete restitution of the Elgin Marbles collection to Greece.
䊏 The Elgin Marbles were legally acquired in 1816 and the British Museum
would violate its legal obligation to hold them in trust for future generations if
it were to make a long-term loan of them to Greece.
䊏 Many in the United Kingdom support restitution of the sculptures as demon-
strated by the Committee for the Reunification of the Parthenon Marbles.
䊏 An international movement for restitution of the Elgin Marbles exists, com-
prised of groups from Europe, the British Commonwealth, and North and
South America.
䊏 There is an international trend toward restitution of cultural artifacts, muse-
ums in the United States, Germany, and the Vatican have returned pieces of
the Parthenon marbles that were in their collections.
䊏 UNESCO treaties on cultural patrimony have done as much harm as good in
preserving the artifacts of antiquity as evidenced by the Taliban’s destruction
of Afghanistan’s pre-Islamic artifacts.
䊏 The vision of Pericles, embodied in the Parthenon, serves as a symbol of
European unity, Britain and Greece are both members of the European Union,
and restitution of the Elgin Marbles would be a significant act of cooperation.
䊏 Museum directors fear the consequences of the British Museum’s returning the
Elgin Marbles to Greece; there are other demands for the return of artifacts
that, if met, would denude the world’s great encyclopedic museums.
䊏 The Elgin Marbles are unique in that their history is known; Lord Elgin cut
them from the Parthenon and shipped them to London; the Parthenon un-
questionably still stands in Athens in recognizable form; there is no other case
for restitution that meets these conditions of a rightful claim. Restitution of
the Elgin Marbles would not create a precedent.
䊏 It is impossible to restore the Elgin Marbles to their cultural context on the
Parthenon. The remaining structure is too fragile to support the sculptures
and more than half of the original sculptures can never be found; sending the
Elgin Marbles to Greece is not restoration, it is moving them from one mu-
seum to another.
䊏 The Trustees of the British Museum have the authority to make a long-term
loan of the Elgin Marbles collection to the new Acropolis Museum and still re-
tain legal custody.
䊏 The Trustees of the British Museum are not empowered to dispose of items at
will through long-term loans or other means; loan requests are considered
only if the United Kingdom’s legal ownership is accepted.
䊏 The new Acropolis Museum was purpose-built for displaying the artifacts of
the Parthenon and Acropolis monuments; it has state-of-the-art facilities and
technology for protecting the fragile marbles.
䊏 London is the number one tourist destination in Europe, allowing more peo-
ple the opportunity to experience the sculptures as the legacy of ancient
Athens to world civilization.
䊏 The British Museum does not charge an entry fee or a fee for access to the
sculptures, the new Acropolis Museum does.
䊏 If Greece’s aim is to attract cultural tourism, having artifacts of ancient Athens
in the world’s greatest museum will accomplish that goal more effectively than
gathering them together in a museum in Athens. Seeing the Elgin Marbles in
the British Museum can encourage travel to Athens to see other artifacts for
those who might not have considered travel to Greece otherwise.
䊏 Athens remains a polluted environment and there are many structural problems
with the new Acropolis Museum; the Elgin Marbles should not be removed to a
less secure site.
䊏 The political and economic stability of Greece is tenuous; Greek governments
do not have a strong track record for stability; the Elgin Marbles would be
safer in the British Museum.
The stock issues of policy argumentation help you discover the kinds of ar-
guments the advocate must develop to establish a prima facie case, but they also
demonstrate the relationship of fact and value to policy argumentation. The
movement from fact through value to policy exponentially increases the com-
plexity of argumentation and the options available to advocates and opponents
of policy change. Not only are the issues more numerous and the strategies more
intricate, but you will also recall from our discussion of policy propositions in
Chapter 3 that policy propositions common to academic argumentation are
worded in such a way that they afford the advocates of change wide latitude
for interpretation.
The Elgin Marbles controversy is one example, albeit one of the leading ones,
of a much larger, worldwide controversy over cultural property policy. For aca-
demic argumentation, we might have worded the policy proposition more broadly:
The large encyclopedic museums should restore contested artifacts to their nation
of cultural origin. The advocate might, through her definition of key terms, inter-
pret this proposition as meaning the return of the Elgin Marbles to Greece. Or, she
might interpret it as the restoration of the Rosetta Stone and the Bust of Nefertiti
to Egypt, or as meaning some other contested artifact or set of artifacts.
The breadth of a policy proposition for academic argumentation creates some
constraints on opponents as they face uncertainty about the actual issues the advo-
cate will argue. The opponent is not without resources because he has the benefit
of presumption and the knowledge that the advocate’s burden of proof is more
complex, creating more opportunities for her to make mistakes. We will have more
to say about strategies of opposition that can be found as the opponent applies the
stock issues of policy to a proposition in Chapter 11.
In analyzing a policy proposition to determine the potential issues he will
argue, the opponent needs to remind himself that he only needs to defeat the advo-
cate on one of the stock issues in order to prevail. His research on the general topic
area and his understanding of the stock issues of policy argumentation can help
him develop a series of generic arguments that would apply to a number of differ-
ent interpretations of the proposition.
For the more general proposition on restoring cultural property, without
knowing that the advocate will choose to interpret it in terms of the Elgin Marbles
controversy, the opponent could find and develop issues on concerns about the
repatriation of cultural property, the legal environment, and the wisdom of using
cultural patrimony as a way of dealing with claims made on museums for the re-
turn of artifacts. He could also develop generic arguments on the value of the en-
cyclopedic museum for scholarship and enjoyment.
The requirements of meeting the advocate’s burden of proof for policy propo-
sitions also provide options for analysis of certain generic issues. The opponent
should carefully consider what issues of cost might be found in the change gener-
ally suggested by the proposition. Whether it is the Elgin Marbles or some other
item in a museum’s collection, the movement of valuable and frequently fragile ar-
tifacts is not a matter of simply crating them up and calling UPS. Many expensive
special arrangements need to be made when items are transported from a museum
to another location. Most policy propositions, whether they are very specific or of
the more general academic variety, will usually involve issues of cost. As an oppo-
nent of a policy proposition, your analysis and research will suggest additional
possibilities for creating issues, even when you do not know the specifics of what
the advocate will argue.
The process of analysis is the same for propositions of fact, value, and policy,
although the breadth and depth of analysis may be different for a specific proposi-
tion. Both advocates and opponents should examine the immediate cause and the
historical background of the proposition. After defining those terms that require
definition and deciding how the clarified terms form a primary inference, advo-
cates and opponents should then use the stock issues for their type of proposition
to generate a list of the potential issues that might be argued. From this list, the ad-
vocate and opponent then decide which issues can be developed with evidence and
reasoning to build a case for or against the proposition.
Issues are established by the requirements of stock issues particular to each
type of proposition. The choice of actual issues to be argued, within the framework
of what is required by the stock issues, is determined by the resources of proof and
reasoning that will help you develop each issue in case building. If you are not expe-
rienced in finding source material, you may want to look over “The Discovery of
Evidence” section in Chapter 6, which discusses techniques for doing research in
the library and online. Once you have a sense of the issues that will become the
main ideas of your case, you need to begin thinking about the individual arguments
that will develop these issues into meaningful argumentation. In the next chapter,
we will demonstrate the use of the Toulmin model as a system for creating a unit of
argument.
LEARNING ACTIVITIES
1. Examine the propositions listed below. Select one of the propositions for issues analysis.
What is the immediate cause of the controversy in the proposition? What are some im-
portant elements in the history of the topic? What key terms should be defined and
References 83
what primary inference can be formed from those definitions? What are the actual is-
sues that might be argued by the advocate? By the opponent?
a. The federal government should provide an opportunity for a college education to
all U.S. citizens.
b. American football has become excessively violent.
c. The further exploration of space should be a priority in the twenty-first century.
d. The need for oil is the most important element of U.S. foreign policy.
e. The high cost of college textbooks is a consequence of the market for used textbooks.
2. Read the Committee for the Reunification of the Parthenon Marbles, “The Case for
Reunification,” at www.parthenonuk.com/the_case_for_the_return.php. Is this case a
value or a policy case? Which set of stock issues would best apply? Does the
Committee meet the requirements of arguing either value or policy? What actual issues
make up the case?
3. Follow the debate over the Elgin Marbles controversy on an online source such as
Facebook, YouTube, or Twitter. What issues do you find in the debate? Are these issues
similar to the ones identified in the chapter or are new issues emerging?
4. Richard Fraser argues that John Wilkes Booth was only indirectly responsible for the
death of Abraham Lincoln, because the physicians on the scene were guilty of malprac-
tice. Their inept medical treatment caused Lincoln’s death. Read the essay, “How Did
Lincoln Die?” by Richard A. R. Fraser in American Heritage, February/March, 1995,
pp. 63–64, 66–70, available online at www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/
ah/1995/1/1995_1_63.shtml. What is the immediate cause that leads Fraser to author
an argument about this subject in 1995? What historical background does Fraser use to
build his argument? What actual issues did Fraser choose to argue? Does he create a
prima facie case of factual argumentation?
5. James Canton’s The Extreme Future: The Top Trends that Will Reshape the World
in the Next 20 Years and Richard Watson’s Future Files: The 5 Trends that Will
Shape the Next 50 Years discuss several trends that will shape the future. Choose
one of these trends, or the trend assigned by your instructor, and make a presenta-
tion to the class in which you explain the trend in terms of the value hierarchy it sug-
gests. What values are implied by the trend? What degree of importance does society
presently attach to these values? How will the future affect the present hierarchy of
these values?
6. Phrase your own proposition of fact, value, or policy. What terms require definition?
What type of definition should you provide? What is the primary inference that your
definitions lead to? What is the immediate cause of controversy in your proposition’s
topic area? What issues may be argued by advocates? By opponents?
REFERENCES
American Committee for the Reunification of the Parthenon Sculptures. (2007). How can
we help. Retrieved May, 18, 2010, from http://www.parthenonmarblesusa.org/
Parthenon/help.aspx.
Appiah, K. A. (2009). Whose culture is it? In J. Cuno (Ed.), Whose culture? The promise of
museums and the debate over antiquities (pp. 71–86). Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Atwood, R. (2004). Stealing history: Tomb raiders, smugglers, and the looting of the ancient
world. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin.
British Museum. (n.d.). What are the Elgin Marbles? Retrieved July 1, 2009, from http://
www.britishmuseum.org/explore/highlights/article_index/w/what_are_the_elgin_marbles.
aspx.
Browning, R. (1997). The Parthenon in history. In C. Hitchens (Ed.), The Elgin Marbles:
Should they be returned to Greece? (pp. 1–15). London: Verso.
Committee for the Reunification of the Parthenon Marbles. (2001–2002a). Our composi-
tion, supporters and aims. Retrieved May 18, 2010, from http://www.parthenonuk.com/
who_are_we.php.
Committee for the Reunification of the Parthenon Marbles. (2001–2002b). The case for the
return. Retrieved May 18, 2010, from http://www.parthenonuk.com/the_case_for_the_
return.php.
Cuno, J. (2009), Whose culture? The promise of museums and the debate over antiquities.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Gillman, D. (2009). Heritage and national treasures. In J. Cuno (Ed.), Whose culture? The
promise of museums and the debate over antiquities (pp. 165–182). Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Greenfield, J. (2000). House of Commons—Culture, Media and Sport—Appendix 13.
Memorandum submitted by Dr. Jeanette Greenfield. Retrieved June 29, 2009, from http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmcumeds/371/371ap20.htm.
Hitchens, C. (1997). The Elgin Marbles: Should they be returned to Greece? London: Verso.
Hitchens, C. (2008). The Parthenon Marbles: The case for reunification (rev. ed.). London:
Verso.
Jenkins, I. (2008). The Parthenon sculptures. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
MacGregor, N. (2009). To shape the citizens of that great city, the world. In J. Cuno (Ed.),
Whose culture? The promise of museums and the debate over antiquities (pp. 39–54).
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Matthew (2005). What is elginism? Retrieved May 20, 2010, from http://www.elginism.
com/definition.
McGuigan, C. (2009, June 15). Romancing the stones. Newsweek, 173, 62–63.
Merryman, J.H. (2009). Thinking about the Elgin Marbles: Critical essays on cultural prop-
erty, art and law. New York: Wolters Kluwer.
Micek, D., & Whitlock, W. (2008). Twitter-revolution. Las Vegas: Xeno Press.
New Acropolis Museum opens. (2009, June 25). The Economist (London). Retrieved from
http://www.economist.com.
Wood, G. (March, 2004). The strange case of Lord Elgin’s nose; or, a study in the pathology
of Hellenism. Prometheus Unplugged. Retrieved June 29, 2009, from http://prometheus.
cc.emory.edu/panels/5E/G.Wood.html.
CHAPTER
How Is a Unit of
Argument Created?
I
n argumentation, controversy over a proposition is disputed in terms of issues.
The stock issues for fact, value, and policy help you find the important points
for developing a prima facie case or arguing against one. Using the stock issues
to discover actual issues gives you main points for the overall organization of your
ideas. Each of those main points must be developed through one or more specific
arguments that help the audience understand how and why that main point is
probably true. Each individual argument that develops a main point can be
thought of as a unit of argument, a building block in case construction.
For example, earlier in your life you may have been involved in a controversy
over the policy proposition: You should eat your vegetables. A prima facie argument
advocating this proposition probably included the main point: “Vegetables are nec-
essary for your good health.” This main point might have been developed through
units of argument, headlined by two subpoints about the connection between veg-
gies and health: “Vegetables have vitamins and minerals” and “Vitamins and miner-
als are vital to proper growth.”
THE TOULMIN MODEL OF ARGUMENT

Whatever topic you choose to argue, your position as advocate or opponent
emerges through a series of claims supported by grounds and warrant, terminol-
ogy developed by British logician Stephen Toulmin (1958; Toulmin, Rieke, &
Janik, 1984) to classify the parts of an argument. There are many interpreta-
tions of how to use Toulmin’s thinking on the structure of an argument. In this
chapter, our interpretation is that the model should be used as a blueprint for
creating your individual units of argument. We recommend that you develop
your cases of advocacy and opposition by labeling the issues to be argued as
contentions (argumentation jargon for a main point) and by using the Toulmin
model to create one or more units of argument that will prove each contention’s
probable truth.
85
86 CHAPTER 5 How Is a Unit of Argument Created?
Claims
Argumentation begins when an advocate makes one or more claims. A claim is
your own opinion, the conclusion you form from information on the topic. A
claim is a conclusion that does not stand alone and something the listener or reader
can ultimately agree or disagree with. In this sense, claims both begin and end the
process of argumentation. Claims begin the process by showing where an arguer
has taken a stand. Claims also end the process, showing what the listener or reader
is expected to accept as true or probable. Disputes concerning claims center on
whether they are capable of being supported by proof and reasoning and shown to
be true-probable or untrue-improbable.
There are four categories of claims, each of which performs a different function:
factual claims argue what was, is, or will be
definitional claims argue how something is to be defined or categorized
value claims argue evaluation or pass judgment on something
policy claims argue that something should be done
Factual claims resemble propositions of fact in that they are concerned with things
that can be verified. They are concerned with past, present, or future fact. The ar-
guer asserts that something did exist, now exists, or will exist in the future, and
then proceeds to offer whatever proof can be discovered to demonstrate it.
Theoretically, the best proof of factual claims derives from direct observation and
experimentation (Ehninger, 1974). Practically, most of us have to rely on print and
electronic sources of information for material to prove our factual claims. What
might you use to prove each of the following factual claims?
Failure to resolve the hostage crisis led to President Carter’s defeat in 1980.
The “No Child Left Behind” policy is undermining K–12 education in the
United States.
Motor vehicles will run primarily on alternative fuels by the year 2020.
The second type of claim common to argumentation is the definitional claim.
Such claims are used when the precise definition of a term becomes a contested
issue. Definitional claims are concerned with how something is defined, as a partic-
ular type or category of act, individual, object, or idea. The following are examples
of definitional claims:
Mass media are commonly considered to be (are recognized as) television,
radio, film, recordings, magazines, newspapers, and books.
Computer literacy is (defined as) the basic knowledge needed to use computers.
The U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 was (should be categorized as) a case of
international aggression.
Like the value propositions they resemble, value claims show the arguer’s evalu-
ation or judgment. Value claims express an attitude toward something and are iden-
tified by the use of evaluative language. The following are examples of value claims:
Return of the King has the best special effects of the three films in the Lord of
the Rings trilogy.
The social security system is a poor substitute for effective retirement planning.
Internet advertising is more effective than television advertising.
The policy claim is similar to the policy proposition. It states that an action
should be taken or a behavior should be altered. Because policy claims advo-
cate change, they always concern the future. The following are examples of
policy claims:
You should floss your teeth once a day.
You should develop fluency in a second language.
You should register to vote.
Claims, regardless of type, are what arguments are about. Because they have
a sentence structure similar to that of propositions, it is not surprising to discover
that claims assert relationships between people, things, and ideas or actions. For
example, in advancing the claim, “The social security system is a poor substitute
for retirement planning,” the arguer seeks to relate an institution (the social secu-
rity system) to a judgment about it (is a poor substitute). Standing alone, this
claim represents the arguer’s opinion of the social security system. Opinion state-
ments of this sort are usually insufficient to alter an audience’s belief or behavior.
More is required.
A final point about claims concerns how they are worded. Because claims ex-
press complete thoughts, they have the properties of formal sentences. Claims may
be phrased as simple statements, with one relationship asserted, or as compound
statements, with multiple relationships asserted. A compound sentence has two or
more independent clauses in its predicate. Compare the following simple claim
statements with their corresponding compound statements:
Personal income tax fraud is increasing. (factual claim)
Personal income tax fraud is the willful evasion of one’s obligation to pay as-
sessed taxes on salaries and remunerations. (definitional claim)
Personal income tax fraud is harmful to the well-being of society. (value claim)
Tax law enforcement should be strengthened to prevent personal income tax
evasion. (policy claim)
A compound claim statement differs in that it argues more than one relation-
ship in its assertion. Compare the following examples of compound claim state-
ments with their simple counterparts:
Personal income tax fraud is increasing and becoming more difficult to prosecute.
Personal income tax fraud is the willful evasion of one’s obligation to pay as-
sessed taxes and a violation of federal and state laws.
Personal income tax fraud is harmful both to U.S. citizens and to institutions.
Tax laws should be revised to more equitably distribute the tax burden and
more stringently punish the tax evader.
Recall that in discussing propositions, we indicated it was unwise to have mul-
tiple ideas stated in a single proposition. In wording claim statements that serve as
subarguments, compound statements often make argumentation more economical.
By offering a single claim to argue that tax fraud harms two entities, individuals
and institutions, the arguer saves time and keeps related ideas together in her lis-
tener’s or reader’s mind. In addition, compound statements allow the arguer to set
up patterns of reasoning through comparisons. “The seriousness of income tax
evasion is demonstrated by the fact that tax fraud is increasing more rapidly than
crimes against persons and property.” The types of crime are unrelated, but the
compound statement gives the audience a basis for comparison and a measure of
the extent of tax fraud.
The arguer’s task in making a claim is to present a well-defined and supported
position for the listener or reader to consider. In doing this, the arguer offers not
only a claim but also the grounds and warrant that support it. The relationship be-
tween them is such that an argument is the movement from grounds, accepted by
the listener or reader, through warrant to claim (Brockriede & Ehninger, 1960).
These three elements make up the primary triad of a unit of argument in the
Toulmin model. A unit of argument is the structure for forming opinions from in-
formation you have collected on the topic. This unit of argument corresponds to
the rational processes people use in making decisions (J. L. Golden, Berquist,
Coleman, Sproule, & R. Golden, 2007).
Although the arguments you hear or read may not have all three elements
clearly identified, the elements of the primary triad are basic to the structure of
all argument. They represent the reasoning process invoked when someone
makes a statement that requires support before someone else is willing to accept
it as true or probable. If we say, “X is the cause of Y” (a claim) and, to support
this opinion, we add, “Y happens every time we find an X present” (information
about the co-occurrence of X and Y), we have created a unit of thought about X
and Y. If we were uncertain that the audience saw the connection between X and
Y in the same way we did, we might state more of our thinking: “X has certain
properties that result in the creation of a Y” (a statement about how one thing
causes another thing).
If the audience accepted our opinion that X causes Y because it shared our
opinion, there would be no argumentation over the relationship between X and Y.
Because argumentation takes place when people have differences of opinion or
want to test all the ways in which the relationship between X and Y might not
hold up, stating a claim is usually not enough for a unit of argument to make
sense. In the Toulmin model form, we would write up this unit of argument as
shown in Figure 5.1.
Real people actually create units of argument when they need to build a case.
Using the Toulmin model as a blueprint for creating arguments to change an audi-
ence’s beliefs, so that in turn they would cease a particular behavior, the Board of
Directors of a condominium association made a case against the popular practice
of feeding wild birds. This example demonstrates how the concept of the prima
Grounds Warrant
X is present in this An X has certain Claim

instance, and we also properties that
X causes Y.
have evidence that Y give it the ability
is present. to produce a Y.
FIGURE 5.1
Toulmin Form of Unit of Argument
facie case comes together with the conventions presumption and burden of proof
discussed in Chapter 2 as a case is developed through a series of units of argument.
This example addresses the first stock issue of a policy proposition, the reason for
change. It also demonstrates why claims alone are inadequate and require the sup-
port of grounds and warrant to make the message worthy of agreement.
When humans and wildlife interact, significant problems can occur.
Between 1980 and 2007, pilots reported over 82,000 bird strikes, and in
January 2009, a flock of Canada geese migrating from Nova Scotia struck U.S.
Airways Flight 1549 as it departed from LaGuardia airport. Disaster was only
averted when the pilot was able to make an emergency landing in the Hudson
River (Walsh, 2009). Our “Canada goose problem” began less dramatically, but
over a few years, turned into what the Board saw as a substantial financial and
health problem for the association. The condominiums are built around a
spring-fed pond in an abandoned quarry in a wooded area that attracts a great
variety of birds. Residents had become accustomed to setting up feeders and en-
joying the many bird species that made the area their home. Five years ago, a
pair of Canada geese made the pond their nesting area, but left with their
goslings soon after they hatched for the safer, larger waters of Lake Superior.
Several residents thought the goslings were cute and enjoyed watching the goose
family for a few, brief weeks. The next spring the original pair returned to
Quarry Pond for the nesting season. Hoping to entice the geese to hang around
a bit longer, several residents put out bread, cereal, cookies, and other “human”
food for the geese.
The geese quickly became full-time summer residents and over time the
flock increased in size. In addition to the food provided by humans, the birds
also ate the grass and fresh plantings. The Canada goose is a very large bird and
each one leaves a significant amount of fecal matter in its wake, as much as one
pound per goose per day (Walsh, 2009). Concerned about the increased costs of
maintenance, along with the health hazards posed by the fecal matter and the
growth of the flock, the Board wanted to ban all wildlife feeding and encourage
residents to use all legal means to discourage the geese from extending their
stay. They knew they had to make a compelling case for this change because
many residents were ardent wildlife lovers and liked the idea of having the flock
in residence for the summer.
PROPOSITION: All condominium residents should refrain from artificially

feeding the geese.
PRESUMPTION: The existing state of affairs is that some residents have been
feeding the geese “human” food and enjoy having them as
neighbors. The Canada goose is native to the area. Presumption
indicates that the geese are thriving and have made the pond
their home. There is no reason to ban feeding the geese.
BURDEN OF PROOF: As advocate, the Board must overcome the presumption
that feeding Canada geese is an acceptable practice. They
had to create arguments that, at face value, would be suffi-
cient to overcome the pro-feeding residents’ presumption
that feeding the geese is acceptable. The Board created four
units of argument based on their analysis of the first stock

issue for arguing policy, reason for change.
PRIMA FACIE CASE: As advocate, the Board seeks suspension of presumption by
presenting arguments on the topic of “the consequences of
artificially feeding wild birds” that demonstrates the in-
herency of “feeding the geese causes problems.”
CLAIM 1: Feeding the geese harms them more than it helps them.
CLAIM 2: The geese cause damage to the common areas that belong to
all residents.
CLAIM 3: The geese pose a health hazard.
CLAIM 4: The geese are a nuisance.
The pro-feeding residents would be unmoved by the four claim statements. To
them, these statements represent the unsupported opinions of the Board. As the
advocate for the ban on feeding geese, the Board would fail to establish a prima
facie case if all they presented were these four claims. Generally, claims are not
accepted at face value and the pro-feeding contingent would not be persuaded to
change their behavior. By providing grounds and the warrant to support each
claim, the combination of claim ➔ grounds ➔ warrant becomes a compelling rea-
son to refrain from feeding the geese, a prima facie case.
CLAIM 1: Feeding the geese harms them more than it helps them.
SUPPORT: Artificially feeding the geese causes them to lose their fear of
humans. Feeding encourages the geese to stay in our urban
area where they are likely to be hit by cars. Feeding the geese
food meant for human consumption alters their digestive
systems and impairs their ability to gain nutrition from nat-
ural food.
CLAIM 2: The geese cause damage to the common areas that belong to
all residents.
SUPPORT: The geese destroy lawns by eating the grass down to the bare
ground. The geese produce fecal matter that contaminates
the ground and the pond. Cleaning up after the geese is ex-
pensive. The appearance of the common areas is deteriorat-
ing, and the value of individual units will decrease.
CLAIM 3: The geese pose a health hazard.
SUPPORT: Fecal matter on the ground creates a health hazard to resi-
dents who use the common areas for recreation, especially
children playing on the ground. Contaminated pond water
presents further risks to swimmers and boaters. There is also
a potential risk associated with avian flu posed by the pres-
ence of waterfowl.
CLAIM 4: The geese are a nuisance.
SUPPORT: Feeding the geese has caused their behavior to change radi-
cally. They have become aggressive toward humans and
pets. Instead of fleeing, they defend their territory and go on
the attack. In other places, geese are known to have injured
children and even adults. (Used by permission of the Shiras
Pointe Condominium Association Board)
Grounds
Because a claim alone is insufficient to alter belief or behavior, you must con-
sider the second major element of the Toulmin model: grounds. Grounding the
claim provides the foundation of information on which an argument rests, the
proof required for a rational person to accept the claim as true or probable. The
relationship of claims to grounds is such that “the claim under discussion can be
no stronger than the grounds that provide its foundation” (Toulmin et al., 1984,
p. 26). Grounding is that element in the argument given to the listeners or read-
ers that enables them to answer such questions as “What information supported
this claim?” or “Upon what foundation is this claim based?” Common ground,
which the audience already knows and accepts, may exist, and you may draw
on it to support claims. You may also add information to it to increase the prob-
ability that the audience will accept your claim as true.
The pro-feeding audience for the proposal to ban feeding the geese has already
observed the deterioration of the lawns around the condominium complex. They
can see the bare spots for themselves. A simple statement of this fact can be used to
ground claim 2.
CLAIM 2: The geese cause damage to the common areas that belong to all
residents.
GROUNDS 1: The geese have eaten the grass down so short in some places that
lawns have developed bare spots.
This bit of information, which the audience already possesses, may not be suf-
ficient to ground the claim because the pro-feeding audience may see this as a
problem easily solved by sprinkling some grass seed on the bare spots. To
strengthen the support for the claim, the Board added a second fact, information
about the way condo fees (the monthly assessment each owner pays for mainte-
nance and other services) are spent, to strengthen the conclusion that the geese ad-
versely affect the common areas of the complex. The revised unit of argument took
this form:
residents.
GROUNDS 2: The Association spends almost $25,000 of our dues to keep the
common areas attractive and useable by the residents.
GROUNDS 3: The size of the goose population has grown since the initial pair
first came to Quarry Pond.
GROUNDS 4: The growth of the goose population has increased the cost of
maintenance over time and decreased the value of our mutually
owned common areas and individually owned condo units.
We sometimes use the generic term evidence to classify all proof in the
form of facts and opinions discovered through research and used to ground
claims. Because other parts of the Toulmin model may also use evidence, this
element in the primary triad is labeled grounds to avoid confusion.
Experimental observations, statistics, expert opinion, personal testimony, matters
of common knowledge, or previously established claims make up the pool of

material used as grounds in an argument. More specific information on the na-
ture and application of evidence is provided in Chapter 6; however, a few gen-
eral comments are in order at this point.
The reliability of the information you use to ground your claims is your first
general concern. Your audience determines the reliability of evidence based on its
accuracy and recency. You must determine whether or not the information you are
relying on represents what its reporter observed as closely as possible. If grounds
are to be believed to be reliable, they must be as credible as possible.
You also need to ensure accuracy in your use of information. When quoting
someone, do not take statements out of context. Make sure you honestly portray
what the source had to say. Sometimes it is neither practical nor desirable to present a
source’s entire statement verbatim in your argument. When paraphrasing, do so hon-
estly, in a manner that accurately reflects the author’s intent or frame of reference.
Much argumentation, and claim making of all kinds, is concerned with cur-
rent events. Use recent sources of information to add potency to your arguments.
This does not mean you should not research the history of your topic carefully.
Knowing what has happened in the past helps you to hypothesize about what will
happen in the future. However, relying on out-of-date sources to ground your
claims may cause you to miss recent developments.
The quality of the information you use to ground your claims is your second
general concern. There is a temptation to confuse gathering a large quantity of in-
formation with having high-quality information. Quality results when you ground
your claims with information that best helps the audience understand how you
have arrived at the conclusions implied by your claim making. Quality evidence is
sufficient, representative, relevant, and clear.
Ideally, the best argumentation occurs when we know everything about our
topic. Having all the facts is seldom possible, particularly in our information-in-
tensive society. Nevertheless, it is your responsibility to research your topic suffi-
ciently and support your claims in a way that makes it possible for your audience
to accept them. Just be sure the grounds you select to support your claims are rep-
resentative of the available information. Did you have to look long and hard, ig-
noring much of what you read, to find grounds for the point of view you are ad-
vancing? If so, there may not be adequate support for your point.
The grounds you offer are relevant if they are related to the claims you wish to
support. In some cases, the relationship between grounds and claim in an argu-
ment is not always apparent. The reasoning process of the warrant, discussed later
in this chapter, can help make this relationship more apparent, as can the use of
additional information in the form of multiple grounds for a claim or backing for
a warrant. The important thing to remember is that information that has little
bearing on a claim will be of little use in supporting it.
Will the information you use to ground a claim be clearly understood by your
audience? The advice on the importance of defining terms in such a way that they
render a subject more understandable to your audience also pertains to the selec-
tion of grounds for an argument. Information that is too technical, or in some way
beyond an audience’s level of understanding, may be unsuitable. Vague or equivo-
cal evidence will not contribute to your audience’s acceptance of a claim it pur-
ports to support.
The consistency of your information with itself, with other information on the
same subject, or with human understanding contributes to grounding your claim
making. Information that seems atypical, for whatever reason, is likely to cause the
audience to disbelieve the claim it supports. Consistency is assessed on two levels:
internal and external.
Does your information contradict itself? A single source should not state contra-
dictory positions. Except in instances in which a simple explanation can be provided,
a piece of information that reports both an increase and a decrease, or a positive and
a negative result, may pose serious problems of internal consistency when you at-
tempt to use it to ground a claim.
External consistency is a matter of agreement with other sources of informa-
tion on the subject. Although new discoveries are being made constantly, and two
equally respected authorities in a field may interpret the same event very differ-
ently, we generally expect that, in most instances, any piece of information will be
consistent with others on the same subject. One instance where you need to be
careful not to dismiss dissenting points of view out of hand is when you are deal-
ing with an area where research relies heavily on grant funding. Because the pur-
pose of foundation and government grants is to discover information related to a
particular value or policy agenda, only projects that meet that litmus test may get
funded. This is not to suggest that foundations or the government try to buy an-
swers favoring their agenda, just that they are only interested in asking questions
related to it.
When another witness appearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources Subcommittee on Public Lands and Forests suggested that
Dr. Thomas Bonnicksen, Department of Forest Science at Texas A&M University,
was “outside the scientific consensus,” he took exception to this characterization.
He also went on to disagree with:
this other point that was brought up earlier about all the scientific values and ecologi-
cal values of old-growth that all the studies have demonstrated. I suggest to you as a sci-
entist that if you were to pour millions of dollars into research on the other successional
stages that are an integral part of a dynamic, functioning forest, you would find that
each and every one of them has immeasurable scientific value rivaling anything any-
body has found from old-growth.
So just because that is where the money went does not mean that is what is really
important scientifically or even ecologically. (Forest Protection Initiatives and National
Forest Policy, 2001, p. 50)
Another part of our need for external consistency is our expectation that the
grounds in an argument will conform to what we already know in general. There
is a natural tendency for a reader or listener to reject something that seems not to
fit. For example, because we expect the president of the United States to support
American values and traditions, we might be skeptical when we hear the president
quoted as condemning some intrinsic American value.
Audience acceptability is your last general concern about the information you
use to ground your claim. Will your listener or reader accept the information?
There is little utility in having the best information if the audience will not accept
it, so what you use must be selected with the audience in mind. This does not mean
you should be dishonest or distort information in such a way that the audience will
be forced to agree. It does mean, however, that audience values, predispositions,

knowledge of the subject, and technical expertise must be taken into account as
you determine how you will ground your claims.
The field in which argumentation takes place often influences the form and
substance of individual arguments that make up a particular instance of argumen-
tation. We have discussed law as one field that possesses features that make it
unique, such as the artificial presumption of innocence. Knowing the field of argu-
ment gives you some insights into the kinds of evidence that appropriately ground
claims and the expectations that surround the kinds of reasoning that warrant ac-
cepting claims based on such evidence.
Some aspects of argument, however, are independent of the particulars of a
given field. Although a geologist and a criminal lawyer use different strategies in
preparing and presenting their arguments, both need a structure to follow in build-
ing those arguments. The same is true when you begin to create your own argu-
ments. This system for constructing arguments is transportable to any field, be-
cause argumentation is based on a series of common elements.
Claims must always be supported by grounds; claims alone are only tentative
hypotheses until something supports their veracity. When the Board made the
claim, “Feeding the geese harms them more than it helps them,” pro-feeding resi-
dents could reasonably be expected to ask, “Why does feeding the geese harm
them?” To these residents, putting out food for birds was a logical thing to do.
That feeding the geese would harm them would seem illogical. Grounds used to
support a claim are selected to provide specific information pertinent to that claim
as distinct from all other possible claims. Grounds should always point toward the
claim and lead the audience directly toward the conclusion specified by it. The
Board needed to ground this claim with information that demonstrated that
“human food” is not nutritionally beneficial for wild geese. Any other information
about the Canada goose, such as how the bird got its name, would not logically fit
the claim. Sometimes, the logical fit between a claim and the information that
grounds it is clear in our own minds but may be a mystery to the reader or listener
without further explanation. The third element of the primary triad in the Toulmin
model provides such explanations.
Warrant
The third element in the primary triad is called the warrant. It shows why if one
accepts the validity of the grounds, one can also safely accept the validity of the
claim. The warrant indicates how, given the available grounds, it is reasonable for
the listener or reader to make the inferential leap from them to the claim. “The as-
sertor’s task is normally to convince us not just that it was legitimate for him to
adopt the initial claim for himself, but also that we should share it and so rely on
it ourselves” (Toulmin et al., 1984, p. 46).
Warrants provide us with specific information about how the arguer rea-
sons. By showing the relationship between grounds and claim, warrants demon-
strate that making the mental leap from one to the other is rational. The easiest
way to show this relationship is to verbalize how you reasoned from the
grounds to the claim in forming an opinion. Chapter 7 explains more about the rea-
soning process, but we can return to our “X causes Y” example for a simple
demonstration of how to explain your reasoning process as the warrant step in

a unit of argument.
CLAIM: X causes Y.
GROUNDS: X is present in this instance, and we also have evidence that Y is
present.
WARRANT: An X has certain properties that give it the ability to produce a Y.
Look very carefully at the wording of the warrant. The warrant describes how
reasoning from cause is done. For one thing to be the cause of another, it must
have the ability or properties to make the second thing occur. We can explain why
we believe that X causes Y with the information that the two always occur to-
gether (the temporal property of causal reasoning). The mental leap that takes us
from this property—X and Y being connected in time—to the claim that X causes
Y is the cue to the reader or listener on the nature of causal reasoning. This pro-
vides additional support for our mental leap: X has certain properties above and
beyond the temporal connection to Y, making it capable of bringing about Y.
A warrant does not always have to describe how you reasoned in forming a
claim statement based on the grounds. You may draw on what the audience knows
as material for the warrant. Warrants are found in things already accepted as true
as a part of common knowledge, values, customs, and societal norms. In addition,
natural laws, legal principles, statutes, rules of thumb, or mathematical formulas
may establish warrants. Warrants take the form of information that shows a rela-
tionship between a claim and the grounds used to support it.
Consider how the Board warranted their claim about the connection between
the goose population and property damage.
residents.
GROUNDS 2: The Association spends almost $25,000 of our dues to keep the
common areas attractive and useable by the residents.
GROUNDS 3: The size of the goose population has grown since the initial pair
first came to Quarry Pond.
GROUNDS 4: The growth of the goose population has increased the cost of
maintenance over time and decreased the value of our mutually
owned common areas and individually owned condo units.
WARRANT: The bare spots on the common-area lawns, the increased amount
of money needed for maintenance, and the decreased value of the
property are all attributable to one source: the growing goose
population.
Note the use of the term cause in the claim statement. Use of this term signals
that the reasoning in this unit of argument is causal reasoning: X (the growing
goose population) causes Y (the increase in maintenance costs and the decrease in
property value). Claim statements are often phrased to reflect the pattern of rea-
soning the arguer uses in a unit of argument. In the Board’s units of argument for
the first stock issue, most of the reasoning was based on such causal connections
between the geese and the problems they created. The Board wanted to prove, as a
prima facie case for change, that a cause–effect relationship existed between feed-
ing the geese (cause) and a series of problems that resulted from their presence (ef-
fect). They also wanted to prove a cause–effect relationship between the practice of
feeding and the growth in the size of the flock.
The warrant justifies movement from the grounds to the claim by describing
how you reasoned to connect grounds to claim or by calling on commonly ac-
cepted belief to demonstrate the connection. In the ebb and flow of everyday ar-
gument, warrants are often unstated. The audience must discover the warrants
for themselves. Very often, it is the warrant that defines the locus of controversy
between advocate and opponent. We reason from claim to grounds or grounds to
claim, and it is the warrant that specifies the reasoning. Thus, a claim stands or
falls on the validity of the warrant. If you have ever confronted a claim and the
grounds that purported to support it and felt that it just did not make sense, it
may have been because you were unable to find a warrant reasonably linking one
to the other.
JEANNE: Phil really isn’t a very good student.
KATHY: Why?
JEANNE: Because he’s on the football team.
Kathy probably wonders, “Why does being a football player automatically make Phil
a poor student?” Her question arises from the lack of a sensible warrant.
From this facetious example, we can learn two things about the nature and use
of warrants. First, warrants are a vital part of argumentation. If a clear link be-
tween grounds and claim is not provided, the audience’s rationality may prevent it
from accepting the claim. Second, the arguer should always select a warrant that
the audience is likely to understand and accept as rational. It “makes sense” that a
flock of geese may damage lawns. It “makes no sense” that being on the football
team equates to poor academic achievement. The warrant is essential in argument,
but it is helpful only to the extent that it is understood by the intended audience.
Summary of the Elements of the Primary Triad

1. A claim is a conclusion that does not stand alone but requires further proof
before the audience is willing to accept it as verified.
2. Grounds are information of fact or opinion used to provide verification for
the claim, commonly labeled evidence.
3. Warrant is the reasoning that justifies the mental leap from grounds to claim,
certifying that given the grounds, the claim is true or probable.
Claim, grounds, and warrant do not always provide sufficient proof and rea-
soning to establish the argument. Because arguers face the need to be clear, accu-
rate, and specific, it is sometimes necessary to build in additional support and
qualification for the claim using the elements of the secondary triad of the Toulmin
model: backing, qualifiers, and rebuttals. These constitute the things that show an
argument’s strength or force. Backing is not always required to build an effective
argument, but we recommend that you use backing while learning argumentation
skills. Qualifiers and rebuttals are necessary when you must show your audience
the limitations on the probable truth of your claims.
Backing
The audience may require more information before they agree that given the
grounds, and in light of the warrant, the claim should be accepted. Warrants some-
times require clarification and additional information. Because “warrants are not
self-validating” (Toulmin et al., 1984, p. 62), the effective arguer demonstrates
that the warrant supplied should be believed. Backing offers explicit information
to establish the reliability of the warrant used in arguing the claim. “An argument
will carry real weight and give its conclusions solid support only if the warrants re-
lied on in the course of it are both sound and also to the point” (Toulmin et al.,
1984, p. 63). Backing your warrant offers support that your point can be made
using a particular kind of reasoning or by drawing on what the audience already
knows to help them make the mental leap from grounds to claim.
The type of information the arguer must use to provide backing may be
either general or specific, depending on the requirements of the situation. As the
warrant serves as justification for making the leap from grounds to claim, back-
ing justifies belief in the warrant itself. Like the warrant, backing may be
unstated, left to the imagination of the listener or reader. If the audience is
knowledgeable on the subject being argued or familiar with the grounds used,
backing, and even the warrant, may be unnecessary. However, in circumstances
where the audience may not have much prior knowledge, the arguer is well
advised to supply both warrant and backing to increase the believability of the
position, as shown in Figure 5.2.
In the Board’s argument, providing both warrant and backing is not argumen-
tative overkill. They help the pro-feeding audience understand the impact their be-
havior is having on both the value of the jointly owned property and their own
units. If after analyzing your audience you are undecided about whether to include
warrant and backing, it is usually wisest to go ahead and include both. Claims seek
to alter belief or behavior, and people are predisposed to resist change. Including
grounds, warrant, and backing in each unit of argument makes that unit of argu-
ment clearer for the audience. Clear arguments and specific information is more
likely to lead to success in advocating or opposing propositions. Warrants and
backing help an audience to interpret and understand the factual basis on which
your claim rests.
Qualifiers
The second element of the secondary triad in the Toulmin model helps the arguer
indicate the force or strength of the claim. Not all arguments have the same
strength. Qualifiers show the degree of force the arguer believes the claim pos-
sesses. Not all claims must be qualified; in some instances the arguer is certain of
the correctness and strength of the claim. If in investigating a topic you discover
exceptions or instances that disconfirm your claim, you will have to account for
those exceptions in your argument. Consider the following examples of qualified
and unqualified claims:
Qualified: In some cases, feeding wild birds harms them more than it helps
them.
Unqualified: Feeding wild birds harms them more than it helps them.
Grounds 1
The geese have eaten the

grass down so short in some
places that lawns have
developed bare spots.
Grounds 2
Warrant
The Association spends
The bare spots on the
almost $25,000 of our dues
common-area lawns, Claim 2
to keep the common areas
the increased amount
attractive and useable by
of money needed for The geese cause damage
the residents.
maintenance, and the to the common areas that
decreased value of the belong to all residents.
Grounds 3 property are all
attributable to one
The size of the goose source: the growing
population has grown goose population.
since the initial pair first
came to Quarry Pond.
Grounds 4 Backing
The growth of the goose According to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, “In
population has increased urban areas birds will congregate at feeding sites in parks
the cost of maintenance near lakes and ponds, transmitting diseases to each other
over time and decreased through droppings and ruining vegetation and water
the value of our mutually quality.” A home surrounded by fecal matter located next
owned common areas and to a contaminated pond is not going to be desirable to
individually owned condo many potential buyers.
units.
FIGURE 5.2
Use of Warrant and Backing
The limitation of the first claim is suggested by the modal qualifier “in
some cases.” The qualified claim is more compelling for the pro-feeding audience
because they provide bird feed to attract robins, cardinals, chickadees, cedar
waxwings, hummingbirds, and other small birds common to the area. There has
never been a problem with feeding these birds. Modal qualifiers are “phrases
that show what kind and degree of reliance is to be placed on the conclusions,
given the arguments available to support them” (Toulmin et al., 1984, p. 85).
Modal qualifiers typically take the form of adverbs, adverbial phrases, or
prepositional phrases that modify the action suggested by the claim’s verb. The
following are examples of frequently used qualifiers:
sometimes maybe
presumably in certain cases
necessarily at this point in time
certainly with the exception of
perhaps in all probability
The use of such qualifying terms indicates the strength or limitation of your
claim. Qualified claims provide the arguer with a means of advancing an argument
in circumstances where the reliability or applicability of the claim is not absolute
or universal. The arguer using qualified claims is communicating honestly, alerting
the listener or reader to the fact that the claim is not valid in all instances or is not
absolutely true. The use of a qualified claim does not necessarily signal that the
opinion it states is unsound, merely that it is not absolutely verified or verifiable.
Rebuttals
The final element of the secondary triad in the Toulmin model also provides a
means of accommodating the limitations of claims. A rebuttal is added to claim
statements that need to be limited to indicate the circumstances under which they
may not be valid. Strategically, the use of a rebuttal anticipates objections to the
claim. Rebuttals help us avoid errors in reasoning and reflect that we are dealing
with what is generally true, not absolutely true.
In our example, attachment of a rebuttal to the claim might result in a
stronger argument than merely attaching the qualifier “in some cases,” given the
experience and knowledge of the pro-feeding audience. Residents are familiar with
seed mixes designed to attract various bird species that have been certified as nutri-
tionally sound by the Audubon Society.
Feeding wild birds harms them more than it helps them.
Feeding wild birds harms them more than it helps them, unless the food is de-
signed to meet their nutritional needs.
You may feel that using qualifiers and rebuttals is not a very good idea, be-
cause they seem to diminish the strength of arguments. The use of qualifiers and
rebuttals acknowledges that argumentation is not an exact science and that human
affairs are seldom discussable in absolute terms. There are two circumstances in
which the use of rebuttals is particularly important if you are truly committed to
being honest with your audience.
The first circumstance exists when grounds, warrant, and backing support the
claim only under certain conditions. This occurs in our example. The second circum-
stance occurs when grounds, warrant, and backing provide only partial support for
the claim. What if a ban on feeding the geese were insufficient to overcome all harm to
the birds? The claim would have to be restricted, stated in terms of that part of poten-
tial harm to the geese that would be overcome by abiding with a ban on feeding them.
Summary of the Elements of the Secondary Triad

1. Backing provides the credentials that help establish the legitimacy of the infer-
ential leap from grounds to claim.
2. Qualifiers show the amount, or degree, of force that a claim possesses.
3. Rebuttals limit claims, showing circumstances under which they may not be
true and anticipating objections to the claim.
The Toulmin model provides a useful system for creating individual units of
argument. Individual arguments, however, are seldom sufficient to advocate or
oppose each issue adequately in your development of a fact, value, or policy case.
Because an issue serves as a main point in your case, and main points must be de-
veloped with substructure, a series of units of argument form that substructure.
In this chapter, we have provided a system for building units of argument used
to make a complete case for or against your proposition, based on the issues you
discovered in doing the analysis of the proposition. Now it is time to head to the li-
brary or grab your laptop to find the information to ground your claims and back
your warrants. Chapter 6 makes that trip much easier.
LEARNING ACTIVITIES
1. Select a topic with which you are familiar. Create four arguments for that topic corre-
sponding to the four types of claims: fact, definition, value, and policy. For each unit of
argument provide and label each of the following elements: grounds, warrant, backing,
and claim. When you have finished, examine your arguments. Do any of them require
qualifiers or rebuttals? If so, provide and label appropriate qualifier or rebuttal state-
ments. Concentrate on developing each part of the argument rather than on the use of
evidence in establishing the grounds, warrant, and backing.
2. Find three examples of claims in an editorial or opinion piece that use qualifiers.
Develop a complete Toulmin model of each, being sure to label all parts of the argument.
3. Find three examples of claims in an editorial or opinion piece that use rebuttals. Develop
a complete Toulmin model of each, being sure to label all parts of the argument.
4. Select an argument such as an editorial, letter to the editor, or an opinion column.
Complete the following:
a. In a single sentence, state the proposition for argument.
b. Identify the contentions used in developing the proposition and the claims used to
develop each contention.
c. Classify these claims as to type: fact, definition, value, or policy.
d. Of the parts of argument, identify those the author uses, and those left to the read-
er to supply.
5. Classify the following claims as to type, and identify those claims that use qualifiers, re-
buttals, or both. Be sure to identify the parts of the claim statement that serve as quali-
fier or rebuttal.
a. Argumentation is the process of arriving at conviction through the use of reason.
b. For good performance through a severe winter, front-wheel-drive vehicles are best.
c. Most restrictions on trade and imports will not solve America’s economic problems.
d. Discretion is the better part of valor.
e. Evolution and Creationism are opposing theories of the development of life on Earth.
f. Professional sports just aren’t the same now that many players are paid such
huge salaries.
g. If you want to develop confidence in your ability to communicate with others, take
a public-speaking course.
h. We should intervene in the affairs of Central American nations, because they are
geographically close to the United States.
i. Laughter is the best medicine.
j. White tigers are a separate strain of Bengal tigers with recessive genetic character-
istics that cause their white coat and blue eyes.
k. In the absence of more equitable proposals, many Americans favor a policy of flat
rate taxes.
l. For those who would gain insights into the future, study the past.
References 101
REFERENCES
Brockriede, W. E., & Ehninger, D. E. (1960). Toulmin on argument: An interpretation and
application. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 46, 44–53.
Ehninger, D. E. (1974). Influence, belief, and argument. Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman.
Forest protection initiatives and national forest policy. (2001, October 2). Washington, DC:
Subcommittee on Public Lands and Forest of the Committee on Energy and National
Resources, U.S. Senate.
Golden, J. L., Berquist, G. F., Coleman, W. E., Sproule, M. J., & Golden, R. (2007). The
rhetoric of western thought (9th ed.). Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt.
Toulmin, S., Rieke, R., & Janik, A. (1984). An introduction to reasoning (2nd ed.). New
York: Macmillan.
Walsh, B. (2009, July 6). Man vs. goose. Newsweek, 173, 52–53.
CHAPTER
How Do I Prove
My Argument?
I
n some situations, proving your arguments will be a matter of drawing on your
own knowledge or that of your audience. In most situations, you will need to
research the topic thoroughly. You will need evidence, the term commonly used
to describe the grounds for an argumentative claim or the information that backs
its warrant. In this chapter, we are concerned with the discovery of evidence and
the assessment of its quality in a larger sense. By definition:
Evidence is information, taken from material of fact or opinion, used to establish the
probable truth of a claim.
The kinds of information necessary to establish the grounds or back the war-
rant in your argument are determined by your analysis of the issues in your propo-
sition. Standards for determining the quantity and quality of proof necessary for
building good units of argument result from applying accepted tests of evidence.
Because proof is the foundation of argument, you will need to learn how to dis-
cover and apply it.
THE DISCOVERY OF EVIDENCE

Your college library holds, or provides access to, most of the best available sources
for locating facts and opinions. Although we describe worthwhile electronic re-
sources you can access through your library or locate on the Internet, those musty
books and periodicals in the library still have several advantages at this point in
time. First, they provide historical background, which most electronic sources will
not. Second, they are more permanent. Third, they may be more credible. Fourth,
they are organized in a way that makes finding information much easier. In this
chapter, we consider each of these points.
When the first edition of this book came out, personal computers had only ex-
isted for a few years. When the third edition came out, the Internet was just start-
ing to spread beyond its roots as a means for government and research institutions
to share information. As we write the seventh edition, more and more information
102
that was once only physically available through libraries is becoming virtually
available online through libraries, as they respond to the constraints of cost and
space. Although some old books and periodicals have been scanned and made
available over the Web, most have not, for reasons of cost and copyright (Mann,
2005), although even that is changing to a certain extent. Because one of your re-
sponsibilities as an arguer is to know the historical background of your topic, the
library remains the ideal place to begin your research.
The reason some of the books and periodicals in your library have gotten
musty is that they have been there for a long time. When thoughtless students
tear pages out of periodicals, Interlibrary Loan can be used to order a copy of the
missing article if it is too old to be available online in full text form. If you have
done much Web surfing, you know that Web sites change addresses, sometimes
vanish completely, or as we learned while working on this edition, not contain
something you expect to be there. In Chapter 4, we mentioned an article in
Newsweek by Cathleen McGuigan about the museum that piqued renewed inter-
est in the dispute over ownership of the Parthenon Marbles. As subscribers, we
had read it shortly after the print version of that issue arrived in our mailbox. A
year later, we wanted to add the article to this edition’s electronic clip file with-
out having to scan it. We could not find it on Newsweek’s Web site. Granted,
paper deteriorates with age, and your library could burn down, but even taking
these factors into account, your library is still a more permanent repository of
knowledge than the Web.
In Chapter 5, we discussed the general concerns you should have about the in-
formation you use to ground your claims. Foremost among these are accuracy and
recency. Although there are unfortunate examples of reporters faking stories and
scientists fudging their data, such cases are the exception, not the rule. Moreover,
we are aware of them because the fakery was exposed and often reported in the
same publication that carried the original report. The Web, on the other hand, em-
powers anyone with an opinion and access to act as publisher, so you need to be
very cautious about who created the sites you visit and whether the information
they contain is biased or even baseless (Jacobson & Cohen, 1997). Ironically, a
good place to go to learn how to do this is located on the Web. Practically every li-
brary now has pages on its Web site that discuss how to evaluate material you find
on the Internet. A particularly good one, which is referenced frequently by other li-
braries, is maintained by Widener University at http://www.widener.edu/libraries/
wolfgram/evaluate/originaleval.asp. It includes both an online tutorial and check-
lists for evaluating various types of Web sites.
Web sites fall into six categories. Some sites try to influence opinion or pro-
mote a cause, while others promote a product. Some sites try to entertain us, while
personal pages exist for the idiosyncratic reasons of those who post them. Some
sites provide factual information about a person, place, or thing, while others
focus on bringing us the latest news. A site’s Web address or uniform resources lo-
cator (URL) sometimes helps you determine what type of site it is (Radford,
Barnes, & Barr, 2006), and sometimes it does not. Domain names can help, but
that is not always the case.
Because whoever registered a domain name first gets to use it regardless of their
purpose, you will find anomalies like www.martinlutherking.org, a site designed to
104 CHAPTER 6 How Do I Prove My Argument?
discredit Dr. King, which is analyzed in the tutorial on Widener’s Web site. Jane
Armour Polly (2001) provides another revealing example in the story of:
a 14-year old student writing a paper on the Holocaust. In an Internet search for the
word Zykion, a poison used in Nazi gas chambers, he found a reasonable looking arti-
cle by Arthur R. Butz, a professor at Northwestern University (pubweb.acns.nwu.edu/
~abutz/di/intro.html), which explains away the “legend” of the Holocaust. Although
it’s true that the essay was written by an academic, Butz is a professor of engineering,
not history. (p. 56)
The .edu domain may suggest a site has scholarly credibility or is an official school
publication, but schools usually allow faculty and even students to post personal
pages often indicated by a tilde (~) somewhere in the address. Although the URL in
this example is no longer valid, the point about exercising care in attributing cred-
ibility is.
Both examples are consciously chosen because they are so transparent, to
make a point. Circumstances surrounding Dr. King’s life and the Holocaust are so
well known that most who would accept the “facts” communicated by these sites
would do so for reasons of personal ideology rather than naiveté. In argumenta-
tion, you frequently are doing research to learn about something you know little or
nothing about, so you must be extremely cautious about what you find on most
Web sites. As Dan Brown’s fictional Harvard professor Robert Langdon is fond of
saying, “‘Google’ is not a synonym for ‘research’” (2009, p. 98).
Finally, the information in your library is better organized than most of the in-
formation you can access on the Internet. This makes it easier to find what you are
looking for. A working knowledge of how your library is organized, as well as the
assistance the reference staff can give you, will save time and frustration in your
search for proof. It helps to get to know your library’s organizational system and
make the acquaintance of the reference librarian. The sources of information de-
scribed in this section are available in most college libraries.
The resources of the reference section in the library can be discovered through
guides that provide bibliographies of reference materials. American Reference
Books Annual has been published yearly since 1970. You can also access it, along
with more than 190,000 other books, online at www.netlibrary.com if your library
is one of the more than 71,000 libraries currently affiliated with the netLibrary
system. American Reference Books Annual provides detailed explanations of such
reference resources as dictionaries, general encyclopedias, specialty encyclopedias,
English-language references from foreign countries, abstracts, indexes, and other
reference material. It covers new editions of older references and annually de-
scribes references published in serial form.
A couple of paperback books that every college student should own are The
Oxford University Guide to Library Research by Thomas Mann and Web
Research: Selecting, Evaluating, and Citing by Marie Radford, Susan Barnes,
and Linda Barr. Mann’s book primarily discusses how to locate all types of ma-
terial found in a library, although it does discuss virtual libraries. The book by
Radford and her colleagues is an up-to-date source about the rapidly changing
world of the Internet. For other sources, consult the card catalog, which is now
computerized in most libraries, and search under the subject heading “reference—
bibliography.”
Subject Heading Searches

The quickest way to find information is to start with the “red books.” This five-
volume set of the Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH) helps you find the
precise terms to look under in searching the card catalog and other sources. These
terms are also used to index most periodicals, although most indexes to serial pub-
lications go beyond this tightly controlled vocabulary.
Suppose you were looking for information about the lottery. Turning to the
2007 edition of the LCSH, you would find this:
Lotteries (May Subd Geog)
[HG6105—HG6270.9]
BT Gambling
—Advertising
USE Advertising—lotteries
—Employees
NT Lottery ticket vendors
—Law and legislation (May Subd Geog)
You now know to search under the subject heading of “Lotteries.” Singulars and
plurals make a big difference in the LCSH system. “(May Subd Geog)” means that
place names may follow the heading, so you could search for “Lotteries—
Michigan,” for example. “BT” stands for “broader term,” so looking under
“Gambling” might turn up some useful information. “NT” stands for “narrower
term.” “USE” tells you that information on lottery advertising can be found under the
subject “Advertising—lotteries” rather than “Lotteries—advertising.”“[HG6105—
HG6270.9]” is the range of class numbers in which books representing the most com-
mon aspect of this subject are classified. If your library has open stacks, you could
browse to your heart’s content.
Books
Books, nonfiction (unless you are arguing about literature), are a valuable source
of evidence for argumentation. Your library’s electronic card catalog lists all books
available in its collection. Unless you are looking for the work of a specific author
or know the title of the book you wish to locate, begin your search using the sub-
ject index. If you were a student at our university and searched under the subjects
“Lotteries” and “United States,” you would find a 2001 book, Governing
Gambling, and a 2004 book, Gambling Politics: State Government and the
Business of Betting, among others. However, before running to get them before
anyone else checks them out, you should check the tracings.
Tracings appear toward the bottom of a card in the physical catalog or an
electronic record. They tell you what subjects the book is catalogued under. This
may not seem like a big deal, because you already found both of them under
“Lotteries—United States.” According to the tracings, you can also find the first
book by searching under subjects such as “Gambling—Law and legislation—
United States,” “Casinos—Law and legislation—United States,” and “Indians of
North America—Gambling.” Also, the second book can be found by searching
under “Lotteries—Government Policy—United States,” among other things. You
now have other subject areas to explore. If you look on the back of the title page
of this book, where the Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data are,
you will discover that you can find other books on argumentation by searching
under headings like “Persuasion” and “Debates and debating.”
Books are useful because they usually provide a more comprehensive treat-
ment of a subject than a periodical or newspaper has space to provide. They pro-
vide historical background on a topic but have limitations. First, books have the
disadvantage of quickly becoming outdated sources of fact and opinion. The
process of researching, writing, revising, and publishing a single volume may span
several years. In that time, the factual basis of the book may become dated or su-
perseded by new discoveries. Second, your library may have only a limited num-
ber of books on your topic, so you may be unable to find the quantity of informa-
tion you had hoped. You can overcome this problem by determining if your
library can provide access to the material in electronic form or by using the re-
sources of other libraries through Interlibrary Loan. If your library is part of such
a system and is one of the more than 10,000 libraries that are part of the
WorldCat system, you may be surprised how many books are available on your
subject. Even if it is not, the books that are available in your library will be a good
place to begin. If you require an abundance of up-to-the-minute information, you
must seek it from other sources.
Before discussing these further, it is important to mention a few electronic li-
braries that might be useful. The Library of Congress is arguably the finest library
in the world, and it has a resource-rich Web site (www.loc.gov/index.html). It
contains a database of bibliographies in science, technology, and the social sci-
ences, a series of electronic books on various countries, and much more. The
merger of the Internet Public Library with the Librarian’s Internet Index has re-
sulted in ipl2 (www.ipl.org). Hosted by the College of Information Science and
Technology at Drexel University, it catalogs electronic almanacs, census data, dic-
tionaries, encyclopedias, books, magazines, newspapers, and special collections.
States have also become actively involved in providing resources to their citizens.
For example, the Michigan Electronic Library (www.mel.org) provides access to a
wide variety of materials.
Periodicals
Periodicals offer access to current fact and opinion and may offer it in quantity.
Because they are so numerous and varied, it is impossible to generalize about
which periodicals will be of most value to you in preparing to argue. Consulting
one of the reference guides mentioned earlier will help you find the ones most per-
tinent to your topic. A good place to begin is The Reader’s Guide to Periodical
Literature, which is now available in electronic form. It indexes what are com-
monly termed popular periodicals such as Time, Newsweek, and US News and
World Report. It indexes by subject heading, so the techniques and terms you used
in mastering the electronic card catalog can be applied here. A search under
“Lotteries” would turn up articles like “Turning the Lottery Loose” in the
September 2008 issue of Governing, which deals with the approaches states have
taken to increase lottery revenues.
The Reader’s Guide has one important limitation. It does not reference many
scholarly journals or special interest publications. Because the credibility of mate-
rial from these sources is often greater, you will need to examine specialty indexes.
Most college libraries have a number of indexes to scholarly or special interest pe-
riodicals such as:
Applied Science and Technology Inde
Biological and Agricultural Index
Business Periodical Index
Education Index
General Science Index
Humanities Index
Index to Legal Periodicals and Books
Social Science Index
The difference between these indexes and The Reader’s Guide is in what they do,
not how they do it. Like The Reader’s Guide, indexing is by subject, and many
now are available in electronic form or have electronic equivalents.
Do not assume a single index adequately covers your subject. If you were
looking for information on the environment and conservation, you could produc-
tively examine the Applied Science and Technology Index (which covers 700 ti-
tles), the Biological and Agricultural Index (which covers 375), and the General
Science Index (which covers 280) without a lot of overlap. Also, do not forget that
the same subject may be approached from different disciplines. Searching for
“Lotteries” in ERIC, an education index, yields “Maximizing State Lottery
Dollars for Public Education: An Analysis of Current State Lottery Models” in the
Fall 2007 issue of the Journal of Educational Research & Policy Studies, which
looks at differences in the way states allocate lottery revenues and identifies the
characteristics that make the process more efficient. The Business Periodicals
Index turns up articles such as “States Use Tough Times to Tout Their Lotteries” in
the October 6, 2008, issue of Advertising Age, which describes how states come up
with different marketing strategies, including using social-networking sites like
Facebook, to boost play. The Social Science Index would help you find articles like
“Gambling at Lucky Stores: Empirical Evidence from State Lottery Sales” in the
March 2008 issue of The American Economic Review, which analyzes where peo-
ple choose to buy their lottery tickets.
Something that distinguishes scholars and effective arguers from plagiarists is
that they are meticulous in documenting their sources. Thus, if you find a recent
article in a scholarly journal that is exceptionally useful to you, you can use its ref-
erence list as a guide to other things you might want to read. But suppose you are
aware of a seminal piece of research that was done a decade or more ago and you
want to see how others have built on this work—what would you do? You could
turn to the Social Science Citation Index or the Arts and Humanities Citation
Index or the Science Citation Index (whichever is relevant to your subject) to dis-
cover later works that have referenced this work. Learning to work with citation
indexes is a bit more complicated than indexes based on subject heading described
earlier, so consult a reference librarian or pick up a printed guide that many li-
braries have available to get a handle on the process.
Newspapers
Not all college libraries offer current and back issues of a wide variety of newspa-
pers, but your library will certainly have one or more major newspapers from your
state and some national newspapers such as The New York Times. The latter is an
excellent source of material, not only because of its reputation but also because it
is indexed. This newspaper prints the text of major speeches, Supreme Court deci-
sions, and documents such as the Pentagon papers. Articles are available for free at
www.nytimes.com. If your library has a service like Access World News, you can
access articles in other excellent newspapers, many of which have established Web
sites that are searchable by keyword.
Keyword searches differ from subject searches in that the vocabulary is totally
free. You could search for the name of your favorite lottery game as a keyword and
only see those articles that use it in the title and/or mention it in the article, de-
pending on how the search engine is configured. Searching by keyword also means
that you will turn up all articles that use the word lottery, even those unrelated to
your area of interest. For example, the National Basketball Association uses a lot-
tery system to determine the order in which teams with the worst records every
year draft new players. You can find the Internet addresses of newspapers, maga-
zines, radio and television stations that have Web sites at www.newslink.org. Just
remember, sometimes the back issues do not go back very far in cyberspace, and
some sites charge for access to their electronic archives.
Access World News, a product of NewsBank, Inc., obviates the need to do this
by reproducing articles from over two thousand U.S. and international newspa-
pers, and a number of other print sources. NewsBank was originally indexed by
topic, with articles provided on microfiche. The index and articles moved first to
CD-ROM in 1986, and are now available over the Internet via Access World
News. Searching for the term lottery produces articles such as “‘Destroyed’ by
Addiction” in the April 28, 2010, issue of The Morning Call (Allentown, PA) and
“States Face Drop in Gambling Revenues” in the September 10, 2009, edition of
The New York Times. You can guess from the titles that the second story would
probably be more useful than the first in building arguments about what lotteries
will or will not be able to do for public education. The first story suggests another
possible line of argument about state lotteries.
Government Documents
If you are interested in nutrition, how to prepare an income tax return, or treaty re-
strictions on foreign trade, the federal government has probably published one or
more documents on the subject. Texts of the hearings of major and minor congres-
sional committees, information bulletins, treaties and agreements, all proceedings of
legislative bodies, and the like are contained between the covers of government doc-
uments, indexed in the Catalog of U.S. Government Publication (catalog.gpo.gov/).
For information on recently published federal documents or court decisions,
visit the Government Printing Office (www.gpoaccess.gov/). You can also use this
site to obtain information from various federal agencies, such as a December 2002
report by the General Accounting Office, Internet Gambling: An Overview of the
Issues requested by the Subcommittees on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit, and Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Financial

Services. A useful portal to millions of pages of information spanning all branches
of government is www.firstgov.gov. You can even use it to apply for a student loan
or a passport, check out lottery results, or find out what is being done to curb
drinking on college campuses.
The Congressional Record, also available through www.gpoaccess.gov/, is a
particularly good source for topics on public policy. It is issued daily (while
Congress is in session) and provides complete transcripts of congressional debates
and presidential messages. It also includes other materials such as letters pertaining
to business before Congress that a legislator wants made part of the official record.
Fact Books, Encyclopedias, and Other Resources

A variety of sources that compile statistics and other factual information are avail-
able in the reference section of your college library. These sources compile infor-
mation in condensed form and are organized for quick access. The Statistical
Abstract of the United States and the World Almanac provide statistical informa-
tion on such subjects as population, demographic characteristics and change,
transportation, agriculture, trade, mining, national and international banking, en-
ergy use, and more. By looking in the 2010 edition of the Statistical Abstract, you
would learn that in 2008 states took in over $77.3 billion dollars from lotteries
and disbursed over $18.1 billion in proceeds after paying the cost of prizes and ad-
ministration. These sources are updated annually, and the Statistical Abstract has
been available online at www.census.gov/compendia/statab/ since 1995.
Dictionaries and encyclopedias can also provide valuable information. We are
not talking about Webster’s or Wiktionary here; we are referring to specialized re-
search tools, such as the Dictionary of American History or the Encyclopedia of
Education, that provide introductions to a variety of fields. Suppose you have
started reading some of the material on the use of lottery profits to fund education
and are confused by terminology such as “state equalization valuation.” You are
not sure what a “bond issue” is or what it does. The Encyclopedia of Education
has hundreds of articles written with you, the nonspecialist, in mind, including two
that explain how public education on the university and K–12 level is financed in
this country. To see if there are such works in the area you are researching, do a
subject search for “Subject—Dictionaries and encyclopedias,” where “Subject” is
an LCSH category like “Education.”
Your library probably contains several sources of biographical information
that can be used to discover the credentials of authorities and experts. A particu-
larly good source is Current Biography Yearbook. In its seventh decade of publica-
tion, it provides biographical articles about living leaders in all fields worldwide,
which are updated yearly.
Your library also probably contains several sources of bibliographical infor-
mation. If someone else has already compiled a list of sources on the subject you
are researching, why not take advantage of it? Search under the heading of your
primary “Subject—Bibliography” or “Bibliography—bibliography:” As with
“Dictionaries and encyclopedias,” “Bibliography” is one of the standard LCSH
subheadings. A quick search of “Lotteries—Bibliography” turned up nothing, so
we tried the broader term “Gambling” and discovered that in 2002 the Michigan
Legislative Service Bureau compiled a seven-page bibliography on gambling for the

state legislature. Because our library is a Michigan documents depository, we
would be able to lay our hands on it without having to resort to Interlibrary Loan.
If your library provides access to the Bibliographic Index Plus, the online successor
to the Bibliographic Index, see whether anything on your subject is available.
Depending on where you are, other bibliographies on the subject might be more or
less easily accessible.
Another resource is the Reference Shelf and its electronic sibling Reference
Shelf Plus. It treats topics in much the same way as arguers do by presenting pro-
and-con positions on a topic. Each volume is devoted to a single topic on a subject
of public interest and contains reprints of articles, excerpts from books, and opin-
ions of experts. Volume 64, number 4, in 1995 was devoted to gambling. Although
none of the articles were specific to lotteries (addressing general issues such as
problem gambling instead), some of the sources in the annotated bibliography
were specific to lotteries. Reference Shelf suffers the same limitations of becoming
outdated as do all other printed materials, but it does provide valuable sources of
information. The series, which began in 1922, can be an excellent source of histor-
ical background information on how Americans have perceived many issues. Just
turn to volume 23, number 6, from 1952, which also addresses the subject of gam-
bling, to see how things have changed.
The foregoing is by no means a complete list of available reference sources—
just some suggestions to get you started. To discover what else is available, browse
through the reference section of your library, consult the librarian assigned to that
section, or experiment with the various computerized services available in your li-
brary. As you become more experienced, the process will get easier. We want to
reemphasize that developing a good working knowledge of your library and its
electronic resources is the first step in the discovery of evidence.
TYPES AND TESTS OF EVIDENCE

As our definition of evidence suggests, there are two general classes of evidence:
fact and opinion. Equally, there are two sources of evidence: your own observa-
tions and the recorded observations of others. The most reliable source of evidence
is personal observation and experimentation. Consider the experience of buying a
new car. “Which car should I buy?” can become a question that may ultimately
lead to argumentation on a policy proposition.
That proposition might be argued through a number of fact and value claims
about the quantifiable performance and qualitative evaluations of a series of auto-
mobiles. The most reliable evidence would be obtained through your own road
tests of these vehicles. However, even in something as personal as buying a new car,
performing your own tests is not always feasible. You may not have the time or
ability to conduct as sophisticated a series of tests as those reported in Road &
Track or AutoWeek. Beyond saving time, relying on printed sources relieves you of
the need to be an expert in a number of fields. Additionally, it is often advanta-
geous to add the credibility of expert opinion or research to your own ideas. By
using published facts and the opinions of sources that are “in the know,” you
strengthen your argument and increase the credibility of its rational appeal.
Evidence of Fact
Facts are those things that can be verified to be true or false. By verification we mean
observation. We believe something because of our own observation or because of the
observations of others, whose ability to make such an observation we respect.
Factual evidence is information obtained from direct or indirect observation. Factual evi-
dence describes or reports what exists—events, objects, places, persons, or phenomena.
Factual evidence does not attempt to explain or evaluate; it merely reports

what was observed. Direct factual evidence is observed by the arguer. Indirect
factual evidence is obtained from the reported observations of others. Indirect
evidence is used more frequently than direct evidence in many fields of argument,
except for the field of law. Because we live in an age of relatively easy access to
a variety of published materials, using evidence obtained from the research
of others has almost as much validity as evidence obtained through our own
observations.
Examples and Illustrations. A report or description of events and phenomena that

tells us what was observed in a given situation constitutes either an example or il-
lustration. This type of evidence may be a brief statement, such as:
A Bethlehem woman charged with stealing nearly $69,000 from her employer to fuel
her addiction to scratch-off lottery tickets “feels horrible” about her actions, her attor-
ney testified. (Lehman, 2010)
An assistant manager at a CVS pharmacy in Palo Alto was arrested in connection
with the theft of 268 packets of Scratchers lotto tickets worth $73,200, lottery investi-
gators said. (“CVS employee,” 2010)
A Sioux Falls man who cashed in fraudulent video lottery tickets for $2,700 is
headed to prison. Jake E. Collins, 28, pleaded guilty. . . . Authorities say Collins used
computer software to print out the fake tickets, which were slightly narrower than au-
thentic tickets. (Waltman, 2010)
Lazaro Morales-Alcala presented his scratch-off ticket, hoping to claim a $500
prize. The ticket looked like a winner but didn’t scan in as one . . . because Morales-
Alcala . . . altered a losing ticket, using a pen to turn a 4 into a 14. (Poltilove, 2010)
Or this evidence can be a longer, more detailed description.

Like many family members, close friends, and even co-workers, 84-year-old
Theresa Sokaitis and her 87-year-old sister, Rose Bakaysa, went to casinos and played
the lottery together and shared their winnings. In fact, they signed a contract to that
effect in 1995. When Theresa sued Rose for what she felt was her share of a $500,000
Powerball jackpot, Connecticut Superior Court Judge Cynthia K. Swienton’s ruling,
that Rose didn’t have to share with her sister, attracted national attention.
Whether the sisters were gambling partners at the time that the Powerball numbers . . .
hit on June 18, 2005, was a key issue in the . . . case.
Both women testified . . . they stuck to the contract for nearly a decade ... until a
fight . . . about a year before the Powerball jackpot. The fight . . . was about a $250
loan Bakaysa had made to Sokaitis.
When Sokaitis said she didn’t have the money to pay her sister back, “it is quite be-
lievable that the conversation became heated, and Terry said, as Rose testified, ‘I don’t
want to be your partner anymore,’ at which point Rose agreed, saying, ‘okay,’ ”
Swienton wrote.
Swienton said the behavioral changes that occurred support Bakaysa’s position that
there was a heated argument. . . . From that day on, . . . the sisters never bought lottery
tickets together, went to the casinos together or gambled together. (Griffin, 2010)
These two reports differ in both subject matter and degree of detail. The ex-
amples of employee theft and attempts to cash bogus lottery tickets present brief,
specific instances of criminal behavior. The more detailed account of how a large
lottery jackpot only served to exacerbate a deteriorating family relationship is
longer and more informative and possesses the characteristics of an illustration.
Although examples have the virtue of being time efficient because of their brevity,
illustrations can draw the reader or listener into the imagery associated with the
story they tell about a person, place, or event. As such, a good illustration embod-
ies the principles of narrative, as discussed by Walter Fisher (1984). Some have ar-
gued that such narratives have the ability to enlighten readers and listeners in ways
other forms of evidence cannot because they humanize that which is being de-
scribed (McDonald & Jarman, 1998; Taylor & Jarvis, 2000).
In addition to recognizing the various types of evidence, we must be able to
evaluate its reliability. In addition to a general concern for reliability, quality, con-
sistency, and audience acceptability of the grounds for any argument (as discussed
in Chapter 5), specific tests need to be applied to each type of evidence. These tests
of evidence establish the standards our proof must meet before it will be accepted
as credible by our listeners and readers.
Tests of Examples and Illustrations. These tests concern the observations made
and ask specific questions about the accuracy and reliability of the report and the
reporter, as follows:
Source Qualifications. Was the observer capable of making the observation in terms of
the necessary physical and mental ability? A blind witness, for example, may have
difficulty describing an automobile accident but may be able to describe minute
variations in the sound of an automobile engine. Did the observer have the train-
ing and experience necessary to make the observation? Someone who has never
driven, for instance, will have difficulty in describing the differences in handling
between a front-wheel-drive and a rear-wheel-drive car.
Data Accuracy. Is the information reported in a straightforward manner, or has it

been manipulated to give it more or less importance? Some of the early reporting on
the evidence found at the scene of the murder of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald
Goldman stated that the police discovered a ski mask, which later turned out to be
a hat. Although this is an example of a lapse of accuracy (which was discovered and
corrected), the early reports made the object the police had found seem more sinis-
ter than it actually was. Because information may be interpreted by the source re-
porting it, you must take care in checking the reliability of the interpretation.
Originality of Observation. Is the source’s information obtained from firsthand or second-

hand data collection? It is possible to make observations on the basis of someone
else’s data, but more reliable reports of fact are obtained from firsthand observation.
This does not mean that you should never rely on a source that reports secondary in-
formation, because in some situations collecting data firsthand is difficult.
Recency of Observation. In general, the more recent the information, the more reliable
it will be. Some things remain relatively stable over time; however, many things do
not. In using examples and illustrations taken from the reports of others, the re-
cency with which the reporter made the observation can be very important. How
easy is it for you to remember what happened last week or last month? The time
that passes between when an observation is made, and when it is reported serves as
an additional filter through which a reporter’s account must pass. Arguments deal-
ing with economic matters are a classic example of the need for up-to-date infor-
mation. You need only examine the economic history of the United States over the
past decade to appreciate how much the Dow Jones average may vary in a short
period of time, with accompanying observations by pundits about how the bulls
and bears are running on Wall Street.
Attitude of the Observer. Ideally, the best sources of factual reports should have a neu-
tral attitude toward what they are observing. Because each person sees the world
through unique perceptual filters, such factors as prejudice, emotion, and ambition
may color the reporting of facts. Thus, a final test of examples and illustrations
concerns reporters’ attitudes toward what they are reporting. Try to find unbiased
reports framed in relatively neutral language.
Statistics. Statistics present descriptive and inferential information about people,

events, or phenomena in a numeric format. While an example often describes peo-
ple, events, or phenomena in isolation, statistics can place such information in con-
text. This gives the reader or listener a sense of the significance of the thing
described. The following is an example of a descriptive statistic, one in which the en-
tire population of people, events, or phenomena of a particular kind are observed.
Currently, Missouri spends $1.3 million on ads, less than any of the 43 other states with
lotteries and a fraction of the $8.2 million that Missouri spent on ads eight years ago. . . .
Lottery sales slid 2.7 percent last year and are down about 1 percent so far this fis-
cal year. With beefed-up ads, the lottery predicts it could generate $259 million for ed-
ucation on sales of about a billion dollars next year. (Young, 2010)
Descriptive statistics can be reported in any number of ways. Averages or per-

centages are sometimes used to reduce raw numbers to more manageable form and
to provide standards for comparing one group of people, events, or phenomena to
another. Although percentages are used to describe the decrease in lottery revenue
in this example, the amount spent on advertising is discussed in terms of raw num-
bers. This example demonstrates something that is important to remember about
using statistical information: the statistics must be interpretable. That is why
Virginia Young, a staff writer for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, compares what
Missouri currently spends on lottery advertising to what other states spend, and
what Missouri used to spend less than a decade earlier.
Not all statistics are descriptive of what happens in an entire population of peo-
ple, events, or phenomena. An inferential statistic is one in which data concerning a
portion, or sample, of the entire population of a particular kind are observed, and the
researcher infers that what is true of the sample is true of the population from which
it was drawn. The Florida Lottery has engaged the services of a marketing firm, Ipsos-
Reid, to help it avoid declining sales. The firm developed a profile of lottery players
who fall into one of six categories, three of which comprise slightly more than half the
state’s population but only buy about six percent of all tickets sold.
Indifferent jackpot dabblers comprise almost one fourth of the population, and
are the folks who only play when jackpots on games like Lotto or Powerball get
very high. Another quarter of the state’s population is almost equally divided be-
tween Concerned followers and Prohibitionists, who both see gambling as harmful
and wonder whether the people who play can afford to do so. What differentiates
these groups is that Concerned followers play what little they do because they be-
lieve lottery profits support worthwhile causes, while Prohibitionists have a moral
opposition to gambling. The remaining three groups are comprised of:
Upscale gamers: 20 percent of the population accounts for 28 percent of lottery sales. . . .
[They] have higher incomes and education levels . . . are competitive, experimental and
comfortable with technology.
Thrill-seeking dreamers: 13 percent of the population accounts for 50 percent of
lottery sales. . . . Middle-income earners with slightly lower education levels . . . They
have the most play on all games, especially scratch-offs and daily games.
Conflicted players: 16 percent of the population accounts for 16 percent of lottery
spending. . . . Educated [with] the second-highest income level. . . . [They] have con-
cerns about gaming and think the government is too dependent on it. (Taylor, 2010)
Firms like Ipsos-Reid regularly conduct market research, something Gary

Taylor, a staff writer for The Orlando Sentinel, mentions in his article. Researchers
asked a sample of Florida residents questions about themselves and the lottery and
used their responses to identify different types of players and what distinguishes
them from each other. Percentages are an inferential statistic in this instance, that
what is true of the sample of lottery players is true of the state’s population as a
whole, whereas the percentage decline in Missouri lottery sales is descriptive of
what is actually the case based on total sales figures.
Regardless of whether statistical information is descriptive or inferential, it
can be misleading. Means, medians, and modes are different terms used to describe
the central tendency of a set of numerical data. The mean is the arithmetic average
of a set of numbers, the median is the middle score in that set, and the mode is the
score that occurs most frequently. Given the following data—98, 57, 23, 11, and
11—a source could report its mean to be 40, its median as 23, or its mode to be 11.
When a source reports results as an average, that term properly refers only to the
mean, but the writer may have misapplied it to the median or mode of a set of
data. Be sure you understand what kind of statistics your sources are using to
avoid misleading your audience.
Tests of Statistical Evidence. These tests reflect our concern with verifying the re-
liability of our evidence. Statistics furnish us with an economical form of proof on
a variety of subjects, but they are more prone to distortion and misrepresentation
than other forms of proof. Statistical proof has a certain psychological appeal. The
use of numbers seems somehow more credible, but you must take care that your
statistics come from credible sources. Consider the following:
Source Reliability. The first test of statistics is to identify the source of the informa-
tion. Certain agencies and institutions are in the business of gathering statistics.
The U.S. Bureau of the Census, for example, may be regarded as a highly credible
source of demographic information about the United States. The U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics might be regarded as a worthy source regarding information on
employment.
Statistical Accuracy. In addition to knowing who collected the information, we also

want to know how it was collected. Statistical information is frequently collected
by sampling techniques. Did the counting procedure fairly select a representative
sample? If a statistic claims to representatively sample the entire country, it
should draw information from each state or region. Along with the process of
data collection, accuracy is also influenced by the length of time during which
data were collected. Conditions change, and it would be a gross misrepresenta-
tion to claim, based on statistics for December reporting a drop in inflation, that
inflation went down last year if inflation increased during the months January
through November.
Comparable Units. Statistics frequently inform through comparisons, so it is impor-

tant for the units being compared to be really comparable. Common sense dictates
that we cannot compare airplanes and microwave ovens, because they do not have
enough in common to render such a comparison meaningful. The same caution is
necessary when dealing in statistical comparisons, because statistics can appear to
have been gathered on comparable entities. For instance, if you want to argue
about technology in industrialized societies before citing statistical information
about the use of robotics in Canada, the United States, and Japan, be sure the term
robotics has been defined in the same way by the agencies that compile each na-
tion’s statistics.
Artifacts. Actual exhibits of objects, audiotapes or videotapes, or photographs

presented for verification by the audience are termed artifacts. If you have ever
watched Court TV or a courtroom drama on television, you are familiar with the
use of artifacts as evidence. In a courtroom, artifacts or exhibits constitute “real”
evidence, as distinguished from the testimony provided by witnesses. The use of ar-
tifacts as evidence enhances argumentation on certain topics.
The New York Lottery introduced a five-dollar scratch-off game with a black
ticket and “gold detail, a look borrowed from the 1970s Lotus Formula 1 race cars
that [New York Lottery Director Gordon] Medenica once idolized. ‘The black
American Express card, Johnny Walker Black: These were all the images we were
trying to get in our mind,’ he said.” This sort of upscale look is unusual for
scratch-off games whose tickets “often resemble pinball machines . . . cluttered,
loud, peppered with explosions, stars, or bulbous bags of cash” (Grynbaum,
2010). Advertising for New York Lottery Black featured oversized images of the
ticket alone, or on a silver platter. The effectiveness of this use of an artifact in an
advertising campaign with a budget half the size of what is normally the case is
seen in the fact that New York Lottery Black tickets sold more quickly than all but
one other five-dollar game.
Tests of Artifacts. These tests are usually performed by having the audience em-
ploy their own senses. There are only two tests of artifacts to consider:
Artifact Genuineness. In an age when the ability to edit audiotapes and videotapes has
benefited from astonishing technological advances, the authentication of artifacts
used as evidence is a concern. Artifacts should be tested to determine their authen-
ticity. Has a document or photograph been altered? The photographic and audio-
tape evidence supporting the claim that Elvis Presley is still alive offers a clear indi-
cation of the importance of document authentication.
Artifact Representativeness. Artifacts are often used in value arguments concerning the
worth of a product. Because it is usually impossible to examine all examples of a
given item, a representative sample is used. When confronted by a large luscious
hamburger in a television commercial, you probably ask yourself why it is not typ-
ical of the burgers you get at the local fast-food emporium. What you are applying
is a test of the representativeness of the video burger as an artifact.
Premises. Factual evidence that is accepted because it reflects human belief or ex-
perience is termed a premise. There are some statements, which may technically be
considered claims, that are so widely believed to be true that they are accepted as
fact without further verification. A premise is accepted because there are many
previously recorded or reported instances of its being true. Premises are discovered
through your own observation of people’s statements about what they believe or
from print and electronic sources of information and opinion.
Laws of nature, such as “Water seeks its own lowest level,” and rules of
thumb or folk wisdom, such as “Monkey see, monkey do,” tend to be accepted.
Because premises are predictions or projections based on experience, they can be
verified like facts of other kinds. In theory, an audience could suspend belief until
a premise is verified. A premise is an expressed belief of those in a field and is used
as proof to save time and effort. When you can predict which premises an audience
will accept, it becomes unnecessary to verify them. Nevertheless, those learning ar-
gumentation should verify premises by providing the warrant and its backing.
Even those experienced in argumentation should follow this suggestion.
Tests of Premises. Because our belief in any premise is based on another prem-
ise—the notion that our ability to predict the future can be safely based on what
we have observed in the past or present—all premises must be tested on two levels.
First, is the underlying premise that we can make a valid prediction warranted in
this case, or is any future outcome independent of what we have observed in the
past? “A gambler usually wagers more after taking a loss, in the misguided belief
that a run of bad luck increases the probability of a win. We tend to cling to the
misconception that past events can skew future odds” (Schulman, 2002, p. 22). We
frequently fall prey to what is called the “gambler’s fallacy.”
When Lotto Texas had not hit in 47 drawings, approaching the previous
record of 48, many felt it was due, prompting Houston Chronicle staff writer
Peggy Fikac (2010) to quote San Antonio College mathematics and statistics pro-
fessor Gerald Busald: “The thing to remember is the drawings are independent
events. What’s happened in the past has no influence on what’s going to happen in
the next drawing. You have a 1-in-25.8 million chance of winning.” When lottery
jackpots soar into the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars, more people play.
That means more combinations of numbers are covered, someone hits the right
combination, and the result appears to confirm the gambler’s fallacy that the lot-
tery was due to hit.
Second, premises are valid because of the assumption that nothing will occur
to invalidate them, so is there any indication that circumstances have changed or
that our interpretation of them should change? Many people believe in “Lucky
Number Seven,” and you would be hard pressed to convince holders of winning
tickets in the Pennsylvania Lottery’s Big 4 drawing on March 31, 2010, otherwise.
When 7-7-7-7, an extremely popular combination, was drawn, the lottery paid off
to the tune of $7.77 million, 1,573 percent of sales for that drawing. Although
seven was a lucky number for the 3,107 winners, “the 7-7-7-7 combination has
come up only twice since Big 4 began in November 1980” (Mucha, 2010a).
Hardly the kind of track record that warrants a belief that the number seven car-
ries a horseshoe in its back pocket.
Many premises are the product of, or are tested by, the scientific method.
When we encounter a problem—for example, perhaps your car won’t start one
morning—we attempt to explain it. The explanation takes the form of a hypothe-
sis, a guess about what might be the source of the problem: “My car won’t start
because the battery is dead.” The hypothesis states the dependency of one thing,
the car’s ability to start, on the variability or independence of another, the level of
charge in the battery. You would test the hypothesis that the battery is dead by see-
ing if the lights, radio, or horn work. If these work, this informal measure of the
charge of your battery suggests that the hypothesis is false, and you would test
other explanations, such as blown fuses, loose wiring, or a defective starter. What
you have just done is roughly equivalent to what researchers in the physical and
social sciences do in laboratory and field settings. Published reports of their find-
ings can be used to support your claims.
Scientific Evidence. The results of controlled experiments on the inferred effect

of one variable on another is termed scientific evidence. Although the lottery
barely returns fifty cents to those who play it for every dollar they wager, the
amounts spent on tickets indicate that it is very popular. It is also known that peo-
ple who can least afford it, the poor, are avid players. A researcher might feel, for
example, that a person’s belief about his or her financial situation is subjective,
based on a comparison to what others have, and not merely a reflection of what
they earn in absolute terms. Because winning a lottery prize, even a small one, can
mean more to a poor person, that person’s subjective feeling about his or her finan-
cial situation may influence a decision to buy lottery tickets. The first variable—
the subjective sense of one’s financial situation—is called the independent variable.
Changes in it are hypothesized to produce changes in the second variable—the de-
cision to purchase lottery tickets—which is the dependent variable. A third class of
variables, nuisance variables, includes those things that could minimize or maxi-
mize the predicted effect. Examples of possible nuisance variables might be such
things as a prior history of regular lottery play; actually having some money to buy
a ticket; or the ease of finding a place to buy one.
In a laboratory experiment the researcher has some degree of control over the
manipulation of the independent variable, measurement of the dependent vari-
able, and the presence of nuisance variables. In a laboratory experiment testing
the impact of subjective feelings about income on the purchase of lottery tickets,
the researcher might manipulate the independent variable by asking people about
their income using two different response formats: one asks subjects to indicate
their income by choosing among five categories ranging from less than $10,000 to
more than $60,000 and the other with categories starting at less than $100,000
and ranging up to more than $1 million. Thinking about how to answer the in-
come question constitutes the treatment condition for the independent variable.
Subjects in the experiment would be randomly assigned to one group or the other,
unless the desire to control for variables such as race or gender requires modifying
group assignment in some way. Having the money to buy a ticket could be con-
trolled by paying subjects for completing a questionnaire about a subject unre-
lated to the experiment except for the subjective income induction and some de-
mographic questions. Offering them the option to use that money to buy lottery
tickets from the researcher, who agrees to pay off on winning tickets, controls the
vendor convenience variable. The researcher could record the number of tickets
the subjects purchased to assess the dependent variable. Finally, the researcher
would conduct the appropriate statistical test on the resulting data. The following
example reports the results of such a laboratory experiment conducted at the
Greyhound Bus Station in downtown Pittsburgh:
Participants who reported their income on a low scale (check at intervals between
$10,000 and $60,000), designed to make them feel they had a high relative income,
purchased .67 tickets on average. Participants who reported their income on a high
scale (check at intervals between $100,000 and $1,000,000), designed to make them
feel they have a low relative income, purchased 1.28 tickets on average.
The dependent variable . . . shows the marginally significant effect (p ⬍ .09) of the
induction. Chronic reflects self-reported lottery play in daily life. Not surprisingly,
chronic players purchased more tickets at a marginally significant level. After controlling
for this factor, the relative income manipulation becomes significant at the .05 level. . . .
These results support the hypothesis that inducing people to perceive that their in-
come is lower than some reference point increases their propensity to purchase lottery
tickets. This manipulation does not force an explicit social comparison and the partici-
pant is very unlikely to be aware of the manipulation, as it is embedded in other demo-
graphic questions. Despite its subtlety, however, the experimental manipulation of sub-
jective poverty has a substantial effect. Ticket purchases were nearly doubled in the low
relative income condition. Results support the idea that when people are made to feel
subjectively poor, they view the lottery as a means to correct for their low-income sta-
tus. (Haisley, Mostafa, & Lowenstein, 2008, pp. 287–289)
In a field experiment, the independent variable is frequently manipulated by the

marketplace or social forces rather than by the researcher. The researcher finds a way
to measure the dependent variable as well as find out what treatment condition the
subject has been assigned to. If a researcher was interested in determining whether
people treated for gambling problems differ from each other based on the type of
gambling, including lottery play, they sought treatment for, a field experiment might
be the logical choice. Consider the following example of a field experiment:
Subjects were drawn from a retrospective analysis of 347 consecutive admissions of in-
dividuals beginning treatment for gambling in the State of Connecticut between August
1998 and July 2000. . . .
15% of participants (n ⫽ 48) indicated lottery alone or in conjunction with
scratch tickets as the most problematic form of gambling. . . .
Differences among the groups emerged with respect to days and amounts gambled
in the month prior to entering treatment, P ⬍ 0.01. The scratch/lottery gamblers wa-
gered on more days per month than all the other groups except for the horse/dog-race
gamblers, and they gambled more frequently than the card players. The horse/dog-race
gamblers wagered the greatest amounts of money. Sports, cards and slot players wa-
gered intermediary amounts, and scratch/lottery players also bet less than the sports
gamblers. Current and life-time debts also differed across groups, P ⬍ 0.05, as did
bankruptcy rates, P ⬍ 0.05. Scratch/lottery players accumulated the least amount of
debt, while slot gamblers were most likely to file for bankruptcy. . . .
Differences among groups emerged in Gamblers Anonymous participation, P ⬍ 0.01,
with scratch/lottery players being the least likely to be involved. . . .
The five groups did not differ with respect to age of first alcohol use, but rates of
illicit drug use differed among the groups, P ⬍ 0.001, with the lottery/scratch players
reporting higher rates than most of the other groups. Substance abuse treatment histo-
ries also differed across groups, P ⬍ 0.05, with the lottery/scratch gamblers most likely
to have been treated for a substance use disorder. (Petry, 2003, pp. 647–649)
Scientific evidence used to ground an argument may not seem that different
from other types of evidence of fact or opinion. However, because it frequently em-
ploys statistical tests of significance, scientific evidence differs from other types of
evidence of fact. Its statements of direct or indirect observation carry with them an
estimate of the probability that the inferred cause–effect relationship could have been
produced by chance or coincidence. Scientific evidence differs from evidence from
opinion in that its credibility derives from the rigor of its method of observation,
rather than the prestige of the person drawing conclusions about those observations.
Tests of Scientific Evidence. These tests are primarily concerned with the appro-
priateness of the methodology used in the experiment and possible effect of the
laws of probability on its outcome. For that reason you should always understand
the methodology of any scientific evidence you use and be able to explain it to
your listeners or readers. The following three tests of scientific evidence should al-
ways be performed:
Generalizability of Setting and Subjects. Laboratory experiments offer researchers greater

control over the variables of interest than do field experiments. Some, however,
question the generalizability of laboratory findings to most settings. Many use col-
lege students who are readily available and can be induced to participate for extra
credit in a class or a small amount of money, whereas real gambling often involves
the possibility of winning a huge jackpot. “Secondly, real gambling implies the risk
of personal monetary loss whereas laboratory gambling usually does not.”
Laboratory studies of gambling often involve people who do not normally gamble,
which may “ignore personality differences and the way in which those differences
interact with the actual gambling behavior” (Walker, 1992, p. 13).
While lauding Emily Haisley and her colleagues for studying the behavior of
low-income subjects at a Greyhound bus station using actual lottery tickets, Debi A.
LaPante, Heather M. Gray, Leslie Bosworth, and Howard J. Shaffer (2010) indicate
a problem with their methodology that limits the generalizability of their findings.
We question the degree to which data derived from laboratory studies can be extrapo-
lated to “real world” settings. As outlined by Levitt and List, social scientists cannot
always assume that people will behave the same way in the laboratory as they do in the
“real world,” because nature and the scrutiny of others influence human decisions. . . .
In this study [Haisley et al, 2008], participants were still aware that their behavior was
being scrutinized. We suggest that research derived from laboratory settings should be
supplemented by studies of actual lottery play in which participants retain their
anonymity. This will allow researchers to test whether important findings derived from
contrived settings represent the behavior of “real” lottery buyers. (p. 312)
In other words, even the dullest subject would realize that the researchers were not
interested in their opinion about Pittsburgh as they were waiting to get on a bus
leaving town as soon as they offered to sell them lottery tickets.
In addition, some experiments are performed on nonhuman subjects, such as
mice or monkeys, for ethical reasons. If a certain food additive produces disease in
a laboratory animal, are we safe in inferring that it will produce the same disease
in humans? Applying these tests does not mean you should exclude all scientific ev-
idence from laboratory studies or research using nonhuman subjects. Those con-
ducting such research often address these questions in describing their methodol-
ogy and discussing the limitations of their study. You should examine the
arguments they present before dismissing their findings.
That is not to say that field experiments cannot and have not also been ques-
tioned on the grounds of generalizability.
The published success rates for problem gambling treatment programs must be treated
with caution. Problem gamblers entering treatment are not at all representative of the
full spectrum of individuals experiencing problems related to gambling. Their motiva-
tion for achieving and sustaining abstinence is much higher than for less seriously com-
promised gamblers. Published reports of treatment effectiveness are biased further by
extremely high dropout rates, common across all treatment modalities. Additionally,
there is little information about recidivism among clients in these programs. While
clients who complete treatment show substantial rates of success, it is likely that a sig-
nificant proportion of the clients who drop out of treatment return one or more times
to attempt treatment again. (Volberg, 2001, pp. 74–75)
Variable Control and Manipulation. Whether in a laboratory or a field setting, a scientific

researcher should take care to control as many of the variables that could con-
found his or her results as possible. If the researcher has reason to believe that
members of one sex may be naturally inclined to buy lottery tickets, the researcher
should make sure that members of both sexes are assigned equally to each treat-
ment condition of the independent variable. However, it is impossible to control all
possible nuisance variables. Your own investigation of a topic will give you insight
into whether the researcher attempted to control the important nuisance variables.
In addition, you should look at the independent variable and the way it is ma-
nipulated. Is it capable of influencing the dependent variable, and is it manipulated
in a meaningful way? Is the decision to buy lottery tickets with money that unex-
pectedly came your way similar to what happens when you decide to spend your
own money? Haisley et al. (2008) argue that paying people for filling out a survey
made them feel like they earned it, so the decision to buy lottery tickets represented
spending their own money. If a difference between treatment groups was found,
does the researchers’ methodology allow them to determine what probably caused
it? Fortunately, much scientific research is published in refereed journals in which
the editorial board, composed of top professionals in that field, screens and rejects
methodologically flawed submissions. It is important to know your source’s edito-
rial policy and apply some common sense.
Consistency with Other Findings. Although external consistency was discussed in general
terms with regard to the grounds for any argument, it requires special attention in
regard to scientific evidence. The conclusions of laboratory and field experiments
often rely on the application of statistical tests of significance to assess whether the
independent variable may have had an impact on the dependent variable. Reading
that “when gender differences in the SOGS [South Oaks Gambling Screen, a
widely used instrument for classifying gamblers] categories were examined there
were significantly more female recreational gamblers than male recreational gam-
blers, p ⬍ .01” (Platz & Millar, 2001, p. 387), it means there was less than one
chance in a hundred that a difference of the size the researchers observed could
have occurred by chance. Sometimes researchers state that the effect of X on Y was
significant at the 0.05 level, meaning that there are less than five chances in a hun-
dred that phenomena of the magnitude observed could have occurred by chance or
coincidence. The findings of studies in which tests of statistical significance are em-
ployed are often considered to be tentative and conditional on others repeating the
experiment and getting similar results, unless there are good reasons why the re-
sults others get might vary.
When Laurie Platz and Murray Millar (2001) discovered that according to the
SOGS, over 11 percent of the 536 subjects who participated in their study of gam-
bling by college students were pathological gamblers (a number that is roughly
twice the rate reported in most other studies), they suggested several possible ex-
planations. Because their subjects were students at the University of Nevada, Las
Vegas, they felt that the higher percentage of pathological gamblers in their sample
might be an artifact of the greater availability of opportunities to gamble offered
by Las Vegas as compared with most other college or university towns. The
authors also suggested the higher rate might have something to do with the way
they calculated their percentages.
A conservative estimate of pathological gambling prevalence . . . divides the number of

pathological gamblers in the sample by the total number of participants in the sample
(including those who have never gambled). A second method provides a more liberal esti-
mate of pathological gambling as it divides the number of pathological gamblers in the
sample by the number of participants in the sample who have actually gambled. . . . The
second and more liberal method was used. . . . The prevalence rate for pathological gam-
bling reported in this study would drop if nongamblers had been included. (pp. 391–392)
The ability to replicate is at the heart of the scientific method, and the need to
do so is the reason why researchers publish their methodology along with their re-
sults. Even in circumstances where differences in the independent variable are to-
tally unrelated to differences in the dependent variable, probability theory suggests
that if we replicated a study a hundred times, randomly selecting a new set of sub-
jects from the available population each time, our statistical test of the effect of X
on Y might yield significant results on three or four occasions. If the conclusion of
a piece of scientific evidence is inconsistent with other findings, you must be able
to account for the difference. Was a different methodology used, or have relevant
changes in the population from which samples were drawn taken place during the
intervening time between studies? If you are unable to find a reason for inconsis-
tent findings, be extremely skeptical of them.
Evidence from Opinion

Although factual evidence describes without judgment or evaluation, opinions are
judgments and interpretations—someone else’s perception of the facts. Anyone
may render an opinion, but in argumentation, evidence from opinion usually refers
to the use of the opinions of experts in the field you are arguing.
Opinion evidence consists of the interpretive and evaluative statements made by an
expert in a given field in regard to factual material pertinent to that field.
The opinions of authorities in a field provide arguers and audiences with ac-
cess to their expertise. Peggy Fikac (2010) turned to a professor of mathematics
and statistics at a nearby college for an explanation of why Lotto Texas was not
“due” to hit just because no one had won the jackpot in a while. Peter Mucha,
staff writer for The Philadelphia Inquirer, turned to a professor of business to help
his readers understand why Powerball outsells Mega Millions even though the
odds of winning the Powerball jackpot are even longer then the odds for Mega
Millions. Scott Testa of Radnor College says the explanation is simple:
“It’s a better name. It has better brand recognition. More people recognize what it is,”
the professor said.
Just as people go into stores and ask for Kleenex or Windex when other brands
will do, lottery players tend to think and say Powerball.
“The name Powerball seems to resonate better with lottery players.”
“When you’re talking about gambling, you’re talking about dreams and emotion,
and logic usually doesn’t come into play, believe it or not,” Testa said. (Mucha, 2010b)
If we are discussing the economy, we might turn to nationally known and re-
spected economists, such as the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, for their
opinion. Not all experts, however, are nationally or even locally recognized. If
your state has a lottery, can you name its director? To find an expert, we seek per-
sons with credentials in the field we are discussing. Because opinions perform the
function of evaluating and interpreting factual information, they often appear to
be claim statements. The only real difference between a claim you might make in
constructing an argument and the opinion of an expert is that the expertise of the
source of the opinion is a kind of proof in and of itself. The qualifications of the
source give these opinions probative value.
When the qualifications of the source are omitted, the probative value of the
source’s opinion may rest solely on its similarity to what the listener or reader al-
ready believes. The critique of the generalizability of field studies of programs for
the treatment of problem gamblers cited earlier in this chapter illustrates the point.
Although you know that this opinion came from a book written by someone
named Volberg, is that enough to convince you that you ought to believe every-
thing it tells you? Would it help if you knew that Rachel A. Volberg is president of
Gemini Research? Is it more convincing to know that since 1986, she has directed
many studies of gambling and people with gambling problems? That her research
has been published in places like Journal of Gambling Studies, American Journal
of Psychiatry, and American Journal of Public Health? In the absence of such cre-
dentials, we could only feel secure in the belief that her opinions would be accepted
as proof by a listener or reader whose opinions were not contrary to them. In
essence, the opinion of an uncredentialed source functions as proof only when it is
viewed as a premise by the audience.
This raises an interesting problem. In magazines such as Time or national
newspapers such as the Washington Post, the credentials of the author are not pro-
vided, or if they are, they may be something like staff writer. In some instances, the
author is not even identified. Can you use such material as if it were an expert’s
opinion? Yes. In this instance, nationally recognized news organizations such as
those mentioned are acknowledged as reputable sources of information. The pub-
lication’s reputation becomes the credentials backing the opinion. However, news
sources are not infallible. It is usually wise to check the opinions they contain
against those of acknowledged experts when you discover what you think might
be worthwhile opinion evidence.
Often a news magazine or newspaper article with a named, or an unnamed, au-
thor will serve as a secondary source for the authoritative opinion of an expert. In
the process of reporting on a story, they may quote briefly from a book or scholarly
article by an expert in the field. In such instances, the credibility of the opinion de-
rives as much, if not more, from this secondary source as it does from the reputation
of the magazine or newspaper. Although it would be best to read the primary source
firsthand if you can locate it, the use of secondary source material is acceptable.
In using opinion evidence as proof, remember that it does not provide facts
but rather interprets or explains them. Expert or authoritative sources provide in-
terpretations or judgments about facts and are always one step removed from the
objects, statistics, and events that comprise their factual basis. Expert opinion is
accepted by the listener or reader only when the expert is believed to be qualified
to offer the interpretation or make the judgment, or when the expert states what
the listener or reader already suspects or believes.
Test of Evidence from Opinion. Unlike facts, opinions are not directly verifiable.
However, that does not mean that we cannot test opinion evidence. Opinion evi-
dence can seldom be judged true or false in the same sense as factual evidence.
Because an opinion is someone’s belief about facts, it is subject to contradiction by
someone else’s opinion of those facts. Keep in mind that some of the best minds of
the sixteenth century believed lead could be turned into gold if only the right chem-
ical formula could be discovered.
Source Expertise. In using opinion evidence, we are concerned with what the law
refers to as the expert witness. Although our opinions might all be of equal worth
on some subjects, it is impossible for each of us to have the degree of experience
necessary to make sound judgments about all the phenomena we encounter. If you
want to know which automobile is most roadworthy, the opinion of a test driver
for an independent consumer-testing agency or automobile magazine that regu-
larly publishes road tests would be valuable. In testing the expertise of the source,
we are concerned with the credentials that give this person the right to pass judg-
ment on something. Investigate the training, background, and experience of these
individuals in their field of expertise. To the extent that your audience will accept
those credentials, their opinion will have impact.
Source Bias. As a general rule, seek the most unbiased source of opinion evidence.
Although it is virtually impossible for experts to remain totally unbiased about
their fields, the more objectively the opinion is stated, the more credible it will be.
In instances where bias cannot be avoided, it should be forthrightly acknowledged
so that the listener or reader is aware of the bias.
Factual Basis of the Opinion. As in the case of statistical information, the credibility of
opinion evidence may be diminished if the opinion is based on secondhand infor-
mation. Out of necessity, many opinions on historical occurrences must be ren-
dered after the fact. The most credible judgments, however, are those made by an
expert observer on the scene at the time something is happening.
Summary of Types and Tests of Evidence

1. Examples and illustrations describe or report events, phenomena that exist.
Examples are brief statements; illustrations are more detailed accounts.
a. Was the report of fact made by a qualified source?
b. Was the information reported accurately?
c. Did the reporter make the original observation, or is the report based on
secondhand information?
d. Was the report based on a recent observation of phenomena?
e. Was the reporter relatively unbiased toward the material being reported?
2. Statistics numerically represent information about people, events, and phe-
nomena; they may be expressed in raw numbers or summarized in percentages
or averages.
a. Were the statistics collected by a reliable source?
b. Were the statistics accurately collected from a sufficiently large sample over
a sufficiently long period of time?
c. Are comparable units used in statistical comparisons?
3. Artifacts are actual exhibits of such things as objects, audiotapes and video-
tapes, photographs, and diagrams.
a. Is the artifact genuine, or has it been altered in some way?
b. If the artifact is supposed to represent a certain class of items, is it typical of
that class of items?
4. Premises are factual claims that exist as evidence on the basis of their being
accepted as reflections of human belief or experience.
a. Is there reason to believe that circumstances, or our understanding of them,
have not changed in such a way as to invalidate the premise?
5. Scientific evidence reports the results of field and laboratory experiments on
the effect of one variable on another.
a. Are the results of the study generalizable beyond the setting in which the
research was conducted and the subjects who were involved?
b. Are nuisance variables controlled and independent variables manipulated
in a meaningful way?
c. Are the conclusions consistent with those of other studies conducted at
roughly the same time using similar methodologies?
Recording Evidence 125
6. Opinions are interpretive and evaluative statements made by an expert in a

field regarding factual information relevant to that field.
a. Is the source a qualified expert in the field by training, background, or
experience?
b. Is the source relatively unbiased?
c. Is there a reliable factual basis for the opinion?
RECORDING EVIDENCE
You should know how to record the material you discover to render it most useful
when the time comes to use it in constructing arguments. It is one thing to find in-
formation in the library or on the Internet; it is quite another to organize it so that
it will be readily accessible. Perhaps you function quite efficiently with a notebook
full of bits of information, a folder crammed full of photocopied pages, or a bunch
of files residing on your hard drive. However, most of us are not that efficient.
What follows is a workable system based on the premise that an organized system
of note taking will make you a better arguer. Failure to have a good system for
recording and organizing material is one of the most common problems experi-
enced by beginning and seasoned arguers alike.
The first step in efficient research is to have a clear idea of the evidence needed.
Your analysis of the topic should help you get off on the right track. In the initial
stages of working with a topic, attempt to discover what information is available by
skimming summaries, prefaces, and opening paragraphs of the sources you find.
Read for ideas as much as for examples, statistics, and opinion statements. Once
you have surveyed the available information, look for specific things—a statistic
grounding a relationship you want to claim, the opinion of an authority to back a
warrant. Later you can become more concerned about the quality of the proof you
are finding, but initially worry as much about quantity. The key concept to keep in
mind is that you can only be efficient in looking for proof if you have a clear idea of
what arguments you are trying to prove. Reading for ideas initially gives you a feel-
ing for what can be proven with the resources available to you and keeps you from
wasting time later looking for proof that may not exist.
Step two in the research process involves keeping an annotated bibliography
and is performed in conjunction with step one. As you consider each printed
source, record the title, author, publisher, date, and page numbers where pertinent.
It is also a good idea to include the call numbers of all library materials so you can
quickly find them again. For electronic sources do the same, but substitute the
URL or Web address so you can find those sources again in cyberspace. In a few
sentences, jot down the viewpoint of the author, a summary of what the source in-
cludes, and your personal evaluation of it. The purpose of this bibliography is to
give you a general idea of what sources contain.
The third step in the research process involves excerpting specific facts and
opinions in an organized system that will allow you to find what you need when
you are ready to construct your arguments. The mechanics of the system need not
be complex. You can use word processing files for recording each separate fact and
opinion statement. Include the author, the author’s qualifications, title, publication
or publisher, date, and page number somewhere in each file; then carefully record
the fact or opinion. For cybersources, include as much of the above as possible as
well as the URL and the date you recorded the information, since Internet sources
can vanish or change address without warning. Accuracy is imperative. Omitting a
word, punctuation mark, or phrase can seriously alter the meaning of the fact or
opinion. Be especially careful in recording statistical information. In a moment of
stress, 3.6 million is less likely to be misread than 3,600,000—just be sure the
source stated “million” and not “billion.” It is easy to become confused when
working with statistical information.
Once you have recorded information from a number of sources, you will
need to arrange it in a way that will make it easy to find particular pieces of
proof later on. If you require a particular opinion to back a warrant, you do not
want to shuffle through a sixty-page electronic file, or a hundred or more smaller
files, to find it and then shuffle through everything all over again to find the ma-
terial to ground the next argument. Although using your word processor’s Find
function might speed the process if you are working with one large file, an orga-
nizational system will help you avoid possibly missing the best evidence you have
to prove a point.
The fourth step in the research process involves developing a topical heading
system and a system of folders and subfolders on your hard drive to organize your
information. Think of this as developing your personal version of the Library of
Congress Subject Heading system. The name of each folder provides a two- or
three-word summary of the information it contains. Because electronic files must
have unique names so that a file created later does not overwrite one with the same
name created earlier, use this to your advantage by naming files in a way that that
provides more detail when you cut and paste the contents of one large file into a
series of smaller files.
For instance, we began the section of this chapter on types and test of evidence
with four examples of criminal activity. This material came from the “Crime” sub-
folder in the “CH6 Articles” folder on our hard drive. The files are named
“Addiction,” “Ticket Theft 3,” “Fake Tickets,” and “Altered Tickets,” respectively.
“Ticket Theft 3” indicates that, unfortunately, we found many examples of people
charged with stealing lottery tickets. Other subfolders in “CH6 Articles” have names
like “Advertising,” “Problem Gambling,” “Poor Play More,” and “Odds.”
Naming folders and files this way, commonly referred to as using “slug lines,”
can help you organize large quantities of material into related categories and dis-
tinguish material pertaining to one category from all others. The important thing
to remember about slug lines is that they serve your purposes and should make
sense to you. They reflect your impression of the contents of a particular folder or
file. Although this may seem needlessly complicated, we assure you it is important.
Because evidence is vital in establishing claims, it is at the nexus of effective argu-
mentation. The more systematic your approach to the discovery and recording of
materials of fact and opinion, and the creation of a means to facilitate their re-
trieval, the better you will be in building arguments.
Knowing the types of evidence used in building arguments, the tests it must
meet, and the means of finding and recording information enables you to begin
preparing arguments. The next chapter discusses how to turn your ideas into argu-
ments by considering the relationship of grounds, claim, and warrant in the rea-
soning process.
References 127
LEARNING ACTIVITIES
1. Find two samples of each of the following types of factual evidence: example, illustra-
tion, and statistic. Explain how each of your samples meets the tests for its type of fac-
tual evidence.
2. Choose a topic with which you are familiar. Find three sources that provide authorita-
tive opinion evidence on this topic. Explain why each source is credible in terms of the
tests of opinion evidence.
3. Find five examples of evidence based on premises. Consider each premise in terms of
how it came to be held as true without needing further proof. Is there any reason to be-
lieve these premises might become invalid?
4. Review the definitions of fact and opinion in this chapter. Decide which of the follow-
ing statements are facts and which are opinions.
a. The Supreme Court has decided that legal counsel will be provided for those who
cannot afford to pay for it.
b. Humans are primates descended from earlier forms of primates.
c. College tuition costs have stabilized.
d. The Pacific Rim will dominate world trade in the twenty-first century.
e. Many professional educators believe studying a foreign language helps students
become more proficient in the structure and grammar of the English language.
f. Railroads played an important part in the North’s ability to win battles during the
Civil War.
g. Simply by visiting the Smithsonian, all may enjoy our nation’s treasures.
h. Natural-habitat zoos are more interesting than traditional caged-exhibit zoos.
5. Begin researching the topic area you have selected for future assignments concerning
propositions of fact, value, and policy. Your evidence file should meet the following
criteria:
a. Sources of information should be identified in a bibliography.
b. Each item of evidence should be classified as to type.
c. Each item of evidence should be evaluated as to credibility—meeting the tests of
evidence.
d. Each piece of evidence should be slugged according to the topic you have selected.
REFERENCES
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CVS employee arrested in theft of lottery Scratchers. (2010, April 23). Alameda Times-Star
(CA). Retrieved from http://www.insidebayarea.com/timesstar.
Fikac, P. (2010, April 7). It’s been a long dry spell for Lotto Texas. Houston Chronicle (TX).
Retrieved from http://www.chron.com/.
Fisher, W. R. (1984). Narration as a human communication paradigm: The case of public
moral argument. Communication Monographs, 51, 1–22.
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(CT). Retrieved from http://www.courant.com/.
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The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/
Haisley, E, Mostafa, R, & Lowenstein, G. (2008). Subjective relative income and lottery
ticket purchases. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 21, 283–295. doi:
10.1002/bdm.588
Jacobsen, T. E., & Cohen, L. B. (1997, August). Teaching students to evaluate internet sites.
The Teaching Professor, p. 4.
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ademic debate. Rostrum, 72. Available online at http://debate.uvm.edu/NFL/rostrumlib/
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(PA). Retrieved from http://www.philly.com/.
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(PA). Retrieved from http://www.philly.com/.
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(FL). Retrieved from http://www.tampatrib.com/.
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CHAPTER
How Do I Reason
with My Audience?
A
rgumentation is a process of drawing inferences. As you discover informa-
tion on a topic, you make guesses about how it fits together and how it
might support or fail to support your own ideas about the topic. You be-
come concerned with creating viable arguments. But what makes an argument vi-
able? In part, an argument is viable because the evidence used to ground the claim
has been tested for validity, but there is more to the viability of an argument than
the validity of the evidence that supports it. The relationship between evidence and
the claim it supports is established through reasoning. In studying the reasoning
process, you are concerned with the logic of the inference drawn when you ask
your listeners or readers to agree that the evidence you provide warrants accepting
your claim. In Chapter 5 we indicated that this inferential relationship is estab-
lished by the warrant, which can be tested for validity. When it passes the test, we
say that the argument is viable.
The reasoning process is based on recognizing common patterns of experi-
ence. Consider a not uncommon experience of dormitory life: You encounter
Dennis and Paul. Dennis has an empty bucket and Paul is dripping wet. What goes
on in your mind? Because you were not on the scene to observe firsthand how Paul
got wet, you probably inferred the cause of Paul’s wetness. Experience suggests
that the claim, “Dennis dumped a bucket of water on Paul,” is viable. How reli-
ably do the grounds, Paul’s wetness and Dennis’s empty bucket, support the claim?
How probable is it that your claim describes what really happened? You do not
know with any degree of certainty based on the grounds and claim alone, but a
warrant increases your certainty of the relationship between grounds and claim.
This chapter is about the reasoning process, the warrant step in the Toulmin model
of argument.
In using the Toulmin model to create units of argument, remember that it is an
idealized blueprint for creating and testing arguments. It graphically depicts the
process of reasoning from evidence to a conclusion. The form an argument takes in
the model may not represent the best way to articulate it in a speech or an essay.
The actual wording of an argument for presentation depends on such factors as
129
130 CHAPTER 7 How Do I Reason with My Audience?
communicator style, audience needs, and how individual arguments combine to

shape your speech or essay. As we guide you through understanding how the rea-
soning process works, we will provide examples that show how arguments are typ-
ically authored.
While you are learning about argumentation, we strongly suggest that you
employ all four elements—grounds, warrant, backing, and claim—in creating your
arguments. As you develop skill, you may find it unnecessary to articulate all of
them all of the time. You will elect to use all of them only when your audience is
likely to require them or want them supplied.
Reasoning is the inferential leap from grounds to claim made through the war-
rant. In earlier chapters, we noted that arguments may be developed in many dif-
ferent fields. Although the subjects about which inferences are drawn and the pat-
tern of inference drawing that is favored may differ from field to field, the
reasoning process does not change because it is based on patterns of common
human experience. In this chapter, we consider the forms of reasoning and the
rules for testing the validity of warrants. In the chapter that follows, we consider
what happens when these forms and rules are not observed and fallacies in reason-
ing, appeal, and language use occur.
Six major forms of reasoning develop the relationship between grounds and
claim: cause, sign, generalization, parallel case, analogy, and authority. In addition,
a minor form of reasoning, dilemma, is useful in certain circumstances. As you
study these forms of reasoning, it is important to remember that reasoning, the
warrant, is used to infer that because these grounds exist, believing this claim to be
true or probable is justified.
ARGUMENT FROM CAUSE

Argument from cause is one of the most prevalent forms of reasoning in argumen-
tation. When things are happening to us and around us, it is human nature to infer
connections between them.
As a form of reasoning, argument from cause suggests a temporal connection between
phenomena.
We claim that an event or condition of one kind is the cause of an event or

condition of another. Consider these phenomena.
PHENOMENON 1: A student does not read his assignments.
PHENOMENON 2: The student receives an F on an exam.
It is useful to conceptualize events as existing on a time line (Ehninger, 1974).
Phenomena along it may be connected, and it may be traveled in either direction.
A present effect may be connected with a preceding cause; a presently existing
cause may be identified to predict some future effect.
Argument from cause is based on the premise that things occur in an orderly
fashion for some reason. Because the affairs of neither humanity nor nature are ran-
dom, we assume we can rely on the premise, “Everything has a cause.” In an argu-
ment from cause, the grounds, warrant, and backing must validate the claim on the
basis of their temporal connection. If we are careful in researching phenomena, we
Argument from Cause 131
can support claims that events or conditions of one kind are the cause of events or
conditions of another.
As an illustration of how argument from cause works, consider the written
testimony of James Hall of the Up Front Drug Center in Miami:
“Smoking” methamphetamine causes drug problems even more serious than those
associated with crack cocaine. Methamphetamine may be vaporized (“smoked”) in its
crystal (salt) form and need not be converted to a base form like crack. When
“smoked,” its extreme volatility delivers a highly concentrated dose of the drug instan-
taneously to the brain, even more intensely than with crack. The drug’s rapid tolerance
means that smoking methamphetamine accelerates compulsive abuse and addiction. Its
long duration of action contributes to the probability of toxic and fatal reactions. Brain
damage is expected to be more severe from methamphetamine “smoking” than from
crack as is the violent, paranoid behavior associated with either drug. (Drugs in the
1990’s, 1989, pp. 80–81)
Figure 7.1 lays out Mr. Hall’s case. There are several grounds—things known
to be true about smoking methamphetamine from observation or research. For
each of these points, something inherent in the drug’s consumption or pharmaco-
logical impact makes its effect worse than crack’s, which warrants Mr. Hall’s
claim—smoking methamphetamine is worse than crack—stated in his opening and
closing sentences.
Ground 1 Warrant
Smoking methamphetamine because it “need not

is easier than smoking be converted to a base
crack, form like crack.”
Ground 2
Warrant
Smoking methamphetamine Claim
packs a bigger, faster because of “its
wallop than smoking extreme volatility.” “Smoking methamphetamine
crack, causes drug problems even
more serious than those
associated with crack
cocaine [including] brain
Ground 3 damage [and] violent,
Warrant
paranoid behavior
Smoking methamphetamine
because of “the drug’s associated with either drug.”
hooks users faster than
rapid tolerance.”
smoking crack,
Ground 4
Warrant
Smoking methamphetamine
is more likely to harm because of “its long
or even kill users than duration of action.”
smoking crack,
FIGURE 7.1
Argument Against Smoking Methamphetamine.
In arguing causality, some precautions must be taken to ensure that our inferen-
tial leaps are justified. The most important question to ask is: Are the grounds suffi-
cient to bring about or cause the conditions specified in the claim? Focusing on the
grounds is an important first step in testing the strength of the argument from cause.
Examine your arguments from cause using the following questions as guidelines:
1. Are other grounds likely to lead to the effect?
2. Is the asserted relationship between grounds and effect consistent, or are there
instances in which this effect has not followed from these grounds?
When using causal reasoning, you are generalizing about the relationship be-
tween phenomena along a time line: In the presence of phenomenon A (cause), we
can always find evidence of phenomenon B (effect); or if we can find evidence of phe-
nomenon B (effect), it is likely to have been the consequence of phenomenon A
(cause). The regularity with which this has been true in the past warrants speculation
about causes or effects that are undocumented or undocumentable. This is particu-
larly useful when arguing about things that have not yet happened, such as brain
damage, paranoia, and violent behavior. We look at a drug that is easier to get, more
potent, longer lasting, and more lethal than crack, and we can reasonably expect it
will have the worst effects on its users. This same strategy can be used in speculating
about the consequences of a policy change, taking that course of action as a cause
and forecasting the effects, both good and bad, that it is likely to produce.
We also want to examine the arguments produced by cause and effect reason-
ing to make sure they are really a cause and its effect, not simply two phenomena
that happened to occur sequentially. Just because phenomenon A is followed by
phenomenon B does not make A the cause of B. Many superstitions are based on
this notion of false cause. Knocking on wood to ward off a run of bad luck, which
was never going to happen in the first place, is a prime example.
Causality requires proof of more than chronological occurrence. When two
things happen sequentially, and you suspect a cause–effect relationship, consider
whether the alleged cause is capable of producing the effect. Is the cause poten-
tially strong enough to do so? If a drug is easier to get than crack because it re-
quires no preparation, does that mean it will produce worse problems than crack?
Avoid being trapped by superficial connection between events by looking for
alternative explanations of what happened. In both interpersonal and public rela-
tions, few things happen as the result of a single cause. The argument on smoking
methamphetamine is a good example of the identification of multiple causalities: It
is not only easier to get but also more potent, addictive, and longer lasting than
crack, making the problems it produces more serious. For any given set of events,
before placing too much faith in any single cause–effect relationship, look for pos-
sible alternative, or multiple, causes for the effect.
A cause may be discussed in terms of its being necessary and sufficient. A
cause is said to be necessary if, without its presence, the effect will not occur.
However, this cause may not be sufficient to bring about the effect all by itself. The
difference between necessary and sufficient cause is illustrated by the relationship
between HIV and AIDS. Some people who are HIV-positive do not have AIDS, so
apparently the virus alone is not a sufficient cause for the disease. The discovery
that some AIDS patients are not HIV-positive suggests the virus may not even be a
necessary cause. In the case of smoking methamphetamine, none of the four causes
is sufficient to make the effects worse than they are for crack cocaine. Taken to-
gether, the facts that it is easier, more potent, addictive, and longer lasting consti-
tute a series of necessary causes that, taken in toto, are sufficient to make the ef-
fects worse.
Why is this distinction important? In determining whether a cause produced
an effect, sufficient causes can always be counted on to produce predictable ef-
fects. The distinction between causes that are necessary and causes that are suffi-
cient helps to emphasize the importance of always looking for alternative and
multiple causes.
Summary of Argument from Cause

1. Argument from cause suggests a temporal connection between events in which
one produces the other.
2. When we can document effect, we may reason as to its cause; when we can
document cause, we may reason as to its effect.
3. A necessary cause is a factor that must be present to bring about an effect but
will not in and of itself produce the effect.
4. A sufficient cause includes all factors needed to produce a particular effect.
5. Causality involves more than chronological order and may be tested by asking
the following questions:
a. Is the cause capable of producing the effect?
b. Is the effect produced by the cause or does the effect occur coincidentally to
the cause?
c. Are there other potential causes?
d. Has this effect consistently followed from this cause?
ARGUMENT FROM SIGN

Unlike arguments from cause, which link causes to their effects,
Arguments from sign connect phenomena with conditions that merely exist.
Signs are indicators—observable symptoms, conditions, or marks—that tell us

what is the case. Would-be naturalists often study the behaviors of animals and
connect those behaviors to other events. Consider the following examples of sign
reasoning in which the sign has no causal connection to the events signs are used
to predict:
When the squirrels store extra nuts, it means we’re in for a hard winter.
If the groundhog sees its shadow on February 2, spring is still six weeks away.
What kinds of things serve as signs? Events are often seen as signs of attitudes
or activities. We observe that a certain product is selling well and take this as sign
evidence of the product’s quality or the effectiveness of its advertising. Statistics are
often interpreted through sign reasoning. High employment and low inflation are
signs of a healthy economy. Public opinion polls signify attitudes about policies,
activities, and persons. Marjorie Heins, who is a Fellow with the Brennan Center
for Justice in New York University’s School of Law and Founding Director of the
Free Expression Policy Project, used sign reasoning in her testimony before the
House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary:
In the time remaining, let me just address the claims that are so frequently made and
that you’ve heard here today that social science research has proved media violence to
cause aggressive behavior. I was perfectly willing to accept this conventional wisdom
when I began research for Not in Front of the Children, but what I discovered, like so
many independent researchers before me, was that, number one, most of the research
has actually produced null results.
Number two, claimed positive results are often based on manipulation of statistics
or flawed measures of aggression, such as punching a Bobo doll, which is an acceptable
form of play aggression, recognizing aggressive words on computer screens, or one of
my favorites, popping a balloon.
There is no uniformity in research results, the first requirement for scientific va-
lidity. Some studies have found children more aggressive after watching Sesame Street
or Mr. Rogers. Joanne Cantor’s book, Mommy, I’m Scared, documents anxiety reac-
tions among children exposed to such relatively non-violent fare as Little House on
the Prairie, Sleeping Beauty, and Alice in Wonderland. No filter V-chip or censorship
law can identify what from the vast array of art and literature might frighten a partic-
ular child.
Even correlational research, which can be suggestive but certainly does not show
causation, is inconclusive. Violent crime rates, as I’m sure you know, for youth have
been declining in the last decade, even as media violence has become more intense. In
1986, one researcher found negative correlations between exposure to violent TV and
violent crime in 281 metropolitan areas. He stated, “the data consistently indicate that
high levels of exposure to violent television content are accompanied by relatively low
rates of violent crime.”
Finally, there’s no uniform definition of media violence in either experimental
or correlational studies. Some researchers use cartoons, some use Batman,
Superman, fight scenes in movies. Even the American Psychological Association,
which speaks usually more guardedly than Mr. McIntyre did today, in terms of risks
rather than proof, acknowledges that “violence, per se, is not the problem. It is the
manner in which most violence on television is shown that should concern us.” Yet
social science studies rarely test the context in which violence is shown or the artis-
tic merit of the work. Certainly, movie filters don’t make these distinctions.
(Derivative rights, 2004, p. 27)
Ms. Hein wants to convince the representatives that social science research
does not support the belief that exposure to media violence causes aggressive be-
havior in children. To do this, she advances this claim supported by sign reason-
ing from examples. She can rely on her position. She has been called as an expert
witness, which implicitly backs her unstated warrant that the examples she pro-
vides signify the lack of a scientific basis for the alleged cause–effect relationship.
She can also rely on the fact that the committee has a full agenda, and that the
two people she specifically mentions are also testifying and would be able to re-
spond. This may lead the members of the committee to believe she could provide
more examples or back her warrant in some other way if she was given the time
to do so.
CLAIM: Social science research does not support the belief that exposure
to media violence causes aggressive behavior in children.
GROUND 1: “Most of the research has actually produced null results.”
GROUND 2: “Positive results are often based on manipulation of statistics or

flawed measures of aggression.”
GROUND 3: “Some studies have found children more aggressive after watch-
ing ‘Sesame Street’.”
GROUND 4: “Even correlational research, which can be suggestive but cer-
tainly does not show causation, is inconclusive.”
GROUND 5: “There is no uniform definition of media violence in either exper-
imental or correlational studies . . . [and] studies rarely test the
context in which violence is shown.”
WARRANT: [implied] These facts signify the lack of a scientific basis for the al-
leged cause–effect relationship between exposure to media vio-
lence and aggressive behavior in children.
There are some cautions to observe in arguing on the basis of signs. The most
important is to be sure the sign you use is reliable. The problem with finding a re-
liable sign is that signs are only circumstantial evidence in many instances. Things
we observe as signs may not really warrant any claim unless backing for the war-
rant can be found.
A second caution regarding sign reasoning is that signs should not be confused
with causes. A good rule to follow in distinguishing sign from cause is this: A sign
tells what is the case, while a cause explains why it is the case. Arguments from
cause attempt to analyze events in terms of antecedents and their consequences.
Arguments from sign concern themselves with what the sign will signify. They tell
us what we can expect to observe as a result of having first observed the sign. Ms.
Hein’s argument does not explain why, for example, there is no uniform definition
of violence, only that there isn’t one and that is just one of the problems with the
research on media violence.
A final caution about sign reasoning is that we must be concerned with the
strength of the sign. Sign arguments lead to conclusions about what was, is, or
will be. Sign reasoning is presented as a factual claim about the sign and what it
signifies. It must be tested the way we test any factual claim, by examining its
grounds. We want to know if the grounds (the sign) always or usually validate
the prediction of what it signifies (the conclusion drawn in the claim).
Examination of the grounds might include asking if sufficient signs are present.
After all, one robin does not constitute spring, but a flock of robins and other
species, buds on trees, and the absence of snow may reliably lead us to conclude
that spring is at hand.
Summary of Argument from Sign

1. Signs are observable symptoms, conditions, or marks used to prove that a cer-
tain state of affairs exists.
2. Signs should be reliable so that the grounds point to the conclusion drawn, not
to some alternative conclusion.
3. Sign reasoning must not be confused with causal reasoning. Signs describe the
situation; causes analyze the situation.
4. Sign reasoning is assessed on the basis of the presence of a sufficient number of
signs or the certainty of an individual sign’s strength.
ARGUMENT FROM GENERALIZATION

Generalizations, based on sampling populations to draw conclusions about
wholes, are very common. Much social science research studies a small sample
of people or events and generalizes about the group the sample represents.
A generalization states that what is true in some instances is true in all or
most instances.
Generalization is a form of inductive reasoning in which one looks at the details of

examples, specific cases, situations, and occurrences and draws inferences about the
entire class they represent.
Generalizing may be the form of reasoning you have experienced most fre-
quently in forming your attitudes, values, and beliefs. If you have had a negative
experience with a course in Department X, you may reason that no course offered
by Department X is worth taking. Prejudices against people and nations are often
formed on the basis of generalizations. This does not mean, however, that general-
ization is not an effective and efficient form of reasoning.
What we see on commercial television is determined on the basis of reasoning
from generalization. The Nielsen ratings of the popularity of various television
shows are based on sampling the viewing habits in a few American homes and gen-
eralizing that what is true of the viewing habits of the sample is true of the viewing
habits of all Americans.
Suppose you wanted your readers to accept a claim that armed violence
occurs too frequently in schools. You have found an example, but your readers
are unlikely to accept it as a reliable sign on your word alone. If you could find
some other examples from cities across the nation, your readers might be
willing to accept the generalization that what is true in these cities is probably
true in cities nationwide. Despite his role as executive director of the National
School Safety Center, this is precisely what Ronald Stephens did in his
written testimony:
Reading, writing and retaliation has become a common theme on many of our nation’s
campuses. Far too often this retaliation involves ducking bullets and serious violence. . . .
September, 1992, Palo Duro High School, Amarillo, Texas—Teenager shoots 6 in
school after a fight; 2 seriously hurt.
May, 1992, Lindhurst High School, Olivehurst, California—Four slain, 11 injured
as ex-student enters high school campus and opens fire; 59 students and teachers were
held hostage during the eight-hour siege.
March, 1992, Largo High School, Washington, D.C.—Sixteen-year-old girl was
stabbed in the abdomen with a 3-inch paring knife by a female classmate.
March, 1992, McAuliffe Elementary School, Chicago, Illinois—Eight-year-old boy
brings gun to school in his book bag, thinking it is a toy and shoots and paralyzes an 8-
year-old girl in the classroom.
February, 1992, Thomas Jefferson High School, Brooklyn, New York—Two
students are fatally shot in school hallway by a ninth grader while students are
changing classes.
February, 1992, Roland Park Elementary/Middle School, Baltimore, Maryland—
Seventh grader shoots a school police officer for confiscating his pager. (Children carry-
ing weapons, 1992, pp. 30–31)
Argument from Generalization 137
Because the claim and the grounds that support it are so transparent,
focus your attention on the warrant and how the choice of examples subtly pro-
vides backing.
WARRANT: [implied] What is true in these instances is probably true in other
instances nationwide.
BACKING 1: This is not a regional problem; the examples are drawn from five
states and the District of Columbia.
BACKING 2: This is not a high school problem; two of the examples are drawn
from elementary and middle schools.
BACKING 3: This is not an exclusively male problem; one of the assailants and
at least two of the victims were female.
The one limitation on the generalizability of the claim that Mr. Stephens’s de-
velopment of this unit of argument does not address is that the warrant and its
backing lead to the conclusion that this is an urban, or at least a large city, prob-
lem. He addresses this in his next unit of argument, claiming “school crime is not
simply a big-city problem. It encompasses rural, suburban and urban communi-
ties” (Children carrying weapons, 1992, p. 31).
Generalizations may be restricted in nature, arguing from some to more.
Notice the qualifiers “many” and “far too often” in the opening statement. Mr.
Stephens does not assert that all disputes on all campuses result in armed violence;
it is left to the reader to determine exactly how often “far too often” and how many
“many” really is. The use of qualifiers in claim statements facilitates generalization
when the behavior of an entire population, or the qualities of an entire class of ob-
jects, cannot be validly predicted. You may have owned three cars made by the
Motor Car Company, experiencing great dissatisfaction with each, but would it be
warranted for you to generalize that “the Motor Car Company produces lemons”?
Generalizations may also be universal, arguing that what is true of some mem-
bers of a group will be true of all members of that group. In making a universal gen-
eralization, the arguer needs to be careful that the sample on which the generaliza-
tion is based is adequate to warrant the conclusion. Much of what we discussed in
Chapter 6 about the verification of factual and statistical evidence applies to gener-
alizations. There are four generic tests to apply to arguments from generalization to
determine whether a generalization should be universal or restricted.
First, sufficient cases or instances should be cited as grounds to ensure a reli-
able generalization. It would be unreasonable to argue on the basis of what hap-
pens in one state that armed violence in our schools is a nationwide problem. A
sample composed of states from each region might be needed to show a national
trend. How large must the sample be? Large enough that the addition of more in-
stances does not change the conclusion. Ultimately, the audience is the final arbiter
of how many cases are needed to support the claim. The more familiar your audi-
ence is with the topic, the fewer instances you will need to cite.
The second test of generalizations is sample representativeness. Do the indi-
viduals or items cited in the grounds fairly represent the group or class about
which the generalization is made? Items or individuals must be typical of a class if
they are to represent it. All items must actually come from the same class, and it
makes a difference how you define the class. For example, generalizing about a
class of objects called schools may be problematic if your definition allows the in-
clusion of institutions, such as reform schools or alternative schools, to which chil-
dren who have already had trouble with the law are sent.
The third test of generalizations is that instances must be taken from random
samples of populations. If in attempting to generalize about school violence you
include schools from only the most violent urban areas, distortion may occur. The
schools you have selected may have more violence and thus fail to accurately rep-
resent a national trend.
The final test of generalizations asks if negative instances have been accounted
for or explained. A generalization will not hold up if too many instances exist that
contradict it. Including a rebuttal statement to modify such a claim is absolutely
necessary. If in preparing an argument on school violence you discover that reli-
giously affiliated schools do not share this problem with their publicly funded
counterparts, you would use a rebuttal to account for the difference.
Summary of Argument from Generalization

1. Generalizations argue that what is true of some members of a group will be
true of more or all members of the same group.
2. Generalizations should be based on a sufficiently large sample of cases if a
conclusion about an entire group is being drawn.
3. Instances cited in making the generalization should be representative of all
members of the group.
4. Instances should be randomly selected to avoid distortion.
5. Negative instances should be explained or accounted for.
ARGUMENT FROM PARALLEL CASE

Argument from parallel case is used when we have all the particulars about a given
case and we reason from it, comparing the known case to a similar unknown case.
Arguments using parallel case involve reasoning on the basis of two or more similar
events or cases.
Government policy makers and organizations such as universities often use argu-
ment from parallel case to frame their thinking. Those who set academic policies
and regulations governing graduation requirements may study what is happening
at other similar schools, reasoning that what is appropriate at college 1, college 2,
and college 3 should be appropriate at our college.
In arguments based on parallel case, grounds involve the case (or cases) that is
in some critical way similar to the case about which the claim is made. The war-
rant, backed by additional evidence when necessary, explains how the case de-
scribed in the grounds and the case identified in the claim are truly parallel cases.
An example of an argument reasoning from a parallel case is found in the testi-
mony of Robert Sachs, president and CEO of the National Cable and
Telecommunications Association:
To put cable prices, in context, if you look at the CPI-U numbers from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, which I believe was 55 percent from the period December 1993
Argument from Parallel Case 139
through June 2003, education costs in this country went up 62 percent, college tuition
and fees 60 percent, financial services 56 percent, cable television 55, admissions 55.
Let me focus on admissions, and I will submit an entire list for the record.
Admissions includes ticket costs for movies, concerts, theater and sporting events.
Cable in its purest form is an entertainment medium, and we have seen across entertain-
ment alternatives that prices increase more rapidly than inflation because the inputs for
creating programs increase—especially the inputs for sports salaries.
Do we think that consumers are getting good value for their money? Absolutely.
For $40 a month, the average cost of a cable bill for basic cable and expanded cable, it
is impossible to take a family of four to a movie for a single evening in the course of a
month, whereas cable is something that people can enjoy for the full month for $40 a
month. Now, people elect to pay more for premium services, for new digital services,
for high-speed Internet, and now for telephony in an increasing number of communi-
ties. But those are all options that consumers have. (Cable competition, 2004, p. 22)
Mr. Sach’s point is that, when you consider cable price increases in compari-
son to price increases for other forms of entertainment, cable customers get good
value for their money. Using the cost of “admissions” as a parallel case serves as a
vehicle for proving his point. To the extent that his listeners perceived fundamental
similarities between paying for cable television and paying for tickets to a movie,
Mr. Sach’s argument demonstrated his point. Those similarities are established in
whatever grounds the arguer provides.
GROUND 1: “From the period December 1993 through June 2003,” the cost
of cable television went up 55 percent the same as admissions,
which “includes ticket costs for movies, concerts, theater, and
sporting events.”
WARRANT: “Cable in its purest form is an entertainment medium,” so it can
reasonably be compared to other forms of entertainment.
GROUND 2: “For $40 a month, the average cost of a cable bill for basic cable
and expanded cable, it is impossible to take a family of four to a
movie for a single evening in the course of a month.”
There are two tests to apply to arguments from parallel case, and both involve
scrutinizing the similarities between the cases cited. First, ask yourself, “How sim-
ilar are the cases cited?” If we hear that we can better understand the value of sub-
scribing to cable television by comparing it to the cost of a movie ticket, we must
be able to find enough similarities between the two to make the comparison hold
up in our minds. Are there dissimilarities, such as experiencing entertainment on a
big screen rather than a small one, or being at an event in person, so we can expe-
rience it in its unmediated form, which might suggest cable television is different
from the forms of entertainment we buy tickets to see?
The second test to apply to arguments from parallel case is to ask, “Are the
similarities cited key factors?” In general, the more critical the factors common to
both cases, the more force the argument will have. In particular, the similarities
cited must have relevance to the claim being made in the argument. Mr. Sachs indi-
cates that the rate of cost increases for cable television and other forms of enter-
tainment for almost a decade have been the same, but that you get a month’s worth
of enjoyment rather than an evening’s worth when you spend your money for
cable. Are these the key factors and are they relevant?
Summary of Argument from Parallel Case

1. Argument from parallel case reasons on the basis of two or more similar
events or cases; because case A is known to be similar to case B in certain
ways, we can appropriately draw inferences from what is known to what is
unknown.
2. For the argument from parallel case to be valid, the cases must not only be
similar but their similarities must also pertain to important rather than trivial
factors.
ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY

Analogies represent a special form of comparison in which the cases compared do
not have a sufficient degree of similarity to warrant argument from parallel case.
Arguments from analogy assume some fundamental sameness exists between the char-
acteristics of dissimilar cases.
The argument proceeds much as it would if it were an argument from parallel case.
A claim that is true of case 1 should be expected to be true of case 2, because both
share a sufficient number of relevant characteristics. The essential difference be-
tween an analogy and an argument from parallel case is found in their forms of
comparison. Analogies are figurative and often used as rhetorical devices to add
style to an argument, while arguments from parallel case are literal.
Consider the following from Marjorie Heins. Prior to her critique of the claim
that social science research supports a cause–effect relationship between viewing
violence and doing violence, she adapted an argument from analogy related to the
Internet to dispute the notion that filtering software, which allows parents to pre-
vent their children from seeing certain scenes in movies on commercially available
DVDs, is the best way to protect them:
As the National Research Council wrote in a 2002 report on the related subject of
Internet filters, “media literacy provides children with skills in critically evaluating the
content inherent in media messages. A child with these skills is less likely to stumble
across inappropriate material and more likely to be better able to put it into context if
and when he or she does.”
And they made the analogy to swimming pools. They can be dangerous for chil-
dren. To protect them, one can install locks, put up fences, and deploy pool alarms. All
of these measures are helpful, but by far, the most important thing one can do for one’s
children is to teach them how to swim. (Derivative rights, 2004, pp. 26–27)
Comparisons in analogies are based on the functional equivalence of very dif-

ferent entities. Starting with a premise that “there are a lot of dangers our children
may face growing up” as its implied subtext, Ms. Heins’ argument from analogy
refines and sharpens that point:
GROUNDS 1: Swimming pools “can be dangerous to children.”

GROUNDS 2: “To protect them, one can install locks, put up fences, and deploy
pool alarms . . . but by far the most important thing one can do
for one’s children is to teach them how to swim.”
Argument from Analogy 141
WARRANT: [implied] If movies like swimming pools pose a danger to our

children, we should teach media literacy rather than installing
locks.
BACKING: “As the National Research Council wrote in a 2002 report on the
related subject of Internet filters, ‘media literacy provides children
with skills to critically evaluate the content inherent in media
messages.’”
CLAIM: [implied] Teaching our children how to cope with potential dan-
gers is more effective than trying to prevent them from encounter-
ing those dangers.
We do not normally think of analogies in terms of the Toulmin model of argu-

ment. If you are going to use them, you need to think them through, and the
Toulmin model provides the framework for doing just that. Ask yourself what
might cause your analogy to be accepted or rejected by your audience and where
the likely points of attack might be for those who are arguing against you.
Because of its figurative nature, analogy has been classified as the weakest
form of argument (Eisenberg & Ilardo, 1980; Toulmin, Rieke, & Janik, 1984;
Ziegelmuller, Kay, & Dause, 1990). It is said that the comparison of dissimilar
cases is a rhetorical device and cannot actually warrant a claim. The analogy’s use-
fulness is primarily confined to illustrating, clarifying, or making an argument
more memorable or striking.
As Ehninger (1974) suggests, the position you ultimately adopt on the use of
analogy will be determined by how you define argument and by the degree of
probability you expect an asserted relationship to possess before you are willing
to regard it as proven. If your definition of argument is restricted to instances
where the relationship between grounds and claim produces conclusions that
have a high probability of truth, you will probably not be satisfied with argu-
ments from analogy.
Argument from analogy can be useful in communication. Rendering the form
of an argument understandable to the audience is a requirement for effective com-
munication, so there will be times when an analogy is the most appropriate argu-
mentative choice. Analogy fulfills several critical functions in argumentation
(Wilcox, 1973). It helps organize and clarify thought by relating terms, enables us
to learn new information, and adds style to our reasoning.
Should you choose to argue from analogy, two tests must be applied to deter-
mine its viability. First, the cases alleged to be similar must be sufficiently similar in
function in all important ways. An analogy will not hold up if the functions com-
pared are so dissimilar that the analogy is incomprehensible to the audience.
Second, the dissimilarities between the cases compared must not be so great as to
adversely influence perception of implied similarities. Because analogies compare
things that are essentially dissimilar, those dissimilarities must not overshadow
their similarities.
If you decide to use this form of argument, search for analogies that will add
force to your argument. Although there is probably a point of diminishing re-
turns in the use of analogy, it is possible to use more than one analogy to help
your audience make connections between the available evidence and the claims
you wish to advance.
Summary of Argument from Analogy

1. An analogy is a comparison of fundamentally dissimilar cases that draws at-
tention to the common function they perform.
2. Analogies are commonly used as rhetorical devices, providing figurative rather
than literal comparisons.
3. The dissimilarities between the cases should not be so great as to nullify the
validity of the comparison being made.
ARGUMENT FROM AUTHORITY

In Chapter 6, we said arguers often use the opinions and research of experts as ev-
idence. Society has become so complex that we are no longer confident of our own
expertise on many subjects, so we rely on the knowledge of authorities. Textbooks,
including this one, are examples of reliance on authority to shape inferences about
the nature of things. Watch the news on television, read an article in a magazine, or
listen to the opinions of friends; it will not take long to discover how reliant you
are on authorities.
Who are these people we turn to for opinions and interpretations of fact? We
label as an authority any person or group determined to possess expertise in a
given field. Their expertise may come from education or experience, from having
published in their field, or from being a well-known professional, scientist, physi-
cian, jurist, artist, or the like. In addition, leaders, public figures, government offi-
cials, and spokespersons for well-known institutions, groups, and organizations
are acknowledged as authorities.
In an argument from authority, the inference is that the claim is justified be-
cause it is consistent with the opinion, interpretation of fact, or research findings
of an authority.
As a form of reasoning, argument from authority relies on the credibility and expertise
of the source to warrant acceptance of a claim.
Authorities use the same patterns of reasoning as the rest of us, so an argument
from authority may appear to be an argument from cause, sign, generalization,
parallel case, analogy, or dilemma. What distinguishes argument from authority is
that the warrant identifies why the audience should regard the authority as credi-
ble rather than drawing some other inference linking grounds and claim.
Dr. Thomas M. Bonnicksen testified before a Senate committee about the fact
that there is no scientific agreement about what constitutes an old-growth forest.
One reason his implied warrant—that the sign evidence he offered reliably indi-
cated why most notions about old-growth forests are romantic myths—was prob-
ably accepted by those listening was the argument from authority with which he
began his prepared statement:
My name is Dr. Thomas M. Bonnicksen. I am a professor in the Department of Forest Sci-
ence at Texas A&M University specializing in restoration forestry. I have conducted
research on restoring and sustaining America’s native forest for more than thirty years. I
have written over one hundred publications and I authored the book titled America’s
Ancient Forests: From the Ice Age to the Age of Discovery (Copyright January 2000, John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 594 pages). The book documents the history of North America’s
Argument from Authority 143
native forests. It gives special emphasis to the way our native forests appeared at the time
of European settlement and the role Native Americans played in their development. (For-
est protection initiatives and national forest policy, 2001, p. 43–44).
If we examine the basis in fact that Dr. Bonnicksen lays out in his argument,
we gain insight not only into how he established his own credibility, but also into
how you might structure your arguments from authority using evidence of fact and
opinion from credible sources. In establishing personal credibility, as Dr.
Bonnicksen does, the crux of the argument lies in the grounds offered:
GROUND 1: “I am a professor . . . specializing in restoration forestry.”

GROUND 2: “I have conducted research on . . . America’s native forest for more
than thirty years” and “have . . . over one hundred publications”
GROUND 3: I authored a book that “gives special emphasis to the way our na-
tive forests appeared at the time of European settlement and the
role Native Americans played in their development.”
In arguments from authority using evidence of fact and opinion that you cre-
ate, the locus shifts to the backing for the warrant that establishes the credibility of
the source of fact or opinion used to ground a claim. Your own arguments from
authority can be structured in one of two ways. In the first form, state your own
opinion as the claim. The reason for your reader or listener to accept the claim is
warranted because an authority, established by backing the warrant, provides the
factual grounds for it. In a sense, this is the form nearly all arguments in academic
argumentation take. Through research, you discover as much as you can about a
topic, determine the opinions you hold on it, and decide how those opinions will
be formed into claim statements. Then you find evidence from credible sources to
ground your claims.
In the second form of argument from authority, you take an authority’s opin-
ion, restate its main point as the claim, and use evidence taken from the authority’s
opinion as grounds for the claim. As in the previous form of argument from au-
thority, the warrant states that the authority should be considered credible, and
backing applies one or more of the tests of argument from authority to establish
that credibility.
Because argument from authority involves evidence that expresses an opinion,
interprets fact, or reports research findings, many of the tests of evidence discussed
in Chapter 6 may be appropriate. The specific tests of argument from authority
seek answers to the question: Can the authority be regarded as credible?
The first test of argument from authority is to determine whether the source is
a qualified expert in the field by reason of training, experience, or background.
The academic degrees a person holds, the length of his or her experience, and the
nature of his or her background are all ways of verifying that an alleged authority
is indeed an expert. To be recognized as an authority, some demonstration of ex-
pertise must be made.
The second test of argument from authority examines the context in which the
source offered an opinion or presented information. Is the statement made within
the context of the alleged authority’s area of expertise? Public figures express a va-
riety of opinions that may not necessarily be within their field of expertise. For ex-
ample, prominent members of the entertainment industry have expressed opinions
about the environment, but are ecology and industrial policy within the context of
their field of expertise?
The third test of argument from authority examines the source’s degree of in-
volvement. Is the alleged authority relatively unbiased? The office or position a
person holds may induce bias in a certain direction, and a person who is trying to
protect tenure in an office or position will reflect such biases. We would expect the
president of the American Medical Association to reflect some bias in expressing
an opinion about government regulation of physicians’ fees or the cost of malprac-
tice insurance. Although all authorities have a vested interest in their fields, the im-
portant thing to look for in examining their biases is obvious conflicts of interest
or self-serving statements.
The fourth test of argument from authority examines the source’s statement in
relation to those of acknowledged experts in the field. Does the alleged authority
reflect a majority or minority view? In legal argument, each side may have its own
expert witnesses, amply qualified, who express diametrically opposite views.
Experts often disagree with each other on subjects inside and outside their fields of
expertise. Just because a view is different, it is not automatically invalid. However,
an alleged authority may also express a totally isolated point of view. Many ac-
cepted principles were once minority opinions. If you cite an authority whose view
does not reflect majority opinion, be prepared to establish the credibility of that
view by providing the backing for the warrant in your argument.
The fifth and final test of argument from authority examines the factual basis on
which the source’s statement rests. Is there a reliable factual basis for this opinion?
Remember, it is not the image or stature of the alleged authority that grounds the
claim but the factual basis on which the opinions are offered. When someone with
prestige, office, or an academic reputation offers an opinion, we assume there is
some basis for it. This may not be the case. The person may be bluffing, expressing a
point of view that is contradicted by the evidence, or speaking outside his or her field
of expertise, relying on reputation alone to support the view (Wilson, 1980).
Because of the special nature of this pattern of reasoning, we offer a final cau-
tion about argument from authority. Arguments from authority can be used to cir-
cumvent the reasoning process when authority is cited to prevent further consider-
ation of a matter. In Chapter 8, this error in reasoning is discussed in more detail.
Someone is properly regarded as an expert because the person possesses spe-
cial knowledge, not because of fame or status. The warrant in an argument from
authority should reassure the listener or reader that this is so. Backing is used to
verify the basis of the alleged authority’s expertise. It is important to include both
steps in creating arguments from authority.
Summary of Argument from Authority

1. Argument from authority relies on the credibility of the source of information
to warrant acceptance of the claim it grounds.
2. The source should be a qualified expert in the field by reason of training, ex-
perience, or background.
3. The statements of authorities are only credible within the context of their
fields of expertise.
4. The authority should not be unduly biased.
Argument from Dilemma 145
5. If the authority expresses an opinion at odds with those of the majority of ex-
perts in the field, the arguer should establish the credibility of that view.
6. The authority’s opinion should have a basis in fact.
ARGUMENT FROM DILEMMA

This final type of reasoning deals with choice making and the consequences those
choices bring. For that reason, arguments from dilemma are built with two or
more arguments from cause that embody undesirable consequences.
An argument from dilemma forces a choice between two unacceptable alternatives.
In 2008 and 2009, the U.S. economy turned sharply downward. The bubble in
housing prices, fueled by subprime mortgages that allowed people to buy more
house than they could afford, burst. Many people faced the choice between trying
to pay off a loan whose principal balance was substantially more than their house
was now worth or having the bank foreclose. As the number of foreclosures
mounted, financial institutions facing troubles themselves tightened credit. This
combined with a decline in consumer spending, fueled by fear of layoffs and a re-
cession, to squeeze retailers and manufacturers like the auto companies. The Bush
administration faced the dilemma of whether to let major American companies
like GM, AIG, and Citigroup go bankrupt or increase the deficit by spending sub-
stantial tax dollars to bail them out.
Representative F. James Sensenbrenner eloquently described the dilemma
faced by those who witness crimes. On the one hand, they have an obligation to
help preserve the fabric of society by testifying. On the other, their obligation to
self-preservation may discourage them from doing just that.
Witness intimidation is one of the toughest issues we have discussed this year. In the
twisted mind of a gang member, murderer, he has little to lose if he kills witnesses. Since
he has already killed one victim, he could face the death penalty or live in prison and
there is little more that the criminal justice system can do to him. That makes this prob-
lem tough to solve and puts a lot of pressure on the good people, on the police and
prosecutors to protect innocent people who are witnesses, people who are trying to do
their duty as good citizens and trying to help take the killers off the streets.
Imagine being the witness to one of these murders. One day you are leading a nor-
mal life at home with your family, going to work, the next day you see a murder. And
all of a sudden, due to no fault of your own, your life and the lives of your family are
threatened by the gang members. How outrageous that these decent people must
change their habits, homes and identities simply because they are doing the right thing
and they are doing their duty as citizens of this great democracy. (Witness intimidation,
1994, p. 3)
Regardless of the number of alternatives suggested in the argument, the valid-

ity of a dilemma depends upon its identification of a true either–or situation. The
grounds presented must identify the options available, and these alternatives must
indeed be different, mutually exclusive, choices. An argument from dilemma can
either point toward the one suitable, or least objectionable, choice among the al-
ternatives that the arguer favors, or it can suggest that, in the absence of change,
no suitable alternative exists.
Representative Sensenbrenner’s argument takes the form of a forced choice be-

tween remaining silent, being silenced if you testify, or having to go into a form of
custody by entering a witness protection program so you can testify. The warrant
indicates these are true either–or choices, because the criminal’s lack of inhibition
to kill again explicitly backs the warrant. No matter what choice the witness
makes, adverse consequences occur. Maximizing the societal value by testifying
minimizes personal values of safety or freedom or both. Minimizing the societal
value may not raise the level of personal need satisfaction, because the criminal
will still be at large in the witness’s neighborhood.
Reasoning makes the connection between claims and the evidence used to
ground them. Although in actual argument the warrant and its backing are seldom
stated, it is only through the presentation of the warrant that your reasoning is ex-
plicitly stated to your reader or listener. In your early attempts to frame arguments
from dilemma, we suggest you include at least four elements of the Toulmin
model—grounds, warrant, backing, and claim—as a means of developing facility
with this technique of reasoning.
When you reason, you make an inference that establishes relationships be-
tween observed or known facts and the probable truth or validity of a claim. The
purpose of reasoning is to assist in determining that probability. In the process,
warrants are offered in the form of argument from cause, sign, generalization, par-
allel case, analogy, authority, or dilemma. Each form has some specific tests associ-
ated with it that help determine the validity of the reasoning process. However,
these tests do not identify all the potential errors in reasoning that can occur in ar-
gumentation. In the next chapter, these errors are discussed as we consider some of
the common fallacies that can impair the quality of your arguments.
LEARNING ACTIVITIES
1. Conduct a discussion of argument from cause on one or more controversial topics such
as gun control, abortion, euthanasia, or a campus controversy. What necessary and suf-
ficient conditions establish cause in each case? Are these instances in which multiple
causality may apply? What would be necessary to prove cause in each case?
2. Find examples of public opinion polls on an issue such as gun control, pollution, or
presidential popularity. Construct an argument from sign based on the statistical infor-
mation. Explain the strengths and weaknesses of this sign in establishing the probable
truth of your claim.
3. Examine the text of several speeches from a recent issue of Vital Speeches, or other sim-
ilar source, for examples of the use of analogies. Share your examples in class. Which
analogies succeed in creating comparisons that make the unknown more easily under-
stood? Which seem to fail, and why do they fail? On the basis of this experience, are
analogies a useful reasoning technique?
REFERENCES
Cable competition—Increasing price; Increasing value? (2004, February 11). Washington,
DC: Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate.
Children carrying weapons: Why the recent increase? (1992, October 1). Washington, DC:
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate.
References 147
Derivative rights, moral rights, and movie filtering technology. (2004, May 20). Washington,
DC: Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives.
Drugs in the 1990s: New perils, new promise. (1989, August 31). Washington, DC:
Ehninger, D. E. (1974). Influence, belief, and argument. Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman.
Eisenberg, A. M., & Ilardo, J. A. (1980). Argument: A guide to formal and informal debate
(2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Forest protection initiative and national forest policy. (2001, October 2). Washington, DC:
Subcommittee on Public Lands and Forests of the Committee on Energy and National
Resources, U. S. Senate.
Toulmin, S., Rieke, R., & Janik, A. (1984). An introduction to reasoning (2nd ed.). New
York: Macmillan.
Wilcox, J. R. (1973). The argument from analogy: A new look. Unpublished paper, Central
States Speech Association, Minneapolis.
Wilson, B. A. (1980). The anatomy of argument. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Witness intimidation: Showdown in the streets—Breakdown in the courts. (1994, August 4).
Washington, DC: Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives.
Ziegelmueller, G. W., Kay, J., & Dause, C. A. (1990). Argumentation: Inquiry and advocacy
(2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
CHAPTER
What Should
I Avoid?
T
he strength of your arguments is determined by the use of reliable evidence,
sound reasoning, and adaptation to the audience. In the process of argu-
mentation, mistakes sometimes occur. At this point, it is important to distin-
guish between those made deliberately to distort or deceive and those made in
error. The message appears the same, whether the mistake is the product of inten-
tional deception or the honest error of an arguer who has failed to examine his or
her arguments critically. These mistakes are generically termed fallacies.
Rather than identifying all possible ways in which deliberate distortion and
deception can occur, this chapter focuses on errors to avoid, which will better serve
your development as an arguer. This chapter also suggests how you can both im-
prove your skills as an advocate or an opponent of change and hone your critical
thinking skills to become a more discerning consumer of argument.
Most errors in logic result from faulty reasoning or problems in language
choice, so we want to emphasize the need to pay careful attention to the structure
of arguments, the nature of the appeals they make, and the language used to
phrase them. Consider these problems from the following perspective:
The study of fallacies can be thought of as a kind of sensitivity-training in reasoning. It
should attune the student to the omnipresent dangers to which we are exposed as a con-
sequence of imprecise expressions—vague, ambiguous, or misdefined terms—students
should also be alert to unarticulated assumptions and presumptions. (Toulmin, Rieke,
& Janik, 1984, p. 132)
FALLACIES IN REASONING
Hasty Generalization
When you make a hasty generalization, you have committed the error of jump-
ing to a conclusion. Recall the two tests of argument from generalization: The
generalization must be made on the basis of a sufficient number of cases, and
the cases must compose a representative sample of all cases. The fallacy of hasty
148
generalization occurs when the claim is not warranted, either because insuffi-
cient cases were used or because they constitute a nonrepresentative sample.
Wagering on amateur and professional sports is illegal everywhere in the
country except Nevada. William Saum, director of agent, gambling, and ama-
teurism activities for the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) com-
mitted the fallacy of hasty generalization when he urged the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce to close the so-called
“Nevada loophole” in the 1992 Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act.
Legalized amateur sports wagering in Nevada continues to blunt efforts of the NCAA
and higher education to combat college sports wagering. The insidious effect of legal-
ized wagering on college sports has crept far beyond the Nevada state line. Even though
sports wagering is illegal in nearly every state, point spreads on college games are pub-
lished in newspapers across the country, bookies are common fixtures on college cam-
puses, and new technologies allow bets on college games to be placed over the Internet
or in a casino in innovative ways. The dollars involved are big and escalating every year.
By clearly making gambling on college sports illegal everywhere all the time, we will
strengthen our efforts to maintain the integrity of college sports.
This nation’s college and university system is one of our greatest assets. We offer
the world the model for postsecondary education. Betting on the outcome of college
sporting events tarnishes the integrity of sport and diminishes the esteem in which we
and the rest of the world hold United States colleges and universities. While we recog-
nize that a ban on collegiate sports wagering will not eliminate all gambling on college
sports, it is a significant part. Our goal is to protect student-athletes and remove the un-
seemly influences of sports wagering on our amateur athletes and the games they play.
(Challenges facing amateur athletics, 2002, p. 35)
The scientific method imposes rigorous standards for data collection and analy-
sis that must be met if valid generalizations are to be drawn. In the field of scientific
argument, reports of results often include a discussion of the limitations that restrict
their generalizability, which constitute deficiencies in backing for the implicit war-
rant that the results are generalizable beyond the sample because they were derived
from the scientific method. No similar tradition exists in other fields of argument.
Although arguers in these fields should make every attempt to avoid committing fal-
lacies, the onus is on their listeners and readers to engage in critical thinking to make
sure they are not being deceived, even in circumstances such as a congressional hear-
ing where spokespersons for the other side of the controversy will be present.
Although Mr. Saum qualifies his conclusion, saying “we recognize that a ban
on collegiate sports wagering will not eliminate all gambling on college sports,”
that does not minimize the significance of two hasty generalizations that precede
it. The first is the argument that legal sports betting in Nevada influences the deci-
sion by newspapers to publish point spreads, bookies to do business on college
campuses, and people to wager lots of money on sports in places where doing it is
illegal. The second is the assertion that “the esteem in which we and the rest of the
world hold United States colleges and universities” is diminished when people
place bets on the outcome the Rose Bowl.
Avoiding the fallacy of hasty generalization underscores the importance of our
earlier suggestions that arguers include all elements of the primary triad in the
Toulmin model of argument and that they back their warrants. “If we are forced to
spell out the warrants on which our arguments rely and the backing on which
150 CHAPTER 8 What Should I Avoid?
those warrants depend, it will usually become clear at once when our grounds are
based on too small a sample of cases or on examples that are quite untypical”
(Toulmin et al., 1984, p. 154).
Many fallacious generalizations occur when arguers are tempted to squeeze
more from an argument than is actually warranted. Arguing an unqualified claim
grounded on insufficient or atypical cases, rather than one qualified to conform to
the limitations of your research, is a mistake. Because generalization is one of the
most frequently used forms of reasoning, you are well advised to examine very
carefully the generalizations you make and hear.
Transfer
Transfers extend reasoning beyond what is logically possible. There are three
common types of transfer: fallacy of composition, fallacy of division, and fallacy
of refutation.
Fallacies of composition occur when a claim asserts that what is true of a part
is true of the whole. The written statement of Merriah Fairchild, Higher Education
Director of the California Student Public Interest Research Group, which accom-
panied her testimony, included the following:
Results of the CALPIRG Report Ripoff 101: How the Current Practices of the
Textbook Industry Drive Up the Cost of College Textbooks Throughout fall 2003, a
team of students and staff at ten University of California and Oregon campuses con-
ducted interviews with bookstore managers and faculty and compared different edi-
tions of the five most purchased textbooks. The report was peer reviewed by a number
of academics and a former publishing industry executive to confirm the statistical valid-
ity of the report’s findings and conclusions.
Among the report’s findings:
Textbooks Are Expensive and Getting Even More Expensive

• Students will spend an average of $898 per year on textbooks in 2003–04, or almost
20 percent of the cost of in-state fees. In contrast, a 1997 UC survey found that stu-
dents spent an average of $642 on textbooks in 1996–97.
Textbook Publishers Add Bells and Whistles That Inflate the Price of Textbooks;
Most Faculty Do Not Use These Materials
• Half of all textbooks now come “bundled” or shrink-wrapped with additional
instructional materials, such as CD-ROMs and workbooks.
• Of all the books surveyed, there was only one instance in which students could buy
a textbook “a la carte” or without additional materials. In that example, the bun-
dled version was $120, while the unbundled version was only $60. Over sixty-five
percent of the faculty surveyed for the report say they “rarely” or “never” use the
bundled materials in their courses.
Textbook Publishers Put New Editions on the Market Frequently—Often With Very Few
Content Changes—Making the Less Expensive, Used Textbooks Obsolete and Unavailable
• Publishers keep textbook editions on the shelf for an average of only 3.5 years before
updating them.
• Meanwhile, seventy-six percent of faculty surveyed said that the new editions they
use are justified half the time or less; over half of those faculty said that the new edi-
tions they use are “rarely to never” justified. (Are college textbooks fairly priced?
2004, p. 10)
Before you start thinking “hasty generalization,” because this argument cer-
tainly is one, or try to remember how much you paid for this book, notice that
CALPIRG’s study focused on a very limited number of books and the faculty who
adopt them. A written statement submitted for the record in response to CALPIRG
by Thomson Higher Education quotes Professor of Statistics Jessica M. Utts at
University of California, Davis:
In fact the size of the population relative to the sample is irrelevant, as long as the pop-
ulation is large. The two relevant issues are the size of the sample, and the method of
selection. In CALPIRG’s case, they say the students were “randomly surveyed” but then
say they were chosen as they finished buying their books at the campus bookstore. That
is not a “random” sample. They also admit that the faculty were selected based on
what books they used in their classes. Thus, they were not randomly selected either.
(Are college textbooks fairly priced? 2004, p. 41)
When claims assert that what is true of a part is true of the whole, the warrant
and its backing must be carefully examined, because they are what justifies the infer-
ential leap from part to whole. CALPIRG’s argument makes the inferential leap from
part to whole in two ways. First, it asserts that what is true of “the five most pur-
chased textbooks” is true of all textbooks. Second, it asserts that the beliefs of faculty
who select these textbooks are held by faculty in general. The most purchased books
are likely to be those used in mass-lecture or standardized multisection courses that
most, if not all, students at a particular school are required to take. Although such
courses can account for a lot of textbook sales, they represent a small, and potentially
atypical, part of the universe of college textbooks and college professors.
Fallacies of division are the opposite of fallacies of composition. This error
arises from arguing that what is true of the whole will be true of its parts. When
you break a whole into its parts and attempt to make claims about them, you may
create an unwarranted transfer from the whole to its parts. “Speech courses are
fun, and argumentation is a speech course; therefore, argumentation is fun.” This
may be true or it may be false, but the transfer from whole to part is not suffi-
ciently warranted.
Johnny Hughes, retired major in the Maryland State Police and the director of
government relations for the National Troopers Coalition, committed the fallacy
of division in the statement he submitted to the Subcommittee on the Constitution,
Federalism, and Property Rights of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary in
which he claims racial profiling does not occur:
If some misguided governors, politicians, and police chiefs continue to attack the issue
of legitimate criminal profiling and call it racial profiling, legitimate policing of this
nation’s drug couriers will be dramatically reduced. Good police officers will be afraid
to stop anyone for fear of being labeled a racist and facing retaliation by their police
department and political rivals. Some police commissioners, superintendents, and chiefs
have already yielded and are not supporting their troopers and police officers on this
particular issue. Overreaction to race rather than crime is a travesty, as troopers and
police officers are in the direct line of fire. Numerous troopers and police officers have
been killed or severely injured on drug interdiction traffic stops. The National Troopers
Coalition represents 45,000 sworn State Police and Highway Patrol personnel. These
fine troopers and officers of all ranks, trooper through colonel, support and utilize pro-
fessional policing methods. Race-based traffic stops is not one of them. (Racial profil-
ing within law enforcement agencies, 2000, p. 44)
The subcommittee heard testimony from a number of witnesses indicating

criminal profiling was racially biased. Setting that aside for the moment, even if
law enforcement officers as a whole do not use race as the basis for pulling people
over, that does not mean the some officers do not stop motorists for the offense of
“driving while black or latino” and nothing else. Whenever we speak of all mem-
bers of a group as having uniform attributes, motives, or behavior patterns, we
risk committing the fallacy of division.
Fallacy of refutation is the final transfer fallacy, also known as the straw man
argument. It occurs when an arguer attempts to direct attention to the successful
refutation of an argument that was never raised or to restate a strong argument in
a way that makes it appear weaker. It is called a straw man argument because it fo-
cuses on an issue that is easy to overturn. It is a form of deception because it intro-
duces a bogus claim, one that was not part of the argument or misrepresents the
original claim.
In his written testimony, Wallace I. Renfro, senior advisor to the president of
the National Collegiate Athletic Association, commits the fallacy of refutation in
arguing that critics of higher academic standards for student-athletes are not only
attacking the integrity of intercollegiate athletics but university faculties as well.
The votes by the Division I Board of Directors on the new reform initiatives had barely
been reported last month when the critics went on the attack. The worst are the cynics
who have declared that the reform efforts will fail because faculty will succumb to the un-
restrained pressure of coaches and fans and commit academic fraud to ensure that student-
athletes remain eligible and athletics programs remain successful. Their arguments are spe-
cious. They would have us believe that higher academic standards result in increased
instances of academic fraud. The logical counterpart is that reduced standards will reduce
academic fraud, and the elimination of all standards will end academic fraud for good.
The Board rejects completely the notion that tougher standards are a barrier to im-
proving academic performance. Faculties around the country should be insulted by the
suggestion that their collective integrity will wilt in the heat of competitive pressure.
Academic fraud is the result of loss of integrity and not the result of higher standards or
enhanced expectations. Nor is it fair to characterize all coaches as knuckle-dragging
Neanderthals who are disinterested in the academic success of their student-athletes.
The vast majority of coaches view themselves as educators who take pride in the class-
room achievements of their charges. (Supporting our intercollegiate student-athletes,
2004, p. 19)
Fallacies of this sort are relatively easy to commit. We often raise a series of
questions or call attention to things related but not central to the issue at hand,
thinking they constitute a sufficient response to the arguments of another. Mr.
Renfro is correct in claiming that critics believe higher standards would increase
fraud, but they never claimed that lowering or eliminating standards would reduce
it. Although it is true that faculty may be insulted by charges that they will suc-
cumb to pressure and commit academic fraud, that does not mean there will not be
pressure, and it does not mean some faculty will not cave in.
It is easy to accidentally shift the focus of argumentation in an inappropriate di-
rection. When we are uninformed or ill-prepared, we may unintentionally create
straw man arguments. Carefully examine the degree of similarity between the things
compared in an analogy or the number of cases used to support a generalization.
Responding to an argument perceived to be weak with a strong argument of your
own does not mean you are necessarily creating a straw man by magnifying a
minor issue into a major one. Remember, the quality of individual units of argu-
ment can vary, depending on both the competence of the arguers and the availabil-
ity of evidence.
Irrelevant Arguments
An irrelevant argument is one that does not seem pertinent in terms of the claim it
advances or the basis of the proof it offers. Such fallacies are also known as non se-
quiturs, Latin for “it does not necessarily follow.” Representative Ed Whitfield of
Kentucky had the following to say during the hearings concerning the Broadcast
Decency Enforcement Act of 2004:
I disagree with some in the industry who say that these incidents are so fleeting, or are
so insignificant that they don’t really have an impact. Any time a flagrantly inappropri-
ate word or scene is broadcast into tens of millions of homes across the nation, in my
opinion, that incident ceases to be isolated or rare. (The broadcast decency enforcement
act of 2004, 2004, p. 20)
These hearings took place shortly after the exposure of Janet Jackson’s right
breast during the 2004 Super Bowl halftime show. In the context of the Super Bowl
halftime extravaganza, which lasts longer than the halftime for any other NFL
game, this roughly one-second event was so fleeting that some people were not
sure what had happened until they checked their TIVOs. In the context of what
has become a half-day Super Bowl experience, complete with pre-game and post-
game shows, it “does not follow” that because millions of people saw her breast
the “incident ceases to be isolated or rare.”
A questionable argument from analogy can seem like a non sequitur. Not to be
outdone by his colleague, minutes later Representative Michael F. Doyle of
Pennsylvania made the following observation:
And I further wonder why we can’t establish a more effective and timely method of
reviewing complaints and handing out fines when necessary. You know, when a driver
runs a red light or parks in the wrong spot, their fine is swiftly established, yet when
indecent material is broadcast to millions of people, our current process can take years
to conclude. Unfortunately, that seems to both allow for and almost invite further
abuse. (The broadcast decency enforcement act of 2004, 2004, p. 20)
Although the definition of what constitutes “running a red light” is fairly well
established and understood, what constitutes “indecent material” is not. Whether
we ever could or should think of them in the same way is an open question.
Therein lies the rub and the reason these hearings were held. If it is your intention
to advance an argument, do so completely by stating your claim, the grounds that
support it, and the warrant that links them so that you do not appear guilty of
speaking or writing in non sequiturs.
Circular Reasoning
Also known as begging the question, circular reasoning supports claims with
reasons identical to the claims themselves. Donald M. Fehr, executive director of
the Major League Baseball Players Association, managed to talk himself around
in an almost perfect circle while discussing the issue of privacy as it relates to
drug testing:
Another important issue which is implicated in this discussion we summarize in a single
word, and that’s “privacy.” We believe that any program can be successful, on steroids
or anything else, only if stringent safeguards are in place to protect the privacy of the em-
ployees, particularly so in an industry like baseball in which the lives of the players—and
the rest of us, for that matter—are so much in the public eye.
We also recognize the ongoing public debate, which has been referred to in the
opening statements this morning, about the merits of cause-based versus random test-
ing. The Players Association has always believed that one should not, absent com-
pelling safety considerations, invade the privacy of an individual without a substantial
reason—that is to say without cause—related to conduct by that individual and not
merely to his status as an employed baseball player.
We understand, of course, that the principles underlying the Fourth Amendment
restrictions on unreasonable searches and seizures are not directly applicable to the pri-
vate employment setting. Nevertheless, such principles should not, we submit, be
lightly put aside. (Steroid use, 2002, p. 27)
In this example, the meaning of grounds and warrant are equivalent to the
meaning of the claim itself.
CLAIM: You shouldn’t invade the privacy of a player who is already in the
public eye.
GROUND: Even though “Fourth Amendment restrictions on unreasonable
searches and seizures are not directly applicable to the private
employment setting . . . such principles should not . . . be lightly
put aside.”
WARRANT: “One should not, absent compelling safety considerations, invade
the privacy of an individual without a substantial reason—that is
to say without cause.”
Strictly speaking, this is a nonargument, because it makes no inference from
grounds through warrant to claim. It is an example of a fallacious attempt to support
a claim by simply repeating the essential aspects of the claim using different words.
Avoiding the Issue

Any attempt to shift attention away from the issue at hand is an error, because ig-
noring an issue rather than discussing it denies the integrity of the reasoning
process. Although we suspect that some avoidance behaviors are intentional, it is
more likely that arguers pay insufficient attention to the task at hand. Monitor
your own behavior and that of others for these common errors.
Simple evasion is the first type of avoidance. Changing the subject for no ap-
parent reason, or bypassing a critical issue, diverts attention from the issues central
to the argument. This error is most likely to occur when insufficient time has been
spent analyzing the topic to determine which issues are inherent to the proposition.
In some instances, evasion represents a conscious attempt to avoid confronting an
unpleasant fact.
In response to a question by Senator Byron L. Dorgan of North Dakota about
why baseball could not have a drug testing program like the National Basketball
Association’s, which screened for drugs that were not explicitly banned by
Congress, Fehr had this to say:
First of all, I don’t speak for, and don’t purport to speak for, the NBA players or anyone
other than my own constituency, so I’m not going to speak to those issues. I assume they
do what they do for reasons that they believe are good and sufficient to themselves.
Secondly, that does not resolve the question which may arise from time to time,
which is, “If this substance is not prohibited, and if I’m of a certain age, is that not a
choice that I should make?” Now, to ask the question doesn’t answer it, but there are
lots of things we say in this country that are different. You can’t buy alcohol when
you’re in 5th grade. You can’t buy tobacco when you’re in 5th grade. You can’t adver-
tise tobacco to kids. You can’t do any of that stuff.
Third—and this is most important point, I think, for me. And we all have kids, and
this is why I think this is a much more significant issue than just baseball, although that’s
where the publicity has been. In fact, if children are using a lot of these substances, and
we’ve just been talking about androstenedione, it is in large part because 11-year-olds can
walk into stores and buy them. And there’s no getting around that. And that is something
that Congress can do something about, which is why we invite you to take a look at it. It
doesn’t answer the question as to what you do in baseball. But I respectfully suggest it’s a
much bigger question than what we do in baseball. (Steroid use, 2002, p. 52)
Attacking the person not the argument is the second avoidance behavior.
Known as an ad hominem argument, it shifts attention to the arguer’s personality
or appearance, ability to reason, skin color, or values, none of which tell us any-
thing about the validity of the arguments. It is essential that the worth of ideas be-
hind claims be given primary consideration in the argumentative context; the ad
hominem argument subverts this.
Former President Carter wrote a book of poetry that was well received by critics.
An ad hominem attack dismissed it briefly, without presenting sound reasons why it
was not worth reading. “He’s written a book of poetry. I think that I shall never see/a
poem as lovely as a goober pea” (Mullen, 1995, p. 10). A more extensive example is
found in the testimony of Robert Corn-Revere, a partner in the law firm of Davis
Wright Tremaine LLP before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the
Internet of the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce. In it,
he labeled one of the other witnesses testifying a censor and attacked his motives:
Justice Kennedy at the Supreme Court has written that self-assurance is the hallmark of
the censor. And in that case, Mr. Bozell seems to be very, very certain about what pro-
grams we should not be watching on television or listening to on radio. Just going by
the Web site of the Parents Television Council, for example, they list the top 10 and the
worst 10 and the best 10 television shows.
The No. 1 show on the worst 10 is CSI, Crime Scene on CBS, which just coinci-
dentally is the top-rated show on television. If the community standard for broadcast-
ing has nothing to do with people—with what people have chosen to watch, I am not
sure what the community standard may be.
There is also a part of the Web site for Parents Television Council that calls on peo-
ple to file complaints with the FCC over the Victoria’s Secret fashion show. Now, say
what you will about that show, you might like it, you might hate it, for purpose of con-
stitutional analysis it is really the same thing as Baywatch, although with perhaps bet-
ter acting. (“Can you say that on TV?” 2004, pp. 70–71)
There is one circumstance in which attacking the person is appropriate and does
not commit any fallacy. That is when the qualifications of a source of information
are called into question. So long as the argument focuses on factors relevant to the
disputed issue and avoids irrelevant personal attack, no fallacy of reasoning takes
place. In a written response to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Professor Michael
Radelet of the University of Florida and Professor Adam Bedau of Tufts University
attacked the tactics of a witness who appeared before the committee and the expert-
ise of a source of information used by that witness:
Mr. Cassell also presented the Committee with a distorted discussion of the research
that has been done on the deterrent effect of capital punishment. Again, the belief
that only sources that support his conclusion should be cited is seen. Mr. Cassell
argues that the death penalty has strong deterrent effects, and cites a study done by
Stephen Layson, a young economist, not a criminologist, and published in a regional
economics journal, as support. He ignores the fact that a meticulous critique of this
study has been published since 1989 that showed that Mr. Layson’s conclusions do
not follow from his data. In addition, Mr. Cassell ignores the fact that no criminolo-
gist or sociologist in the country today claims to have data that show the death
penalty has a better deterrent effect than long imprisonment. He ignores the fact that
virtually every study done on deterrence in the United States in the last sixty years has
found no deterrent effects. He ignores such authority as the National Academy of Sci-
ences, whose study on this topic in 1978 concluded that a study similar to that cited
by Mr. Cassell had no relevance for public policy. Even Stephen Layson, author of the
study cited by Mr. Cassell, acknowledged in his 1985 congressional testimony that his
results were an artifact of the 1960s, when few executions occurred, and thus the
findings could not be generalized to other years in the irresponsible way done by Mr.
Cassell. By ignoring the problems with the work on deterrence he cites, as well as by
ignoring numerous other studies that conflict with his preset conclusions, Mr. Cassell
misleads this Committee about the status of modern research on deterrence. (Inno-
cence and the death penalty, 1993, p. 158)
What Professors Radelet and Bedau did differs from the two previous exam-
ples because they offer a series of arguments indicting the tactics of Mr. Cassell and
the qualifications of Mr. Layson. They apply tests of proof, source credibility, and
sound reasoning rather than attacking the personhood of either the opposing ar-
guer or his source. They apply the rule of that noted practitioner of argumentation,
Don Vito Corleone, the Godfather: “It’s not personal, it’s business.”
Shifting ground is a third fallacy of avoidance. Shifts of ground occur when an
arguer abandons his or her original position on a particular argument and adopts a
new one. It is probably one of the easiest errors to commit. In everyday communica-
tion, most of us do not decide on what we plan to say in advance. There is a ten-
dency to adapt, to modify our thoughts and the manner of their expression, to those
around us. This becomes a problem when we are involved in argumentation, be-
cause shifting ground gives the impression of evasiveness. We need to be careful to
stick to our claims. This does not mean you can never change your mind or admit an
error in argumentation. However, if you find it necessary to move away from your
original claims, take special care to explain what has caused you to shift ground.
L. Brent Bozell III, president and founder of The Parents Television Council
gives the impression of shifting ground in response to Mr. Corn-Revere’s charge
that he is acting like a censor.
MR. BOZELL: Since this attack came out of nowhere, can I defend myself?
MR. UPTON: I will give you 30 seconds.
MR. BOZELL: Fine. First of all, we have never suggested that nobody should
watch CSI. That is preposterous, and you know that.
Second, where Victoria’s Secret is concerned, many organi-
zations complained, people complained from all over the coun-
try. I thought that was our right, first amendment. Thank you.
(“Can you say that on TV?” 2004, p. 71)
Seizing on a trivial point is the final error of avoidance. When you locate an-
other’s weak or indefensible argument and magnify it out of all proportion to dis-
credit his entire position on the proposition, you have committed the fallacy of seizing
on a trivial point. Sarah Brady almost committed the fallacy of seizing on a trivial
point in responding to Senator Herbert Kohl’s question about the claim that the exis-
tence of 22,000 gun laws proves that legislation cannot reduce gun-related violence:
No one has ever been able to figure out where this 22,000 figure comes from. Accord-
ing to the Justice Department we can only figure out close to 15,000 or 16,000 laws,
most of which are very local, some very antiquated. (Children and gun violence,
1993, p. 159)
The accuracy of factual information is of great importance, but focusing all of

your attention on minor inaccuracies and trivial points is unsound argumentation.
Had her response stopped at this point, Ms. Brady would have seized on a trivial
point. Even using the lower range of the Justice Department estimate, 15,000 laws
is a lot. It should be enough to reduce gun-related violence if laws were a necessary
or sufficient cause to produce that effect. The remainder of her response to Senator
Kohl’s question is what enabled her to avoid the fallacy of seizing on a trivial point:
They are certainly not federal laws. And it points out what we need are effective,
national, uniform laws that are enforceable and that are enforced. And we need effec-
tive laws, and that’s what we’re working toward with the Brady Bill, . . . which would
be put in place federally, what Wisconsin already has in place. . . . Make it uniform so
that you can’t go to other states and traffic guns back in, so that everybody across the
country is on an even footing. (Children and gun violence, 1993, p. 159)
Forcing a Dichotomy
A forced dichotomy is one in which listeners or readers are presented with an over-
simplified either–or choice, phrased in such a way that it forces them to favor the
arguer’s preferred option. The fallaciousness of the forced dichotomy rests on its
failure to consider alternative choices fully. The forced dichotomy is also known as
the false dilemma. Because argument from dilemma involves clustering two or
more arguments from cause, forced dichotomies, or false dilemmas, are produced
when arguers fail to account for the possibility of partial or multiple causality. The
forced dichotomy is a fallacy in reasoning because the choice that it forces one to
make is too simplistic.
Notice how Representative Charles Schumer rejected a false dichotomy, that
television is either the cause of all social problems or has no effect on them what-
soever, in his statement opening the hearings on television violence:
At a recent symposium on television violence sponsored by TV Guide, Neil Hickey
pointed out that, in 1940, the seven top problems in public schools identified by teachers
were: talking out of turn; chewing gum; making noise; running in the halls; cutting in line;
dress code infractions; and illiteracy.
In 1980, the top seven problems in public schools were: suicide; assault; robbery;
rape; drug abuse; alcohol abuse; and pregnancy.
Now, of course, television is not to blame for all of this dramatic change, but it is
just as wrong to say it has had no effect at all. It has, and that is why we are here.
(Violence on television, 1992, p. 2)
The either–or rhetoric of a forced dichotomy in this instance would have fore-
stalled consideration of too many potential issues. In human affairs, truth about
causality is seldom an either–or proposition, a simple choice between two alterna-
tive explanations. Examine your own reasoning and that of others to avoid being
trapped into arguing or accepting forced dichotomies.
Summary of Fallacies in Reasoning

1. Hasty generalizations offer conclusions based on insufficient information—
for example, on too few instances, atypical examples, or overstatements that
claim more than is warranted.
2. Transfer fallacies of composition result from the unwarranted assumption that
what is true of the part is true of the whole.
3. Transfer fallacies of division result from the unwarranted assumption that
what is true of the whole is true of its parts.
4. Irrelevant arguments, non sequiturs, make assumptions that do not follow
from the information provided.
5. Circular reasoning offers as warrants and grounds statements equivalent in
meaning to the claims they are supposed to support.
6. Avoiding the issue is an error in reasoning that shifts attention from the issue
under consideration. It commonly takes the form of a simple evasion of the
issue, an attack on the arguer rather than the argument, a shift of ground, or
seizing on a trivial point rather than the central issue.
7. Forcing a dichotomy puts the listener or reader in the position of having to
choose between oversimplified either–or options.
FALLACIES OF APPEAL
When you construct an argument, you do not do so in a vacuum. You have an
audience in mind and develop your arguments accordingly. This can lead you to
commit a series of fallacies based on the appeals you decide to make. In particu-
lar, we must be careful when appealing to emotion rather than the ability to rea-
son. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with emotional appeals, but problems
can arise when you use these appeals to avoid arguing the issues at hand.
Appeals that bypass reason are usually based on the feelings, prejudices, or de-
sires of the audience. The fallacies of appeal we shall discuss are some of the
more commonly occurring lapses arguers experience that reduce the rationality
of their arguments. Again, we emphasize that emotional appeals are an impor-
tant part of the process of persuasion and caution that, in argumentation, emo-
tion should not supplant reason.
Appeal to Ignorance
Appeals to ignorance, known as the ad ignoratium argument, ask the audience to
accept the truth of a claim because no proof to the contrary exists. In other words,
something is true simply because it cannot be proven false. Dr. Arnold Relman,
M.D., and Professor Emeritus of Medicine and of Social Medicine at the Harvard
Medical School begged the question in a unique way in responding to Larry Craig,
Chairman of the Senate Special Committee on Aging, on the question of whether
direct-to-consumer drug advertising has any effect:
THE CHAIRMAN: Dr. Relman, in your testimony you stated “There is no scien-
tific evidence to support the contention that DTC advertising
encourages people to consult physicians for earlier diagnoses
or treatment.” How do you respond to the surveys by FDA
and Prevention Magazine that indicate that as many as 20
million people visited with their doctor about a condition for
the first time as a result of DTC advertising?
DR. RELMAN: Senator, one of the basic rules of all good epidemiologic re-
search is that there be adequate controls. There are simply
no controls for all such studies. We do not know in any sys-
tematic, quantitative way what the behavior would be of pa-
tients who never heard about these ads for the simple reason
that there is hardly anybody who is conscious in America
these days who has not heard about these ads.
If you look at the data which says well, these ads are re-
sponsible for the behavior, it will not pass muster. It would not
have been accepted for the New England Journal of Medicine
or any other really rigorously peer-reviewed journal.
Senator Craig then asked Dr. Janet Woodcock, M.D., and Director of the
Food and Drug Administration’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, how
she would respond to that statement.
It would be a challenge in today’s environment, as Dr. Relman just alluded to, to design
such a study. It would be difficult to take a segment of our population and refuse to
allow them access to prescription drug ads so that we could determine what their
behavior is. There are methodologic difficulties in getting to the level of scientific proof
that Dr. Relman is looking for. (Direct-to-consumer advertising, 2003, p. 117)
Dr. Woodcock’s answer indicates the inherent problem in trying to scientifi-

cally prove that exposure to drug advertising causes people to check with their
doctor sooner than might have otherwise been the case. Given his background, Dr.
Relman’s appreciation for the medical model of scientific research is understand-
able, but it causes him to dismiss the existence of all evidence collected using alter-
native models that supports a causal connection. For him, if you cannot prove
something happens using this method, it means it does not happen.
Even more troublesome is the technique of claiming that because we cannot
prove something has not happened, or does not exist, it therefore must have hap-
pened or must exist. Consider this example: “The inability to disprove the exis-
tence of flying saucers and extraterrestrial visitation to earth confirms the existence
of the former and the occurrence of the latter.” Can you make nonfallacious claims
about what the absence of proof may mean? The answer is yes, to a certain extent.
Artificial presumption may be assigned in such a way that failure to prove
something leads to the conclusion that its logical opposite is true. When the prose-
cution fails to present a prima facie case against the accused, we conclude the ac-
cused must be innocent. In other fields that do not rely exclusively on artificial pre-
sumption, the absence of contrary evidence may strengthen a claim, but it in no
way proves it. The absence of evidence may simply mean that research regarding
the phenomenon has not been very thorough.
Appeal to the People

Also known as the bandwagon appeal, the ad populum argument, is an appeal to
the people that addresses the audience’s prejudices and feelings rather than the is-
sues at hand. When a claim is justified on the basis of its alleged popularity—we
should do or believe something because the majority of people do or believe it—an
appeal to the people is being made. FCC Commission Michael J. Copps did pre-
cisely that in the following:
I think the average citizen has helped bring us to where we are today. I think the average
citizen has kind of compelled the attention of the Federal Communications Commission
for the first time in many, many, many, many years or even going farther back. I have a
great trust in the average citizen when he or she speaks out, and if given the facts I hold to
that quaint notion that the American people will probably arrive at the conclusion of
what is the right thing to do for the country. I think millions of Americans have arrived at
the conclusion that the time is now to do something on indecency.
I think our leaders also, like Brent Bozell and the Parents Television Council, Jim
Steyer, Common Sense Media, the list goes on and churches and others who have been
instrumental in this, not because they’re directing an orchestra, but because they’re re-
sponsive to the grass roots and they appreciate the sentiment that’s out there and how
widespread it is in every nook and corner of this land. (The broadcast decency enforce-
ment act of 2004, 2004, p. 133)
On the one hand, common sense suggests that when matters concerning “the
people” are discussed, their will should be taken into account. In the case of a fu-
ture law, this allows us to forecast whether it would likely be obeyed or violated.
On the other hand, to make popular opinion the sole criterion of a claim’s worth,
and to appeal to this opinion to discourage consideration of pertinent facts, cannot
help but result in less informed and less thoughtful decisions. Critical considera-
tion of the issues should take precedence over popular opinion.
Appeal to Emotion
As we suggested, the use of emotional appeals is not necessarily bad, nor is it pos-
sible to be entirely rational. Nevertheless, strong appeals to emotion are no substi-
tute for careful reasoning. Any emotion may be a source of appeal; here, we will
concentrate on the two used most frequently in poor argumentation, appeals to
pity and fear.
Traditionally, the use of the appeal to pity was taught as a means of creating
audience sympathy for an individual or group. Such appeals are common on topics
that address the suffering of those unable to overcome misfortune without the aid
of others. No fallacy is committed when such appeals are used in conjunction with
sound reasoning. However, when pity is the only basis on which an alteration of be-
lief or behavior is justified, argumentation has been abandoned in favor of exclu-
sively emotive persuasion.
The appeal to fear is another form of emotion seeking, arousing concern over
potential consequences. As with appeals to pity, the use of appeals to fear is a mat-
ter of appropriateness and balance. There are occasions when a little fear is needed
to move people to action, but appealing to fear alone may produce disastrous con-
sequences. When fear dictates behavior, rash decisions may result, such as the
blacklisting that destroyed careers during the McCarthy era. Lowell W. “Bud”
Paxson, chairman and CEO of Paxson Communications Corporations suggested
we have more than indecent content in what is broadcast to fear:
Yes, the father and the mother have a responsibility of what their children watches. We
also have a real issue here going beyond that. We are talking about the satellite, we are
talking about the cable company. We are talking about the right of ways all owned by
the public. And I can tell you that a majority of American people would stand up and
scream no in no way, scrambled, unscrambled, in no way do we want our right of way,
our licenses, our airways to be used for pornography. Let us go past indecency.
Let us go right to the heart of the matter: pornography; 675 hours in one 24-hour
period here in the Nation’s Capital on Tuesday. That is destroying the family. It is de-
stroying it in every way. The kids can get to the remote. Mom is not in there every
minute. A lot of families work. The kids come home in the afternoon. Their parents go
to bed at 9. They get up at 11. There is just no way that the pornography issues should
be allowed to exist. (The broadcast decency enforcement act of 2004, 2004, p. 251)
Appeal to Authority
An argument from authority that uses the opinions and testimony of experts is a
legitimate form of reasoning. However, care must be exercised to ensure that the
argument from authority does not become a fallacious appeal to authority. An ap-
peal to authority is fallacious when a seemingly authoritative source of opinion ei-
ther lacks real expertise or prevents a fair hearing of the other side of the issue.
Instead of being used to ground a claim or back a warrant, the authority is charac-
terized as infallible and is used to shut off further discussion of the issues. Abuses
of authority commonly involve the Bible, the Constitution, revered persons, or tes-
timonials by celebrities in advertising.
Robert Corn-Revere used biblical examples to explain why “per se rules,”
which define certain words as indecent, regardless of their context, do not work:
For one thing, under such a rule, certain passages in the Bible would be banned from
the air. Isaiah, Chapter 36, Verse 12, would be out, as would Samuel, Chapter 25, Verse
22. So would certain newscasts.
In 1991, the FCC dismissed an indecency complaint against National Public Radio
for a newscast which included an excerpt of a wiretap from the mob trial of mob boss,
John Gotti. The same word or variations thereof that appeared in the Golden Globes’
telecast was repeated 10 times in the course of any 30-second segment. Nevertheless,
the Commission found that, given the surrounding circumstances, the use of expletives
during the Gotti segment does not meet its determination of broadcast indecency.
(“Can you say that on TV?” 2004, p. 31)
At a later point in the hearings, representative John Shimkus of Illinois seems

to commit the fallacy of appeal to authority by discussing the issue of per se rules
as they might relate to certain passages from the Bible:
Mr. Corn-Revere, you mentioned scripture, which brings us to this issue of intent.
Second Timothy 3:16 says: All scripture is inspired by God and profitable for doctrine
for rebuke, for training and righteousness, but the man of God might be equipped for
every good deed.
So if we just had a radio show and quoted scripture and then penalized the use of
the word in scripture, the intent of the language in the scripture is not to debase, but it
is to train, instruct, and it is—to train in righteousness. That is the whole intent.
So I am going to throw out, how do we fashion legislative language—and I am a
cosponsor—to make sure that we go after the bad actors, the people who are intending
to defraud and abuse and misuse the public airwaves, and not go after, you know, as I
said in the opening statement, slippage? And how do you craft in the FCC a ruling body
that can judge intent? (“Can you say that on TV?” 2004, p. 69)
Representative Shimkus only avoids a fallacious appeal to authority to the extent

that intent (his term) and context (Mr. Corn-Revere’s term) are synonymous,
which his desire to “go after the bad actors” suggests is not the case.
Besides avoiding the use of authority to short-circuit the process of argumen-
tation entirely, be prepared to defend your choice of experts. Unknowingly, your
choice may represent a fallacious use of authority if you cite someone outside her
or his acknowledged field of expertise. Although we might take Tiger Woods’s ad-
vice about golf, is he likely to be an expert on cars or some of the other products
he used to hawk? Making this distinction is sometimes difficult because an individ-
ual may be an expert in more than one field. At one time, comedian Bill Cosby ap-
peared in a series of computer commercials. We might acknowledge his expertise
as a performer, but what about education, the major claim advanced in these com-
mercials? In fact, Bill Cosby has advanced degrees in psychology and education,
has produced several educational films, and has also lectured on race relations and
motivation. This illustrates why it is always important to provide information doc-
umenting the qualifications of those you cite.
Appeal to Humor
Appeals based on humor can be problematical for several reasons. The arguer who
resorts to a series of jokes about women drivers to refute criticism of auto safety
standards uses humor to entertain rather than enlighten. When humor becomes
the focal point of the discussion, the point of argumentation is lost.
Representative Tammy Baldwin of Wisconsin comes perilously close to com-
mitting the fallacy of appealing to humor in her opening remarks during the hear-
ings concerning the Bowl Championship Series (BCS), the method by which a na-
tional champion is determined in Division I college football.
I am sure that many of my colleagues did as I did over the Thanksgiving recess and
spent much of our time in listening sessions and engaging with constituents. I can tell
you my own experience, in listening session after listening session around my district,
that I was shocked to hear more constituents talk about their confusion with the
Medicare prescription drug plan than their confusion or the changes that are being
proposed to the BCS formula. I also have to admit, I was taken aback when I got more
questions about what Congress is doing to provide health care to the uninsured and no
questions about who I would pick to win the Heismann Trophy. For the record, I think
that Reggie Bush is a lock, with all apologies to Texas University and Vince Young
fans. (Determining a champion on the field, 2005, pp. 12–13)
Humor is also misused when it takes a claim to its most extreme and therefore
absurd meaning. This is known as reductio ad absurdum. Reducing a claim to ab-
surdity is a particularly troublesome kind of fallacy because it sometimes occurs in
an effort to employ style. What it mostly does is decrease the discussion’s rational-
ity. One of the premises of the National Rifle Association is frequently seen on
bumper stickers: “I support the right to bear arms.” This claim is reduced to the
absurd by another bumper sticker: “I support the right to arm bears!” Although
such a turn of phrase may be witty, it has the effect of trivializing a serious issue.
Certainly humor can be an effective device and humor can even have a posi-
tive effect, creating goodwill or lessening tensions in a heated situation. During the
summer of 1980, President Carter had the unpleasant task of informing farmers in
the Southwest that the economic aid they desired would not be forthcoming. Just
before his helicopter landed in the drought-stricken Dallas-Fort Worth area, there
was a sudden rainfall. President Carter began an address to a group of farmers say-
ing, “Well, you asked for either money or rain. I couldn’t get the money so I
brought the rain” (Boller, 1981, p. 346).
Appeal to Tradition
We normally have strong ties to tradition, and learning the historical background of
a topic is a good way to prepare to argue it. However, the act of asking an audience
to accept something because it is customary rather than because of the reasons that
justify it is the fallacy of appeal to tradition. Representative Baldwin followed up
her lighthearted opening with an argument that explicitly appeals to tradition.
But in all seriousness, I know that the BCS system has had its fair share of controversies
since it was adopted in 1998. Moreover, I do believe that it is prudent for the Energy
and Commerce Committee to keep a watchful eye on the integrity of billion dollar busi-
nesses, including college football. But I also believe that we must be careful and not go
too far in suggesting changes to the bowl system that may damage the long tradition of
college football and what it means to the schools, players and coaches.
I think most college football fans in Wisconsin would prefer that retiring UW
coach, Barry Alvarez, have more of a say in these types of decisions than Tammy
Baldwin or members of Congress, and I agree. Those of you who follow college football
know how much Wisconsin loves their Badgers, and believe me, there is nothing like
going to Camp Randall Stadium and see that 85,000-plus crowd enjoy the game and
come together in song to the tune of varsity at the end of the game. These traditions
may be small, but they have helped make the school and the student body what it is
today, and are deeply valued and appreciated by everyone who is a part of the univer-
sity. Annual bowl games are much bigger traditions, but are valued in much the same
way. (Determining a champion on the field, 2005, p. 13)
Just because bowl games have been the end-of-the-season focus for Division I
college football in the past is not an adequate reason that they should be so in the fu-
ture. This fallacious appeal to tradition implies that the existence of any tradition, be
it college bowl games or fraternity hazing, is sufficient in and of itself to justify its
perpetuation. On that basis, women should not have the right to vote and African
Americans should not have the opportunity to learn to read, because giving these
rights to either group violates a tradition that was legally sanctioned at one time.
Comparisons that reference tradition are not necessarily inappropriate. Value
claims often involve matters of taste derived from tradition. A thorough analysis of
the reasons behind a tradition provides a valid basis on which to argue its future
violation or veneration. However, it is important to realize that arguing on behalf
of a belief or behavior solely on the basis of tradition gives the audience insuffi-
cient understanding of the issues that justify opposing a proposed change in that
belief or behavior.
Recalling our discussion of presumption, you may think something is amiss.
Doesn’t presumption favor tradition, that which is already in existence? Yes, and
opponents in argumentation find themselves arguing on behalf of the benefits of
continuing to believe or behave as we have in the past, just as Representative
Baldwin does. However, when the opponent uses such argument, she must provide
good and sufficient reasons to justify maintaining that tradition and not merely ap-
peal to tradition alone.
Summary of Fallacies of Appeal

1. Appeals to ignorance ask the audience to accept a claim solely because no
proof exists to deny its validity.
2. Appeals to the people ask an audience to accept a claim because it is supported
by majority opinion.
3. Appeals to pity arouse sympathy for individuals or groups to encourage the
redress of some wrong or misfortune they have suffered.
4. Appeals to fear attempt to gain the audience’s acceptance of a claim by arous-
ing concern over the consequence it alleges.
5. Appeals to authority encourage reliance on some ultimate source of knowl-
edge in place of reasoning as the basis of a claim.
6. Appeals to humor either fail to make a serious point or reduce another’s claim
to its most absurd level.
7. Appeals to tradition ask an audience to accept a claim because it represents a
customary belief or course of action.
FALLACIES OF LANGUAGE
Language is the vehicle of an argument’s meaning, so arguers must be cognizant of
how they use it in constructing arguments. We have already indicated some con-
cerns about the way in which claims are phrased, and we have stressed the impor-
tance of defining terms. We will now discuss the care that must be exercised in
choosing language appropriate to all aspects of argumentation. In any use of lan-
guage, but especially in using it to alter belief or behavior, an important point to
remember is that meanings are in people, not in words. The meaning we attach to
the words of others is a consequence of their passing through our own perceptual
filters. Become aware of your own language habits and biases to avoid falling vic-
tim to the fallacies of language described here.
Fallacies of Language 165
Ambiguity and Equivocation

The ambiguity of language interferes with effective argumentation when a term is
used differently by both parties to the dispute. This “meanings are in people” prob-
lem may occur unintentionally, with both arguers operating on the basis of legitimate,
but entirely different, meanings of a term. If you have ever handed a paper in late and
the professor, emulating Benjamin Disraeli, has told you, “I shall lose no time in read-
ing this,” you have experienced the uncertainty that ambiguity engenders.
As with the errors resulting from the ambiguity of language, errors of equivo-
cation occur because words have multiple legitimate meanings. Thus an error of
equivocation occurs when we use ambiguous words to conceal the truth or avoid
committing ourselves to a position. When you shift the meaning of a term in an ar-
gument, you are equivocating. When you use language to try to step around an
issue rather than face it head on, you are equivocating. The statements of candi-
dates for public office are frequently and intentionally equivocal as they attempt to
avoid offending part of the electorate.
In 2004, Mel Kazmazin was president and CEO of Viacom, Inc., the parent
company of CBS that brought both the Super Bowl and Janet Jackson’s right
breast into our living rooms. He appeared before the committee holding hearings
on broadcast decency, and did his best to avoid being pinned down by the commit-
tee chair, Representative Fred Upton of Michigan:
MR. UPTON: But on the one hand you said it was objectionable enough that
even the producers, everybody was fired, and it’s off the air and
a second later, you indicate—and that was justified, but the sec-
ond case though, you don’t pay the fines. The FCC has agreed
that it was, in fact, indecent. I would guess that everyone in this
room in watching would say that it was totally inappropriate,
terribly offensive to virtually everyone that heard it. You
agreed with that. The FCC ruled and yet the fine is unpaid.
MR. KARMAZIN: Congressman, I think what you said was objectionable, of-
fensive and we would all agree to that. The question—
MR. UPTON: And indecent.
MR. KARMAZIN: The question is whether or not the material was indecent. So I
can fire somebody for reasons that they broadcast something
that I did not want on the air. I did not like during halftime of
the Super Bowl that somebody touched their crotch, okay? I
don’t know whether or not touching the crotch, there’s an
awful lot of people who do that, whether or not that violates
the indecency—but I can tell you that’s not acceptable for us.
So the fact that we fire somebody doesn’t mean they vio-
lated necessarily the indecency standard, so the idea of pay-
ing the fine is basically acknowledging that you have aired
indecency and my attorneys have assured me that in their
judgment we did not air indecency. We aired objectionable,
offensive, embarrassing, don’t want it, shocking all of these
other words. The question is whether or not the legal first
amendment standard of indecency was crossed. (The broad-
cast decency enforcement act of 2004, 2004, pp. 43–44)
Because the audience is a part of the process of argumentation, it will be im-

possible for you to avoid all instances of ambiguity. However, by exercising care in
phrasing arguments and defining key terms, you can avoid many errors of equivo-
cation. You, as arguer, should be cognizant of language in the arguments you con-
struct and scrutinize the language used in the evidence these arguments contain, es-
pecially when it is opinion evidence.
Emotionally Loaded Language

The arguments of everyday life are frequently condensed to what fits on a bumper
sticker, a T-shirt, or a picket sign carried at a march or rally: “War is unhealthy for
children and other living things”; “Abortion is murder”; “A boy of quality is not
threatened by a girl of equality.” In addition to serving as a vehicle for the denota-
tion of ideas, language is a powerful instrument for the expression of attitudes and
feelings. Your choice of language can reveal your attitude toward a topic. There
can be little doubt how Marvin Kitman, television critic for Newsday, feels about
the issue of violence:
The networks are like serial killers. Their programs are the equivalent of writing
with lipstick on the mirrors in our home, “Stop me before I kill again.” They have
won the disrespect and distrust of the Nation in dealing with the violence problem.
It is time TV was made to end the killing fields of violence. (Violence on television,
1992, p. 16)
In various forms of imaginative or creative speaking and writing, language

that fully expresses feeling or attitude is highly prized. Indeed, if language did not
possess the power to express and elicit feelings, most of the world’s great literature
would not exist. In arguments, however, emotionally loaded language, which ex-
ceeds the natural warmth that marks a sincerely expressed belief and earnestness
of purpose, becomes an impediment to rational decision making and represents a
poor choice.
Technical Jargon
The use of the technical terminology of a field becomes a problem when it so con-
fuses listeners that they lose sight of the issues or when it is used in place of reason-
ing on the issues. Beginning arguers frequently become so involved in their topic
that they forget that not everyone is as conversant with its jargon as they are.
Technical terminology may be important in explaining the issues involved, but it is
possible to send an audience into semantic shock if you ask them to deal with too
many new terms at once.
Audience analysis is critical in determining what needs further explanation
and what does not. Some of the discussion of the bill prohibiting possession of
handguns by juveniles centered on the wisdom of passing a law that would create,
for the first time, a federal status offense. For those in attendance, the issue was not
clouded by jargon. As lawmakers and lobbyists, they all knew a status offense is
one in which behavior is only an offense (an illegal act) for persons of a certain sta-
tus (under eighteen years old). A minor caught with a beer is a status offender. A
minor caught with marijuana gets busted just as anyone else would.
In some cases, problems with jargon are less a result of the failure to analyze
our audience than they are a failure to refrain from making word-salad when we
speak or write:
One of the concerns that we had in our preliminary review of the bill is that it doesn’t
state an interstate nexus to it, and you have a situation of possession with intrastate, and
so we just would want to address what we need to do in terms of the Federal Govern-
ment’s role as the nexus in interstate commerce. (Children and gun violence, 1993, p.75)
The best way to avoid problems with jargon is to say what you mean, and mean
what you say, plainly.
Summary of Fallacies of Language

1. Ambiguity occurs when a term is used in legitimate but different senses by two
or more persons involved in argumentation.
2. Equivocation occurs when an individual uses a term in different ways in the
context of the same argument.
3. Emotionally loaded language becomes a problem when we use terms that
show more about our feelings on the issues than about the rational basis from
which those feelings derive or when we use emotion as the sole means to alter
the belief or behavior of others.
4. Technical jargon becomes a problem when the audience is overwhelmed with
too many new terms or when it is used to impress the audience or replace
sound reasoning.
The foregoing are the sorts of errors in reasoning, appeal, and use of language
that should be avoided in constructing your own arguments. Use them as a yardstick
as well in evaluating the arguments of others. You should now be able to construct
valid arguments, patterns of proof, and reasoning that are sufficient to support
claims. You are ready to begin putting it all together. In the next chapter, we look at
how advocates and opponents argue propositions of fact.
LEARNING ACTIVITIES
1. Discuss current examples of advertising in the mass media. Which seem to contain fal-
lacies? What kinds of fallacies are they? Which examples of advertising, if any, employ
sound reasoning according to the tests in Chapter 7?
2. Each of the following statements represents a fallacy of the types discussed in this chap-
ter. Identify the type of fallacy in each statement and explain why the reasoning, appeal,
or use of language is in error. Some statements contain more than one error, so be sure
to identify all fallacies.
a. In reference to high levels of defense and social spending, the government should
have learned from the Vietnam experience that you can’t have guns and butter at
the same time.
b. By definition, since a housewife is someone who doesn’t work, it follows that all
housewives are unemployed.
c. When you’ve seen one zoo, you’ve seen them all.
d. The Democratic party has always been the party of the working man and woman.
It makes no sense for the AFL-CIO to endorse a Republican candidate.
e. Obviously, the authors of this book want to make us schizophrenic. They want us
to learn how to both advocate and oppose a proposition on the same topic.
f. Your argument that drunk driving causes death and injury is very interesting, but
what about all the people who weren’t wearing their seatbelts at the time of the ac-
cident? Aren’t you assuming that every person involved in an automobile accident
has been drinking? You can’t really make that claim until you look at some of the
other information.
g. We outlawed prayer in schools and look what happened! Within ten years of that
sacrilegious Court’s decision, the divorce rate approached 50 percent, students
were becoming functionally illiterate, drug abuse increased in our schools, and ju-
venile crime rose.
h. Cheating on exams must surely be acceptable. After all, most college students
cheat on an exam at least once.
i. The advocate has obviously misanalyzed the situation. The Supreme Court ruled
in favor of freedom of choice in the matter of abortions in 1973, not 1972.
j. The Motor Car Company’s new Q-Body designs have had serious problems with
their brake systems. I’d be suspicious of all their products.
k. Rolling Valley Vineyards must produce good wines. Their commercials state that
they are the only American winery that doesn’t use pesticides to control insect
damages to the crop. We should all be concerned about pesticides in what we eat
and drink.
l. The chairman of the rules committee says that our bylaws have been incorrectly
developed. He ought to know. After all, he’s the chairman of the rules committee.
m. We shouldn’t be surprised that State University’s basketball team was cited for re-
cruiting violations. Recruiting players has always been a matter of which college
could offer a prospect the best deal.
n. Professional athletics is a hotbed of drug abuse. Why, just last week, three more
football players were arrested for using cocaine.
REFERENCES
Are college textbooks fairly priced? (2004, July 20). Washington, DC: Subcommittee on 21st
Century Competitiveness of the Committee on Education and the Work Force, U.S.
House of Representatives.
Boller, P. E., Jr. (1981). Presidential anecdotes. New York: Penguin.
“Can you say that on TV?” An examination of the FCC’s enforcement with respect to
broadcast indecency. (2004, January 28). Washington, DC: Subcommittee on
Telecommunication and the Internet of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S.
House of Representatives.
Challenges facing amateur athletics. (2002, February 13). Washington, DC: Subcommittee
on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives.
Children and gun violence. (1993, June 9, and September 13). Washington, DC: Committee
on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate.
Determining a champion on the field: A comprehensive review of the BCS and postseason
college football. (2005, December 7). Washington, DC: Subcommittee on Commerce,
Trade and Consumer Protection of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House
of Representatives.
Direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs: What are the consequences? (2003,
July 22). Washington, DC: Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate.
Innocence and the death penalty. (1993, April 1). Washington, DC: Committee on the
Judiciary, U.S. Senate.
References 169
Mullen, J. (1995, February 3). Jim Mullen’s hot sheet. Entertainment Weekly, p. 10.
Racial profiling within law enforcement agencies. (2000, March 30). Washington, DC:
Steroid use in professional baseball and anti-doping issues in amateur sports. (2002, June
18). Washington, DC: Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and
Toursim of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate.
Supporting our intercollegiate student-athletes: Proposed NCAA reforms. (2004, May 18).
Washington, DC: Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the
Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives.
The broadcast decency enforcement act of 2004. (2004, February 17 and 26). Washington,
DC: Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet of the Committee on Energy
and Commerce, U. S. House of Representatives.
Toulmin, S., Rieke, R., & Janik, A. (1984) An introduction to reasoning (2nd ed.). New
York: Macmillan.
Violence on television. (1992, December 15). Washington, DC: Committee on the Judiciary,
U. S. House of Representatives.
CHAPTER
How Are Factual

Propositions Argued?
M
ost argumentation textbooks consider arguing a factual proposition a
stepping-stone to arguing about values and policies. And, it is a valid
point that the ability to successfully argue propositions of value and pol-
icy is greatly enhanced by knowing how to argue fact. The complexities of the
postmodern world, however, have created a new interest in factual argumentation.
The complicated relationships of our personal and public lives, the explosive de-
velopment of technology, the pursuit of new knowledge, and the interpretation of
existing knowledge in every field have revitalized argumentation theory and awak-
ened interest in arguing factual propositions in their own right.
Answering factual questions is often a matter of arguing a factual proposition.
Many fields see factual, as well as value and policy, argumentation as central to the
production of knowledge. Argumentation is more than a process of advocating
and opposing prima facie cases and asking an audience to render a decision as to
which side wins. The new interest in factual argumentation suggests that we con-
sider argumentation as critical thinking. “Argumentation is no longer solely the ar-
ticulation and testing of claims, it is also the understanding, critique, and creation
of the means of legitimation of knowledge” (Sandman, 1993, p. 101).
For example, scientists from fields such as paleontology, evolutionary biol-
ogy, biomechanics, and physiology are trying to understand what dinosaurs
may actually have been like by studying contemporary birds, reptiles, and
mammals. They take what they know about how these animals are put together
and how they work, and apply the knowledge to the often fragmentary remains
of creatures that no longer exist. In this way, the field of paleobiology rests
on what Ohio University’s Lawrence Witmer refers to as an “Inverted Pyramid
of Inference.”
Imagine an upside-down pyramid with, at the pointed bottom, the words “bones.”
Bones are the known commodity, the solid evidence. They are aged; they may be bro-
ken, cracked, ambiguous, but you can at least hold them in your hand.
Above bones on the inverted pyramid are soft tissues. There aren’t many of those
because they rarely fossilize.
170
Above that is function, how the bones and tissue work.

Above that—so very far from the hard evidence of bones—behavior.
Above that is environmental interaction. The dream would be to know the behav-
iors of many different dinosaurs and to be able to put them in context so you’d know
what dinosaurs ate and where they slept and what they feared and how they prowled
the landscape. (Achenbach, 2003, p. 18)
The debates that emerge over whether Tyrannosaurus Rex was a top predator or
merely a very large scavenger are as lively as any you find concerning any subject
for argumentation.
Even if you are not a scientist, learning how to argue factual propositions has
practical applications that you can use as a student who must prepare presenta-
tions, write research papers, and answer essay questions on exams. The stock is-
sues for factual argumentation and the process of case development for advocates
and opponents can guide your preparation of any assignment that calls for you to
sift through information and draw conclusions about it.
Karyn recently taught a course on the rhetoric of Jane Austen using film and
television adaptations of Austen’s classic novels to explore why this nineteenth-
century lady is so popular with twenty-first century audiences. About half of the
students were familiar with the novels, but the rest were experiencing Austen for
the first time through these adaptations. The question emerged: Was Jane Austen a
feminist, or do the creators of these films and television miniseries make her ap-
pear to be one by including contemporary themes to appeal to today’s audiences?
Those who were familiar with the novels questioned whether Austen was a femi-
nist, while those who had not previously read any of her novels argued that she
must have been because the stories contained feminist themes.
In preparing oral reports, students interested in exploring this issue encoun-
tered an extensive body of research, especially criticism of Austen’s novels from a
feminist perspective. Those who had taken the argumentation class used principles
of factual argument to answer the question: Was Jane Austen a feminist?
ADVOCATING PROPOSITIONS OF FACT

Construction of a prima facie case for a proposition of fact begins with analysis of
the proposition, using the steps we identified in Chapter 4: locating immediate
cause, investigating the history, defining key terms and making the primary infer-
ence, and using the stock issues for factual argumentation to determine the actual
issues you will argue.
Analyzing the Proposition

Analysis of factual propositions will help you define the key terms and make the
primary inference that clarifies the relationship between the subject and predicate
of the proposition, the primary inference to be advocated or opposed. The essence
of factual argumentation is to determine whether this relationship is probably true
or probably false. The information that you discover from locating immediate
causes and investigating the historical background of the controversy surrounding
the subject will provide the evidence that you need to offer as proof and reasoning-
when arguing the probable truth or falsity of the factual proposition.
172 CHAPTER 9 How Are Factual Propositions Argued?
Immediate Cause. In locating immediate causes, look for examples, illustrations,

or other information of fact and opinion that signify something about the topic.
Students in the Jane Austen class were struck by how many books on Austen, film
and television miniseries based on her novels, and adaptations that inject zombies,
vampires, and sea monsters into an Austen novel have recently appeared. They
also discovered ongoing debates about Austen and feminism on a variety of Web
sites such as Jane Austen Today and the Republic of Pemberley. As you research
immediate cause for your question of fact, look for instances of unusual discover-
ies or an authority’s statement that we need to know more about something as the
source of an immediate cause.
Historical Background. As you investigate the historical background of your

topic, collect sufficient published research and commentary by experts in the field
to give you a reasonably thorough understanding of the topic. The Jane Austen
class discovered that published commentary and criticism on her novels began in
the mid-1800s, with some sources even earlier. They also discovered two impor-
tant dates pertinent to the topic. First, in the 1970s during the second wave of the
feminist movement, literature scholars and those in the new “women’s studies”
programs began producing an extensive body of research applying feminist con-
cepts to Austen’s novels. Second, in the mid-1990s, a number of very popular films
and television miniseries based on the novels were made. These productions, se-
quels to and adaptations of the novels, and other Austen-related artifacts made
Jane Austen a pop culture phenomenon.
The Internet added a new dimension to the Austen phenomenon. In research-
ing historical background, students discovered an electronic universe of scholarly
work on Austen and a thriving, worldwide community of “Janeites” who engaged
in extensive debates on all-things-Austen. They also learned that while we talk
about factual argumentation in terms of “past,” “present,” and “future” fact,
these distinctions sometimes blur.
Students were exploring a question about the relationship between an author
who died nearly two centuries ago and the ideology of feminism. At first glance,
that clearly seemed to be “past fact.” Researching immediate cause and historical
background, particularly through Internet sites, they began to agree with an obser-
vation made by Claire Harman in Jane’s Fame: How Jane Austen Conquered the
World: “Just as Jane Austen feels closer to our own time the further she recedes
from it, so the sense of a personal connection being possible with the author has
increased with the exponential growth of her fan base” (2009, p. 224).
What began as an exploration of past fact began to have elements of present
and even future fact. Not every proposition concerning past fact will necessarily
turn out to be like this, but do not be surprised if you find elements of present and
future fact intruding into a consideration of “past” fact. Students also discovered
that investigation of the historical background on Austen and application of the
stock issues of fact blended into a single analytical step as we shall presently discuss.
Defining Key Terms. Defining key terms and making the primary inference are im-
portant in factual argumentation, even when the proposition seems to point to
only one possible inference: Jane Austen was a feminist. A proposition of fact asserts
a relationship about something (Jane Austen) and what we are asked to believe
about it (that she was a feminist). On the surface, this seems like a fairly straight-
forward inference, but defining key terms and making the primary inference from
these definitions is still important, even when the inference seems obvious.
The proposition had two key terms, Jane Austen and feminist. Defining these
terms helped identify the issues to be developed in the advocate’s case.
Jane Austen—the foremost female novelist in English literature, author of
Sense and Sensibility, Pride and Prejudice, Mansfield Park, Emma,
Persuasion, and Northanger Abbey.
feminist—one who supports the principles of feminism, a social movement for
women’s equality that is now a well-established ideology based on equal
rights and the acknowledgment of gender differences.
The advocate’s definition positioned Jane Austen as the most important fe-
male novelist in English literature and identifies the novels under consideration in
proving the alleged relationship between her work and feminist ideology. The def-
inition of feminist specifies that ideas about “equal rights” and “gender differ-
ences” are central to feminist ideology, producing the primary inference:
If Jane Austen’s novels address issues of equal rights and gender differences, she was a
feminist.
Can you spot the problem in trying to advocate this proposition and the pri-
mary inference produced by defining key terms? Jane Austen was born in 1775
and died in 1817. The feminist movement did not begin until much later in the
nineteenth century and the term feminism did not come into common use until
near the end of the century. To create a prima facie case for Jane Austen was a fem-
inist, the advocate had to explain her use of the term feminist. That became one of
the issues in her case development.
Using Stock Issues. The advocate employs the stock issues for factual argumenta-
tion to decide what main points to use in developing the primary inference. You
will recall that the stock issues point you in the direction of finding what informa-
tion and reasoning are available to prove the primary inference.
1. What information confirms (or denies) the alleged relationship between the
subject and predicate of the primary inference?
2. What techniques of reasoning should be used to demonstrate this relationship?
Using the research collected in locating the immediate cause and investigating
historical background, the advocate determined what she could confirm about the
alleged relationship between Jane Austen’s novels and feminist ideology, and which
reasoning techniques she should use in proving that relationship. Earlier, we men-
tioned that investigation of historical background and the application of the stock
issues of fact can blend into a single analytical step. Such was the case for the ad-
vocate in this instance.
As she researched immediate cause and historical background, the advocate
discovered information about a connection between Jane Austen and the “founding
mother” of the feminist movement, Mary Wollstonecraft. This helped her figure out
a strategy for dealing with the problem posed by the proposition and her definition
of feminist. Before there was a feminist movement, there were proto-feminists such
as Wollstonecraft who first articulated ideas that would become the core of the fem-
inist movement. This research also suggested the actual issues and reasoning tech-
niques that the advocate used in developing her prima facie case.
The advocate’s historical research merged into the application of the stock is-
sues of fact as she found information and authoritative commentaries that pointed
to a connection between Austen and the proto-feminist ideas of her era. She also
determined that techniques of sign and cause–effect reasoning would be most use-
ful in creating units of argument from this information, along with argument from
authority to back her reasoning. The actual issues for the advocate’s case develop-
ment were: (1) Jane Austen was a proto-feminist; her novels reflect the proto-fem-
inist views of her era; and (2) Jane Austen disguised her feminist themes by using
her skills as a writer to protect her reputation and social status.
The advocate also needed to consider presumption found in the existing knowl-
edge and opinion of both her audience and experts on Austen. In this case, the advo-
cate was addressing an audience interested in exploring this question: Was Jane
Austen a feminist? They did not begin with a predetermined stance, but wanted to
weigh available information and opinion, and their own observations, to answer the
question. In this context, factual argumentation became a process of inquiry.
In applying presumption as an audience analysis technique, the advocated
made further strategic decisions using the two stock issues of fact. Because only
some members of the class were familiar with Austen’s novels, but all were familiar
with their plotlines from the screen adaptations, the advocate decided to use mate-
rial from the novels as some of her supporting evidence. Because this fulfilled an
oral reporting assignment, and the audience would expect the answer to the cen-
tral question to be informed by scholarly research, the advocate also wanted to
reason on the basis of argument from authority. With this use of presumption in
mind, the advocate developed her prima facie case.
Building the Prima Facie Case

From the two actual issues, the advocate created three contentions to use as the
structure for her prima facie case.
CONTENTION 1: Jane Austen’s novels reflect proto-feminist views, ideas
that would become feminism in the late nineteenth century.
CONTENTION 2: Jane Austen’s proto-feminism is found in the plotlines of her
novels that concern dominant women’s issues of her era.
CONTENTION 3: Austen disguised her feminist themes to protect herself
from social censure.
She then built her prima facie case by creating units of argument for each contention.
How did she know what to include? Advocates for factual propositions create
units of argument about effect, significance, and inherency to argue why the con-
tentions are probably true.
Effect Arguments. In factual argumentation, effect focuses on one or more units

of argument that call the audience’s attention to the results, outcome, or conse-
quences of the relationship alleged by the proposition of fact. Another way to
think of “effect” is that it answers the question: What is produced by proving that
the alleged relationship is probably true? The effect the advocate wanted to prove
was that Jane Austen had feminist beliefs that we can find expressed in her novels.
The focus on effect in the advocate’s case is found in her second contention:
“Jane Austen’s proto-feminism is found in the plotlines of her novels that concern
dominant women’s issues of her era.” The advocate developed units of argument
to prove three claims.
CLAIM 1: The inadequacy of education for women is a common theme in
Austen’s novels.
CLAIM 2: Limited choices and the narrowness of women’s lives are a com-
mon theme in Austen’s novels.
CLAIM 3: A woman’s need to marry to gain economic stability and social
position is central to Austen’s novels.
Notice how the advocate employed the two stock issues of fact. She deter-
mined that choosing evidence from Austen’s novels met the requirements for
grounding claims discussed in Chapter 5, the standards of reliability, quality, con-
sistency, and adaptability to the audience. Because examples taken from her novels
are observable indicators of Austen’s proto-feminism, the appropriate reasoning
technique for these units of argument is sign reasoning. Choosing excerpts from
the novels that reveal a concern for a dominant women’s issue of her era would
prove effect, confirming the relationship between Austen and proto-feminism. The
advocate also incorporated argument from authority as she provided an expert
opinion in backing each unit of argument.
Significance Arguments. It is not enough to know that something is a result, out-

come, or consequence; building a prima facie case for factual argumentation must
also explain the significance of the effect of the alleged relationship. Why is it sig-
nificant that we find evidence of Jane Austen’s proto-feminism in her novels? In
factual argumentation, significance focuses on one or more units of argument that
prove the importance, magnitude, extent, or impact of the effect.
There is no necessary order in which the advocate must cover effect, signifi-
cance, and inherency. In our example, the advocate elected to devote her first con-
tention to significance arguments. She created three units of argument to develop
the contention: “Jane Austen’s novels reflect proto-feminist views, ideas that
would become feminism in the late nineteenth century.”
CLAIM 1: Wollstonecraft’s arguments against primogeniture and male finan-
cial control over women are reflected in Austen’s novels.
CLAIM 2: Wollstonecraft’s distaste for Dr. James Fordyce’s Sermons to
Young Women is reflected in Austen’s mocking of them in Pride
and Prejudice.
CLAIM 3: Wollstonecraft’s Vindication questions the prevailing belief that
women were incapable of rational thought because they were
physically and mentally weak, a response echoed by Austen’s fe-
male characters.
Strategically, the advocate decided to place this contention first because she
knew many in the audience wondered how Jane Austen could be connected to fem-
inism if the feminist movement did not emerge until several decades after her death.
From her research on historical background, the advocate discovered information

about Mary Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Woman, published in
1792, a proto-feminist statement that Austen may have been familiar with. She also
discovered authoritative sources connecting Austen with Wollstonecraft, plus an ar-
ticle from Jane Austen’s Regency World, a magazine with a pop culture orientation,
suggesting the similarity of Austen’s Pride and Prejudice and Sense and Sensibility
to Wollstonecraft’s Vindication (Ray, 2009).
For significance, the advocate decided that establishing a connection between
the foremost female novelist of English literature and the seminal work on which the
feminist movement would be based would be compelling for her audience. She devel-
oped the units of argument for her focus on significance much as she did for effect.
She used the two stock issues of fact to determine what information and opinion best
confirmed the connection between Austen’s novels and Wollstonecraft’s Vindication,
and what pattern of reasoning should be used to show the connection.
The advocate chose evidence from the primary sources, Wollstonecraft’s
Vindication and Austen’s novels, to ground her claims. She backed each unit of ar-
gument with an authoritative opinion that further explained the connection, con-
firming her linkage of Austen and Wollstonecraft. Her reasoning technique in com-
paring material from the primary sources was a combination of parallel case and
sign reasoning. For each comparison of a passage from Vindication with one from
an Austen novel, the advocated reasoned that a parallel exists. Each similarity be-
tween Vindication and an Austen novel was also a sign that Austen was either
familiar with Wollstonecraft’s ideas or developed similar feelings independently,
either of which connect her to proto-feminism.
Inherency Arguments. Finally, to develop a prima facie case for factual argumen-
tation, the advocate must consider inherency. In factual argumentation, inherency
often deals with attitudes—why we do or do not believe something to be probably
true. In our example, what information and reasoning causes us to believe, or dis-
believe, the alleged relationship between Jane Austen and feminism?
Because the advocate could find no direct confirmation from Austen herself,
or those close to her, that she embraced the emerging proto-feminist views of the
era, explicitly proving the inherency of the relationship between Austen and femi-
nism was not possible. In developing her first two contentions, the advocate be-
lieved there were strong indications that Austen was sympathetic to the ideas of
proto-feminism. The question remained, if this was so, why was Austen not more
obvious in her support of these ideas? In researching historical background, the
advocate discovered powerful attitudes against proto-feminist authors in Austen’s
day and that even attaching her name to “her own writing could threaten a
woman’s reputation as well as her social position” (Fergus, 1997, p. 13).
With no direct evidence of Austen’s feminism, but with the evidence of similari-
ties between the ideas in Wollstonecraft’s Vindication and the women’s issues ad-
dressed in Austen’s novels, the advocate addressed the inherency of Austen’s feminism
in her third contention: “Austen disguised her feminist themes to protect herself from
social censure.” Two units of argument were developed to support this contention.
CLAIM 1: As Austen began her career as a novelist, there was a backlash
against women associated with the ideas of Wollstonecraft.
CLAIM 2: Austen’s use of irony and satire were her principal means of disguis-
ing her proto-feminist ideas.
Remember that inherency deals with causality, using cause–effect reasoning.

The cause of the failure to be able to directly connect Jane Austen with the proto-
feminist ideas of her era was that she concealed them to protect her social position.
The advocate’s two units of argument explained why many women in Austen’s era
did not want to be publicly associated with Wollstonecraft’s ideas and how Austen
used literary techniques to disguise her proto-feminism.
Inherency in factual argumentation deals with the causes behind why we do or
do not believe an alleged factual relationship exists. This is why inherency in factual
argumentation is more often attitudinal rather than structural. In our example, the
advocate could not find any “structure” establishing the relationship between
Austen and emerging proto-feminism. Would it be possible to argue structural in-
herency for this topic?
Jane Austen was a prodigious letter writer, frequently exchanging letters with
her sister Cassandra in the same way that people exchange e-mails and text mes-
sages today. We know that she left a considerable number of letters and other writ-
ten material and that Cassandra Austen closely guarded this material, destroying
much of it before her own death. A structural barrier that has frustrated Austen
scholars and “Janeite” enthusiasts is the loss of this material. In the future, if some-
one found a hidden cache of letters or manuscripts in Jane Austen’s hand address-
ing the proto-feminist beliefs of the era, they would constitute a “structure,”
Austen’s own words, revealing her relationship to proto-feminism. Whether struc-
tural inherency will be an issue in factual argumentation depends on your topic
and what you discover in researching it.
To develop a prima facie case for a proposition of fact, you must create argu-
ments addressing the effect, significance, and inherency of the primary inference,
the alleged relationship in the proposition. There is no necessary order in which
these issues must be addressed and no specific number of units of argument needed
to establish each. Our Jane Austen example evolved from class discussions and
oral reports by groups of students in the rhetoric of Jane Austen course. It was
pure serendipity that caused three contentions to emerge as they did, one each for
effect, significance, and inherency. Not every proposition will require three con-
tentions to build a prima facie case. A single contention might be developed with
units of argument that establish effect, significance, and inherency. As long as you
address all three, your case will be prima facie. How you do it is a matter of the
strategic choices you make and the resources of information and reasoning avail-
able to you.
Preempting Opposing Arguments

Before saying she is done, the advocate should consider the proposition from the
opponent’s perspective. What is the opponent likely to argue and where are points
of clash likely to occur? One strategic option the advocate has is to include
preemptive arguments in her case, arguments that respond to the probable objec-
tions the opponent will make before he has a chance to raise them.
The advocate’s third contention in our Jane Austen example functions as a
kind of preemptive argument. As we noted, the advocate found no direct evidence
to support a connection between Austen and the proto-feminists. A natural objec-
tion for the opponent to raise is to call attention to the absence of any direct proof
of the alleged relationship. The advocate preempted this in her third contention as
she explained why no direct connection can be found. Although the opponent may
still choose to argue that in the absence of direct proof, the audience should not
accept the probable truth of the alleged relationship, the advocate’s preemptive
argument puts her in an offensive rather than a defensive position. She offered
compelling reasons for the absence of direct proof that the opponent must dis-
prove. He can’t just holler “no direct proof.”
If as an advocate, you choose to preempt an opponent’s arguments, you must
avoid excess, preempting everything but the “kitchen sink” and creating a series of
what might be unrelated arguments. Kitchen sink preempts are also a bad rhetori-
cal strategy because they run the risk of weakening, rather than strengthening,
your position in the audience’s mind. They create the impression that, if you can
find so many objections to your position, it must be weak. Prudent use, however,
of preemptive arguments keeps attention focused on the proposition and keeps
presumption and the burden of proof where they belong.
Developing an Argumentative Brief

The advocate now has a number of arguments, and the proof and reasoning that
support them, to keep straight. One way to make sure things stay where they be-
long is to create an argumentative brief. The idea of briefing arguments is adapted
from the field of law and legal brief writing. Lawyers develop written briefs that
include all of their arguments and evidence as they prepare for a trial or in appeal-
ing a decision to a higher court. A legal brief is seldom “brief” because lawyers in-
clude everything they think is germane to their side’s case.
You will be operating in a different environment, and even if you are asked to
produce a written argument, you will likely have restrictions on its length. If you
are developing a brief as preparation for an oral presentation or in-class debate,
your argumentative brief may be structured as an outline. The purpose of brief
writing is to promote clarity and you should choose a format for organizing your
brief that will clearly present the proposition for argumentation, definitions of key
terms, and each contention with the claims and evidence that develop it. Clarity is
enhanced by using complete sentences for contentions and claim statements.
Argument in Action
There are several different ways to format an argumentative brief to achieve clar-
ity. The next two chapters on value and policy argumentation will illustrate other
ways to lay out a brief, but for factual argumentation, the Toulmin model is used.
Box 9.1 shows how the advocate’s prima facie case was fully briefed.
In preparing a brief, remember that it is not the finished product in argumen-
tation. The finished product is a speech or essay. The brief provides the logical
framework that organizes your arguments. It is refined for oral and written presen-
tation. For oral argumentation, think of the brief as a speaking outline that in-
cludes main points, their subpoints and evidence that supports them, and other im-
portant information such as an expert’s qualifications. For written argumentation,
a brief can serve as a very rough draft that you must revise, rewrite, and polish into
a completed essay. For both oral and written argumentation, you also need to de-
velop an introduction and conclusion, as well as transitional material to move the
listener or reader between your main points.
BOX 9.1
Fact Advocate Brief
Proposition
Jane Austen was a feminist.
Definition of Key Terms

Jane Austen—the foremost female novelist in English literature, author of Sense and Sensibility,
Pride and Prejudice, Mansfield Park, Emma, Persuasion, and Northanger Abbey.
Feminist—one who supports the principles of feminism, a social movement for women’s equality
that is now a well-established ideology based on equal rights and the acknowledgment of
gender differences.
Overview
Jane Austen (1775–1817) lived and wrote during the Enlightenment, that era of revolutionary
thought about natural rights and the power of human reasoning that are the province of men.
“For inherent in the vaunting human (male) reason is the idea that rational beings are the lords
of creation and have the right to impose their reason on all who lack it—women, nonhuman
creatures, and the earth itself” (Donovan, 1992, p. 3). In 1792 Mary Wollstonecraft published A
Vindication of the Rights of Woman, becoming the founding mother of Western feminism, with her
arguments that women, like men, are rational creatures. The feminist movement and the use of
the term feminism did not begin until after her death, but in Jane Austen’s day, “to become an
author was, in itself, a feminist act” (Kirkham, 1997, p. 33).
{Contention 1} Jane Austen’s novels reflect proto-feminist views, ideas that would become
feminism in the late nineteenth century.
{Claim 1} Wollstonecraft’s arguments against primogeniture and male financial
control over women are reflected in Austen’s novels.
{Grounds 1} In Vindication, Wollstonecraft describes the situation of women left
without financial resources. “Girls . . . are often cruelly left by their parents
without any provision, and, of course are dependent on . . . their brothers. . . . In
this equivocal humiliating situation a docile female may remain some time with a
tolerable degree of comfort. But when the brother marries . . . she is viewed as an
intruder, an unnecessary burden on the benevolence of the master . . . The wife . . .
is displeased at seeing the property of her children lavished on an helpless sister”
(Wollstonecraft, 1792/1992, p. 159).
{Grounds 2} Austen’s Sense and Sensibility opens with the death of Henry Dashwood,
whose estate will pass to the son of his first marriage, leaving his second wife and
three daughters with limited resources and no home. John Dashwood has
promised his father “to do everything in his power to make them comfortable”
(Austen, 1811/2003, p. 12). “Mrs. John Dashwood did not at all approve of what
her husband intended to do for his sisters.To take three thousand pounds from the
fortune of their dear little boy, would be impoverishing him to the most dreadful
degree . . . And what possible claim could the Miss Dashwoods . . . have on his
(continued)
generosity to so large an amount. . . . why was he to ruin himself, and their poor
little Harry, by giving away all his money to his half-sisters?” (pp. 15–16).
{Warrant} The similarity between the scenario described by Wollstonecraft and
Austen’s plotline in Sense and Sensibility is a strong indicator that Austen was
familiar with Wollstonecraft’s ideas about male financial control of women.
{Backing} “The most stunning echo of Wollstonecraft occurs in Sense and Sensibility . . .
when Fanny Dashwood convinces her husband to convince himself that they must
not honor his father’s deathbed request because any charity to his sisters and
mother-in-law would harm ‘poor little Harry.’ Perhaps Austen should have credited
Wollstonecraft” (Ray, 2009, p. 57).
{Claim 2} Wollstonecraft’s distaste for Dr. James Fordyce’s Sermons to Young Women is
reflected in Austen’s mocking of them in Pride and Prejudice.
{Grounds 1} Wollstonecraft notes that young women are encouraged to read the
Sermons and explains that they encourage them to be weak. “Dr. Fordyce may have
had a very laudable end in view; but these discourses are written in such an
affected style . . . melting every human quality into female meekness and
artificial grace” (Wollstonecraft, 1792/1992, p. 194).
{Grounds 2} Mr. Collins is one of Austen’s comic clergymen. In Pride and Prejudice, he
visits the Bennetts and Mr. Bennett asks him to read aloud to entertain the family
after dinner. “Mr. Collins readily assented, and a book was produced; but on
beholding it . . . protested that he never read novels. . . . Other books were produced,
and after some deliberation he chose Fordyce’s Sermons. Lydia [youngest Bennett
daughter] gaped as he opened the volume, and before he had, with very monotonous
solemnity, read three pages, she interrupted him . . . Mr. Collins, much offended, laid
aside his book, and said,‘I have often observed how little young ladies are interested
by books of a serious stamp, though written solely for their benefit’” (Austen,
1813/2003, p. 92).
{Warrant} Although Austen does not directly attack Fordyce’s advice to young
women as did Wollstonecraft, by associating the Sermons with the pompous, silly,
and obsequious Mr. Collins, her satire makes the same point.
{Backing} Peter Knox-Shaw’s (2004) study of how Austen’s novels evoke
Wollstonecraft’s Vindication describes the connection. “Austen would have had a
clear sense of what Wollstonecraft stood for . . . the Vindication . . . made its presence
felt in the scene in which Collins, taking it upon himself to read to the Bennett
daughters, discards a novel . . . in favor of Fordyce’s sermons. Wollstonecraft had
devoted an entire section of her tract to the mischief done by this standby of the
young woman’s library” (pp. 102–103).
{Claim 3} Wollstonecraft’s Vindication questions the prevailing belief that women were
incapable of rational thought because they were physically and mentally weak, a
response echoed by Austen’s female characters.
{Grounds 1} Wollstonecraft explains her belief in the rational power of women.

“My own sex, I hope, will excuse me, if I treat them like rational creatures,
instead of flattering their fascinating graces, and viewing them as if they were in a
state of perpetual childhood, unable to stand alone . . . I wish to persuade women
to endeavor to acquire strength, both of mind and body, and to convince them that
the soft phrases, susceptibility of heart, delicacy of sentiment, and refinement of
taste, are almost synonymous with epithets of weakness . . .” (Wollstonecraft,
1792/1992, pp. 81–82).
{Grounds 2} In an early scene in Persuasion, Mrs. Croft is arguing with her brother,
Captain Wentworth, about the suitability of having an officer’s family on board a
warship. Wentworth argues that women have no “right” to feel at home on a
warship. His sister responds, “But I hate to hear you talking so like a fine
gentleman, and as if women were all fine ladies, instead of rational creatures. We
none of us expect to be in smooth water all our days” (Austen, 1818/2004, p. 86).
{Warrant} This example shows us the agreement of the two authors that women
possess intellectual strength. Mrs. Croft is an example of a strong woman who
can think for herself.
{Backing} Knox-Shaw (2004) concludes that the character of Mrs. Croft signifies
the connection with Wollstonecraft. “Jane Austen’s continuity with
Wollstonecraft . . . is evident in the language Mrs. Croft uses when she tries to
convince her brother that women have a place on naval voyages . . . and the
distinction she draws between ‘fine ladies’ and ‘rational creatures’ breathe the air
of the Vindication” (p. 238).
{Contention 2} Jane Austen’s proto-feminism is found in the plotlines of her novels that con-
cern dominant women’s issues of her era.
{Claim 1} The inadequacy of education for women is a common theme in Austen’s
novels.
{Grounds} Caroline Bingley, who has romantic designs on Mr. Darcy in Pride and
Prejudice, tries to impress him with her account of the well-educated woman. “A
woman must have a thorough knowledge of music, singing, drawing, dancing, and
the modern languages, to deserve the word; and besides all of this, she must
possess a certain something in her air and manner of walking, the tone of her
voice, her address and expressions, or the word will be but half deserved” (Austen,
1813/2003, p. 58).
{Warrant} Austen uses the comic character of snooty Caroline Bingley, and the
absurd things she does and says, to show the inherent weakness in the education
commonly provided for upper-class women.
{Backing} Darryl Jones (2004), Lecturer in English at Trinity College, Dublin,
explains the use of Caroline Bingley: “In the Vindication, Wollstonecraft writes
witheringly of the limitations inherent in the series of ‘alluring’ accomplishments
which comprised the standard female education, and which have served
effectively to cretinise generations of women . . . Miss Bingley, who certainly
wishes to establish herself and rise in the world by marriage to Darcy, offers a
conventional account of woman’s accomplishments” (p. 103).
{Claim 2} Limited choices and the narrowness of women’s lives are a common theme in
Austen’s novels.
{Grounds 1} Emma takes place largely in Emma Woodhouse’s home and the small
village of Highbury. Emma rarely travels more than a mile from home. Donwell
Abbey, home of Emma’s eventual husband, Mr. Knightley, is a mile from her
home. “It was so long since Emma had been at the Abbey . . . she was glad to . . .
look around her; eager to refresh and correct her memory with more particular
observation, more exact understanding of a house and grounds which must ever
be so interesting to her” (Austen, 1816/2003, p. 430).
{Grounds 2} Anne Elliot talks about women’s confined lives in Persuasion. “We
certainly do not forget you as soon as you forget us. It is, perhaps, our fate rather
(continued)
than our merit. We cannot help ourselves. We live at home, quiet, confined, and
our feelings prey upon us. . . . You have always a profession, pursuits, business of
some sort or other, to take you back into the world immediately, and continual
occupation and change soon weaken impressions” (Austen, 1818/2004, p. 279).
{Warrant} Emma Woodhouse’s physical confinement to her home and the
adjacent village, and Anne Elliot’s observations on both the physical and
psychological narrowness of women’s lives, are evidence of Austen’s recognition
of the limits placed on women’s lives.
{Backing} John Wiltshire (2006), English Department of LaTrobe University,
Australia, observes that women in Austen’s novels are mostly limited to the home
while men are free to come and go as they choose. “Space is thus gendered, and
the various dimensions of confinement interrelated: confinement to the indoors, to
a restricted sphere of influence” (p. 27).
{Claim 3} A woman’s need to marry to gain economic stability and social position is
central to Austen’s novels.
{Grounds} In Pride and Prejudice, Charlotte Lucas accepts the odious Mr. Collins,
after he has been rejected by Elizabeth Bennett, because marriage is her only
option. “Mr. Collins to be sure was neither sensible nor agreeable; his society was
irksome, and his attachment to her must be imaginary. But still he would be her
husband. Without thinking highly either of men or of matrimony, marriage had
always been her object; it was the only honorable provision for well educated
young women of small fortune” (Austen, 1813/2003, pp. 161–162).
{Warrant} Women in Austen’s time who did not have a personal fortune would be
dependent on their families to support them for their lifetimes. Inherent in the
social structure was the stricture against involvement of women in a profession.
{Backing} Hazel Jones (2009), Exeter University, United Kingdom, describes the
situation that caused Charlotte Lucas to accept Mr. Collins. “In a world where
genteel women with negligible fortunes must marry or face social denigration and
humiliating reliance on their male relations, the choice between marrying or staying
single could be relatively uncomplicated, as Jane Austen recognized” (p. 181).
{Contention 3} Austen disguised her feminist themes to protect herself from social censure.
{Claim 1} As Austen began her career as a novelist, there was a backlash against
women associated with the ideas of Wollstonecraft.
{Grounds} Wollstonecraft died in 1798 and her husband, William Goodwin, wrote
a factually accurate memoir with “foolish disregard for how the truth would be
received . . . [Wollstonecraft] was branded as a whore and an atheist . . . and not
only her own arguments discredited, but those of any other woman who dared to
write on the subject, for it was argued they all wanted to overthrow the
institutions of marriage and religion” (Lane, 2005, p. 95).
{Warrant} The effect on women authors was to conceal any connection to
Wollstonecraft’s ideas and to emphasize their support for the prevailing social
structure.
{Backing} Claudia L. Johnson (1988), professor of English at Marquette
University, explains, “No woman novelist, even among the most progressive,
wished to be discredited by association with Mary Wollstonecraft . . . the fear of
being branded a treasonous Jacobin [in sympathy with the French revolutionists]
obliged moderately progressive novelists to appear more conservative than they
really were” (p. xxiii).
{Claim 2} Austen’s use of irony and satire were her principal means of disguising her
proto-feminist ideas.
{Grounds} Jane Austen “smuggled” in her “social criticism . . . through various
means of indirection—irony, antithetical pairings, double plotting, the testing or
subverting of overt, typically doctrinaire statements with contrasting dramatic
incident” (Johnson, 1988, pp. xxiii-xxiv).
{Warrant} Authors commonly use these techniques when writing in a comic frame
to disguise their real message.
{Backing} Margaret Kirkham (1997), Bristol Polytechnic, United Kingdom,
“There is in the Austen comedy, a great deal of wit, some sarcasm and a true
malignity here and there . . . The feminism is in the laughter, sometimes rather
harsh laughter, but it is also a visionary ideal, for Austen manages to create a few
brief oases where men and women experience equal relationships with one
another” (p. 83).
Sources Cited
Austen, J. (1811/2003). Sense and sensibility. London: CRW Publishing.
Austen, J. (1813/2003). Pride and prejudice. London: CRW Publishing.
Austen, J. (1816/2003). Emma. London: CRW Publishing.
Austen, J. (1818/2004). Persuasion. London: CRW Publishing.
Donovan, J. (1992). Feminist theory: The intellectual traditions of American feminism (2nd ed.). New York:
Frederick Unger.
Johnson, C. L. (1988). Jane Austen: Women, politics, and the novel. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press.
Jones, D. (2004). Jane Austen: Critical issues. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Jones, H. (2009). Jane Austen and marriage. London: Continuum.
Kirkham, M. (1997). Jane Austen, feminism and fiction. London:The Athlone Press.
Knox-Shaw, P. (2004). Jane Austen and the Enlightenment. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Lane, M. (2005). Jane Austen’s world: The life and times of England’s most popular novelist. London: Carlton
Books.
Ray, J. (2009, September/October). Crediting Wollstonecraft. Jane Austen’s Regency World, Issue 41,
pp. 56–57.
Wiltshire, J. (2006). Jane Austen: Introduction and interventions. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Wollstonecraft, M. (1792/1992). A vindication of the rights of woman. London: Penguin Books.
Summary of Fact Advocacy

1. What is the primary inference identified in the proposition of fact?
a. Is the primary inference about past, present, or future fact?
b. What is the nature of probable truth concerning this proposition, and how
should it be argued?
2. What do the stock issues lead you to discover about this proposition of fact?
a. What reasoning pattern is sufficient to establish the key issues?
b. Is sufficient proof available to support this reasoning pattern?
c. What will audience expectations be in regard to proof and reasoning; should
warrant and backing be included in establishing the pattern of reasoning?
3. Have the requirements of a prima facie case been satisfied?

a. Are terms defined where necessary for clarity?
b. Is the interpretation of the proposition topical?
c. Does the development of issues provide good and sufficient reasons (effect,
significance, and inherency) for accepting the advocate’s inference?
4. Should preemptive arguments be used?
a. Is the opponent likely to be skeptical of the advocate’s interpretation of the
issues?
b. Will preemptive arguments focus argumentation or create confusion?
OPPOSING PROPOSITIONS OF FACT

Whether the proposition is one of fact, value, or policy, both advocate and oppo-
nent are obligated to follow certain rules. The advocate has the burden of proof
and must develop claims that uphold it; the opponent initially possesses presump-
tion. He may choose to question the validity of the advocate’s allegations concern-
ing fact in a number of ways. Determining exactly what to argue as opponent is a
matter of using the resources gained from analyzing the proposition and paying
careful attention to what the advocate has argued.
The opponent begins construction of his case by examining the advocate’s pri-
mary inference in interpreting the proposition. The inference established her
unique way of describing the relationship between the subject and the object of the
proposition. The opponent’s task is to determine what strategies to employ in dis-
puting the probable truth of the advocate’s inference.
Evaluating the Primary Inference

The opponent’s first strategic decision is to determine whether to accept the advo-
cate’s primary inference as topical or as unnecessarily restricted. The inference
grows out of the advocate’s definition of terms and issues discovered while analyz-
ing the proposition. Although the opponent is not obligated to dispute the advo-
cate’s definitions, it may be advantageous to do so. If the advocate has defined
terms in such a way that the primary inference represents an unreasonable inter-
pretation of the proposition, the opponent may wish to argue for a different defi-
nition of terms. He should consider whether the advocate has developed a topical
prima facie case.
The opponent for the proposition, Jane Austen was a feminist, chose to
accept the advocate’s definition of Jane Austen, but provided his own definition
of feminism.
feminism—the ideology of equal rights for men and women, women’s struggle
to achieve economic and political parity, and the twentieth-century exten-
sions of girl power and equity in romantic relationships
You will notice that the opponent’s choice of a key term was feminism, rather than
feminist, and his definition had a contemporary emphasis. This definition was
essential to his strategy of opposition.
Establishing Strategy
In factual argumentation, clarity is enhanced if the opponent begins with an
overview of his interpretation of the relationship alleged by the proposition. This is
his philosophy of opposition in which he establishes his position and previews his
strategy, telling the listener or reader in general terms how he will respond to the
advocate’s arguments and what arguments of his own he will advance.
One strategic choice the opponent must make is how he will use the benefit of
presumption. You will recall that the concept of presumption in argumentation
refers to those beliefs presently held by those in a field or by an audience.
Presumption describes who presently occupies the figurative ground over which
argumentation takes place. Presumption in this sense is natural presumption. In
factual argumentation, we may also view presumption as artificial when the
proposition is treated as a hypothesis and argumentation is used to test its proba-
ble truth or falsity. Artificial presumption, as hypothesis testing, is commonly used
when we engage in argumentation to seek knowledge.
The proposition alleging a relationship between Jane Austen and feminism
emerged as students observed feminist ideas being conveyed in film and television
adaptations of her novels. Different opinions were expressed by those already fa-
miliar with the novels than those whose only exposure to Austen was through these
adaptations. Both sides kept coming back to the question: Was the author a femi-
nist, or were feminist ideas imposed on her novels by those who adapted them for
the screen? The students treated this question as a hypothesis to be tested, granting
artificial presumption, that Jane Austen was not a feminist, to the opponent.
Like the advocate, the opponent also discovered important issues for devel-
oping his case through the process of analysis. In locating immediate cause and re-
searching historical background, he discovered that beginning in the mid-1990s,
those who adapted Austen’s novels for film and television incorporated feminist
themes to appeal to contemporary audiences. He also discovered a possible rea-
son for this.
The second wave of the feminist movement of the 1970s encouraged more
women to enter Ph.D. programs and many were in doctoral programs in literature,
communication, and the new area of women’s studies. In their graduate research,
and later as college professors expected to publish scholarly research, many
women (and some men) “discovered” Austen’s novels and produced a staggering
amount of material applying feminist ideas to them. In the mid-1990s, scriptwriters,
producers, and directors who adapted Austen’s novels for predominantly female
audiences, drew on this body of feminist scholarship.
From his research, the opponent’s philosophy of opposition began to emerge.
First, his review of feminist and other literary scholarship on Austen revealed that
opinion was divided as to whether she embraced the proto-feminism of her era.
Credible sources made sound arguments to suggest she did not. Second, he dis-
covered extensive material regarding the adaptation of the novels for film and tel-
evision and knew he could draw on his audience’s experience of having viewed
those adaptations most frequently identified as having had feminist themes added
to them. From this, the opponent established two strategies for building his case:
(1) Jane Austen was not a feminist, her novels have been appropriated and inter-
preted by twentieth-century critics as espousing feminist ideas; and (2) Jane Austen’s
novels have been re-visioned in popular film and television adaptations that add
contemporary feminist themes to them.
Refuting by Denial and Extenuation

Strategic decisions about how to address the advocate’s primary inference and how
to use the benefit of presumption shape how the opponent will respond to the ad-
vocate’s contentions and the units of argument that develop them. He must deter-
mine whether the strategies of denial and extenuation can be used to refute these
arguments. He makes this decision after examining how well the advocate’s argu-
ments satisfy the requirements of the stock issues for factual argumentation.
First, the advocate will have selected a particular pattern of reasoning to use in
constructing arguments substantiating the proposition. The opponent should
make sure that this pattern is sufficient to demonstrate the probable truth of the in-
ference made in each of the advocate’s units of argument. Second, the opponent
may elect to challenge the sufficiency of the proof offered by the advocate. In
essence, this strategy asserts that while the advocate’s claims in and of themselves
would be sufficient to establish the probability of the inference, those claims are
not grounded in proof and reasoning sufficient to warrant assent. The two strate-
gies commonly used by opponents to refute the advocate’s arguments are denial
and extenuation.
Denial. In employing a strategy of denial, the opponent does not argue that the
advocate has knowingly engaged in distortion or deception, but that the argu-
ments offered are nonetheless unwarranted because the advocate has:
1. Misanalyzed the situation, and the analysis provided by the opponent is proper;
2. Overlooked certain important facts, which the opponent provides along with
an explanation of the significance of their having been overlooked;
3. Given undue significance to certain facts, and the opponent explains why they
lack significance;
4. Drawn unwarranted conclusions from the proof, and the opponent provides
the proper conclusion.
Denial is a form of refutation in which the opponent argues that the advocate has
failed to provide sufficient proof and reasoning to establish the relationship inferred
by a contention and its supporting units of argument.
In opposing the proposition that Jane Austen was a feminist, the opponent’s
first strategy was one of denial. “Jane Austen was not a feminist, her novels have
been appropriated and interpreted by twentieth-century feminist critics as espous-
ing feminist ideas” denies the advocate’s inference of a relationship between Austen
and the proto-feminist ideas of Mary Wollstonecraft. The opponent’s first con-
tention established his strategy of denial: “Jane Austen was not a feminist author.”
He developed this contention with three claims.
CLAIM 1: Austen was not an advocate of Mary Wollstonecraft’s proto-
feminist ideas.
CLAIM 2: Twentieth-century feminist critics have imposed their feminist prin-
ciples on Austen’s novels.
CLAIM 3: Film and television adaptations of Austen’s novels encourage us

to think of her as a feminist.
The opponent’s first unit of argument was a direct denial of the advocate’s
contention of a connection between Austen’s novels and the proto-feminist views
of her era. He grounded this claim with his own authoritative source and used one
of the advocate’s techniques, directly quoting an Austen novel, to back his argu-
ment. The next two units of argument extended the denial of a relationship be-
tween Austen and proto-feminism, explaining that such a connection was unwar-
ranted by providing arguments showing why the connection was flawed. These
units of argument were grounded and backed by information and authoritative
opinion on feminist criticism of Austen’s novels and how it influenced those who
adapted the novels for the screen and contemporary audiences.
Extenuation. The other strategy commonly used to oppose arguments of fact is

one of extenuation. Extenuation arguments focus on the circumstances that sur-
round a given fact and its interpretation. In this type of refutation, the opponent
argues that the relationship inferred by the advocate is based on a limited under-
standing of the circumstances surrounding those facts and that a more complete
understanding of those circumstances would lead to a different inference.
Extenuating or unusual circumstances warrant a conclusion other than the one
normally drawn when these facts are present.
The opponent’s second strategy was one of extenuation. “Jane Austen’s novels
have been re-visioned in popular film and television adaptations that add contem-
porary feminist themes to them” was used to develop two contentions and their
supporting units of argument to prove that extenuating circumstances cause the
perception that some relationship exists between Austen and feminism. His second
contention addressed the re-visioning of characters that took place as Austen’s
novels were adapted for film and television: “Adaptations of Austen’s novels have
re-visioned her female characters from a feminist perspective.” He developed three
claims to support this contention.
CLAIM 1: Emma Thompson’s adaptation of Sense and Sensibility re-visions
the story from a contemporary feminist perspective.
CLAIM 2: Douglas McGrath’s adaptation of Emma re-visions the titular
character from a contemporary feminist perspective.
CLAIM 3: Patricia Rozema’s adaptation of Mansfield Park changes the char-
acter of Fanny Price to embrace a contemporary feminist perspective.
With this contention and its supporting claims, you might notice how the
opponent’s definition of feminism from a contemporary perspective became im-
portant. He wanted the audience to understand that it is contemporary ideas
about feminism that are the source of the alleged connection of Austen to femi-
nism, not the proto-feminism of her era. Also, because many of the advocate’s
units of argument focused on Austen’s female characters, the opponent made a
point of emphasizing how her female characters have been re-visioned on the
basis of contemporary feminism.
The opponent’s third contention continued the strategy of refutation by extenua-
tion, this time focusing on Austen’s male characters: “Film and television adaptations
re-vision Austen’s male characters from a contemporary perspective.” He developed

this contention with two claims:
CLAIM 1: Male characters are modified to fit today’s image of an ideal man
from a feminine perspective.
CLAIM 2: Visual storytelling focuses on the male body as an object of female
desire in Sue Birtwistle and Andrew Davies’s re-visioning of Austen’s
Pride and Prejudice from a contemporary female perspective.
The opponent discovered extensive discussion of how the screen adaptations
of Austen’s novels had re-visioned her heroes to make them appealing to contem-
porary women in his research. “Girl power” of twentieth-century feminism sug-
gested women want to see men portrayed with certain qualities that do not appear
in Austen’s novels. The units of argument supporting this contention, along with
those supporting the second contention, used descriptions of the adaptations to
signify the re-visioning to ground claims backed by expert opinion, argument from
authority, confirming and explaining the incorporation of contemporary feminist
themes in the adaptations.
Responding to Preemptive Arguments

The final strategic choice the opponent must make concerns what to do if the ad-
vocate presents preemptive arguments. Is the opponent obligated to respond to
them? No. The opponent has as much right to determine his strategy and select the
arguments he will advance in refutation of the proposition as the advocate has in
choosing hers. The opponent must examine the advocate’s preempts carefully.
Although they may represent a sincere and ethical attempt to keep argumentation
focused, they may be nothing more than a collection of straw man arguments cyn-
ically and unethically introduced to gain an advantage.
In our example, the opponent responded to the advocate’s preemptive argument
with his first unit of argument under the first contention: “Austen was not an advocate
of Mary Wollstonecraft’s proto-feminist ideas.” He offered an authoritative source of
his own and used Austen’s most famous statement about marriage to deny the connec-
tion between Austen and proto-feminism. Because the main thrust of the opponent’s
case was to argue that any feminist themes the audience finds are the product of the
adaptation of Austen’s novels for the screen, he did not dwell on direct denial of the ad-
vocate’s preempt. This was a strategic choice he made to keep the audience focused on
why they found feminist themes in the film and television adaptations.
Argument in Action
The complete brief of the opponent’s argumentation for the proposition, Jane
Austen was not a feminist, appears in Box 9.2. As you review the grounds used for
the units of argument under his second and third contentions, visualize how video
clips might be used in place of the written descriptions. In presentations made in
class, students frequently used this kind of artifactual evidence to ground claims
about the re-visioning of Austen’s characters. We are constrained by the print
medium so we have provided descriptions, but assure you that these clips were a
compelling means of grounding such claims.
BOX 9.2
Fact Opponent Brief
Proposition
Jane Austen was not a feminist.

Feminism—the ideology of equal rights for men and women, women’s struggle to achieve eco-
nomic and political parity and the twentieth-century extensions of girl power and equity in
romantic relationships.
Overview
Today, people experience the novels of Jane Austen through adaptations for film and
television. Louise Flavin (2004), author of Jane Austen in the Classroom, encourages this use in
literature classes as a gateway to the novels. M. Casey Diana (2001) found that students were
better able to engage with the plot and characters from Emma Thompson’s adaptation of
Sense and Sensibility, that the film “left a stronger, far more lasting impression” than did reading
the novel (p. 144).
{Contention 1} Jane Austen was not a feminist author. {strategy of denial}

{Claim 1} Austen was not an advocate of Mary Wollstonecraft’s proto-feminist ideas.
{Grounds} British historian Josephine Ross (2002) indicates that Austen’s
characters and themes do not reflect the “subversiveness” of the proto-feminist
“lady philosophers” and that Austen would not have thought of herself as one of
them. [Austen] “did not seek to unpick the stitches which bound society . . . She
does not openly challenge the dependent female role within marriage: her
message, rather, is that it is both a woman’s right, and her duty, to choose wisely
and responsibly whom to marry” (pp. 137–138).
{Warrant} Austen’s novels all conclude with one or more marriages and do not
offer any sense that she rejected the social structure of her day.
{Backing} Austen’s most famous line, the first sentence in Pride and Prejudice,
supports the era’s idea of marriage, “It is a truth universally acknowledged, that
a single man in possession of a good fortune, must be in want of a wife” (Austen,
1813/2003, p. 11).
{Claim 2} Twentieth-century feminist critics have imposed their feminist principles on

Austen’s novels.
{Grounds} From the 1970s, “Austen was a gift to feminist theorists and provoked
intense debate among them as to the nature and degree of her own feminism . . .
[In Emma, Mansfield Park, and Northanger Abbey] elements . . . that hardly seemed to
be noticed before . . . [are subjected to locus of meaning shifts as feminist critics
show] how flexible Austen can be in the hands of her interpreters . . . Exponents
of ‘heteronormativity’ in Austen’s work now vie with those who note its
‘queerness’” (Harman, 2009, pp. 190–191).
(continued)
{Warrant} Feminist critics, mostly university professors who must publish to

advance in their careers, are the cause of Austen’s being labeled a feminist.
Critics, especially postmodernists who interpret Austen on the basis of what she
doesn’t say, use the ideological lens of their feminist beliefs to see their own
notions of gender, class, or national identity reflected in her novels.
{Backing} As the most prominent female author of the literary canon, “Jane
Austen was a natural subject for feminist criticism . . . from the early 1970s, the
dominant critical methodology for the study of Austen was feminist” (Jones,
2004, p. 3).
{Claim 3} Film and television adaptations of Austen’s novels encourage us to think of
her as a feminist.
{Grounds} “Austen-mania” began in the mid-1990s and continues with recent
film and television adaptations of the novels. “[T]he key factors in the recent
resurgence of Austen has undoubtedly been gender. . . a rise of interest in filming
from a feminist perspective . . . Austen’s novels have been recognized as a fertile
terrain for socially conscious representations of women’s lives—a perception
undoubtedly nurtured by the proliferation of politicized readings of Austen in the
academy” (Dobie, 2003, p. 248).
{Warrant} Gender issues are important to women today and popular culture
artifacts address issues raised by academics in a more accessible medium.
{Backing} Sue Parrill (2002), Head of the English Department at Southeastern
Louisiana University:“recent Austen adaptations have been popular because they
represent a ‘mainstreaming’ of modern feminism. Often incorporating modern
critics’ interpretations of Austen’s novels as embodying feminist principles, the
adaptations of the nineties reflect modern feminism and are appealing to modern
viewers for that reason” (p. 7).
{Contention 2} Adaptations of Austen’s novels have re-visioned her female characters from
a feminist perspective. {strategy of extenuation}
{Claim 1} Emma Thompson’s adaptation of Sense and Sensibility re-visions the story from
a contemporary feminist perspective.
{Grounds} In Austen’s novel, 13-year-old Margaret Dashwood is covered in a few
sentences and has no significance in the plotline. “In Thompson’s adaptation,
Margaret serves several purposes. She is the primary critic of the status quo and
advocate of equal opportunity for women . . . By her protests, she also is the
occasion for her elders’ explaining . . . the reasons for their predicament. Further,
she practices a kind of freedom of action and speech that her sisters cannot . . .
Since Margaret’s plans for the future include a career in piracy, she obviously does
not feel debarred from traditionally masculine activities such as the captaincy of
ships and slaughter on the high seas. We see her practicing swordsmanship with
Edward and hear him say that Margaret plans to take him along as a servant on
her forthcoming expedition to China” (Parrill, 2002, pp. 37–38).
{Warrant} Emma Thompson’s re-characterization of Margaret as a contemporary
girl adds feminist overtones to a character that Austen’s novel described as “good-
humored” and “well-disposed,” but “without having much sense” and not likely “to
equal her sisters at a more advanced period of life” (Austen, 1811/2003, p. 15).
{Backing} Kristin Flieger Samuelian (2001), professor of English at George Mason
University: “Transformed by Thompson from a plot device to an integral character,
Margaret serves both to voice reasonable dissent and to exhort unpalatable truths
from the mouths of her more restrained elders . . . Elinor and Edward’s support of
her ambitions, however tongue-in-cheek , . . . that the world she inherits will be far
more tolerant than the one her sisters find themselves in” (p. 149).
{Claim 2} Douglas McGrath’s adaptation of Emma re-visions the titular character from
a contemporary feminist perspective.
{Grounds 1} Emma is portrayed as a modern girl. “She and Harriet are
‘girlfriends’ in a modern, trivialized sense, talking about boys and playing with
puppies” (Kaplan, 2001, p. 185).
{Grounds 2} “Paltrow plays Emma as a beautiful model, as a spoiled child, as a
rebellious teen . . . Her typical gestures are pouting, rolling her eyes, sighing in
exasperation, and whining” (Flavin, 2004, p. 140).
{Grounds 3} “In Douglas McGrath’s version, Emma was pictured engaging in
target archery and driving her own carriage, actions that have no source in the
novel. . . . The image of Emma engaging simultaneously in athletic and verbal
competition with Knightley has a particular resonance for contemporary women,
who are regularly exhorted to ‘Just Do It’ like their male counterparts” (Ferriss,
2001, p. 127)
{Grounds 4} Austen’s Emma is very conscious of the social hierarchy. McGrath’s
Emma is Americanized to erase class distinctions: “. . . the film erases . . . the
most problematic passage in the novel: Emma’s final disposal of Harriet as a
friend. In McGrath’s version, the estrangement between the two women is fleeting;
when Emma’s announcement of her engagement is seen in dumb show through a
window, Harriet appears to rush out of the room, but the very next scene has the
two warmly reuniting over the news of Harriet’s own engagement. . . . Nothing in
this version suggests that difference in rank will ultimately separate the two
women” (Dole, 2001, p. 69).
{Warrant} McGrath’s adaptation of the character, and Gwyneth Paltrow’s
portrayal, encourage the interpretation of Emma as a contemporary American
girl with contemporary feminist ideas.
{Backing} Marc DiPaolo (2007): Communication and English Department at
Alvernia College: “. . . the McGrath film is possibly unique in its portrayal of
Emma as a physical figure who counts archery as one of her hobbies and drives
herself from place to place (p. 89). [A]s much as [it] is faithful to the novel . . .
the Miramax film is clearly a product of the 1990s, a time in which Hollywood
strove to fashion romance films that could please . . . modern-day feminists”
(p. 91).
{Claim 3} Patricia Rozema’s adaptation of Mansfield Park changes the character of
Fanny Price to embrace a contemporary feminist perspective.
{Grounds 1} “Rozema . . . entirely abandoned the author’s characterization of
Fanny Price and makes her into a fantasy version of the young Austen herself, a
spirited, would-be writer . . . she often appears angry and passionate, displays an
energetically heaving bosom . . . “ (Harman, 2009, p. 215).
{Grounds 2} “At one point we see Fanny lying on her stomach on her bed, kicking
her feet in the air, while Edmund listens to her read aloud. This scene, like many
others, presents Fanny as having a twentieth century girl’s ease with the opposite
sex” (Parrill, 2002, p. 89).
{Grounds 3} “Rozema has . . . injected energy into Austen’s ‘creepmouse’ heroine . . .
Frances O’Conner’s verve and athleticism makes her Fanny Price physically appealing
(continued)
. . . a far cry from Austen’s retiring protagonist, who longs to fade into the
background. . . . the novel’s Fanny rides—fearfully, at first, then sedately . . . O’Conner
cannot repress her energy, galloping around the house . . . then pounding across the
countryside on a horse” (Troost & Greenfield, 2001, pp. 191–192).
{Warrant} Austen’s Fanny Price had moral strength but was physically weak.
Rozema’s makeover causes us to see her as a contemporary young woman with
today’s attitudes.
{Backing} Martine Vioret (2003), Romanticism literary scholar: “[Fanny] has
become Rozema’s ‘feminist Cinderella.’ Gone also from the film, are all the
judgments that because of ‘the sweetness of her temper, the purity of her mind and
the excellence of her principles’ [Austen’s description], Fanny would have been
the perfect complement and ideal wife for Henry Crawford . . . [because many
people] now reject the idea, exemplified by Fanny, that women are the guardians
of morality and virtue” (p. 235).
{Contention 3} Film and television adaptations re-vision Austen’s male characters from a
contemporary perspective. {strategy of extenuation}
{Claim 1} Male characters are modified to fit today’s image of an ideal man from a
feminine perspective.
{Grounds 1} “[Adding] twentieth-century emotional substance to Austen’s
characters, Thompson’s Sense and Sensibility makes substantial revisions to the two
heroine’s suitors by replacing scenes of restraint with those of connection”
(Nixon, 2001, p. 35).
{Grounds 2} “Men’s love of children is very much at issue in the films. Dear’s
Persuasion shows Admiral Croft to be a good man for his indulgence of the
Musgrove boys, and he makes paper boats with them, which they later sail on the
water with Anne’s guidance” (Looser, 2001, p. 171).
{Warrant} By re-visioning Austen’s male characters as “sensitive,” the added
scenes make Austen’s male characters more appealing to today’s woman.
{Backing} Martine Voiret (2003):“In the wake of the feminist revolution, we now
want men to be egalitarian, sensitive, nurturing, and expressive . . . They [the
adaptations] translate contemporary desires for a type of masculinity that
happily embodies those conflicting features . . . Austen’s male characters . . .
have been modified to embody characteristics of the new man . . . the films invent
or focus moments showing that the principal male characters are sensitive and
responsive to other people’s needs” (p. 238).
{Claim 2} Visual storytelling focuses on the male body as an object of female desire in
Sue Birtwistle and Andrew Davies’s re-visioning of Austen’s Pride and Prejudice from a
contemporary female perspective.
{Grounds 1} “. . . it is, traditionally, men who are possessors of the gaze in viewing
on screen and film . . . Pride and Prejudice, however, is unashamed about appealing to
women—and in particular about fetishizing and framing Darcy and offering him
up to the female gaze” (Hopkins, 2001, p. 112).
{Grounds 2} “The scene opens with Darcy in a bath. . . . We cut to Darcy arising
from his bath and donning his dressing gown (it is at this point we just miss seeing
his naked body).The camera trails Darcy as he moves to the window. . . . We bring
to this scene our twentieth-century context of familiarity with the sight of naked
bodies on screen” (Blum, 2003, p. 167).
{Grounds 3} “During the screening of the series . . . Colin Firth, became the
nation’s number one heartthrob, a position he . . . retains virtually unchallenged . . .
the scene that made him famous was one invented by Andrew Davies, in which
Darcy is shown brooding by the lake at Pemberly, and emerging with his clothes
damp . . . now considered one of the most unforgettable moments in British TV
history . . . the matrons of England went mad” (Harman, 2009, p. 207).
{Warrant} Scenes displaying Colin Firth’s male charms encouraged women to
gaze on Mr. Darcy in a way Austen never suggests, but resonates with the
contemporary feminist notion that women should have parity with men when it
comes to gazing upon an attractive film star.
{Backing} Martine Voiret (2003) points out, “the sexual revolution of the 1960s
brought a plethora of movies exhibiting the female body. . . . Hollywood became
less and less interested in catering to female subjectivities. While the screen was
still filled with handsome actors, they were rarely presented to the female viewer
as sight. In Jane Austen movie adaptations, the hero by contrast is there to be
looked at. He presents an arresting spectacle not only because of his attire but
also because the camera capitalizes on the sight he offers” (p. 231).
Sources Cited
Austen, J. (1811/2003). Sense and sensibility. London: CRW Publishing.
Austen, J. (1813/2003). Pride and prejudice. London: CRW Publishing.
Blum, V. L. (2003).The return home. In S. R. Pucci & J.Thompson (Eds.), Jane Austen and co. (pp.
133–155). Albany: State University of New York Press.
Diana, M. C. (2001). Emma Thompson’s Sense and Sensibility as gateway to Austen’s novel. In L.
Troost & S. Greenfield (Eds.), Jane Austen in Hollywood (2nd ed., pp. 140–147). Lexington:The
University Press of Kentucky.
DiPaolo, M. (2007). Emma adapted: Jane Austen’s heroine from work to film. New York: Peter Lang.
Dobie, M. (2003). Gender and the heritage genre: Popular feminism turns to history. In S. R.
Pucci & J. Thompson (Eds.), Jane Austen and co. (pp. 247–259). Albany: State University of
New York Press.
Dole, C. M. (2001). Austen, class, and the American market. In L. Troost & S. Greenfield (Eds.),
Jane Austen in Hollywood (2nd ed.; pp. 58–78). Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky.
Ferriss, S. (2001). Emma becomes clueless. In L. Troost & S. Greenfield (Eds.), Jane Austen in
Hollywood (2nd ed.; pp. 122–129). Lexington:The University Press of Kentucky.
Flavin, L. (2004). Jane Austen in the classroom. New York: Peter Lang.
Harman, C. (2009). Jane’s fame: How Jane Austen conquered the world. New York: Henry Holt.
Hopkins, L. (2001). Mr. Darcy’s body: Privileging the female gaze. In L.Troost & S. Greenfield (Eds.),
Jane Austen in Hollywood (2nd ed.; pp. 111–121). Lexington:The University Press of Kentucky.
Jones, D. (2004). Jane Austen: Critical issues. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Kaplan, D. (2001). Mass marketing Jane Austen: Men, women, and courtship in two film
adaptations. In L.Troost & S. Greenfield (Eds.), Jane Austen in Hollywood (2nd ed.; pp. 177–187).
Lexington:The University Press of Kentucky.
Looser, D. (2001). Feminist implications of the silver screen Austen. In L. Troost & S. Greenfield
(Eds.), Jane Austen in Hollywood (2nd ed.; pp. 159–176). Lexington: The University Press of
Kentucky.
Nixon, C. L. (2001). Balancing the courtship hero: Masculine emotional display in film
adaptations of Austen’s novels. In L. Troost & S. Greenfield (Eds.), Jane Austen in Hollywood
(2nd ed.; pp. 22–43). Lexington:The University Press of Kentucky.
(continued)
Parrill, S. (2002). Jane Austen on film and television: A critical study of the adaptations. Jefferson, NC:
McFarland.
Ross, J. (2002). Jane Austen: A companion. London: John Murray.
Samuelian, K. F. (2001). “Piracy is our only option”: Postfeminist intervention. In L.Troost & S.
Greenfield (Eds.), Jane Austen in Hollywood (2nd ed.; pp. 148–158). Lexington: The University
Press of Kentucky.
Troost, L., & Greenfield, S. (Eds.). (2001). The mouse that roared: Patricia Rozema’s Mansfield
Park. In Jane Austen in Hollywood (2nd ed.; pp. 188–204). Lexington: The University Press of
Kentucky.
Vioret, M. (2003). Books to movies: Gender and desire in Jane Austen’s adaptations. In S. R.
Pucci & J. Thompson (Eds.), Jane Austen and co. (pp. 229–246). Albany: State University of
New York Press.
Summary of Fact Opposition

1. Will the advocate’s definition of terms be challenged or accepted?
a. Does the advocate’s definition of terms stay within the bounds of the
proposition’s figurative ground?
b. What definition of terms does the opponent offer, and why is it a more rea-
sonable interpretation of the proposition?
2. Will the opponent support presumption?
a. Are there existing interpretations of fact that the advocate has overlooked
that the opponent wishes to argue?
b. What is the level of probability that the advocate’s arguments are true? Is
that level of probability greater than the probability that existing beliefs
about ideas, institutions, laws or rules, policies, customs, or practices are
worth preserving?
3. How will the advocate’s argumentation on stock issues be opposed?
a. Will denial arguments be used to argue that the advocate has misanalyzed
the situation, overlooked important facts, given undue significance to cer-
tain facts, or drawn unwarranted conclusions?
b. Will extenuation arguments be used to argue that special conditions or cir-
cumstances result in interpretations of fact other than those made by the
advocate?
4. If the advocate has presented preemptive arguments, how will they be addressed?
a. Are such arguments truly representative of the counterarguments an oppo-
nent might be expected to raise? Or are they straw man arguments?
b Do preemptive arguments reveal significant flaws in the advocate’s inter-
pretation of the proposition that the opponent might exploit?
Propositions of fact attempt to establish what has been, is, or will be. As well as
being worthwhile in it own right, learning how to argue fact is a necessary step for
becoming effective in arguing value and policy. Value and policy cases of advocacy
and opposition are built on a foundation of issues of factual argumentation.
References 195
LEARNING ACTIVITIES
1. In discussing the advocacy and opposition for the proposition, Jane Austen was a fem-
inist, we did not reveal the outcome of the audience’s response to the hypothesis testing
that went on in class. Review the briefs in Box 9.1 and 9.2. Which side makes the more
compelling case? Why? How does each arguer’s use of information and reasoning influ-
ence your opinion of which side offered the more compelling case?
2. The Web site, Male Voices in Praise of Jane Austen at http://www.theloiterer.org, offers
argumentation and commentary on how the film and television adaptations either serve
as “models” of Austen’s novels or make “egregious errors” that “must be confronted,”
along with a variety of other Austen-related topics. How does this argumentation com-
pare to that offered by the advocate and opponent in this chapter?
3. Develop your own class project for factual argumentation as inquiry to determine the
relationship between audience perceptions of people and how they are portrayed in var-
ious “reality” programs on television. Choose a group of shows that have a similar
theme for your inquiry—for example, choose The Jersey Shore (MTV), Jersey Couture
(Oxygen), Jerseylicious (Style Network), and The Real Housewives of New Jersey
(Bravo). Create a factual proposition to test as a hypothesis about what a specific real-
ity show or group of shows says about people. For the New Jersey reality television
group of shows, the proposition might be: “Reality television programs about people
from New Jersey portray them as overly emotional.” Develop positions of advocacy
and opposition to test your hypothesis.
4. Phrase your own proposition of past, present, or future fact. Prepare a prima facie case
from the advocate’s position. Respond as an opponent to your advocate’s case of fac-
tual argumentation, or to that of a classmate as assigned by your instructor.
REFERENCES
Achenbach, J. (2003, March). Flesh & bone: A new generation of scientists brings dinosaurs
back to life. National Geographic, 203, 2–33.
Fergus, J. (1997). The professional woman writer. In E. Copeland & J. McMaster (Eds.),
The Cambridge companion to Jane Austen (pp. 12–31). Cambridge, UK: The Cambridge
University Press.
Harman, C. (2009). Jane’s fame: How Jane Austen conquered the world. New York: Henry
Holt.
Ray, J. (2009, September/October). Crediting Wollstonecraft. Jane Austen’s Regency World,
Issue 41, 56–57.
Sandman, W (1993). Gorgias and his postmodern cousins: Toward a skeptical view of argu-
ment. In R. E. McKerrow (Ed.), Argument and the postmodern challenge. Proceedings of
the eighth SCA/AFA conference on argumentation (pp. 97–104). Annandale, VA: Speech
Communication Association.
Wollstonecraft, M. (1792/1992). A vindication of the rights of woman. London: Penguin
Books.
CHAPTER
10
How Are Value

W
here do we find examples of value argumentation? Religion and philosophy
are fields primarily concerned with right and wrong, moral and
immoral, and ethical and unethical behavior. Both fields seek to determine
standards of socially or doctrinally acceptable behavior. A theologian examines
behavior in terms of whether it measures up to a moral code expressed in sacred
texts. The philosopher may speculate on the existence of several alternatives for
ethical and unethical behavior.
The arts—film, theater, music, literature, sculpture, painting, and dance—
concern themselves, in part, with judging artistic works against a set of critical
standards to determine whether they are “good art.” The critics continually revise
these sets of standards to keep pace with trends. We rely on the opinions of the
professional critic to help us determine what album to buy, book to read, or film to
see. We have a chance to observe how standards for the arts are developed and
applied by reading articles and reviews in publications such as the Journal of
Popular Culture, Critical Studies in Media Communication, TV Guide,
Entertainment Weekly, or on Web sites like Premiere.com.
Other fields also use value argumentation, particularly regarding standards of
ethical behavior. Medicine, law, business, education, and public relations, along
with most other fields, are concerned with determining acceptable behaviors for
their practitioners. Is prescribing a certain drug to a certain category of patients
ethical? Is a certain sales technique an ethical business practice? Is a certain behavior
appropriate for an ethical educator? Most professional organizations and many
corporations have established codes of ethical conduct. These codes can provoke
extensive value and policy argumentation as individuals and groups seek to interpret
and apply them.
Almost any statement, lengthy or brief, can contain a value judgment. How
we describe something or someone will necessarily be colored by our feelings
toward what we have described. Deni Elliott (1997) suggests the world’s many
cultures “appear to be an array of values, a colorful moral kaleidoscope” (p. 68).
The uses of value argumentation are as varied as the groups and individuals who
196
are concerned with standards of excellence and appropriate behavior. In academic

argumentation, you may be asked to develop a case about the quality or lack of
quality of some institution or practice, or the degree to which something is in the
audience’s best interests. In this chapter we will examine how arguments are developed
for propositions of value.
THE NATURE OF VALUES

Value can be an ambiguous term. Consider how a number of scholars have tried to
fix the meaning of something that is a psychological and sociological process.
Values are intangibles . . . things of the mind that have to do with the vision people
have of “the good life” for themselves and their fellows. (Rescher, 1969, p. 4)
A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of exis-
tence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or
end-state of existence. A value system is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning
preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum of relative
importance. (Rokeach, 1973, p. 5)
Values are premises which are related to the preference of a particular audience
for one thing as opposed to another. (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Kruiger, 1987,
p. 222)
Values . . . are beliefs expressed in judgment statements rather than in fact
statements. . . . Statements about values are normative as distinguished from descriptive
statements. (Elliott, 1997, p. 69)
[Values are found in the] struggle to understand right and wrong, good and bad,
[absolutely] true and false, just and unjust, virtuous and corrupt. In dealing with these
ends, we assume that we seek the right, the good, the true, the just, and the virtuous
rather than their opposites. (Jensen, 1997, p. 5)
Values can be viewed as conceptions of The Good or The Desirable that motivate
human behavior and that function as criteria in our making of choices and judgments.
Concepts such as material success, individualism, efficiency, thrift, freedom, courage,
hard work, competition, patriotism, compromise, and punctuality are value standards
that have varying degrees of potency in contemporary North American culture.
(Johannesen, Valde, & Whedbee, 2008, p. 1)
From these definitions, we gain a general understanding that values are modes of
thought that can influence the way we perceive things and the behaviors in which
we engage. In the value-thinking mode, we make subjective, judgmental statements
about people, places, ideas, and artifacts.
Michael E. Porter (2000) suggests that “attitudes, values, and beliefs that are
sometimes referred to as a ‘culture’ play an unquestioned role in human behavior
and progress” (p. 14). A culture is a complex of collectively determined rules,
values, ideologies, and habits that shape thought and action. Although we live in a
multicultural society, what makes us American are a few core values. Core values
are “those large patterns of behavior from generation to generation that express
continuing convictions” (McElroy, 1999, p. xi). Value judgments are frequently
made on the basis of these long-standing core values.
198 CHAPTER 10 How Are Value Propositions Argued?
Core American Values

Richard L. Johannesen, Kathleen S. Valde, and Karen E. Whedbee (2008) suggest
what some of these standards of judgment might be, but theirs is not the only list
that has been put forward. Anne-Marie Slaughter (2007), Dean of the Woodrow
Wilson School at Princeton and Professor of Politics and International Affairs,
examines American foreign policy through the lens of our values. She believes that
our foreign policy should be informed by our values and that our actions at home
and abroad can be consistent with our values. For her, values of liberty, democracy,
equality, and justice, derived from foundational documents like the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution, are supplemented by our values of tolerance,
humility, and faith.
Bill Halamandaris (2004), founder and president of the Heart of America
Foundation, believes that a set of values derived from Alexis de Tocqueville’s 1831
book On Democracy in America are still relevant today. Cleverly arranged so that
the first letters of each combine to spell the words core values, these foundational
values are said to be compassion, opportunity, responsibility, equality, valor, ambition,
liberty, unity, enterprise, and spirituality. He argues these values should have
the same utility for Americans in the twenty-first century as they did for the
Founding Fathers.
Daniel Yankelovich (2005), Chairman of DYG, Inc., one of the leading
marketing and social research firms in the country, has been in the business of public
opinion research since the 1960s. Based on the annual tracking polls conducted by
his firm, he has “identified eleven core values that are consistently embraced by
most Americans . . . summarized as follows: patriotism, self-confidence, individualism,
belief in hard work and productivity, religious beliefs, child-centeredness, community
and charity, pragmatism and compromise, acceptance of diversity, cooperation
with other countries, [and a] hunger for common ground” (p. 25).
Some of the difference between these lists may be semantic, and a consequence
of Halamandaris’s desire to have his list literally proclaim itself as America’s core
values. There may be no difference, for example, between faith, spirituality, and
religious beliefs. The greatest difference derives from the authors’ respective methods.
Yankelovich is interested in what Americans do believe rather than what they
should believe. His list of 11 values is preceded by an indication of how feelings
have changed over time, and followed by a discussion of the extent of popular
support for each, making explicit his qualification of the claim that these values
are embraced by most Americans.
Core national value systems, which may include values relevant to various
fields of argument, are of particular importance to your analysis of a value proposition
when the dispute is joined at a national level. Dominant patterns of valuing can
help you identify value hierarchies that may apply to your value proposition. The
following core values are supported by “strong majorities of the general public”
(Yankelovich, 2005, p. 26). They are listed alphabetically rather than in rank order,
and may exist in combination or in conflict with each other in a given situation.
Acceptance of Diversity. In the late nineteenth century, millions of immigrants

came to the United States seeking a better life, and one of the enduring images
Americans have of their country is as a “melting pot.” Most of us are immigrants
or the children of immigrants. Hate crimes against members of racial, religious, or

ethnic groups still occur, but what makes us “American” is that most of us share a
common cluster of values about the kind of nation we want. “U.S. society emphasizes
individualism, the dignity and intrinsic worth of each person, and honors freedom
and mutual respect” (Jensen, 1997, p. 26). The controversy over illegal immigration
is joined in part over this value.
Belief in Hard Work and Productivity. “The vast majority of Americans (82
percent) describe themselves as ‘hardworking’” (Yankelovich, 2005, p. 27). The
value we place on hard work can be traced back to the Protestant work ethic.
The initial British efforts to colonize North America at Jamestown and
Plymouth almost failed because the educated gentlemen who emigrated were
not used to getting their hands dirty. Captain John Smith decreed that “those
who don’t work don’t eat,” and the work ethic triumphed in the colonies.
Today, we believe hard work pays off and that the accomplishments of individ-
uals should be rewarded. A corollary to achievement is the belief that we should
not be idle, that we should always be progressing toward some goal, even in our
leisure activities.
Child-centeredness. Three out of every four people surveyed “strongly agreed

with the statement that ‘once you have a child your own needs come second’”
(Yankelovich, 2005, p. 27). Men and women in almost equally high numbers
embraced the identity of being a “family man” or a “family woman,” although
the numbers were slightly higher for women. This value finds its expression in
the myriad activities we encourage children to engage in, the emergence of the
role of “soccer mom,” and government programs ranging from Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) to the Bush administration’s No Child Left
Behind initiative.
Community and Charity. Community is the core value of the group, the belief that
we should work together to accomplish things. This core value encompasses family,
neighbors, members of our ethnic group, loyalty to an employer, labor union,
professional association, or school. Community-based values take the individual
outside of self and into the society of others, while charity engages us in the act of
helping the poor, the victims of a natural disaster, or those afflicted with a serious
disease. Notice how colleges and universities engage both aspects of this value in
their solicitation of contributions from alumni.
Cooperation with Other Countries. Although the collapse of the former Soviet
Union left the United States as the world’s lone superpower, the lessons learned
from the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation are not lost on us. Americans
recognize that problems like terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
and global economic development are best addressed with the cooperation of
other countries.
Hunger for Common Ground. In a diverse society, the ability to find areas of common
ground is one means of ensuring social cohesion. The American people’s hunger
for common ground represents a centrist reaction to media characterizations of
behavior in the political sphere as increasingly partisan, ideological, polarizing,

and indicative of the fact that we are a divided rather than a united people.
Individualism. “Nearly two-thirds (65 percent) strongly agreed with the statement
that ‘When making choices, I like to go my own way and not necessarily do what
others are doing’” (Yakelovich, 2005, p. 27). Foundational documents like the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights give Americans the right to choose their leaders,
to speak out for those things they believe in and against those they do not. The
freedom to read, watch, and listen to what we want, to choose our spiritual path
and to live our personal lives as we see fit without interference from the government
is reflected in the value we place on individualism.
Patriotism. “Two-thirds (66 percent) of Americans describe themselves as

strongly patriotic. As many as 68 percent stated that they were ‘willing to make
sacrifices for’ their country” (Yankelovich, 2005, p. 26). Patriotism is the core
value of loyalty to the United States and our concept of democracy. “Patriotism
comes naturally to Americans. . . . I know of nowhere else where love of country
comes so easily and devoid of complications” (Elliott, 2002, p. 84). This loyalty
and love of country extends to the symbols of the United States—the flag, those
who serve in the military, our historical traditions and celebrations, and sometimes
our leaders. Patriotism can also be local or regional, as in loyalty to one’s state,
hometown, or alma mater.
Pragmatism and Compromise. According to Yankelovich (2005), “embracing

ideological extremes is actually far more characteristic of our intellectual elites
than of the general public” (p. 29). Even on issues that are ideologically polarizing
like abortion, Yankelovich notes that only a small percentage of Americans
absolutely favor or oppose it. Most are in the pragmatic middle, favoring abortion
in certain circumstances such as cases of rape or when the mother’s life is in jeopardy.
An overwhelming majority of Americans wish their political leaders were willing
to compromise to get things done.
Religious Beliefs. “Americans, as is often observed, remain an extraordinarily

religious people. Nearly two-thirds (61 percent) describe themselves as ‘strongly
active in church, synagogue, or spiritual group’” (Yankelovich, 2005, p. 27). This
core value suggests we feel we benefit from believing in a higher power. America is
often referred to as a “Christian nation,” so the religious values expressed tend to
be those of Christian doctrine. As a core value, religion is also a source of moral
standards. Religion and spirituality are significant in American core values, and we
go to great lengths to ensure separation of church and state.
Self-confidence. Almost three-quarters of those surveyed by Yankelovich (2005)

thought of themselves as confident. Sixty-nine percent indicated that “no matter
what comes my way I can handle it” (pp. 26–27). This core value may derive from
the Pilgrims’ belief that God had given them this vast, fertile, uncivilized land, “a
world in which the Creator had spread before them a richly endowed, primordial
continent” (McElroy, 1999, p. 112). Americans have a vision of their nation as a
special place, forged from a wilderness through blood and dedication, ordained by
heaven. This idealized view of America makes a “can-do” feeling of self-confidence

seem warranted to many people, although recent economic events have certainly
tested it.
Values in Conflict
Although these core values are held by a substantial majority of Americans, they
are not held by all, so the potential for conflict is inherent in this or any other
scheme of values such as those related to matters of taste or personal preference.
How do values come into conflict? We either make an evaluation of something
based on our knowledge and experience, or we are asked to choose one value over
another. In value propositions, the controversy exists over opposing judgments of
a person, event, idea, or artifact.
Generational Differences. One of the ways Americans differ in their values is

along generational lines. J. Walker Smith and Ann Cluman (1997), authors of
Rocking the Ages: The Yankelovich Report on Generational Marketing, argue that
Matures, born before 1946, Boomers, born between 1946 and 1964, and Gen X,
born since 1964, have very different values. Matures’ values emphasize discipline,
self-denial, hard work, and obedience to authority, and they tend to be conservative
on matters financial and social. Boomers, whose only experience with the Great
Depression and World War II was hearing Matures talk about it or studying it in
school, feel a certain sense of entitlement and favor self-expression and finding
themselves over self-sacrifice. Unlike Boomers who grew up in times of prosperity
and stability, Gen X grew up in times of changing economic and political conditions,
and as a result, they share some of the Matures’ values.
Smith and Cluman’s interest in values relates to how these differences impact
marketing messages, which Chapter 1 suggests are used to process information
along the peripheral route in the Elaboration Likelihood Model. In the broadest
sense, the message “you’ve earned it,” will resonate with Matures, while Boomers
will respond more positively if told “you deserve it.” Gen X is suspicious of
advertising and slick marketing messages, so a campaign that does not take itself
too seriously and provides reassurance that the product or service is sound and
practical is most likely to succeed with them. Although there is no doubt that the
values held by individual Americans differ generationally, it would be a mistake to
believe that all Americans of a certain age hold similar values and afford them
equal importance in their daily lives.
Value Hierarchy Differences. Values do not exist in isolation; they are usually
found in value clusters or systems. Rokeach’s (1973) definition of values includes
the concept “value systems,” his term for a value hierarchy. “Every person places
values in their own hierarchy, “ says John Russonello (2005), one of the principals
of Belden, Russonello & Stewart, an opinion research and communications
consultancy based in Washington, DC, whose philosophy is to focus on values in
assisting their clients’ efforts to communicate with key constituencies. Having said
that, he is quick to note that,
Our study of values over the last five decades has led us to conclude that some values
are consistently stronger motivators than others, so we describe them in two tiers:
primary and secondary values. Primary values are: responsibility to yourself and your
family; freedom; honesty; fairness; spirituality; and work. Secondary values are: respon-
sibility to care for others or for the world we live in—what is called stewardship; self-
fulfillment; respect for authority; and patriotism, or the love of country or culture.
A common source of value conflict is when two things, both highly valued,
come into opposition with each other because the situation does not appear to
allow both to be realized simultaneously. Extracting or developing natural
resources may provide much needed employment, but it also disturbs the environment
and displaces wildlife. A clash of values takes place over which is more important:
employment opportunity or environmental protection.
Cultural Differences. This clash of values and value hierarchies may also occur
when different cultures interpret values to mean different things and give them
different significance in their respective value hierarchies. Such was the case in the
1990s as the Ojibway of northern Wisconsin clashed with local government over
the proposed site of a copper mine. “Appropriate land use became a common
thread in the conflict of values over resources” (Coleman, 1997, p. 202).
Government officials held that the copper had no value unless it was mined. The
Ojibway held that the value of the copper could not be separated from the value of
the earth; we live in a reciprocal relationship with the environment.
Russonello (2005) classifies “responsibility to care for others or for the world
we live in—what is called stewardship” as a secondary value, which local officials
would likely view as relevant only as it related to dealing with the impact that
realizing a primary value, work/mining, might have on the environment. For the
Ojibway, stewardship combined with earth’s spiritual significance forms the pinnacle
of their value hierarchy,
the source of all nourishment and thus the source of life. In addition, home is hearth,
where food is prepared and shared, where stories are told and retold, and where
communal bonds are recreated in a celebration of life. Life is rooted in a concrete locality,
and this sense of place is part of the grounding of life. (Coleman, 1997, p. 201)
Generational, cultural, and, no doubt, other differences in values and value

hierarchies are not the only source of conflict. So, too, are differences in the meaning
supposedly shared values have. Slaughter (2007) believes values, and the manner
in which differences of opinion about them are resolved, are particularly important
for Americans:
Values play a particularly important role in the American national psyche for a unique
reason: Although we inhabit a common land that we love, we do not share a common
race, creed, or national origin. Liberty, democracy, equality, justice, tolerance, humility
and faith bind us together more powerfully than do blood or soil. But here is the paradox.
It is the vigorous and impassioned debates we have about the practical meaning of
those values and the trade-offs between them that bind us most strongly. The tone of
those debates is often fierce and divisive, but the disagreement and dissent that feed
them is an essential part of American life. (p. 216)
Whatever differences exist domestically, regardless of source, they pale in compar-

ison to the differences in values that exist when we move beyond our borders and
consider other national value systems.
Societal Differences Worldwide. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter

to discuss these differences in depth, they are significant enough that ignoring them
as a source of value conflict is impossible. The World Values Survey (2009) has
interviewed 257,000 respondents from 97 countries representing 88 percent of the
world’s population in five waves between 1981 and 2007. Top social scientists
from each country studied are recruited as the principal investigator responsible
for gathering and analyzing data from randomly selected subjects in their country.
The World Values Survey has discovered that,
many basic values are closely correlated and can be depicted in two major dimensions
of cross-cultural variation: (1) Traditional/Secular-rational and (2) Survival/Self-
Expression values . . . [which] explain more than 70 percent of the cross-cultural
variance on key variables. (p. 6)
Values in Traditional societies “emphasize the importance of parent-child ties,

deference to authority, and traditional family values.” Values in these societies also
manifest “high levels of national pride, and a nationalistic outlook.” Secular-
Rational societies “have the opposite preferences.” The World Values Survey
emerged from the European Values Study with the goal of not only examining
values cross-culturally but also longitudinally in order to assess how values change
over time. As a result, it has been determined that “in nearly all industrial societies,
worldviews have shifted from Traditional toward Secular-Rational values.” (p. 6)
Survival values place tremendous emphasis on issues of economic and social
security. For example, child-rearing in societies that emphasize Survival values
focus on the importance of hard work. Self-Expression values are associated
with a subjective sense of “well-being that is conductive to an atmosphere of
tolerance, trust and political moderation.” These values are associated with giv-
ing “high priority to environmental protection, tolerance of foreigners, gays and
lesbians and gender equality, and rising demand for participation in decision-
making in economic and political life.” A child raised in such a society would
be encouraged to develop his or her imagination and taught importance of
tolerance (pp. 6–7).
To understand what this means in a global sense, consider how the United
States compares with Northern Ireland, India, and Romania. All are similarly
Traditional in their values, as illustrated by their location along the Traditional/
Secular-Rational dimension in Figure 10.1. What differentiates values in these
societies is where they fall on the Survival/Self-Expression dimension. The United
States and Northern Ireland both fall on the Self-Expression end of this dimension,
although the United States’ factor score places it about twice as far from the tip-
ping point between Self-Expression values and Survival values as Northern
Ireland. India and Romania are both Survival values societies, although Romania
is about three times as far away from the tipping point as India.
A sense of how societies vary in terms of Traditional/Secular-Rational values can
be gained from looking at countries with similar Survival/Self-Expression values. For
example, Iceland is similar to the United States relative to Self-Expression values.
(See Figure 10.1.) However, Iceland is Secular-Rational in its values to about the
same extent the United States is Traditional in its. Survival values are present in
Egypt and China to about the same extent as they are in India. Egypt is a society
2
Secular-Rational Values
1.5
China
0.5 Iceland
0
Romania
Northern Ireland
ⴚ0.5 India United States
ⴚ1
Traditional Values
ⴚ1.5 Egypt
ⴚ2
ⴚ2 ⴚ1.5 ⴚ1 ⴚ0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2

Survival Values Self-Expression Values
Factor Score
FIGURE 10.1
Difference in Survival/Self-Expression and Traditional/Secular-Rational Values.
(Adapted from the Cultural Map of the World, World Values Survey, 2009)
with much more Traditional values than India, whereas China is a society in which
Secular-Rational values are very strong.
Although values are relatively stable, they are not static. The World Values
Survey indicates that values are changing in various parts of the world.
Yankelovich (2005) comments on how determining right from wrong has shifted
from a question of whether an action is moral to whether it is legal. More than a
decade ago, Yankelovich (1994) identified a belief in American superiority and
luck as being core American values.
There is a natural resistance to change. As Smith and Cluman (1997) point
out, a younger generation does not automatically adopt the values of an older one,
which can be a source of conflict. Understanding the forces that foment value
change is important, not only in terms of the ability it affords you to forecast possible
conflict, but also because as an advocate or opponent in value argumentation you
become part of the process of change.
Value Change
Although values seldom change abruptly, events can influence what is valued at a
particular point in time by a particular culture:
The most influential men in America met in Boston. The nation, they agreed, faced a
terrible moral crisis: rampant substance abuse, sex (even the old taboo against naked
breasts seemed to be gone), and illegitimacy. Public schools were languishing, the
pursuit of profits was appalling, the explosion of lawsuits was completely out of hand.
Worst of all, parents were doing a terrible job of raising their kids—not enough
discipline. (Monroe, 2000, p. 90)
The Boston group published their findings and proclaimed the need for “moral
action.” The year was 1679. More than 300 years have passed, but this call for
action could easily fit our time.
Engines of Change. Core values remain relatively stable even when society expe-
riences abrupt changes. A desire for value change may emerge from the collective
experience of those in a field or in society in general, with value conflict as the
cause or effect of this change. Nicholas Rescher’s (1969) classic view of shifting
values includes a discussion of the sources of value change: change in information;
ideological and political change; erosion of values through boredom, disillusion-
ment, and reaction; and changes in the operating environment.
The first way in which a value system can change is when new information is
introduced. Many of today’s changes are brought about by scientific discovery.
Consider the impact that modern communication technology has had on notions
of safety, privacy, and appropriate behavior. One of the great unanswered questions
that may produce a significant value change, if it can ever be established, is the
determination of the point at which life begins. Although it has been said that there
is nothing new under the sun, new discoveries about old things do happen. As you
investigate the immediate causes and historical background of your value proposition,
be alert for new discoveries, new directions, and shifts in thinking that point to
changing values.
A second way in which society experiences value change is through political
and ideological change. Such change can be revolutionary, as occurred in Eastern
Europe in 1989 and 1990. Both political and ideological change took place as
communist governments were overthrown and attempts at democracy were begun.
Political and ideological change need not be abrupt; “it can take the gradualistic
form of conditioning, advertising, propaganda, and promotion” (Rescher, 1969,
p. 117). For instance, think about the ways in which television commercials and
programs articulate what is to be valued. Mass media call our attention to every-
thing from eating habits to controlling wildlife in urban areas, and they offer us the
commentary of experts and ordinary people who are most affected. These
commentaries and experiential views give us new or revised ways of thinking
about politics and ideologies.
The third way societal values change is through erosion of the value, which
occurs when large numbers of people resist acting in accordance with a value.
Patriotism has long been a core American value, but in the 1960s, thousands of
young men rejected the patriotism of the time as they refused to register for the
military draft. Events of September 11, 2001, a change in the operating environment
that we will discuss shortly, produced a very different reaction. Erosion can also
occur as a society experiences gradual change, and as a result, a value loses much
of its importance. In an age when anyone with cable television or a satellite dish
can view sexually explicit series such as MTV’s The Jersey Shore or True Blood on
HBO, the value of modesty may be of decreasing importance.
A value may also be eroded if society becomes disillusioned with it. Concern
with alcohol consumption has long been an issue in our society. In the late nine-
teenth century, many Americans placed sobriety very high in their personal value
systems. The Women’s Christian Temperance Union, the very colorful activist
Carrie Nation, and religious leaders all advocated abstinence from alcohol. By
1920 sobriety was so firmly fixed in the national value hierarchy that a constitutional
amendment prohibiting the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages was
adopted. As soon as the Eighteenth Amendment took effect, millions of Americans
decided it did not apply to them personally and took to making “bathtub gin” or
“moonshine,” while others patronized “speakeasies” or bought “bootleg” liquor.
Americans became so disillusioned with the lawlessness that occurred in the wake
of the Eighteenth Amendment that they approved the Twenty-first Amendment
restoring the right to make and purchase alcohol.
The final way in which value changes occur is through a change in the operating
environment, a “whole range of social, cultural, demographic, economic, and tech-
nological factors that comprise the way of life in that society” (Rescher, 1969,
p. 117). Results of the World Values Survey (2009) indicated how the shift from an
industrial to a knowledge economy in many parts of the world was causing a shift
away from survival values toward self-expressive values. Discussion and debate
about values accelerated in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and the U.S.
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Anne-Marie Slaughter (2007) wrote The Idea
That Is America: Keeping Faith with Our Values in a Dangerous World to call
attention to how our treatment of enemy combatants represented an undesirable
change, or at least flew in the face of national values. “Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib,
secret prisons, extraordinary renditions, detention without trial and possibly
without end, tolerance of torture by others and even ourselves—all enable our
enemies to taunt us as hypocrites and our friends to doubt our sincerity” (p. 10).
Processes of Change. Rescher (1969) also discusses the process by which values
change, suggesting that values are seldom accepted or abandoned absolutely,
except in the rare circumstances of religious or ideological conversions. Instead,
values are changed through processes of redistribution, emphasis or deemphasis,
restandardization, and retargeting.
When value redistribution occurs, society adopts the value of a minority
group that has successfully promoted a different way of attributing importance to
that value. Insurance companies have promoted “women’s work” or “housework”
as being equally valuable as the work of wage earners and therefore worthy of
insurance coverage against the possibility that the homemaker might die or
become incapacitated. This places a new connotation on the value of housework
by putting it in an insurable category of labor.
Environmental change can cause value emphasis or deemphasis. Some deeply
entrenched value, perhaps one that is not even openly stated, is suddenly threatened
by a change in the physiological or psychological environment and takes on a

different level of importance relative to other values. A nearby chemical accident
can suddenly make the protection of the community or the right to feel secure in
your own home seem extremely important, while 500 miles away people in an area
of high unemployment may be excited about the jobs that will be created by the
opening of a chemical plant just outside their city limits.
You may be familiar with the phrases like “standard of living” and “quality of
life.” One way in which values change is through value restandardization, the
meaning of “quality of life” changes. Technology, along with trends in other fields,
will change what we perceive as a good quality of life. In Future Files: The 5
Trends That Will Shape the Next 50 Years, Richard Watson (2008) indicates how
ageing, the shift of economic, political, and military power eastward, global
connectivity, GRIN technologies (genetics, robotics, the Internet, and nanotech-
nologies), and the environment will change the way we live our lives. Although it
is an open question whether some of the restandardizations he forecasts will be for
the better, the authors of this book, who are approaching retirement age, were
appreciative of his prediction that “companies will employ older people to design
packaging that those with old hands and poor eyesight can actually open” (p. 2).
All of us have goals that operationalize enduring values. Because a goal does
not always help us to maximize attainment of a particular value, we find ourselves
engaging in value implementation retargeting. In this case, the value itself has not
undergone a change; what has changed is the manner in which we pursue it. Most
people in our society place good health high in their personal hierarchy of values.
Government and private medical plans reflect the value we place on good health.
This value has not changed substantially, but the manner in which society pursues
it has. Instead of focusing on the treatment of disease, medical care has shifted
toward the prevention of disease—the “wellness” concept.
ADVOCATING PROPOSITIONS OF VALUE

The analysis of value propositions will lead you to the definition of the value
object, its placement in a particular value hierarchy, and a choice of criteria to use
in judging the value object against the standards of the value hierarchy.
Information you gain from locating immediate causes will be used in developing
units of argument and may be used to focus on what is being evaluated and why.
Historical background is particularly important because it provides you with
information about the core values that pertain to your proposition. Although these
may be core national values, if the proposition relates to a particular field, these
values may be less relevant than the core values of that field.
Construction of a prima facie case for value advocacy is a four-step process
that begins by defining key terms and proceeds through considering the competing
values within a hierarchy to identifying criteria. It ends with applying the criteria
to the value object. Two students in our argumentation class wanted to explore the
pros and cons of the proposition, Teaching the uses of social media is the most
important element in the college curriculum. Immediate cause in this instance may
appear to be the assignment they were given, to select and argue a proposition of
value, but that would be a facile thought.
What prompted these two students to select this topic? Perhaps they learned
about how companies use social network sites to interact with customers in one of
their public relations or marketing classes. Perhaps, through their own involvement
in online social networks, they were aware of issues of privacy and the commercial
aspect of some sites.
In 2007 . . . the default setting in an initiative called Facebook Beacon sent all your
Facebook friends updates about purchases you made on certain third party sites.
Beacon caused an uproar among users—who were automatically enrolled. . . . In April
[2010], it launched a major initiative called Open Graph, which lets Facebook users
weigh in on what they like on the web, from a story on Time.com to a pair of jeans
from Levi’s. The logic is that if my friends recommend something, I’ll be more
inclined to like it too. And because Facebook has so many users—and because so
many companies want to attract those eyeballs—Facebook is well positioned to
display its members’ preference on any website, anywhere. Less than a month after
Open Graph’s rollout, more than 100,000 sites had integrated the technology.
(Fletcher, 2010, p. 34)
Regardless of what prompted selection of social media as a topic area, the

advocate begins her development of a prima facie case by defining the value object.
Defining the Value Object

In some instances, the value object may be instantly recognizable and may not
require lengthy definition. We all know what social media are, or do we? Turning
to A Modern Dictionary of Human Resource Management: Oxford Reference
Online, the advocate learned that,
social networking websites (such as Facebook and Myspace) provide individuals with
an opportunity to share details about themselves on personal webpages and interact
with others in cyberspace. They also provide the opportunity for companies to check on
candidates who apply for jobs, or existing employees. (Heery & Noon, 2008)
The advocate had not only begun to define the value object, but serendipitously dis-
covered a reason why learning about how to handle social media properly might
be important to a college student, if this was something her research on the histor-
ical background of the subject had not already turned up.
Looking further, she found a more precise definition that differentiated
social media from bulletin boards and other venues that allow people to interact
in cyberspace.
We define social network sites as web-based services that allow individuals to (1)
construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of
other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of
connections and those made by others within the system. The nature and nomenclature
of these connections may vary from site to site. (boyd & Ellison, 2008, p. 211)
Even in an example like this, providing a definition of the value object is a

good idea, and her definition served to clarify the value object’s meaning for
the audience.
Next, the advocate used the stock issues for analyzing value propositions:
1. By what value hierarchy is the object of the proposition best evaluated?

2. By what criteria is the value object to be located within this hierarchy?
3. Do indicators of the effect, significance, and inherency of the value object
show that it conforms to the criteria?
Identifying the Hierarchy

Value hierarchy identification is the second step for the advocate. A value hierarchy
is a complex set of attitudes and core values shared by members of a field or audience.
These hierarchies can vary widely from audience to audience. For example, “the
majority of audiences will probably regard both beauty and profitability as values,
but if they have to be weighed against each other the preference . . . will probably
be different” (van Eemeren et al., 1987, p. 224). A group of recent college graduates
looking to start their careers may place greater emphasis on the economic vitality
of an area than they do on whether it affords them beautiful, panoramic vistas. On
the other hand, a group of recent retirees looking for a place to spend their golden
years may value an area’s aesthetic properties more than its economic ones. It is
not the values that change drastically but the way different audiences and individuals
combine them into hierarchies (van Eemeren et al., 1987).
In arguing that one core value, or a certain combination of them, should take
preeminence in making this evaluation, the advocate wants to move the audience
in the direction of a particular set of standards for making evaluations. She wants
the audience to view the value object in terms of the “right” hierarchy so that they
will understand and accept the criteria she uses to make her evaluation. She knows
there are privacy issues and concerns about the commercial aspects of social
media, and has learned companies use them to screen prospective employees.
Characterizing social media as “the most important element in the college curriculum”
in a hierarchy of core values related to the world of work will probably make more
sense to her classmates and professor than if she chose values like patriotism, self-
confidence, or even individualism. As a result, she decided that the appropriate
hierarchy emphasizes “the mission of higher education is to educate students to
enable them to realize the value of hard work and productivity upon graduation.”
The appropriateness of the advocate’s positioning of the value object within a
hierarchy can be verified by arguments that (1) prove the superiority of the advocate’s
interpretation of the value object relative to all other possible interpretations,
(2) offer the testimony of “admirable people” who support valuing the object of
the proposition in this way, and (3) identify signs demonstrating that this interpre-
tation best fits the existing societal value hierarchy.
Conflicting values are framed by value propositions, and value argumentation
is aimed at resolving this conflict. The advocate attempts to resolve the conflict in
her favor by creating a decision rule: (1) proving the advocate’s value maximizes
another agreed-upon value, (2) proving the advocate’s value subsumes opposing
values, (3) proving the advocate’s value has more desirable consequences, or (4)
arguing from definition, in which the advocate’s value is the defining property of
the opposing value (Zarefsky, 1976). This initiates argumentation on the first stock
issue, “By what value hierarchy is the object of the proposition best evaluated?” The
advocate’s next responsibility in building a prima facie case is to decide what criteria
she will use to evaluate the value object.
Specifying the Criteria

Statement of the criteria for evaluation is the third step in value advocacy.
Description of the criteria for evaluation occurs first as the advocate states the
criteria to be used. Because the criteria defining values lie at the heart of argumentation
over these propositions, the two approaches that can be taken in identifying and
applying them need to be considered: criteria discovery and criteria development.
Criteria discovery uses an existing framework of values—one already understood
and generally accepted—as a standard by which phenomena may be evaluated.
These criteria may be set forth in a general statement, but because they are so
commonly accepted, advocate and opponent focus all argumentation on the
appropriateness of judging the value object as a member of the class of phenomena
to which this evaluation is commonly applied. Consider the general outline of
advocacy using criteria discovery:
Value Proposition: Drug XYZ is an effective treatment for cancer.

Criteria as Discovered from the Medical Field: The effectiveness of a drug
rests on its ability to cure, contain, or prevent a disease, without producing
adverse side effects.
Inference Relative to the Object of the Proposition: If drug XYZ can safely
cure and contain cancer without producing adverse side effects, it can be
considered an effective treatment.
Contentions: Drug XYZ can cure cancer.
Drug XYZ can contain cancer.
Drug XYZ has no adverse side effects.
In this instance, the decision to adopt discovered criteria is reasonable. Most
listeners and readers would consider a substance with purported medicinal properties
to be effective if it had curative powers. Three criteria—the ability to cure cancer, the
ability to contain cancer, and the absence of adverse side effects—are applied.
Criteria development is used in situations where the advocate finds the criteria
by which value may be determined either do not exist or are not commonly
understood and therefore require explanation. This approach may also be used in
situations where the criteria may be understood but are not readily accepted and
therefore require substantiation. If, on analyzing the proposition, the advocate
decides to combine value standards from different fields or to use a relatively
unknown value standard, criteria development will be her best approach. In criteria
development, the locus of controversy may include the stock issues of hierarchy and
criteria as well as the issue of whether the value object is appropriately measured
by them. A prima facie case is established only if proof and reasoning relevant to
all three stock issues of value are presented.
In arguing value propositions, a reasonable question to ask is, “Should I use
discovered criteria or should I develop them?” Sometimes, a controversy over values
has its genesis in a misunderstanding of the value term. A “good” sandwich may
be tasty to you, economical to me, and nutritious to someone else. For this reason,
criteria development may be the best approach because it has the potential of better
ensuring clarity of focus in argumentation rather than assuming it will occur

naturally. By identifying and defining specific criteria to measure values, the
advocate is less likely to find her arguments dismissed out of hand because they
were misunderstood.
However, the advocate must exercise good judgment. Remember that argu-
mentation is an instrumental process, and you should consider the audience as well
as your opponent. If the advocate and her audience share an understanding of the
criteria that define a particular value at the outset, it is a waste of time and an in-
sult to the audience’s intelligence to use anything but a criteria-discovery approach.
The advocate then establishes the necessary and sufficient characteristics of
these criteria. For example, in the case arguing that drug XYZ is an effective treatment
for cancer, the necessary characteristics were (1) that it could cure cancer, (2) that
it could contain cancer, and (3) that it did not have seriously harmful side effects.
Notice that these conditions individually are insufficient to warrant acceptance of
the proposition. A drug that merely has no seriously harmful side effects is not
acceptable. This single criterion is insufficient to warrant the drug’s use. It must
also possess some other properties. The criteria advanced by the advocate must
include all necessary and sufficient properties for proving her primary inference
about the value object.
The decision to employ single or multiple criteria, which are either necessary
or sufficient, is one of the strategic choices the advocate makes in deciding how
best to advance her value proposition. These choices reflect the advocate’s consideration
of the information the reader or listener may legitimately require to assent to the
value proposition. Contentions and claims in support of value propositions must
be worded so that argumentation over them focuses on the stock issues of value. In
analyzing the value proposition’s topic area, look for resources that will provide
support for these claims.
You might be wondering at this point what happened to the advocate’s
responsibility to define the other key terms in her proposition and complete the
primary inference. One of the secrets of making a primary inference for a value
proposition is that defining the predicate in terms of the specific criteria for evaluation
meets that responsibility. Our advocate indicated “the mission of higher education
is to educate students to enable them to realize the value of hard work and productivity
upon graduation” was at the pinnacle of the value hierarchy. She next defined
what makes social media “the most important element in the college curriculum”
in terms of the following criteria that she developed based on her examination of
immediate cause and research on the historical background of the topic:
䊏 The ability to use social media properly is important to the success of a variety
of businesses.
䊏 The ability to use social media properly enhances the probability of getting a job.
䊏 The ability to use social media properly enhances the probability of keeping a job.
The advocate might have chosen to use discovered criteria for what makes some-
thing central to the college curriculum based on what professional educators have
to say. The Association of American Colleges and Universities (1998) indicates that
liberal learning, the foundation on which higher education is based, regardless of
disciplinary emphasis, results in “the ability to think, to learn, and to express oneself
both rigorously and creatively, the capacity to understand ideas and issues in con-
text, the commitment to live in society, and the yearning for truth.” Because her
audience consisted of her classmates as well as her professor, she decided to
develop criteria they would more readily understand in relationship to social
media. Using her developed criteria as contentions, she then built her case by
constructing units of argument, applying them to the value object.
Measuring the Value Object

Measuring the value object with the criteria for value judgment is the fourth step in
value advocacy. Three subissues must be addressed as the advocate confronts the
third stock issue of value argumentation: “Do indicators of the effect, significance,
and inherency of the value object show that it conforms to the criteria?” The
amount of proof and the number of arguments used in establishing effect, significance,
and inherency are matters of choice, but all three subissues must be present for
each criterion, or the case will not be prima facie.
By effect we mean what the value object is purported to do or possess. The
advocate’s first contention in arguing that social media are the most important
thing to teach in the college curriculum was supported by two main arguments:
I. The ability to use social media properly is important to the success of a variety
of businesses.
A. Social media enable people to share their feelings about products and services
with each other.
B. Businesses realize that in order to be successful, they need to avoid allowing
themselves to be totally defined by others.
The effect the advocate must demonstrate in proving main point A was that
one of the things people discuss on social media are their feelings about products
and services. She did this with an argument from authority in her first subpoint:
1. Many people share their opinions online.

According to Don Tapscott, chairman of nGenera Innovation Network and
University of Toronto adjunct professor of management, “As the Net Generation comes
of age, hundreds of millions of passionate users and consumers will be taking an active
role in determining, shaping and redefining brands independent of company involvement.”
(Tapscott, 2009, p. 216)
In value argumentation, significance is related to the magnitude, severity, or

frequency with which the effect occurs. Making value judgments is a form of mea-
surement of the value object; we use the term significance because criteria are a
measuring instrument. Does the object of the proposition do what it is purported
to do with important or serious consequences, and does this happen with regu-
larity? Notice how Don Tapscott’s testimony indicated that the effect is the
product of the behavior of “hundreds of millions” people acting “independent of
company involvement.”
Effect and significance arguments are both necessary elements of value advocacy.
If a criterion for measuring the value object is shown to exist extensively, but does
not have much effect on society, interest or concern may not be justified. Equally,
if the effect of criteria on the value object is very serious or has consequence, but
does not extend to a significant number of individuals, interest or concern may not
be justified. In this instance, a single argument establishes both. This may not
always be the case, and value advocates need to be sure they have established both
the effect and significance of each criterion they use to measure the value object.
Inherency pertains to causation. Are the effect and its significance the result of
something intrinsic to the value object? In value argumentation, inherency often
results from societal attitudes toward the value object. If the advocate believed her
audience was familiar with the freedom of expression on the Internet, where “I
Hate Disney” (or Jeff Gordon, or broccoli, or anything else you can think of) sites
are prevalent, and the kind of interaction that takes place on social media sites, she
might have decided to forego a separate inherency argument. She could also have
relied on the fact that inherency was also implied in Tapscott’s statement when he
talked about “the Net Generation coming of age.”
To be on the safe side, she included subpoint 2, a second argument from
authority, to establish inherency:
2. Social media provide people with a means to do this.

According to John Blossom, Shore Communications, Inc., “The bad news for
many companies is that people are free to have a conversation with anyone they’d like
in social media.” (Blossom, 2009, p. 11)
Keep in mind that causality is often the consequence of complex, interrelated

factors, so inherency arguments have to consider the possibility of multiple
causes and the fact that, in some instances, inherency relative to value criteria is
structural.
Effect, significance, and inherency arguments must be present for a case to be
prima facie. This is only logical. If the significance of the effect is not inherent to
the fundamental nature of the value object, then measurement of the value object
by the criterion is invalid. Inherency arguments prove that the effect and signifi-
cance attributed to a value object are central to a value system or some elements of
it. The most carefully constructed arguments about the effect and significance of
people sharing their feelings on “shaping and redefining brands” will not warrant
the audience’s acceptance of the advocate’s argument if she cannot demonstrate
that it is inherent to their use of social media.
Argument in Action
The organizational pattern used in discussing effect, significance, and inherency
need not always be the same. The advocate could have begun by establishing the
inherency of the freedom to converse on a subject of your choosing afforded by
social media, and then discussed the effect and its significance relative to corporate
image. To see how she went about developing her entire case, review the value
advocate brief in Box 10.1. This brief looks different than the ones in Chapter 9,
which “Toulminized” each unit of argument. It more closely follows the principles
of formal outlining to show another way of constructing a brief. However, all parts
of the primary triad are expressly stated or implied in each unit of argument, with
elements of the secondary triad included where necessary.
BOX 10.1
Value Advocate Brief
Proposition
Teaching the uses of social media is the most important element in the college curriculum.

Social Media—“We define social network sites as web-based services that allow individuals to
(1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of
other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of
connections and those made by others within the system. The nature and nomenclature of
these connections may vary from site to site” (boyd & Ellison, 2008, p. 211).
College Curriculum—the group of courses making up an area of specialization in higher
education.
Hierarchy
The mission of higher education is to educate students to enable them to realize the value of hard
work and productivity upon graduation.
Criteria
• The ability to use social media properly is important to the success of a variety of
businesses.
• The ability to use social media properly enhances the probability of getting a job.
• The ability to use social media properly enhances the probability of keeping a job.
I. The ability to use social media properly is important to the success of a variety of
businesses.
A. Social media enable people to share their feelings about products and services with
each other.
1. Many people share their opinions online.
According to Don Tapscott, chairman of nGenera Innovation Network and
University of Toronto adjunct professor of management, “As the Net Generation
comes of age, hundreds of millions of passionate users and consumers will be
taking an active role in determining, shaping and redefining brands independent
of company involvement” (Tapscott, 2009, p. 216).
2. Social media provide people with a means to do this.
According to John Blossom, Shore Communications, Inc., “The bad news for
many companies is that people are free to have a conversation with anyone they’d
like in social media” (Blossom, 2009, p. 11).
B. Businesses realize that to be successful they need to avoid allowing themselves to be
totally defined by others.
1. Social media are an effective way for companies to do this.
According to Blossom, “The good news is that social media is turning out to
be a great way for companies to have a conversation with their markets”
(Blossom, 2009, p. 11).
2. Many companies are doing this successfully.
“Twitter has proven to be a very valuable branding tool, and it hasn’t been
lost on many big corporations. Just some of the companies you can find on Twitter
include: Carnival Cruise Lines, Delta Airlines, JetBlue, Dell, Amazon, Forrester,
GM and my favorite M&Ms” (Comm, 2009, pp. 143–144).
a. Providing customer service is one way that companies are using social
network Web sites successfully.
“Good customer service itself can be good branding. It shows that the
company is available to anyone who needs their help and that it listens too.
The Home Depot does this very well” (Comm, 2009, pp. 154–155).
b. Enabling customers to interact with top management is another.
According to Blossom (2009),“One of the most important developments
in promoting the brand value of senior managers is using social media to enable
them (senior managers) to speak directly to markets” (pp. 121–122).
For example, “GM’s Bob Lutz, a self-professed car nut who is seen as
an influential media figure, posting items on the FastLane blog” and
“FirstRain CEO Penny Herscher whose Market Mine blog covers events in
the financial industry as well as highlighting her up-and-coming company’s
information-analysis products” (Blossom, 2009, p. 122).
II. The ability to use social media properly enhances the probability of getting a job.
A. Businesses want employees with social media skills.
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution says, “The landscape of today’s job market is
shifting, and the shift favors individuals who are savvy in social media” (Knorr, 2009).
1. Position descriptions indicate the need for such skills.
For example, “Valtech Technologies seeks an Atlanta scrum master/project
manager whose critical responsibilities will include ‘social collaboration including
work spaces like Wiki’s, blogs,Twitter, etc.’” (Knorr, 2009).
2. A variety of fields, not just those that are marketing or communications related,
require social media skills.
According to Bob Van Rossum, recruitment firm president, “Long term, you
will need to be able to use social media and be able to communicate on behalf of
your company” (Knorr, 2009).
B. Social media can facilitate a successful job search.
1. Social media can be used to make an applicant stand out from the crowd.
Charles Brown, blogger and social media marketing coach, says, “Think of the
kinds of problems you are very good at solving. . . . Start a blog. . . . The goal here is
not necessarily to impress an employer that you are a great writer . . . but to make
your site a resource for helpful, useful information on solving these problems. . . . to
make yourself stand out among the crowd of job seekers” (Brown, 2009).
2. Social media can be used to showcase an applicant’s skills.
According to Kevin Wheeler, Global Learning Resources, Inc., president,
“Social networks will become the ultimate sourcing and screening tool. Recruiters
and particularly hiring managers will be able to see a more 3-D version of a person
and get a much better sense of their past accomplishments and capabilities”
(Hansen, 2010).
C. Even if social media are not part of a job search strategy, applicants need to realize
that businesses use cybervetting to screen prospective employees.
1. According to A Dictionary of Human Resource Management, “Cybervetting is the use of
information from cyberspace (i.e. on the Internet) to vet job applicants and help
decide their suitability to fill job vacancies.The main source of information of this
kind are social networking websites, such as MySpace and Facebook, which
contain millions of personal webpages” (Heery & Noon, 2008).
(continued)
2. The practice of cybervetting job applicants is widespread.

ExecuNet, an executive search firm, indicates “77 percent of recruiters run
searches of candidates on the Web to screen applicants; 35 percent . . . say
they’ve eliminated a candidate based on the information they uncovered”(Lorenz,
2009).
3. Various kinds of information on a social network Web site can disqualify an
applicant.
According to a Fortune 500 company recruiter, “I found the profile of one
[applicant] on MySpace. It boasted a photo of her lounging on a hammock in a
bikini, listed her interests as ‘having a good time’ and her sex as ‘yes,
please.’ . . . Another time I . . . found racial slurs and jokes” (Lorenz, 2009).
III. The ability to use social media properly enhances the probability of keeping a job.
A. Improper use of social media can cost a person his job.
According to the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, “frustrated fans pleading for
something—anything—to be done to stop the Pirates’ losing ways are likely to
find little to cheer about in the baseball team’s latest move. They fired a pierogi.
Andrew Kurtz, . . . one of the 18 men who take turns posing as pierogies in a
crowd-pleasing race [similar to the sausage races at Milwaukee Brewers home
games], . . . was dismissed by the team Thursday because he posted disparaging
remarks about the Pirates on his Facebook page.” Frustrated by the team’s 19
game losing streak, he posted comments critical of team president Frank
Coonelly for extending the contracts of general manager Neal Huntington and
manager John Russell through the 2011 season . . . “Asked if he’d learned
anything during his time as a pierogi—or as an employee of the Pittsburgh
Pirates—Mr. Kurtz [said] . . . ‘Don’t post personal thoughts about the boss or
whoever I work for’” (Majors, 2010).
WCSC-TV in Charleston, South Carolina, reported that paramedic Jason
Brown was fired over a video he made and posted on Facebook. “In a letter of
dismissal Brown provided, Colleton County Fire-Rescue Director Barry McRoy said,
‘You [Brown] displayed poor judgment in producing a derogatory video depicting a
member of this department with a physician which is implied to be at Colleton
Medical Center’” (Vela, 2010)
According to The Blade, “a Facebook posting . . . resulted . . . in the firing of an
employee of the Lucas County Board of Elections for discussing on the social-media site
how a citizen voted. . . . The same Facebook posting referred to [the voter] as ‘a
snake’” (Troy, 2010).
According to the Charlotte Observer, a waitress became frustrated with a couple
who left a $5 tip after spending three hours at the restaurant “forcing her to work an
hour past her quitting time. . . . When she got home, she went on Facebook [and
wrote], ‘Thanks for eating at Brixx, you cheap piece of ____ camper.’ . . . She was
fired for violating company policy against speaking disparagingly about customers. A
Brixx official said she also violated a second policy against casting the restaurant in
a negative light on social networks” (Frazier, 2010).
B. Improper use of social media can adversely affect employment even if it doesn’t cost a
person her job.
That same article indicated that an area school district suspended an
elementary school teacher “in 2008 after learning that her Facebook page listed
‘teaching chitlins in the ghetto’ as one of her activities” (Frazier, 2010). According to
The Daily Reflector, at the same time “a high school special education teacher was
suspended after writing on her site, ‘I hate my students,’ . . . [and] four other
employees received lesser punishments for photos or comments” in the same district
(School employee, 2008).
Sources Cited
Blossom, J. (2009). Content nation. Indianapolis, IN: Wiley.
boyd, d. m., & Ellison, N. B. (2008). Social network sites: Definitions, history, and scholarship. Journal
of Computer-Mediated Communication, 13, 210–230. doi: 10.1111/j.1083-6101.2007.00393.x
Brown, D. (2009). A social media strategy for job seekers—Part one. Web Marketing Coach.
Retrieved from http://webmarketingcoach.blogspot.com/search/label/job%20searching.
Comm, J. (2009). Twitter power. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Frazier, E. (2010, May 17). Facebook post costs waitress her job. Charlotte Observer (NC). Retrieved
from www.charlotteobserver.com.
Hansen, K., (2010). How the real-time web changes job search: The Internet as one giant job
board. Quintessential Careers. Retrieved from http://www.quintcareers.com/real-time_
job-search.html.
Heery, E., & Noon, M. (2008). A dictionary of human resource management: Oxford reference online. Oxford
University Press. Retrieved from http://ezpolson.nmu.edu:5214/views/ENTRY.html?subview=
Main&entry=t162.e1538.
Knorr, A. K. (2009, August 2). Companies want applicants with social-media skills. The Atlanta
Journal-Constitution (GA). Retrieved from www.ajc.com.
Lorenz, K. (2009, November 10). Warning: Social networking can be hazardous to your job
search. Career Builder. Retrieved from http://www.careerbuilder.com/Article/CB-533-
Job-Search-Warning-Social-Networking-Can-Be-Hazardous-to-Your-Job-Search/?ArticleID=
533&cbRecursionCnt=1&cbsid=92b529ef792c4411afa730694e4dff81-329667288-VK-4.
Majors, D. ( 2010, June 19). Out at the plate: Pirates dump outspoken pierogi. Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette, (PA). Retrieved from www.post-gazette.com.
School employee, (2008, November 26). School employee is fired over Facebook post. The Daily
Reflector (Greenville, NC). Retrieved from www.reflector.com/archives.
Tapscott, D. (2009). Grown up digital. New York: McGraw Hill.
Troy, T. (2010, May 12). Election worker fired for Facebook posting. The Blade (Toledo, OH).
Retrieved from www.toldeoblade.com.
Vela, H. (2010, 25 February). Colleton County rescue worker loses job over Facebook post. WCSC
TV/DT. Retrieved from www.live5news.com.
Summary of Value Advocacy Strategies

1. Define the terms of the proposition’s value object.
2. Place the value object in the appropriate field, and state the value hierarchy of
the field in which the value object is now placed.
3. State the criteria for evaluation.
a. Have the characteristics of the criteria been defined or described?
b. Are the criteria identified as necessary and/or sufficient to warrant ac-
ceptance?
c. Has the relevance of the criteria to the value object been established?
d. Are the criteria consistent with placement of the value object in a given
field?
4. Measure the value object against the value judgment criteria, demonstrating
that the value object fits the criteria on the basis of the following:
a. What element of society is influenced by the value object? (arguments on effect)
b. To what degree or in what amount does the effect occur? (arguments on

significance)
c. What is the cause that produces the effect and significance of the value
object? (arguments on inherency)
OPPOSING PROPOSITIONS OF VALUE

As was the case with fact, the opponent of the proposition of value has his choices con-
strained by both his resources and the advocate’s choices. The uncertainty that this cre-
ates for the opponent of value change—and, for that matter, opponents of fact and
policy—is partially offset by the asset of presumption. The opponent can also antici-
pate what the advocate is most likely to argue based on his analysis of the proposition,
his knowledge of the stock issues she must address, and his understanding of audience
beliefs and attitudes that the advocate might emphasize to encourage a value change.
The analysis of the proposition and search for issues is just as important for the
opponent as it is for the advocate. To gain any advantage from presumption, the
opponent must be aware of how the value object is presently viewed. The opponent
should investigate every possible aspect of the value object—how it is regarded in its
field, what opinions have been formed about it, what value standards are used to
judge it, and what controversies exist concerning it. On the basis of this analysis,
the opponent chooses his strategies for refuting the advocate’s case.
Establishing Strategy
The opponent normally begins with an overview of the value proposition reflecting
the position he will take in presenting arguments refuting the advocate’s case. This
is his philosophy, and it expresses the essence of the opponent’s perspective on the
controversy, including a preview of his strategy. It tells the listener or reader that he
will defend present values, present alternative values, or demonstrate the weakness
of proof and reasoning in specific areas of the advocate’s arguments; in short, it
elucidates the strategy he chooses to employ. The purpose is to clarify where he
stands on the proposition’s value object.
Examining Definitions and Hierarchy

Because the first step in advocacy was to define the value object, that may be the oppo-
nent’s next area of concern. Has the value object been properly defined? Does the
opponent agree with the method of definition used by the advocate? If he feels that the
value object should include elements the advocate has failed to consider or exclude
elements she has included, his first point of clash with the advocate will be over how to
define the value object. Our opponent chose to accept the advocate’s definition of so-
cial media, but argued that her definition of college curriculum, courses in an area of
specialization, was too narrow, and therefore inappropriate to use in judging at least
one of the criteria the advocate developed. He found the same definition the advocate
had, that a liberal education results in “the ability to think, to learn, and to express
oneself both rigorously and creatively, the capacity to understand ideas and issues in
context, the commitment to live in society, and the yearning for truth” (Association of
American Colleges and Universities, 1998). He offered this definition because the
proposition resided in the field of higher education, and he felt that the beliefs of those
in the field about valued outcomes should be taken into consideration.
The opponent’s next step is to make use of the stock issues of value argumen-
tation. Recall that the first stock issue asks by what value hierarchy the value
object is best understood. There are two questions the opponent should ask
himself in preparing arguments about this issue. First, is the hierarchy the advocate
has chosen really as important in the field and to the audience as the advocate
suggests? He may attempt to demonstrate that society, or those in the topic’s field,
do not accept the validity of the value hierarchy the advocate has identified.
Second, has the advocate identified a value hierarchy appropriate to better
understanding the value object? Does he see other, more appropriate value hierarchies
that the advocate has failed to recognize? Does the advocate provide an adequate
justification for her choice of a value hierarchy? Would a different value hierarchy
be more appropriate for this proposition?
The advocate’s choice of hierarchy and criteria restricts her opponent’s options.
This does not mean that he has no choices. He may choose to dispute the core value she
places at the top of her value hierarchy. Our advocate identified the core value of a be-
lief in hard work and productivity as the most important in making her judgment, and
justified this by arguing that the mission of higher education is to prepare people for a
career. Should the opponent dispute this? Although he chose not to, he could have ar-
gued that that college is not a trade school. That by seeking to instill “the commitment
to live in society” included in the Association of American Colleges and Universities’
definition, a college education speaks as much or more to values such as the acceptance
of diversity or the importance of community and charity as it does to getting a job.
This illustrates one of the fundamental differences between fact and value
argumentation. It is inappropriate and results in fallacious factual argumentation
for the opponent to do too much shifting of the relationship between the subject
and predicate of the proposition. An opponent of the factual proposition “the failure
of the Army Corps of Engineers to maintain the levee system caused the flooding
of New Orleans,” would be misleading the audience if he responded, “It wouldn’t
have mattered if Hurricane Katrina hadn’t happened.” This response bypasses the
advocate’s argument and does nothing to refute any points she made about what
the Corps of Engineers did or did not do.
In value argumentation, opponents do have the option of attempting to shift
the hierarchy—asking the audience to view the value object from the perspective of
a different value system—without necessarily engaging in fallacious reasoning.
This is not an instance of avoiding the issue, as long as the opponent develops
arguments that will allow the audience to understand that shifting hierarchies is
more appropriate to understanding the proposition. The opponent may deny that
there is any utility or probable truth in the advocate’s evaluation of the value object.
Or, he may choose to accept the general idea that making such a value judgment is
a good thing to do, but argue that the advocate does not go about it in quite the
right way. The opponent then offers a new interpretation of the value hierarchy
and suggests other criteria that are more appropriate.
Suppose the opponent had asked the audience to view the question of what is
most important in a college curriculum, not from the economic perspective of hard
work and productivity but from the viewpoint of a volunteer or philanthropist
concerned with assuring a vibrant community and charitable environment. On the
surface, you may not see values from these fields as compatible with determining
what is most important in the college curriculum, but consider the extent to which
issues of civic engagement and academic service learning are being incorporated in
college curricula. Had he chosen to do this, the opponent would have had to
develop arguments from his investigation of the historical background of curriculum
development and change demonstrating the connection to values related to
community and charity, and argued that they were the most appropriate source of
criteria for making judgments about what is most important.
Challenging the Criteria

Whether the opponent chooses to refute every aspect of the advocate’s case or asks the
audience to shift to a different field for viewing the value object, his next concern is
with the appropriateness of the criteria used in measuring the value object in terms of
its effect, significance, and inherency. Has the advocate established unique criteria for
a value object for which other, more commonly understood or accepted criteria exist?
He may choose to argue that the value criteria are inappropriate for the value object
because these criteria are too unusual or more appropriate to measuring some other
value object. He would then provide arguments establishing that better criteria exist
that are more appropriate to the value object or more widely recognized by experts in
the field or society, or that the advocate has misinterpreted the value in question.
The advocate developed three criteria for determining what the most important
element in the college curriculum might be, based on the core value of the belief in
hard work and productivity. The opponent chose to accept the advocate’s value
hierarchy rather than proposing another one, but did not accept her criteria at face
value. Although he chose to not dispute her arguments concerning the first criterion,
that the ability to use social media properly is important to the success of a variety of
businesses, he used the definition of what a liberal education includes to reframe her
second criterion. He also chose to reframe her third criterion and added one of his
own as the basis for asking the audience to accept his position that teaching social
media is not the most important element in the college curriculum. From the oppo-
nent’s perspective, the criteria for evaluating the proposition were:
䊏 There are more important things than the ability to use social media properly
that contribute to the probability of getting a job.
䊏 The ability to use social media properly is not what enhances the probability
of keeping a job, but the recognition that this is public space.
䊏 Teaching the use of social media in the college curriculum would be unworkable.
Refuting the Measurement

Finally, the opponent will turn to the third stock issue to determine if the value object
is appropriately measured by the value criteria. With the concepts of effect, signifi-
cance, and inherency clearly in mind, the opponent considers his strategies for oppo-
sition. First, remembering that the advocate must establish a prima facie case, he asks
himself, “Have effect, significance, and inherency been argued by the advocate?” If
one or more have not, a prima facie case has not been established. He should begin
refutation by pointing this out. Second, because arguments of effect, significance, and
inherency are advanced as claims, they require supporting proof and reasoning. He
should examine the advocate’s support for claims, asking, “Does the proof and rea-
soning offered by the advocate meet the tests established to determine their validity?”
If they do not, the existence of a prima facie case would be in serious doubt.
If after analyzing the advocate’s strategy, the opponent decides that the value cri-
teria are fairly drawn, he must concentrate refutation on the goodness of fit between
the criteria and the value object in the proposition. In employing denial and extenu-
ation to oppose the value advocate, the opponent searches for proof and reasoning
to ground arguments: (1) stating that the effect suggested by the advocate occurs
only in an exceptional case or that extenuating circumstances produce the effect, (2)
denying that the value object’s influence is as significant as the advocate suggests, (3)
showing that only a small segment of those who place value on this object are influ-
enced, (4) showing that prominent sources in the field do not consider the effect or
the significance to be of great importance, (5) showing that either the effect or the
significance is a temporary phenomenon brought about by the unusual circum-
stances, a passing fad, and (6) challenging inherency by demonstrating that the value
in question is either not central to the society or is subject to change over time.
When the opponent reframed the advocate’s second criterion to argue that
there are more important things than the ability to use social media properly that
contribute to the probability of getting a job, he was denying that the value object’s
influence was as significant as the advocate suggests. His research led him to a
study commissioned by the American Association of Colleges and Universities that
indicated employers want college graduates to be broadly educated, and other
research that suggested immersion in social media diminished the ability to
develop the kind of knowledge and skills employers want.
When the opponent reframed the advocate’s third criterion to argue that the abil-
ity to use social media properly is not what enhances the probability of keeping a job,
but the recognition that this is public space, he ended up claiming both that the effect
suggested by the advocate occurs only in exceptional cases and that extenuating cir-
cumstances produce the effect. He discovered that millions of people use social media,
most of them have not taken a class, and most of them do not lose their jobs. In other
words, the effect was exceptional. In searching for the reason for these exceptional
cases, the opponent came to the conclusion that they were the product of people treat-
ing a public space as if it were private, an extenuating circumstance.
When the opponent added a criterion of his own, that teaching the use of
social media in the college curriculum would be unworkable, he was challenging
inherency by demonstrating that the value in question is either not central to the
society or is subject to change over time. In this case, it was not the value but the
value object that was in a state of flux. The opponent learned that social media
have existed in various forms for over three decades, that they are constantly
evolving and changing, and that the field is populated by products with broad ap-
peal as well as those targeted at niche markets and interests. For him, the question
of what should be taught was a major one in deciding whether something should
be included in the curriculum let alone be deemed most important.
Argument in Action
To see how he went about developing his entire case, review the value opponent’s
brief in Box 10.2. To emphasize how he initially establishes lines of clash with the
advocate, boldface is used in the brief’s preamble (the proposition, definition of
BOX 10.2
Value Opponent Brief
Proposition
Teaching the uses of social media is not the most important element in the college curriculum.

Social Media—OK
College Curriculum—Goes beyond the group of courses making up an area of specialization in
higher education. It includes courses that contribute to “the ability to think, to learn, and
to express oneself both rigorously and creatively, the capacity to understand ideas and
issues in context, the commitment to live in society, and the yearning for truth”
(Association of American Colleges and Universities, 1998).
Hierarchy
The mission of higher education is to educate students to enable them to realize the value of hard
work and productivity upon graduation.
Criteria
• There are more important things than the ability to use social media properly that
contribute to the probability of getting a job.
• The ability to use social media properly is not what enhances the probability of keeping a
job, but the recognition that this is public space.
• Teaching the use of social media in the college curriculum would be unworkable.
I. There are more important things than the ability to use social media properly that
contribute to the probability of getting a job.
A. Employers want broadly educated rather than narrowly skilled employees.
The American Association of Colleges and Universities commissioned a study of
what students need to know to succeed in a global economy, a survey of 305 employers
and 510 recent graduates by Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc. (2008).
1. Employers feel that colleges need to do a better job of preparing students.
“Fully 63% of business executives interviewed agree that too many recent
college graduates do not have the skills to be successful in today’s global economy.
Indeed, nearly nine in 10 (87%) employers agree that America’s colleges and
universities need to raise the quality of student achievement to ensure the United
States remains competitive in the global economy” (Peter D. Hart, 2008, p. 6).
2. Areas needing improvement relate to broader rather than narrower skills and
knowledge.
“While these employers are somewhat concerned about recent college
graduates not having necessary specific job or technical skills, they express the
greatest frustration with the challenges of finding ‘360 degree people’ who have
both the specific job/technical skills and the broader skills . . . necessary. . . .
Employers believe that the areas most in need of increased emphasis by higher
education institutions are 1) science and technology, 2) teamwork skills in diverse
groups, 3) applied knowledge in real-world settings, 4) critical thinking and
analytical reasoning skills, 5) communication skills, and 6) global issues” (Peter
D. Hart, 2008, pp. 7–8).
a. Applied knowledge was not specifically related to social media, but “the
ability to apply knowledge and skills to real-world settings through
internships or other hands-on experiences” (Peter D. Hart, 2008, p. 8).
b. Communication skills were also not specifically related to social media, but
“the ability to effectively communicate orally and in writing” (Peter D.
Hart, 2008, p. 8).
B. Immersion in social media may diminish the ability to develop the kind of knowledge
and skills employers want.
Naomi Baron “sees youth uptake of more informal forms of online writing as part
of a broader set of social and cultural shifts in the status of printed and written
communication” (Ito et al., 2010, p. 11).
1. Social media inhibits the development of the kind of written communication skill
employers want.
According to Mark Bauerlein (2009), Emory University professor of
English, “Bad grammar, teen colloquialisms, and shallow ironies litter the blogs,
comment threads, and social networking sites, raising the vocabulary problem . . .
just as weak-vocabulary encounters don’t inculcate stronger reading comprehension
skills, so weak-vocabulary writing doesn’t yield better composition skills” (p. 132).
2. Social media inhibits the development of the kind of cognitive abilities employers want.
Tim Pychyl, associate professor of psychology, Carleton University says,
“Facebook is like taking a person with a gambling problem to Vegas. It’s just too
easy to get doing other things rather than the hard work of intellectual work. And
Twitter’s even worse. . . . When we get into a context, our brains just go where
they go most easily, which is automatic pilot, and that’s not the place that going
to stretch and pull you to do learning” (Bowman, 2009).
a. The Net Generation engages in multitasking, which inhibits critical thinking.
According to John Grafman, National Institute of Neurological
Disorders and Stroke, cognitive neuroscience section, “Does optimizing for
multitasking result in better functioning—that is, creativity, inventiveness,
productiveness? The answer is, in more cases than not, no. . . . The more
you multitask, the less deliberative you become; the less you are able to think
and reason out a problem and the more you’re willing to rely on
stereotypical solutions” (Tapscott, 2009, pp. 108–109).
b. Multitasking inhibits analytical reasoning.
According to David Meyer, University of Michigan psychologist, “You
can’t think deeply about a subject, analyze it, or develop a creative idea if
you’re constantly distracted by an e-mail message, a new site, or a cell phone
call” (Tapscott, 2009, p. 109).
3. Social media can make you dumber.
“Even if we grant that visual media cultivate a type of special intelligence, they
still minimize verbal intelligence, providing too little stimulation for it, and intense,
long term immersion in it stultifies the verbal skills of viewers and disqualifies them
from most every academic and professional labor” (Bauerlein, 2009, p. 130).
C. Contrary to what the advocate says, social media may not help you get a job.
According to the 2010 Annual Report on the State of Internet Job-Hunting by
Quintessential Careers, “Beginning . . . in 2001, we have emphasized the
importance . . . of stepping away from . . . computers and getting out and networking
with warm bodies. Back then, job boards created the illusion that online job-hunting was
tantamount to actually doing something productive toward landing a job.Today, not only
are job-seekers fooled into thinking that posting resumes and applying to job-board ads
is an effective use of their time, but they are also being told that significant participation
(continued)
in social-media venues like Twitter and Linkedin will get them a job.” Although they
have their use, according to Jason Fall on the website Social Media Explorer the kind of
social networking you want to be doing “was, is, and will always be the off-line kind”
(Hansen, 2010).
II. The ability to use social media properly is not what enhances the probability of keeping a
job, but the recognition that this is public space.
A. There is a huge user-base, even if only Facebook is considered.
“Sometime in the next week, Facebook will officially log its 500 millionth active
citizen. If the website were granted terra firma, it would be the world’s third largest
country by population” (Fletcher, 2010, p. 32).
B. Most of these people probably didn’t take a class.
“Social media can be learned without ever taking a course for college credit. It is
a social experiment, and students are able to teach themselves. They can use a trial by
fire approach and navigate the medium for themselves. . . . Kristina Gorr, a student
affairs counselor at the MINI University and account administrator for Automatik
Education , . . [says that] part of the value of social media is that she learned from
personal experience. . . . ‘Learning from experience instead of in the classroom is very
crucial for this type of media’” (Davis, 2010).
1. Even those who take a class end up learning most of it on their own.
“Hanson Hosein . . . runs the Master in Communication and Digital Media
program at the University of Washington.” He believes social media is a hard
thing to teach and that students figure a lot of it out on their own. “There are ‘no
textbooks or easy answers’ to cracking the social media riddle. ‘But the answers
come through collaboration. . . . I’m not necessarily telling them how exactly to
[do it]’” (Kolowich, 2010).
C. Unless their employer has never looked at what they were saying online, what probably
differentiates most users from the few who have lost their jobs is that they recognize
social networks are public rather than private space.
1. From a legal perspective, the expectation of privacy on social network sites is an
open question.
In 2006, “Hodge argued that the fourth amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and legal decisions concerning privacy are not equipped to address
social network sites. For example, do police officers have the right to access
content posted to Facebook without a warrant. The legality of this hinges on
users’ expectation of privacy and whether or not Facebook profiles are considered
public or private” (boyd & Ellison, 2008, p. 222).
2. From a moral/ethical perspective, the expectation of privacy on social network
sites is a contentious issue.
Heery and Noon’s (2008) definition of social networking Web sites in A
Dictionary of Human Resource Management mentions the practice of checking on applicants
and employees, noting that “there is a question as to whether this is ethical: some
people argue that it is akin to poking round in a person’s home or belongings; others
argue that it is information that the person concerned has chosen to make public, so
it is legitimate of companies to look at this information, especially during selection.”
3. The advocate argues that social media can facilitate a job search and indicates
that companies use cybervetting to screen and disqualify some applicants. If
cyberspace is treated as public when a person is looking for a job, it is illogical to
assume it suddenly becomes private once they are hired.
III. Teaching the use of social media in the college curriculum would be unworkable.
A. A wide range of social media currently exists.
“Social media have become an integral part of modern society.There are general
social networks with user bases larger than the population of most countries.There are
niche sites for virtually every special interest out there.There are sites to share photos,
videos, status updates, sites for meeting new people and sites to connect with old
friends. It seems there are social solutions to just about every need” (Chapman, 2009).
B. The nature of social media has changed over time.
When they began in the late 1970s, “public online communities such as Usenet and
public discussion forums were structured by topics or according to topical hierarchies,
but social network sites are structured as personal (or ‘egocentric’) networks, with the
individual at the center of their own community” (boyd & Ellison, p. 219).
C. The features of social media are constantly evolving.
“The first recognizable social network site launched in 1997. SixDegrees.com
allowed users to create profiles, list their Friends and beginning in 1998, surf the
Friends lists. Each of these features existed in some form before SixDegrees, of course.
Profiles existed on most major dating sites and many community sites” (boyd &
Ellison, 2008, p. 214).
D. Because the field of social media is characterized by change and diversification, it is
hard to know what to teach.
While Facebook is most popular, can you ignore Orkut which is big in Brazil and
India with 65 million users, or any of the 1.5 million niche networks hosted by Ning?
While Twitter is big, can microblogging systems like Posterous or Tumblr be safely
ignored? (Chapman, 2009)
Sources Cited
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from http://www.aacu.org/About/statements/liberal_learning.cfm.
Bauerlein, M. (2009). The dumbest generation. New York: Jeremy P.Tarcher/Penguin.
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http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2009/08/26/f-back-to-school-social-media.html.
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Retrieved from http://www.webdesignerdepot.com/.
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classroom? Platform Online Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.platformmagazine.com/.
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board. Retrieved from http://www.quintcareers.com/real-time_job-search.html.
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leap/documents/Re8097abcombined.pdf.
key terms, hierarchy, and criteria) but nowhere else. It does not include a statement
of philosophy, which typically offers a presummary of where the opponent stands.
That would be redundant to the foregoing discussion of how the opponent went
about developing his position.
Summary of Value Opposition Strategies

1. Give a statement of the opponent’s philosophy that summarizes the stand to
be taken against the advocate’s case.
2. Challenge or accept the advocate’s definition of the value object.
3. Consider the criteria that should be used to measure the value object.
a. Is the asserted value as good as the advocate claims?
1. Does society recognize it as good?
2. Do experts in the field recognize it as good?
b. Have the value criteria been correctly identified?
1. Are there other values involved in the standard used?
2. Does the advocate provide adequate justification for the value criteria
selected?
3. Is there a better standard by which to evaluate the value object?
4. Evaluate how appropriately the value object has been measured by the value
criteria.
a. Does the value object fit the stated criteria?
b. Is the effect of the value object created by an exceptional case or
extenuating circumstances?
c. Is the significance temporary, inconsequential, or improperly measured?
d. Is the value inherent in the value hierarchy of society or the field of the
value proposition? Is there some alternate causality?
Propositions of value attempt to establish how something or someone ought
to be judged. It is important to remember that “because our individual and collec-
tive access to truth is imperfect, most disagreements about values call for civility,
openness to other views, and reasonable argument in pursuit of truth”
(Blankenhorn, 2001). Value propositions are argued by determining the criteria
or standards by which the evaluation ought to be made and then determining the
fit between the object being evaluated and these criteria. Advocates of value
propositions must be sure their argumentation considers effect, significance, and
inherency, regardless of whether they proceed by means of criteria discovery or
criteria development. The opponent, besides employing techniques applicable to
arguing propositions of fact, may also use the strategies of proposing different cri-
teria and charging improper classification. Understanding how propositions of
both fact and value are argued provides important insight into the next chapter’s
subject—how policy propositions are argued.
LEARNING ACTIVITIES
1. Choose an article that reviews a film from a magazine such as Entertainment Weekly or
a similar source. What hierarchy does the reviewer use as a source for evaluative criteria?
What specific criteria are used in evaluating this film? What arguments of effect, signif-
icance, and inherency are used?
2. In the field of communication, one area of scholarship, rhetorical criticism, is devoted

to making value judgments about the relative merits of human communication. Read
one of the following articles and prepare an oral or written report using the questions
listed:
Nick Trujillo & Leah R. Ekdom (1985, September). Sportswriting and American cultural
values: The 1984 Chicago Cubs. Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 2, 262–281.
Janice H. Rushing (1989, February). Evolution of “the new frontier” in Alien and
Aliens: Patriarchical co-optation of the feminine archetype. Quarterly Journal of
Speech, 75, 1–24.
a. How does the rhetorical critic identify the value hierarchy used in doing criticism?
b. Is a theory of rhetoric used to discover criteria or does the critic create criteria by
combining ideas from rhetorical theory and other fields?
c. How are criteria applied to the communication examples of the value object?
d. How does this value argumentation differ from other types you have read or
heard?
3. Discuss each of the following value propositions in terms of the value(s) to be sup-
ported by the advocate, the field(s) from which value criteria could be taken, and the
specific judgmental criteria that might be used in measuring the value object.
a. Students will benefit from classical literature studies in grades 6 through 12.
b. For most college students, going to Cancun for spring break is a waste of money.
c. The rights of endangered species ought to take precedence over the rights of in-
digenous human populations.
d. Humanitarian rather than geopolitical objectives ought to govern foreign policy
decisions.
4. Examine the Value Advocate Brief in Box 10.1 and do the following:
a. Although we have identified effect, extent, and inherency in the advocate’s first ar-
gument, do the same for the remainder of her arguments. Are any parts missing?
Remember that the pattern of organization in which these three elements are han-
dled can vary, that some parts of an argument can be implied by what is explicitly
stated in others, and that the arguer may rely on the audience’s common knowl-
edge to fill in the blanks. If something is implied, how likely is the audience to get
it? If the audience is expected to supply something, how reasonable is it to assume
that what is to be supplied is a matter of common knowledge?
b. Using the types and tests of reasoning in Chapter 7, classify each of the advocate’s
arguments as to type. Apply the tests of reasoning for that type of reasoning and
determine if her reasoning is sound or if she has committed one of the fallacies of
reasoning identified in Chapter 8. Is anything done to preempt potential argu-
ments by the opponent?
5. Examine the Value Opposition Brief in Box 10.2 and do the following:
a. We showed how the value advocate demonstrated effect, extent, and inherency in
her first argument. Using this as a model, do the same for the opponent’s argu-
ments. Are any parts missing? Remember that the pattern of organization in which
these three elements are handled can vary, that some parts of an argument can be
implied by what is explicitly stated in others, and that the arguer may rely on the
audience’s common knowledge to fill in the blanks. If something is implied, how
likely is the audience to get it? If the audience is expected to supply something,
how reasonable is it to assume that what is to be supplied is a matter of common
knowledge?
b. Using the types and tests of reasoning in Chapter 7, classify each of the opponent’s
arguments as to type. Apply the tests of reasoning for that type of reasoning and
determine if his reasoning is sound or if he has committed one of the fallacies of
reasoning identified in Chapter 8. Is anything done to preempt potential rebuttal
arguments by the advocate?
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CHAPTER
11
How Are Policy

P
olicy argumentation contemplates a potential course of action. Where do we find
examples of policy argumentation? In the field of law, we see examples of policy
making as criminal codes are devised and revised, judges set penalties for those
who are found guilty, and both professionals and ordinary citizens debate the merits of
capital punishment and other issues involving the law and its implementation.
One of the more obvious places to see policy making and policy argumentation
in action is in legislative bodies—national, state, and local. The establishment of
new programs and the evaluation of existing ones take place in city councils and
commissions, in state legislative houses, and in the U.S. House of Representatives
and the Senate. Your school may have a decision-making body that sets university
policy. Because many policy proposals create both strong support and strong
opposition, deliberations can become quite lengthy and even fraught with
emotion, such as occurs when students try to justify changing majors, studying
abroad, or doing an unpaid summer internship to their parents.
Those who successfully advocate and oppose propositions of policy employ
their understanding of how fact and value are argued. Many aspects of policy
argumentation have been explored in high school and intercollegiate debate com-
petitions over the years. Although Appendix A discusses debate in more detail, the
ideas discussed in this chapter apply many of the concepts developed in contest
debating to policy argumentation in other contexts.
ADVOCATING PROPOSITIONS OF POLICY

Creation of a prima facie case for a policy proposition begins with the advocate’s
research to find immediate causes, historical background on the topic, and devel-
opment of three stock issues:
1. Is there a reason for change in a manner generally suggested by the policy
proposition?
230
We refer to these stock issues as first, second, and third, but the logic of the
advocate’s approach is dictated by what she discovers about the immediate causes
of the problem and its historical background. Suppose for a moment that she is
advocating the proposition, Compass Point University (CPU) should significantly
improve the availability of parking on campus. During the course of her research,
she discovers that CPU has seen student enrollment double in the last ten years and
has built no new parking lots. As a result, students park illegally in nonparking
areas on campus or miss classes when they cannot find a place to park. She plans
to propose building a multistory parking garage. This will provide space for those
who park illegally as well as for those who park legally off campus but congest the
streets in surrounding neighborhoods.
The overall pattern presented here reflects a traditional organization known as
need-plan-advantage. It is used when the reason for change involves resolving an
existing problem and showing the subsidiary benefits of the proposed policy—in this
case, mollifying those who own homes near CPU. For this type of advocacy, the order
in which the stock issues were listed is the order in which they should be argued.
If the reason for change relates to the attainment of a more desirable future
state, however, then the means to attain that state (the second stock issue) should
be discussed first. Suppose that in the course of her research, the advocate discovers
that as CPU has grown it has acquired land near campus and built parking lots.
Students do not like to walk from these lots because of their distance from the
central campus, especially if the winters are brutal at CPU. As a result, they park
illegally on campus and congest neighborhood streets. She plans to propose building
a multistory parking garage in the center of campus. Her advocacy would be
successful to the extent that she can prove her proposal represents what is called a
comparative advantage over the existing policy.
This approach is used when serious present problems under the stock issue of
reason for change cannot be discovered or are not widely accepted. It is also used
when there is almost universal agreement that a reason for change exists, but contro-
versy surrounds the question of what is the best future course of action. Perhaps
CPU is about to buy the land to build another perimeter lot, and someone asks,
“Why not build a multistory parking garage in the center of campus?” This is often
the case in legislative debate. Argumentation compares the proposed solution to the
existing policy of building perimeter lots. The second and third stock issues, the pro-
posed change and the consequences of change, provide the focus for argumentation.
Although there is no rule regarding how many advantages are necessary to
warrant a change, the advantages must be demonstrated to result from the new
policy, and their value must be qualitatively or quantitatively measurable. The
same is true of advantages claimed in the traditional need-plan-advantage case.
The organization of comparative advantage advocacy begins with the presentation
of the policy proposal, and the advocate then indicates one or more advantages to
be achieved by adopting it. Each advantage should be unique. Only the proposed
policy, when compared with existing policy, should be capable of achieving it. In
addition to demonstrating uniqueness, the advocate establishes a quantitative
and/or qualitative measure of each advantage’s value to society.
Finally, suppose the advocate discovers from her research that adequate
parking exists on campus and in perimeter lots. The perimeter lots are only a
232 CHAPTER 11 How Are Policy Propositions Argued?
block or two from the main campus. Although students grumble, they do not re-
ally mind the walk if CPU is located in an area with a year-round balmy climate.
She has also discovered a study proving that the single most important factor in
a student’s choice of a university is parking, rather than the size of the library or
the number of national championships the football team has won. She is aware
that CPU has embarked on a campaign to increase the size of the student body
by touting its planned investments in technology. She proposes building a multi-
story parking garage in the center of campus instead of spending all the money
on computers.
Her argument represents a third pattern of organization for policy advocacy
that uses many of the features of value argumentation. Goals-criteria advocacy
begins by examining what society values and the goals it has set to achieve these
values. If CPU values increasing enrollment based on the premise that “bigger is
better,” a proposal to build a parking garage instead of a computer lab might be
advocated on the basis that it better achieves the goal and therefore more fully
realizes the relevant value. Criteria are used in the same manner as in value
argumentation. The proposed policy is then examined in terms of value criteria
that measure its ability to obtain the desired goal.
The advocate’s presentation may be organized in accordance with different
philosophies—traditional, comparative advantage, or goals-criteria—but arguments
will still address the same stock issues. The first step in creating a prima facie case is
to discover whether a disparity between that which exists and that which would be
desirable represents a problem to be solved.
For example, suppose CPU has seen student enrollment double in the last ten
years and has built no new parking lots. Many people believe this represents a
disparity between the way things are and the way things ought to be. The analysis of
stock issues in a policy proposition leads to discovering the existence of this disparity.
The first stock issue asks what unresolved problems exist or will exist in the future: Is
there a reason for change in the manner generally suggested by the policy proposition?
Advocacy of the First Stock Issue

Answering this question is important, because if no reason for change exists,
change is unwarranted. If someone walks up to you and asks to borrow ten
dollars, that person is advocating the policy proposition, “You should give me ten
dollars.” Your probable response will either be “no,” because the person have
given you no reason to warrant action on your part, or “why?” because you
would like to know that person’s reason. Inquiry into the reason for change
involves consideration of what the advocate perceives the disparity between
actual and ideal to be.
The advocate’s response normally takes the form of a value contention, and
four subissues must be advanced to win assent. These subissues provide the answers
to questions customarily asked to determine whether a reason for change exists:
1. What is the nature of the disparity?

2. How extensive is the disparity?
3. Does the disparity cause harm to something or someone?
4. Is the disparity inherent in the present nature of things?
Advocacy of the first stock issue, reason for change, makes the listener or
reader aware of an unresolved problem, now or in the future, which is a conse-
quence of the way things are at present. The advocate might advance a contention
such as, The lack of parking at CPU is harmful, and then create a series of arguments
related to the four subissues to prove it.
Identify the Disparity. The first subissue, the nature of the disparity, requires the
advocate to substantiate at least one definitional claim—that something that
presently exists can be defined or classified as representing a disparity of a certain
type. Because there is a natural resistance to change, people will usually be unre-
sponsive unless the disparity is a serious one, for example: Students enroll in the
classes they want or need to take at CPU but are subsequently late for or miss
them. The seriousness of the disparity is suggested in this definitional claim and
further supported by arguments on the next two subissues—significance and
effect. This should sound familiar, because it is basic value argumentation. The
advocate may discover that more than one disparity must be identified to produce
a case that is compelling or prima facie: Students who are late for or miss classes
affect the climate of learning for students who are on time.
Quantify the Disparity. The second subissue explains or quantifies the significance
of the disparity, alleging the magnitude of this present or future problem. If the
significance of the problem is demonstrable in quantitative terms, the advocate will
advance and substantiate a factual claim: Most students miss or are late for at least
one class per week. If the question is addressable only qualitatively, the claim will
be definitional—that the disparity is to be classified as being of a certain qualitative
type, widespread or all encompassing, for example.
Characterize the Consequences. The third subissue concerns the effects, or conse-
quences, of the disparity. A value claim is presented, suggesting that the consequences
are in some way harmful to those experiencing the disparity, for instance: Missing class
seriously impairs learning. Why is this important? We are confident that no one read-
ing this book is a student at CPU, a disparity that is extensive. However, unless we
could demonstrate that as a result you are being hurt, our advocacy of the policy
proposition, You should transfer to CPU, would be unwarranted. Thus, the advocate
uses the third subissue to examine the consequences of the present or future disparity.
She evaluates them in negative terms by first establishing the criteria for harm and then
demonstrating the goodness of fit between those criteria and the present disparity.
Establish Inherency. The final subissue used in developing argumentation on the

first stock issue, reason for change, concerns inherency. In policy propositions,
inherency is argued to determine the cause of the serious and harmful disparity.
Blame for the existence of the disparity is placed on things as they are now—existing
laws, institutions, or beliefs. A factual claim is used to establish the causal relationship
between that which exists and the disparity: The lack of adequate parking on
campus is the reason for being late or missing class in the vast majority of cases.
The demonstration of inherency is critical. We might assume students miss
class because they partied too hard the night before or had not done the assigned
homework that was due that day. They might be late because of irresponsibility or
a faulty alarm clock. Subscribing to the philosophy of “If it ain’t broke don’t fix
it,” we would be unwilling to change something that is apparently innocent of having
caused the problem for which a remedy is sought.
If the reason for change rests on the hypothesis that some more desirable
future state will not be achieved, the advocate must demonstrate that this state will
probably not be reached because of the way things are now. People tend to give
existing laws, institutions, or beliefs the benefit of the doubt, assuming these are
likely to change naturally in ways that result in a future that is better than the past
or present. The advocate must preclude this kind of thinking by demonstrating
that existing barriers render the more desirable future state she supports unavailable
by any means other than those she will propose.
Having successfully upheld the burden of proof with regard to the first stock
issue, reason for change, the advocate must now propose a way to remedy the
disparity, the second stock issue. The remedy is a new policy by which a preferred
state, one in which the disparity would cease to exist, is reached. Does the
proposed policy resolve the reason for change?
Advocacy of the Second Stock Issue

Assuming change is warranted because the advocate has proven the existence of a
problem, she must provide the solution if she hopes to win assent. This solution, or
proposed policy, should explain exactly what is to be done, and it should include
the following elements:
䊏 Change—What behaviors are to be enacted that are not presently being
enacted? What will be done differently?
䊏 Mechanism—On whose authority will these behaviors be undertaken? Will a
new law be passed, a new agency or institution created, or will individuals do
this on their own?
䊏 Financing—If the change or mechanism incurs any costs, how much will they
be, and how will they be paid?
䊏 Enforcement—How will violations of the proposed policy be detected? Who
will be responsible for this detection, and how will violators be dealt with?
What means are used to ensure compliance?
Unless a separate definition of the key terms in the proposition is provided, the
advocate’s proposal serves as an operational definition of the meaning of the
proposition.
The advocate has suggested that inadequate parking on campus has caused a
problem with class attendance. After investigating how much it costs to build
additional lots or a multistory garage, she decides to advocate a proposal for
change such as the following:
The Regents of Compass Point University will adopt a policy that only students who
have achieved sophomore status or above can register their cars on campus. Any
unregistered vehicle found to be parked on campus by Campus Security will be ticketed
on the first offense and impounded on the second. First-offense fines will be set at $50,
and reclaiming a vehicle from impound will cost $100. Because this proposal involves
the addition of no new manpower or facilities, it is essentially a free solution to the
problem.
All four elements a policy proposal should have are contained in this example.
After its details are spelled out, the advocate will be obliged to demonstrate how
the reason for change has been satisfied. This involves considering the third stock
issue: What are the consequences of the proposed policy?
Advocacy of the Third Stock Issue

At the very least, we expect solutions to work, to solve the problems that called
them into being. If, in addition to this workability, other good things happen coin-
cidentally, we are very pleased. The advocate guides the listener or reader through
the consequences of the proposed policy by considering four questions:
1. How does the proposed policy address the disparity?

2. How does the proposed policy overcome its inherency?
3. How workable is the proposed policy?
4. What are the subsidiary effects of the proposed policy?
These four questions represent the subissues the advocate must develop in support
of the third stock issue of policy argumentation, the consequence of change.
Demonstrate Solvency. The first question pertains to the concept sometimes

referred to as solvency. Does the proposed policy address the disparity in such a
way that it eliminates or substantially minimizes it? Does the proposed policy get
us to, or at least nearer to, the more ideal state the advocate seeks? The proposed
solution to the problem created by a lack of parking spaces at CPU rests on the
premise that you can remedy this problem by either increasing the number of
spaces or decreasing the number of cars. If freshmen constitute 40 percent of the
student body, then keeping their cars off campus almost doubles the available
parking spaces relative to the number of student-owned cars registered on campus.
The penalties are hoped to be severe enough to deter freshmen from parking their
unregistered cars on campus. The advocate of this policy would have to offer proof
and reasoning in support of these claims alleging the solvency of the proposal.
Overcome Inherency. The second subissue is important. If existing institutions

cannot address the reason for change because of inherent barriers, the advocate
must demonstrate how her proposal is not hamstrung by these same barriers.
Normally, the mechanism section of the policy proposal will fiat the necessary
change. If the barrier was structural—for example, the current parking regulations’
failure to differentiate between freshmen and other students—the advocate would
argue that her proposal removes or alters it in such a way that it no longer constitutes
an impediment. If inherency was a consequence of something’s absence at present—
for example, the lack of high fines or the power to impound the vehicles of repeat
offenders—the advocate must show how her proposal fills these gaps. If inherency
resulted from attitudes, the advocate must be able to prove that these same
attitudes will not undermine the solvency of the proposal, or she must provide
some means to change them. For example, if Campus Security employs students to
handle the issuance of most parking citations, the advocate would be in serious
trouble because those charged with enforcing her proposal might not attach much
importance to the task or might tend to give their friends a break.
Establish Workability. The third subissue turns attention to the fundamental

nature of the proposal itself and analyzes its workability. A proposal may solve
problems and overcome inherent barriers but be totally unrealistic and unworkable.
To suggest that the most effective solution to the problem of drunk driving would
be to prohibit the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages may be true but un-
workable. The nation tried that particular policy for moral reasons in the past and
discovered that most Americans not only did not favor it but also willfully violated
it. Solving a parking problem by banning cars might prove equally unworkable.
The advocate must develop and use criteria of effectiveness to argue that the pro-
posed policy is more workable than that which it replaces. For example, if CPU has
a large population of freshman commuter students, this plan would be workable
only if there is adequate public transportation in the city where CPU is located.
Identify Subsidiary Effects. The fourth subissue, identifying the subsidiary effects
of the proposed policy, allows the advocate to conclude discussion of the conse-
quences of change by pointing to whatever desirable side effects occur as a result of
assent to her proposal. Do the members of her audience get something for nothing?
The advocate of a ban on freshman parking could claim they might. Although her
reason for change concerns all students being late for or missing class from time to
time (a problem the proposed policy is thought to remedy), a subsidiary effect of
the policy might be higher retention rates for freshmen. The highest attrition is
always between the freshman and sophomore years. If freshmen living on campus
cannot register cars on campus, perhaps they will leave them at home. Maybe they
will spend more time on their studies and be less likely to fail or drop out.
To be considered a subsidiary effect, something must be an inherent consequence
of the success of the proposed policy over and above remedying the disparity that mo-
tivated its being proposed. Subsidiary effects are like fringe benefits: They are nice to
have but they are not always available. Therefore, the absence of subsidiary effects
does not render an advocate’s case non prima facie. Nor do subsidiary effects consti-
tute a warrant for change in and of themselves. If a reason for change does not exist,
or if the proposal for change fails to remedy the problem it is intended to resolve, the
advocate’s cause is lost even if her proposal produces some pleasant side effects.
Argument in Action
Although CPU is a figment of our imagination, the perception that campus park-
ing is inadequate is a reality just about everywhere. Because the issues involved
should be relatively transparent to you, our explanation of policy argumentation
from the advocate’s perspective could focus on the strategies involved. Because
arguments over policy rest on a foundation of fact and value, methods of argument
development and case construction discussed in Chapter 9 and 10 are also used in
preparing to argue policy. The example of Argument in Action in Box 11.1 returns
to the question of whether the British Museum should return the Elgin Marbles to
Greece discussed in Chapter 4. You might want to review the analysis of the
proposition provided there before examining the advocate’s case for restoration.
BOX 11.1
Policy Advocate Brief
Proposition
The British Museum should restore the Elgin Marbles collection to Greece.

British Museum—the trustees of the British Museum empowered by the British Museum Act
of 1963 to lend items from its collections to institutions inside and outside the United
Kingdom.
Elgin Marbles collection—sculptures cut from the Parthenon and taken from its environs by
Thomas Bruce, Lord Elgin between 1801 and 1806.
Restore to Greece—loan the Elgin Marbles collection to the new Acropolis Museum in
Athens, Greece.
Reason for Change

I. Lord Elgin’s removal of the marbles from the Parthenon was the theft of Greek cultural
patrimony.
A. Removal of the marbles was not an act of archeological conservation.
1. Elgin was not an archeologist, wanting only the finest Greek art.
“Neither Elgin nor his agents were interested much in archaeology as a
study of the past for its own sake, nor in collecting antiquities which might
illustrate the different periods and changing styles of Greek art. Only the best
would do, and for their purposes the best meant the high classical period of the
fifth century” (St. Clair, 1998, p. 101).
2. Elgin intended to have the sculptures restored to appear as intact pieces.
“When Elgin left Greece it was his firm intention to have his sculptures
restored in Italy ... [he] offered the work to . . . John Flaxman . . . [who] was
willing to do the work but was hesitant. The restored parts would be inferior to
the original . . . even when finished” (St. Clair, 1998, pp. 149–150).
3. Elgin wanted the marbles for himself, not the United Kingdom.
A letter to his on-site art expert about removal of items from Athens refers to
the mansion Elgin was building that, “offers me the means of placing, in a useful,
distinguished and agreeable way, the various things that you may perhaps be able
to procure for me . . . I should wish to collect as much marble as possible . . . one
can easily multiply ornaments of beautiful marble without overdoing it” (quoted in
Hitchens, 2008, pp. 31–32).
B. Elgin did not have permission of the ruling Ottoman-Turks to remove the sculptures.
1. In a letter to British Prime Minister Spencer Perceval dated 31 July 1811, Elgin
admitted he did not have permission.
“I have no advantage from the Turkish government beyond the firman
[permission to gain access to the site to make drawings, casts, and molds] given
equally to other English travelers. My successors in the Embassy could not obtain
permission for the removal of what I had not myself taken away . . . ‘The Porte
(continued)
[official] denied that the persons who had sold those marbles to me had any right
to dispose of them’” (quoted in Hitchens, 2008, pp. 43–44).
2. Elgin’s removal of the sculptures was illegal.
“[W]e have Lord Elgin, in a signed letter to the prime minister, admitting that
he had acquired the marbles without the authority he was later to claim that he
possessed . . . [undermining] the British government’s repeated contention that his
transaction was a legal one by the standards of the day” (Hitchens, 2008, p. 44).
C. Elgin’s removal of the marbles constitutes theft of the most important symbol of the
Greek people.
1. Elgin was a looter, not a conservator of Greek cultural treasures.
“Elgin’s agents began pulling down friezes and metopes from the Parthenon
itself . . . Elgin took the plunder to a completely new level. Over the next eight
years his team removed over seventy-five meters of the frieze which ran around
the outside of the Parthenon . . . depicting scenes from Athenian life and ritual.
They took fifteen of the ninety-two metopes depicting scenes from a battle
between Greeks and centaurs, some still considered among the finest sculptures
ever made” (Atwood, 2004, p. 134).
2. The marbles Elgin removed were the cultural patrimony of the Greeks.
“If there is one icon . . . that stands for ancient Greece and its leading city-
state of the fifth century B.C., Athens, it is the Parthenon . . . It is seen as
standing for purity, beauty, and even a form of moral and intellectual integrity”
(Freeman, 1999, p. 1).
II. The Elgin Marbles collection is a significant part of the cultural patrimony of Greece.
A. The Elgin Marbles collection is a significant part of Greek cultural heritage.
1. The Parthenon is a significant symbol for the Greek people.
Melina Mercouri, Greek Minister of Culture in 1983: “The marbles are part
of a monument to Greek identity, part of the deepest consciousness of the Greek
people: our roots, our continuity, our soul. The Parthenon is our flag” (quoted in
Gillman, 2009, p. 168).
2. The Elgin Marbles are an important part of Greek identity.
“The sculptures were created for the Athenians, by the Athenians and with a
uniquely Athenian theme. These are the people for whom the Marbles were
intended” (Greenfield, 2000).
3. An incident during the Greek War for Independence in 1821 demonstrates the
significance.
“[W]hen the Greeks were besieging the Acropolis, they learned that the
Turkish defenders were melting down the lead clamps of the buildings to make
improvised bullets . . . Kyriakos Pittakis, who would later become the first
General Keeper of Antiquities, . . . conferred with his fellow-soldiers, [and] the
Athenians sent a quantity of lead bullets to the Ottomans on the Acropolis so that
they might desist from their acts of destruction” (Hitchens, 2008, pp. 59–60).
B. Inherently, the Elgin Marbles belong with the surviving Parthenon sculptures.
1. A principle of the aesthetics of museum display is that objects of a set belong
together.
“Integrity is an issue for all art exhibits. . . . [The] Parthenon sculptures . . .
only make sense as a whole. They are components of a unique collection . . . and
they are only complete together, and in the context of the monument site where they
belong—the Acropolis of Athens” (Acropolis of Athens, Attiki, 2004–2010).
2. The marbles are part of the Parthenon’s architecture, not a separate piece.
“The Parthenon Sculptures are not free standing pieces or art. They were
created as architectural and symbolic parts of the temple of Athena . . . The
monument is fully understood with its sculptures and the sculptures are
meaningful only next to the temple, in their natural and historical environment.
The Parthenon still stands . . . and is considered a powerful symbol of freedom of
thought, democracy, philosophy, harmony and liberty” (Hellenic Ministry of
Culture and Tourism, 2007).
3. The British Museum’s display of the marbles gets their placement wrong.
“[T]he Duveen Gallery is vaguely reminiscent of the inside of a Greek temple,
[but] it gives a misleading idea of the size, shape, and color of the
Parthenon . . . the Marbles were arranged in a false symmetry giving a misleading
impression of completeness . . . In ancient Athens the sculptures faced out, the
observer looked in. The frieze . . . offered a changing narrative as . . . [the
observer] moved around the outside of the building until they reached the
culmination. As now presented, it was the observer who was at the center” (St.
Clair, 1998, p. 304).
4. The British Museum’s explanation of the marbles’ context in a video is seriously
flawed.
“[T]he British Museum’s video is entirely context free, with the building
drifting in a black abyss without even a ground plan to relate to. Nowhere is there
any suggestion of the importance of the context to the building . . . the video
doesn’t at any point present the viewer with a human perspective of the
building . . . the viewer floats . . . watching the building rotate” (Taylor, 2004).
III. There is a mandate to restore artifacts whose cultural patrimony is known.
A. UNESCO treaties and resolutions encourage the return of artifacts of cultural
patrimony.
1. Recent United Nations activity confirms UNESCO’s work.
“[In] November 2006 the Return or restitution of cultural property to the countries of
origin was debated and resulted in a new resolution reaffirming previous UN
resolutions. . . . Certain categories of cultural property are irrevocably identified
by reference to the cultural context in which they were created (unique and
exceptional artworks and monuments, ritual objects, national symbols, ancestral
remains, dismembered pieces of outstanding works of art). It is their original
context that gives them their authenticity and unique value” (Committee for
Reunification of the Parthenon Marbles, 2001–2002).
2. The international climate of restoration of cultural patrimony is evidenced by the
return of the Icelandic Saga manuscripts to Iceland.
“These manuscripts mean to Icelanders what Shakespearean literature
means to the English. . . . Thousands of manuscripts have now been
returned . . . [a]lthough the return was painful for the Danish institutions”
(Greenfield, 2000).
3. Other museums in the United Kingdom have returned cultural artifacts.
“Cases involving the return of significant cultural property from museums in
Britain include the return of artifacts from the Cambridge Museum of
Archaeology and Anthropology to Uganda . . . from the Victoria and Albert Museum
to Burma . . . from the Liverpool Museum to Australia ... from the Wellcome
Institute (London) to Yemen . . . from the Royal Albert Memorial Museum to
Tasmania . . . and from the Edinburgh University Museum to Australia . . . and New
Zealand” (International Organizing Committee—Australia—for the Restitution of
the Parthenon Marbles, 2000).
B. There is widespread support for return of the Elgin Marbles to the Greeks.
1. A majority of British people support return of the collection to the Greeks.
“According to a poll conducted during 2008 by the British Ipsos-Mori firm
[principal polling agency in the UK] . . . 69% of those who were familiar with
(continued)
the issue [favored] the Sculptures’ restitution to Greece . . . a 7% increase

[since a similar poll in 2002]” (Mottas, 2009).
2. There is strong international support for return of the Elgin Marbles to the Greeks.
“The campaign for the restoration . . . has gained international recognition
from Australia to the United States, significant celebrities from the political and
cultural scene, as well as distinguished scholars, have favored [restitution] . . .
the European Parliament [of the European Union] and UNESCO have formally
supported that aim, while politicians from various countries have expressed their
keen interest towards the reunification of the Parthenon” (Mottas, 2009).
Proposal for the restoration of the Elgin Marbles collection to Greece.
• Change: Under joint Greek-British supervision, copies of the Elgin Marbles collection and
the surviving Parthenon sculptures will be made using equivalent marble from Greek
quarries for the British Museum, which will then loan the Elgin Marbles collection to the
new Acropolis Museum. The British Museum and the new Acropolis Museum will share
responsibility for overseeing conservation of the Elgin Marbles collection via a joint
trusteeship, which will (1) ensure access to the collection for scholarly purposes, and (2)
promote research and publication regarding the unified collection.
• Mechanism: Pursuant to the British Museum Act of 1963, the Elgin Marbles collection’s
status as being “held in trust” for the people of the United Kingdom will be maintained
under the terms of the loan, and the display in the new Acropolis Museum will acknowledge
the collection as being “on loan from the British Museum.”
• Financing: The Greek government, through the Hellenic Ministry of Culture and Tourism, and
the Acropolis Museum, will be responsible for all costs, including: (1) creating and
transporting the copies for the British Museum; (2) packing and transporting the Elgin
Marbles collection to the new Acropolis Museum; and (3) ongoing maintenance and
conservation of the Elgin Marbles collection.
• Enforcement: By Greek-British joint agreement, no other copies will ever be made, granting
the British Museum a unique display and ensuring a permanent and complete Parthenon
Marbles display for the British Museum.
Advantages of uniting the surviving sculptures in the new Acropolis Museum.
I. The artifacts will benefit from reunification in the new Acropolis Museum.
A. The sculptures will be viewed as their creators intended them to be.
“The new state-of-the-art Acropolis Museum . . . will ensure the most faithful
display of the Parthenon sculptures. Featuring a dedicated Parthenon gallery, it will
[have] . . . the exact dimensions, orientation and proportions as the periphery of the
Parthenon . . . The exhibition layout of the frieze will be informative and correct,
allowing the visitor to walk around the frieze and look at the sculptures in the exact
order and arrangement that they were originally designed for . . . with its close view
of the Acropolis itself, the Parthenon gallery will provide a direct link between the
exhibits and the monument they belong to” (Acropolis of Athens, Attiki, 2004–2010).
B. The unity of the sculptures will be restored.
“To have the Marbles located in sight of the building to which they belong
would be to give them back that which they have lacked for the past two
centuries: a sense of their true purpose, which the ordinary viewer could instantly
appreciate” (Snodgrass, 2000).
C. The new Acropolis Museum will better ensure conservation of the sculptures.
“Physically, the Acropolis Museum will offer the best environment for the
keeping of the Parthenon sculptures. In addition to climatic control that will
optimize temperature and humidity levels for keeping of such antiquities, specific
measures will ensure the protection of the sculptures from excess heat and light,
whilst not compromising natural lighting and optimal visual exposure” (Acropolis
of Athens, Attiki, 2004–2010).
II. The British Museum and the British government will benefit.
A. The display in the new Acropolis Museum calls attention to the missing pieces.
“To accentuate the ghostly absence of the missing marbles, there are white
plaster copies to fill the gaps” (McGuigan, 2009, p. 62).
B. This display creates a public relations problem for the British.
“Each person who visits the new museum will see the same story: here is a
great family of sculptures kept apart by the grouchy British, still exercising their
imperial rights of loot and pillage” (Moore, 2009).
C. The reputation of the British Museum will be enhanced by loaning the Elgin Marbles
collection to the new Acropolis Museum.
“The failure or the inability of the British Museum to address claims for the
return of cultural property is increasingly diminishing its reputation and
overshadowing its excellent record of scholarship and its other fine collections”
(International Organizing Committee—Australia, 2000).
Sources Cited
Acropolis of Athens, Attiki. (2004-2010).The meaning of the Acropolis of Athens, the Parthenon
and its sculptures: Museum exhibits. One Monument, One Heritage. Retrieved from http://www.
acropolisofathens.gr/l_epsilon.html.
Atwood, R. (2004). Stealing history: Tomb raiders, smugglers, and the looting of the ancient world. New York:
St. Martin’s Griffin.
Committee for the Reunification of the Parthenon Marbles. (2001–2002). The case for the
return. Articles and Research. Retrieved from http://www.parthenonuk.com/article.php?=381.
Freeman, C. (1999). The Greek achievement: The foundation of western civilization. New York: Viking.
Gillman, D. (2009). Heritage and national treasures. In J. Cuno (Ed.), Whose culture? The promise of
museums and the debate over antiquities (pp. 165–182). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Greenfield, J. (2000). House of Commons—Culture, Media and Sport—Appendix 13,
Memorandum submitted by Dr. Jeanette Greenfield. Retrieved from http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmcumeds/371/371ap20.htm.
Hellenic Ministry of Culture and Tourism. (2007). The restitution of the Parthenon marbles: The
removed sculptures. Odysseus. Retrieved from http:// odysseus.culture.gr/a/l/12/ea126.html.
Hitchens, C. (2008). The Parthenon Marbles: The case for reunification (rev. ed.). London: Verso.
International Organizing Committee—Australia—for the Restitution of the Parthenon Marbles
(2000). House of Commons—Culture, Media and Sport—Appendix 17, Memorandum.
Retrieved from http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmcumeds/
371/371ap23.htm.
McGuigan, C. (2009, June 15). Romancing the stones. Newsweek, 173, 62–63.
Moore, R. (2009, June 24). Now let’s return the Elgin Marbles. London Evening Standard. Retrieved
from http://www.elginism.com/20090624/2154/print/.
Mottas, N. (2009, February 23). Eight reasons: Why the Parthenon sculptures must be returned
to Greece. American Chronicle. Retrieved from http://www.americanchronicle.com.
Snodgrass, A. M. (2000). House of Commons—Culture, Media and Sport—Annex B:The integrity of
the monument and the advantages of re-uniting the London and Athens marbles. Retrieved from
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmcumeds/371/371ap16.htm.
(continued)
St. Clair, W. (1998). Lord Elgin & the marbles (3rd ed.). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Taylor, M. (2004). BM violates original architectural concept. The Parthenon Marbles. Retrieved
from http://www.uk.digiserve.com/mentor/marbles/taylor02.htm.
In academic argumentation, advocates as well as opponents face time or page-

length constraints. As a result, they may choose to leave some things unstated, re-
lying on audience knowledge or common sense to fill in the blanks. Were you won-
dering where the advocate addressed solvency, overcoming inherency, and
workability relative to the third stock issue in her brief? They are implied in her
proposal. The Greeks get to display the Elgin Marbles, which may eliminate the
disparity and solve the problem from their perspective. The marbles will be “on
loan from the British Museum,” overcoming the inherent barrier to giving the col-
lection away posed by the British Museum Act of 1963. The British end up with
more material to display at no cost, possibly making things workable, if not palat-
able, from their perspective. If you were not wondering about solvency, inherency,
and workability, her relying on you to fill in the blanks was either well founded or
you have not been reading carefully enough, in which case the following summary
of policy advocacy will be helpful.
Summary of Policy Advocacy

1. Is there a reason to change in the manner generally suggested by the policy
proposition?
a. What is the nature of the disparity?
b. How extensive is the disparity?
c. Does the disparity cause harm to something or someone?
d. Is the disparity inherent in the present nature of things?
a. What will be done differently?
b. Who will be responsible for doing it?
c. What will it cost, and how will costs be paid?
d. What means are used to ensure compliance?
a. How does the proposed policy address the disparity?
b. How does the proposed policy overcome its inherency?
c. How workable is the proposed policy?
d. What are the subsidiary effects of the proposed policy?
OPPOSING PROPOSITIONSOF POLICY

The opponent of the policy advocate attempts to demonstrate that good and
sufficient reasons exist to consider the proposed policy unacceptable.
Remember that the advocate must develop arguments in support of three stock
issues. Although the second one may become essentially noncontestable as soon
as a topical proposal for change is advanced, the advocate must win the two
remaining stock issues. There must be a reason for change, and the conse-
quences of the proposed policy must be such that, at a minimum, the reason for
change is remedied. Must the opponent also win both these issues in order to
defeat the advocate? No! In fact, he does not even have to contest both! Thus,
the first strategic choice the opponent makes concerns whether to argue one or
both of the remaining stock issues. If he feels one is clearly winnable and the
other is not, he may choose to attack only where he has the advantage, focusing
audience attention on that portion of the contested ground where his arguments
are strongest.
Why is this strategic choice possible? A prima facie case is one that can be
taken at face value, meaning that the reason for change, the proposed change, and
the proposed change’s ability to resolve the reason for change must be present in
the advocate’s case before it can be termed prima facie. If the opponent can
successfully attack the advocate’s position on the first or last of these stock issues,
the case is no longer prima facie. It no longer offers good and sufficient reasons for
a listener’s or reader’s assent. As a rule, the advocate’s position will not be so
clearly deficient in its development of the three stock issues as to make this
decision an easy one. Therefore, the opponent usually attacks on both fronts and
determines the real strengths and weaknesses of the advocate’s case based on the
arguments used to defend it.
Establish Strategy
Like the advocate, the opponent will have examined both the historical background
and immediate causes for concern about parking at CPU. Although he cannot be
sure until he actually hears or reads them, he probably has a pretty good idea about
the lines of argument she could possibly advance. He may even have a sense of
whether her pattern of case construction is more likely to be need-plan-advantage,
comparative advantage, or goals criteria. On the basis of his research of the advo-
cate’s side of the proposition as well as his own, he can formulate his strategy.
Opponents typically follow the pattern of organization provided by the advocate,
arguing first things first and proceeding to subsequent arguments in an order that
juxtaposes each with the advocate’s argument it addresses. This helps listeners and
readers clearly understand the points of clash and disagreement. Although the
opponent has a number of strategic options available, all of these options cannot
be used simultaneously.
The opponent’s case usually begins with an overview of his rationale for rejection.
What will he defend? What does he oppose? How does he wish the listener or
reader to view the proposed policy? The opponent examines the advocate’s case,
identifies the central idea behind the proposed change, and asks himself the follow-
ing questions: Does the reason for change contain assumptions that are unwar-
ranted because they have not been fully proven? Are there implied values the reader
or listener is asked to accept without explanation? What is the advocate’s burden of
proof and has it been met? In addition to determining whether the advocate has
fulfilled the responsibility of the burden of proof, the opponent assesses the evidence
and reasoning contained in individual arguments, applying tests of evidence to the
proof grounding and backing claims and examining the reasoning for fallacies.
Examine Definitions
The opponent also determines whether he wishes to contest the advocate’s definition
of terms. If the proposition has been defined operationally, his refutation of the
ability of the proposal to do what the advocate claims is equivalent to contesting
the definition of terms. But if the advocate has chosen to define the subject of the
proposition independently, the opponent applies the same tests he employed in
opposing fact and value propositions—namely, has the advocate excluded
something important or included too much? Is barring certain groups of individuals
from having cars on campus a reasonable interpretation of a proposition that
points toward making parking more available?
Refute the Reason for Change

Opposing argumentation on the first stock issue uses the strategies discussed in
Chapters 9 and 10, because the stock issue of reason for change is advanced by
fact and value arguments. The opponent may use arguments denying that the
disparity exists or that it is as great as the advocate suggests. If most of the growth
of the student body at CPU has been among nontraditional students who take
courses primarily at night, then the fact that the size of the student body has grown
while the number of parking spaces has not may be inconsequential. The opponent
may use arguments that deny the harmfulness of the disparity, or he may attempt
to prove that the harm is insignificant: Is missing a class really that bad for
students? He may also argue that extenuating circumstances, which are only
temporary, explain the existence of the disparity. Perhaps the increase in the
student body is the result of a temporary increase in birth rates twenty years ago.
That baby boom was followed by a baby bust, so in a few years there will be fewer
students and therefore fewer cars at CPU.
Challenge Inherency. Regarding the reason for change, the opponent may offer
arguments showing that the disparity is not inherent to the field or society and its
institutions or policies. In arguing inherency, the advocate wants the reader or
listener to believe that what presently exists causes the problem and, by implication,
that the only remedy lies beyond the reach of existing laws, institutions, or
patterns of belief. If this were absolutely true, we would be locked in place, totally
incapable of change. In reality, that which exists at present is, to a certain degree,
in a state of flux and in the process of becoming something else. The opponent may
capitalize on this, denying the inherency of the reason for change on the basis of a
field’s or society’s self-correcting abilities. This is normally referred to as a minor
repairs argument. CPU could make the encouragement it currently gives students
to carpool more substantial.
The philosophy of minor repairs does not give the opponent license to claim
whatever he wishes. Whatever minor repairs are suggested to that which exists
must meet certain tests. First, minor repairs must be attainable within the foreseeable
future. To assert that someday everyone will abandon cars in favor of bicycles,
thus rendering unnecessary an advocate’s proposal to bar freshmen from having
cars on campus, stretches both an audience’s credulity and the limits of the foreseeable
future beyond their breaking points.
Second, a minor repair must be attainable without benefit of a structural or

attitudinal change—it must be a natural consequence of that which presently
exists. To argue that CPU should create a carpool program if it does not already
have one would violate this second standard. However, arguing that there is a
current trend toward encouraging carpooling that could be expanded conforms to
the second standard.
Third, minor repairs are subject to the same standards of proof, insofar as
their solvency, inherency, and workability are concerned, as the policy proposed by
the advocate. Fourth, and finally, minor repairs should not themselves be inter-
pretable as a legitimate part of the policy proposition. If the proposition calls for
making parking more available, the opponent could not propose as a minor repair
that the width of parking spaces on campus be reduced, effectively increasing the
capacity of existing lots. Although the suggestion differs from the specific interpre-
tation of the proposition presented by the advocate, it still constitutes “advocacy”
of the proposition’s intent. If it constitutes a structural change in the way CPU does
things, it is neither a defense of present policy nor a reasonable interpretation of
what present policy is in the process of becoming.
Refute the Consequences of Change

Question Solvency. Opposing argumentation on the third stock issue requires
creativity, along with a firm belief in the principle, “Whatever can go wrong, will
go wrong.” What might preclude solvency? Almost anything or anyone whose
actions are necessary to remedy a problem has the potential to interfere. We have
already mentioned the possibility that students employed by Campus Security may
not enforce the new regulations very thoroughly. What happens in the case of
siblings attending CPU when only one is a freshman? How would you know
whether she or her older sister was parking a registered car on campus?
Identify Barriers. What might preclude inherency being overcome? Although the
proposal will normally fiat a means to overcome present barriers, two things must
be remembered. First, attitudes cannot be legislated. Second, people resist change,
especially when they are not sure that a change is in their best interests. This leads
the opponent to an analysis of what are commonly called circumvention arguments.
How might circumvention occur in the present example? What prevents an upper
classman from registering his freshman fraternity brother’s car in his name? What
about the children of CPU faculty and staff? What prevents these parents from
registering their freshman son or daughter’s car as their own?
Dispute Workability. What renders a proposal unworkable? If the means by which

it operates are so slow, inconvenient, or time consuming that the cost of making a
proposal work outweighs the benefits gained when it does, it is deemed unworkable.
Simple proposals are rarely all that simple. The efforts expended by those who
make the system work should not be excessive. If freshmen revolt, violate the parking
ban en masse, and then all appeal their first citation, the appeals process would
grind to a halt. Presuming they lose their appeals, what if they violate the ban
again? How much time would be spent towing cars to impound, and how much
chaos would that cause in the parking lots? How much time will officials at CPU
have to devote to responding to claims for damage to cars caused by the impound
process? At what point will officials at CPU start to look the other way when
unregistered cars are parked on campus? The opponent cannot simply play
“Twenty Questions” with the advocate on these issues; he must develop arguments
proving the probability and consequence of these things happening.
Present Disadvantages. Up to this point we have said nothing about the fourth
subissue, subsidiary effects. Proposals are like pebbles tossed into ponds; they
make waves. Sometimes these waves are small, but usually one or more may be of
epic proportions. The opponent should look for these, because they constitute the
disadvantages to the advocate’s proposal. Development of arguments of this kind
rests on performing a “worst-case” analysis of a situation, in which the conse-
quences of the proposal are portrayed to be as bad, or worse, than the problem the
proposal was intended to remedy.
What would be a worst-case situation in the proposal we have been
discussing? Because they cannot have their cars with them on campus at CPU,
prospective freshmen decide to enroll at another school that will allow them to
have their cars. The advocate has solved the parking problem and created a much
worse enrollment problem. Unless students transfer to CPU after their freshman
year, the school will have very few students in two or three years. As a result, CPU
will have to lay off large numbers of faculty and staff. This will be devastating not
only to the school but to the community as well, because CPU is currently one of
the major employers in town.
How are disadvantage arguments developed? The opponent begins by assuming
the policy will do exactly what the advocate says it will. This means that solvency,
inherency, and workability are, partially or wholly, granted to the advocate. The
argument is then developed in the same manner that an argument advocating a
value proposition would be. The opponent establishes criteria for evaluating the
advocate’s proposal as if it were in existence and then demonstrates the goodness
of fit between these criteria and the proposal. This also means that he assumes a
burden of proof similar to that of the advocate of a value proposition.
A final note concerning disadvantage arguments. Opponents must resist arguing
disadvantages indiscriminantly. To be effective, disadvantages must possess
uniqueness; they must occur only in the presence of, and as a consequence of, the
advocate’s proposal. If the same disadvantage would occur as a result of a minor
repair the opponent has suggested, or would occur even without the repair as a
consequence of that which presently exists, the impact of the argument in dissuading
the reader or listener is diminished.
Critique the Proposal or Proposition. Argued in many ways like a disadvantage, a

critique (or kritic) is an indictment of the underlying philosophical premise on
which the advocate’s proposal for change or the policy proposition itself rests. It
takes the form of an argument about value hierarchies. The critique argues that
either the proposal or the proposition, by its very existence, places a value object in
an inappropriately high or low location within the hierarchy. When directed
against the proposal, the critique ends up sounding a lot like a disadvantage. When
directed against the proposition, the critique becomes an indictment of the figurative
ground the advocate must build her case on.
The opponent of a proposal that prohibits freshmen from registering their cars
at CPU might critique it as an abrogation of rights. Although driving is a privilege,
once the state grants that privilege to a person by licensing that person to drive,
driving becomes, for all intents and purposes, a right. CPU’s ban on freshmen
registering their cars has the effect of denying them the right to park on campus,
which is a de facto ban on their right to drive to campus. This is an unreasonable
abrogation of rights, because the right to drive can only be taken away for good
reasons, such as a bad driving record. In other words, the proposal asks us to place
individual rights, the value object, too low in the value hierarchy. The opponent
should probably think twice before offering this critique, because there are a
number of things colleges and universities routinely prevent freshmen from doing,
like taking upper-level courses. However, this approach does illustrate the concept
of the critique as it applies to the proposal for change.
On a broader level, the proposition Compass Point University should signifi-
cantly improve the availability of parking on campus tacitly acknowledges and
even enhances the privileged status of cars at CPU, in particular, and in society as
a whole. The opponent is in a position to offer a stronger critique at this level,
because it can be argued that the production of cars and the products they
consume deplete resources, increase pollution, and ultimately contribute to the
death of tens of thousands of people each year. He could argue that, even though
the advocate’s proposal restricts the use of cars by some CPU students to a certain
extent, the acceptance of any proposal emanating from this proposition serves to
continue the hegemony of privately owned vehicles in this country. Cars are the
problem; parking is only a symptom. In other words, the proposition asks us to
continue to place cars, the value object, too high in the value hierarchy. Notice
how much stronger this argument would become if the advocate’s proposal had
involved building a parking ramp on campus.
Opponents employing the critique as an argumentative strategy need to
consider how such arguments fit with others they plan to offer in order to avoid
inconsistency and contradiction. A critique is pure value argument, and it estab-
lishes an opponent’s absolute philosophical position. The abrogation of rights
critique of the proposal, although weak in and of itself, would be totally consistent
with the disadvantage argument that forecasts slumping freshman enrollment and
might gain strength by being paired with this argument. The parking ban could be
differentiated from other restrictions placed on freshmen and characterized as “the
straw that broke the camel’s back” for purposes of the disadvantage. The critique
of the proposition for its privileging of the automobile would be inconsistent,
however, with both the abrogation of rights critique of the proposal and a minor
repair argument encouraging more carpooling. An opponent offering either of
these arguments in conjunction with the critique of the proposition would sound
like a fool, at best, or a hypocrite, at worst.
If the opponent must concede so much and be so careful in arguing a disadvan-
tage or critique, why bother? Because disadvantages and critiques have the potential
to be absolute winning issues—argumentation’s equivalent of the “service ace” in
tennis. The opponent can concede everything (the stock issues of reason for change
and the ability of the proposed change to remedy the problem), but if he can
convince the audience that a single disadvantage, or series of disadvantages, or the
shift in the value hierarchy that is the subject of the critique represents a greater
harm to society than the one the proposal remedies, he can win their assent.
Consider the power of disadvantages and critique in determining the outcome

of argumentation. A drug company makes a product intended to produce certain
health-improving effects. Assume the drug produces those effects, along with some
dangerous side effects. If the Food and Drug Administration determines that these
side effects are so harmful and extensive that they outweigh the benefits the drug
produces, it would not allow the company to market the product or would force it to
take the product off the market if these side effects were discovered later. Other areas
of public policy are heavily influenced by differences of opinion about underlying
values, and debates over policy frequently center on one side’s critique of the other.
For example, when liberals propose a government program to address a social prob-
lem, conservatives frequently oppose it based on the critique that big government is
the problem in most cases, not the solution. If the burdens placed on the advocate
seem so great, and the opponent may defeat a policy proposal with a telling disad-
vantage argument or critique, why bother to argue? Why risk advocacy? The advocate
actually has a number of natural advantages, not the least of which is the ability to
define the nature of the ground over which argumentation is joined. The policy
advocate makes the best possible case for a proposal’s adoption. However, if the
good to be achieved would be outweighed by the greater evils that would occur,
rational decision making suggests that the reader or listener ought to reject it.
In addition, disadvantage and critique arguments are not the opponent’s
exclusive property. Although the advocate need only know how to respond to such
arguments in most circumstances, when the opponent adopts the counterproposal
strategy we are about to discuss, the advocate can use disadvantage and critique
arguments, along with other techniques designed to refute the consequences of
change, to combat the opponent’s arguments.
Offer a Counterproposal
One final strategy the opponent may elect to employ is to accept as valid the
advocate’s reason for change and offer a counterproposal, an equally acceptable
alternative to the proposal. This strategy is used in many fields and has become
common in academic argumentation. In lawmaking, business, and family decision-
making situations, all parties may agree that a problem exists that must be
solved, but they may disagree over which policy would represent the best solu-
tion. In the legislative context, this often results in an amendment to a proposal
being suggested.
In many fields, opponents sometimes would happily acquiesce to the advocate’s
proposal if she would withdraw one part of it or make some revision of it. The
opponent in academic argumentation normally does not follow this strategy.
Opponents usually seek rejection of the advocate’s case as a whole. In academic
argumentation, the requirement that the proposal must be nontopical applies to
counterproposals and minor repairs alike. In addition, the counterproposal in
academic argument must be competitive, which means that its adoption must
preclude the ability to also adopt the advocate’s proposal. The audience is asked to
choose between two mutually exclusive proposals. If the opponent chooses to use
a counterproposal, he assumes the same burden of proof as an advocate and uses
the subissues of the second and third stock issues in his argumentation to demonstrate
the superiority of his proposal.
For example, the opponent of a ban on freshman parking at CPU could offer
the counterproposal that more courses be offered via two-way interactive television
and the Internet so that CPU could better serve its current students and reach a
greater number of students than at present. Such a proposal would have the
secondary effect of alleviating the pressure of CPU’s inadequate parking facilities
on campus by reducing the number of times students needed to be on campus for a
class. Because the rationale for the counterproposal is to improve the delivery of
courses rather than to make parking more readily available, the proposal is
nontopical. Because not all classes could be offered this way, freshman commuter
students would need to be able to bring their cars to campus to take certain classes.
Likewise, freshmen living on campus might need cars to get to off-campus sites
where two-way interactive telecourses were being provided. These factors make
the counterproposal competitive with the advocate’s registration restrictions: You
could not accept it and also bar freshmen from being able to park their cars
on campus.
Argument in Action
As you were reading about the various strategic options available to opponents of
policy propositions, we hope you kept the advocate’s brief for the restoration of
the Elgin Marbles in mind. If you did, you probably formed some opinions about
which strategies her opponent was most likely to use and which did not appear to
be very useful in this instance. You may have even come up with you own ideas
about how the opponent might argue particular points. To see how your ideas
match up with his, review the opponent’s brief against restoration in Box 11.2. If
the opponent argues some things you did not expect, keep in mind that his choices
are constrained by the availability of proof and reasoning, and the need to estab-
lish a logically consistent position overall, just like the advocate.
BOX 11.2
Policy Opponent Brief
Proposition
The British Museum should continue to hold the Elgin Marbles collection in trust for the people
of the United Kingdom.

Elgin Marbles collection—approximately half of all surviving sculptures from the Parthenon that
Thomas Bruce, Lord Elgin, rescued from further destruction between 1801 and 1806.
in trust—the British Museum acts as conservator of its collections for the people of the
United Kingdom and cannot legally dispose of any item without their consent.
(continued)
Strategy of Opposition
• Deny that Elgin was not a conservator of the sculptures and did not have legal permission to
remove them.
• Argue that extenuating circumstances drive Greek demands for return of the Elgin Marbles.
• Use presumption of the value of retaining the Elgin Marbles in the British Museum.
• Demonstrate the adverse consequences of the advocate’s proposal.
I. Lord Elgin rescued the sculptures from further deterioration and possible loss or
destruction.
A. Elgin’s actions saved a portion of the sculptures.
From his 1816 statement to Parliament: “Every traveler coming added to
the general defacement of the statuary . . . the Turks have been continually
defacing the heads . . . they have pounded down the statues to convert them into
mortar. It was . . . with these feelings, that I proceeded to remove as much of the
sculpture as I conveniently could” (quoted in St. Clair, 1998, p. 96).
B. Elgin’s drawings and molds reveal the extent of loss and destruction that occurred to
the sculptures left behind.
“[T]wo heads from the west pediment . . . are now lost . . . The Turks, keen
to profit from the ready market in easily transportable relics . . . [chopped] off
small pieces . . . [Elgin’s] plaster casts of the west frieze . . . reveal many
features including heads of horsemen . . . were broken off or defaced. . . . In
some cases the originals were almost entirely obliterated and Elgin’s casts are our
best record of what they once looked like” (St. Clair, 1998, pp. 211–212).
C. Twentieth-century pollution further damaged the sculptures remaining on the
Parthenon.
“The pieces Elgin removed were spared further devastation that befell all the
sculptures that remained in situ: dissolution in the polluted atmosphere of 20th
century Athens. That pollution irreparably damaged the surfaces . . . Surfaces
crumbled and flaked away, not only destroying sharpness and detail but in some
cases causing obliteration of substantial portions of frieze figures” (Tinios, 2000).
II. The legality of the collection’s ownership has long been recognized.
A. Elgin’s removal of the sculptures was legal under Ottoman-Turkish authority.
“The document . . . used to justify the removal of the Parthenon metopes,
the Caryatid, and other antiquities from the Acropolis was issued on 1 July
1801. . . . Elgin took advantage of the situation [Napoleon’s surrender to the
British in Egypt] and was granted by the Turks, as a gesture of gratitude, what he
had been requesting. . . . Elgin’s workmen were now free to begin their task”
(Demetriades, 2000).
B. The Greek government and British Parliament recognize Elgin’s actions as legal.
“Even Greece no longer challenges the legal ownership of the marbles. In
1815, Parliament bought the marbles by paying part of Lord Elgin’s costs. In
1816, a Select Committee said that they had been rightfully acquired. That
judgment has been confirmed by a Select Committee report in 1999” (Loughton,
2002).
C. A distinction must be drawn between historically removed artifacts and contemporary
efforts to prevent looting of archeological sites.
Eighteen directors of the world’s great museums concurred in the December
2002 Munich Declaration, “today’s ethical standards cannot be applied to
yesterday’s acquisitions . . . encyclopedic museums have a special duty to put the
world on display” (Economist, 2009).
III. Cultural patrimony obfuscates political and economic reasons behind demands for
restoration.
A. The Parthenon, and its missing sculptures, was not central to Greek identity until
Melina Mercouri declared it so.
“For most of the 19th and 20th centuries, the defining element in Greek
identity was membership in the Greek Orthodox Church. . . . [I]n the
1980s . . . Melina Mercouri . . . turned [the marbles] into a symbol of Greek
identity” (Dorment, 2009).
B. The Elgin Marbles are a political symbol for the Greek government.
“It’s all political. Academically, there is no case to return the Elgin marbles
and other works of art to Athens.They are in the ownership of the British Museum
but they belong to the history of world civilization.To treat them as some political
trophy that can be traded for short-term political advantage is the worst reason
for ripping them out of the heart of one of the world’s great museums”
(Loughton, 2002).
C. The real value of the Elgin Marbles for Greece is economic.
“It’s not coincidental that conflicts over patrimony have accelerated in
recent decades thanks to globalizing trends . . . and the evolution of institutions
like the British Museum from sleepy, scholarly repositories of artifacts into
entertainment palaces . . . Authorities in countries like Greece, having seen the
escalating economic and symbolic value of works like the marbles, have naturally
sought to take advantage” (Kimmelman, 2010).
D. The politics of restitution stem from the postmodern desire for absolution from the sin
of colonialism.
“Some restitutionists would applaud the return of the Elgin Marbles
because . . . it would force Britain to take account of ‘important post-imperial
realities’ . . . there are those who see the Elgin Marbles as a means by which we
now might atone for the ‘sins’ of previous generations” (Tinios, 2000).
IV. Greek claims concerning return of the Elgin Marbles are misleading.
A. The Elgin Marbles are not analogous to the Icelandic Sagas.
“The whole idea of ‘return’ of cultural objects began when Denmark donated
to Iceland the Icelandic Sagas which had been collected from Iceland in the 18th
Century and which form the root from which modern Icelandic culture can be
traced in a direct line . . . this is not the case with . . . the Parthenon marbles,
which are monuments of a pagan religion . . . rejected and repudiated by the
Christianity which forms the foundation of modern Greek culture” (Selkirk, 2000).
B. The return of the Elgin Marbles would not restore the integrity of the Parthenon.
“The ‘integrity’ of the Parthenon . . . was shattered long ago; it cannot now
be restored even in part by returning the Elgin Marbles to Athens . . . The
sculptures surviving in Athens will not be returned to their original context. . . . If
scattered parts of a monument cannot be reintegrated with the monument,
shifting those parts from one museum to another to achieve a notion of wholeness
cannot take precedence . . . A monument dismembered remains a monument
dismembered” (Tinios, 2000).
V. Great encyclopedic museums, such as the British Museum, encourage understanding of the
world’s diversity.
A. The British Museum encourages taking a worldview.
“Nothing can be more conducive to the sort of cosmopolitan view of the
world we so desperately need to cultivate in our world, in which global, national,
(continued)
and sectarian forces are dangerously working in opposition . . . The British

Museum, as the world’s quintessential encyclopedic museum, . . . does its work
on even the least aware among its visitors. . . . [I]n a higher sense the sculptures
belong to no one” (Miller, 2008).
B. The British Museum is international.
1. It serves the world, not the people of one nation-state.
“The British Museum was established very specifically for everybody . . .
established on the proposition that through the study of things gathered together
from all over the world, truth would emerge . . . truth as a living, changing thing,
constantly remade as hierarchies are subverted, new information comes, and new
understandings of societies emerge” (MacGregor, 2009, p. 39).
2. It has a responsibility to preserve antiquities that represent the diversity of world
culture.
“[The public] want museums to expand their world view and change their
lives, to introduce them to the great wonder of the world’s cultural diversity and
interrelatedness and to help them see and feel that they are a part of this world,
they and everyone else with whom they are connected by virtue of their
humanity” (Cuno, 2009, p. 17).
C. Maintaining the Elgin Marbles in the British Museum is fundamental to meeting its
public trust as an encyclopedic museum.
1. The Elgin Marbles play a central role in the museum’s mission:
“The Museum is committed to . . . communicating to a world audience and
providing an international context where cultures can be compared and contrasted
across time and place. The sculptures from the Parthenon have come to act as a
focus for Western European culture and civilization” (British Museum, n.d.)
2. The centrality of that role rests on the relationship between Athenian and other
civilizations.
“The British Museum exists to tell the story of cultural achievement
throughout the world. . . . [T]he Parthenon sculptures are an important
representation of ancient Athenian civilization. Each year millions of visitors, free
of charge, admire the artistry of the sculptures and gain insights on how ancient
Greece influenced, and was influenced by, the other civilizations that it
encountered . . . the sculptures are part of everyone’s shared heritage and
transcend cultural boundaries” (British Museum, n.d.)
VI. The advocate’s proposal has significant workability problems.
A. Trusteeship relative to the Elgin Marbles cannot be interpreted as empowering the
British Museum loan items long-term to the new Acropolis Museum.
1. Trusteeship is central to its mission as an encyclopedic museum.
“[Trusteeship] brings with it the notion of an obligation to hold the object
for the benefit of others, the whole world, natives as well as foreign, those living
now and not yet born . . . that gives rights to the beneficiaries—the whole
world—and gives obligations to the trustees, who work on behalf of the world and
its people” (MacGregor, 2009, p. 43).
2. The Museum Act of 1963 does not allow a long-term loan.
“Objects in our national museums belong in law . . . to their trustees. . . . Were
the trustees . . . to comply with the Greek proposal, they would be in breach of their
obligation to use the objects . . . for maximum public benefit” (Dorment, 2009).
B. The Greek government probably cannot pay for the creation of replicas, their shipment
to London, and shipment of the Elgin Marbles to Athens.
1. The Greek government is in a dire economic straits.
“Years of unrestrained spending, cheap lending, and failure to implement
financial reforms left Greece badly exposed when the global economic downturn
struck . . . National debt . . . is bigger than the country’s economy . . . the

government has started slashing away at spending and has implemented austerity
measures” (CNN, 2010).
2. Sending replicas to London and the Elgin Marbles to Athens will be expensive.
The work of Rita Gomez, chief packer for the Getty Center in Los Angeles,
illustrates the high cost of shipping. “It can cost as much as $3000 to prepare
some objects for loan . . . [the preparer] carves precise shapes in foam to fit and
protect every surface when the object is crated. . . . Ms. Gomez’s team can easily
spend eight hours a day for four or more weeks on a single [item]. . . . For
several months she has been working . . . to prepare a 17th-century Italian table
for transport to England” (Novak, 2007).
3. Meeting European shipping restrictions will incur additional costs.
“[T]he European Union . . . enacted restrictions on the use of wood-based
packing materials for import-export. All crates must now be certified and stamped
‘heat-treated’ to insure against infestation by wood-boring pests” (Preston, 2006).
VII. Significant adverse consequences will result from returning the Elgin Marbles to Greece.
A. The new Acropolis Museum is not aesthetically pleasing.
The viewer experiences “some clunkingly awful moments. . . . Throughout
the building, architecture gets in the way of the exhibits. There are too many fat
columns, and thick joints between panels, and holes cut in the walls and ceiling for
purposes of acoustics or lighting. The serene sculptures are interrupted with too
much visual noise” (Moore, 2009).
B. Returning the Elgin Marbles to Greece will open the floodgates to demands by other
nations seeking the return of cultural patrimony.
1. There are presently several such demands.
“Countries believing that colonialists stole their spiritual heritage are
uniting in a send-back-our-stuff campaign. . . . Peru wants Yale University to
return thousands of Inca artifacts discovered by the Yale historian who
uncovered . . . Machu Picchu in 1911. . . . Israel has possessed the Dead Sea
Scrolls. . . . But the Palestinians have decided . . . that the Scrolls were found in
what they (dubiously) consider Palestinian land, therefore Palestinians own
them” (Calgary Herald, 2009).
2. China has begun investigating its dispersed antiquities.
“The British Museum is to be asked to open its archives to allow teams of
Chinese investigators to document ‘lost’ Imperial treasures. . . . [T]he mission
will send researchers to museums, libraries, and private collections . . . in an
attempt to build up a comprehensive catalogue of artifacts China says were
stolen in 1860” (Foster, 2009).
3. Egypt has spearheaded the international movement demanding the return of
artifacts.
“[Sixteen] countries plan to sign a declaration that demands the return of
artifacts sent overseas generations ago. . . . [Egypt wants] the Rosetta Stone in
the British Museum and the bust of Nefertiti in Berlin’s Neues Museum. . . .
Nigeria [claims] the Benin bronzes, . . . Mexico, . . . a featured headdress of a
tribal warrior and China . . . astrological items looted from the Summer Palace
in Beijing” (McElroy, 2010).
C. Supporting cultural patrimony can lead to the destruction of ancient treasures as
occurred to pre-Islamic artifacts in Afghanistan’s National Museum.
“The endangered artifacts would be shipped to a museum in Switzerland
that had been set up specifically for the purpose of keeping these works out of
(continued)
harm’s way. . . . Switzerland, as a signatory of UNESCO treaties, simply required

UNESCO approval to receive the shipment. . . . UNESCO refused to authorize the
shipments [on the basis of] . . . the 1970 UNESCO . . . strictures
against . . . moving objects from their country of origin. . . . Museum workers
were ordered by Taliban inspectors to open drawers of antiquities, in the wake of
Mullah Omar’s February 2001 edict against pre-Islamic art, . . . drawers of
extraordinary Bactrian artifacts and Ghandara heads and figurines. . . . Taliban
inspectors responded to these extraordinary artifacts by taking out mallets and
pulverizing them” (Appiah, 2009, p. 81).
Sources Cited
Appiah, K. A. (2009). Whose culture is it? In J. Cuno (Ed.), Whose culture? The promise of museums and the
debate over antiquities (pp. 71–86). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
British Museum. (n.d.). The Parthenon sculptures: Stewardship. The British Museum. Retrieved from
http://www.britishmuseum.org/explore/highlights/article_index/p/the_parthenon_stewardship.
Calgary Herald. (2009, May 18). A museum director fights back. Retrieved from http://www.
parthenonuk.com/DynaLink/ID/315/newsdetail.php.
CNN. (2010, February 10). Greece’s financial crisis explained. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.
com/2010/BUSINESS/02/10/greek.debt.qanda/index.html.
Cuno, J. (2009). Introduction. Whose culture? The promise of museums and the debate over antiquities (pp.
1–35). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Demetriades, V. (2000). House of Commons—Culture, Media and Sport. Annex A, Was the
removal of the Parthenon marbles by Elgin legal? Retrieved from http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmcumeds/371/371ap15.htm.
Dorment, R. (2009, June 30). The Elgin Marbles will never return to Athens—The British
Museum is their rightful home. Telegraph. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk.
Economist. (2009, June 25). Lord Elgin and the Parthenon marbles. Retrieved from http://www.
elginism.com/20090625/2164/.
Foster, P. (2009, October 19). China to study British Museum for looted artifacts. Telegraph.
Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk.
Kimmelman, M. (2010, May 4). Who draws the borders of culture? The New York Times. Retrieved
from http://www.nytimes.com.
Loughton, T. (2002, February 5). House of Commons Hansard Debates for 5 February 2002:
Statement of Tim Loughton, East Worthington and Shoreham. Retrieved from http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020205/debtext/20205-17.htm#20205-
17_spnew0.
MacGregor, N. (2009).To shape the citizens of that great city, the world. In J. Cuno (Ed.), Whose
culture? The promise of museums and the debate over antiquities (pp. 39–54). Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
McElroy, D. (2010, April 7). British Museum under pressure to give up leading treasures.
Telegraph. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk.
Miller, M. (2008, September 6). The Elgin Marbles: Another view. Berkshire Review for the Arts.
Retrieved from http://www.berkshirereview.net.
Moore, R. (2009, June 24). Now let’s return the Elgin Marbles. London Evening Standard. Retrieved
from http://www.thisislondon.co.uk.
Novak, L. (2007, March 28). Master of the science of packing and crating. The New York Times.
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com.
Preston, H. H. (2006, April 28). The fine art of shipping art. The New York Times. Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com.
Selkirk, A. (2000, March). House of Commons—Culture, Sport and Media. Appendix 39:
Memorandum submitted by Mr. Andrew Selkirk. Retrieved from http://www.publications.
St. Clair, W. (1998). Lord Elgin & the marbles (3rd ed.). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Tinios, P. E. (2000). House of Commons—Culture, Sport and Media. Appendix 14: Memorandum
submitted by Dr. P.E. Tinios, University of Leeds. Retrieved from http://www.publications.
Summary of Policy Opposition

1. Is the advocate’s case prima facie, and does it fulfill the burden of proof?
a. Has the advocate failed to provide a rationale for change?
b. Has the advocate failed to provide a specific proposal for change?
c. Has the advocate failed to consider the consequences of change?
2. Will the opponent choose to argue both the first and third stock issues, or only
one of them?
3. What is the philosophy on which opposition rests?
a. What will the opponent defend?
b. How does the opponent wish the audience to view the proposed change?
4. Will the opponent accept the advocate’s definition of terms?
a. Has the advocate “broken faith” with the audience by distorting the mean-
ing of the proposition?
b. Has the advocate improperly included or excluded things in defining terms?
5. How will the reason for change be opposed?
a. Is the disparity as great as the advocate has alleged? (challenges to significance
arguments)
b. Is the disparity as severe as the advocate has alleged? (challenges to effect
arguments)
c. Are there extenuating circumstances that produce the disparity? (challenges
to inherency arguments)
d. Are there other possible causes for the alleged disparity? (challenges to in-
herency arguments)
6. Will existing institutions ameliorate the disparity?
a. Will the normal pattern of societal change resolve the disparity given time?
b. Short of the change called for by the advocate, what minor repairs are
available to remedy the disparity?
7. What are the deficiencies in the proposed solution?
a. Is the solution capable of solving the problem?
b. Are conditions necessary for the solution to work present, or will some-
thing preclude the proposal’s ability to solve the problem? Can the pro-
posal be circumvented?
c. Is the solution workable?
8. What are the consequences of the proposed solution?
a. Will the proposal bring about the advantages claimed by the advocate?
b. Will the proposal cause disadvantages or greater evils?
c. Are these disadvantages unique to the advocate’s proposal?
9. Will a critique be offered?

a. Will the proposal for change be critiqued for altering the value hierarchy?
b. Will the proposition itself be criticized?
10. Will a counterproposal be offered?
a. Is it an equally acceptable alternative to the advocate’s proposal?
b. Is it nontopical and competitive with the advocate’s proposal?
As you have probably concluded, the range of potential issues may vary
greatly with propositions from different fields of argument. The number of poten-
tial reasons for change might not be as extensive for some topics as for others. The
range of potential new policies may be vast or narrow, depending on the topic
area. Some proposed policies may cause more problems than they solve, or they
may accrue benefits in a number of different areas. Regardless of the field of the
proposition, the stock issues common to all policy propositions can be used to
identify the general areas of concern that you should analyze and argue.
LEARNING ACTIVITIES
1. In The Parthenon Marbles: The Case for Reunification (rev. ed.), Christopher Hitchens
examines the arguments the British have made over the years for keeping the Elgin
Marbles collection in the British Museum. He makes the case for the returning the marbles
to Greece.
a. What disparity does Hitchens identify?
b. What issues of fact and value does he argue in making the case for reunification of
the Parthenon sculptures?
c. What proof and reasoning does he offer in response to the reasons given by the
British for keeping the marbles?
d. Does he make a compelling case for returning them to Greece? Why or why not?
2. Read Neil MacGregor’s “To Shape the Citizens of that Great City, the World,” in Whose
Culture? The Promise of Museums and the Debate over Antiquities, (pp. 39–54). It pres-
ents arguments using presumption for the world’s great encyclopedic museums.
a. What arguments does he offer in support of the encyclopedic museum?
b. Is his proof and reasoning effective in defending these museums against the case
for return of cultural property?
3. Many online news sources provide an opportunity for readers to respond to a story and
interact with each other. Choose a story and the discussion of the issue, or issues, by re-
spondents. For example, you might choose the story from the 7 April 2010 edition of
the Telegraph, “British Museum Under Pressure to Give Up Leading Treasures,” which
provoked an extensive discussion of the issue of returning cultural property. The re-
sponses are a form of debate on the return of cultural property topic. The URL is http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/7563963/British-
museum-under-pressure-to-give-up-leading-treasures.html.
a. What specific issues do you find being argued?
b. What extensions of the central issue are made as the debate evolves?
c. Are these issues similar, or different, from the ones in the advocate and opponent
cases in Boxes 11.1 and 11.2?
d. Which arguments are most compelling? Why?
e. What is the difference between this kind of online argumentation and the advocacy
and opposition you saw taking place in Chapters 9, 10, and 11?
4. Group project: Each group should scan news stories to find a problem that needs
solving. Phrase a policy proposition for this topic, prepare a brief description of the
policy topic, and consider which approach (traditional, comparative advantage, goals-
criteria) would be most feasible for case development of the proposition. Present your
ideas, and consideration of each approach, to the class.
5. Group project: Each group will be assigned a policy proposition from the following list.
Each group should identify the disparity implied in their policy proposition, brainstorm
possible fact and value argumentation that could be used in developing the advocate’s
case, and proposals to achieve the change. Then, discuss the arguments you would use
in opposing the case you have brainstormed. Present your findings to the class and dis-
cuss each group’s ideas for case development.
a. The Federal Communications Commission should create a uniform system of cell
phone regulation for all national phone service.
b. A nationwide ban on the use of electronic devices while driving a motor vehicle
should be instituted.
c. Alcohol consumption should be banned at all sporting events.
d. Good nutrition habits should be a standard part of the K–12 curriculum.
e. The United States should initiate a new Manhattan Project to expand safe and
effective nuclear power generation for the nation’s energy needs.
f. All high school graduates in the United States should be given the opportunity for
a college education.
g. Noise-making devices should be banned at sporting events.
6. Identify one or more problems at your school that seem to create a disparity. Analyze
this disparity in terms of its nature, extent, harm, and inherency. Suggest proposals to
solve the disparity. How would each proposal solve the disparity? What advantages
does each proposal have?
7. Take the role of opponent for the policy proposals made in no. 6. What would be your
strategy of opposition? What minor repairs might remedy the disparity? What would
be the consequences of adopting the changes suggested? What kind of critique or coun-
terproposal might be in order?
APPENDIX A
What Are the Rules

of the Game?
A
lthough attempts to influence belief and behavior through oral and
written messages take place in many fields, a means of learning about
and practicing argumentation found in the academic field is called de-
bate. The setting is formalized, and specific time limits and responsibilities are
imposed on those who participate. Debates may take place in argumentation
classes as a learning experience or in an intercollegiate contest between teams
representing different schools. There are even national debate championship
tournaments.
This appendix provides an introduction to some debate formats and tech-
niques that you might encounter in class. Because entire books are devoted to the
highly specialized tactics and strategies of competitive intercollegiate debate, we
will leave that to them. Once you have learned the basic skills of arguing, you may
choose to delve further into debate technique.
DEBATE FORMATS
There are many different debate formats and different kinds of propositions that
can be argued, but an academic debate generally has the following characteristics:
1. Teams of debaters, usually two to a side, are prepared to argue both sides of a
proposition. In debate parlance, they are called affirmative and negative rather
than advocate and opponent.
2. Both the affirmative and negative teams are given an equal amount of time to
make their case. The time for both teams to make presentations is divided into
constructive and rebuttal speeches, with more time allocated to the former
than the latter.
3. The debate is judged and the winning side determined based on which team
demonstrated the greater skill or had the better arguments. Whether judging is
done by your instructor, other students in class, or a faculty member from an-
other school in the case of intercollegiate debate, the judge is the audience that
matters.
As with all communication, debate is rule-governed behavior. One set of rules
pertains to the order in which members of both teams make their presentations
258
Debate Formats 259
and the length of time they have for each presentation. This is referred to as the
format for the debate. The easiest format to understand is called the traditional
format, in which each team member presents a constructive and a rebuttal speech.
Although the time limits for the speeches may vary, the format looks like this:
Traditional Format
First Affirmative Constructive Speech 8 minutes
First Negative Constructive Speech 8 minutes
Second Affirmative Constructive Speech 8 minutes
Second Negative Constructive Speech 8 minutes
First Negative Rebuttal Speech 4 minutes
First Affirmative Rebuttal Speech 4 minutes
Second Negative Rebuttal Speech 4 minutes
Second Affirmative Rebuttal Speech 4 minutes
Notice that the affirmative team has the first and last speeches, and that the
negative team has two speeches in a row (we will have more to say about this when
we discuss the responsibilities of the speakers). We should also point out that the
debate may take longer to complete, because it is customary to allow each team a
total of ten minutes of preparation time during the course of the debate to com-
pose their thoughts and check their briefs. This is time that may be used as the
team members see fit.
The most widely used format in intercollegiate debate competitions is the
cross-examination format. The order and length of constructive and rebuttal
speeches stay roughly the same as in traditional format, but both teams are given
the opportunity to interrogate each other. The format looks like this:
Cross-Examination Format
First Affirmative Constructive Speech 8 minutes
Cross-Examination of First Affirmative Speaker 3 minutes
First Negative Constructive Speech 8 minutes
Cross-Examination of First Negative Speaker 3 minutes
Second Affirmative Constructive Speech 8 minutes
Cross-Examination of Second Affirmative Speaker 3 minutes
Second Negative Constructive Speech 8 minutes
Cross-Examination of Second Negative Speaker 3 minutes
First Negative Rebuttal Speech 5 minutes
First Affirmative Rebuttal Speech 5 minutes
Second Negative Rebuttal Speech 5 minutes
Second Affirmative Rebuttal Speech 5 minutes
Constructive and/or rebuttal speeches may be lengthened or shortened by a

minute or so to alter the time that it takes to complete the debate, because prepa-
ration time is also provided in this format. Regardless of these subtle variations,
debate formats establish fixed amounts of speaking and preparation time and give
equal time to both parties to the dispute.
260 A P P E ND I X A What Are the Rules of the Game?
Other Formats
Differing from these formats for debates between teams of individuals is the
Lincoln–Douglas format, named after the historical one-on-one debates between
these two Senate candidates. This format is often favored for in-class debating. As
such, format variations are numerous and can involve cross-examination follow-
ing the constructive speeches, but typically Lincoln–Douglas debates follow this
model:
Lincoln–Douglas Format
Affirmative Constructive 6 minutes
Negative Constructive 7 minutes
Affirmative Rebuttal 4 minutes
Negative Rebuttal 6 minutes
Affirmative Rejoinder 3 minutes
Notice how the basic principle of the affirmative speaking first and last and equal
time for both sides to make their case are preserved by the way time is allocated
among the different number of speaking opportunities afforded both sides.
Parliamentary format debating has also become popular in recent years for its
emphasis on speaking skill and the use of general knowledge rather than copious
research to support arguments. Featuring policy propositions such as “The presi-
dent should resign” or philosophical statements of value or fact such as “The pen
is mightier than the sword,” the only preparation time for a parliamentary debate
is the 10 or 15 minutes before it commences when teams are given the topic they
are to argue. In most other respects, parliamentary format resembles traditional
format, with four constructive speeches but only two rebuttals, one to a side.
SPEAKER RESPONSIBILITIES
In any style of debating, each speaker has certain duties to perform. The order of
presentation, with affirmative speakers beginning and ending the debate, is based
on presumption, which lies with the negative, and the requirements of the burden
of proof, which fall on the affirmative. What follows is couched in terms of the
speaking order in traditional and cross-examination formats, but the basic princi-
ples of what each speech tries to accomplish can be translated into the fewer
speaking opportunities afforded in the other formats. The rule of thumb is that
while Lincoln–Douglas and parliamentary formats truncate the number of
speeches, the responsibilities we are about to describe remain unchanged and
must be discharged.
The debate begins with the first affirmative constructive speech in any for-
mat. This presentation establishes the basis of the affirmative case and normally
includes all the claims, evidence, and reasoning that, if unanswered, would allow
the judge to vote in favor of adopting the proposition. In value debate, this
would involve presenting a case as discussed in Chapter 10: identifying the value
object, establishing the criteria by which it is to be evaluated, and providing ar-
guments supporting the appropriateness of judging the value object in this man-
ner. In a policy debate, the first affirmative speaker discusses the three stock issues:
reason for change, proposal for change, and consequences of change. Regardless
of whether the proposition is one of value or policy and irrespective of the pat-
tern of organization followed, the first affirmative speaker establishes her team’s
interpretation of the proposition. The second affirmative may add arguments
that further develop that interpretation, but if the first affirmative speech fails to
establish a prima facie position, the affirmative has lost before the debate has
even begun, provided that the negative points out this failure.
Assuming a prima facie case has been presented, what are the duties of the
first negative constructive speech? The first negative speaker establishes the philos-
ophy of the negative team and its stand on the proposition. If the negative team
plans to question the definitions of key terms offered by the affirmative, those
questions are raised in this speech, and alternative definitions are offered. If the af-
firmative definitions are so outrageous that the affirmative’s case appears to be
nontopical, the first negative speaker argues this as well. If the negative team in-
tends to offer a counterplan instead of defending the present system of values or
policies, the first negative presents it. If a critique of the affirmative’s proposal or
the proposition itself is part of the negative’s strategy, it is initiated in this speech.
This speech also responds directly to points raised in the first affirmative presenta-
tion and establishes the points of clash over them between the two teams, focusing
on the parts of that presentation that seem weakest.
The second affirmative constructive speech attempts to repair the damage
done to the affirmative case by the first negative speaker. Because the points of
clash between the two teams were defined by the first negative, the second affirma-
tive must respond point by point, for three reasons. First, if there are arguments re-
lating to definitions or topicality, the affirmative will be unable to carry argumen-
tation forward successfully unless an attempt is made to resolve these disputes in
the affirmative’s favor. Second, it is a rule in debate that although new evidence
may be introduced by both teams during rebuttal speeches, neither team is permit-
ted to initiate a new line of argument in rebuttals. The constructive speeches are
the appropriate place for presenting original arguments, and this is the affirma-
tive’s first and last chance to present such arguments against a counterproposal or
a critique offered by the negative. Third, the negative team is about to get back-to-
back turns to argue. If the second affirmative does not respond to the first nega-
tive’s arguments directed against weaknesses in their case, the first affirmative re-
buttalist will be swamped. In addition to repairing any damage, the second
affirmative should point out arguments that still stand, arguments with which the
first negative chose not to clash. This is best accomplished if the second affirmative
responds to the negative arguments in terms of the basic case structure used in the
first affirmative constructive speech.
The second negative constructive speech is the final speech in the constructive
phase of the debate, and it is followed by a rebuttal speech by his colleague. For
this reason, the negative team must divide up what each member is going to cover
to avoid rendering this rebuttal speech redundant. The second negative speaker
must also be careful to listen to his partner so that the way in which he extends or
rebuilds negative arguments in light of second affirmative responses is not contra-
dictory. The easiest way for the affirmative team to get off the hook on an argu-
ment is to point out a contradiction or shift ground. Affirmative speakers have to
listen to each other as well, but they usually do not have as much of a problem
with contradictions, because they know where they do and do not want to go with
their case; they have argued it many times before. The negative may be hearing it
for the first time, grasping for anything to defeat it.
The first negative rebuttal speech begins the final phase of the debate. These
back-to-back speeches are sometimes called the “negative block.” If the negative
speakers do not maintain a clear division of labor, the first negative rebuttalist will
waste time repeating what the second negative constructive speaker has just said;
thus, any advantage that might have been gained from consecutive speeches will
have been squandered. The first negative rebuttalist’s responsibilities are similar to
the second affirmative constructive speaker’s: rebuild and extend on the points of
clash established in the constructive speeches not touched on in the second nega-
tive constructive. It is important for the first negative rebuttalist to respond to the
second affirmative’s arguments, not merely repeat his own. This rebuttal should
identify arguments the negative has “won” outright because they were not con-
tested by the second affirmative. It should also begin to crystallize the important
arguments to which the affirmative, during its rebuttals, must respond with new
evidence and further reasoning, but add no new arguments. If it suddenly dawns
on the negative team that all the affirmative’s evidence is more than twenty years
old, too bad. These are rebuttal speeches, and no new arguments can be advanced.
The first affirmative rebuttal speech is, strategically speaking, the most impor-
tant and most difficult speech in the entire debate. Attacks that took the negative
team two speeches to present must be answered in substantially less time. In a policy
debate, the drill goes like this: First, answer challenges on definitions and/or topi-
cality and extend refutation on any negative counterproposal and/or critique.
These are all arguments that although they appear peripheral to the affirmative’s
case, can cause the judge’s decision to go against the affirmative team if they are
lost. Second, respond to what appears to be the most critical negative constructive
and rebuttal arguments attacking specific weaknesses in the affirmative case.
Third, in the unlikely event that time permits, respond to other issues extended in
the preceding negative speeches, and extend affirmative arguments that the nega-
tive has chosen not to contest or has broken off clash on. In value debate, the order
of priority is the same, although the nature of the issues discussed is different.
The second negative rebuttal speech is the negative team’s last speech. He
should respond to what the first affirmative rebuttalist had to say about arguments
presented in the negative block, but the second negative rebuttalist must remember
that his primary mission is to give the judge one or more good reasons to vote for
the negative team. This speech should cover the main arguments favoring rejection
of the affirmative team’s arguments, regardless of whether they were extended by
the second negative constructive speaker or the first negative rebuttalist. At this
point in the debate, continuing to observe the division of labor between negative
speakers hurts the team, so the second negative rebuttalist responds to first affir-
mative rebuttal arguments in a manner that synthesizes the negative position.
The second affirmative rebuttal speech is the final speech in the debate. Like
the second negative rebuttal, it summarizes the debate but from the affirmative
team’s perspective. The second negative rebuttalist probably established reasons
why the decision should favor the negative. The second affirmative rebuttalist
should respond to these, as well as point out things the negative team has not con-
tested or has stopped arguing that suggest an affirmative decision. In essence, both
final rebuttal speakers attempt to provide the judge with a set of rules or criteria
that favors their side’s interpretation of the proposition.
Burden of Clash
As already indicated, the order of speeches reflects the exigencies of presumption
and burden of proof. The order of speaking also puts certain obligations on both
teams in terms of going forward with the debate. Recall that the first affirmative
speech must be prima facie; otherwise the debate is over before it really begins,
even though the rest of the speeches will be given. The negative team must move
the debate forward by establishing clash. The negative is obligated to respond to
what the affirmative has presented in some way, even if their only argument is that
the affirmative case is so far off the topic that topicality is the only thing they have
to argue.
Successive speakers have the responsibility of maintaining clash. Each speech
moves the judge closer to making a decision by responding to what the other side
has just said. The only exception occurs during the negative block. Because of divi-
sion of labor, the second negative constructive speaker leaves some second affirma-
tive constructive arguments to the first negative rebuttalist to handle. It is not suf-
ficient merely to repeat your arguments. You must respond to your opponent’s
arguments to move the controversy toward resolution. Not only must arguments
be presented, but the points of clash between the two teams must be identified. In
so doing, both sides have the obligation to make an honest effort to develop argu-
ments that do not distort, deceive, or misrepresent what they know to be true. The
obligations to establish and maintain clash are relevant to all formats for debating.
Cross-Examination
Cross-examination gives debaters some unique opportunities. You should ap-
proach the opportunity to ask and answer questions as a chance to advance the de-
bate in a way that favors your side. Cross-examination usually covers the speech
immediately preceding it, although it might cover lines of argument extending
through several preceding speeches. Use cross-examination for various purposes:
1. Cross-examination allows you to gain information about your opponent’s rea-
soning. What kinds of inferences link evidence to claims, and what kinds of in-
ferences link one argument to another? If they are illogical, you can point this
out in a later speech.
2. Cross-examination allows you to prevent possible misunderstandings. If you
are not sure whether the speaker said “million” or “billion,” ask. In this way
you ensure that the argument you advance in a later speech cannot be dis-
missed because it is based on a misinterpretation.
3. Cross-examination allows you to probe for and point out inconsistencies ei-
ther within a single speech or between two speakers. If you are a first affirma-
tive rebuttalist, remember that negative teams are especially vulnerable to con-
tradictions if they do not listen to each other. Finding the contradictions
makes your task much easier.
4. Cross-examination allows you to advance your own position. You can ask ques-
tions whose answers point toward the conclusion you wish the judge to draw.
Notice that all these purposes represent means to an end, rather than ends in
and of themselves. Cross-examination is used to set up arguments in subsequent
speeches. No one ever won a debate during cross-examination. Debates are won in
the constructive and rebuttal speeches. Whatever gains you think you may have
made will be realized only if you capitalize on them in your speeches.
Preparation is as important to success during cross-examination as it is in the
rest of the debate. Preparation begins with a thorough understanding of your
topic. Cross-examination quickly exposes limited knowledge. Be prepared to take
the role of both questioner and respondent. In terms of the first three purposes dis-
cussed here, you obviously have to listen to what the other team says and decide
on the spot what you need to ask. However, in regard to the fourth, you can plan
a series of questions in advance. A series of questions is needed, because even the
dullest respondent will not readily admit to something favoring your position. If
your position is that the poor are denied access to cable television because of its
cost, asking “Don’t you agree that the poor are denied access to cable because of
cost?” will probably elicit a no. Assuming you had the supporting evidence, you
would be better served by asking the following series of questions:
The poor own just as many television sets, proportionally speaking, as the rest
of the population, don’t they?
They watch television just about as much as everyone else, don’t they?
The majority of them live in urban areas served by cable systems, don’t they?
Yet few poor people are cable subscribers. Doesn’t this suggest that the cost of
cable service is a barrier to access for the poor?
Even though this last question might still elicit the same answer, your posi-
tion would be advanced for two reasons. First, you would have planted a seed in
the judge’s mind that a series of signs point to your conclusion. Second, you
could always ask one more question: “OK, can you tell me why the poor don’t
subscribe to cable?”
You may want to think twice before you ask that question. When attempt-
ing to advance your position through cross-examination, always ask questions
to which you already know the answer. Your motive is to educate the judge, not
yourself. Thus, if you do not know the answer to a question, it is sometimes
safer not to ask it, lest you discover, too late, that you have presented the other
team with an opportunity to advance its position. Although you will be fairly
sure of the answers your questions will elicit, you still need to listen to the an-
swers and adapt subsequent questions or even abandon a line of questioning if
it is going nowhere.
Like the role of questioner, which allows for some prior planning, the role of
respondent allows you to prepare your position. You cannot anticipate every ques-
tion that might be asked, but you can anticipate the kinds of questions that will
probably be asked about your affirmative case and the negative arguments you
typically use. Prepare for answering by having your partner interrogate you.
Just as the various speaker positions in the debate have different responsibili-
ties, the roles of questioner and respondent carry with them specific requirements
as well. Neither questioner nor respondent may confer with colleagues during the
cross-examination period. The questioner is in charge during cross-examination.
She asks the questions, being careful that the respondent does not try to turn the
Flow Sheeting 265
tables. Questions should be as brief and clear as possible to encourage brief and
clear responses. Although the questioner cannot require yes or no responses, she
need not tolerate filibustering by the respondent. The respondent should attempt
to be as direct as possible, but may qualify answers if necessary and refuse to an-
swer questions that are patently unfair. If it becomes necessary to qualify an an-
swer or refuse to provide one, it is important that the respondent explain why.
Both the questioner and respondent should remember that the debate is a pub-
lic-speaking situation. Questions and answers should be articulated clearly and
distinctly so that the judge may understand both. The most important thing to re-
member is to remain composed. Do not become hostile or defensive, and do not do
things that would produce these behaviors in the other person.
FLOW SHEETING
Knowing what to ask in cross-examination, or what to argue in your next speech,
requires not only argumentative skills but also a sense of what is going on in the
debate as a whole. What is your team’s position? What has the other team dis-
puted? What has the other team conceded? What has your partner said? What are
you going to say? No matter how good your memory is, learning how to keep a
flow sheet of the debate as it unfolds is your best memory aid. A flow sheet tracks
the progress of arguments during a debate and is nothing more than a specialized
form of note taking.
You begin by dividing a piece of paper into as many as columns as there are
speeches; the two speeches comprising the negative block are considered a single
speech for flow-sheeting purposes. Moving from left to right and beginning with
the first affirmative constructive speech, label each column at the top to corre-
spond with the order of speeches in your debate format. This is where the notes
you take on each speech will go. You will not be able to get everything down word
for word, but you will want to write down as much as you can, arguments as well
as any supporting evidence and sources. Aside from the business with columns,
flow sheeting may not be all that different from what you already do when you
take notes in class.
Outline each successive speech in its appropriate column. Place arguments
that clash opposite each other, and draw a line between them. You can preflow
your own speeches by jotting down what you intend to argue against a point. This
is a good way to use your preparation time, and you can facilitate your presenta-
tion by writing briefs for lines of argument you typically find yourself using. If
nothing is to the right of an argument, it means it has gone uncontested.
To record as much information in as little space and time as possible, use ab-
↓
breviations. Some abbreviations are logical and symbolic such as meaning
“increasing,” ↓ meaning “decreasing,” and → meaning whatever is to the left of
the arrow causes whatever is to the right. Abbreviations can also represent com-
mon debate terms or conventions, such as 1AC standing for “first affirmative
constructive,” and T, CP, and K representing “topicality,” “counterplan,” and
“critique,” respectively. Other abbreviations are shorthand for the terms specific
to the topic you are arguing. For example, FG or fedgov could stand for “federal
government.” You will have to develop these shorthand symbols for yourself and
should use what makes sense to you.
G L O S S A RY
actual issues the specific need for knowl- audience one or more people who have
edge identified by the wording of the the power or ability to ensure the future
proposition and discovered while analyzing influence of a belief or pattern of behavior
the proposition that must be satisfied if the arguer seeks
belief or behavior is to change authority the pattern of reasoning that
ad hominem argument the fallacy of relies on the credibility or expertise of a
attacking the person rather than source of information to warrant accept-
the argument ance of a claim; a fallacy in reasoning
ad ignorantium argument the fallacy of occurs when an ultimate source of authority
asserting that when something has not is invoked to restrict further consideration
been proven false it must therefore be true of an issue
ad populum argument the fallacy of as- backing information that supports the
serting that something should be believed warrant and helps legitimize the inferential
or done because popular opinion favors it leap from grounds to claim
advocate an individual who argues in burden of proof the advocate’s responsi-
favor of a change in belief or behavior bility to provide reasoning and proof suffi-
analogy the pattern of reasoning that
cient to overcome presumption and war-
compares fundamentally dissimilar cases rant a change in belief or behavior
and asserts that what is known to be true case development the process of putting
of one is true of the other; the weakest together a set of arguments to be used to
form of reasoning advocate or oppose the acceptance of a
analysis the process of discovering the proposition by the audience
actual issues in a controversy by applying cause the pattern of reasoning that sug-
the stock issues of fact, value, or policy to gests a temporal connection between phe-
the particulars of a proposition nomena in which the first is capable of
argumentation a form of instrumental producing the second
communication relying on reasoning circular reasoning the fallacy of reasoning
and proof to influence belief and in which the grounds and warrant are
behavior through the use of spoken or equivalent in meaning to the claim they
written messages purport to support, thus making no infer-
artifacts evidence in the form of actual ential leap from grounds to claim
objects, audiotapes and videotapes, claim a statement that does not stand
photographs, or diagrams alone without further proof, a conclusion
artificial presumption the arbitrary the audience will not accept without
assignment of possession of the figurative verification
ground over which argument takes place to counterproposal a nontopical and
one party to the dispute; the presumption competitive proposal for change offered
of innocence is an artificial presumption by the opponent that remedies the reason
attitudinal inherency that which prevents for change
change from occurring in a field of argu- criteriathe discovered or created
ment is a consequence of the beliefs of standards by which a value judgment
those in the field is made
266
Glossary 267
critique an indictment of the underlying based on a representative sample of items

philosophical premise on which the advo- from the class
cate’s proposal for change or the policy grounds information of fact or
proposition itself rests opinion used to verify the claim; also
decoding the interpretive process audi- termed evidence
ence members and other arguer use to hasty generalization the fallacy of
come to an understanding of what the jumping to a conclusion based on too few
arguer means instances or on atypical instances of
denial refutation of an argument by particular phenomena
pointing out how the person advancing it hypothesis testing the use of presumption
has misanalyzed the situation, overlooked as a decision rule that determines what the
important facts, given undue significance advocate must prove for the proposition to
to certain facts, or drawn an unwarranted be probably true
conclusion
illustration evidence that describes in
dilemma the pattern of reasoning in detail events that have occurred
which a choice between unacceptable alter- immediate cause events or circumstances
natives is presented; when a true either–or in the present or recent past that focus at-
situation does not exist, this pattern of tention on the subject of the proposition
reasoning leads to committing the fallacy
of forcing a dichotomy inference a conclusion or decision about
what is unknown based on what is known
effect the consequences of what has derived by reasoning
happened, is happening, or will happen
inherency the societal structure or
evidence information taken from material attitude responsible for causing the present
of fact or opinion used to establish the state of belief or behavior to exist
probable truth of a claim
issues key points under dispute, the reso-
example evidence that briefly describes lution of which will aid in determining
events that have occurred who prevails in an argument
extenuation refutation of an argument by minor repairs the strategy of policy oppo-
focusing on the circumstances surrounding sition in which it is suggested that naturally
a fact or the interpretation of it, which occurring changes in existing institutions
lead to a different conclusion than the one will remove any reason for change within
that has been drawn the foreseeable future
factual evidence information obtained by modal qualifiers adverbs, adverbial
direct or indirect observation that de- phrases, or prepositional phrases that
scribes or reports on events, objects, modify the action suggested by the verb in
places, persons, or phenomena a claim statement
factual propositions assertions that seek natural presumption assignment of pos-
to alter the way we view reality concerning session of the figurative ground over which
past, present, or future events, objects, argument takes place based on observation
places, persons, or phenomena of the natural order; natural presumption
fallacies errors in reasoning, appeal, or lan- automatically rests with whatever belief or
guage use that render a conclusion invalid behavior is being challenged
field of argumentation the social or pro- necessary cause a cause that must be
fessional context in which people argue in present for an effect to occur but that is not
order to build a body of knowledge or itself sufficient to produce the effect with-
reach decisions about belief or behavior out the presence of other necessary causes
generalization a form of inductive reason- non sequitur an argument that is irrele-
ing in which conclusions are drawn about vant to the issue or in which the claim does
an entire class of events or individuals not follow from the proof offered
268 Glossary
opinion evidence a form of evidence con- argument that refutes a claim

sisting of the interpretive or evaluative previously made
statements of an expert in a field regarding reductio ad absurdum the fallacy of re-
facts pertinent to that field ducing another’s claim to absurdity rather
opponent the individual who argues than raising serious points to refute it
against the change in belief or behavior refutation the process of responding to
sought by the advocate opposing arguments by means of denial
parallel case a pattern of reasoning based and extenuation; refutation becomes falla-
on examining two or more similar cases cious when directed at arguments that
and inferring that what is known to be were never raised or were not raised in the
true of one will be true of the other manner suggested
persuasion a form of instrumental com- scientific evidence reports of the results
munication relying on emotion as well as of field and laboratory experiments on the
reason to influence belief and behavior effect of one variable on another
policy propositions assertions that seek to sign the pattern of reasoning that suggests
alter the behavior of individuals or institu- a temporal connection between phenomena
tions, often in regard to political, eco- in which the first is a symptom, condition,
nomic, or social issues or mark used to predict the second
preemptive argument an argument of- significance the magnitude of an effect;
fered in anticipation of an argument from the seriousness of the consequences of that
your opponent to blunt its effectiveness which has happened, is happening, or
premises factual claims that carry the will happen
weight of evidence because the audience solvency the ability of the advocate’s pro-
accepts them as true reflections of human posal in policy argumentation to resolve
belief or experience the reason for change
presumption describes a situation that statistics numerical information about
presently exists and, naturally or artifi- people or events used to ground claims
cially, grants possession of the figurative
stock issues field-invariant questions per-
ground over which argumentation occurs
taining to propositions of fact, value, or
to one party to the dispute or the other
policy that must be answered if belief or
prima facie case a series of arguments behavior is to change
that, if taken at face value and left unre-
structural inherency that which pre-
futed, would be sufficient to justify a
vents change from occurring in a field of
change in belief or behavior
argument is a consequence of the insti-
primary inference the conclusion you tutions and the formal or informal sys-
draw about what you believe a proposition tems of behavior adopted by those in
means, based on your definition of the key the field
terms in it
subsidiary effect a consequence of an ad-
probability the likelihood of a statement vocate’s proposal in policy argumentation
being true beyond its ability to resolve the reason
proposition a statement that identifies the for change that may be advantageous
argumentative ground and points to the or disadvantageous
change in belief or behavior sought by sufficient cause a cause that must be
the advocate present for an effect to occur and is itself
qualifier a statement that shows the degree capable of producing the effect without the
of force an arguer believes a claim possesses presence of any other causal factors
rebuttal a statement that limits a claim, terministic screen the ability of the lan-
showing the circumstances under which it guage used to set limits or direct attention
might not be true, or a response to an in one way as opposed to another; for
Glossary 269
example, sexist language creates a termin- value object the portion of the value
istic screen about appropriate male and fe- proposition that identifies an existing idea,
male roles person, action, agency, tradition, practice,
topicality the requirement in academic ar- or custom to be evaluated; the subject of
gumentation that an advocate’s proposed the sentence
change in belief or behavior fit within the value propositions assertions that seek to
bounds of the proposition alter belief by dealing with our subjective re-
value hierarchy the implied or actual actions to things and our opinions of them
order imposed on a set of competing val- warrant the pattern of reasoning that jus-
ues in resolving a problem; for example, in tifies the inferential leap from grounds,
order to be safe from criminals we may which are known to be true or probable,
have to give up a little freedom to a claim
value judgment the portion of the value workability the ability of the advocate’s
proposition that identifies broad criteria by proposal in policy argumentation to not
which a value object is to be measured; the only resolve the reason for change but to
predicate of the sentence do so in an efficient and effective manner
INDEX
actual issues, 59, 174 from parallel case, 138–139

ad hominem argument, 155–156 from sign, 133–135
ad ignoratium argument, 159–160 inherency in factual advocacy, 176–177
ad populum argument, 160 inherency in policy advocacy, 233–235
advocate, 24 inherency in value advocacy, 176–177
analysis of factual propositions and the, irrelevant, 153
171–174 preemptive in factual advocacy, 177–178
analysis of policy propositions and the, preemptive in factual opposition, 188
230–232 significance in factual advocacy, 175–176
analysis of value propositions and the, significance in policy advocacy, 233
207–211 significance in value advocacy, 212–213
burden of proof and the, 28, 184 solvency in policy advocacy, 235
preemptive arguments and the, 177–178 subsidiary effects in policy advocacy, 236
prima facie case for factual propositions, Toulmin Model of. See Toulmin
174–177 Model of Argument
prima facie case for policy propositions, unit of, 85, 88
233–236 workability in policy advocacy, 236
prima facie case for value propositions, workability in policy opposition,
211–213 245–246
analogy argumentation, 3
reasoning from, 140–141 characteristics of, 22
test of, 141 cultural perspectives on, 1–2
analysis dialectical perspective on, 8
defining terms and 69–74 differentiated from persuasion, 4
factual propositions and, 171–174 ethics and, 13–14
historical background and, 62–63 logical perspective on, 8–9
immediate cause and, 59–60 rhetorical perspective on, 7–8
policy propositions and, 230–232 artifacts
stock issues and, 74–77, 79, 81–82 evidence from, 115
value propositions and, 207–211 tests of, 116
argument artificial presumption, 25, 185
ad hominem, 155–156 fallacy of appealing to ignorance and, 160
ad ignoratium, 159–160 attitudinal inherency, 31–32
ad populum, 160 audience, 5
circumvention in policy opposition, 245 acceptance of evidence by the, 93
definitional, 56 analysis and the, 68
disadvantage in policy opposition, 246–248 burden of proof and the, 29
effect in factual advocacy, 174–175 characteristics of the, 6
effect in policy advocacy, 233 field of argument and the, 6
effect in value advocacy, 212 presumption and the, 26, 174
fields of. See fields of argument authority
from analogy, 140–141 defining terms by, 54
from authority, 142–143 evidence from opinion of an,
from cause, 130–132 122–124
from dilemma, 145–146 fallacy of appealing to, 161–162
from generalization, 136–137 reasoning from, 142–144
270
Index 271
backing, 97 in policy opposition, 244

brief writing in value opposition, 218
advocate and, 178, 213, 236, 242 definitional claims, 86
opponent and, 188, 221, 226, 249 in policy advocacy, 233
burden of proof, 28 denial
audience and the, 29 refutation by in factual opposition,
proposition and the, 38 186–187
refutation by in policy opposition, 244
cause refutation by in value opposition, 221
immediate, 59–60 deontological ethics, 14
inherency and, 31–32 descriptive statistics, 113
necessary and sufficient, 132–133 dialectic perspective on argumentation, 8
of value change, 205–206 Elaboration Likelihood Model and, 13
reasoning about, 130–133 ethics and the, 15
circular reasoning, 153–154 example of the, 11–12
circumvention arguments, 245 dilemma
claim, 86–88 fallacy of creating a false, 157–158
definitional, 233 reasoning from, 145–146
qualifying the, 97–98 disadvantage arguments, 246–248
clarity, 15–16 critique and, 247
coined terms, 52–53 discourse ethics, 18–19
contentions, 85
counterproposal, 248–249 effect arguments
criteria in factual advocacy, 174–175
challenging in value opposition, 220 in policy advocacy, 233
development of in value advocacy, in value advocacy, 212
210–211 efficiency, 17
discovery of in value advocacy, 210–211 Elaboration Likelihood Model, 4–5
necessary and sufficient, 211 dialectical perspective and the, 13
policy advocacy and, 232 efficiency and the, 17
critique, 246, 248 relevance and the, 17
disadvantage arguments and, 247 equivocal terms, 51
minor repairs and, 247 ethics
argumentation and, 13–14
decoding, 16 clarity and, 15–16
defining terms deontological, 14
analysis and, 69 dialectical perspective and, 15
by authority, 54 efficiency and, 17
by example, 54 honesty and, 15
by function, 55 of discourse, 18
by operation, 55 pragma-dialectics and, 19
by synonym, 53 relevance and, 17–18
dictionaries and, 47–49 teleological, 13–14
in factual propositions, 70, truth telling and, 15
172–173 evidence, 91, 102
in policy propositions, 73–74, 234 audience acceptance of, 93
in value propositions, 71, 208, 211 consistency of, 93
primary inference created by, 69 factual, 111–121
rules for, 50–51 fields of argument and, 94
that are coined, 52–53 limitations of electronic sources of, 103–104
that are new, 52 opinion as, 122–124
that are technical, 52 quality of, 92
that are vague, 52 reliability of, 92
definitional arguments, 56 sources of, 105–110
in factual opposition, 186–187 tests of. See tests of evidence
272 Index
example reasoning from, 136–137

defining terms by, 54 tests of, 137–138
evidence from, 111–112 grounds, 91
tests of, 112–113
extenuation hasty generalization, 148–150
refutation by in factual opposition, hierarchy of values
187–188 critique and the, 246–247
refutation by in policy opposition, 244 differences in, 201–202
refutation by in value opposition, 221 disputing in value opposition, 219–220
identifying in value advocacy, 209
factual claims, 86 historical background, 62–62, 172
factual evidence, 111–121 honesty, 16
factual proposition, 41–42 hypothesis testing, 26–27
analysis of the, 171–174
defining terms in the, 70 illustration
fields of argument and, 170–171 evidence from, 111–112
historical background of the, 62–63 tests of, 112–113
immediate cause in the, 60 immediate cause, 59–60, 172, 208
opposing the, 184–188 inferential statistics, 113–114
prima facie case for the, 174–177 inherency, 31
stock issues for the, 74–75 arguments in factual advocacy, 176–177
fallacy, 148 arguments in policy advocacy, 233–234
of appealing to authority, 161–162 arguments in policy opposition, 244–245
of appealing to emotion, 160–161 arguments in value advocacy, 213
of appealing to humor, 162–163 attitudinal, 31–32
of appealing to ignorance, 159–160 overcoming in policy advocacy, 235
of appealing to popular opinion, 160 structural, 31
of appealing to tradition, 163–164 issues, 40
of avoiding the issue, 154–157 actual, 59
of circular reasoning, 153–154 fallacy of avoiding, 154–157
of composition, 150–151
of division, 151–152 kritic. See critique
of forcing a dichotomy, 157–158
of hasty generalization, 148–150 language
of irrelevant argument, 153 fallacies in the use of, 164–167
of refutation, 152–53 logical perspective on argumentation, 8–9
of using ambiguous language, 165–166 example of the, 12–13
of using emotional language, 166
of using equivocal language, 165–166 minor repairs, 244–245
of using technical jargon, 166–167 critique and, 247
fields of argument, 23 disadvantage arguments and, 246
analysis and, 68 mode of resolution, 6
audience and, 6
counterproposals and, 248 natural presumption, 25, 185
evidence and, 94 necessary cause, 132–133
factual propositions and, 170–171 new terms, 52
field dependent elements in, 23 non sequitir, 153
field invariant elements in, 23–24
mode of resolution in, 6 opinion
policy propositions and, 230 evidence from, 122–124
rules of engagement in, 6 fallacy of appealing to authoritative,
value propositions and, 196 161–162
fallacy of appealing to popular, 160
generalization opponent, 24
fallacy of hasty, 148–150 factual propositions and the, 184–185
Index 273
policy propositions and the, 242–249 issues and the, 40

preemptive arguments and the, 188 phrasing the, 45–47
presumption and the, 27, 184–185 policy, 43–44
value propositions and the, 218–221 value, 42–43
organization patterns
in policy advocacy, 231–232 qualifiers, 97–98
in policy opposition, 243
reasoning, 129–130
parallel case fallacies of, 148–158
reasoning from, 138–139 from analogy, 140–141
tests of, 139 from authoritative opinion, 142–143
periodicals, 106–107 from cause, 130–131
persuasion, 4 from generalizations, 136–137
policy claims, 87 from parallel case, 138–139
policy proposition, 43–44 from sign, 133–135
analysis of the, 230–232 inferences in, 129–130
defining terms in the, 73–74 tests of. See tests of reasoning
fields of argument and, 230 warrant and, 130
historical background of the, 62–63 rebuttals, 99
immediate cause in the, 60 reductio ad absurdum, 163
opposing the, 242–249 refutation
prima facie case for the, 232–236 fallacy of, 152–153
stock issues for the, 79, 81–82 strategies of, 186–188, 220–221, 244–246
pragma-dialectics, 19 relevance, 17–18
preemptive arguments, 177–178, 188 rhetorical perspective on argumentation, 7–8
premises example of the, 10–11
evidence from, 116 rule governed behavior, 5
tests of, 116–117 rules of engagement, 6
presumption, 24
analysis and, 68 scientific evidence
artificial, 25, 185 from field experiments, 118–119
as a decision rule, 25–26 from laboratory experiments, 117–118
audience analysis and, 26, 174 tests of, 119–121
burden of proof and, 28, 38–39 shifting ground, 156–157
fallacious appeals to tradition and, 164 sign
hypothesis testing and, 26–27 reasoning from, 133–135
natural, 25, 185 tests of, 135
prima facie case and, 30 significance arguments
prima facie case, 30 in factual advocacy, 175–176
factual proposition and the, 174–177 in policy advocacy, 233
inherency and the, 31 in value advocacy, 212–213
policy proposition and the, 232–236 solvency arguments, 235
stock issues and the, 33 statistics
value proposition and the, 209–213 evidence from, 113–114
primary inference tests of, 114–115
definition of terms and the, 69 stock issues, 33
disputing in factual propositions, 184 factual propositions and, 74–75,
in factual propositions, 70 173–174
in value propositions, 72 policy propositions and, 79, 81–82,
proposition, 35–36 230–232, 242–243
change and the, 38–39 value propositions and, 76–77, 209
critique of in policy opposition, straw man argument, 152–153
246–248 structural inherency, 31
defining terms in the, 37–38, 47–51 subsidiary effects, 236
factual, 41–42 sufficient cause, 132–133
274 Index
technical terms, 52 for policy advocacy, 233–234

teleological ethics, 13–14 for value advocacy, 212–213
tests of evidence
from artifacts, 116 vague terms, 52
from example, 112–113 value claims, 86
from illustration, 112–113 value hierarchy, 76–77
from opinion, 123–124 value judgment, 43, 71
from premises, 116–117 value object, 42, 71
from scientific studies, 119–121 value proposition, 42–43
from statistics, 114–115 analysis of the, 207–211
tests of reasoning defining terms in the, 71
from analogy, 141 fields of argument and, 196
from authoritative opinion, historical background of the, 62–63
143–144 immediate cause in the, 60
from cause, 132–133 opposing the, 218–221
from generalizations, 137–138 prima facie case for the, 209–213
from parallel case, 139 stock issues for the, 76–77
from sign, 135 values, 197
Toulmin Model of Argument, 85 changing, 204–207
backing in the, 97 core, 198–200
claims in the, 86–88 criteria for measuring, 210–211, 220
grounds in the, 91 differences in, 201–204
qualifiers in the, 97–98 hierarchy of, 201–202, 209, 219, 220
reasoning in the, 129
rebuttals in the, 99 warrant, 94–96
warrant in the, 94–96 backing, 97
reasoning and the, 129–130
units of argument, 85, 88 workability arguments, 236
for factual advocacy, 174–178 disputing in policy opposition, 245–246

Advocacy:Opposition

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Advocacy and Opposition

KARYN CHARLES RYBACKI

DONALD JAY RYBACKI

Allyn & Bacon

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Rybacki, Karyn C. (Karyn Charles),

Allyn & Bacon

The Classification of Propositions 41

Argument from Dilemma 145

Establishing Strategy 185

Examine Definitions 244

NEW TO THIS EDITION

OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK

THE NATURE OF ARGUMENTATION

Argumentation is a form of instrumental communication relying on reasoning and

By examining this definition, we can begin to understand the purpose, targets,

THE NATURE OF THE AUDIENCE

From the earliest theories on how argumentation works to the social-scientific

Whether your audience is yourself or some other person, argumentation provides a

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

adapting them to the audience by relating content to context. Rhetorically, argumen-

twelve-minute monologue by humorist George Carlin, in the early afternoon, featur-

Justice Stevens’s emphasis on understanding why the Carlin monologue might be

From a rhetorical perspective, “good” argumentation helps members of a so-

[material that] describes or depicts, in terms patently offensive as measured by contem-

Much of Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion is devoted to answering

From a dialectical perspective, “good” argumentation should produce wide-

[A]n individual’s actions in switching on and listening to communications transmitted

From a logical perspective, “good” argumentation meets the standards of effec-

[R]hetoric helps us understand and evaluate arguing as a natural process of persuasive

Viewing argumentation in this way, contemporary scholars are exploring argu-

ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR ARGUMENTATION

The quality of relevance is especially important in a multicultural society.

Parsons, S. F. (2002). The ethics of gender. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

䊏 Argumentation is a social activity.

Social, intellectual, and verbal activity directed toward an audience suggest

behavior on the part of communicators is hardly unique to argumentation. What

There is a final perspective from which we may consider the convention of

THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

adopt the three-credit-hour course as the university standard. In providing a prima

b. Advocate: Walter R. Fisher (1985, December). The narrative paradigm: An elabo-

THE NATURE OF PROPOSITIONS

Because controversies commonly occur over questions of “what happened,”

The proposition defines the locus of disagreement in a controversy. This locus of

Selecting Terms for Definition

Specifying Direction of Change

between media consumption and American value structures. In a value proposi-

Identifying Key Issues

federal government—the FCC

Summary of the Nature of Propositions

THE CLASSIFICATION OF PROPOSITIONS

Summary of the Classification of Propositions

PHRASING THE PROPOSITION

process that follows. A failure in proposition wording is an invitation to misun-

board for professional sports contract negotiations, made up of people with no

Summary of Rules for Phrasing Propositions

DEFINING THE KEY TERMS

The Dictionary Problem

We may want to paraphrase Turner’s definition for presentation to our audience,

䊏 Celebrity can be understood as an “industry” that exists to produce celebrities.

The Neutrality Rule. Phrase definitions to avoid unnecessary emotionality. We

Summary of Rules of Definition

Terms Needing Definition

Summary of Terms Needing Definition