Daf Ditty Succah 40: Lulav, Sh’viis and Eco-Theology

Each of the four species of plant represents one of the four types of habitats in
Israel.

1) Lulav-Palm branch = desert

2) Hadas-Myrtle = mountains
3) Aravot-Willow = rivers and streams
4) Etrog-Citron = lowlands, agricultural land

Each one needs the most water of all the species that grow in its region.
Between them, they make a kind of ecological map of Israel, and they
represent last year's rainfall. And we use them to ask for this year's rain.

Rabbi David Mevorach Seidenberg1

1
creator of neohasid.org and author of Kabbalah and Ecology (Cambridge 2015)

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§ The Gemara resumes its discussion of the mishna: The reason that a lulav may be purchased
from an am ha’aretz during the Sabbatical Year is specifically that it is a lulav of the sixth year
that is entering the seventh. This indicates by inference that a lulav of the seventh year is sacred
with the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year. The Gemara asks: Why is it sacred? It is merely wood,
and wood is not subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year, as it was taught in a baraita:
With regard to reed leaves and vine leaves that one piled for storage upon the field, if he
gathered them for eating, they are subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year; if he
gathered them for use as wood, e.g., for kindling, they are not subject to the sanctity of the
Sabbatical Year. Apparently, wood or any other non-food product is not subject to the sanctity of
the Sabbatical Year.

The Gemara answers: It is different there, in the case of the reed and vine leaves, as the verse
states:

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 ,‫ו ְוָה ְיָתה ַשַׁבּת ָהָא ֶרץ ָלֶכם‬ 6 And the sabbath-produce of the land shall be for food for
;S‫ ְוַלֲאָמֶת‬S‫ וְּלַﬠְבְדּ‬,S‫ְל‬--‫ְלָאְכָלה‬ you: for thee, and for thy servant and for thy maid, and for
,‫ ַהָגּ ִרים‬,S‫ וְּלתוָֹשְׁב‬,S‫ְוִלְשִׂכי ְר‬ thy hired servant and for the settler by thy side that sojourn
._‫ִﬠָמּ‬ with thee;
Lev 25:6

“And the Sabbatical produce of the land shall be for you for food” From the juxtaposition of
the term: For you, and the term: For food, it is derived: For you is similar to for food; the sanctity
of the Sabbatical Year takes effect on those items whose benefit and whose consumption
coincide. Wood is excluded, as its benefit is subsequent to its consumption. The primary
purpose of kindling wood is not accomplished with the burning of the wood; rather, it is with the
charcoal that heats the oven. Therefore, it is not subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year.

The Gemara asks: What is the rationale for the statement of the first tanna? It is as the verse
states with regard to Sabbatical-Year produce: “For food,” from which it is inferred: And not for
soaking and not for laundering. What is the rationale for the statement of Rabbi Yosei
permitting one to do so? It is as the verse states: “For you,” from which it is inferred: For you,
for all your needs, and even for soaking and for laundering. The Gemara asks: But according
to the first tanna, isn’t it written: “For you”? How does he explain that term? The Gemara
answers: From that term “for you” it is derived: For you, similar to for food; the sanctity of the
Sabbatical Year takes effect on those items whose benefit and whose consumption coincide,
which excludes soaking and laundering, where the items’ benefit is subsequent to their
consumption.

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The Gemara asks: But according to Rabbi Yosei, isn’t it written: “For food,” indicating that it
may not be used for any other purpose? The Gemara answers: He needs that phrase to teach: For
food, and not for a remedy [melugma], as it is taught in a baraita: For food and not for a
remedy. The baraita continues: Do you say: For food and not for a remedy, or perhaps it is
only: For food and not for laundering? When the verse says: “For you,” for laundering is
already stated as permitted since it includes all one’s bodily needs. How, then, do I uphold that
which the verse states: “For food”? It is: For food, and not for a remedy. And should one ask:
What did you see that led you to include the use of Sabbatical-Year produce for laundering and
to exclude the use of Sabbatical-Year produce as a remedy?

Summary

Daf Shevui writes:2

The Talmud cites a baraita according to which leaves that were gathered for firewood are not
subject to the laws of the sabbatical year. Only produce that is eaten, even by animals, is liable to
these halakhot. So then, why would a lulav ever possess the sanctity of the sabbatical year, even if
it blossomed on the seventh year itself?

The Talmud cites a midrash on the verse concerning what type of produce is subject to the laws of
sabbatical year sanctity—anything whose benefit and consumption come at the same time. This is
true of food—when one eats food, one simultaneously benefits and consumes the product. But
when it comes to something used for kindling, first it is consumed, the heat is produced and only
then one benefits from it by cooking or heating up the house. Therefore, if he sets aside the leaves
to burn them, they are not subject to the laws of sabbatical year produce.

Rashi explains that the normal use of a lulav is to sweep out the house—it was the ancient broom.

2
https://www.sefaria.org/Sukkah.40a.4?lang=bi&p2=Daf_Shevui_to_Sukkah.40a.2-13&lang2=bi

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The benefit one derives from it comes at the same time it is used. Thus it gets ruined simultaneous
to its use. Therefore the laws of sabbatical year produce do apply.

The wood of the “oily tree” was used to light torches, not for cooking or heating. In this case it is
consumed at the same time that one derives benefit from it. So why don’t the rules of the sabbatical
year apply?

Rava answers that since wood is generally used for heating, all wood falls into this category. The
sabbatical year rules never apply to wood, even if it is used for making torches.

The Talmud continues to discuss whether wood set aside for heating/kindling is subject to the
sabbatical year laws. This section uses a baraita that only indirectly relates to the subject.

The Talmud cites a baraita, which it will now explain and then later connect to the issue about
wood during the sabbatical year. In this baraita we see a dispute between the sages whether one
can use produce gathered during the sabbatical year for steeping or washing. Rashi explains that
this produce is wine—they would steep flax or launder clothes in wine. R. Yose says that the wine
can be used for such a purpose, while the first opinion says it may not. Below we shall see why.

The Torah (Leviticus 25:6) says that one can use sabbatical year produce for food. The first opinion
in the baraita learns from here that one cannot use this produce for other purposes—such as
steeping or washing.

Rabbi Yose emphasizes a different word from the verse—”for you.” One can use the sabbatical
year produce for any purpose, even to steep or launder.

The Talmud now asks what the first tanna who said that sabbatical year produce can only be used
for food, does with the verse “for you.” The answer is that he compares it with “for food.” This is
a similar notion to the one we saw in yesterday’s section—once can use sabbatical year produce
only if it is consumed and benefit is derived from it at the same time. When one steeps or launders
with wine, the product is first consumed (by being rendered undrinkable), and then the benefit is
derived. Therefore, one cannot use it for such a purpose.

This opinion would therefore hold that wood is not subject to the sabbatical year restrictions
because its benefit by definition comes after it has been consumed. Thus from this baraita the
Talmud can conclude that there is a debate about wood, not just about using wine for steeping or
laundering.

Today’s section is a direct continuation of yesterday’s section. R. Yose used the word “for you”
to deduce that one could use sabbatical year produce even for steeping or for laundering. So, the
question is, how does he understand the word “for food” which seems to limit the use of sabbatical
year produce to food.

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He needs that phrase to deduce, “for food”, but not for a salve, as it has been taught, “for food”,
but not for a salve. You say “for food” but not for a salve; why not say, “[for food”] but not for
washing? When it says, “for you” washing is included. So how then do I understand, “for food”?
“For food”, but not for a salve.

R. Yose uses the word “for food” to teach that one may not use sabbatical year produce as a salve.
The baraita cited here debates whether the word “for food” excludes using sabbatical produce for
washing or for a salve, ultimately deciding that it excludes the latter.

I include washing since it is a requirement common to all men and exclude a salve since it is not
common to all men.

The baraita now asks the obvious question—why allow one to use sabbatical year produce for
washing but not for a salve.

The answer is that the Torah wished to allow one to use sabbatical year produce for things that
everyone always needs. Washing is a need common to all people, assumedly at all times. A salve
is probably used more often by those who can afford it and it is certainly not something that
someone needs all of the time.

Rav Avrohom Adler writes:3

Shemittah for lulav

The Gemora had said that the Mishna didn't apply Shemittah rules to the lulav, since it was from
the sixth year, implying that in principle Shemittah does apply to a lulav. The Gemora asks why it
does, since it is not food, but simply wood, and the braisa says that if one gathered twigs and vines
from the field on Shemittah, they only have the sanctity of Shemittah if he did so for animal feed,
but not if he is using them as wood.

The Gemora answers that the reason to exempt wood from Shemittah is particular to the way wood
is used for fueling fire. The verse says that the produce of Shemittah will be “for you, for eating,”
teaching that Shemittah applies to produce which is enjoyed like food, whose benefit occurs at the
same time it is consumed. This excludes wood, which is first consumed, but whose benefit occurs
afterwards, when it turns to coals. However, a lulav is usually not used for coals, but for sweeping,
which consumes the branches at the same time as the benefit occurs.

The Gemora challenges this answer from the case of wood which can be burned as torches, giving
benefit at the time of consumption. Rava answers that wood is generally used for fueling a fire,
and therefore Shemittah does not apply even if one uses it as a torch.

3
http://dafnotes.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Sukkah_40.pdf

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The Gemora says that it is a dispute of Tannaim whether the rules of Shemittah apply to firewood,
citing a braisa which says that one may not use Shemittah produce to soak linen or launder clothing,
while Rabbi Yossi says that one may.

The Gemora explains that the first opinion says that the verse which says that the produce is “for
eating” excludes these uses, while Rabbi Yossi says that the verse which says that is “for you”
includes them. The first opinion says that “for you” teaches that it may only be used for things like
eating, whose benefit occurs at the time of consumption, as opposed to these uses, whose benefit
comes after consumption. Rabbi Yossi says that “for eating” only excludes using it for medical
purposes.

The Gemora cites a braisa which explains the verses this way, explaining that we exclude medical
uses, which aren't universal, as opposed to laundry and soaking, which all people do. The Gemora
cites a braisa which says that “for eating” excludes spraying or medical use, and says that this
follows Rabbi Yossi, since the Sages would also exclude soaking and laundry.

Redeeming Shemittah funds

Rabbi Elozar says that Shemittah funds can only be redeemed through a purchase, while Rabbi
Yochanan says they can also be redeemed outright. The Gemora explains that Rabbi Elazar's
position is based on the fact that the Torah follows the section about Yovel (which is like
Shemittah) with the section about buying and selling merchandise, teaching that redemption can
only be done via purchase. Rabbi Yochanan says that the verse which refers to yovel as kodesh –
holy implies that it can be redeemed in either way, just like consecrated items.

Observing Shemittah is Akin to Observing Shabbos The Gemara states that if one is not meticulous
even regarding the lenient laws of Shemittah, i.e. one sells Shemittah produce, he will be forced
to sell all of his possessions and eventually he will be forced to sell himself as a slave. Rashi at the
end of Parshas Behar quotes the full text of the Baraisa that is mentioned in Arachin 30b and
Kiddushin 20a. The Ramban in the beginning of Parshas Behar writes that one should be careful
to adhere to the laws of Shemittah just as one would be meticulous in observing the laws of
Shabbos, as Shemittah is the secret of Creation. When one treats the laws of Shemittah lightly, he
will be the catalyst that causes the Jewish People to be exiled for he is demonstrating that he does
not affirm the belief that HaShem created the world and he also denies the concept of the World
to Come.

The Dust of their Feet

The Gemara discusses the harsh punishment that one incurs when he treats the laws of Shemittah
lightly. The Gemara uses the term avak shel sheviis, the dust of Shemittah, to refer to the less
stringent laws of Shemittah. We find elsewhere that the Gemara uses the term avak Lashon hara
to describe slander that is rabbinically prohibited, and the term avak ribbis in describing
rabbinically prohibited interest on a loan. Why does the Gemara use the word avak, dust, in these

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instances? It is noteworthy that when Yaakov struggled with the angel of Esav, it is said vayeiavek
ish imo, and a man wrestled with him.

The Gemara in Chullin 91a states that the angel of Esav appeared to Yaakov like a Torah scholar.
Perhaps the meaning of the Gemara is that the angel of Esav attempted to convince Yaakov that
although one must follow the mitzvos that are stated explicitly in the Torah, one can be more
lenient regarding the rabbinical prohibitions. This is alluded to in the word vayeiavek, which is
derived from the word avak, dust.

For this reason the Gemara refers to certain rabbinical prohibitions with the term avak, to allude
to the idea that it is the evil inclination, a.k.a. the angel of Esav, who is attempting to convince the
person that he can be lenient regarding rabbinical prohibitions. We must adhere to the dictum
recorded in Pirkei Avos 1:4, where it is said vehevay misabak bafar ragleihem, literally translated
as sit in the dust of their feet, and homiletically interpreted that one should adhere to even the less
stringent rabbinical prohibitions

A LULAV OF SHEVI'IS
Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:4

The Gemara asks that one should not be permitted to purchase a Lulav of Shevi'is from an Am
ha'Aretz, because the money that the Am ha'Aretz receives for the Lulav becomes sanctified with
Kedushas Shevi'is.

In what way does Kedushas Shevi'is affect a Lulav, which is not an edible fruit? RASHI (DH
Ta'ama) explains that Kedushas Shevi'is affects a Lulav in the event that one exchanges a Lulav
of Shevi'is for money. The money attains the Lulav's Kedushas Shevi'is, and it must be used to
buy only edible food and not a durable item (like a garment).

However, Rashi earlier (39a, DH Ein Mosrin) writes that the only reason why Sechorah
(commerce) with fruits of Shevi'is is forbidden is because one is required to consume them
("l'Ochlah") or the money exchanged for them before the time of Bi'ur arrives. Accordingly, the
reason why one may not buy a garment with money that has Kedushas Shevi'is (money that was
used to buy fruit of Shevi'is) is because the garment will remain in existence past the time of the
fruit's Bi'ur, as Rashi explains later (41a, DH u'Vikesh). According to this explanation, there is
nothing wrong with conducting Sechorah, or purchasing garments, with a fruit of Shevi'is that has
no time of Bi'ur.

Rashi later (40b, end of DH Shema Yigadel) writes that the time of Bi'ur of a fruit is determined
by the time at which that fruit no longer is found naturally in the fields. A Lulav, however, remains
on the tree perennially (it does not rot and fall off like fruit). Indeed, it is presumably for this reason

4
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/sukah/insites/su-dt-040.htm

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that Rashi here (40a, DH Ta'ama) does not write that Kedushah of Shevi'is affects the Lulav in that
the Lulav must be used up before its time of Bi'ur.

However, if the Lulav does not have any time of Bi'ur, then why is one prohibited to buy a garment
with the money exchanged for a Lulav of Shevi'is? Since there is no time of Bi'ur for a Lulav itself,
an object bought with its value should also be allowed to remain. One should be permitted to use
the money to buy a non-edible item, according to Rashi. (TOSFOS 39a, DH she'Ein)

Rashi maintains that a Lulav does have a time of Bi'ur. Although Lulav branches remain on the
tree throughout the year, there are seasons during which no new sprouts are produced, and the
older Lulav branches open up and their leaves spread out. When its leaves spread out, the Lulav is
no longer fit to be used as a broom, its primary utilitarian purpose (Rashi DH Yatz'u). It is at that
moment that the Lulav is no longer considered available in the natural environment.

If a Lulav has a time of Bi'ur, then why does Rashi not write that the practical application of
Kedushas Shevi'is to a Lulav is that one must consume the Lulav before its time of Bi'ur? The
answer is that Rashi's intention here is to explain why one may not give the value of a Lulav to
an Am ha'Aretz. Rashi needs to show how the Am ha'Aretz will misuse the money that he receives
from the sale of the Lulav (see Rashi to 39a, DH Ein Mosrin). Rashi therefore mentions a practical
application with regard to the value of the Lulav.

According to Rashi, it seems that money exchanged for fruits of Shevi'is becomes sanctified with
Kedushas Shevi'is only with regard to the requirement to consume that money before the time of
Bi'ur (but not with regard to the other laws of Shevi'is). This explains why the Gemara is concerned
only that the Am ha'Aretz will not consume the money before the time of Bi'ur arrives, and it is
not concerned with any of the other ways that items of Shevi'is might be misused (such as being
wasted (Pesachim 52b), being used to make a bandage or fed to an animal (Shevi'is 8:1), being
used as payment for one's debts (Shevi'is 8:4 and Avodah Zarah 62a, as cited by Rashi later, 44b,
DH Amar Lei)). Rashi maintains that the Kedushas Shevi'is is not transferred from the fruits onto
the money ("Tofes Damav") with regard to the other prohibitions, but only with regard to the
requirement of Bi'ur and the prohibition against giving more than three meals' worth of money to
an Am ha'Aretz (which is related to the law of Bi'ur, according to Rashi).

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:5

Our Gemara continues discussing the rules of the Sabbatical year that were introduced by the
last Mishnah (39a) in the context of purchasing an etrog during the shemitta year.

Our Gemara brings a baraita that emphasizes the severity of shemitta, in that even forbidden
business dealings with shemitta fruit, which is referred to as avakah shel shevi’it – “the dust of the
Sabbatical year laws” – leads to severe punishment. Calling the laws forbidding business dealings
with shemitta fruit avakah shel shevi’it indicates that these are not the main rules of the Sabbatical
year, either because the focus of the prohibitions of the Sabbatical year is the agricultural work

5
https://www.ou.org/life/torah/masechet_sukkah3440/

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itself (Rashi and Tosafot), or because business dealings are only a small part of the larger
prohibition against storing the kedushat shevi’it fruit for use in the year after shemitta (Arukh).

According to Rabbi Yossi bar Chanina in the baraita, someone who does business with Sabbatical
year fruits will find himself impoverished and be forced to sell his movable property. Should he
not realize the severity of his actions, the punishment will continue as long as he does not repent.
He will end up selling his agricultural lands, then his own house and real estate; he will be forced
to take loans, and when he cannot pay them he will be forced to sell himself as a slave to a fellow
Jew – or even to a non-Jew.

Rabbi Yossi bar Chanina derives this from his reading of the laws of shemitta as they appear in
the Torah, and the continuation of the laws that are discussed there. In Parshat
Behar (Vayikra 25:1-13) we learn the rules of shemitta and yovel. This is followed by the laws of
buying and selling movable objects (pasuk 14), selling land (beginning with pasuk 15), selling
homes (beginning with pasuk 29), borrowing money (from pasuk 35), being sold as a slave to a
Jew (from pasuk 39) and finally being sold as a slave to a non-Jew (47 and onwards).

Our daf states that a lulav has ‫ שביעית קדושת‬,and it proceeds to identify under what conditions this
is true. Although, in general, leaves or wood grown during shemittah do not possess the restriction
of ‫ שביעית קדושת‬, there are, however, the following qualifications. If the leaves or branches are
edible, even if it be only for animals, they have the status of food, and the rules of shemittah apply
to these branches and leaves just as they do for produce fit for human consumption. Certain reed
leaves and grape leaves can be used either for animal food or for fuel. In this case, the Baraisa
rules that the intent of the one gathering them determines their status. If he intends for them to be
eaten by his livestock, they have ‫ שביעית קדושת‬. If, however, he collects them for fuel, they have
no such holiness. This would suggest that a lulav, which is not used for animal feed, should not
have ‫ שביעית קדושת‬.Nevertheless, the Gemara explains that the status of holiness due to shemittah
is based upon the concept Food is consumed, and the benefit derived
from it occurs simultaneous with its being consumed. This type of benefit is prohibited from a
shemittah product. Wood used for heating an oven, however, becomes consumed by the fire, and
the benefit of baking in an oven heated by such sticks and logs comes only afterwards, when the
heated oven has food introduced into it.

Here, the benefit from the wood occurs after the commodity is consumed. When the benefit from
a shemittah product is only realized upon a “delay,” such a benefit is not prohibited. A lulav, all
year long, is typically used as a broom. Technically, a broom becomes expended as it is used for
sweeping, thus rendering its benefit in the category which is prohibited during shemittah. This
definition leads ‫ רבא‬to conclude that benefiting from wood that is typically used for illumination
is prohibited, for in this case the benefit is immediately realized as the fire burns, before the wood
turns into a coal. It does not occur upon a delay, as we found regarding baking in an oven or heating
a house.

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‫ דמשחן עצים‬is wood that has oil absorbed into it, and it is used both for heating an oven as well as
for illumination yet it does not have ‫ שביעית קדושת‬.

Why is this different than reed and grape leaves, where the status depends upon the intent of the
one gathering them? As Rashi explains, it is because the main use of these branches is for heating,
and we do not its other, occasional usage.

Rashi (1) explains that the primary benefit from wood occurs after it has been burned into coal
when it is used for baking. A lulav, on the other hand, is used primarily for sweeping one’s house,
thus the benefit and consumption of the lulav occur simultaneously. Since the benefit from the
lulav occurs simultaneously with its consumption, as is the case concerning food, it is subject to
the sanctity of shemittah. In our times, when lulavim are no longer used to sweep the floor, one
could ask whether lulavim acquire the sanctity of shemittah. Perhaps they should be treated the
same as regular wood which does not acquire the sanctity of shemittah. Rav Yosef Liberman (2)
suggested a line of reasoning which would indicate that lulavim would acquire the sanctity of
shemittah even though they are not used as brooms. He cites a ruling of Rav Shmuel Wosner3 that
orange peels acquire the sanctity of shemittah. Since animals can eat them, they acquire shemittah
sanctity despite the fact that they are normally discarded, unless they are rendered inedible for
animals.

Thus, we see that something that can be used in a way that its benefit and consumption occur
simultaneously will acquire sanctity even if that is not its normal use. Therefore, submits Rav
Liberman, a lulav should also acquire sanctity since it could still be used as a broom
notwithstanding the fact that it is not normally used in that fashion. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach
(4) disagreed with this assertion.

Rav Auerbach writes that only food items acquire the sanctity of shemittah, even if it is not
normally used as food. Since it is by nature an edible item, it acquires sanctity automatically. Non-
food items, on the other hand, do not acquire sanctity simply because they are able to be used in a
way that would involve their benefit and consumption occurring simultaneously. Only if in
practice they are used in a way that involves their benefit and consumption occurring
simultaneously would they acquire the sanctity of shemittah.

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On our daf, we see the terrible consequences that befall one who trades commercially in the
produce of shemittah. If it is not declared ownerless and open to the public, one may not use it.
The Chazon Ish, zt”l, struggled mightily to halt the improper use of shemittah produce in Israel in
modern times.

During the last shemittah of his life, the Chazon Ish refused to make a brachah on the superior
esrogim that were available through the device known as the ‫ מכירה היתר‬,which he opposed
vehemently. Since the esrogim had not been declared ownerless, they were considered the
merchandise of ‫ שביעית‬that invites the awful curse brought down in our Gemara. The Chazon Ish
elected instead to use an esrog that was kosher, but had several minor blemishes on its surface.

Since this particular esrog had been raised in an orchard owned by a God-fearing Jew who could
be relied upon to have really opened it to the public completely, it was preferable to a perfect fruit
with real halachic problems attached. On another occasion, unrelated to shemittah, a very wealthy
man spent a very large amount of money on his ‫ מי ארבע ים‬by purchasing the most expensive set
available. He took it to a number of very prominent Rabbonim in Israel, and all declared that they
had never seen a set to match it.

Since the Chazon Ish was the ultimate halachic authority of his time, the wealthy man wanted very
much to hear the gadol sing the praises of his ‫ מי ארבע ים‬He figured, that way, no one he knew
would be able to resist envying the great wealth that had bought him the good opinion of all the
gedolei Yisroel.

When he brought them to the Chazon Ish shortly before Sukkos, the gadol inspected them closely.
He said, “Your ‫ מי ארבע ים‬are truly impeccable, they are b’tachlis ha’hidur.” The Chazon Ish went
on, “Tell me, though, was the money used to buy them also earned b’tachlis ha’hidur?”

R. Shuli Passow writes:6

Yesterday’s daf introduced us to some of the challenges of observing Sukkot during

a shmita (sabbatical) year — the one year in seven during which the Bible requires Jews to let the
land rest. As we saw yesterday, selling edible produce in the shmita year is forbidden, which
makes buying and selling etrogs ... complicated. Today, we’re going to dive deeper into rabbinic
thought on the sabbatical.

The biblical shmita is a sabbath for the land. Humans work six days and rest on the seventh;
likewise, the land yields crops for six seasons, and then is allowed to rest in the seventh. Although
purposely farming land in a shmita year was forbidden, one was permitted to glean the produce
that grows on its own — and even sell it, subject to some restrictions. Namely, if you sell any

6
Myjewishlearning.com

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produce that grew on its own during the sabbatical year, you must use the money from the sale
only for the purchase of something you will consume in a short amount of time. Why? Because
produce that grows on its own during the sabbatical year carries kedushat shevi’it, “shmita
sanctity.” The sanctity of this produce transfers to the money used to purchase it in a sale — and
therefore that money must also be used to purchase only specific consumable items.

The rabbis took all of this very seriously. If someone sold spontaneously grown shmita produce
and then used the money for something that wasn’t a consumable good, trouble was expected to
follow — as Rabbi Yose bar Hanina explains in a beraita (early rabbinic teaching) toward the
bottom of today’s page:

Rabbi Yose bar Hanina said: Come and see how harsh is the dust of the shmita prohibition. For
if a person does business with produce of the shmita year, in the end poverty will force them to
sell their moveable property and utensils…

Selling shmita produce and then using those sacred funds for something forbidden was such a
serious violation a person could expect to lose all their belongings within the year. The full text of
the beraita, which appears in Arakhin 30b and Kiddushin 20a, goes even further, stating that if the
person does not learn a lesson from this loss, they will then be forced to sell not just their stuff but
also their house, land and even their family members and themselves into slavery.

This is an intriguing statement — not only because of the harsh punishment, but also because of
the way it is phrased. What does Rabbi Yose mean by “the dust of the shmita prohibition”?

Rashi explains that the “dust of shmita” refers specifically to the prohibition against doing business
with shmita produce for the purpose of profit. We might assume that since the primary prohibitions
of shmita are related to farming and eating — no planting, harvesting, eating of certain crops —
these secondary laws about trading shmita produce are unimportant, like dust.

Rabbi Yose warns us against this perspective, teaching that even what we may think of as non-
essential aspects of the shmita year — the dust — must be taken seriously. He teaches this idea
not only by articulating a severe punishment, but through the image his language conjures. Dust
may seem inconsequential, but enough particles of it can also be overwhelming — permeating the
air and spreading over everything.

We tend to think of dust as something undesirable. But Rabbi Yose helps us see it in a new light:
It is the teeniest elements, the most infinitesimal particles that constitute the environment we live
in. In this case, Rabbi Yose is suggesting that we are actually meant to live in the dust of shmita
in order to experience it as the all-consuming experience it is intended to be. These minute
prohibitions — complex, apparently endless, and seemingly secondary or unimportant — swirl all
around us, creating a spiritual atmosphere: a year spent creating and living in a culture that is not
rooted in commerce, consumerism and profit.The shmita dust reminds us that God is the ultimate
owner of all.

13
 Still Life With Lemons On A Plate by Vincent Van Gogh

What is the difference between the palm branch and a citron?

Mark Kerzner writes:7

Our last rule said that the etrog (citron) is a fruit, and is subject to the laws of the Sh’mita year, but
that lulav (palm branch) did not have this problem. Buy why? If etrog is subject to Sh’mita,
so should be the lulav! Well, lulav did not begin growing in the fifteen days between Rosh
HaShanah and Sukkot, when Sh’mita really started. But then the same can be said about the etrog!
No, the difference is that for palm tree its Sh’mita starts when it is planted which is before Sh’mita,
but for etrog at the time of picking it, which is on Sh’mita.

The last explanation may work, but it seems artificial. Why do we even need to use it? The
difference is simpler: citron is food, and palm branches are not. So the laws of Sh’mita apply to
one but not to the other. Actually, this is not so obvious. The laws of Sh’mita are defined as for
you it will be for food.

This includes foods, but it also includes anything that is for you, that is anything at all. How do we
reconcile this? We include anything like food. Just like with food, the act of destroying it and the

7
http://talmudilluminated.com/sukkah/sukkah40.html

14
act of enjoying it comes at the same time, so for example ointments are also included. But palm
branches are excluded, because we burn them now, and use their hot coals for cooking later.

Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:8

A principle taught in our daf (Sukkah 40) and derived from Vayikra 25:6 is that Shemitta sanctity
only applies to items whose benefit and consumption coincide (‫ )שהנאתו וביעורו שוה‬such as food,
drink, oils and wax (see Rashi). On the basis of this principle, given that only after wood has begun
to burn does it provides heat (i.e. its consumption does not coincide with its benefit), wood does
not retain sanctified Shemitta status.

Reflecting on this distinction while looking beyond the specific laws of Shemitta, there are many
areas of our lives where benefit and consumption do coincide, and even more things where they
do not; there are things that we do and enjoy which provide us with instant gratification, and other
things that take time before we are able to reap the benefits of their consumption. The problem –
however - is that many of us are impatient and expect instant gratification and immediate results.

In terms of Judaism, we are taught that the Torah is comparable to ‘a tree of life to those who grasp
it’ (Mishlei 3:18) – which leads some people to mistakenly think that all religious experiences
should be like fruit of a tree whose benefit and consumption coincide. However, while that is true
in some cases (as our sages teach us, ‫ ֵאלּוּ ְדָּב ִרים ֶשָׁאָדם אוֵֹכל ֵפּירוֵֹתיֶהן ָבּעוָֹלם ַהֶזּה‬- ‘these are the precepts
whose fruits a person enjoys in this world’ – Shabbat 127a), some aspects of the Jewish experience
are more comparable to us using the branches from the actual tree of life to give us heat - and in
such a situation, the benefit and consumption don’t coincide.

As you may know, the name for the wooden handles on which the parchment of Sifrei Torah is
wrapped is ‫( עצי חיים‬literally ‘trees of life’), and I believe that in this there is a deep message that
while we should enjoy our study of Torah (as we say, ‫– ֵ ֽהינוּ ֶאת ִדְּבֵרי תוָֹרְת˜ ְבּ ִֽפינוּ‬-‫ ְוַהֲﬠֶרב ָנא ה' ֱא‬- ‘please
God, sweeten the words of Your Torah in our mouth’), studying Torah and living a Torah life does
not always provide instant gratification and immediate results. Instead, there are times when what
we do is a slow burn and when there is a long period between our efforts and their results. And if
we ever forget this message – which we often do – we should look at the ‫ עצי חיים‬which holds a
Torah scroll and remember that while some aspects of a Torah life is like fruit, other aspects are
like wood.

8
www.rabbijohnnysolomon.com

15
Rav Baruch Weintraub writes:9

9
https://etzion.org.il/en/talmud/seder-moed/massekhet-sukka/produce-benefit-which-comes-same-time-its-consumption-sukka-
40a

16
I. THE TALMUDIC PASSAGE

The law regarding "produce the benefit of which comes at the same time as its

consumption" is the subject of direct discussion in two talmudic passages – the first in our chapter,

on p. 40a, and the second in Bava Kama, p. 101b.

Both passages open with an objection and a resolution presented by Rava. Rava argues

that shemita sanctity does not attach to wood, as is proven by the Baraita regarding one who

gathers the branches of a grapevine for firewood, and then raises an objection against a previously

cited law that implies that shemita sanctity does attach to wood. In our passage the objection is

directed against the law that a lulav has shemita sanctity. In Bava Kama it is directed against the

law that plants used as dyes have shemita sanctity.

From that point on, the two passages are identical. Rava answers that that in the cases of

the lulav and the dyes, a benefit is derived at the time of their consumption, whereas in the case of

firewood, the benefit is derived only after its consumption; hence the different laws in the different

cases. The Gemara then says that the wood of the pine tree which is used for torches does not

have shemita sanctity even though benefit is derived from it at the time of its consumption, because

"Rava said: Wood as a rule is used for heating." At the end of the passage Rav Kahana brings a

tannaitic dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Yose connected to the law of "produce the benefit

of which comes at the time of its consumption." The Gemara does not explain how Rava's

statement answers the question from the pine tree, or what is the relationship between it and the

disagreement between the Sages and Rabbi Yose brought by Rav Kahana. The dispute itself is

unclear, and the Rishonim suggest various ways to understand it.

17
 In this shiur, we shall discuss the law of "produce the benefit of which comes at the time

of its consumption," and through this discussion, we shall also try to explain the talmudic passage.

II. THE APPLICATION OF SHEMITA SANCTITY AND THE

ALLOWANCE TO USE SHEMITA PRODUCE

Rashi, s.v. shani hatam she-hana'ato u-bi'uro shave," explains that the verse, "the sabbath

produce of the land shall be food for you" (Vayikra 25:6), teaches two laws. First,

that shemita sanctity attaches only to produce the benefit of which is such that it comes at the same

time as its consumption. The benefit must be similar to eating, where the consumption of the

produce and the benefit derived from it coincide in time. The second law that is derived from this

verse is that produce to which shemita sanctity attaches may only be used in such a way that the

benefit derived from it comes at the same time as its consumption. Rashi implies that we are

dealing with two different laws, which, though they are derived from the same verse, are in fact

unconnected.

An alternative explanation may be suggested, namely, that the two laws are indeed

connected one to the other.

The Ramban, in his critique of the Rambam's Sefer ha-Mitzvot, positive mitzva 3, writes:

Regarding shemita produce, the Torah said: "The sabbath produce of the land shall be

food for you" (Vayikra 25:6), and the Sages interpreted: "For food and not for trade…

And this mitzva is repeated in the verse: "That the poor of your people may

eat…" (Shemot 23:11). One who trades in shemita produce transgresses a positive

commandment.

18
 The Acharonim disagree as to what the Ramban means to say here. The Megilat Esther (ad

loc.) understands that according to the Ramban there is an obligatory mitzva to

eat shemita produce. This is a very novel position. More likely is the understanding of the author

of Torat ha-Aretz (Rav Moshe Kliers, chap. 8, letter 26), that we are dealing with a fulfillable,

rather than an obligatory mitzva. That is to say, there is no obligation to eat shemita produce, but

someone who eats it fulfills a mitzva. The Chazon Ish (Shevi'it 14, 10) disagrees with both of these

explanations, and proposes a third possibility: the Ramban, as is implied by a careful reading of

his remark, does not mean to say that eating shemita produce constitutes a mitzva, but only that

trading in or destroying shemita produce constitutes an issur asei – a prohibition derived from a

positive commandment. That is to say, there is no way to fulfill the mitzva; but prohibitions are

violated when the mitzva is transgressed.

These words of the Ramban, however we understand them, allow us to understand the

connection between the two laws derived from the verse "for food for you." To understand this

explanation, let us examine another place where a question arises regarding the relationship

between an allowance and a prohibition.

III. BETROTHAL

We wish to analyze the foundation of the prohibition of a married woman to a man other than her

husband. Does the prohibition stem from the fact that the woman has been set aside for a particular

man, and thus she is forbidden to everyone else in the world? Or perhaps the status of married

woman forbids her to everybody, but a special allowance exists with respect to her husband.

19
At first glance, it would appear that the first possibility is the correct one. In other words, the

prohibition does not stand on its own, but rather it follows from the woman's relationship with her

husband. But two proofs may be adduced that the matter is not so simple:

1) The prohibition of a betrothed woman. It would appear that a betrothed woman is forbidden

to her husband only by rabbinic law, as Rashi explains in Ketubot (7b, s.v. she-mityached ima).

The Shita Mekubetzet (ad loc.) brings other opinions, e.g., that of the Shita Yeshana, who writes

as follows:

Since she still must be handed over to the bridal chamber, this implies that she has not

been entirely acquired by him. Therefore she is to him like one who is betrothed to

another person, and forbidden to him as a married woman. Thus explain the Re'a and

the Rashba.[1]

The Shita Yeshana clearly implies that the prohibition of a married woman does not stem

from the fact that she had been designated for her husband, and that it applies even to him. Entry

into the bridal chamber permits the woman to her husband, but her having being designated for

him does not cause the prohibition.

2) Residual connection in a get. The Mishna at the beginning of the ninth chapter

of Gittin records a dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer whether or not a man can give his

wife a get with the stipulation that she remain forbidden to a particular person. The Gemara brings

a disagreement whether this is considered a condition or a residual connection of marriage. In other

words, is the get a full-fledged get, which permits the woman absolutely, only that if she has

relations with a particular person she will nullify the get? Or perhaps the husband can give his wife

a partial get, in such a manner that the woman will remain forbidden as a married woman to a

particular person. If we accept the possibility that Rabbi Eliezer permits even the residual

20
connection of marriage, it would mean that even after the marital relationship between a man and

a woman is severed, the prohibition of married woman can still remain in place. Here too the

implication is that there exists a prohibition that does not stem from the allowance to the husband.

In essence, the question that rises before us relates to the meaning of the concept of sanctity.

Does sanctity denote separation, as the Ramban writes in his famous comment to the verse

in Vayikra 19:1, or perhaps it denotes designation for a particular purpose, just as a person

consecrates an object to the Temple treasury.

According to the first understanding that sanctity denotes separation, the prohibition itself

is the sanctity. According to the second understanding that sanctity denotes designation, the

prohibition stems from diverting the article from its intended purpose.

IV. SHEMITA SANCTITY

Let us now return to the issue under discussion. A parallel question may be raised with

respect to shemita sanctity. Is the sanctity essentially a prohibition to use it, only that particular

types of benefit were permitted? Or perhaps, the sanctity stems from the produce's designation for

eating or benefits similar to eating, and thus there is a prohibition to divert the produce from its

designated purpose.

According to the first understanding, that sanctity denotes separation, the two laws, the

application of shemita sanctity and the allowance to use the produce, are indeed unconnected, as

is implied by Rashi. One law defines the produce to which shemita sanctity attaches, i.e., a

prohibition to use the produce, and a second law relates to the uses that are nevertheless permitted.

According to the second understanding, however, the two laws are in fact one law –

produce whose designated purpose is use of a particular kind is that very produce which has

sanctity that forbids it to be used for other purposes.

21
 The idea that shemita produce has a designation can be more readily accepted if we accept

the Torat ha-Aretz's understanding of the Ramban, that there is a positive commandment to

eat shemita produce. But even if we do not say that such a mitzva exists, it can still be argued that

the prohibitions stem from the fact that the Torah designated this produce for eating, even though

it did not actually command that the produce must be eaten, as is implied by the Chazon

Ish's understanding of the Ramban.

We shall now examine various aspects of the law of "consumption and benefit coming at

the same time," and see whether the two understandings that we suggested find

expression.

V. THE DEFINITIONS OF CONSUMPTION AND BENEFIT

Let us first define consumption and benefit. If we continue in the direction outlined above,

according to the understanding that sanctity denotes separation, the law of "consumption and

benefit coming at the same time" wears two hats – as a definition of the produce and as a factor

that permits benefit. According to the second understanding, this idea denotes a designated

purpose.

It might be argued that there is no practical difference between these two understandings,

for ultimately they both refer to the same thing – the definition of eating. Produce is defined as

something that is eaten, the Torah permitted the prohibition for the sake of eating, and the

designated purpose of shemita produce is eating. If so, then there should be no distinction between

them regarding the definitions of consumption and benefit. Since, however, the Rishonim did in

fact disagree about these definitions, we should further examine whether in fact there is a practical

difference between the different understandings.

22
 First of all, let us discuss the definition of "consumption and benefit coming at the same

time" as a factor that permits the deriving of benefit. If we do not understand that that it was the

Torah's intention to permit the eating, we must seek out another definition. For this purpose, let us

see Rashi in Bava Kama, s.v. letokh ha-mishra:

One must not steep flax in shemita wine, and so too one must not launder clothing

because it is regarded as trade.

That is to say, when Rashi comes to explain the position of the Sages who require that

benefit be derived at the time of consumption, he defines the prohibition as trade.

The Acharonim ask what does trade have to do with anything; surely the prohibition applies even

if a person launders for himself (see, for example, Kapot Temarim, Sukka 40a, s.v. ein moserin).

It seems that, according to Rashi, the Torah only permitted benefit from shemita produce

when the benefit is immediate, but not when the produce is first destroyed and only afterwards the

benefit arrives. We learn this principle from the prohibition of trade. When a person engages in

trade, he gives some article to another person, and in exchange the buyer obligates himself to pay.

That is to say, it is only the completion of the transaction and the article's total removal from the

seller's possession that brings him benefit. According to this explanation, any benefit from the

produce will permit its consumption, provided that it comes at the time of the consumption.

If, on the other hand, we understand the idea of "consumption and benefit coming at the

same time" as the destined purpose of shemita produce, it stands to reason that the Torah's

intention was that the benefit derived from the produce should be direct. That is to say, the destined

purpose of the produce is the benefit and not the causing of benefit. When the consumption and

the benefit do not coincide in time, the benefit is not derived directly from the produce. According

to this explanation, the benefit's directness relates not only to the time between the consumption

23
and the benefit, but also to the nature of the benefit – it must come directly to the person's body,

in the manner of eating or the like, and not indirectly, as in monetary gain.

We find a dispute between the Rishonim as to what is the benefit and the consumption in

the various cases brought in the Gemara. We shall focus on a disagreement between Rashi in Bava

Kama and Rashi in Sukka regarding laundry. Regarding laundry, the Gemara explicitly states that

it is regarded as benefit that does not come at the same time as the consumption. Rashi

in Sukka (s.v. ve-lo likhevisa) writes that the benefit from the laundry comes only three days after

the soaking, when the garments become clean, whereas the consumption of the shemita produce

takes place at the time of the soaking, because it gets ruined as a result. The Tosafot (ad loc.,

s.v. hakhi garsinan be-kuntrus) note that Rashi's position in Bava Kama (s.v. yatz'u) is different.

There Rashi explains that the benefit arrives when the person dons the clean clothing.

Rashi appears to have understood the two passages differently. The passage in Bava

Kama he explains in accordance with the understanding that the rule of "consumption and benefit

coming at the same time" permits benefit wherever the consumption involves benefit, however

small, and therefore he also counts the monetary gain of laundered clothing. On the other hand,

the passage in Sukka he understands according to the understanding that the rule of "consumption

and benefit coming at the same time" refers to the destined purpose of the produce. Thus, the

benefit that we require is direct benefit to man, which only comes when the clothing is actually

worn.[2]

VI. THE POSITION OF RABBI YOSE

We explained earlier that if we relate to the idea of "benefit and consumption at the same

time" as a factor that permits the benefit, we can expand the category of benefits. This argument

follows more strongly from the position of Rabbi Yose. The Rishonim disagree about how to

24
understand the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Yose; here we will follow Rashi in Sukka.

Rashi (s.v. eitzim dehasaka) explains that Rabbi Yose disagrees with the restriction of "benefit and

consumption coming at the same time." According to him, any human requirement that is shared

by all people permits benefit, and therefore laundry and dying are permitted, but medicine, which

is necessary only for the sick and is not shared by all people is forbidden.

Rabbi Yose's allowance is of course reminiscent of the allowance to perform forbidden

labors on Yom Tov for a human requirement shared by all people. The Gemara

in Ketubot (7a) states that there are certain labors on Yom Tov, which because they were permitted

for the sake of eating, were permitted also for other needs, provided that we are talking about a

requirement shared by all people. For example, the Gemara there states that one is permitted to

catch a deer and slaughter it, because food is a requirement shared by all people, but one is

forbidden to light a fire in order to burn incense at the end of a meal, because that is not a

requirement shared by all people, but only by the pampered.

The Ramban in his commentary to the verse, "You shall do no servile

work" (Vayikra 25:7), explains the basis of this allowance. He writes that as opposed to Shabbat,

when labor is forbidden because of its creative nature, on Yom Tov labor is forbidden because of

the exertion that it involves – melekhet machshevet versus melekhet avoda. The Ramban explains

that labor for the sake of eating is not servile work, but rather work for benefit. This seems to be

the foundation of the allowance of work for other human requirements shared by all people, for a

person who performs a labor defined as a requirement does not exert himself, but rather he benefits

himself.

25
 It stands to reason that this is also the foundation of Rabbi Yose's allowance to do laundry

with shemita produce. The sanctity of shemita produce means that such produce should not be

used for work of exertion, but the Torah permitted one to derive benefit from it. The definition of

benefit is a human requirement shared by all people.

If we go in this direction, it is possible that Rabbi Yose totally separates between the two

laws under discussion – the application of shemita sanctity and the allowance to derive benefit

from shemita produce. That is to say, it is possible that for shemita sanctity to attach to produce,

Rabbi Yose indeed requires that the produce be intended for food or some other benefit that is

similar to eating, where the consumption and the benefit come at the same time, for fundamentally

it is only produce that stands to be eaten that is sanctified. The allowance, on the other hand, is for

use of this produce even when the benefit and the consumption do not come at the same time, as

in the case of laundry, provided that it is a human requirement shared by all people.

The Tosafot in Bava Kama (s.v. hakhi garsinan, end) raise such a possibility, but reject it arguing

that this is not reasonable. According to what we have said, the reasoning is clear.

VII. WOOD AS A RULE IS USED FOR HEATING

As it may be recalled, the talmudic passage opens with an objection – how

does shemita sanctity attach to a lulav – surely the wood has no shemita sanctity. The Gemara

answers that in the case of a lulav, the benefit and consumption come at the same time, whereas in

wood used for heating, they do not. The Gemara then asks what the law in the case of a pine tree

is, the benefit and the consumption of which come at the same time, for it is used for lighting, and

the benefit comes together with the consumption. The Gemara answers that wood as a rule is used

for heating.

26
 The Rishonim disagree about the meaning of these words. The Ritva understands that since

most types of wood are used for heating, where the benefit and the consumption do not come at

the same time, therefore even pine trees, the benefit and consumption of which do coincide, are

nullified among all the other trees, and so shemita sanctity does not attach to them. Rashi, in

contrast, understands that since pine trees are also designated for heating, only that sometimes

people use them for lighting, this change does not suffice so that shemita sanctity should apply to

them.

There is a practical ramification between these two explanations with respect to wood that

is used only for lighting. According to the Ritva, it too would be nullified among trees in general,

whereas according to Rashi, since it stands to be used for illumination, shemita sanctity should

apply to it.

We wish to suggest that they disagree about what causes shemita sanctity to attach to

produce. One possibility is that whatever man intends to derive benefit from in a manner similar

to eating (benefit and consumption coming at the same time) is governed by shemita sanctity. A

second possibility is that the produce by itself is sanctified with shemita sanctity, only that man is

capable of defining what is regarded as produce and what is not, and that which is defined by him

as produce is governed by shemita sanctity.

These two understandings might depend on the analysis that we presented at the beginning

of the shiur, though this is not necessary. That is to say, if we understand that the essence of the

sanctity lies in the destined purpose of the produce, it stands to reason that the purpose itself is

what confers sanctity. If we say that the sanctity attaches to the produce as a prohibition, whatever

is defined as produce should be sanctified.

27
 Now, if we say that sanctity attaches because of the destined purpose, Rashi is right, that

wherever the purpose is clear, shemita sanctity attaches. And if we say that the sanctity attaches to

produce, the discussion will not be about man's thoughts but about defining the species, and if the

species as a whole is defined as not being produce, the sanctity will not attach, as argued by Ritva.

VIII. THE POSITION OF THE RAMBAM

The Acharonim worked very hard to reconcile a difficult law in the Rambam:

Laundering substances, such as soap and aloe, are subject to the sanctity of the

Sabbatical year, and one may launder with them, as it is said: "And the Sabbath produce

of the land shall be … for you" (Vayikra 25:6), implying any of your needs. One may

not, however, launder with edible Sabbatical year's produce, nor may one make a plaster

out of it, as it is said, "And the Sabbath produce of the land shall be for food for you,"

implying not for a plaster, a spray, or an emetic, nor for soaking or laundering. (Hilkhot

Shemita ve-Yovel 5:10)

The difficulty is self-evident. If soap and aloe are designated for laundering, regarding

which the benefit and the consumption do not come at the same time, why does shemita sanctity

attach to them? The Kesef Mishne (ad loc.) relates to this question, and answers that a distinction

must be made between produce intended for actual eating, regarding which there is a prohibition

of laundering, and laundry products which are learned from the word "lakhem," "for you," even

though the benefit and consumption do not come at the same time.

28
 In other words, the Kesef Mishne suggests that the Rambam codifies both understandings

suggested above as two types of sanctity. Regarding produce that stands to be used for one of the

five main benefits listed by the Rambam at the beginning of the chapter – eating, drinking,

anointing, lighting a lamp, and dyeing – shemita sanctity attaches in the sense of a destined

purpose. Regarding such produce any diversion from the original purpose is forbidden. On the

other hand, produce that fills a human need, but not one of the five benefits mentioned above,

has shemita sanctity in the sense of separation. This produce may be used for all human needs

which were permitted, even when their benefit and consumption do not come at the same time,

and shemita sanctity attaches them so that they may not be wasted and that they are subject to the

obligation of bi'ur.

Rabbi Yosef B. Soloveitchik proposes a similar idea in his shiurim to Sukka (ad loc.).

IX. SUMMARY

At the beginning of the shiur we raised a question regarding shemita sanctity in particular

and the concept of sanctity in general – does sanctity denote a destined purpose, and the

prohibitions stemming from the sanctity result from diversion from that purpose, or does sanctity

denote separation, and the prohibitions themselves express that separation.

We hung two issues on this question:

1) Does sanctity attach to produce destined for particular uses, and the destined

purpose is what brings about the sanctity, or does the sanctity attach to produce, and the destined

29
purpose, if necessary, is just to establish that we are dealing with produce, but it is not the cause

of the sanctity itself?

2) Is the allowance to derive benefit from produce, where the consumption and benefit

come at the same time, only an allowance, or is it itself a fulfillment of the destined purpose of the

produce?

We suggested that it is reasonable to say that the Sages and Rabbi Yose disagree about this very

issue. At the end we saw that the Rambam may distinguish between produce of one kind, to which

the first kind of sanctity attaches, and produce of another kind, to which the second kind of sanctity

attaches.10

In July 2013, Jewish farmer Shneur Naparstek inspects his crop of etrog fruits
in an orchard in the village of Kfar Chabad in central Israel. Credit: Nati
Shohat/Flash90.

10
Translated by David Strauss

30
Shmita sabbatical year puts Israel’s Sukkot four species industry in a bind

Maayan Jaffe writes:11

Hagai Kirshenbaum is a member of the fourth generation of his family to harvest etrogim (singular:
etrog) on a large orchard outside of Rehovot in central Israel. Each year, he personally oversees
the annual export of thousands of what the Torah calls the “fruit of a beautiful tree.”
But not this year.

This fall marks the culmination of the Jewish shmita (sabbatical) year, which began on Rosh
Hashanah in September 2014 and corresponds to the Hebrew calendar year 5775. Though
Kirshenbaum’s orchards produced just as many of the yellow citron fruits that Jews around the
world will use this holiday season for Sukkot (Sept. 27 at sundown through Oct. 4), he projects he
will sell only about two-thirds of his usual crop.

“People choose not to buy from Israel after a shmita year despite there being poskim (religious
decision-makers) who say you can,” Kirshenbaum says.

While he doesn’t want to judge others’ decisions, Kirshenbaum says he feels Jews should make a
point of buying religious and spiritual items from Israel, and that those who choose not to do so
are impacting the lives and livelihoods of people like himself.

Kirshenbaum is not alone in his sentiments. On average, Israeli farmers export 350,000 etrogim to
the United States each fall holiday season—but only about 50 percent of that amount on the tail of
a shmita year, according to a report by Israel’s Ministry of Agriculture.

11
https://www.jns.org/shmita-sabbatical-year-puts-israels-sukkot-four-species-industry-in-a-bind/

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Shmita is a Torah commandment (Leviticus 25: 3-6) observed exclusively in the land of Israel. As
soon as the Jews settled in Israel, they began to count and observe seven-year cycles. Every cycle
would culminate in a sabbatical year—“shmita,” which literally translates as “release.” During that
year, Israeli farmers must completely desist from cultivating their fields. They also relinquish
personal ownership of their fields; whatever produce grows on its own is considered communal
property, free for anyone to take.

After the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, rabbis were forced to grapple with how to support
local farmers whose lives were built on working the land. One method is much like the one we see
on Passover, when Jews “sell” their chametz (leavened foods) to non-Jews but still keep it in their
homes. Then, the chametz is “returned” to its Jewish owners after the holiday.

In this instance, Jews “sell” their farms and/or orchards to non-Jewish neighbors and receive them
back (profits and all) in the fall, at the end of the shmita year. While this works for the majority of
Israelis—including the religious Zionist community—there are many Orthodox Jews in the U.S.
who instead will simply buy their produce from somewhere other than an Israeli source, rather
than risk a potential transgression of the shmita law.

Rabbi Yosef Carmel of the Israel-based Eretz Hemdah Institute for Advanced Jewish Studies says
those who choose not to buy Israeli produce during the shmita year are “stringent where they don’t
need to be stringent, because they don’t know the Jewish law.”

Carmel, working with rabbinic colleagues, has compiled an extensive Jewish response on the
subject detailing areas in the Torah that make clear “the special obligation to use a set of the four
species—etrog, lulav, boughs with leaves from a myrtle tree, and branches with leaves from a
willow tree—from Israel. This should be a consensus.”

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But there is not a consensus. Yeshiva University (YU) recently put out a primer that demonstrates
the complications and options for dealing with Israeli produce during the shmita year. In that
document, YU lists five ways farmers can handle shmita and explains that buyers need to decide
what makes sense for them based on each methodology’s pros and cons. It notes that many buyers
choose a combination of methods:

“Otzar Beit Din” requires non-Jews to work land and lots of rabbinic supervision, and ends up
being expensive.

“Yuval Nochri,” which promotes non-Jewish farmers, may negatively impact the Israeli
agricultural economy even beyond the shmita year and might at times indirectly support terrorism.

“Matza Menutak” means no privilege of eating “kedushat shevi’it” (produce grown on Jewish-
owned land during shmita, which has a holy status). Besides that, there are no issues!

“Havla’ah” is buying one non-shmita item and getting permission to buy one Israeli-grown item
as a result. In essence, “buy one, get one free.”

“Heter Mechira” is a less accepted method. Even its supporters say to use it only when no other
option is available. This method promotes non-Jewish agriculture, and it is unclear if the sale of
land to a non-Jew is even valid or permitted.

Steve Berger, president of the MyIsraelConnection.com tourism and product sales website, agrees
with Rabbi Carmel. His company has become a major distributor of the four species of Sukkot.
Berger tells JNS.org that while shmita “is a beautiful and ancient ideal that is at the heart of Jewish
tradition…it is not designed to create a situation where Jewish consumers are hurting the Israeli
economy.”

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Berger’s business partner, Micky Katzburg, supervises the Israeli distribution of the four species
for MyIsraelConnection.com. He has been selling the species as a fundraiser since he was a
religious Zionist youth leader in Israel and brought the business to the U.S. when he came as a
Jewish studies teacher several years ago. Katzburg and Berger explain that growth and sales of the
four species has become a major enterprise in Arab countries such as Egypt and Morocco, who are
now distributing these items to the U.S. They fear that if too much of the American purchases of
etrogim this year come from Morocco, the farmers there will be able to develop a farming
infrastructure faster and at a more competitive rate than their Israeli competitors, thereby
continuously seizing market share in the coming years. Moroccan farmers have reportedly planted
some 2,500 etrog trees in recent years in preparation for this year’s sale.

Israeli etrog exporter Kirshenbaum, meanwhile, says he wants to ensure that the mitzvah of using
the four species stays “pure and Jewish.”

“If the four species is just another business, they (the species) will lose their holiness,” says
Kirshenbaum. “Do you want your etrog to say ‘Made in China,’ or do you want the real thing from
the holy land of Israel?”

From neohasid.org, http://www.neohasid.org/stoptheflood/sukkot_in-between/ . For more Sukkot

teachings, including Egalitarian Ushpizin, at http://www.neohasid.org/zman/sukkot/ .

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 The Shaman’s Rainstick: The eco-Torah of Sukkot12
Rabbi David Mevorach Seidenberg writes:13

“When Israel was encamped, the pillar of cloud was…like a sukkah and made a canopy over
the tent (of meeting) from without, and filled the mishkan (inner sacntum) from within…and
this was one of the clouds of glory that served Israel forty years in the wilderness: one on their
right and one on their left and one before them and one behind them and one above them and
the cloud of the Shekhinah in-between them.”

B’raita Dim’lekhet Hamishkan, also in Yalkut Shimoni, Pekudei

In Kabbalah, God is called the soveiv kol almin, what surrounds all worlds, and the m’malei kol
almin, what fills all worlds. In this ancient midrash, the ultimate principle of God that fills and

12
creator of neohasid.org and author of Kabbalah and Ecology (Cambridge 2015)
13
http://www.neohasid.org/pdf/shamansrainstick.pdf

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surrounds all, the Shekhinah or the indwelling presence of God, takes the form of a pillar of cloud
that makes itself manifest within and around the mishkan, the dwelling place created for God. But
the midrash also tells us that the Shekhinah dwelt “between” the people of Israel – in other words,
that Shekhinah dwells on this earth when the people make a dwelling place for her “between them”,
that is, in their relationships and connections.

We will return to this idea below. First, let’s explore how the lulav itself draws God’s presence
into our lives and world.

Why a Lulav?

Sukkot is about water. Every day in ancient Israel, the priests poured water on the altar and
sung prayers asking for the blessings of water. The four species (arba minim) of the lulav are
all about water too: The lulav itself, the date palm, was the most water-loving plant of the
desert; the myrtle (hadas) needs the most water of the mountain plants; the etrog fruit among
agricultural trees requires the most rain to grow; and of course the “willow of the streams”
(arvei nachal) is synonymous with abundant water, often growing with their roots right in the
streams.

Each of these species represents one of the primary habitats of the land of Israel: the desert,
the mountain, the lowland (sh’feilah in Hebrew), and the river or riparian corridors. Each of
these types of habitat is distinguished by how much rainfall and how much groundwater are
found there.

Together, the four species make a kind of bioregional map of the land of Israel, and they each
hold in greatest abundance the rains that fell where they grow in the year that has passed. That’s
why the tips of each species, the pitom of the etrog, the unsplit central frond of the lulav, the
end leaves of the myrtle and the willow, cannot be dried out: it would be like praying for good
health while eating junk food.

Bringing these four species together, we wave them in all directions around us, up and down,
praying that the coming year will again bring enough water for each of these species to grow
and thrive, and with them all the species of each habitat. All the other explanations you may
have heard for the four lulav species (like, we wave them to show that “God is everywhere”,
or they represent “the spine, eyes, lips and heart”) are lovely midrashim, but this is the real
reason.

We are praying, fundamentally, for the climate, for the stability and sufficiency of the rain and
sunshine, on which depend every being living upon the land, whether plant or animal (or
fungus or bacteria). How can we make our prayers heard? We can make them heard by hearing
them ourselves. When we pray for abundance and sustenance while living in ways that destroy
our climate, it is like praying with a dried-out lulav, or worse, praying for health while eating
not just junk food, but poisons and toxins.

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We need to pray for abundance and sustenance, but we also need to pray for the wisdom and
ability to act consistently with our prayers, to change how we live so that we might live
sustainably on the earth. As the Torah enjoins us: Uvacharta bachayim! Choose life! Chabad-
style lulav w/extra hadasim.

2) Hoshanot

What does it mean to be a “nation of priests”? Abraham was told that through his descendants,
“all the families of the earth” would be blessed. If you look at the liturgy and at midrashic
teachings on Sukkot, you will see that this means praying for all other peoples and nations –
according to the midrash correspond, the seventy bull sacrifices brought over the holiday
correspond to the seventy nations. But it also includes, as we read in the Hoshanot prayers for
each day, the crops, the animals, the trees, the rains, and the sustenance of all the earth. We cry
out on each day, pleading for sustaining blessings for all of these:

“Please save human and animal! Please, save! Please save flesh and spirit and breathing!
Please save likeness and image and weave! Please save the ripe fruit, sweeten, and save!
Please save the clouds from withholding! Please the animals from miscarrying! Please save
the rooting of the breathing trees! Please save, Renew the face of the earth!”

What species and habitats need our special prayers this year? Some examples: Save the polar
bears from drowning; save the fireflies from becoming lost; save the honeybees from colony
collapse; save the coast live oaks from decay; save the old-growth redwoods from becoming
lumber; save the cloud forests from vanishing; save the seas from dead zones. Not all
environmental crises are our fault, but they are all exacerbated by the pressure, stress and loss
of habitat created by both climate change and by our use of more and more land for our
purposes (which also accelerates climate change).

What can each of us do to protect the particular species in our own locale and “bioregion”?
How do each of our actions and choices about what to buy and use and how to live affect
species in other places? Finding out the answers to these questions is part of what we need to
do to make our prayers real. All ecosystems are connected, and we cannot harm one without
harming the others, so any prayers we make for individual species or places are also prayers
for the whole Earth.

Our prayers help us to focus on this by asking us to be aware of the fragility of life, on the
fragility of all that is “suspended on nothingness”, t’luyah al b’li mah. Two of the lines from
the Hoshanot are especially striking: “Please save the soul from desperation! Please save what
is suspended upon nothingness! Hoshana nefesh mibehalah! Hoshana t’luyah al b’li mah!”
Behalah, desperation, can mean all the forces that turn us away from action, that make us
believe that we cannot make a difference. The way to save the soul from “behalah” is to fulfill
the mission described in the Hoshanot: to act as priests and pray on behalf of all the other
species, to fix what we can.

Part of this process includes mourning for what is being lost, and celebrating what remains.

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3) The month of Tishrei

We have been praying, fasting, purifying ourselves since the new moon of Rosh Hashanah, for
one overwhelming reason: to make ourselves ready and worthy to pray for the well-being and
fertility of the earth, the crops, the animals, and all the peoples. Only now, after we have
completed that process through Yom Kippur, can we start to say those prayers. That’s why the
tradition says the gates don’t really close until the last day of Sukkot, Hoshana Rabbah. That’s
why it’s traditional to wear a kittel on that day (kittel is the shroud many men some women
wear on Yom Kippur, as well as on their wedding day and in death), and why the Chazan
(cantor) may don a kittel the first time we say the prayers for rain, on the following day of
Sh’mini Atseret. On Yom Kippur, in the Sefardic prayers, there are long confessions that detail
every possible sin.

One of the sins confessed in this list, among such varied items like “I have misled people in
business” and “I ate outside a sukkah on Sukkot” is so very deep: “I have not chosen life / Lo
bacharti bachayim.” To do t’shuvah, repairing ourselves and returning to God, means to choose
life. Sukkot teaches us how.

4) S’khakh

If you know how to build a sukkah, you know that its roof is made of s’khakh, branches and
leaves. This is not only the essence of the sukkah, it is also the reason why it’s called a
“sukkah”. S’khakh can be made of anything that grows from the ground. To be s’khakh,
however, the material must both be cut off from the ground, and yet not manufactured into
something new and finished (e.g., one cannot use a woven grass mat). S’khakh can’t be held
together by wire, and it should not be tied down in any way. It should ideally rest on plain
wood, not metal. All these rules are referred to by the idea that s’khakh cannot be made of
anything that is “m’kabeil tuma”, that is able to become ritually impure.

An object can become “impure” or tamei only when it is fully part of the human world. So, for
example, if one is making a chair out of wood and has attached only three of the four legs, the
chair is not finished and it’s not able to become impure. The categories of ritual purity are
human constructs, as the Talmud explicitly acknowledges.

Nothing that is wholly part of Nature can become impure, and nothing that is in process of
being made into a human artifact, but that is unfinished, can become impure. (Nevertheless,
some materials, like metal, just by being extracted and refined, are considered part of the
human world, even before they are made into something specific.)

The essence of what it means for s’khakh to not be “m’kabeil tuma” is that it is in-between
Nature and the human world, neither attached to the ground nor manufactured or turned into a
human object: it is cut from the ground (or from a tree growing in the ground), but not yet re-
formed or shaped into something useful or woven or tied down.

The roof made of s’khakh represents many aspects of the “in-between”: the interface between
heaven and earth, the space between atmosphere and ground, the meeting place between us

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and God, but it also (and most importantly) represents the transitional space between Nature
and our human-made world. S’khakh is the “in-between”, the filter and screen through which
we experience the greater reality of divinity and nature. It also represents the atmosphere and
climate that gives us ran and tends and protects us, and it represents the fragility of that
protection.

Traditionally, s’khakh should cover more than half the area above the Sukkah by creating more
shade than light, but it should have openings throughout, smaller than a handbreadth, but big
enough to see some stars. At night with a light on in the Sukkah it may seem like there are
almost no openings. But what is unseen permeating what we see, like the stars that shine
through the sky and the s’khakh. Shefa, the blessing of overflowing abundance, pours in,
whether we are aware of it or not. The sukkah gives us the privilege and opportunity to sense
this happening. An essential aspect of Sukkot is to teach us to live in the “in-between”, to find
shelter and comfort in vulnerability and in making ourselves open to the elements, and to bear
witness to the Shekhinah-radiance that underlies all that we can experience. Being aware of
the fragile liminality of our separation from God and from Nature, right over our heads, is an
entry to thanksgiving, acceptance, and joy.

5) Shaking the lulav

We read in the midrash above: “When Israel was encamped, the pillar of cloud was…like a
sukkah and made a canopy over the tent from without, and filled the mishkan from
within…and this was one of the clouds of glory that served Israel forty years in the
wilderness: one on their right and one on their left and one before them and one behind
them and one above them and the cloud of the Shekhinah between them.”

We are surrounded by the divine presence, what is called “glory” or kavod in the Bible, or
Shekhinah in rabbinic and post-rabbinic Judaism. If the lulav is meant to draw down shefa and
blessing to the Earth and all creatures, then we shake or wave it in all directions both because
we want to draw blessing from all quarters of creation, and because we need to simultaneously
bring blessing to all quarters and corners of creation. Right and left, before and behind, up, and
down.

When we wave or shake the lulav toward the Earth, we are waving in the direction of all that
binds us together, all that we are made of, the direction of adamah, our substance, and
Shekhinah or Malkhut, according to Kabbalah. The Earth is one manifestation of Shekhinah,
which truly rests in the “inbetween”, in the relations between all creatures, in the “weave” of
creation, and in the weave of human caring. (Note that shaking the lulav down is the last
direction for most folks, but there are different orders for waving the lulav. For some Hasidim
and Mizrachi Jews, the last shake of the lulav is behind us, rather than down.)

Sukkot reminds us that our relationships are not just with other humans, but with the world
that is one step beyond the human, the more-than-human world that provides us with all that
we need. All creatures are our relations. Both the s’khakh and the lulav draw us by steps toward
the greater physical and spiritual reality which is the bed and bedrock of our lives. When we
pray for all creatures, as our tradition bids us do on Sukkot, we act this out ritually by shaking

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the lulav. We wave or shake the lulav three times in each direction, returning the lulav and
most especially the etrog after each shake to our hearts. A kavanah for each set of three shakes
could be to shake the first time to receive blessing from the direction, from all that could come
from there), the second time to send blessing to that direction (and all that dwell there), and
the third time to express gratitude or to unite our hearts in compassion with the One who cares
for all of them. It’s not enough to hope for blessing: we call for blessing by using our whole
bodies, using what we gather from the earth, and gesturing and dancing towards all the
directions. We need to make this physical gesture into a real prayer by purposefully acting
change our impact on the planet, to change ourselves, instead of changing the climate. What
we give to the Earth must also become a blessing. A blessing for all the families of the earth,
mishp’chot ha’adamah, all the tribes of species and genus, of region and ecosystem, all our
relations of earth and sea and sky. This is how we can choose to act, how we can measure our
actions, in an age of global climate change and uncertainty. This is how we should measure
government policies, community decisions, and justice itself.

This is how we can ask God to “renew the face of the ground” chidush p’nei ha’adamah, and
be answered. The final dimension of action is joy: V’hayita ach sameach! And you will rejoice!
The gates are still open, and the way through them is joy and service: both are the
characteristics of acting as priests to bring down blessing for all our relations. May we all be
blessed to rejoice, to receive the Shekhinah dwelling between us, in all our relationships, with
all the creatures of heaven and Earth.

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