Vitug v.
CA found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two
183 SCRA 755
Facts:
This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court
involving the probate of the two wills of the late Dolores Vitug,
who died on November 1980, naming private respondent Rowena
Faustino-Corona executrix. In our said decision, SC upheld the
appointment of Nenita Alonte as co-special administrator of Mrs.
Vitug’s estate with her widower, petitioner Romarico Vitug,
pending probate.
On January 1985, Romarico filed a motion asking for authority
from the probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real
properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his advances
to the estate in the sum of P667,731.66, plus interests, which he
claimed were personal funds.
On April 1985, Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground
that the same funds withdrawn from savings account no. 35342-
038 were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate,
and hence, there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement. She
also sought his ouster for failure to include the sums in question
for inventory and for “concealment of funds belonging to the
estate.”
Romarico insists that the said funds are his exclusive property
having acquired the same through a survivorship agreement
executed with his late wife and the bank on June 1970.
Issue:
WON the survivorship agreement is a will.
WON it is valid
Held:
The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa,
which should be embodied in a will. A will has been defined as “a
personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated
person disposes of his property and rights and declares or
complies with duties to take effect after his death. In other words,
the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. In this case,
the monies of the savings account in question were in the nature
of conjugal funds.
In this case, the savings account involved was in the nature of
conjugal funds. Since it was not shown that the funds belonged
exclusively to one party, it is presumed to be conjugal.
It is also not a donation inter vivos because it was to take effect
after the death of one party. It is also not a donation between
spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouse’s own
properties to the other.
It was an error to include the savings account in the inventory of
the deceased’s assets because it is the separate property of
Romarico.
Thus, Romarico had the right to claim reimbursement
A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a
capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and
declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death.
Survivorship agreements are permitted by the NCC. However, its
operation or effect must not be violative of the law (i.e. used as a
cloak to hide an inofficious donation or to transfer property in
fraud of creditors or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir).
Aluad v. Aluad
G.R. 176943
Facts:
Petitioner’s mother, Maria Aluad, and respondent Zenaido ALuad
were raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad and Crispin
Aluad. On November 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled
“Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos” in favor of
petitioners’ mother Maria, covering all the six lots which Matilde
inherited from her husband Crispin. On August 1991, Matilde sold
Lot No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property. Subsequently or on January 1992, Matilde executed a
last will and testament, devising Lot Nos. 675, 677 and 682 to
Maria, and her “remaining properties” including Lot No. 674 to
respondent.
RTC declared the plaintiffs as rightful owners but the CA reversed
the TC’s decision, it holding that the Deed of Donation was
actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it
had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will. Thus, it
witnesses and had no attestation clause which is not in
accordance with Art. 805 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
WON the Deed of Donation complied with the formalities of a will
Held:
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation “to become
effective upon the death of the DONOR” admits of no other
interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to
transfer the ownership of the 6 lots to petitioners’ mother during
her lifetime. Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved
in her the right to dispose them. That the donation is mortis causa
is fortified by Matilde’s acts of possession as she continued to pay
the taxes for the said properties which remained under her name;
appropriated the produce; and applied for free patents for which
OCTs were issued under her name. The donation being then
mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed
but they were note, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or
more witnesses following Art. 805 of the Civil Code. Further, the
witnesses did not even sign the attestation clause the execution of
which clause is a requirement separate from the subscription of
the will and the affixing of signatures on the left-hand margins of
the pages of the will.
Rabadilla v. CA
G.R. No. 113725
Facts:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the CA dated 23
December 1993, in CA-GR No. CV035555, which set aside the
decision of Branch 52 of the RTC in Bacolod City, and ordered the
defendants-appellees (including herein petitioner) as heirs of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with
its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix
Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the
herein petitioner, Johnny Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of
a parcel of land. The said Codicil, which was duly probated before
the CFI of Negros Occidental. Pursuant to the same Codicil, the
subject land was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
and the TCT thereto was issued in his name. Dr. Rabadilla died and
was survived by his wife Rufina and their children.
Respondent brought a complaint before the RTC in Bacolod City,
against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Rabadilla, to enforce the
provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the
defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil.
The plaintiff then prayed for the reconveyance/return of the
subject land to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza,
because it is alleged that petitioner failed to comply with the
terms of the will; that since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the
fruits; and that the land was mortgaged to the PNB, which is a
violation of the will.
Issue:
Won the private respondent has only a right of usufruct but not
the right to seize the property itself from the instituted heir
because the right to seize was expressly limited to violations by
the buyer, lessee or mortgagee
Held:
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the
face of the Will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the
testator’s intention is to be ascertained from the words of the
Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it
was made. Such construction as will substation and uphold the
Will in all its parts must be adopted.
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation
to deliver 100 piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella.
Such obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer; lessee, or mortgagee should
they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property
involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event that the
obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena shall
seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix’s near
descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation is thus
with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof
to the testatrix’s near descendants. Since the said obligation is
clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir
but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the
testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should
equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.
Seangio vs. Reyes
G.R. No. 140371-72
Facts:
Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio before RTC – Manila.
Petitioners opposed contending that Segundo left a holographic
Will disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio,
for cause, thus, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically
suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the
Will. A petition for the probate of the holographic Will of Segundo
was subsequently filed by petitioners before the RTC. Private
respondents moved for its dismissal on the ground that the
document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does
not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus
does not meet the definition of a will under Art. 783 of the Civil
Code as the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance and
nothing else. Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to
dismiss contending that disinheritance constitutes a disposition of
the estate of a decedent and that the rule on preterition does not
apply because Segundo’s will does not constitute a universal heir
or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs. The
RTC issued its order dismissing the petition for probate
proceedings as the will clearly shows that there is preterition since
the other heirs were omitted. Art. 854 of the NCC thus applies.
Petitioner filed a motion or reconsideration but was subsequently
denied.
Issue:
Whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered
as a holographic will
Held:
A holographic will, as provided under Art. 810 of the Civil Code,
must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the
testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made
in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundo’s documents, although it may initially come across as a
mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a
holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed
by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa
can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and
while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s
property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in
the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of
those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will
of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits
prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in
succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and
give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the
testator is contrary to law, morals or public policy that it cannot
be given effect.
Dizon-Rivera v. Dizon
G.R. No. L-24561
Facts:
IN 1961, Agripina Valdez (widow) died and was survived by seven
compulsory heirs: 6 legitimate children and 1 legitimate
granddaughter. Marina is the appellee while the others were the
appellants.
Valdez left a will executed in February 1960 and written in
Pampango dialect. The beneficiaries were the 7 compulsory heirs
and 6 grandchildren.
In her will, Valdez distributed and disposed of her properties
(assessed at P1.8M) which included real and personal properties
and shares of stocks at Pampanga Sugar Central Dev’t. Co.
During the probate proceedings, Marina (Appellee) was named
the executor of the deceased’s estate.
In her will, Valdez commanded that her property be divided in
accordance with her testamentary disposition where she devised
and bequeathed specific real properties comprising almost her
entire estate among her heirs. Based on the partition Marina and
Tomas were to receive more than the other heirs.
Subsequently, Marina filed her project of partition adjudicating
the estate as follows: a) the legitime computed for each
compulsory heir was P129,254.96, which was comprised of cash
and/or properties specifically given to them based on the will; b)
Marina and Tomas were adjudicated the properties that they
received in the will less the cash/properties to complete their
respective legitime.
The other heirs opposed the partition and proposed a counter-
partition on the estate where Marina and Tomas were to receive
considerably less.
The lower court approved the executor’s project of partition citing
that Arts. 906 and 907, NCC specifically provide that when the
legitime is impaired or prejudiced. The same shall be completed.
The court cited that if the proposition of the oppositors was
upheld, it will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy
which is a violation of Art. 791, NCC.
Issue:
WON the will of the deceased is to be considered controlling in
this case
Held:
Art. 788 and 791 of the Civil Code states that “If a testamentary
disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt,
the interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall
be preferred” and “The words of a will are to receive an
interpretation which will give to every expression some effect,
rather than one which will render any of the expressions
inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be
preferred which will prevent intestacy. “In Villanueva v. Juico, for
violation of these rules of interpretation as well as of Rule 123,
Section 59 of the Rules of Court, the Court, speaking through
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the lower court’s decision and
stressed that “the intention and wishes of the testator, when
clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of
interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its
execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance
therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator’s
words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise.
In re Will of Rev. Abadia
G.R. No. L-7188
Facts:
Andres Enriquez, as one of the legatees in a document purporting
to be the last will and testament of Father Sancho Abadia, which
was executed on Sept. 1923, filed a petition for its probate. Some
cousins and nephews of the deceased, who would inherit his
estate if he left no will, filed opposition. The trial court ruled in
favor of Enriquez, stating that even if the said document is a
holographic will, one which is not permitted by law at the time it
was executed and at the same time of the testator’s death, such
form of a will is already allowed at the time of the hearing of the
case since the NCC is already enforced, and that to carry out the
intention of the testator which according to the trial court is
controlling factor and may override any defect in form. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether the reckoning period in deciding the validity of the
holographic will of Rev. Sanchio, the time of the hearing of the
case shall be considered and not the time of its execution
Held:
No. the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforced at
the time of the testator’s death or at the time the supposed will is
presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by
the court but by the time the instrument was executed, as
supported by Art. 795 of the NCC. One reason in support of the
rule is that although the will operates upon and after the death of
the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of
his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn
expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the
legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act.
When one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe
and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then
upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died
intestate, an his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession and
no subsequent law with more liberal requirements for which
dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be
allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of
their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The
general rule is that the Legislature cannot validate void wills.
Hence, the Trial court’s decision was reversed.
In re will of Jose Riosa
G.R. No. L-14074

Facts:
Jose Riosa made a will in January 1908, disposing of his entire
estate. The will was executed according to the law in force at that
time, complying with all the requisites then required. He died on
April 1917. However, between the execution of the will and his
death, the law on formalities on execution of wills was amended
by Act. 2645. It added formalities required such as signatures on
each page of the will. The new law, therefore, went into effect
after the making of the will and before the death of the testator,
without the testator having left a will that conforms to the new
requirements.

Issue:
WON the will is valid

Held:

Yes. The validity of the execution of a will must be the statutes in

force at the time of its execution and statutes subsequently
enacted have no retroactive effect.

All statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective

operation unless the intention of the Legislature to give them a
retroactive effective is expressly declared or is necessarily implied
from the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must
be resolved against the retrospective effect.

The language of Act. No. 2645 gives no indication of retroactive

effect. Such, likewise, has been the uniform tendency of the SC on
cases having special application to testamentary succession.

Our statute announces a positive rule for the transference of

property which must be complied with as a completed act at the
time of the execution, so far as the act of the testator is
concerned, as to all testaments made subsequent to the
enactment of Act No. 2645, but is not effective as to testaments
made antecedent to that date.

The court considered 3 views in addressing the issue:

a. Validity of wills are tested by the laws in force at the time

of death of the testator (considered the right of one to
make a will as an inchoate right). This view was rejected by
the court. “the act of bequeathing or devising is something
more than inchoate or ambulatory. In reality, it becomes a
completed act when the will is executed and attested
according to the law, although it does not take effect on the
property until a future time.”
b. Validity of wills must be tested by statutes in force at the
time of execution. This view is the one adopted by SC
c. Statutes relating to the execution of wills, when they
increase the necessary formalities, should be construed so
as not to impair the validity of a will already made and,
when they lessen the formalities required, should be
construed so as to aid wills defectively executed according
the law in force at the time of their making.