Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The Globa Rrisks Report 2020
The Globa Rrisks Report 2020
Report 2020
Infrastructure Blow up in Asset price Asset price Storms and Income disparity Income disparity Income Interstate Involuntary Extreme Extreme Extreme Extreme
breakdown asset prices collapse collapse cyclones disparity conflict migration weather weather weather weather
1st
Chronic Middle East China economic China economic Flooding Fiscal Fiscal Extreme Extreme Extreme Involuntary Natural Climate action Climate action
diseases instability slowdown slowdown imbalances imbalances weather weather weather migration disasters failure failure
2nd
Oil price shock Failed and Chronic Chronic Corruption Greenhouse gas Greenhouse Unemployment Failure of Climate action Natural Cyberattacks Natural Natural
3rd failing states diseases disease emissions gas emissions national failure disasters disasters disasters
governance
China hard Oil price shock Global Fiscal crises Biodiversity loss Cyberattacks Water crises Climate action State collapse Interstate Terrorist Data fraud Data fraud Biodiversity loss
4th landing governance failure or crisis conflict attacks or theft or theft
gaps
Blow up in Chronic Deglobalization Global Climate change Water crises Population Cyberattacks Unemployment Natural Data fraud Climate action Cyberattacks Human-made
asset prices diseases (emerging) governance ageing catastrophes or theft failure environmental
5th gaps disasters
Blow up in Blow up in Asset price Asset price Fiscal crises Financial failure Financial failure Fiscal crises Water crises Climate action Weapons of Weapons of Weapons of Climate action
asset prices asset prices collapse collapse failure mass mass mass failure
1st destruction destruction destruction
Deglobalization Deglobalization Deglobalization Deglobalization Climate change Water crises Water crises Climate action Infectious Weapons of Extreme Extreme Climate action Weapons of
(developed) (developed) (developed) failure diseases mass weather weather failure mass
2nd destruction destruction
Interstate China hard Oil and gas Oil price spikes Geopolitical Food crises Fiscal Water crises Weapons of Water crises Water crises Natural Extreme Biodiversity loss
3rd and civil wars landing price spike conflict imbalances mass disasters weather
destruction
Pandemics Oil price shock Chronic Chronic Asset price Fiscal Weapons of Unemployment Interstate Involuntary Natural Climate action Water crises Extreme
diseases disease collapse imbalances mass conflict migration disasters failure weather
4th destruction
Oil price shock Pandemics Fiscal crises Fiscal crises Energy Energy Climate action Infrastructure Climate action Energy price Climate action Water crises Natural Water crises
price volatility price volatility failure breakdown failure shock failure disasters
5th
4.0 Climate
Climate a action
ction
ffailure
ailure
Weapons
W eapons ooff m
mass
ass
destruction
destruction
Biodiversity lloss
Biodiversity oss
Extreme weather
Extreme weather
Water c
Water crises
rises
Information
Information Natural disasters
Natural disasters
iinfrastructure
nfrastructure Cyberattacks
Cyberattacks
breakdown
b reakdown
Infectious d
Infectious diseases
iseases Human-made
H uman-made
environmental disasters
environmental d isaster
Interstate
Interstate Global
G governance
lobal g overnance
conflict
confl
fliict failure
failure
Food c
Food crises
rises
3.5
Financial
Financial ffailure
a i lu r e
3.47
average Fiscal
Fiscal crises
crises Involuntary migration
Involuntary m igration
2.5 Data fraud
Data orr ttheft
fraud o heft
Unemployment
U n e mp l o y me n t Asset bubbles
Asset b u b b le
Social
Social instability
instability
Critical
Critical infrastructure
infrastructure National
N ational
ffailure
a ilu re governance
governance
failure
failure
State ccollapse
State ollapse
Terrorist
Terrorist attacks
attacks Adverse
Adverse technological
technological
advances
advances
Energy
Energy price
price shock
s h oc k
Unmanageable inflation
Unmanageable infl
flaation
3.0
Failure of
urban planning
Impact
Deflation
Illicit
Illicit ttrade
ra d e
Likelihood 5.0
Source: World Economic Forum Global Risks Note: Survey respondents were asked to assess the likelihood of the individual global risk on a scale of
Note: Survey respondents were asked to assess the likelihood of the individual global risk on a scale of 1 to 5, 1
Source: World
Perception Survey Economic
2019–2020.Forum Global Risks 1representing
to 5, 1 representing a risk that is very unlikely to happen and 5 a risk that is very likely to occur. They
a risk that is very unlikely to happen and 5 a risk that is very likely to occur. They also assess the impact
Perception Survey 2019–2020. also assessed
on each theonimpact
global risk a scale of each
of 1 global
to 5 (1: riskimpact,
minimal on a scale ofimpact,
2: minor 1 to 5,3:1moderate
representing
impact,a 4:
minimal impactand
severe impact and 5 a
catastrophic
5: catastrophicimpact.
impact). ToSeeensure
Appendixlegibility, thedetails.
B for more names To of the legibility,
ensure global risks are abbreviated;
the names seeare
of the global risks Appendix A for
abbreviated;
the full nameseeand Appendix A for the full name and description.
description.
The Global Shapers Risks Landscape 2020
Figure III: The Global Shapers Risk Landscape 2020
Economic Environmental
Climate Biodiversity
action failure loss
Extreme
Human-made
weather
environmental
disasters Natural disasters
4.0 4.0
Critical
4.
Unemployment
Financial infra-
failure structure
failure Fiscal crises
Unmanageable
inflation Asset bubbles
Deflation
Illicit trade
3.0 3.0
Impact
Geopolitical Societal
Water crises
Weapons of
mass destruction
Food 3.
crises
Infectious
diseases
4.0 Interstate 4.0
conflict
Terrorist State
attacks collapse Global governance failure Involuntary
migration
National Failure of
governance urban planning
failure
3.5 3.5
Social instability
3.0 3.0
Impact
Technological Respondents 3.
Cyberattacks
Multistakeholder Shapers
4.0 Information
infrastructure
breakdown
Data fraud or theft
The Global
The Global Shapers
Shapers Community
Communityisisthe
theWorld
World
Economic Forum’s network
Economic Forum’s networkof
ofyoung
youngpeople
people
3.5 driving dialogue, action
driving dialogue, actionand
andchange.
change.
Adverse
technological
advances Source: World Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey 2019–2020.
Note: We applied the same completion thresholds to survey responses from the
Global Shapers as to the multi-stakeholder sample (see Appendix B: Global Risks
3.0 Note: We applied the same completion thresholds to survey responses from the
Impact
2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 “Assessment of Global Risks”. The data for Part 3 “Global Risk Interconnections”
Likelihood were not used.
Figure IV: The Global Risks Interconnections Map 2020
The Global Risks Interconnections Map 2020
Natural d
Natural disasters
isasters
.0
E
Extreme
xtreme w
weather
eather Human-made
H uman-made
environmental disaster
environmental
disasters
Infectious diseases
Infectious diseases
Food c
Food crises
rises B
Biodiversity
iodiversity lloss
oss
F
Failure
ailure o
off
u
urban
rban planning
planning
G lobal
Global
ggovernance
overnance Weapons
Weapons of
d
of mass
mass
destruction
estruction
ffailure
ailure
Water c
Water crises
rises Climate
C limate action
action
failure
failure
Critical
Critical infrastructure
infrastructure
.5 failure
failure
Average
IInterstate
nterstate
3.47 Involuntary
Involuntary migration
migration c
conflict
onfl
fliict
IInformation
nformation National
National
iinfrastructure
nfrastructure governance
governance
breakdown
breakdown failure
failure Illicit
Illicit trade
trade
Cyberattacks
Cyberattacks
Social
Social instability
instability
Terrorist attacks
Terrorist attacks
State
State collapse
collapse
D
Data
ata fraud
fraud A
Adverse
dverse ttechnological
echnological
o
orr theft
theft a
advances
dvances Energy price
Energy price shock
shock
Unemployment
Unemployment
Fiscal crises
Fiscal crises
F
Financial
inancial failure
failure
.0 U
Unmanageable
nmanageable iinflation
nfla
flation
Asset
Assetbubbles
bubble Deflation
Defl
flaation
Source: World Economic Forum Global Risks Note: Survey respondents were asked to select up to six pairs of global risks they believe to be most
Note: Survey respondents were asked to select up to six pairs of global risks they believe to be most interconnected.
PerceptionWorld
Source: SurveyEconomic
2019–2020.Forum Global Risks See interconnected. Seedetails.
Appendix B for more Appendix B oflegibility,
To ensure the fullthe
report
namesforofmore details.
the global risks To
are ensure legibility,
abbreviated; the the names
see Appendix A for of
Perception Survey 2019–2020. fullglobal
names risks are abbreviated; see Appendix A for the full name and description.
and descriptions.
The Global Risks
Report 2020
15th Edition
Strategic Partners
Marsh & McLennan
Zurich Insurance Group
Academic Advisers
National University of Singapore
Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford
Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center, University of Pennsylvania
Contents
Preface CHAPTER 3 CHAPTER 6
CHAPTER 4
CHAPTER 1 Appendices
Save the Axolotl Appendix A: Descriptions of
Global Risks 2020: Dangers of Accelerated Global Risks 2020
An Unsettled World 8 Biodiversity Loss Appendix B: Global Risks Perception
Survey and Methodology 84
In collaboration with the Platform
for Global Public Goods 44
CHAPTER 2
4 Preface
be more ambitious when it comes to climate McLennan and Zurich Insurance Group,
action, the UN has warned that countries who offered invaluable input to produce
have veered off course when it comes to this publication. I am also grateful to our
meeting their commitments under the Paris academic partners: the National University
Agreement on climate change. of Singapore, the Oxford Martin School of
the University of Oxford, and the Wharton
And on global health and technology, we Risk Management and Decision Processes
caution that international systems have Center at the University of Pennsylvania.
not kept up to date with the challenges of Over the course of developing the report,
these domains. The global community is the Forum benefited from a committed
ill-positioned to address vulnerabilities that Advisory Board, who shaped the direction
have come alongside the advancements of early drafts and provided beneficial
of the 20th century, whether they be the comments and insight throughout the
widening application of artificial intelligence writing process. The Forum also hosted a
or the widespread use of antibiotics. range of representatives from the public and
private sectors in September and October
Today’s risk landscape is being shaped for discussions in Geneva, New York and
in significant measure by an unsettled Washington, DC, insights from which can
geopolitical environment—one in which be found in these pages.
new centres of power and influence are
forming—as old alliance structures and The foundation of the report is our
global institutions are being tested. While annual Global Risks Perception Survey,
these changes can create openings for new completed by approximately 800 members
partnership structures, in the immediate of the Forum’s diverse communities. I am
term, they are putting stress on systems of particularly proud that for the first time we
coordination and challenging norms around are also featuring the results from more
shared responsibility. Unless stakeholders than 200 members of our Global Shapers
adapt multilateral mechanisms for this Community—a generation of emerging
turbulent period, the risks that were once global social entrepreneurs and leaders.
on the horizon will continue to arrive. This younger generation is increasingly
using its digital savviness—and its feet—to
The good news is that the window for action is spotlight issues, particularly relating to
still open, if not for much longer. And, despite climate change, that it sees as existential
global divisions, we continue to see members risks not only to its generation but to the
of the business community signal their wider global community.
commitment to looking beyond their balance
sheets and towards the urgent priorities ahead. The Global Risks Report is part of an
expanded Global Risks Initiative launched
by the Forum this past year that includes
The Global Risks Initiative sustained analysis at the global, regional
and industry levels. It is this qualitative and
It is fitting that this year’s report, which quantitative study of global risks, conducted
makes clear the need for a multistakeholder in partnership with members of the business,
approach to mitigating risk, coincides academic and public-sector communities,
with the Forum’s 50th anniversary. As the that we hope will help bring stakeholders
international organization for public-private together in developing sustainable,
cooperation, the Forum brings together integrated solutions to the world’s most
leaders from the business, government and pressing challenges.
non-profit communities for action-oriented
deliberations and uses the conclusions of
this report to inform its multistakeholder
initiatives throughout the year.
6 Executive Summary
environmental consequences. The near- technology governance framework and
term impacts of climate change add up to cyber insecurity all pose significant risk.
a planetary emergency that will include loss Geopolitical and geo-economic uncertainty—
of life, social and geopolitical tensions and including the possibility of fragmented
negative economic impacts. cyberspace—also threaten to prevent the
full potential of next generation technologies
For the first time in the history of the Global from being realized. Respondents to our
Risks Perception Survey, environmental survey rated “information infrastructure
concerns dominate the top long-term breakdown” as the sixth most impactful risk
risks by likelihood among members of the in the years until 2030.
World Economic Forum’s multistakeholder
community; three of the top five risks by
impact are also environmental (see Figure I, Health systems under
The Evolving Risks Landscape 2007–2020). new pressures
“Failure of climate change mitigation and
adaption” is the number one risk by impact Health systems around the world are at
and number two by likelihood over the next risk of becoming unfit for purpose. New
10 years, according to our survey. Members vulnerabilities resulting from changing
of the Global Shapers Community—the societal, environmental, demographic and
Forum’s younger constituents—show technological patterns threaten to undo the
even more concern, ranking environmental dramatic gains in wellness and prosperity
issues as the top risks in both the short that health systems have supported over the
and long terms. last century. Non-communicable diseases—
such as cardiovascular diseases and mental
The Forum’s multistakeholder network illness—have replaced infectious diseases as
rate “biodiversity loss” as the second most the leading cause of death, while increases
impactful and third most likely risk for the in longevity and the economic and societal
next decade. The current rate of extinction costs of managing chronic diseases have
is tens to hundreds of times higher than the put healthcare systems in many countries
average over the past 10 million years—and under stress. Progress against pandemics is
it is accelerating. Biodiversity loss has critical also being undermined by vaccine hesitancy
implications for humanity, from the collapse and drug resistance, making it increasingly
of food and health systems to the disruption difficult to land the final blow against some
of entire supply chains. of humanity’s biggest killers. As existing
health risks resurge and new ones emerge,
humanity’s past successes in overcoming
Consequences of health challenges are no guarantee of
digital fragmentation future results.
OLASER/GETTY IMAGES
The world cannot wait for the fog of address pressing challenges. On key issues
geopolitical and geo-economic uncertainty to such as the economy, the environment,
lift. Opting to ride out the current period in the technology and public health, stakeholders
hope that the global system will “snap back” must find ways to act quickly and with
runs the risk of missing crucial windows to purpose within an unsettled global landscape.
9
REUTERS/JEAN-PAUL PELISSIER
Powerful economic, demographic and addressed through cooperative institutions
technological forces are shaping a new and in ways that sought to minimize
balance of power. The result is an interruptions to cooperation for global
unsettled geopolitical landscape—one economic progress. And some have argued
in which states are increasingly viewing that greater economic interconnectedness
opportunities and challenges through a and interdependence in the last 20 years—
unilateral lens. What were once givens fostered by multilateral institutions—has
regarding alliance structures and multilateral acted as a check on great power conflict.1
systems no longer hold as states question
the value of longstanding frameworks, But new dynamics—in certain cases,
adopt more nationalist postures in pursuit underlying forces that are the result of
of individual agendas and weigh the progress over the last three decades—are
potential geopolitical consequences of causing states to re-evaluate their approach
economic decoupling. to geopolitics. Today’s emerging economies
are expected to comprise six of the world’s
Beyond the risk of conflict, if stakeholders seven largest economies by 2050.2 Rising
concentrate on immediate geostrategic powers are already investing more in
advantage and fail to reimagine or adapt projecting influence around the world.3 And
mechanisms for coordination during this digital technologies are redefining what it
unsettled period, opportunities for action on means to exert global power.4 As these trends
key priorities will slip away. are unfolding, a shift in mindset is also taking
place among some stakeholders—from
multilateral to unilateral and from cooperative
Turbulence: The new normal to competitive. The resulting geopolitical
turbulence is one of unpredictability about
For much of the post–Cold War period, all who is leading, who are allies, and who will
but a few societies shared the aspiration end up the winners and losers.
of stable development in the context of
formally agreed (if not universally observed) As states respond to the challenges and
rules governed by multilateral institutions. opportunities offered by today’s epochal
Geopolitical challenges—from border power-shift, some view multilateral
conflicts to terrorist attacks—were often institutions as obstacles rather than
Populist and nativist agendas 75.7% Loss of trust in media sources 77.1%
Source: World Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey 2019-2020. See Appendix B for details.
degradation, but by exploiting the region for but did present a strategy in which the
geostrategic advantage. The Arctic Council, “end-state for the Arctic is a secure and
which for more than 20 years has served stable region in which U.S. national security
as an important multilateral mechanism interests are safeguarded.”17
for collaboration among the eight Arctic
States, is under stress. A new cold war is The digital frontier
developing as countries—including China, Both sets of respondents to the Global Risks
Norway, Russia and the United States— Perception Survey—the multistakeholder
compete for fish, gas and other natural community and the Global Shapers—identify
resources; for the use of new shipping lanes; cyber-related issues, such as cyberattacks
and to establish a strategic footprint in the and data fraud or theft, within the list of top
region.15 Russia and China have prioritized 10 long-term risks (see Figure 1.2). Indeed,
developing the Northern Sea Route, with while the growth of digitalization offers
the latter dubbing its initiative the “Polar Silk opportunities that can best be captured
Road”.16 The U.S. Department of Defense through coordinated approaches among
released its Arctic strategy in July; that stakeholders, it also creates areas in need
document did not mention climate change of coordinated solutions.
78 % Respondents
expecting “economic
confrontations” to
increase in 2020
However, the trend today is not one in which There are signs of adaptation in the
these two countries are just competing creation of new institutions designed
across common domains but one in which to function in this turbulent geopolitical
each is looking to design its own systems— climate. One example is the Franco-German
its own supply chains, 5G networks and “Alliance for Multilateralism”, a group of
global investment institutions. Already nations working to boost international
investment flows between the two have cooperation in areas such as disarmament,
dropped,28 each has moved to restrict digitalization and climate change.33 Another
technology from the other,29 and some is the African Continental Free Trade
analysts predict China will look to reduce Agreement, which will bring together the
its dependence on the US dollar by holding 55 member states of the African Union to
more foreign currencies.30 form the largest free trade area since the
formation of the WTO.34 Narrower, issue-
Even if the current trade tensions cool, specific, ad-hoc “coalitions of the willing”
we risk heading towards an era in which are proliferating—including Asian regional
the two countries disentangle their trade and investment instruments, the
economies and create barriers between “Quad” (consultation among Australia,
one another. While leaders in Beijing and India, Japan and the United States), and
Washington have expressed disapproval the Global Coalition against Daesh. While
of an economic decoupling, the policy aiming to address collective priorities,
measures being put in place are paving a however, such adaptive approaches run
road towards that destination.31 the risk of being less effective because
they lack the legitimacy of broad-based
A return to a kind of cold war or iron curtain multilateral institutions. Still, they point to
economic landscape would fundamentally the need for continued coordination and
change the way in which global business partnership during an unsettled time.
5 Lipton, D. 2018 “Trust and the Future of 13 Manzanaro, S. S. 2019. “COP25 in Madrid:
Multilateralism”. Introductory Remarks for the UN Secretary-General Guterres Says Planet
Eurofi High Level Seminar, IMF First Deputy Is ‘Close to a Point of No Return.’” Euronews.
Managing Director David Lipton, 30 April 3 December 2019. https://www.euronews.
2018. International Monetary Fund. https:// com/2019/12/02/live-un-leaders-and-
www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/04/30/ delegates-arrive-in-madrid-for-the-climate-
sp042618-trust-and-the-future-of- change-summit
multilateralism
14 Temko, N. 2018. “COP24: Nationalism and
6 Edelman. 2019. “2019 Edelman Trust the Challenge of Climate Change”. The
Barometer”. 20 January 2019. Edelman. Christian Science Monitor. 27 November
https://www.edelman.com/trust-barometer 2018. https://www.csmonitor.com/
World/2018/1127/COP24-Nationalism-and-
7 IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2019. the-challenge-of-climate-change
World Economic Outlook, October 2019:
Global Manufacturing Downturn, Rising 15 Shea, N. 2019. “Scenes from the New
Trade Barriers. Washington, DC: IMF. Cold War Unfolding at the Top of the
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/ World”. National Geographic. 8 May 2019.
Issues/2019/10/01/world-economic-outlook- https://www.nationalgeographic.com/
october-2019 environment/2018/10/new-cold-war-brews-
as-arctic-ice-melts/
8 WTO (World Trade Organization). 2019.
“Global Trade Growth Loses Momentum as 16 Reuters. 2019. “Maersk Explores Arctic
Trade Tensions Persist”. Press Release, 2 Shipping Route with Russia”. Reuters
April 2019. World Trade Organization. https:// Business News. 14 June 2019. https://
www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres19_e/ www.reuters.com/article/us-arctic-
pr837_e.htm; “WTO lowers trade forecast shipping-maersk/maersk-explores-
as tensions unsettle global economy”. Press arctic-shipping-route-with-russia-
Release, 1 October 2019. https://www.wto. idUSKCN1TF0WW#targetText=Russia%20
org/english/news_e/pres19_e/pr840_e.htm has%20made%20developing%20
the,route%20the%20northern%20Suez%2-
9 Reuters. 2019. “Factbox: What Is Actually in 0Canal
the U.S.-China ‘Phase One’ Trade Deal?” 16
December 2019. Reuters Business News. 17 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa- for Policy. 2019. Report to Congress:
trade-china-details-factbox/factbox-what-is- Department of Defense Arctic Strategy”.
actually-in-the-us-china-phase-one-trade- June 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/
deal-idUSKBN1YK1QT Jun/06/2002141657/-1/-1/1/2019-DOD-
ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF
19
The global economy is at risk of stagnation. Going forward, rising trade tensions, lower
Rising trade barriers, lower investment and investment, weak confidence and high debt
high debt are straining economies around risk a prolonged slowdown of the world
the world. The margins for monetary and economy. At the time of writing this report,
fiscal stimuli are narrower than before the IMF had lowered its last five estimates
the 2008–2009 financial crisis, creating of world output for 2019 and expected a
uncertainty about how well countercyclical growth rate of 3.0%—a sharp decline from
policies will work. This uncertainty is 3.6% in 2018 and the slowest since the 1.7%
exacerbated by a tense geo-economic contraction in 2009.3 For 2020, the IMF had
and geopolitical landscape (see Chapter also downgraded its forecast from 3.7% to
1, Global Risks 2020), as well as by 3.4% (see Figure 2.1).
domestic challenges. Profound citizen
discontent—born of disapproval of the way Trade tensions
governments are addressing economic and “Economic confrontations between major
social challenges—has sparked protests powers” is the most concerning risk for
throughout the world, potentially weakening 2020, according to members of the Forum’s
the ability of governments to take decisive multistakeholder community; this is the
action should a downturn occur. same risk our multistakeholder network
rated as the top risk last year. It is clear why
short-term economic risks ranked high in
the Global Risks Perception Survey: global
Economic risk factors are trade, which for decades has been an
engine for growth, is slowing down. World
compounding with Trade Organization (WTO) data for the first
three quarters of 2019 shows that total
widespread domestic world merchandise trade decreased 2.9%
from the previous year (see Figure 2.2)—it
discontent towards decreased in the world’s top ten traders.4
600
3.7%
3.6% 3.6% 500
3.5% 400
3.4%
3.5% 300
200
3.3%
100
3.2%
0
3.0% 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Source: IMF. 2018 and 2019. World Economic Outlooks and Source: World BankOpen Data, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.
quarterly updates. CD.WD?end=2018&locations=CN-XC-US&start=2009&view=chart, accessed 15
December 2019.
FIGURE 2.2
-0.6%
-1.4%
-2.9%
-2.6% -2.4% -2.4%
World total
-3.3%
-4.4%
-4.7%
-7.5% -7.4%
Hong S. Korea Germany Italy Japan Netherlands France China United United
Kong Kingdom States
Source: World Economic Forum estimates from WTO data, https://data.wto.org/, accessed 8 January 2020.
95 %
burdens” as a key vulnerability in the global
financial system.14
rate to a historic low of -0.50% in September has increased every year since the 2008–
2019.18 The Bank of Japan’s deposit rate 2009 crisis.24 Researchers from the ECB
has remained at -0.10% since February analysed four decades worth of data from
2016.19 Such low rates raise concerns about 17 European countries and concluded that
the soundness of banking systems. The fiscal stimuli may not be effective when
ECB has warned that decreasing profits are public debt is high.25
challenging Europe’s banking sector;20 in the
second quarter of 2019, European banks At the same time, tax rates have increased
yielded an average return-to-equity of 7.0%,21 across G20 economies—their average
compared to 12.1% in the United States.22 maximum income tax rate has risen by
more than two percentage points since
The role and reach of monetary policies are 2009, to 37.7%.26 Lowering tax rates could
also challenged by wider factors such as be a potential stimulus measure, but strong
technological change, climate change and political and social pressure may arise as
rising inequality. Christine Lagarde, President these monies are often used for public
of the ECB, for example, announced a services that attempt to combat inequality.
“strategic review” of the ECB’s mandate to
preserve price stability to “address the major Higher debt and economic stagnation help to
changes that have taken place over the explain why “fiscal crises” are the top-rated
course of the last 16 years”—when the last risk for businesses globally over the next
such review was conducted.23 10 years—according to our Executive
Opinion Survey.27 In the current global
Fiscal constraints context, weak public finances have two
The margin for fiscal stimulus in most of the implications: they jeopardize whatever
world’s main economies has narrowed, as remaining margin governments have to
higher spending has reduced budget coffers. address a recession, and they could
Public debt in 15 of the 20 largest economies aggravate already hard-felt social tensions
REUTERS/DAMIR SAGOLJ
to change its policy. Chile is one of the forced the government to cancel the Asia-
fastest growing and most stable Latin Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and
American economies, and it is becoming COP25 summits scheduled to take place in
less unequal: its Gini coefficient—the most Santiago.35 Hong Kong’s economy contracted
widely used measure of income inequality— by 3.2% in the third quarter of 2019, with the
fell from 0.57 in 1990 to 0.47 in 2017. Government Economist stating that “local
Nonetheless, it still has the second highest social incidents dealt [it] a very severe blow”.36
Gini coefficient among OECD members,
well above the OECD average of 0.32.31 The profound political consequences of
In Hong Kong, the recent months-long inequality can also undermine economic
demonstrations on political issues have growth by making a country harder to
also been aggravated by inequality: at 0.54, govern—in ways ranging from legislative
Hong Kong’s Gini coefficient is at its highest impasses to complete government
level in 45 years, significantly above those paralysis. This risk is accentuated by the
of China (0.39) or the United States (0.42). decentralized and spontaneous nature
As Andrew Sheng and Xiao Geng have of recent demonstrations: with pop-up
argued, “a powerful, but oft-ignored factor protests, it is difficult for governments to
underlying the frustrations of Hong Kong’s negotiate with demonstrators and develop
people is inequality.”32 concrete measures to meet their demands.
During 2019, distinctive issues exacerbated
In Lebanon, where the Gini coefficient is by inequality forced the reshuffling of the
0.51, nation-wide protests were triggered entire presidential cabinet in Chile and the
by the government’s decision to impose resignation of the heads of state in Bolivia,
a tax on the popular communication app Iraq and Lebanon.
WhatsApp. In Iraq, protests began in
October—mostly led by people from the According to our expert community,
disenfranchised working class and middle- “domestic political polarization” is the second
income groups—over issues of corruption, risk most likely to increase in 2020—up from
unemployment and demands for access to ninth in 2019. Our global business community
basic public services. also ranked “failure of national governance”
as the sixth most concerning risk for doing
Economic and political consequences business over the next 10 years.
Inequality hinders growth and damages
macroeconomic fundamentals, as the IMF
has pointed out: it slows down economic Stakeholder capitalism
activities and casts doubt on a country’s
stability.33 This damages investor confidence The World Economic Forum has argued
and undermines political capital—both since 1970 for the need to consider social
fundamental conditions for prosperity, well-being alongside economic gains.
especially in times of economic volatility. Unless the global economic system is
In France, for example, the persistence of reformed to be more socially conscious,
the “gilets jaunes” movement had caused the twin risks of prolonged slowdown and
businesses more than US$11.4 billion in stronger defiance towards the current
losses by December 2019 and complicated economic model will continue to exacerbate
the government’s plans for economic revival. each other. Economic growth, political will
At the time of writing this report, growth in and social stability will be fundamental to
France was expected to slow from 1.7% in ensure a prompt and smooth transition to
2018 to 1.3% in 2020.34 The protests in Chile a more cohesive and sustainable model of
cost businesses over US$1.4 billion and “stakeholder capitalism”.37
1 Gopinath, G. 2019. “The World Economy: 11 Mbaye, S. and M. Moreno Badia. 2019.
Synchronized Slowdown, Precarious “New Data on Global Debt”. IMFBlog
Outlook”. IMFBlog post. 15 October 2019. post. 02 January 2019. https://blogs.imf.
https://blogs.imf.org/2019/10/15/the- org/2019/01/02/new-data-on-global-debt/
world-economy-synchronized-slowdown-
precarious-outlook/ 12 Bloomberg. 2019. “China’s Debt Ratio Is
Growing as Its Economy Loses Steam”.
2 OECD Data. Quarterly GDP – Total, Percent Bloomberg News. 16 July 2019. https://www.
change same period, previous year. https:// bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-16/
data.oecd.org/gdp/quarterly-gdp.htm china-s-debt-growth-keeps-marching-on-as-
economy-loses-pace
3 IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2019.
World Economic Outlook, October 2019: 13 Faria-e-Castro, M. 2019. “Corporate Debt
Global Manufacturing Downturn, Rising Since the Great Recession”. On the Economy
Trade Barriers. Washington, DC: IMF. blog post. 13 August 2019. Federal Reserve
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/ Bank of St. Louis. https://www.stlouisfed.
Issues/2019/10/01/world-economic-outlook- org/on-the-economy/2019/august/corporate-
october-2019 debt-great-recession
4 WTO (World Trade Organization). WTO 14 IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2019.
Data Portal: Total merchandise exports and Global Financial Stability Report: Lower for
imports – quarterly (Million US dollar). https:// Longer. October 2019. https://www.imf.org/
data.wto.org/, accessed 07 January 2020. en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2019/10/01/
global-financial-stability-report-october-
5 WTO (World Trade Organization). World 2019#FullReport
Trade Statistical Review 2019. Geneva: WTO.
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/ 15 Adrian, T. and F. Natalucci. 2019. “Lower for
wts2019_e/wts19_toc_e.htm Longer: Rising Vulnerabilities May Put Growth
at Risk”. IMFBlog post. 16 October 2019.
6 IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2019. https://blogs.imf.org/2019/10/16/lower-for-
Transcript of International Monetary Fund longer-rising-vulnerabilities-may-put-growth-
Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva’s at-risk/
Opening Press Conference, 2019 Annual
Meetings. 17 October 2019. https://www.imf. 16 Bloomberg. Rates & Bonds. https://www.
org/en/News/Articles/2019/10/17/tr101719- bloomberg.com/markets/rates-bonds,
transcript-managing-director-kristalina- accessed 03 January 2020.
georgieva-press-conference-2019-annual-
meetings 17 Ibid.
7 World Bank Open Data. “Foreign 18 ECB (European Central Bank). 2019. Interest
direct investment, net inflows (BoP, rates – Deposit facility. Effective from 18
current US$) - Euro area, World, United September 2019. https://www.ecb.europa.
States, China, Japan.” https://data. eu/home/html/index.en.html
worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.
CD.WD?end=2018&locations=XC-1W-US- 19 Bank of Japan. 2019. The Bank’s Market
CN-JP&start=2002, accessed 15 December Operations – Interest Rate Applied to the
2019. Complementary Deposit Facility. https://
www.boj.or.jp/en/index.htm/, accessed 15
8 Ibid. December 2019.
9 OECD (Organisation for Economic Co- 20 ECB (European Central Bank). 2019. “Euro
operation and Development). 2019. Business Area Banks: The Profitability Challenge”.
confidence index (BCI). https://data.oecd.org/ Keynote speech by Luis de Guindos, Vice-
leadind/business-confidence-index-bci.htm, President of the ECB, at the ABI annual
accessed 03 January 2020. conference “Banking Union and Basel III – risk
and supervision 2019”. 25 June 2019. https://
10 IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2019. IMF www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2019/
DataMapper Database, “General government html/ecb.sp190625~6d33411cff.en.html
gross debt – Percent of GDP”. https://www.
imf.org/external/datamapper/GGXWDG_ 21 EBA (European Banking Authority). 2019.
NGDP@WEO/CHN/FRA/DEU/IND/GBR/USA/ “Low Profits and High Costs Remain a
JPN/AUS/BRA/CAN/IDN/ITA/KOR/MEX/ Key Challenge for the EU Banking Sector”.
RUS/SAU/ESP/CHE/NLD/TUR, accessed 15 Press Release, 04 October 2019. https://
December 2019. eba.europa.eu/low-profits-and-high-costs-
remain-a-key-challenge-for-the-eu-banking-
sector
28 World Economic Forum, in partnership with 36 Hong Kong Economy – The Government
Marsh & McLennan Companies and Zurich of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Insurance Group. 2019. Regional Risks for Region. 2019. “Economic Situation in the
Doing Business Report 2019. Insight Report. Third Quarter of 2019 and Latest GDP and
Geneva: World Economic Forum. https:// Price Forecasts for 2019”. Press Release, 15
www.weforum.org/reports/regional-risks-for- November 2019. https://www.hkeconomy.
doing-business-2019 gov.hk/en/pdf/19q3_pr.pdf
29
Governments, markets and, in an increasing temperature rise must be limited to 1.5°C.8
number of societies, voters are awakening This equates to a remaining carbon budget of
to the urgent realities of climate change—it less than 10 more years of emissions at their
is striking harder and more rapidly than current level.9
many expected.1 The last five years are on
track to be the warmest on record.2 Climate-
related natural disasters such as hurricanes, Climate realities
droughts and wildfires are becoming more
intense and more frequent, reportedly now The near-term consequences of climate
averaging a disaster a week.3 Polar ice is change add up to a “planetary emergency”.10
melting more quickly than anticipated,4 with Implications are catastrophic, wide-ranging
drastic implications for sea levels and coastal and intersecting. Worse still, the complexity
populations.5 Severe weather is worsening: of the climate system means that some
the last year witnessed unprecedented impacts are still unknown. Established
wildfires and devasting storms across the risks include:
globe,6 sea ice loss in the Arctic and record-
breaking heatwaves in Europe. Loss of life
More and more species are becoming
Global temperatures today are slightly over extinct (see Chapter 4, Save the Axolotl).
1°C above pre-industrial levels. On the current Humans, too, will experience loss of life—
trajectory set out in countries’ nationally but potentially unequally. Women and
determined contributions (NDCs), which children are 14 times more likely than men
remain largely unchanged in the wake of to die during natural disasters, which are
the most recent UNFCCC Conference of likely to intensify or become more frequent
Parties in Madrid in December (COP 25), because of climate change.11 The elderly
that figure will rise to at least 3°C by the end and infirm are also at higher risk.12 Climate
of the century.7 Because each additional change will also lead to increased health
degree of warming will be proportionally spillovers, burdening already stretched health
more destructive, the damage will accelerate systems, particularly for the poorest and
and be exponential. To avoid the most most vulnerable, including in many low- and
severe economic, social and environmental middle-income countries,13 as explored in
consequences, climate experts warn that the Chapter 6, False Positive.
REUTERS/DARREN STAPLES
30 A Decade Left
Stress on ecosystems resource extraction,22 all of which could
Oceans are getting warmer, stormier cause tension between countries already
and more acidic, impacting the health of at odds over unresolved maritime and land
sensitive marine ecosystems such as coral boundaries (see Chapter 1, Global Risks
reefs. As glaciers and ice sheets melt, 2020).23 According to the UN, water was
low-lying geographies will flood;14 indeed, a major factor in conflict in 45 countries
by 2050, three times more people will be in 2017; disputes between upstream and
impacted than previously thought.15 This downstream areas will likely intensify.24
risk was explored in detail in the 2019 And as transition to a more decentralized,
Global Risks Report chapter Fight or renewable energy economy changes
Flight, which examined the intersection of geopolitical equations and creates new
rapid urbanization and rising sea levels. vulnerabilities for certain states and regions,
Additionally, a scenario in which ice-cap states’ relative position in the international
melt creates disruption to the Gulf Stream system will shift as well.25
could cause further ecosystem disorder,
as well as major change in the pattern of
severe weather perils. Another significant
unknown risk relates to the potential thawing
of permafrost—frozen soil around the poles US$
165 billion
that stores nearly twice as much carbon as
the atmosphere currently holds.16 If the soil
thaws, this carbon could be released with
unprecedented consequences.
Transition Risks
Infrastructure materials. Technology is playing a
role in developing low-carbon alternatives for iron,
steel, glass and cement.
Technological
Mining and metals. The solar industry will
Across many sectors, technological change is
increase demand for aluminium. Copper,
already transformative and, in moving towards
lithium and cobalt demand will increase
lower carbon technologies, risks could include
multiple times by 2040.
stranding assets, reducing investment returns
and reducing market capitalization.
Mobility. The shift from fossil
fuels to hybrid, plug-in hybrid, fully
electric and hydrogen fuel cells is
already well underway.
Societal Economic
Transition to a low-carbon economy A dramatic shift in the price of carbon—broadly seen as necessary to tackle climate
raises profound issues around the change—implemented in a short time frame without taking into account wider economic and
future job market, health and safety, equity issues could be viewed as a politically unpalatable transition risk for many decision-makers.
and the broader fate of This is particularly the case given economic vulnerabilities already in place such as high debt,
communities. For both investors negative interest rates, rising income inequalities and elevated geopolitical risks. International
and workers, transitioning quickly, initiatives such as the Carbon Pricing Leaders Coalition and national bi-partisan coalitions like the
effectively and equitably will be this Climate Leadership Council in the United States are working on practical solutions—such as
generation’s challenge. reallocating dividends from carbon pricing and adjusting border taxes—to these challenges. More
comprehensive transition policy packages, which recognize these economic transition risks, such
as the European Green New Deal, are also being explored.
non-action is not an option.30 More common current oil reserves, 50% of gas reserves
extreme weather events could make and 80% of coal reserves into stranded
insurance unaffordable or simply unavailable assets for extractive companies and their
for individuals and businesses:31 globally, investors (see Box 3.1).33 Pension funds may
the “catastrophe protection gap”—what face catastrophic shortfalls as industries
should be insured but is not—reached consolidate and transition.34 Climate risk
US$280 billion in 2018.32 The transition may also cause disruption to the mortgage
to a low-carbon economy also creates market, particularly in vulnerable regions
potential challenges that will need to be such as Florida where 30-year mortgages
managed. For example, action to reduce could default en masse if homes become
emissions could turn approximately 30% of uninsurable over time.35
32 A Decade Left
Trade, labour and supply disruptions, or draconian interventions
chain disruption from panicked policy-makers that imperil
Climate change will affect trade by distorting macroeconomic and financial instability.
prices and disrupting supply chains.36 For Communities will also suffer if jobs are lost
example, with the Artic sea ice melting at without well-thought-through and equitable
a record pace, a northern route through transition plans in place.
once-impassable waters has “emerged as
a potential global shipping artery.”37 Shifts Over 40 central banks and supervisors are
in seasonable temperature and rainfall will already examining how climate risks can be
place particular stress on economies reliant integrated into their economic and financial
on agricultural output,38 creating new winners activities.41 The Bank of England has warned
and losers in the trade sphere.39 The labour that corporations in incumbent “dirty”
force will experience impacts as well, and industries can expect to go bankrupt if they
not only in the structural transition to a low- fail to understand the risk of their business
carbon economy: for example, heat stress models becoming obsolete as investment
resulting from global warming is projected to flees to net-zero-emission alternatives.42
cause productivity losses equal to 80 million The Financial Stability Board’s Taskforce
full-time jobs in 2030.40 on Climate-related Financial Disclosures
announced recommendations in 2017
that have driven boardroom discussions
At a crossroads regarding financial exposures and transition
strategies.43 Now supported by almost 900
For the future of climate change mitigation, companies, assessing financial risk of climate
2020 is a critical year: it presents the change is becoming more mainstreamed.44
first opportunity for nations to revise Governments are also moving towards
their national plans to tackle climate mandatory disclosure of climate risks by
change as set out under the 2015 Paris listed companies.45 The investor community
Climate Agreement, and to close the gap is also responding to climate risk, with a
between what they have pledged and recent notable development being the launch
what is needed. An increasing number of of the UN-convened Net Zero Asset Owners
governments are announcing long-term Alliance at the 2019 United Nations Climate
net-zero emissions goals and showing Action Summit.46
more interest in tackling outstanding
challenges in developing potential low-
carbon solutions. These include creating
a low-carbon hydrogen supply chain at
scale; reducing emissions through carbon Climate change is striking
capture, use and storage; managing the
intermittency of renewables with grid-scale harder and more rapidly than
storage solutions; electrifying domestic
and commercial heating; better recycling many expected
of electric car batteries; and mapping out
the future availability of the raw materials
needed to support the transition.
Second, the risk of unilateral geoengineering
Nonetheless, achieving significant change gambles will become more likely. Failure
in the near term will depend on greater to implement effective regional or global
commitment from major emitters. Failure to climate policies increases the risk that
seize 2020’s opportunity to mitigate climate countries may decide unilaterally to
change will have three main consequences. implement geoengineering projects such
as ocean fertilization or stratospheric aerosol
First, transition risks will increase (Box 3.1). injection. This would risk further disruption
Further delay in reducing emissions will make to ecosystems: one recent study, for
it harder to achieve carbon budget goals: example, found that stratospheric sulphate
companies and markets will ultimately be aerosols could harm agricultural production,
forced to adjust more rapidly, which could cancelling out benefits from the reduction
lead to higher costs, greater economic in warming.47
34 A Decade Left
agriculture system to practices such as organizations.62 Overall, lack of consistent
regenerative farming would require radical awareness-raising among business leaders
shifts in subsidies and investment. Similarly, may create first-mover advantages for some,
about 10% of global emissions comes but it also potentially demonstrates the
from the very high heat levels required to much more concerning overarching risk: that
produce commodities—such as cement, many businesses may not be planning for
steel and petrochemicals—and, although the physical and financial risks that climate
low-carbon alternatives do exist, they are change may have on their activities and
currently costly.55 New public-private initiatives across their value chains.
such as the Mission Possible Platform,
launched at the UN Climate Action Summit in
2.3 %
September 2019, are designed to help heavy
industry sectors achieve net-zero emissions increase in global
by mid-century through collaboration with
governments, international organizations
energy demand
and investors. in 2018
Although there are financing roadmaps for
green energy, there are serious financing
gaps for overall plans to mitigate and adapt Consequently, businesses may also struggle
to climate change. The UN estimates to anticipate future shifts in government
that, to meet 2030 goals for adaptation, policy and customer preferences in time
developing countries will need US$140 to to align their strategy—for example, the
US$300 billion annually—much higher than rapid rise in consumer demand for non-
currently available adaptation financing.56 plastic packaging took companies by
Moreover, investments in climate-related surprise. Increasing pressure to respond is
activities largely stay within wealthy nations’ generating transition risk at the individual
borders.57 Only 49 developing countries company level as each company needs to
have quantifiable climate-financing targets, reassess assets, reconcile trade-offs and
and few of them look further than 2020, develop new capabilities to move towards
rendering them largely irrelevant to climate a more sustainable model. At the same
risks beyond this horizon.58 time, there is growing acknowledgement
among some critical financial-sector players
Aside from a number of vanguard first- that environmental risks could threaten the
mover champions, most companies, too, broader economic outlook, which could be a
appear ill-equipped to address climate risk. sign of more positive shifts moving forward.63
Many do not yet quantify physical climate
risks in their direct operations and supply
chains, and those that do are likely to be A green social contract
underestimating them significantly.59 In the
World Economic Forum’s survey of business Concern about climate change is increasing,64
leaders, none of the top 10 risks globally are particularly among young people, and
environmental, suggesting a critical blind this could alter the paths societies take in
spot.60 On the other hand, those business confronting the challenge. Political winds are
leaders who are more exposed to climate shifting: in 2019 climate change underpinned
change discussions among their peers the Greens’ surge in the European
become more aware of climate risks and Parliament elections;65 it also emerged as
thus become more likely to act. For example, a key policy issue in the US Democratic
industry partners of the World Economic presidential primaries and in elections in
Forum ranked environmental risks higher Australia, Canada and Switzerland.66 Most
than business leaders surveyed more recently, the European Commission, led by
broadly.61 This awareness and concern for President Ursula von der Leyen, announced
environmental risks is also likely influenced a broad set of plans—the “European Green
by other business organizations that focus Deal”—that is intended to re-evaluate the
on helping their members tackle climate European economy in light of environmental
and other related issues, demonstrating risks.67 Climate activism also increased in
the importance of these networks and 2019. The non-violent civil disobedience
15
The resilience decade
Renewables in power generation The next 10 years will shape the outlook
10
for climate risk for the rest of the century.
5 To avoid the worst consequences, global
Oil in power generation emissions need to peak almost immediately
0
and decline precipitously—by 7.6% each
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
year between 2020 and 2030.75 This
Source: IEA. Data and statistics, “Energy Transitions Indicators”,
implies an additional US$460 billion a year
https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics of clean energy investment over the next
36 A Decade Left
decade.76 Far-reaching policies will be
needed to transform industrial
processes, transport, agriculture and
land-use, alongside changes in consumer
behaviours to scale the necessary
critical solutions.77
1 Oreskes, N., M. Oppenheimer and D. Jamie- 9 In 2018, the IPCC estimated the remaining
son. 2019. “Scientists Have Been Under- carbon budget for a 66% chance of avoiding
estimating the Pace of Climate Change: A 1.5°C of temperature rise was 420 giga-
Book Entitled Discerning Experts Explains tonnes of CO2—about 10 times global annual
Why—and What Can Be Done about It”. CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and land-use
Scientific American. 19 August 2019. https:// change. See McSweeney, R. and R. Pearce.
blogs.scientificamerican.com/observa- 2017. “Analysis: Just Four Years Left of the
tions/scientists-have-been-underestimat- 1.5C Carbon Budget”. Carbon Countdown.
ing-the-pace-of-climate-change/ Carbon Brief. 05 April 2017. https://www.
carbonbrief.org/analysis-four-years-left-one-
2 Schwartz, J. and N. Popovich. 2019. “It’s point-five-carbon-budget
Official: 2018 Was the Fourth-Warmest
Year on Record”. The New York Times. 06 10 The Club of Rome. 2019. “Nations Should
February 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/ Declare a Planetary Emergency Says Club
interactive/2019/02/06/climate/fourth-hottest- of Rome”. The Club of Rome. 24 Sep-
year.html; Kaufman, M. 2019. “All the Ways tember 2019. https://www.clubofrome.
Climate Change Has Impacted Earth in 2019 org/2019/09/24/nations-should-declare-a-
(So Far)”. Mashable. 16 March 2019. https:// planetary-emergency-says-club-of-rome/;
mashable.com/article/climate-change-2019- see also Club of Rome. 2019. “Planetary
list/ Emergency Plan”. https://www.clubofrome.
org/2019/09/23/planetary-emergency-plan/
3 Harvey, F. 2019. “One Climate Crisis Dis-
aster Happening Every Week, UN Warns”. 11 UNDP (United Nations Development Pro-
The Guardian. 07 July 2019. https://www. gramme). 2013. New York: “Gender and Dis-
theguardian.com/environment/2019/jul/07/ aster Risk Reduction”. Gender and Climate
one-climate-crisis-disaster-happening-every- Change: Asia and the Pacific Policy Brief 3.
week-un-warns UNDP. https://www.undp.org/content/dam/
undp/library/gender/Gender%20and%20En-
4 The Economist. 2019. “The Greenland Ice vironment/PB3-AP-Gender-and-disaster-risk-
Sheet Is Melting Unusually Fast”. The Econ- reduction.pdf
omist. 17 July 2019. https://www.economist.
com/graphic-detail/2019/06/17/the-green- 12 Christensen, J. 2019. “250,000 Deaths
land-ice-sheet-is-melting-unusually-fast?fs- a Year from Climate Change Is a ‘Con-
rc=gp_en?fsrc=scn/tw/te/bl/ed/thegreen- servative Estimate,’ Research Says”. CNN
landicesheetismeltingunusuallyfastdailychart Health. 16 January 2019. https://edition.cnn.
com/2019/01/16/health/climate-change-
5 Kulp, S. A. and B. H. Strauss. 2019. “New health-emergency-study/index.html
Elevation Data Triple Estimates of Global
Vulnerability to Sea-Level Rise and Coast- 13 Ebi, K. L., J. J. Hess and P. Watkiss. 2017.
al Flooding”. Nature Communications. 10 “Chapter 8: Health Risks and Costs of
(4844). 29 October 2019. https://www. Climate Variability and Change”. In Injury
nature.com/articles/s41467-019-12808-z; Prevention and Environmental Health, 3rd
McGrath, M. 2019. “Climate Change: Global edition, edited by C. N. Mock, R. Nugent, O.
Impacts ‘Accelerating’ – WMO”. BBC News. Kobusingye and K. R. Smith. Washington,
28 March 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/ DC: International Bank for Reconstruction
science-environment-47723577 and Development/World Bank. https://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK525226/
6 Marsh & McLennan. 2019. The Burning Issue:
Managing Wildfire Risk. https://www.mmc. 14 IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
com/insights/publications/2019/oct/wildfire- Change). 2019. Special Report on the Ocean
paper--oct--2019-.html and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate.
IPCC. https://www.ipcc.ch/srocc/home/
7 UNEP (United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme). 2019. Emissions Gap Report 15 Kulp and Strauss. 2019. Op. cit.
2019. Nairobi: UNEP. https://wedocs.unep.
org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/30797/ 16 Woods Hole Research Center. 2019. “Study:
EGR2019.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Winter Carbon Emissions Shifting Permafrost
Region to a Carbon Source”. Post. 21 Octo-
8 IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate ber 2019. https://whrc.org/study-winter-car-
Change). 2018. Summary for Policymakers. bon-emissions-shifting-permafrost-region-to-
In Global Warming of 1.5°C: An IPCC Special a-carbon-source/
Report. Geneva: World Meteorological Or-
ganization. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/
uploads/sites/2/2018/07/SR15_SPM_ver-
sion_stand_alone_LR.pdf; https://www.ipcc.
ch/sr15/
38 A Decade Left
17 IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 25 IRENA (International Renewable Energy
Change). 2019. Special Report on Climate Agency). 2019. A New World: The Geopolitics
Change and Land. IPCC. https://www.ipcc. of the Energy Transformation. IRENA. http://
ch/report/srccl/; Seddon, N. S. Sengupta, geopoliticsofrenewables.org/assets/geopo-
M. García-Espinosa, I. Hauler, D. Herr and litics/Reports/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/
A. R. Rizvi. 2019. Nature-Based Solutions Global_commission_renewable_ener-
in Nationally Determined Contributions: gy_2019.pdf
Synthesis and Recommendations for
Enhancing Climate Ambition and Action by 26 Swiss Re Institute. 2019. “Nature Catastro-
2020. Gland, Switzerland and Oxford, UK: phes and Man-Made Disasters in 2018: ‘Sec-
IUCN and University of Oxford. http://4fqbik- ondary’ Perils on the Frontline”. https://www.
2blqkb1nrebde8yxqj-wpengine.netdna-ssl. swissre.com/dam/jcr:c37eb0e4-c0b9-4a9f-
com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Inter- 9954-3d0bb4339bfd/sigma2_2019_en.pdf
national-Union-for-Conservation-of-Na-
ture-IUCN-and-Oxford-University.pdf 27 NCA (National Climate Assessment). 2018.
Fourth National Climate Assessment. Volume
18 World Resources Institute. 2019. “RELEASE: II: Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the
Update Global Water Risk Atlas Reveals Top United States. NCA. https://nca2018.global-
Water-Stressed Countries and States”. Press change.gov/
Release, 06 August 2019. https://www.wri.
org/news/2019/08/release-updated-global- 28 Green, M. 2019. “World’s Biggest Firms Fore-
water-risk-atlas-reveals-top-water-stressed- see $1 Trillion Climate Cost Hit”. Reuters. 04
countries-and-states June 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-climate-change-companies-disclosure/
19 UNHCR (The UN Refugee Agency). 2016. worlds-biggest-firms-foresee-1-trillion-clima-
“Frequently Asked Questions on Climate te-cost-hit-idUSKCN1T50CF
Change and Disaster Displacement”. 6 No-
vember 2016. https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/ 29 Ricke, K., L. Drouet, K. Caldeira and M.
news/latest/2016/11/581f52dc4/frequent- Tavoni. 2018 (correction 25 March 2019).
ly-asked-questions-climate-change-disas- “Country-Level Social Cost of Carbon”.
ter-displacement.html Nature Climate Change 8 (2018): 895–900.
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-018-
20 UNHCR (The UN Refugee Agency). 2019. 0282-y; UNISDR (United Nations Office for
UNHCR Mozambique – Factsheet: Cyclone Disaster Risk Reduction). 2018. Economic
IDAI, May 2019. 19 May 2019. https://relief- Losses, Poverty & Disasters (1998-2017).
web.int/report/mozambique/unhcr-mozam- https://www.preventionweb.net/files/61119_
bique-factsheet-cyclone-idai-may-2019 credeconomiclosses.pdf
21 Lanteigne, M. 2019. “The Changing Shape of 30 Bank of England. 2019. “Open Letter on
Arctic Security”. NATO Review. 28 June 2019. Climate-Related Financial Risks”. Bank of
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2019/Al- England News. 17 April 2019. https://www.
so-in-2019/the-changing-shape-of-arctic-se- bankofengland.co.uk/news/2019/april/
curity/EN/index.htm open-letter-on-climate-related-financial-risks
22 The Economist. 2019. “Why Russia Is Ambiv- 31 Nelson, A. 2019. “Climate Change Could
alent about Global Warming”. The Economist. Make Insurance Too Expensive for Most
19 September 2010. https://www.economist. People – Report”. The Guardian. 21 March
com/europe/2019/09/19/why-russia-is-am- 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/environ-
bivalent-about-global-warming ment/2019/mar/21/climate-change-could-
make-insurance-too-expensive-for-ordi-
23 Dellink, R., H. Hwang, E. Lanzi and J. Cha- nary-people-report; Rudolph, M. J. 2019.
teau. 2017. “International Trade Consequenc- 12th Annual Survey of Emerging Risks: Key
es of Climate Change”. OECD Trade and Findings. Canadian Institute of Actuaries,
Environment Working Papers 2017/01. Paris: Casualty Actuarial Society, and Society of
OECD Publishing. http://www.fao.org/3/a- Actuaries, March 2019. https://www.soa.
bu414e.pdf org/globalassets/assets/files/resources/re-
search-report/2019/12th-emerging-risk-sur-
24 Brosig, M., P. Frawley, A. Hill, M. Jahn, M. vey.pdf
Marsicek, A. Paris, M. Rose, A. Shambal-
jamts and N. Thomas. 2019. Implications of 32 Bevere, L. 2019. Sigma 2/2019: Secondary
Climate Change for the U.S. Army. United Natural Catastrophe Risks on the Front Line.
States Army War College. https://climateand- 10 April 2019. Swiss Re Institute. https://
security.files.wordpress.com/2019/07/impli- www.swissre.com/institute/research/sig-
cations-of-climate-change-for-us-army_ar- ma-research/sigma-2019-02.html
my-war-college_2019.pdf
37 The Economist 2019. Op. cit. 47 Proctor, J., S. Hsiang, J. Burney, M. Burke
and W. Schlenker. 2018. “Estimating Global
38 Lafakis, C., L. Ratz, E. Fazio and M. Cosma. Agriculture Effects of Geoengineering Using
2019. “The Economic Implications of Climate Volcanic Eruptions”. Nature 560 (2018):
Change”. Moody’s Analytics. June 2019. 480–83. https://www.nature.com/articles/
https://www.moodysanalytics.com/-/media/ s41586-018-0417-3
article/2019/economic-implications-of-cli-
mate-change.pdf 48 Watts, J. 2019. “Climate and Economic Risks
‘Threaten 2008-Style Systemic Collapse’”.
39 Dellink et al. 2017. Op. cit. The Guardian. 12 February 2019. https://
www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/
40 ILO (International Labour Organization). feb/12/climate-and-economic-risks-threaten-
2019. “Increase in Heat Stress Predicted 2008-style-systemic-collapse
to Bring Productivity Loss Equivalent to 80
Million Jobs”. ILO News Report, 01 July 2019. 49 IEA (International Energy Agency). 2019.
https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/ “Global Energy Demand Rose by 2.3% in
newsroom/news/WCMS_711917/lang--en/ 2018, Its Fastest Pace in the Last Decade”.
index.htm IEA News, 26 March 2019, Updated 28
March 2019. https://www.iea.org/newsroom/
41 NGFS (Network for Greening the Financial news/2019/march/global-energy-demand-
System). No date. Membership list. https:// rose-by-23-in-2018-its-fastest-pace-in-the-
www.ngfs.net/en/about-us/membership last-decade.html
43 TCFD (Task Force on Climate-Related Finan- 51 The Business Times. 2019. “China Firms
cial Disclosures). 2017. Recommendations of Funding Coal Plants Offshore as Domestic
the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Curbs Bite: Study”. The Business Times. 22
Disclosures: Final Report. https://www. January 2019. https://www.businesstimes.
fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/ com.sg/energy-commodities/china-firms-
FINAL-TCFD-Report-062817.pdf funding-coal-plants-offshore-as-domestic-
curbs-bite-study; Hanada, Y., Y. Ohira and
Y. Fukumoto. 2019. “Cheap Coal Swells in
44 TCFD (Task Force on Climate-Related
Southeast Asia, Foiling Global Green Push”.
Financial Disclosures). TCFD Supporters.
Nikkei Asian Review. 06 April 2019. https://
https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/tcfd-supporters/;
asia.nikkei.com/Business/Energy/Cheap-
World Economic Forum, in collaboration with
coal-swells-in-Southeast-Asia-foiling-global-
PwC. 2019. How to Set Up Effective Climate
green-push
Governance on Corporate Boards Guiding
Principles and Questions. Geneva: World
40 A Decade Left
52 Matsumura, W. and Z. Adam. “Fossil Fuel 61 Respondents to the Global Risks Perception
Consumption Subsidies Bounced Back Survey were asked about global risks over
Strongly in 2018”. IEA Commentary. https:// a 10-year horizon, while respondents to the
www.iea.org/commentaries/fossil-fuel-con- Executive Opinion Survey were asked about
sumption-subsidies-bounced-back-strong- risks for doing business in their country over
ly-in-2018 the same horizon. The difference between
the questions may in part explain the varied
53 Smith P., M. Bustamante, H. Ahammad, outcomes.
H. Clark and F. Tubiello. 2014. “Agriculture,
Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU)”. In 62 These organizations include, among others, the
Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate World Business Council for Sustainable Devel-
Change. Contribution of Working Group III to opment (https://www.wbcsd.org/), the We Mean
the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergov- Business coalition (https://www.wemeanbusi-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change [Eden- nesscoalition.org/) and the UN Global Compact
hofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. (https://www.unglobalcompact.org/).
Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I.
Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, 63 See, e.g., BlackRock Investment Institute.
J. Savolainen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow, 2019. Getting Physical: Scenario Analysis
T. Zwickel and J.C. Minx (eds.)]. Cambridge, for Assessing Climate Risks. Global Insights.
UK and New York: Cambridge University April 2019. https://www.blackrock.com/us/
Press. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/up- individual/literature/whitepaper/bii-physical-
loads/2018/02/ipcc_wg3_ar5_chapter11.pdf climate-risks-april-2019.pdf; Goldman Sachs
Research. 2019. “Taking the Heat: Making
54 FOLU (The Food and Land Use Coalition). Cities Resilient to Climate Change”. Goldman
2019. Growing Better: Ten Critical Transitions Sachs Insights. 05 September 2019. https://
to Transform Food and Land Use. FOLU. www.goldmansachs.com/insights/pages/
https://www.foodandlandusecoalition.org/ taking-the-heat.html
global-report/
64 Fagan, M. and C. Huang. 2019. “A Look at
55 Roberts, D. 2019. “This Climate Prob- How People around the World View Climate
lem Is Bigger than Cars and Much Change”. Pew Research Center, Fact Tank.
Harder to Solve”. Vox. 10 October 2019. 18 April 2019. https://www.pewresearch.org/
https://www.vox.com/energy-and-en- fact-tank/2019/04/18/a-look-at-how-people-
vironment/2019/10/10/20904213/ around-the-world-view-climate-change/
climate-change-steel-cement-industri-
al-heat-hydrogen-ccs 65 Henley, J. 2019. “European Elections: Trium-
phant Greens Demand More Radical Climate
56 UNEP (United Nations Environment Pro- Action”. The Guardian. 27 May 2019. https://
gramme). 2018. The Adaptation Gap Report www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/
2018: Health. UNEP. https://wedocs.unep. may/28/greens-eu-election-mandate-lever-
org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/27114/ age-climate-policy
AGR_2018.pdf?sequence=3
66 Morton, A. 2019. “How Australia’s Election
57 Yeo, S. 2019. “Where Climate Cash Is Flow- Will Decide Its Role in Climate Change”.
ing and Why It’s Not Enough”. Nature. 17 Nature. 16 May 2019. https://www.nature.
September 2019. https://www.nature.com/ com/articles/d41586-019-01543-6; Turner,
articles/d41586-019-02712-3 C. 2019. “The ‘Climate Change Election’ Is
Over. What Happens Now?“ The Globe and
58 UNEP. 2018. The Adaptation Gap Report Mail. 25 October 2019. https://www.theglo-
2018: Health. Op. cit. beandmail.com/opinion/article-the-climate-
change-election-is-over-what-happens-now/;
59 Goldstein, A., W. R. Turner, J. Gladstone Henley, J. 2019. “Green Surge Expected in
and D. G. Hole. 2019. “The Private Sector’s Swiss Elections as Climate Concern Grows”.
Climate Change Risk and Adaptation Blind The Guardian. 18 October 2019. https://
Spots”. Nature Climate Change 9 (2019): www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/18/
18–25. https://www.nature.com/articles/ green-surge-expected-in-swiss-elections-as-
s41558-018-0340-5 climate-concern-grows
60 World Economic Forum, in partnership with 67 Harvey, F., J. Rankin and D. Boffey. 2019.
Marsh & McLennan Companies and Zu- “European Green Deal Will Change Econ-
rich Insurance Group. 2019. Regional Risks omy to Solve Climate Crisis, Says EU”. The
for Doing Business Report 2019. Insight Guardian. 11 December 2019. https://www.
Report. Geneva: World Economic Forum. theguardian.com/environment/2019/dec/11/
https://www.weforum.org/reports/region- european-green-deal-will-change-economy-
al-risks-for-doing-business-2019 to-solve-climate-crisis-says-eu
69 Barclay, E. and B. Resnick. 2019. “How Big 78 Gallagher, M. B. 2019. “Understanding the
Was the Global Climate Strike? 4 Million Peo- Impact of Deep-Sea Mining”. MIT News. 5
ple, Activists Estimate. It Was Likely the Larg- December 2019. http://news.mit.edu/2019/
est Climate Protest in World History”. Vox. 22 understanding-impact-deep-sea-mining-1206
September 2019. https://www.vox.com/ener-
gy-and-environment/2019/9/20/20876143/ 79 Smith, P., S. J. Davis, F. Creutzig, S. Fuss
climate-strike-2019-september-20-crowd-es- and C. Yongsung. 2016. “Biophysical and
timate Economic Limits to Negative CO2 Emis-
sions”. Nature Climate Change 6 (2016):
70 Weise, K. 2019. “Over 4,200 Amazon 42–50. https://www.nature.com/articles/ncli-
Workers Push for Climate Change Action, mate2870
Including Cutting Some Ties to Big Oil”. The
New York Times. 10 April 2019. https://www. 80 Egan, M. 2019. “Secretive Energy Startup
nytimes.com/2019/04/10/technology/ama- Backed by Bill Gates Achieves Solar Break-
zon-climate-change-letter.html through”. CNN Business. 19 November 2019.
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/11/19/business/
71 Raval, A. and L. Hook. 2019. “Oil and Gas heliogen-solar-energy-bill-gates/index.html
Advertising Spree Signals Industry’s Dilem-
ma”. Financial Times. 06 March 2019. https:// 81 Lazard. 2018. “Levelized Cost of Energy and
www.ft.com/content/5ab7edb2-3366-11e9- Levelized Cost of Storage 2018”. Insights. 08
bd3a-8b2a211d90d5 November 2018. https://www.lazard.com/
perspective/levelized-cost-of-energy-and-
72 BBC News. 2019. “‘Flight Shame’ Could levelized-cost-of-storage-2018/
Halve Growth in Air Traffic”. BBC News. 02
October 2019. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 82 Ellsmoor, J. 2019. “Renewable Energy Is Now
business-49890057 the Cheapest Option—Even without Subsi-
dies”. Forbes. 15 June 2019. https://www.
73 Connolly, A. 2019. “Canadians Want to Stop forbes.com/sites/jamesellsmoor/2019/06/15/
Climate Change—But Half Don’t Want to renewable-energy-is-now-the-cheapest-op-
Pay an Extra Cent: Ipsos Poll”. Global News. tion-even-without-subsidies/#180bcaed5a6b
26 September 2019. https://globalnews.ca/
news/5948758/canadians-climate-change-ip- 83 Amin, A. Z. 2018. “A Just and Fair Energy
sos-poll/ Transition: An Opportunity to Tackle Climate
Change and Create Prosperity”. IRENA arti-
74 Rachman, G. 2019. “The Perilous Politics cle. 13 December 2018. https://www.irena.
of Climate Change”. Financial Times. 01 org/newsroom/articles/2018/Dec/An-Oppor-
July 2019. https://www.ft.com/content/70f- tunity-for-Poland-and-the-World-to-Tackle-
290de-9bd8-11e9-9c06-a4640c9feebb; Climate-Change
Murphy, K. 2019. “Scott Morrison Says
Australia’s Record on Climate Change 84 United Nations. 2019. Report of the Sec-
Misrepresented by Media”. The Guardian. retary-General on the 2019 Climate Action
25 September 2019. https://www.the- Summit and The Way Forward in 2020.
guardian.com/australia-news/2019/sep/26/ Climate Action Summit 2019. https://www.
scott-morrison-says-australias-record-on-cli- un.org/en/climatechange/assets/pdf/cas_re-
mate-change-misrepresented-by-media port_11_dec.pdf
75 UNEP. 2019. Op. cit. 85 Zurich. 2019. Managing the Impacts of Cli-
mate Change: Risk Management Respons-
76 Timperley, J. 2018. “Clean Energy Investment es—Second Edition. Zurich: Zurich Insurance
‘Must Be 50% Higher’ to Limit Warming to Company. https://www.zurich.com/en/
1.5C”. CarbonBrief. 18 June 2018. https:// knowledge/topics/global-risks/managing-im-
www.carbonbrief.org/clean-energy-invest- pacts-climate-change-risk-management-re-
ment-must-be-50-per-cent-high-limit-warm- sponses-second-edition
ing-one-point-five
42 A Decade Left
REUTERS/ERIK DE CASTRO
Save the
Axolotl
Dangers of Accelerated Biodiversity Loss
REUTERS/BRUNO KELLY
Human-driven nature and biodiversity loss nature could exacerbate the social
is threatening life on our planet. The previous and economic consequences of climate
chapter assessed where the world stands risk. At the same time, understanding
in 2020 in the face of existential climate risk. nature’s benefits could help societies
This chapter considers the other side of the leverage opportunities to stem the
same coin: how destabilizing tipping points in planetary emergency.
45
REUTERS/DAVID LOH
The axolotl, arguably one of the world’s most recognizable salamanders, has a unique ability to regenerate severed
limbs, which unlocks medicinal and scientific opportunities for everything from tissue repair to development and
cancer. After centuries of inbreeding, captive populations are at risk and scientists could lose the opportunity to
learn vital information about the animal’s biology that could have significant benefits for human health.1
83 %
controls have facilitated the spread of invasive from the United Nations’
species, pests and diseases, which aggravate Intergovernmental
a quarter of plant extinctions and a third of Panel on Climate
animal ones.12 Demand for food will more Change (IPCC) identifies
than double by 2050; meeting this demand another risk: increased
will require an additional billion hectares carbon-dioxide levels
of land—an area the size of Canada13—or are lowering the wild mammal
increasing yields on existing land through the nutritional value of
use of fertilizers and pesticides, which also food staples such as
species loss
contribute to biodiversity loss. rice and wheat.21 caused by humanity
Health risks
Implications for humanity Well-functioning ecosystems support
human health by providing clean air and
The dramatic loss of biodiversity brings water and a source of medicines.22 An
serious risks for societies, economies estimated 50,000–70,000 plant species
and the health of the planet. Sir Robert are harvested for traditional or modern
Watson, chair of the Intergovernmental medicine,23 and around 50% of modern
Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and drugs were developed from natural
Ecosystem Services (IPBES),14 observes: products. Researchers are increasingly
“Biodiversity and nature’s contributions to “reverting to nature” to look for new
people sound, to many people, academic therapeutic options, efforts that are
and far removed from our daily lives. threatened by biodiversity loss.24 Species
. . . Nothing could be further from the currently endangered by biodiversity loss
truth—they are the bedrock of our food, include the South American cinchona tree,
clean water and energy.”15 Humans rely the source of the malaria drug quinine.25
on biodiversity in fundamental ways, In many cases, natural molecules for
from pollinating crops to curing diseases. medical treatments are so complex that
Biodiversity loss has also come to threaten scientists are not yet able to chemically
the foundations of our economy: one synthesize them, so they must harvest and
attempt to put a monetary value on goods store plants and seeds.26 Some threatened
and services provided by ecosystems organisms are critical for medical research:
estimates the worth of biodiversity at US$33 the Mexican axolotl (described above), for
trillion per year—close to the GDP of the example, has unique characteristics that
United States and China combined.16 Risks enable instructive comparisons with the
arising from biodiversity loss include: human genome.27
Business risk
The destruction of nature will inevitably
Exacerbation of climate change impact bottom lines—for example,
Terrestrial and marine biodiversity together through reduced fish stocks disrupting
support the reduction of greenhouse gas commodity supply chains, economic
emissions and the conservation of carbon losses from disasters such as flooding,
sinks, sequestering 5.6 gigatonnes of and the loss of potential new sources
carbon per year—the equivalent of 60% of of medicine. Extractives, construction,
global human-driven emissions. The health energy, fashion and textiles are among
of ecosystems that sequester carbon can the sectors especially vulnerable to
depend on individual species: for example, ecological destruction.31 All businesses
endangered forest elephants are vital to should account for ecological risks to their
the health of Central Africa’s rainforests. operations and reputations, yet few do: a
Collapse of this ecosystem could release recent study of Fortune 500 companies
3 billion tons of carbon, the equivalent found that nearly half mentioned biodiversity
of France’s emissions for 27 years.28 in their sustainability reports, but only five
Phytoplankton provide another example set specific, measurable and timebound
of how depletion of species and ecosystems targets.32 Nature-related risks are
could exponentially worsen the climate undervalued in business decision-making.
FIGURE 4.1
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Hemiptera
(hoppers)
Cerambycidae
Sirphidae
Plecoptera
Ephemeroptera
Odonata
Carabidae
Hymenoptera
Orthoptera
Apidae
(bees)
Lepidoptera
Coccinelidae
Lepidoptera
(moths)
Trichoptera
Coleoptera
(dung beetle)
Data source: Sánchez-Bayo, F. and K. A. G. Wyckhuys. 2019. “ Worldwide Decline of the Entomofauna: A Review of its Drivers”. B
iological Conservation 232
(April 2019): 8–27. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0006320718313636
REUTERS/ANDY CLARK
80 %
rainforest could exacerbate the effects of
climate change: if 20% to 25% of the forest is oxygen that humans
lost, scientists warn that the Amazon could
pass a tipping point where a vicious cycle
breathe comes
of drought, fire and canopy loss takes hold from the ocean
that cannot be stopped. This tipping point
could be reached within decades.58 The
destruction of the forests of Borneo offer an
ominous precedent: mass deforestation and Solutions to stemming biodiversity loss
fires there have led to the loss of over 50% of will be as complex as the problem itself.
lowland tropical rainforest.59 No longer can nature be protected by either
“sparing” (preserving areas of land where
Because the Amazon is the world’s most species can thrive away from production)
diverse ecosystem and home to about 10% or “sharing” (integrating processes where
of terrestrial species,60 its destruction means nature and food production coexist).64 Both
potentially undiscovered cures for disease approaches are required and both will
would be lost forever. More intense fires involve trade-offs: how should biodiversity
and flooding in the region, as well as more be weighed against social and economic
unpredictable rainfall patterns and droughts, imperatives such as food production and
could also ensue. This would undermine economic development? For example,
food production, increase water scarcity organic agriculture avoids the use of
and reduce hydropower generation, with harmful chemicals but might require more
economic costs exceeding US$3 trillion.61 land for comparable yields.65 Similarly, the
Global agricultural markets might suffer production of biofuels and bioenergy with
as well,62 since Brazil is one of the world’s carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is a
largest agricultural exporters of products potential game-changer for negative carbon
including soybeans, maize and meat. A emissions.66 However, BECCS
significant decline in Brazil’s agricultural also uses large swaths of agricultural
output could increase volatility of food land, with implications for future socio-
prices, which history shows can trigger economic developments, food security
instability and contribute to long-term and biodiversity management.
70 %
may incur a stiffer penalty risks.76 According to the Organisation for
for the protection of the Economic Co-operation and Development
planet by virtue of their (OECD), restoring 46% of the world’s
geography and natural degraded forests could provide up to US$30
resources. However, in benefits for every dollar spent, boosting
conservation efforts do local employment and increasing community
agricultural land not necessarily require awareness of biodiversity’s importance.77
use accounted trade-offs in development
priorities or human rights.69 A critical challenge for the biodiversity
for by livestock In fact, efforts to address agenda will be finding investment models
declining biodiversity ought that mobilize private finance to capture a
sector to be inextricably linked share of this opportunity. New approaches
to other social agendas, are emerging, such as resilience-financing
such as poverty alleviation, structures through which businesses can
healthcare, disaster relief and protection invest in the restoration of ecosystems in
of human rights.70 It is vital to expand return for a reduction in insurance premiums
discussion around biodiversity loss to include or risk-financing costs. Better data to track
researchers from non-empirical disciplines the effectiveness of investments will be
as well as farmers, indigenous communities, critical. However, given the sums involved—
businesses and other stakeholders. one estimate puts the current cost of
protecting biodiversity at US$100 billion per
year78—public funding will also be needed.
The new nature economy Habitat protection and restoration are highly
beneficial public goods for which government
While trade-offs may be unavoidable, there investment is more than justified. The People’s
are also potential “win-wins”. Consider diets. Bank of China, for instance, now offers capital
The livestock sector accounts for 70% of relief for banks that make green loans.79
agricultural land use;71 it is also responsible The International Union for Conservation of
for about 14% of global greenhouse gas Nature is developing a species conservation
emissions.72 Reducing meat consumption metric that will help companies, banks and
would be good for nature and the climate. In governments to quantify their contribution.80
a growing number of countries it would be A renewed interest in nature-based solutions
good for people as well, as overconsumption can help combat climate change as well as
of meat could be leading to worse health mitigate the exacerbating effects of nature
outcomes.73 Another win-win example is the loss on the climate.
Beyond policy interventions, stemming the Later in 2020, governments will gather in
impacts of biodiversity loss may require Kunming, China, to revisit global targets
a fundamental shift in thinking about the on protecting ecosystems and halting
economic value of nature. Gross domestic species loss. This is a critical moment: as
product (GDP), the primary performance climate change exacerbates ecosystem
indicator for economies, fails to account for collapse, we could be causing irreversible
“natural capital”—the stock of a country’s ecosystem damage with serious economic
ecosystems, natural resources and human and social consequences.85 Some of
capital.81 Businesses, governments and the most serious impacts will not occur
individuals would be better served by gradually, but rather suddenly and violently,
another metric—or series of metrics—that as critical thresholds are breached.
more accurately describes an economy’s Messaging around biodiversity loss and
overall health, thus incorporating the costs its impacts is key to underscoring the
of ecosystem degradation. The Gaborone meaning and impact of biodiversity loss
Declaration for Sustainability in Africa, for for societies. Consumers also have a role
example, is encouraging member countries to play in demanding sustainable policy-
to use metrics such as “ecosystem valuation” making and products.
and “natural capital accounting” in measuring
economic activity and decision-making.82 The rapid degradation of our life support
system means a lot more is needed. As
The most effective solutions may imply we find ourselves at the doorstep of the
significant disruption or shifts to existing “sixth mass extinction”, both businesses
business models. For example, the fashion and regulators have a huge role to play
industry could reduce its impacts on in shifting paradigms about who pays for
biodiversity by shifting towards transforming the externalities created by business-as-
old clothes into new ones and creating usual. The World Economic Forum will
garments that are durable rather than be publishing the New Nature Economy
disposable—an opportunity worth US$560 Report—to be released in three parts during
billion.83 Extractive industries’ negative 2020—setting out risks, key transformation
impacts on biodiversity could be mitigated pathways and financing for a nature-
if mining companies were to move to a positive economy. We have the science and
resource services model,84 in which the evidence required to pivot in this direction,
companies retain ownership of metals over but there is an acute need for champions
their lifecycle and keep them in use for as who can shift systems and prioritize
long as possible. investment for safeguarding nature.
11 Seto, K. C., B. Günerlap, and L. R. Hutyra. 17 “FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of
2012. “Global Forecasts of Urban Expan- the United Nations).” The Biodiversity That
sion to 2030 and Direct Impacts on Biodi- Is Crucial for our Food and Agriculture Is
versity and Carbon Pools”. PNAS 109 (40): Disappearing by the Day. Press Release, 22
16083–88. https://www.pnas.org/con- February 2019. http://www.fao.org/news/sto-
tent/109/40/16083.short ry/en/item/1180463/icode/
19 IPBES. 2019. Op. cit.; Roe, D., N. Seddon 29 Morello, L. 2010. “Phytoplankton Population
and J. Elliott. 2019. “Biodiversity Loss Is Drops 40 Percent Since 1950”. Scientific
a Development Issue: A Rapid Review of American. 29 July 2010. https://www.scienti-
Evidence”. Issue Paper. London: International ficamerican.com/article/phytoplankton-pop-
Institute for Environment and Development. ulation/; Watts, S. 2017. “Global Warming
Is Putting the Ocean’s Phytoplankton in
20 Roe, D. 2019. “Biodiversity Loss—More Than Danger”. Pacific Standard. 29 December
an Environmental Emergency”. The Lancet 2017. https://psmag.com/environment/glob-
Planetary Health 3 (7): PE287–E289, 01 July al-warming-is-putting-phytoplankton-in-dan-
2019. https://www.thelancet.com/journals/ ger; University of Leicester. 2015. “Failing
lanplh/article/PIIS2542-5196(19)30113-5/full- Phytoplankton, Failing Oxygen: Global
text; Roe, Seddon and Elliott. 2019. Op. cit. Warming Disaster Could Suffocate Life on
Planet Earth”. ScienceDaily. ScienceDaily, 01
21 IPCC (United Nations’ Intergovernmental December 2015. https://www.sciencedaily.
Panel on Climate Change). 2019. Climate com/releases/2015/12/151201094120.htm
Change and Land. Special Report. https://
www.ipcc.ch/srccl/ 30 IPBES. 2019. Op. cit.; Isbell, F., D. Craven, J.
Connolly, M. Loreau, B. Schmid, C. Beierkuh-
22 WHO (World Health Organization). 2015. nlein, T. M. Bezemer, C. Bonin, H. Bruelheide,
“Loss of Biodiversity Impacts Human Health”. E. de Luca, A. Ebeling, J. N. Griffin, Q. Guo,
https://www.who.int/globalchange/publica- Y. Hautier, A. Hector, A. Jentsch, J. Kreyling,
tions/phe-pr.pdf?ua=1 V. Lanta, P. Manning, S. T. Meyer, A. S. Mori,
S. Naeem, P. A. Niklaus, H. W. Polley, P. B.
23 IUCN. 2009. “New International Standard Reich, C. Roscher, E. W. Seabloom, M. D.
for Sustainable Wild Collection of Medicinal Smith, M. P. Thakur, D. Tilman, B. F. Tracy, W.
and Aromatic Plants”. IUCN Support. 26 May H. van der Putten, J. van Ruijven, A. Weigelt,
2009. https://www.iucn.org/content/new-in- W. W. Weisser, B. Wilsey and N. Eisenhaurer.
ternational-standard-sustainable-wild-collec- 2015. “Biodiversity Increases the Resist-
tion-medicinal-and-aromatic-plants ance of Ecosystem Productivity to Climate
Extremes”. Nature 526: 547–77.
24 Thomford, N. E., D. A. Senthebane, A. Rowe,
D. Munro, P. Seele, A. Maroyi and K. Dzobo. 31 OECD. 2019. Op. cit.
2018. “Natural Products for Drug Discovery in
the 21st Century: Innovations for Novel Drug 32 Addison, P. F. E., J. W. Bull, and El J.
Discovery”. International Journal of Molecular Milner-Gulland. 2018. “Using Conservation
Sciences 19 (6): 158. https://www.ncbi.nlm. Science to Advance Corporate Biodiversity
nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6032166/ Accountability”. Conservation Biology. 15 July
2018. https://conbio.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
25 Roe. 2019. Op. cit.; Roe, Seddon and Elliott. doi/10.1111/cobi.13190
2019. Op. cit.
33 Roe. 2019. Op. cit.; Roe, Seddon and Elliott.
26 Technical University of Denmark. 2018. 2019. Op. cit.
“Scientists to Produce Anti-Cancer Drugs
in Yeast”. Science Daily. 07 December 34 Raygorodetsky, G. 2018. “Indigenous Peo-
2018. https://www.sciencedaily.com/releas- ples Defend Earth’s Biodiversity—But They’re
es/2018/12/181207121419.htm in Danger”. National Geographic. 16 Novem-
ber 2018. https://www.nationalgeographic.
27 Learn, J. R. 2019. “Complete Axolotl Ge- com/environment/2018/11/can-indige-
nome Could Reveal the Secret of Regen- nous-land-stewardship-protect-biodiversity-/
erating Tissues”. Smithsonian.com. 24
January 2019. https://www.smithsonianmag. 35 Kanase, H. R. and K. N. M. Singh.
com/science-nature/complete-axolotl-ge- 2018. “Marine Pharmacology: Poten-
nome-could-reveal-secret-regenerating-tis- tial, Challenges, and Future in India”.
sues-180971335/ Journal of Medical Sciences 38 (2):
49–53. http://www.jmedscindmc.com/
article.asp?issn=1011-4564;year=2018;vol-
ume=38;issue=2;spage=49;ep-
age=53;aulast=Kanase#ft1
44 Yong, E. 2019. “Is the Insect Apocalypse 54 McGrath, M. 2019. “Deforestation: Tropical
Really Upon Us?” The Atlantic. 19 February Tree Losses Persist at High Levels”. BBC
2019. https://www.theatlantic.com/science/ News. 25 April 2019. https://www.bbc.com/
archive/2019/02/insect-apocalypse-really-up- news/science-environment-48037913
on-us/583018/
55 The Economist. 2019. “The Amazon Is Ap-
45 Loria, K. 2018. “What Happens If All the proaching an Irreversible Tipping Point”. The
Coral Reefs Die?” World Economic Forum Economist. 01 August 2019. https://www.
Global Agenda, published in collaboration economist.com/briefing/2019/08/01/the-am-
with Business Insider. 20 April 2018. https:// azon-is-approaching-an-irreversible-tip-
www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/what- ping-point
happens-if-all-the-coral-reefs-die
REUTERS/TOMAS BRAVO
Heightened geopolitical tensions discussed the risk of a fragmented cyberspace and
in previous chapters also risk negatively competing technology regulations. This chapter
influencing the huge economic potential of the contemplates how a fragmented cyberspace
next generation of technologies. The current and differing technological standards
lack of global technology governance and the could hinder economic growth, exacerbate
presence of cybersecurity blind spots increase geopolitical rivalries and further divide societies.
61
The 4IR: The new economy and businesses: our surveys rank them
as the seventh most likely and eighth
More than 50% of the world’s population most impactful risk, and the second most
is now online;1 roughly one million more concerning risk for doing business globally
people join the internet each day.2 over the next 10 years (see Figure II, The
Two-thirds of humanity own a mobile Global Risks Landscape). Fifth generation
device.3 Fourth Industrial Revolution (5G) networks, quantum computing and
(4IR) technologies are already bringing AI are creating not only opportunities but
tremendous economic and societal benefits also new threats of their own. The lack
to much of the global population. of a global governance framework for
technology risks fragmenting cyberspace,
The next wave of 4IR technologies will which could deter economic growth,
dramatically reshape economies and aggravate geopolitical rivalries and widen
societies. Precision medicine, autonomous divisions within societies.
vehicles and drones are all fast-growing
markets (see Figure 5.1), while artificial
intelligence (AI) alone is expected to boost The dangers of digital
global growth by 14% by 2030.4 innovation
Smart technologies have enormous potential Cyberattacks. The digital nature of 4IR
to improve both human life and the health technologies makes them intrinsically
of the planet. For example, satellite-based vulnerable to cyberattacks that can take
applications can aid rural farmers to irrigate a multitude of forms—from data theft
their crops efficiently.5 Prostheses can be and ransomware to the overtaking of
3D printed.6 Autonomous vehicles can systems with potentially large-scale harmful
be employed by the elderly to support consequences. Operational technologies
better mobility.7 The Internet of Things (IoT) are at increased risk because cyberattacks
can even help to lower CO2 emissions by could cause more traditional, kinetic impacts
optimizing energy consumption and reducing as technology is being extended into the
traffic congestion.8 physical world, creating a cyber-physical
system. However, using “security-by-design”
However, many unintended consequences principles to integrate cybersecurity features
have also surfaced. Cyberattacks have into new products is still secondary to getting
become a common hazard for individuals products quickly out into the market.
FIGURE 5.1
One million
used to take down Wikipedia through
classic distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks,18 and the risk of IoT devices being
used as intermediaries is expected to
increase.19 In 2021, cybercrime damages
might reach US$6 trillion20— what would be additional people joining the
equivalent to the GDP of the world’s third internet daily
largest economy.21
A new digital arms race. Digital preparedness efforts. It has also raised the
dependency is changing the nature of question of whether the participants in critical
international and national security, raising information infrastructure are trustworthy.
three urgent issues: how to protect critical The fragmentation of cyberspace will
infrastructure, uphold societal values and render those efforts moot and create
prevent the escalation of state-on-state possibly insurmountable technological
conflicts. Digital technologies increasingly incompatibilities for law enforcement to
feature in asymmetric warfare, enabling cooperate across varying systems.
attacks by smaller countries and non-state
actors on larger states. Viruses developed Economic risks
as cyberweapons have been re-purposed It is no surprise that technology hardware
by adversaries after being released into supply chains have driven recent research
cyberspace. Cyberspace has become an and development (R&D) and trade debates
extension of the military domain, triggering between major global economies.44
new technological arms races.42 Many countries are heavily scrutinizing
investment in—or acquisition of—technology
In 2019, several countries agreed to pursue companies by foreign investors. Countries
the establishment of guiding principles are increasingly looking at foreign
for the use of lethal autonomous weapons investment in universities to assess risks of
systems.43 However, key military powers intellectual property—in the form of research
are resisting international legal regulation and its potential commercial applications—
in this area, increasing the risk of serious vanishing abroad. Technology transfers in
future mishaps. exchange for market access have become
a contested part of trade negotiations.
Interruption of international
interconnectivity. Increased intelligence- These issues highlight the trade-offs
sharing between government cybersecurity countries are making between near-term
agencies and infrastructure operators has economic gain at a time of slow growth
strengthened the appreciation of challenges and longer-term security in an increasingly
related to cyberattacks and improved challenging geopolitical context. Europe’s
80
behind to catch up, and easier for regions
Loss of sustainability. As the to miss critical investment opportunities that
world is on the brink of climate would allow access to new 4IR technology
collapse (see Chapter 3, A Decade markets. Hence, countries could lose out
Left), the necessary duplication on the compounding effect of investments
of efforts for overcoming such and subsequently lack the R&D capabilities
number of technical fragmentation would needed to thrive, contributing to yet further
international not only be economically brain drain. Within countries, wealth gaps
counterproductive, but also could also increase: automation is forecasted
frameworks environmentally inefficient. This to hit low-skilled workers and women the
of ethics inefficiency is further amplified hardest.51 Societal divides could also widen
by countries’ pursuit of isolated between rural and urban areas in developing
and AI national technology regulations. economies,52 and between smart and non-
Adaptation to different products smart cities in developed countries.53 The
for different markets would wide-scale affordability of new technologies
inevitably increase the negative will be one important factor for minimizing
environmental footprint of any industry. At the digital divide.54
the same time, today’s ecological footprint
of mass data generated for and by AI— A human dystopia. Given the growing
for example, the energy required to run societal awareness of problems such as
servers—is already considerable.47 biased algorithms and cyberbullying,55 there
are many calls for deeper engagement on
Monetary and fiscal risks. The lack of questions of ethics in the development and
coordinated efforts by nations on how to use of 4IR technologies.56 Due diligence must
capture wealth created by open trade and be applied to avoid negative consequences
through digital means is a major challenge, for under-represented communities. The lack
creating disparities with local companies of a global technological framework could
and between countries. Moreover, new lead to a dystopia involving, for example,
digital currencies operating outside a clear cyberbullying without consequences,
regulatory framework could undermine workplace surveillance and the erosion of
sovereign currencies and international employee privacy.57
cooperation against money laundering.
Collapse in confidence in digital currencies While the open cyberspace has allowed
could also threaten financial stability.48 At the the democratization of certain processes
same time, innovation in this space could and increased access to information and
provide social benefit but this requires, as data, growing opportunities for promoting
falsehoods (accidentally and deliberately) have businesses are facing the challenge of
resulted in a gradual erosion of trust in media, implementing existing cybersecurity and
social networks and even governments. 4IR standards (where they exist), while
ensuring compliance with fragmented
Data are increasingly being collected on regulations on accountability, transparency,
citizens by government and business alike, bias and privacy for developing—or simply
and these data are then monetized and used applying—4IR technologies. Because
to refine the development and deployment government and corporate leaders equally
of new technologies back towards these share the responsibility for promoting global
citizens, as consumers. Amassing of data by cybersecurity and digital trust, cooperation
a handful of small entities leads to a further between the public and private sectors
entrenchment of gaps between advanced is more vital than ever in areas such as
and emerging economies. information-sharing, collaboration with
law enforcement agencies, and skill and
capacity development.
Global governance challenges
for businesses The new digital geopolitical race (see
Chapter 1, Global Risks 2020) also risks
Businesses, just as economies, rely on affecting businesses’ development of 4IR
concerted global technology governance. technologies and their market readiness
Fragmentation and incompatibility between to harness the benefits of the 4IR
global cybersecurity and technology transformation. An open and interconnected
frameworks risk weakening businesses’ cyberspace, along with global technological
capabilities to adapt to the emerging compatibility, are essential for businesses
challenges discussed in this chapter in a to be able to counter the dislocating
timely way, as raising transactional costs impacts of social media, the economic
increases the financial burden on businesses. impacts of global technology giants and
potential security issues resulting from
More and more firms operate in complex, the digital technology race between the
global and digital service ecosystems that world’s leading economies. By advocating
not only expose them to their own cyber for fair and concerted global actions on
and technological weaknesses, but also any 4IR-related governance frameworks,
to those of other participants—including businesses can mitigate risks, ensure trust
customers, suppliers and managed towards consumers and governments, and
system providers. At the same time, increasingly benefit from the 4IR.
27 Grijpink, F., A. Ménard, H. Sigurdson and N. Efforts have been led by regional organiza-
Vucevic. 2018. “The Road to 5G: The Inevita- tions as well, such as the Organisation for
ble Growth of Infrastructure Cost”. McKinsey. Security and Cooperation in Europe, the
February 2018. https://www.mckinsey.com/ Council of Europe, the Organization of Amer-
industries/technology-media-and-telecom- ican States, the ASEAN Regional Forum and
munications/our-insights/the-road-to-5g-the- the Organization of American States.
inevitable-growth-of-infrastructure-cost
See also recommendation 4 in United Na-
28 Global Infrastructure Hub. 2019. Investment tions. 2019. The Age of Digital Interdepend-
forecasts for Telecommunications. Global ence: Report of the UN Secretary-General’s
Infrastructure Outlook. https://outlook.gihub. High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation. June
org/sectors/telecommunication 2019. https://digitalcooperation.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2019/06/DigitalCooperation-re-
port-web-FINAL-1.pdf
37 United Nations. 2019. Op. cit. 44 Markman, J. 2019. “Trade War with China
Will Hit U.S. Tech Companies Hard”. Forbes.
38 McDonald, J. 2019. “China Promises No 30 September 2019. https://www.forbes.
Forced Tech Transfers, Access to Finance”. com/sites/jonmarkman/2019/09/30/trade-
Associated Press. 29 October 2019. https:// war-with-china-will-hit-u-s-tech-companies-
apnews.com/5dcec36663324b34b290f3f7f- hard/#7621e04c6cca
378c6f3
45 Deloitte. 2016. The Economic Impact of
39 Waters, R. 2019. “No End in Sight to Split In- Disruptions to Internet Connectivity. A Report
ternet Say Researchers”. Financial Times. 20 for Facebook. Deloitte. https://www2.deloitte.
February 2019. https://www.ft.com/content/ com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Docu-
69f97e7e-34a3-11e9-bd3a-8b2a211d90d5 ments/Technology-Media-Telecommunica-
tions/economic-impact-disruptions-to-inter-
40 Stanek, R. 2019. “Four Steps to Help Prepare net-connectivity-deloitte.pdf
for an Increasingly Balkanized Internet”. 07
November 2019. Forbes. https://www.forbes. 46 Accenture. 2017. Digital Fragmentation:
com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/11/07/four- Adapt to Succeed in a Fragmented World.
steps-to-help-prepare-for-an-increasingly- Accenture. https://www.accenture.com/_
balkanized-internet/#7a8589086755; Russia acnmedia/pdf-60/accenture-digital-fragmen-
Today. 2019. “Russia to Launch ‘Independent tation-interactive-pov.pdf#zoom=50
Internet’ for BRICS Nations – Report”. Russia
Today. 28 November 2017. https://www. 47 Hao, K. 2019. “Training a Single AI Model
rt.com/russia/411156-russia-to-launch-inde- Can Emit as Much Carbon as Five Cars in
pendent-internet/ Their Lifetimes. Deep Learning Has a Terrible
Carbon Footprint”. MIT Technology Review.
41 KTU (Kaunas University of Technology). 06 June 2019. https://www.technologyre-
2019. “Patent Filings around the World: Can view.com/s/613630/training-a-single-ai-mod-
Lithuania Compete?” KTU News. 23 October el-can-emit-as-much-carbon-as-five-cars-in-
2019. https://en.ktu.edu/news/patent-filings- their-lifetimes/
around-the-world-can-lithuania-compete/;
Benassi, M., E. Grinza and F. Rentocchini. 48 Wagner, K. 2019. “Facebook Says Cen-
2019. “The Rush for Patents in the Fourth tral Banks Have Nothing to Fear from
Industrial Revolution: An Exploration of Libra”. Bloomberg. 17 September 2019.
Patenting Activity at the European Patent https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
Office”. SPRU Working Papers Series, SWPS cles/2019-09-17/facebook-says-central-
2019-12 (June). Sussex: University of Sussex banks-have-nothing-to-fear-from-libra
Business School. https://www.sussex.ac.uk/
webteam/gateway/file.php?name=2019-12- 49 IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2019.
swps-benassi-et-al.pdf&site=25 Opening Statement by Christine Lagarde to
the Economic and Monetary Affairs Commit-
42 Tao, A. L. 2019. “Black Hat Asia 2019: Get tee of the European Parliament. 04 Sep-
Ready for the Cyber Arms Race”. Compu- tember 2019. https://www.imf.org/en/News/
terWeekly.com. 02 April 2019. https://www. Articles/2019/09/04/sp090419-Opening-
computerweekly.com/news/252460807/ Statement-by-Christine-Lagarde-to-ECON-
Black-Hat-Asia-2019-Get-ready-for-the-cy- Committee-of-European-Parliament
ber-arms-race
50 UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development). 2019. Digital Econ-
omy Report 2019. Value Creation and Cap-
ture: Implications for Developing Countries.
New York: United Nations. https://unctad.org/
en/PublicationsLibrary/der2019_en.pdf
REUTERS/BENOIT TESSIER
The institutions and approaches that have until against some of humanity’s biggest killers.
now enabled health progress across the world Meanwhile, new vulnerabilities threaten to undo
are straining under gathering pressures and the dramatic gains in wellness and prosperity
seem outmatched against new risks. that health systems have supported over the
last century. Non-communicable diseases
Health systems around the world are at risk of (NCDs)—such as cardiovascular diseases
becoming unfit for purpose. Changing societal, or mental illness—have replaced infectious
environmental, demographic and technological diseases as the leading cause of death.
patterns are straining their capacity. Vaccine As existing health risks resurge and new
hesitancy and drug resistance are undermining ones emerge, humanity’s past successes
progress against pandemics, making it in overcoming health challenges are no
increasingly difficult to land the final blow guarantee of future results.
73
The slowing of However, strained health systems are leading
health progress to worrying trends. Gains in lifespan and
healthspan (the number of years spent in
Global investments in health in recent good health) seem to be slowing in both
decades have yielded substantial gains to developed and developing countries.4 For
both longevity and quality of life. Over the example, recent data published by the
long history of our species, the average Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
life expectancy at birth for people in most shows that US life expectancy declined in
societies ranged from 20 to 50 years. Since 2017 for the third year in a row, the longest
1950, this has improved significantly—to sustained drop for a century—since the
72 years globally,1 of which 63 years on combined effects of World War I and a global
average are lived in good health, free of influenza pandemic.5 In Singapore, although
disease or disability (see Figure 6.1).2 life expectancy has increased since 1990,
people are spending more of their lives in
Many factors have contributed to this sickness.6 Disparities in health outcomes
success: scientific breakthroughs; better persist within and across countries. A baby
hygiene, sanitation and nutrition; health born in Hong Kong can expect to live for
policies and investments made possible 85 years, versus just 52 years in the Central
by prosperity; international cooperation; African Republic (Figure 6.1).7 Meanwhile,
and individual choices. Vaccines illustrate rich-poor health gaps are growing in
this point: after germ theory took hold in countries including the United Kingdom
the late 19th century, scientists developed and the United States.8
vaccines for many deadly infectious
diseases including smallpox, measles,
polio, pertussis, diphtheria, tetanus and Pressures on health systems
tuberculosis. Smallpox—once among the
deadliest diseases—was the first to be Gathering pressures are straining health
eradicated by national programmes and systems on many fronts. In this section, we
international cooperation in surveillance and discuss long-standing challenges as well as
containment, reinforced by people’s trust the next generation of health pressures that
in health systems and their willingness to health systems are now confronting.
be vaccinated. Coordinated immunization
programmes continue to prevent millions of Familiar foes
deaths annually.3 There is no guarantee that health systems
will continue to improve health, and clear
signs of strain are apparent. Despite historic,
hard-won success against diseases such
FIGURE 6.1
as smallpox, some of humanity’s most
Life Expectancy at Birth, 1967–2017 formidable global health threats still linger—
and other threats, thought to have been
Age
quashed, are resurgent.
85
80 Persisting pandemics. Thirty years ago,
75 polio was endemic in 125 countries,
70 causing 350,000 clinical cases per year.
65 After an extraordinary international effort
60 and US$20 billion in investment, today
55 there are 99.9% fewer cases and polio
50
remains endemic in only Afghanistan,
Pakistan and possibly Nigeria—where
45
geopolitical challenges have complicated
40
eradication.9 Polio could potentially be
35
1967 2017 eradicated in the next four years—but the
estimated cost to make that happen would
Central African Republic World Hong Kong be another US$4.2 billion.10 The last mile is
proving the hardest, for reasons including
Source: World Bank Open Data, https://data.worldbank.org/, accessed 15 December 2019. persistent political instability and community
74 False Positive
REUTERS/EMMANUEL FOUDROT
33 years:
resistance—which often stems in part
from a perception that investments in polio
eradication come at the expense of other
health priorities.11 Letting up is not an option
because the short- and long-term benefits
of eradicating this enduring scourge would
be massive.
widest gap in life expectancy
between countries
Similar stories can be told about HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis and malaria. After years of
remarkable progress as a result of sustained
political commitment and funding via also recently saw the world’s largest
the Global Fund, ambitions to end these measles outbreak, affecting over 200,000
epidemics by 2030 are being undermined people in less than a year.16 The resurgence
by factors such as diseases’ increasing of measles is a symptom of complacency
resistance to drugs.12 and recklessness.
76 False Positive
Dementia affects 10 million more
people each year
2 million:
including risks of compromising patient
safety and privacy, as well as introducing
bias. Errors by individual health workers
affect only their patients, whereas the
consequences of AI errors could unfold
cost per patient of recent cell at a whole new scale. Since training data
and gene therapies sets in health often skew white and male,44
AI could fail to spot symptoms or devise
effective treatment plans for everyone else.
These outcomes will be tough to predict or
Disruptive technologies. Over the avoid because AI’s black-box nature makes
centuries health systems have embraced it difficult to understand how it reaches
many innovations, sometimes without conclusions—making it hard to spot bias.
waiting for them to be proven safe and Health data are especially vulnerable to
effective. Healthcare providers and payers cyberattacks,45 with risks of individuals being
are already using today’s emerging identified even from anonymized data (see
technologies—machine learning and artificial Chapter 5, Wild Wide Web).
intelligence (AI), sensors, digital therapies,
telemedicine and so on—to support both Pharmaceutical revolution. Highly complex,
clinical and operational decisions: to triage specialized new drugs promise radically better
symptoms,41 interpret diagnostic tests,42 treatment for devastating diseases—but they
create personalized treatment plans43 come at exorbitant prices. For example, three
and predict re-admissions at a hospital or recently launched cell and gene therapies
epidemics in a population. Combined with cost up to US$2 million per patient. Over
human capacity, these technologies could the next few years, between 15 and 30 new
78 False Positive
could lead to rewards and incentives for
people to live healthier lifestyles, but if
unchecked by regulation, it could also
potentially put insurance beyond the reach of
people judged to be higher risk for genetic,
environmental or behavioural reasons.
1 WHO (World Health Organization). 2019. 9 WHO (World Health Organization). 2018.
Global Health Observatory (GHO) Data: Review of Polio Endemic Countries. Report
Life Expectancy. https://www.who.int/gho/ of the Independent Monitoring Board of the
mortality_burden_disease/life_tables/situa- Global Polio Eradication Initiative on Pro-
tion_trends/en/ gress in Afghanistan, Nigeria and Pakistan.
September 2018. https://www.who.int/
2 WHO (World Health Organization). 2019. immunization/sage/meetings/2018/octo-
Global Health Observatory (GHO) Data: ber/4_Review_Polio_Endemic_Countires_Re-
Healthy Life Expectancy (HALE) at Birth. port_IMB_Final_revised.pdf
https://www.who.int/gho/mortality_burden_
disease/life_tables/hale_text/en/ 10 WHO (World Health Organization). 2019.
Proposed programme budget 2020–2021.
3 WHO (World Health Organization). 2019. “The 13 May 2019. https://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/
Power of Vaccines: Still Not Fully Utilized”. pdf_files/WHA72/A72_INF3-en.pdf
https://www.who.int/publications/10-year-re-
view/vaccines/en/ 11 Razum, O., D. Sridhar, A. Jahn, S. Zaidi, G.
Ooms and O. Müller. 2019. “Polio: From Erad-
4 Cardona, C. and D. Bishai. 2018. “The ication to Systematic, Sustained Control”.
Slowing Pace of Life Expectancy Gains since BMJ Global Health 2019; 4:e001633. https://
1950”. BMC Public Health (2018) 18:151. gh.bmj.com/content/4/4/e001633
DOI 10.1186/s12889-018-5058-9. https://
bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/ 12 The Global Fund. 2019. “Global Fund Donors
pdf/10.1186/s12889-018-5058-9 Pledge US$14 Billion in Fight to End Epidem-
ics”. Press Release, 10 October 2019. https://
5 Murphy, S. L. B. S., J. Xu, K. D. Kochanek www.theglobalfund.org/en/news/2019-10-10-
and E. Arias. 2018. “Mortality in the United global-fund-donors-pledge-usd14-billion-in-
States, 2017”. Centers for Disease Control fight-to-end-epidemics/
and Prevention, NCHS Data Brief No. 328,
November 2018. https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/ 13 WHO (World Health Organization). 2019. “Ten
products/databriefs/db328.htm; Bernstein, L. Threats to Global Health in 2019”. https://
2018. “U.S. Life Expectancy Declines Again, www.who.int/emergencies/ten-threats-to-
a Dismal Trend Not Seen since World War I”. global-health-in-2019
The Washington Post. 29 November 2018.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/ 14 CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
health-science/us-life-expectancy-declines- vention). 2019. “Global Health: Global Mea-
again-a-dismal-trend-not-seen-since-world- sles Outbreaks”. https://www.cdc.gov/global-
war-i/2018/11/28/ae58bc8c-f28c-11e8-bc79- health/measles/globalmeaslesoutbreaks.htm
68604ed88993_story.html
15 Soucheray, S. 2019. “US Measles Cases
6 Lim, J. 2018. 2019. “Singaporeans Living Hit 1,234 as Brooklyn Outbreak Called
Longer but Spending More Time in Ill Health: Over”. CIDRAP News. 03 September 2019.
Study”. Today. 20 June 2019. https://www. http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspec-
todayonline.com/singapore/singapore- tive/2019/09/us-measles-cases-hit-1234-
ans-living-longer-spending-greater-propor- brooklyn-outbreak-called-over
tion-time-ill-health-study
16 UNICEF. 2019. “As Measles Deaths in the
7 World Bank Open Data. Life Expectancy at Democratic Republic of the Congo Top
Birth. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 4,000, UNICEF Rushes Medical Kits to
SP.DYN.LE00.IN?most_recent_value_desc=- Health Centers and Vaccinates Thousands
false, accessed 01 December 2019. More Children”. Press Release, 09 October
2019. https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/
8 Public Health England, Gov.UK. 2018. measles-deaths-democratic-republic-congo-
“Health Profile for England 2018. Chapter top-4000-unicef-rushes-medical-kits-health
5: Inequalities in Health”. https://www.gov.
uk/government/publications/health-profile- 17 Wellcome. 2019. “Q&A: What Are Drug-Re-
for-england-2018/chapter-5-inequalities-in- sistant Infections?” Wellcome News. 09 Sep-
health; Bleich, S. N., M. P. Jarlenski, C. N. tember 2019. https://wellcome.ac.uk/news/
Bell and T. A. LaVeist. 2012. “Health Inequal- what-are-drug-resistant-infections
ities: Trends, Progress, and Policy”. Annual
Review of Public Health. 33 (1): 7–40. https:// 18 Review on Antimicrobial Resistance. 2016.
www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/an- Tackling Drug-Resistant Infections Globally:
nurev-publhealth-031811-124658 Final Report and Recommendations. May
2016. Wellcome Trust and UK Govern-
ment. https://amr-review.org/sites/default/
files/160525_Final%20paper_with%20cover.
pdf
80 False Positive
19 NTI (Nuclear Threat Initiative). 2019. “Glob- 28 WHO (World Health Organization). 2019.
al Health Security Index: Inaugural Global “WHO Calls for Urgent Action to Protect
Health Security Index Finds No Country Is Health from Climate Change – Sign the Call“.
Prepared for Epidemics or Pandemics”. NTI. https://www.who.int/globalchange/glob-
Press Release, 24 October 2019. https:// al-campaign/cop21/en/
www.nti.org/newsroom/news/inaugural-glob-
al-health-security-index-finds-no-coun- 29 Watts, N., et al. 2019. “The 2019 Report
try-prepared-epidemics-or-pandemics/ of The Lancet Countdown on Health and
Climate Change: Ensuring that the Health
20 World Economic Forum. 2019. “Outbreak of a Child Born Today Is Not Defined by a
Readiness and Business Impact Protecting Changing Climate”. The Lancet 394 (10211):
Lives and Livelihoods across the Global P1836–78. 13 November 2019. https://
Economy”. White Paper, in collaboration with www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/
Harvard Global Health Institute. https://www. PIIS0140-6736(19)32596-6/fulltext
weforum.org/whitepapers/outbreak-read-
iness-and-business-impact-protect- 30 World Bank and Institute for Health Metrics
ing-lives-and-livelihoods-across-the-glob- and Evaluation (IHME). 2016. The Cost of Air
al-economy Pollution: Strengthening the Economic Case
for Action. Washington, DC: World Bank.
21 WHO (World Health Organization). 2018. Fact http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
Sheet on Noncommunicable Diseases. 1 en/781521473177013155/pdf/108141-RE-
June 2018. https://www.who.int/news-room/ VISED-Cost-of-PollutionWebCORRECTEDfile.
fact-sheets/detail/noncommunicable-dis- pdf
eases; Ha, B., S.H. Lee, and D. Park. 2019.
“Will Asia Grow Old Before Becoming Rich?” 31 Watts et al. 2019. Op. cit.
BRINK News. 03 July 2018. https://www.
brinknews.com/will-asia-grow-old-before-be- 32 Caminade, C., K. M. McIntyre, and A. E.
coming-rich/ Jones. 2019. “Impact of Recent and Future
Climate Change on Vector-Borne Diseases”.
22 WHO (World Health Organization). 2011. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
Global Status Report on Noncommunicable 1436 (1): 157–73. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
Diseases 2010. https://www.who.int/nmh/ gov/pmc/articles/PMC6378404/
publications/ncd_report2010/en/
33 Scheer, R. and D. Moss. 2013. “Mosqui-
23 Mnookin, S. 2016. “Out of the Shadows: to-Borne Diseases on the Uptick—Thanks
Making Mental Health a Global Develop- to Global Warming”. Scientific American,
ment Priority”. World Bank and World Health EarthTalk. https://www.scientificamerican.
Organization background paper. http://www. com/article/mosquito-borne-diseases-on-
who.int/mental_health/advocacy/wb_back- the-uptick-thanks-to-global-warming/
ground_paper.pdf
34 Dunne, D. 2019. “Mosquito-Borne Diseases
24 Patel, V. and S. Saxena. 2014. “Transforming Could Reach Extra ‘One Billion People’ as
Lives, Enhancing Communities—Innovations Climate Warms”. Carbon Brief. 28 March
in Global Mental Health”. New England Jour- 2019. https://www.carbonbrief.org/mosquito-
nal of Medicine 370 (6): 498–501. borne-diseases-could-reach-extra-one-bil-
lion-people-as-climate-warms
25 Bloom, D. E., E. T. Cafiero, E. Jané-Llopis, A.
Abrahams-Gessel, L. R. Bloom, S. Fathima, 35 Mercer Marsh Benefits. 2019. “Health and
A. B. Feigl, T. Gaziano, M. Mowafi, A. Pan- Benefits: Health Insurance Costs – In-
dya, K. Prettner, L. Rosenberg, B. Seligman, sights & Implications. Results of the 2019
A. Z. Stein and C. Weinstein. 2011. The Glob- Medical Trends around the World Sur-
al Economic Burden of Noncommunicable vey”. https://www.mercermarshbenefits.
Diseases. A Report by the World Economic com/en/intellectual-capital/2019-medi-
Forum and the Harvard School of Public cal-trends-around-the-world1.html
Health. Geneva: World Economic Forum.
https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-eco- 36 U.S. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
nomic-burden-non-communicable-diseases Services. 2018. National Health Expenditure
Accounts (2018). https://www.cms.gov/Re-
26 ADI (Alzheimer’s Disease International). 2018. search-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statis-
World Alzheimer Report 2018. The State of tics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthEx-
the Art of Dementia Research: New Fron- pendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.
tiers. London: ADI. https://www.alz.co.uk/ html, accessed 01 December 2019.
research/WorldAlzheimerReport2018.pdf
82 False Positive
REUTERS/MIKE SEGAR
Appendices
REUTERS/STRINGER
85
Appendix A:
Descriptions of Global Risks 2020
Global Risks
A “global risk” is defined as an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, can cause significant negative impact
for several countries or industries within the next 10 years.
To ensure legibility, the names of the global risks have been abbreviated in the figures. The portion of the full name
used in the abbreviation is in bold.
Deflation in a major economy Prolonged near-zero inflation or deflation in a major economy or region
Failure of a major financial Collapse of a financial institution and/or malfunctioning of a financial system
mechanism or institution that impacts the global economy
Extreme weather events Major property, infrastructure, and/or environmental damage as well as loss
(e.g. floods, storms) of human life caused by extreme weather events
Major natural disasters (e.g. Major property, infrastructure, and/or environmental damage as well as
earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic loss of human life caused by geophysical disasters such as earthquakes,
eruptions, geomagnetic storms) volcanic activity, landslides, tsunamis or geomagnetic storms
Human-made environmental
Failure to prevent major human-made damage and disasters, including
damage and disasters
environmental crime, causing harm to human lives and health,
(e.g. oil spills, radioactive
infrastructure, property, economic activity or the environment
contamination)
86 Appendices
Failure of national
governance (e.g. failure of rule Inability to govern a nation of geopolitical importance as a result of weak
of law, corruption, political rule of law, corruption or political deadlock
deadlock)
Major social movements or protests (e.g. street riots, social unrest) that
Profound social instability disrupt political or social stability, negatively impacting populations and
economic activity
Massive incident of data fraud Wrongful exploitation of private or official data that takes place on an
or theft unprecedented scale
The Global Risks Perception Survey (GRPS) is the World Economic Forum’s source of original risks data,
harnessing the expertise of the Forum’s extensive network of business, government, civil society and thought
leaders. The survey was conducted from 5 September to 22 October 2019 among the World Economic Forum’s
multistakeholder communities (including the Global Shapers Community), the professional networks of its
Advisory Board, and members of the Institute of Risk Management. The results of the GRPS are used to create
the Global Risks Landscape and Interconnections Map presented at the beginning of the report, and to offer
insights used throughout.
Both the GRPS and the Global Risks Report adopt the following definition of global risk:
Global risk: A “global risk” is an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, can cause significant negative
impact for several countries or industries within the next 10 years.
Methodology
The world in 2020
In the first section of the GRPS, respondents were decrease” and 5 representing “significantly increase”.
asked to assess whether the risks associated with 40 To reduce framing bias, the values between this range
current issues would increase or decrease in 2020 were not assigned specific wording. For each risk, the
compared to 2019 (see Table B.1 below for full results). share for each answer was obtained by dividing the
Respondents were also given the option to name any number of respondents who selected that answer by
other issue(s), not included in the 40 risks listed that the total number of answers.
they expect to be a source of increased risk in 2020.
We use these open responses to assess the need to Respondents were asked to base their answers to
update our list of risks from year to year. each of these 40 risks on a global level. They were
asked the following question: “On a global level, do
The possible answers to survey questions ranged from you think that in 2020 the risks presented by the
“significantly decrease” to “significantly increase” on following issues will increase or decrease compared
a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 representing “significantly to 2019?”
88 Appendices
T A B L E B .1:
Percent of respondents who think a risk will increase in 2020
compared to 2019.
Economic confrontations between major powers 78.5% Foreign interference in domestic politics 60.5%
Domestic political polarization 78.4% Civil unrest (including strikes and riots) 60.2%
Destruction of natural ecosystems 76.2% Loss of confidence in collective security alliances 57.4%
Protectionism regarding trade and investment 76.0% Involuntary climate-related migration 53.8%
Cyberattacks: theft of data/money 75.0% High levels of crisis-driven or economic migration 53.0%
Loss of privacy (to companies) 69.1% Military actions short of war 44.3%
Loss of trust in media/information sources 68.4% Erosion of global supply chains 43.7%
Loss of privacy (to governments) 67.4% High levels of youth unemployment 42.9%
Public anger against elites 66.3% Market collapse of stock or other assets 40.9%
90 Appendices
Completion thresholds
We received 1,047 total responses to the GRPS to – Part 2 “Assessment of Global Risks”:
which we applied an overall standard deviation check, as The answers from the 718 respondents who
well as specific completion thresholds for each section assessed the impact and likelihood of at least
of the survey: one risk were used to compute the results (leaving
the question entirely blank was not considered a
– Overall: nine responses yielded a standard valid answer).
deviation of zero in the increase/decrease scores
for Part 1 of the survey, as well as the likelihood – Part 3 “Global Risk Interconnections”: The
and impact scores for Part 2. These responses answers from the 628 respondents who selected
were not included in the survey results. at least one valid pair of risks were used to
compute the results.
– Part 1 “The World in 2020”: The answers from
the 777 respondents who assessed at least four Figure B.1 presents some key descriptive statistics and
of the risks listed in this question were used to information about the profiles of the respondents.
compute the results.
F I G U R E B .1
Survey Sample Composition
Other
0.39% Technology
Economics
13.06%
25.07% Business
Male 37.73%
68.44% Academia
Female Other 20.63% NGO
31.17% Society 22.16%
11.36%
13.06%
Geopolitics Other
11.87% 5.35%
Government
14.88%
29.08% 26.69%
Europe Eurasia
22.97% North America 44.42% 2.21%
14.21% 16.88%
At the World Economic Forum, a debt of gratitude We are also grateful to our three Academic Advisers:
is owed to Professor Klaus Schwab (Founder and the National University of Singapore, the Oxford Martin
Executive Chairman), Børge Brende (President) and School at the University of Oxford and the Wharton
Mirek Dusek (Deputy Head, Centre for Regional and Risk Management and Decision Processes Center at
Geopolitical Affairs), under whose guidance this report the University of Pennsylvania.
has been produced. Lee Howell (Head of Global
Programming) has been an important mentor. The report has greatly benefited from the insight
and expertise of the members of the Global Risks
This report has relied heavily on the dedication and Report Advisory Board: Rolf Alter (Hertie School
expertise of the Global Risks and Geopolitics team: Ariel of Governance), Sharan Burrow (International Trade
Kastner, Melinda Kuritzky, Richard Lukacs and Philip Union Confederation), Winnie Byanyima (Oxfam
Shetler-Jones. Thanks also to the other members of International, through August 2019), Marie-Valentine
The Global Risks Report 2020 team: Oliver Cann, Aylin Florin (International Risk Governance Center), Al Gore
Elçi, Emily Farnworth, Maxwell Hall and Yann Zopf. (Generation Investment Management), Carolyn Kousky
(Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes
A special thanks goes to our partners across Center), Kok Kwang Phoon (National University of
World Economic Forum teams as well as external Singapore), Julian Laird (Oxford Martin School),
experts who have contributed to specific chapters Pascal Lamy (Jacque Delors Institute), Maleeha Lodhi
of this report: (Government of Pakistan), Gary Marchant (Arizona
State University), Robert Muggah (Igarapé Institute),
Chapter 2, The Fraying Fundamentals. Moisés Naím (Carnegie Endowment for International
Sheikh Tanjeb Islam. Peace), Naomi Oreskes (Harvard University), Jonathan
Ostry (International Monetary Fund), Carol Ouko-Misiko
Chapter 3, A Decade Left. Dominik Breitinger, Emily (Institute of Risk Management), Eduardo Pedrosa
Farnworth, Andrew Pickens and Jahda Swanborough. (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council), Daniel Ralph
(Cambridge Centre for Risks Studies), Nouriel Roubini
Chapter 4, Save the Axolotl. Marco Albani, Akanksha (New York University), John Scott (Zurich Insurance
Khatri, Marie Quinney and Kimberly Nicole Pope. Group), Carsten Schrehardt (Federal Ministry of
Defence of Germany), Richard Smith-Bingham (Marsh
Chapter 5, Wild Wide Web. Francesca Bosco, & McLennan), Ursula von der Leyen (Government of
Amy Jordan, Zvika Krieger, Rebekah Lewis, Germany, through July 2019), Ngaire Woods (University
Adrien Ogée, Thomas Philbeck, Algirde Pipikaite and of Oxford) and Alexandra Zapata (Mexican Institute for
Anelia Uzunova. Competitiveness).
Thanks also go to members of the Club of Rome We are grateful to the following individuals from our
(George Biesmans, Sandrine Dixson-Declève, Gail Strategic Partners and Academic Advisors.
Whiteman) for their contributions.
Marsh & McLennan: Rob Bailey,
***** Alex Bernhardt, Helga Birgden, Leslie Chacko, Blair
Chalmers, John Colas, Lorna Friedman, Jason Groves,
We would like to thank our Strategic Partners, Kavitha Hariharan, Rachel Lam, Jordan Parker,
Marsh & McLennan (MMC) and Zurich Insurance Hilary Pereira, Lily Phan, Viet Hoang Phan, Tom
Group, and in particular Daniel Glaser (Chief Executive Quigley, Stephen Szaraz, Alex Wittenberg and
Officer, MMC) and Mario Greco (Chief Executive Amelia Woltering.
Officer, Zurich Insurance Group). Thanks also to
John Drzik (President, Global Risk and Digital, MMC) Zurich Insurance Group: Paige Adams, Lori Bailey,
and Peter Giger (Group Chief Risk Officer, Zurich Francis Bouchard, Matteo Capolei, Laura Castellano,
Insurance Group). Anette Dahl-Hiscott, Daniel Eherer, Lillian Labbat,
Wen Lin, Alison Martin, Jessica McLellan, Guy Miller,
Special gratitude is due to John Scott (Head of Eugenie Molyneux, Pavel Osipyants, Marc Radice,
Sustainability Risks, Zurich Insurance Group) and Richard Gregory Renand, Jennifer Schneider and Angel Serna.
contact@weforum.org
www.weforum.org