REMREV1 Case Doctrines

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1
Atty. Henedino M. Brondial

CASE DOCTRINES
JURISDICTION
SANDIGANBAYAN
It is clear that it is the Sandiganbayan and not the Makati City RTC that has jurisdiction over the disputed UHC and PNCC shares, being the alleged
"ill-gotten wealth" of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and petitioner Cuenca. The fact that the Makati City RTC civil case involved the
PCGG v. Dumayas performance of contractual obligations relative to the UHC shares is of no importance. The benchmark is whether said UHC shares are alleged to be
1 G.R. No. 209447; August 11, 2015 ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their perceived cronies. More importantly, the interests of orderly administration of justice dictate that all incidents
Villarama, Jr., J. affecting the UHC shares and PCGG's right of supervision or control over the UHC must be addressed to and resolved by the Sandiganbayan. Indeed,
the law and courts frown upon split jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity of suits, which result in much lost time, wasted effort, more expenses,
and irreparable injury to the public interest.
For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is
essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the
Escobal v. Garchitorena Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because
2 G.R. No. 124644; February 5, 2004 that would be a conclusion of law. The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the
Callejo, Sr., J. intimate relation between his office and the discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24,
1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to office. The
trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan.
Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan; Crime of Estafa. Plainly, estafa is the one of those felonies within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to
the twin requirements that: (1) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of PD. NO. 1606, as amended,
and that; (2) The offense is committed in relation to their office.
It is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office. Delegation
of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government,
to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer. A UP Student Regent is a Public Officer. A public officer is the right,
authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the power, an individual
Serana v. Sandiganbayan
is invested with some portion of sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public.
3 G.R. No. 162059; January 22, 2008
Reyes, R.T., J.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; Covers Board of Regents. The Sandiganbayan, also has jurisdiction over the other officers enumerated in PD.
No. 1606. In Geduspan vs. People, we held that while the first part of section 4(A) covers only officials with SG 27 and higher, its second part
specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of SG 27 and higher but who are by express provisions of law placed under
the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of PD. No. 1606 explicitly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors and trustees, or manager of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities,
or educational or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out. The Board of Regents (BOR) performs functions
similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by
PD. No. 1606.
Those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2)
Duncano v. Sandiganbayan officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades. While the first part of Section 4 (A) covers only
4 G.R. No. 191894; July 15, 2015 officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may
Peralta, J. not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
1 This material has not been proofread.

Cases that are highlighted were asked in class.
Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the
positions enumerated by the law. In this category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
To reiterate for emphasis, Section 4 (b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, is the general law on jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over crimes
and offenses committed by high-ranking public officers in relation to their office; Section 90, RA 9165 is the special law excluding from the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction violations of RA 9165 committed by such public officers. In the latter case, jurisdiction is vested upon the RTCs
designated by the Supreme Court as drugs court, regardless of whether the violation of RA 9165 was committed in relation to the public officials'
office.
De Lima v. Guerrero
5 G.R. No. 229781; October 10, 2017 The exceptional rule provided under Section 90, RA 9165 relegating original exclusive jurisdiction to RTCs specially designated by the Supreme Court
Velasco, Jr., J. logically follows given the technical aspect of drug-related cases. With the proliferation of cases involving violation of RA 9165, it is easy to dismiss
them as common and untechnical. However, narcotic substances possess unique characteristics that render them not readily identifiable.
The Court has held that an offense is deemed to be committed in relation to the public office of the accused when that office is an element of the crime
charged. However, even if public office is not an element of the offense, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan obtains when the relation between the
crime and the office is direct and not accidental such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the office.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS

In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives
the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari,whether or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is provided under
Section 21 of BP 129.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
City of Manila v. Judge Cuerdo determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
6 G.R. No. 175723; February 4, 2014 instrumentality of the Government.
Peralta, J.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases
falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of
certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also
such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should
only be considered as partial, not total.
It is the CTA which has the power to rule on a Petition for Certiorari assailing an interlocutory order of the RTC relating to a local tax case.
CE Casecnan Water & Energy Co. v.
Prov. of Nueva Ecija
7 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is required for a court to act on any controversy. It is conferred by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a
G.R. No. 196278; June 17, 2015
court. As such, if a court lacks jurisdiction over an action, it cannot decide the case on the merits and must dismiss it.
Del Castillo, J.

With respect to the CTA, its jurisdiction was expanded and its rank elevated to that of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction by virtue of Republic
Act No. 9282. This expanded jurisdiction of the CTA includes its exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions, orders or resolutions
of the RTC in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will preserve
the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make
the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters
necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any
act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it. Given these, it is settled that it is the CTA which
has exclusive jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
SHARI’A COURTS
The Shari'a Appellate Court created under Republic Act No. 9054 shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases tried in the Shari'a District Courts.
Lomondot v. Balindong
It shall also exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, and other auxiliary writs and processes
8 G.R. No. 192463; July 13, 2015
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The decisions of the Shari'a Appellate Court shall be final and executory, without prejudice to the original and
Peralta, J.
appellate jurisdiction of this court.
The matters over which Shari'a district courts have jurisdiction are enumerated in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, specifically in Article 143.
Municipality of Tangkal, Lanao Del Consistent with the purpose of the law to provide for an effective administration and enforcement of Muslim personal laws among Muslims, it has a
Norte v. Balindong catchall provision granting Shari'a district courts original jurisdiction over personal and real actions except those for forcible entry and unlawful
9
G.R. No. 193340; January 11, 2017 detainer. The Shari'a district courts' jurisdiction over these matters is concurrent with regular civil courts, i.e., municipal trial courts and regional trial
Jardeleza, J. courts. There is, however, a limit to the general jurisdiction of Shari'a district courts over matters ordinarily cognizable by regular courts: such
jurisdiction may only be invoked if both parties are Muslims. If one party is not a Muslim, the action must be filed before the regular courts.
RESIDUAL JURISDICTION
Residual jurisdiction refers to the authority of the trial court to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not
involve any matter litigated by the appeal; to approve compromises; to permit appeals by indigent litigants; to order execution pending appeal in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 39; and to allow the withdrawal of the appeal, provided these are done prior to the transmittal of the original record
or the record on appeal, even if the appeal has already been perfected or despite the approval of the record on appeal or in case of a petition for review
Dev. Bank of the Phil. v. Carpio under Rule 42, before the CA gives due course to the petition.
10 G.R. No. 195450; February 1, 2017
Mendoza, J. The "residual jurisdiction" of the trial court is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case
or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records
on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual
jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and
allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Unduran v. Aberasturi Primary jurisdiction is the power and authority vested by the Constitution or by statute upon an administrative body to act upon a matter by virtue of
11 G.R. No. 181284; April 18, 2017 its specific competence. Given that the provisions of the enabling statute are the yardsticks by which the Court would measure the quantum of quasi-
Peralta, J. judicial powers that an administrative agency may exercise, as defined in the enabling act of such agency.

LBP v. Dalauta The doctrine of primary jurisdiction tells us that courts cannot, and will not, resolve a controversy involving a question which is
12 G.R. No. 190004; August 8, 2017 within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
Mendoza, J. requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
SPLIT JURISDICTION
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with
jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount
to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
People v. Henry T. Go Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest
13 G.R. No. 168539; March 25, 2014 but also covered other matters which called for respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said court’s
Peralta, J. jurisdiction over him.
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail
and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an
Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
EPISTOLARY JURISDICTION
For their part, the Stewards contend that there should be no question of their right to represent the Resident Marine Mammals as they have stakes in
Resident Marine Mammals v. the case as forerunners of a campaign to build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait and as stewards of the environment since the
Angelo Reyes primary steward, the Government, had failed in its duty to protect the environment pursuant to the public trust doctrine.
14
G.R. No. 180771; April 21, 2015
Leonardo – De Castro, J. Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also aver that this Court may lower the benchmark in locus standi as an exercise of epistolary
jurisdiction.
EQUITY JURISDICTION
Equity jurisdiction versus appellate jurisdiction of the RTC. The appellate jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law. The appellate court acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties when an appeal is perfected.
On the other hand, equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special
circumstances of a case because of a resulting legal inflexibility when the law is applied to a given situation. The purpose of the exercise of equity
Regulus Dev. Inc. v. De la Cruz jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution.
15 G.R. No. 198172; January 25, 2016
Brion, J. The RTC orders which allowed the withdrawal of the deposited funds for the use and occupation of the subject units were issued pursuant to the RTC’s
equity jurisdiction, as the CA held in the petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 81277.
The RTC’s equity jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its appellate jurisdiction on the ejectment case. The RTC could not have issued its orders
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction since there was nothing more to execute on the dismissed ejectment case. As the RTC orders explained, the
dismissal of the ejectment case effectively and completely blotted out and cancelled the complaint. Hence, the RTC orders were clearly issued in the
exercise of the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, not on the basis of its appellate jurisdiction.

JURISDICTIONAL ESTOPPEL
Question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any time/stage of the action. The fundamental rule is that the lack of jurisdiction of the court over
an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent. Precedents tell us that as a
general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Also, neither
waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances.
Duero v. CA
16 G.R. No. 131282; January 4, 2002
Rule On Estoppel. While participation in all stages of a case before the trial court, including invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief,
Quisumbing, J.
effectively bars a party by estoppel from challenging the courts jurisdiction, we note that estoppel has become an equitable defense that is both
substantive and remedial and its successful invocation can bar a right and not merely its equitable enforcement. Hence, estoppel ought to be applied
with caution. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a
tool of injustice.
Effect of active participation; Bars question of lack of jurisdiction. It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction x x x Generally,
an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any stage. However, active participation in the proceedings
Gonzaga v. CA
in the court which rendered the order or decision will bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction. The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of
G.R. No. 144025; December 27,
17 party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment but only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if not.
2002
Corona, J.
The question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the
party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such
a practice cannot be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.
Manila Bankers v. Ng Kok Wei Limitations of the Petition under Rule 45. The jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
G.R. No. 139791; December 12, Civil Procedure, as amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings being assailed are not supported by
18
2003 evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.
Sandoval – Gutierrez, J.
The Supreme Court barred the attack on the jurisdiction of the respective courts concerned over the subject matter of the case based on estoppel by
laches, declaring that parties cannot be allowed to belatedly adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of a court to which they
submitted their cause voluntarily. Here, what respondent was questioning in her motion to dismiss before the trial court was that court's jurisdiction
Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. over the person of defendant Manuel. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds no application in this case. Instead, the principles relating to
CA jurisdiction over the person of the parties are pertinent herein.
19
G.R. No. 173946; June 19, 2013
Perez, J. Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not one of those defenses which are not deemed waived under Section
1 of Rule 9, such defense must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver of the defense. If the objection
is not raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or the defendant is deemed
waived by virtue of the first sentence of the above-quoted Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that
he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay
alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches" unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not
Figueroa v. People
sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former
20 G.R. No. 147406; July 14, 2008
state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes. In applying the principle of
Nachura, J.
estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the
judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less 15 years. The same, however, does not obtain in the instant case.

We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely—only from necessity, and only in
extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its favor. When misapplied, the doctrine of
estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice. Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject
matter is void. Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts or tribunals that have no jurisdiction
over the concerned cases. No laches will even attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.
HIERARCHY OF COURTS
Rule on Hierarchy of Courts. The rule on hierarchy of courts in cases falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the trial courts and appellate courts
Agan, Jr. v. Phil. International Air
generally applies to cases involving warring factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to repair to the trial courts at the first instance to
Terminal Co., Inc.
21 determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of the evidence of the parties. Cases which depends on disputed facts for
G.R. No. 15001; May 5, 2003
decision cannot be brought immediately before the appellate courts as they are not triers of facts. It goes without saying that when cases brought before
Puno, J.
the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary.
Liga ng mga Barangay v. Atienza, Even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts.
Jr. No special and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced by the petitioner or the intervenor why direct recourse
22
G.R. No. 154599; January 21, 2004 to this Court should be allowed.
Davide, Jr., C.J.
The filing of the instant special civil action directly in this Court is in disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Court has concurrent
St. Mary Crusade Foundation, Inc. jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when there are special, extra-ordinary or compelling
v. Riel reasons that justify the same. The Court enforces the observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from unnecessary, frivolous and
23
G.R. No. 176508; January 12, 2015 impertinent cases and thus afford time for it to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. There
Bersamin, J. being no special, important or compelling reason, the petitioner thereby violated the observance of the hierarchy of courts, warranting the dismissal of
the petition for certiorari.
Intramuros Administration v. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not inviolable, and this Court has provided several exceptions to the doctrine. One of these exceptions is the
Offshore Construction and exigency of the situation being litigated.
24 Development Co.
G.R. No. 196795; March 7, 2018
Leonen, J.
The concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, CA and the RTC to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. Stated differently, although this
Bureau of Customs v. Gallegos
Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and the RTC in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when there are special,
G.R. No. 220832; February 28,
25 extraordinary or compelling reasons that justify the same. The Court enforces the observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from
2018
unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent cases and thus afford time for it to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that
Tijam, J.
the Constitution has assigned to it. Absent any showing of any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the petition will
cause the dismissal of the recourse, as in this case.
RESIDUAL PREROGATIVE
Residual Prerogative. Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
Katon v. Palanca answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are
G.R. No. 151149; September 7, evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action.
26
2004
Panganiban, J. In Aldovino v. Alunan, the Court has held that when the plaintiff’s own complaint shows clearly that the action has prescribed, such action may be
dismissed even if the defense of prescription has not been invoked by the defendant.

In Gicano v. Gegato, trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other
facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred.
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals. When the
law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is
Pat-og Sr. v. Civil Service
exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction
Commission
27 over the matter.
G.R. No. 198755; June 5, 2013
Mendoza, J.
Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
of the others.
ACTIONS INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION

First Sarmiento Property Holdings To determine the nature of an action, whether or not its subject matter is capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action
v. Phil. Bank of Communications or relief sought must be ascertained. If the principal relief is for the recovery of a sum of money or real property, then the action is capable of pecuniary
28
G.R. No. 202836; June 19, 2018 estimation. However, if the principal relief sought is not for the recovery of sum of money or real property, even if a claim over a sum of money or
Leonen, J. real property results as a consequence of the principal relief, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
RULES 1 - 5
ACTIONS: COMMENCEMENT
Test to determine whether a counterclaim is permissive or compulsory. Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, is the “compelling test of compulsoriness”
which requires “a logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the
Alday v. FGU Insurance parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court.”
G. R. No. 138822; January 23,
29
2001 Non – payment of docket fees does not result in automatic dismissal. In Suson, the Court explained that although the payment of the prescribed docket
Gonzaga – Reyes, J. fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment does not result in the automatic dismissal of the case provided the docket fees are paid within the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Coming now to the case at bar, it has not been alleged by respondent and there is nothing in the records
to show that petitioner has attempted to evade the payment of the proper docket fees for her permissive counterclaim.
Nonpayment of docket fees and non-attachment of a certificate of non-forum shopping. The CA held that the counterclaims of PGSMC were
compulsory ones and payment of docket fees was not required since the Answer with counterclaim was not an initiatory pleading. For the same reason,
the CA said a certificate of non-forum shopping was also not required. The rules on the payment of docket fees for counterclaims and cross claims
were amended effective August 16, 2004
Korea Technologies v. Lerma
30 G.R. No. 143581; January 7, 2008 Foreign arbitral awards; Subject to judicial review. While the RTC does not have jurisdiction over disputes governed by arbitration mutually agreed
Velasco, Jr. J. upon by the parties, still the foreign arbitral award is subject to judicial review by the RTC which can set aside, reject, or vacate it. In this sense, what
this Court held in Chung Fu Industries (Phils.), Inc. relied upon by KOGIES is applicable insofar as the foreign arbitral awards, while final and binding,
do not oust courts of jurisdiction since these arbitral awards are not absolute and without exceptions as they are still judicially reviewable. Chapter 7
of RA 9285 has made it clear that all arbitral awards, whether domestic or foreign, are subject to judicial review on specific grounds provided for.
Petitioner is correct in its contention that an arbitration clause, stipulating that the arbitral award is final and binding, does not oust our courts of

jurisdiction as the international arbitral award, the award of which is not absolute and without exceptions, is still judicially reviewable under certain
conditions provided for by the UNCITRAL Model Law on ICA as applied and incorporated in RA 9285.
Compulsory vis – a – vis Permissive Counterclaim. A counterclaim (or a claim which a defending party may have against any party) may be
Mercado v. CA
compulsory or permissive. A counterclaim that (1) arises out of (or is necessarily connected with) the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
31 G.R. No. 169576; October 17, 2008
matter of the opposing party’s claim; (2) falls within the jurisdiction of the court and (3) does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
Corona, J.
parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, is compulsory. Otherwise, a counterclaim is merely permissive.
Correct payment of prescribed docket fees. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, which vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Proton Pilipinas v. Banque
The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the
Nationale de Paris
32 filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable
G.R. No. 151242; June 15, 2005
prescriptive or reglementary period.
Carpio – Morales, J.
Additional filing fees; Constitute a lien on the judgment. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same
has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the
Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
A careful examination of respondent’s complaint is that it is a real action. In Paderanga vs. Buissan, we held that "in a real action, the plaintiff
seeks the recovery of real property, or, as stated in Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, a real action is one ‘affecting title to real property
or for the recovery of possession of, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on a real property.’"
Obviously, respondent’s complaint is a real action involving not only the recovery of real properties, but likewise the cancellation of the titles thereto.
Ruby Shelter Builders v. Formaran Considering that respondent’s complaint is a real action, the Rule requires that "the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated
G.R. No. 175914; February 10, value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees."
33
2009
Chico – Nazario, J. We note, however, that neither the "assessed value" nor the "estimated value" of the questioned parcels of land were alleged by respondent in both his
original and amended complaint. What he stated in his amended complaint is that the disputed realties have a "BIR zonal valuation" of ₱1,200.00 per
square meter. However, the alleged "BIR zonal valuation" is not the kind of valuation required by the Rule. It is the assessed value of the realty. Having
utterly failed to comply with the requirement of the Rule that he shall allege in his complaint the assessed value of his real properties in controversy,
the correct docket fee cannot be computed. As such, his complaint should not have been accepted by the trial court. We thus rule that it has not acquired
jurisdiction over the present case for failure of herein respondent to pay the required docket fee. On this ground alone, respondent’s complaint is
vulnerable to dismissal.
Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance with the provision set by law. Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court provides that appeals from the judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA, by filing a petition for review within fifteen (15) days
St. Louis University v. Cobarrubias from the receipt of the notice of judgment. Furthermore, upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the CA clerk of court the docketing
34 G.R. No. 187104; August 3, 2010 and other lawful fees; non-compliance with the procedural requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the petition’s dismissal. Thus, payment in full
Brion, J. of docket fees within the prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. It is an essential requirement, without which, the decision
appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal has been filed.

Procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the litigants; the rules were established primarily to provide order to and enhance the efficiency of
our judicial system. While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they
are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.
Gipa v. Southern Luzon Institute Suffice it to say that concomitant to the liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to
35 G.R. No. 177425; June 18, 2014 adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules. Those who seek exemption from the application of the rule have the burden of proving the existence
Del Castillo, J. of exceptionally meritorious reasons warranting such departure.
The general rule, however, against second and subsequent motions for reconsideration admits of settled exceptions. In Neypes v. Court of Appeals, the
Court declared:
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary
situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to
Reyes v. People
undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently
36 G.R. No. 193034; July 20, 2015
applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to
Peralta, J.
maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the
just and proper disposition of his cause.
The circumstances surrounding this case do not warrant the relaxation of the rules. Petitioner failed to present compelling justification or reason to
relax the rules of procedure.
Essentially, the nature of a counterclaim is determinative of whether or not the counterclaimant is required to pay docket fees. The rule in permissive
counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. On the other hand, the
prevailing rule with respect to compulsory counterclaims is that no filing fees are required for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
Sy – Vargas v. Estate of Ogsos
In general, a counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being
37 G.R. No. 221062; October 5, 2016
cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
Perlas – Bernabe, J.
opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. A
compulsory counterclaim is barred if not set up in the same action.
On the other hand, a counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim. It is essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately in another case.
Camaso v. TSM Shipping Inc. Verily, the failure to pay the required docket fees per se should not necessarily lead to the dismissal of a case. It has long been settled that while the
G.R. No. 223290; November 7, court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of filing of the initiatory
38
2016 pleading does not automatically cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on
Perlas – Bernabe, J. the part of the claimant to defraud the government.
JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION

Rule 2, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a] party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action.” Moreover, Section 4
Dynamic Builders v. Presbiterio discusses the splitting of a single cause of action in that “if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or
39 G.R. No. 174202; April 7, 2015 a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.” The splitting of a cause of action “violate[s] the policy
Leonen, J. against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective [is] to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts.”

Republic Act No. 8975 does not sanction splitting a cause of action in order for a party to avail itself of the ancillary remedy of a temporary restraining
order from this court.
PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

A petitioner who is not a real party in interest, cannot be an indispensable party nor a necessary party. An indispensable party is one without
whom there can be no final determination of an action.
Elements of a cause of action. A cause of action is an act or omission of one party the defendant in violation of the legal right of the other. The
elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation
Relucio v. Lopez
on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the
40 G.R. No. 138497; January 16, 2002
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery
Pardo, J.
of damages.
Sufficiency of a cause of action; Requirement of a motion to dismiss. A cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgment may be rendered thereon if
the alleged facts were admitted or proved. In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim
for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been merely defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.
De Castro v. CA Rule on solidarity of co-owners does not make a solidary obligor an indispensable party in a suit filed by the creditor. Operators Incorporated
41 G.R. No. 115838; July 18, 2002 vs. American Biscuit Co., Inc. Article 1216 of the Civil Code says that the creditor `may proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all
Carpio, J. of them simultaneously.
Orquiola v. CA No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In
42 G.R. No. 141463; August 6, 2002 the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in
Quisumbing, J. interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto.
An indispensable party is a party in interest, without whom no final determination can be had of an action.
China Banking Corp. v. Oliver A party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the other parties
43 G.R. No. 135796; October 3, 2002 and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete justice to the parties in court.
Quisumbing, J.
A party is also not indispensable if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or will simply
avoid multiple litigation.
Rule on indispensable party; Joinder in an action. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of
an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable
parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is 'the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case. Thus, without the
presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders
Lotte Phils. Co. Inc. v. De la Cruz
all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
44 G.R. No. 166302; July 28, 2005
Ynares – Santiago, J.
Non-joinder of indispensable party; Not a ground for dismissal. Non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action
and the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its
own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the
court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiff's failure to comply therefore. Domingo v. Scheer.
Carabeo v. Dingco The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive,
45 G.R. No. 190823; April 4, 2011 the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in

the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the present case, respondents are pursuing a property right arising from the kasunduan, whereas petitioner is invoking nullity of the kasunduan to
protect his proprietary interest. Assuming arguendo, however, that the kasunduan is deemed void, there is a corollary obligation of petitioner to return
the money paid by respondents, and since the action involves property rights, it survives.
It bears noting that trial on the merits was already concluded before petitioner died. Since the trial court was not informed of petitioner’s death, it may
not be faulted for proceeding to render judgment without ordering his substitution. Its judgment is thus valid and binding upon petitioner’s legal
representatives or successors-in-interest, insofar as his interest in the property subject of the action is concerned.
In another vein, the death of a client immediately divests the counsel of authority. Thus, in filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner’s counsel of record had
no personality to act on behalf of the already deceased client who, it bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a party after his death. The trial
court’s decision had thereby become final and executory, no appeal having been perfected.
Juana Complex I Homeowners The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are:
Association v. Fil Estate 1. The subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons;
46 Ecocentrum Corp. 2. The parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and
G.R. No. 152272; March 5, 2012 3. The parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.
Mendoza, J.
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant
Navarro v. Escobido
jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners,
G.R. No. 153788; November 27,
47 namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not
2009
indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the
Brion, J.
suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
It is hornbook principle that a taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. A person
Land Bank v. Cacayuran
suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.
48 G.R. No. 191667; April 17, 2013
In other words, for a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must be met namely, (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political
subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed; and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the
alleged act.
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the
case can be had. The party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that
his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before
the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
Divinagracia v. Parilla
49 G.R. No. 196750; March 11, 2015
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are
just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable
party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order.
The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. x x x(Underscoring supplied; emphases in the original)

In view of the foregoing, the correct course of action in the instant case is to order its remand to the RTC for the inclusion of those indispensable parties
who were not impleaded and for the disposition of the case on the merits.
Verily, Rosario is an indispensable party in the petition before the CA as she is the widow of the original party-plaintiff Eduardo. The determination
of the propriety of the action of the trial court in merely noting and not granting his motion would necessarily affect her interest in the subject matter
of litigation as the party-plaintiff.
Accordingly, the Court differs with the CA in ruling that the petition for certiorari filed before it merely delves into the issue of grave abuse of
Enrique Vda. De Santiago v. Vilar discretion committed by the lower court. Guilty of repetition, the final determination of the case would pry into the right of Rosario as party-plaintiff
50 G.R. No. 225309; March 6, 2018 before the lower court who is entitled to the proceeds of the judgment award. As it is, the CA did not actually rule on the issue of grave abuse of
Tijam, J. discretion alone as its corollary ruling inquired into the right of Rosario. In ruling for Vilar's substitution, the right of Rosario as to the proceeds of the
judgment award was thwarted as the CA effectively ordered that the proceeds pertaining to Rosario be awarded instead to Vilar.
Likewise, the Court finds merit in Rosario's contention that her failure to participate in the proceedings before the CA constitutes a denial of her
constitutional right to due process. Hence, failure to implead Rosario as an indispensable party rendered all the proceedings before the CA null and
void for want of authority to act.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held by this Court in the vintage case of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, is that while
Pacific Consultants International they are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised
Asia v. Schonfield Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. They should be considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting
51 G.R. No. 166920; February 19, venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be
2007 accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be litigated only at the place named
Callejo, Sr., J. by them. In the instant case, no restrictive words like "only," "solely," "exclusively in this court," "in no other court save '," "particularly," "nowhere
else but/except '," or words of equal import were stated in the contract.
The question of whether the trial court has jurisdiction depends on the nature of the action, i.e., whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in
rem. The rules on service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court likewise apply according to the nature of the action.
An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is an action against the thing itself instead
of against the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
Biaco v. Countryside Rural Bank interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property.
52 G.R. No. 161417; February 8, 2007
Tinga, J. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in
rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into
actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective.
Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due
process requirements.
It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action. The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal
nature have been fixed by the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that
BPI Savings Bank v. Sps. Yujuico
affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on,
53 G.R. No. 175796; July 22, 2015
real property is a real action. The real action is to be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
Bersamin, J.
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is also referred to as a local action. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all
other actions as personal actions. such actions may include those brought for the recovery of personal property, or for the enforcement of some contract

or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property. The venue of a personal
action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in
the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for which reason the action is considered a transitory one.
Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover the deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property
mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein.
Planters Dev. Bank v. Ramos Stipulations on venue, however, may either be permissive or restrictive. "Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit
G.R. No. 228617; September 20, may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the
54
2017 places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter.
Reyes, Jr., J.
RULES 6 - 9
KINDS OF PLEADINGS
A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable
by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must
be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court,
necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim or even where there is such a connection, the Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the claim or it requires for adjudication the presence of third persons over whom the court acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim
Alba v. Malapajo is barred if not set up in the same action.
55 G.R. No. 198752; January 13, 2016
Peralta, J. A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. It is
essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately in another case.
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, we have devised the following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the
claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants’ claims, absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs’ claim as well as the defendants’ counterclaim? and (d) Is there
any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.
Under this revised section [2], where the plaintiff moves for the dismissal of his complaint to which a counterclaim has been interposed, the dismissal
shall be limited to the complaint. Such dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to either prosecute his counterclaim in a
Lim Teck Chuan v. Uy
separate action or to have the same resolved in the same action. Should he opt for the first alternative, the court should render the corresponding order
56 G.R. No. 155701; March 11, 2015
granting and reserving his right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. Should he choose to have his counterclaim disposed of in the same
Reyes, J.
action wherein the complaint had been dismissed, he must manifest such preference to the trial court within 15 days from notice to him of plaintiff's
motion to dismiss. These alternative remedies of the defendant are available to him regardless of whether his counterclaim is compulsory or permissive.
In determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, we have, in several cases, utilized the following tests:
1. Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same?
Metrobank v. CPR Promotions 2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
57 G.R. No. 200567; June 22, 2015 3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim?
Velasco, Jr., J. 4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the
parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court? This test is the "compelling test of
compulsoriness."

Based on the above tests, it is evident that a claim for recovery of the excess in the bid price vis-à-vis the amount due should be interposed as a
compulsory counterclaim in an action for recovery of a deficiency filed by the mortgagee against the debtor-mortgagor. First, in both cases, substantially
the same evidence is needed in order to prove their respective claim. Second, adjudication in favor of one will necessarily bar the other since these two
actions are absolutely incompatible with each other; a debt cannot be fully paid and partially unpaid at the same time. Third, these two opposing claims
arose from the same set of transactions. And finally, if these two claims were to be the subject of separate trials, it would definitely entail a substantial
and needless duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court, for said actions would involve the same parties, the same transaction, and the
same evidence. The only difference here would be in the findings of the courts based on the evidence presented with regard to the issue of whether or
not the bid prices substantially cover the amounts due.
Having determined that a claim for recovery of an excess in the bid price should be set up in the action for payment of a deficiency as a compulsory
counterclaim, we rule that respondents failed to timely raise the same.
It is elementary that a defending party’s compulsory counterclaim should be interposed at the time he files his Answer, and that failure to do so shall
effectively bar such claim. As it appears from the records, what respondents initially claimed herein were moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney’s fees. Then, realizing, based on its computation, that it should have sought the recovery of the excess bid price, respondents set up another
counterclaim, this time in their Appellant’s Brief filed before the CA. Unfortunately, respondents’ belated assertion proved fatal to their cause as it did
not cure their failure to timely raise such claim in their Answer. Consequently, respondents’ claim for the excess, if any, is already barred. With this,
we now resolve the substantive issues of this case.
To begin with, the Court notes from the respondent's Comment that he appeared to be perplexed as to whether or not he would admit his extramarital
liaisons with Sonia. As Investigating Commissioner Chan stated in his report, Atty. Dabon interposed a blanket denial of the romantic involvement but
at the same time, he seemed to have tacitly admitted the illicit affair only that it was not attended by sexual assaults, threats and intimidations. The
Court also observed that he devoted considerable effort to demonstrate that the affair did not amount to gross immoral conduct and that no sexual
abuse, threat or intimidation was exerted upon the person of Sonia, but not once did he squarely deny the affair itself.
Valdez v. Dabon
58 A.C. No. 7353; November 16, 2015
In other words, the respondent's denial is a negative pregnant, a denial coupled with the admission of substantial facts in the pleading responded to
Per Curiam
which are not squarely denied. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an
implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation
as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstance alone is denied while the fact itself is admitted. It is
clear from Atty. Dabon's Comment that his denial only pertained as to the existence of a forced illicit relationship. Without a categorical denial thereof,
he is deemed to have admitted his consensual affair with Sonia.
Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the
admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was
Republic v. Sandiganbayan
directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some
59 G.R. No. 152154; July 15, 2003
kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged
Corona, J.
with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.
Petitioner does not dispute its loan obligation with respondent. Petitioner’s bone of contention before the RTC is that the promissory notes are silent
Caneland Sugar Corp. v. Alon as to whether they were covered by the Mortgage Trust Indenture and Mortgage Participation on its property covered by TCT No. T-11292. It does not
G.R. No. 142896; September 12, categorically deny that these promissory notes are covered by the security documents. These vague assertions are, in fact, negative pregnants, i.e.,
60
2007 denials pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. As defined in Republic of the
Austria – Martinez, J. Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, a negative pregnant is a "form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of
some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is

alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the
qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted."
PARTIES OF A PLEADING
Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable
opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded
on the same cause or supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens when, in the two or more
pending cases, there is identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements of litis pendentia are
present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other, there is forum shopping. For litis pendentia to be a ground for
the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which
may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
Alma Jose v. Javellana
61 G.R. No. 158239; January 25, 2012
For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes of
Bersamin, J.
action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised,
and two objectives were sought.
Dangers of forum shopping. The first danger, i.e., the multiplicity of suits upon one and the same cause of action, would not materialize considering
that the appeal was a continuity of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, whereas C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455 dealt with an independent ground of alleged grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. The second danger, i.e., the unethical malpractice of shopping for a
friendly court or judge to ensure a favorable ruling or judgment after not getting it in the appeal, would not arise because the CA had not yet decided
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 as of the filing of the petition for certiorari.
In addition, the allegations and contentions embodied in the CA petition do not deviate from the claims already made by the heirs in Civil Case Nos.
00-11320 and 797-C, both specifically mentioned in the SPA. We emphasize that the verification requirement is simply intended to secure an assurance
that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct, and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed
in good faith. We rule that there was no deficiency in the petition's verification and certification against forum shopping filed with the CA.
In any case, we reiterate that where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in the property subject of the action, the fact
Medado v. Heirs of Antonio
that only one of the petitioners executed the verification or certification of forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with the action.
Consuing
62
G.R. No. 186720; February 8, 2012
The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is
Peralta, J.
insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration
of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial
compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions
regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with
or its requirements completely disregarded. Thus, under justifiable circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such
certification considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.
Authority to File Petition. First, we tackle Atty. Tiu's authority to file the petition and sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
COA v. Paler
The petitioner in this case is the Commission on Appointments, a government entity created by the Constitution, and headed by its Chairman. There
63 G.R. No. 172623; March 3, 2010
was no need for the Chairman himself to sign the verification. Its representative, lawyer or any person who personally knew the truth of the facts
Corona, J.
alleged in the petition could sign the verification. With regard, however, to the certification of non-forum shopping, the established rule is that it must
be executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel. In this case, Atty. Tiu failed to show that he was specifically authorized

by the Chairman to sign the certification of non-forum shopping, much less file the petition in his behalf. There is nothing on record to prove such
authority. Atty. Tiu did not even bother to controvert Paler’s allegation of his lack of authority. This renders the petition dismissible.
On the procedural issue, we hold that while the general rule is that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the
petitioners in a case, the signature of only one of them, petitioner Basan in this case, appearing thereon may be deemed substantial compliance with
the procedural requirement. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that the rule on verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has
Basan v. Coca – Cola Bottlers Phils. ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition
64 G.R. No. 174365 – 66; February 4, have been made in good faith or are true and correct. Similarly, this Court has consistently held that when under reasonable or justifiable circumstances,
2015 as when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, as in this case, the signature of only one of them
in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the certification requirement. Thus, the fact that the petition was signed only by
petitioner Basan does not necessarily result in its outright dismissal for it is more in accord with substantial justice to overlook petitioners’ procedural
lapses. Indeed, the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed in labor cases to serve the demand of justice.
A certification against forum shopping is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there
are no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. It must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel.
If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) designating
Uy v. CA his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
G.R. No. 173186; September 16,
65
2015 We have ruled that the general rule is that non-compliance or a defect in the certification is not curable by its subsequent submission or correction.
Jardeleza, J. However, there are cases where we exercised leniency and relaxed the rules on the ground of substantial compliance, the presence of special
circumstances or compelling reasons. The rules on forum-shopping are designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and
"should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subve1i its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure
which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.”
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above respecting non-
compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:
1. A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance
with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2. As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may
order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3. Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
Bandillon v. LFUC
complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
66 4. As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by
2015
its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence
Peralta, J.
of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."
5. The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will
be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a
common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
6. Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or
justifiable reasons, the party- pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign
on his behalf.
People v. Arojado In any event, to avoid inordinate delays in the disposition of cases brought about by a counsel's failure to indicate in his or her pleadings the number
67 G.R. No. 207041; November 9, and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance, this Court issued an En Bane Resolution, dated January 14, 2014 which amended
2015 B.M. No. 1922 by repealing the phrase "Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the

Peralta, J. pleadings from the records" and replacing it with "Failure to disclose the required information would subject the counsel to appropriate penalty and
disciplinary action." Thus, under the amendatory Resolution, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of
his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the case and expunction of the pleadings from the records.
Nonetheless, such failure will subject the lawyer to the prescribed fine and/or disciplinary action.
Powerhouse Staffbuilders The following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson
International, Inc. v. Rey of the Board of Directors; (2) the President of a corporation; (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager; (4) Personnel Officer; and (5) an
68 G.R. No. 190203; November 7, Employment Specialist in a labor case. The rationale applied in these cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the
2016 corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations
Jardeleza, J. in the petition.
Heirs of Josefina Gabriel v. The substitution of heirs in a case ensures that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal
Segundina Cebrero representative of his estate. The purpose behind the rule on substitution is to apprise the heir or the substitute that he is being brought to the jurisdiction
69 G.R. No. 222737; November 12, of the court in lieu of the deceased party by operation of law. It is for the protection of the right of every party to due process. Proper substitution of
2018 heirs is effected for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over their persons and to obviate any future claim by any heir that he or she was not apprised
Peralta, J. of the litigation.
ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADINGS
The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon motion of the claiming party when the defending party's answer fails to tender an issue,
or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. For that purpose, only the pleadings of the parties in the action are
considered. It is error for the trial court to deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings because the defending party's pleading in another case
supposedly tendered an issue of fact.
Fernando Medical Enterprises Inc.
v. Wesleyan University Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court recognizes only three modes by which the denial in the answer raises an issue of fact. The first is by the
70
G.R. No. 207970; January 20, 2016 defending party specifying each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, setting forth the substance
Bersamin, J. of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. The second applies to the defending party who desires to deny only a part of an averment,
and the denial is done by the defending party specifying so much of the material allegation of ultimate facts as is true and material and denying only
the remainder. The third is done by the defending party who is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material
averment made in the complaint by stating so in the answer. Any material averment in the complaint not so specifically denied are deemed admitted
except an averment of the amount of unliquidated damages.
While the failure to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document does not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence
of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel and want of consideration [nor] bar a party from raising the defense in his
answer or reply and prove at the trial that there is a mistake or imperfection in the writing, or that it does not express the true agreement of the parties,
Go Tong Electrical Supply v. BPI
or that the agreement is invalid or that there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing," none of these defenses were adequately argued or proven during
Family Savings Bank
71 the proceedings of this case.
G.R. No. 187487; June 29, 2015
Jurisprudence abounds that, in civil cases, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it; the burden rests on the defendant, i.e., petitioners, to
prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff, i.e., respondent, to prove non-payment. When the creditor is in possession of the document of credit, proof
of non-payment is not needed for it is presumed.
Unless the factual findings complained of are not supported by the evidence on record or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts,
Benguet Exploration Inc v. CA the findings of the trial court must be accorded the highest respect, even finality, by this Court.
72 G.R. No. 117434; February 9, 2001
Mendoza, J. The admission of the due execution and genuineness of a document simply means that "the party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or
that it was signed by another for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of

the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or
revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.
A prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that some substantive basis for a third-party claim be found to exist, whether the basis be one of indemnity,
subrogation, contribution or other substantive right. The bringing of a third-party defendant is proper if he would be liable to the plaintiff or to the
Asian Const. & Dev. Corp. v. CA defendant or both for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against the original defendant, although the third-party defendant's liability arises out of another
73 G.R. No. 160242; May 17, 2005 transaction. The defendant may implead another as third-party defendant (a) on an allegation of liability of the latter to the defendant for contribution,
Callejo, Sr., J. indemnity, subrogation or any other relief; (b) on the ground of direct liability of the third-party defendant to the plaintiff; or (c) the liability of the
third-party defendant to both the plaintiff and the defendant. There must be a causal connection between the claim of the plaintiff in his complaint and
a claim for contribution, indemnity or other relief of the defendant against the third-party defendant.
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

On the procedural aspect, the Court reiterates the rule that the failure to attend the pre-trial conference does not result in the default of an absent party.
Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant is only declared in default if he fails to file his Answer within the reglementary period. 29 On
the other hand, if a defendant fails to attend the pre-trial conference, the plaintiff can present his evidence ex parte.
Salvador v. Rabaja The failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has indeed adverse consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed. If
74 G.R. 199990; February 4, 2015 it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment based on the
Mendoza, J. evidence presented. Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege to present his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood being that the
court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence. The stringent application
of the rules on pre-trial is necessitated from the significant role of the pre-trial stage in the litigation process. Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call
for the speedy disposition of cases. Although it was discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the
subsequent amendments in 1997.
BDO v. Tansipek A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an ordinary motion in that the Motion should be verified; and must show fraud, accident, mistake
75 G.R. No. 181235; July 22, 2009 or excusable neglect, and meritorious defenses. The allegations of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and (2) of meritorious defenses
Chico – Nazario, J. must concur.
The rule is that "right to appeal from the judgment by default is not lost and can be done on grounds that the amount of the judgment is excessive or is
different in kind from that prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is contrary to
Bitte v. Jonas law." 15 If a party who has been declared in default has in his arsenal the remedy of appeal from the judgment of default on the basis of the decision
76 G.R. No. 212256; December 9, 2015 having been issued against the evidence or the law, that person cannot be denied the remedy and opportunity to assail the judgment in the appellate
Mendoza, J. court. Despite being burdened by the circumstances of default, the petitioners may still use all other remedies available to question not only the judgment
of default but also the judgment on appeal before this Court. Those remedies necessarily include an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
RULES 10 - 13
Our rules of procedure allow a party in a civil action to amend his pleading as a matter of right, so long as the pleading is amended only once and
before a responsive pleading is served (or, if the pleading sought to be amended is a reply, within ten days after it is served). Otherwise, a party can
Yujuico v. United Resources
only amend his pleading upon prior leave of court. As a matter of judicial policy, courts are impelled to treat motions for leave to file amended pleadings
Management Corp.
77 with liberality. This is especially true when a motion for leave is filed during the early stages of proceedings or, at least, before trial.
G.R. No. 211113; June 29, 2015
Perez, J.
Our case law had long taught that bona fide amendments to pleadings should be allowed in the interest of justice so that every case may, so far as
possible, be determined on its real facts and the multiplicity of suits thus be prevented.

Hence, as long as it does not appear that the motion for leave was made with bad faith or with intent to delay the proceedings, courts are justified to
grant leave and allow the filing of an amended pleading. Once a court grants leave to file an amended pleading, the same becomes binding and will not
be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that the court had abused its discretion.
A responsive pleading having been filed, amendments to the complaint may, therefore, be made only by leave of court and no longer as a matter of
right.
Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so
far as possible, be determined on its real facts and in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense.
That is, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might justify a
refusal of permission to amend.
Lisam Enterprises v. Banco de Oro
78 G.R. No. 143264; April 23, 2012
Since, as explained above, amendments are generally favored, it would have been more fitting for the trial court to extend such liberality towards
Peralta, J.
petitioners by admitting the amended complaint which was filed before the order dismissing the original complaint became final and executory. It is
quite apparent that since trial proper had not yet even begun, allowing the amendment would not have caused any delay. Moreover, doing so would
have served the higher interest of justice as this would provide the best opportunity for the issues among all parties to be thoroughly threshed out and
the rights of all parties finally determined. Hence, the Court overrules the trial court’s denial of the motion to admit the amended complaint, and orders
the admission of the same.
Amendment of cause of action provided it will not interfere with the jurisdictional requirements
Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so far as possible,
be determined on its real facts and in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the circuity of action and unnecessary expense. That is, unless
there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of permission
Tiu v. Phil. Bank of to amend.
Communications
79
G.R. No. 151932; August 19, 2009 The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad,
Peralta, J. subject only to the limitations that the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or that it was not
made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela, even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such
amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings.
Remington Industrial Sales Corp. v. Amendment of complaint as a matter of right is allowed when some but not all defendant have filed their responsive pleading. The fact that the other
CA defendants below has filed their answers to the complaint does not bar petitioner’s right to amend the complaint as against respondent. Indeed, where
80
G.R. No. 133657; May 29, 2002 some but not all the defendants have answered, the plaintiff may still amend its complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely
Ynares – Santiago, J. against the non-answering defendant, but not as to claims asserted against the other defendants.
Indeed, its filing or service of a copy thereof to petitioners by courier service cannot be trivialized. Service and filing of pleadings by courier service is
a mode not provided in the Rules. This is not to mention that PDB sent a copy of its omnibus motion to an address or area which was not covered by
LBC courier service at the time. Realizing its mistake, PDB re-filed and re-sent the omnibus motion by registered mail, which is the proper mode of
Palileo v. Planters Development
service under the circumstances. By then, however, the 15-day period had expired.
Bank
81
G.R. No. 193650; October 8, 2014
"Settled is the rule that a party is barred from assailing the correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him." The "presumption that a party who
Del Castillo, J.
did not interject an appeal is satisfied with the adjudication made by the lower court" applies to it. There being no appeal taken by PDB from the
adverse judgment of the trial court, its Decision has become final and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. "Finality of a
judgment or order becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, and is conclusive as to the issues actually

determined and to every matter which the parties might have litigated and have . . . decided as incident to or essentially connected with the subject
matter of the litigation, and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect to matters of claim and of
defense." And "[i]n this jurisdiction, the rule is that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ
of execution to enforce the judgment;" "execution will issue as a matter of right . . . (a) when the judgment has become final and executory; (b) when
the judgment debtor has renounced or waived his right of appeal; [or] (c) when the period for appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been filed . .
..
Though not prohibited by the Rules, we cannot consider the filing of petitioners' Notice of Appeal via LBC timely filed. It is established jurisprudence
Heirs of Numeriano Miranda v.
that "the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court;" instead, "the
Miranda
82 date of actual receipt by the court . . . is deemed the date of filing of that pleading." Records show that the Notice of Appeal was mailed on the 15th
G.R. No. 179638; July 8, 2013
day and was received by the court on the 16th day or one day beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the Notice of Appeal
Del Castillo, J.
was filed out of time.
RULE 14
Service of summons; Action in rem and in personam. In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible and he cannot
be personally served, substituted service, as provided in Rule 14, 7-8 is essential for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of a
Valmonte v. CA defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. If defendant cannot be served with summons because he is temporarily
G.R. No. 108538; January 22, abroad, but otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of summons may, by leave of court, be made by publication. Otherwise stated, a resident
83
1996 defendant in an action in personam, who cannot be personally served with summons, may be summoned either by means of substituted service in
Mendoza, J. accordance with Rule 14, 8 or by publication as provided in 17 and 18 of the same Rule. On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. If
the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country, summons may be served extraterritorially in accordance with Rule 14, 17.
Service of summons; Service to corporations. Summons is the means by which the defendant in a case is notified of the existence of an action against
him and, thereby, the court is conferred jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. If the defendant is a corporation, Rule 14, 13 requires that service
of summons be made upon the corporation's president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. The rationale of the rule is that service
must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori presumable that he will realize his responsibilities and
Millenium Ind. & Com. Corp. v. Tan
know what he should do with any legal papers received by him.
84
2000
Doctrine of substantial compliance; Requisites. In Porac Trucking, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court enumerated the requisites for the application
Mendoza, J.
of the doctrine of substantial compliance, to wit: (a) there must be actual receipt of the summons by the person served, i.e., transferring possession of
the copy of the summons from the Sheriff to the person served; (b) the person served must sign a receipt or the sheriff's return; and (c) there must be
actual receipt of the summons by the corporation through the person on whom the summons was actually served. The third requisite is the most
important for it is through such receipt that the purpose of the rule on the service of summons is attained.
Service of summons; Agent of corporations. “Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons upon an AGENT of the corporation is NO LONGER
authorized.” “The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited
E.B. Villarosa v. Benito and more clearly specified in Section11, Rule 14. The rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of
85 G.R. No. 136426; August 6, 1999 "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase “agent, or any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.” “A strict
Gonzaga – Reyes, J. compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must
be one who is named in the statute; otherwise the service is insufficient. . .” The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute
for the plain legal requirements as to the manner in which summons should be served on a domestic corporation.

No valid service of summons through persons not included in Sec. 11, Rule 14 (1997 RCP) We held that there was no valid service of summons
on Villarosa as service was made through a person not included in the enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
Mason v. CA revised the Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court
86 G.R. No. 144662; October 13, 2003
Quisumbing. J. At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial
matter in any administrative or judicial proceedings. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. We will deprive
private respondent of its right to present its defense in this multi-million peso suit, if we disregard compliance with the rules on service of summons.
Personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the
latter. Moreover, the proof of service of summons must: (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the
Spouses Jose v. Spouses Boyon efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the
87 G.R. No. 147369; October 23, 2003 address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant.
Panganiban, J.
It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officers return. The failure to comply
faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective.
We can break down this section into the following requirements to effect a valid substituted service:
1. Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the
sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to
submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriff's Return provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the
Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one
month from the issuance of summons can be considered "reasonable time" with regard to personal service on the defendant.
For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable
period [of one month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries,
preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service
can be confirmed or accepted.
Manotoc v. CA 2. Specific Details in the Return

88 G.R. No. 130974; August 16, 2002 The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the
Velasco, Jr. J. attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant
and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service.
3. A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment
to understand the importance of a summons. "Discretion" is defined as "the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for
which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed". Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read
and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant
at the earliest possible time for the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the "relation of confidence" to the defendant, ensuring
that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons.
4. A Competent Person in Charge

If the substituted service will be done at defendant's office or regular place of business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the
place. Thus, the person on whom the substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of defendant, such as the

president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance,
and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons.
Filing an Entry of Appearance with Motion for Time constitutes voluntary submission. Under Section 20 of the same Rule, a defendants voluntary
appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons. As held previously by this Court, the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such
as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for
DOLE Phil. v. Quilala
reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
89 G.R. No. 168723; July 9, 2008
Quisumbing, J.
Summons on Domestic Corporations; Exclusive. Well-settled is the rule that service of summons on a domestic corporation is restricted, limited and
exclusive to the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, following the rule in statutory construction that
expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Service must therefore be made on the president, managing partner,
Santos v. PNOC Rule on substituted service through publication applies to both actions. The present rule expressly states that it applies "in any action where the
G.R. No. 170943; September 23, defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry."
90
2008 Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.
Corona, J.
Fortune Life Insurance Co. v. COA Section 13 thus requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service shall consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the
G.R. No. 213525; January 27, mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the paper being served. A compliance with the rule is mandatory, such that there
91
2015 is no proof of service if either or both are not submitted.
Bersamin, J.
In court proceedings, there is no right more cherished than the right of every litigant to be given an opportunity to be heard. This right begins at the
very moment that summons is served on the defendant. The Rules of Court places utmost importance in ensuring that the defendant personally grasp
the weight of responsibility that will befall him. Thus, it is only in exceptional circumstances that constructive notification, or substituted service of
summons, is allowed. If the server falls short of the rigorous requirements for substituted service of summons, then the Court has no other option but
to strike down a void judgment, regardless of the consequences.
Ong v. Co
G.R. No. 206653; February 25, Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature
92
2015 of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The former is a matter of substantive law because statutory law defines the
Mendoza, J. jurisdiction of the courts over the subject matter or nature of the action. The latter is a matter of procedural law, for it involves the service of summons
or other processes on the petitioner.
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. If the defendant
does not voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be acquired by personal or substituted service of summons as laid out under Sections 6 and 7 of
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
To insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers
served on him.
Nation Petroleum Gas, Inc. v. RCBC
93 G.R. No. 183370; August 17, 2015 When the defendant is a domestic corporation like herein petitioner, service of summons may be made only upon the persons enumerated in Section
Peralta, J. 11, Rule 14 of the Rules. The enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is restricted, limited and exclusive following the rule on
statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Substantial compliance cannot be invoked. Service of summons upon persons other than
those officers specifically mentioned in Section 11, Rule 14 is void, defective and not binding to said corporation.
Green Star Express v. Nissin Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized. The rule now likewise states "general
Universal Robina Corp. manager" instead of "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of merely "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." It has now become restricted,
94
G.R. No. 181517; July 6, 2015 limited, and exclusive only to the persons enumerated in the aforementioned provision, following the rule in statutory construction that
Peralta, J. the express mention of one person excludes all others, or expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Service must, therefore, be made only on the persons

expressly listed in the rules. If the revision committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily done so by clear and
concise language.
A careful reading of the provision shows that notice to any partner, under certain circumstances, operates as notice to or knowledge to the partnership
only. Evidently, it does not provide for the reverse situation, or that notice to the partnership is notice to the partners. Unless there is an unequivocal
Guy v. Gacott law which states that a partner is automatically charged in a complaint against the partnership, the constitutional right to due process takes precedence
G.R. No. 206147; January 13, and a partner must first be impleaded before he can be considered as a judgment debtor. To rule otherwise would be a dangerous precedent, harping in
95
2016 favor of the deprivation of property without ample notice and hearing, which the Court certainly cannot countenance.
Mendoza, J.
Therefore, because Guy was not impleaded in the case, regardless if the service of summons upon the partnership although initially flawed was
thereafter cured by voluntary appearance, he is still not bound by the Court’s judgment on the case against the partnership.
We have, time and again, held that the filing of a motion for additional time to file answer is considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court. If the defendant knowingly does an act inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of personal jurisdiction as to him, like voluntarily appearing
in the action, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Seeking an affirmative relief is inconsistent with the position that
Carson Realty and Management no voluntary appearance had been made, and to ask for such relief, without the proper objection, necessitates submission to the Court's jurisdiction.
Corp. v. Red Robin Security Agency
96
G.R. No. 225035; February 8, 2017 Carson voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC when it filed, through Atty. Roxas, the Appearance and Motion dated April 25, 2007
Velasco, Jr., J. acknowledging Carson's receipt of the Summons dated April 11, 2007 and seeking additional time to file its responsive pleading. As noted by the
CA, Carson failed to indicate therein that the Appearance and Motion was being filed by way of a conditional appearance to question the regularity of
the service of summons. Thus, by securing the affirmative relief of additional time to file its responsive pleading, Carson effectively voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Improper service of summons and lack of voluntary appearance do not automatically warrant the dismissal of the complaint.
G.V. Florida Transport Inc. v. Tiara Thus, when there is improper service of summons and the defendant makes a special appearance to question this, the proper and speedy remedy is for
Commercial Corp. the court to issue alias summons.
97
G.R. No. 201378; October 2017
Jardeleza, J. In the present case, the summons was served to Gino-gino, a financial supervisor of TCC. While she is not one of the officers enumerated in Section
11 of Rule 14, we find that TCC has voluntarily appeared before (and submitted itself to) the RTC when it filed its pre-trial brief without any reservation
as to the court's jurisdiction over it.
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his
voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court's
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge,
Sunrise Garden Corp. v. CA
among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.
98
2015
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
Leonen, J.
1. Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;
2. Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an
unequivocal manner; and
3. Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking
affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.

By seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, the individual [petitioner is] deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. A
party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court to secure the affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
Tujan – Militante v. Nustad
99 G.R. No. 209518; June 19, 2017
In this case, while Tujan – Militante's motion to dismiss challenged the jurisdiction of the court a quo on the ground of improper service of summons,
Tijam, J.
the subsequent filing of a Motion for Reconsideration which sought for affirmative reliefs is tantamount to voluntary appearance and submission to the
authority of such court. Such affirmative relief is inconsistent with the position that no voluntary appearance had been made, and to ask for such relief,
without the proper objection, necessitates submission to the [court]'s jurisdiction.
RULES 15 - 19
MOTIONS
The 3-day notice rule was established not for the benefit of movant but for the adverse party, in order to avoid surprises and grant the latter sufficient
time to study the motion and enable it to meet the arguments interposed therein. The duty to ensure receipt by the adverse party at least three days
before the proposed hearing date necessarily falls on the movant.
Republic v. Dimarucut Accordingly, the "strict and rigid application, [of procedural rules] which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
100 G.R. No. 202069; March 7, 2018 substantial justice, must always be eschewed."
Caguioa, J.
Here, the State's policy of upholding the sanctity of marriage takes precedence over strict adherence to Rule 15, for the finality of the RTC Decision
necessarily entails the permanent severance of Alvin and Nailyn's marital ties. Hence, the RTC should have exercised its discretion, as it did have such
discretion, and set the MR for hearing on a later date with due notice to the parties to allow them to fully thresh out the Republic's assigned errors. The
CA thus erred when it affirmed the RTC in this respect.
DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
As per the second sentence of the provision, if a counterclaim has been pleaded by the defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion
Blay v. Bana for the dismissal - as in this case - the rule is that the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Commentaries on the subject elucidate that instead of
101 G.R. No. 232189; March 7, 2018 an ‘action’ shall not be dismissed, the present rule uses the term ‘complaint’. A dismissal of an action is different from a mere dismissal of the
Perlas – Bernabe, J. complaint. For this reason, since only the complaint and not the action is dismissed, the defendant inspite of said dismissal may still prosecute his
counterclaim in the same action."
Lim Teck Chuan v. Uy A dismissal of an action is different from a mere dismissal of the complaint. For this reason, since only the complaint and not the action is dismissed,
102 G.R. No. 155701; March 11, 2015 the defendant in spite of said dismissal may still prosecute his counterclaim in the same action. In the instant case, the petitioner's preference to have
Reyes, J. his counterclaim (and cross-claims) be prosecuted in the same action was timely manifested.
The logic for such requirement is simple: a motion invariably contains a prayer which the movant makes to the court which is usually in the interest of
Acampado v. Cosmilla
the adverse party to oppose. The notice of hearing to the adverse party is therefore a form of due process; it gives the other party the opportunity to
103 properly vent his opposition to the prayer of the movant. In keeping with the principles of due process, therefore, a motion which dees not afford the
2015
adverse party a chance to oppose should simply be disregarded. Principles of natural justice demand that a right of a party should not be affected
Perez, J.
without giving it an opportunity to be heard.
Failure to meet the three-day notice rule for filing motions and to obtain the concurrence of the Public Prosecutor to move for an interlocutory relief in
104 Laude v. Ginez – Jabalde
a criminal prosecution cannot be excused by general exhortations of human rights.

2015 The failure of petitioners to comply with the three-day notice rule is unjustified. Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory
Leonen, J. rule that the adverse party be given notice of hearing on the motion at least three days prior. Failure to comply with this notice requirement renders the
motion defective consistent with protecting the adverse party's right to procedural due process. In Jehan Shipping Corporation:
As an integral component of procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather,
the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the
arguments in the motion before a resolution by the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without
giving it an opportunity to be heard. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper, an exception may be made and
the motion may still be acted upon by the court, provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her due process
rights. The adverse party must be given time to study the motion in order to enable him or her to prepare properly and engage the arguments of the
movant.
An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates the case nor finally disposes of it, as it leaves something
to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be
questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
Therefore, an order denying a motion to dismiss may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The
De Guzman, Jr. v. Ochoa ordinary procedure to be followed in such cases is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the
105 G.R. No. 169292; April 13, 2011 final judgment.
Mendoza, J.
Only in exceptional cases where the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion that the Court allows the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari. By "grave abuse of discretion," we mean such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal-to perform the duty enjoined by or to .act
all in contemplation of law.
Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third persons, not originally parties to the suit but claiming an interest in the subject matter, come into
the case in order to protect their right or interpose their claim. Its main purpose is to settle in one action and by a single judgment all conflicting claims
Office of the Ombudsman v. Sison of, or the whole controversy among, the persons involved.
106
2010 To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation;
Velasco, Jr., J. and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable
of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in litigation, and of such direct
and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.
Office of the Ombudsman v. De It is true that under our rule on intervention, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is left to the sound discretion of the court after a
Chavez consideration of the appropriate circumstances. However, such discretion is not without limitations. One of the limits in the exercise of such
107
G.R. No. 172206; July 3, 2013 discretion is that it must not be exercised in disregard of law and the Constitution. The CA should have considered the nature of the Ombudsman's
Peralta, J. powers as provided in the Constitution and RA 6770.
Anonuevo v. Intestate Estate of A court’s power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic demand of sound judicial procedure that
Jalandoni only a person with interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed to intervene. Otherwise stated, a court has no authority to allow a person, who
108
G.R. No. 178221; December 1, has no interest in an action or proceeding, to intervene therein.
2010

Perez, J. Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows an uninterested person to intervene in a case—the mistake is not simply an error of judgment,
but one of jurisdiction. In such event, the allowance is made in excess of the court’s jurisdiction and can only be the product of an exercise of discretion
gravely abused. That kind of error may be reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari.
Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. Conversely, a person who is not a party in
Fernandez v. CA
the main suit cannot be bound by an ancillary writ, such as a preliminary injunction. Indeed, he cannot be affected by any proceeding to which he is a
A.M. OCA IPI No. 12 – 201 – CA –
109 stranger. Moreover, a person not an aggrieved party in the original proceedings that gave rise to the petition for certiorari, will not be permitted to
J; February 19, 2013
bring the said action to annul or stay the injurious writ. Such is the clear import of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, a person
Reyes, J.
not a party to the proceedings in the trial court or in the CA cannot maintain an action for certiorari in the Supreme Court to have the judgment
reviewed. Stated differently, if a petition for certiorari or prohibition is filed by one who was not a party in the lower court, he has no standing to
question the assailed order.
This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the higher
interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after
a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when the petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted for decision before the Supreme
Rodriguez v. CA Court, and even where the assailed order has already become final and executory. In Lim v. Pacquing, the motion for intervention filed by the Republic
110 G.R. No. 184589’ June 13, 2013 of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties.
Leonardo – De Castro, J.
In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate
circumstances. We stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and
completely available for justice. Its purpose is not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.
At the pre-trial, the parties mutually worked out a satisfactory disposition of the criminal case. Appellant, assisted by counsel, signed a Pre-Trial
Agreement which, as incorporated in the Pre-Trial Order, stated that: ". . . . 3. The victim in this case, Mayia P. Ponseca was born on 23 May 1990 as
evidenced by her birth certificate; . . . ." During the pre-trial, the prosecution marked in evidence Mayia's birth certificate as Exhibit "A". The
prosecution submitted its Offer of Evidence which included Exhibit "A", a certified true copy of Mayia's birth certificate. The trial court admitted
Exhibit "A" without any objection from the defense. . . Moreover, Mayia herself testified in open court as to her age. During the trial on December 15,
1998, which was about twenty-three (23) months after the rape incident occurred on January 17, 1997, Mayia testified on cross-examination that she
People v. Perez
was "8 years old last May 23." Thus, by deduction, since Mayia was born on May 23, 1990 as shown in her birth certificate, she was about six (6) years
111 G.R. No. 142556; February 5, 2003
and seven (7) months old on January 17, 1997, the day the crime took place. We rule that the prosecution has indisputably proven that Mayia was
Per Curiam;
below seven years old at the time appellant raped her.
The purpose of pre-trial is to consider the following: (a) plea bargaining; (b) stipulation of facts; (c) marking for identification of evidence of the
parties; (d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; (e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes lawful
defenses; and (f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case. Facts stipulated and evidence
admitted during pre-trial bind the parties.
Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governs dismissals of actions at the instance of the plaintiff. Hence, the "two-dismissal rule" under Rule 17,
Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure will not apply if the prior dismissal was done at the instance of the defendant.
Ching v. Cheng
112 G.R. No. 175507; October 8, 2014 The first section of the rule contemplates a situation where a plaintiff requests the dismissal of the case before any responsive pleadings have been filed
Leonen, J. by the defendant. It is done through notice by the plaintiff and confirmation by the court. The dismissal is without prejudice unless otherwise declared
by the court.

The second section of the rule contemplates a situation where a counterclaim has been pleaded by the defendant before the service on him or her of the
plaintiff's motion to dismiss. It requires leave of court, and the dismissal is generally without prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court.
The third section contemplates dismissals due to the fault of the plaintiff such as the failure to prosecute. The case is dismissed either upon motion of
the defendant or by the court motu propio. Generally, the dismissal is with prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court.
In all instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of the plaintiff, not of the defendant. Dismissals upon the instance of the defendant are
generally governed by Rule 16, which covers motions to dismiss.
To allow intervention, it must be shown that (a) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation or otherwise qualified, and (b) consideration
must be given as to whether the adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor's rights may
be protected in a separate proceeding or not. Both requirements must concur as the first is not more important than the second.
Yao v. Perello
113 G.R. No. 153828; October 24, 2003
As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for intervention may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. Petitioner filed
Corona, J.
his motion only on April 25, 2002, way beyond the period set forth in the rules. The court resolution granting private respondent's petition for prohibition
and lifting the levy on the subject property was issued on March 22, 2002. By April 6, 2002, after the lapse of 15 days, the said resolution had already
become final and executory.
The Partial Decision was a judgment by default, which is generally looked upon with disfavor, for it cannot pretend to be based on the merits of the
controversy. As in this case, the judgment by default may amount to a positive and considerable injustice to private respondents. Hence, justice and
equity demand that this case be litigated anew. It is evident that the reopening of the case would not amount to an exercise in futility nor is it intended
to further delay the final resolution of this controversy. The court a quo should give all the necessary parties every chance to fight their case fairly and
in the open, without resort to technicalities.
Pinlac v. CA The conclusion that the Partial Decision of the court a quo is void finds support in Rule 10, Section 5(c) of the then Rules of Court, which provides:
114 G.R. No. 91486; January 19, 2001 "(c) Effect of partial default. — When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against several defending parties, some of whom
Ynares – Santiago, J. answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented."
In fact, the court a quo enumerated in the Partial Decision those who filed responsive pleadings. Considering that petitioners in their complaint stated
a common cause of action against all the named respondents, the court a quo should have heard the case as against all respondents, the defaulted
respondents included. However, the trial court, unmindful of the above-quoted rule, proceeded to receive evidence ex parte only against the defaulted
respondents. The trial court's disposition is not only violative of the rules but also a clear negation of the defaulted respondents' limited rights.||| (Pinlac
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91486, [January 19, 2001], 402 PHIL 684-709)
Intervention is "a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to
protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings." If an intervention makes a third party a litigant in the main
proceedings, his pleading-in-intervention should form part of the main case.
Chipongian v. Benitez – Lirio The dismissal of the petitioner's intervention constituted "a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing. For the petitioner,
115 G.R. No. 162692; August 26, 2015 therefore, the period for perfecting the appeal by record on appeal was 30 days from notice of the final order dismissing the intervention. The start of
Bersamin, J. the period of 30 days happened on September 18, 1998, the date when his counsel received the decision dismissing his intervention.
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner lost his right to appeal through his failure to file the record on appeal, and rendered the dismissal of his
intervention final and immutable. With this outcome, we no longer need to dwell on the denial of due course to his notice of appeal because of the late
payment of the appellate court docket fees.

RULES 23 - 32
CONSOLIDATION
"Consolidation" is used in three different senses:
1. Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to the others.
This is not actually consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasi-consolidation)
2. Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered.
This is illustrated by a situation where several actions are pending between the same parties stating claims which might have been set out
originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation)
Rep. v. Heirs of Enrique Oribello
3. Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment.
116 G.R. No. 199501; March 6, 2013
This type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to the other.
Carpio, J.
(consolidation for trial)
Since each action does not lose its distinct character, severance of one action from the other is not necessary to appeal a judgment already rendered in
one action. There is no rule or law prohibiting the appeal of a judgment or part of a judgment in one case which is consolidated with other cases.
Further, severance is within the sound discretion of the court for convenience or to avoid prejudice. It is not mandatory under the Rules of Court that
the court sever one case from the other cases before a party can appeal an adverse ruling on such case.
SEVERANCE
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party
complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.1 But a separate trial may
Metrobank v. Sandoval
be denied if a party is thereby deprived of his right to be heard upon an issue dealt with and determined in the main trial.
117
2013
Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are extraordinary grounds for conducting separate trials on different issues raised in the
Bersamin, J.
same case, or when separate trials of the issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues will further convenience, or when separate
trials of the issues will promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule must apply.
Deposition; Purpose. Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge
of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other modes of discovery (interrogatories to
parties; requests for admission by adverse party; production or inspection of documents or things; physical and mental examination of persons) are
meant to enable a party to learn all the material and relevant facts, not only known to him and his witnesses but also those known to the adverse party
and the latter's own witnesses. In fine, the object of discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the material and relevant
facts, from whoever may have knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or motions may not suffer from inadequacy of factual foundation, and
Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. v.
all the relevant facts may be clearly and completely laid before the Court, without omission or suppression.
Reyes
118
G.R. No. 108229; August 24, 1993
Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts; they are not therefore
Narvasa, C.J.
generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. The deponent must as a rule be presented for oral
examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules of evidence.
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open
court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay; the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the
deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. It matters not that that opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the

deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented
against him during the trial or hearing.
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination or written
interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any
Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a foreign state or country, with no additional requirement
Go v. People
except reasonable notice in writing to the other party.
119 G.R. No. 185527; July 18, 2012
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial,
the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate
of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of the judge. This is especially true in criminal cases in
order that the accused may be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses
face to face. It also gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such questions as they deem material and necessary to support their
Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos position or to test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses demeanor.
120 G.R. No. 152643; August 28, 2008
Nachura, J. This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of discovery that may be
resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal
proceedings, Sections 12, and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional
examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses.
Requests for admission of facts and genuineness of documents; Purpose. The purpose of the rule governing requests for admission of facts and
genuineness of documents is to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of
which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless within a
period designated in the request which shall not be less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow
on motion, the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying
specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those
matters.[12] Upon service of request for admission, the party served may do any of the following acts: (a) he may admit each of the matters of which
an admission is requested, in which case, he need not file an answer; (b) he may admit the truth of the matters of which admission is requested by
Allied Agri – Business Development
serving upon the party requesting a written admission of such matters within the period stated in the request, which must not be less than ten (10) days
Co. Inc. v. CA
after service, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion and notice; (c) he may file a sworn statement denying specifically the matter
121 G.R. No. 118438; December 4,
of which an admission is requested; or, (d) he may file a sworn statement setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or
1998
deny the matters of which an admission is requested.
Bellosillo, J.
The burden of affirmative action is on the party upon whom notice is served to avoid the admission rather than upon the party seeking the
admission. Hence, when petitioner failed to reply to a request to admit, it may not argue that the adverse party has the burden of proving the facts
sought to be admitted. Petitioner’s silence is an admission of the facts stated in the request.
Summary judgment; When granted. It is a settled rule that summary judgment may be granted if the facts which stand admitted by reason of a party's
failure to deny statements contained in a request for admission show that no material issue of fact exists. By its failure to answer the other party's
request for admission, petitioner has admitted all the material facts necessary for judgment against itself.
People v. Webb Written interrogatories; Time limit. The time within which to file and serve written interrogatories is explicitly fixed by the rules, that is, in civil
G.R. No. 176389; December 14, cases before responsive answer is filed with leave of court or without leave of court after the filing of responsive answer; and in criminal cases before
122
2010 the setting of the arraignment and pre-trial conference. The admissions made in the verified answer to the written interrogatories may already be
Abad, J. considered during the pre-trial conference and would definitely aid the parties for purposes of a plea-bargaining.

Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party not served with written interrogatories may not
be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.
One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of
trial. It will be presumed that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit
facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its witness. Instead, the process could be treated as a fishing
expedition or an attempt at delaying the proceedings; it produces no significant result that a prior written interrogatories might bring.
Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse party’s testimony,33 compelling the adverse party to take the witness stand may result
Afulugencia v. Metro Bank
in the calling party damaging its own case. Otherwise stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or information useful to its case through the facility of written
123 G.R. No. 185145; February 5, 2014
interrogatories or other mode of discovery, then the calling of the adverse party to the witness stand could only serve to weaken its own case as a result
Del Castillo, J.
of the calling party’s being bound by the adverse party’s testimony, which may only be worthless and instead detrimental to the calling party’s cause.
Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the
calling party from straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand.
Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or harassment; it likewise prevents the calling party from conducting a
fishing expedition or bungling its own case. Using its own judgment and discretion, the court can hold its own in resolving a dispute, and need not bear
witness to the parties perpetrating unfair court practices such as fishing for evidence, badgering, or altogether ruining their own cases. Ultimately, such
unnecessary processes can only constitute a waste of the court’s precious time, if not pointless entertainment.
To rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. The prevailing
Disini v. Sandiganbayan
rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense charged is punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the
G.R. No. 169823 – 24; September
124 complaint or information in the office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of prescription.
11, 2013
Consequently, prescription did not yet set in because only five years elapsed from 1986, the time of the discovery of the offenses charged, up to April
Bersamin, J.
1991, the time of the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman.
It is settled in jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is
credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Jurisprudence is likewise instructive that the factual findings
of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.
People v. Bustamante
125 G.R. No. 189836; June 5, 2013 With regard to the allegation that the accusation of rape was motivated by ill will and revenge, this Court is not surprised at this rather common excuse
Leonardo – De Castro, J. being raised by offenders in rape cases. We have consistently held that such alleged motives cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies
of complainants who remained steadfast throughout the trial. Jurisprudence tells us that it is against human nature for a young girl to fabricate a story
that would expose herself as well as her family to a lifetime of shame, especially when her charge could mean the death or lifetime imprisonment of
her own father.
Instead of ordering the dismissal of the respondent’s complaint for cancellation of certificate of title, we find that the consolidation of the reivindicatory
action and the cancellation of certificate of title case to be the appropriate remedy in the present situation. Consolidation is proper when two or more
actions pending, not necessarily, before the same court involve a common question of law or fact.27In such cases, the court may: order a joint hearing
Spouses Marano v. Pryce Gases
or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions, order all the actions consolidated, and make such orders concerning the proceedings therein for
Inc.
126 the purpose of avoiding unnecessary costs and delay.
G.R. No. 196592; April 6, 2015
Brion, J.
Considering that the validity of the petitioners’ certificate of title is the crucial issue in both the reivindicatory action pending appeal before the RTC
and the cancellation of certificate of title case filed by the respondent, these two cases should be consolidated in order to avoid the possibility of
rendering conflicting decisions and for the orderly administration of justice. And since the issue of validity of the petitioners’ certificate of title has

been subjected to a full-blown trial before the MTC and is now the subject of appeal before the RTC, allowing the cancellation of certificate of title
case to proceed independently and separately would be needlessly circuitous and would necessarily delay the resolution of the present issue.
Through written interrogatories, a party may elicit from the adverse party or parties any facts or matter that are not privileged and are material and
Phil. Health Ins. Corp. v. Our Lady
relevant to the subject of the pending action. Like other modes of discovery authorized by the Rules, the purpose of written interrogatories is to assist
of Lourdes Hospital
the parties in clarifying the issues and in ascertaining the facts involved in a case. On the other hand, the provision on production and
127 G.R. No. 193158; November 11,
inspection of documents is to enable not only the parties but also the court (in this case, the PHIC Arbitration Department) to discover all the relevant
2015
and material facts in connection with the case pending before it. It must be shown, therefore, that the documents sought to be produced, inspected
Peralta, J.
and/or copied/photographed are material or contain evidence relevant to an issue involved in the action.
Once a party serves a request for admission as to the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact, the party to whom such request is served has 15
days within which to file a sworn statement answering it. In case of failure to do so, each of the matters of which admission is requested shall be
deemed admitted. This rule, however, admits of an exception, that is, when the party to whom such request for admission is served had already
Duque v. Spouses Yu
controverted the matters subject of such request in an earlier pleading. Otherwise stated, if the matters in a request for admission have already been
128 admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the requesting
2018
party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and, thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Section
Velasco, Jr., J.
2, Rule 26. The rationale is that "admissions by an adverse party as a mode of discovery contemplates of interrogatories that would clarify and tend to
shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in a pleading, and does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleadings;
or else, it constitutes an utter redundancy and will be a useless, pointless process which petitioner should not be subjected to.
RULES 33 - 36
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
To reiterate, "[d]emurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his [or her]
part, as he [or she] would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff's evidence shows that he [or she] is not entitled to the relief sought." The order of dismissal
Republic v. Gimenez must be clearly supported by facts and law since an order granting demurrer is a judgment on the merits:
G.R. No. 174673; January 11,
129
2016 As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the merits, it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly
Leonen, J. and distinctly stating therein the facts and the law on which it is based.
To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on the delay to formally offer documentary evidence essentially deprives one party of due process.
The new rule on demurrer to evidence was first incorporated in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure that when a motion to dismiss on
insufficiency of evidence is denied the accused has a right to present evidence in his behalf. Earlier the rule was, when after the prosecution has rested
its case, and the accused files a motion to dismiss on insufficiency of evidence, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for
judgment on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution. The rule was further modified in 1988 to the effect that only when the accused files a demurrer
or motion to dismiss on insufficiency of evidence without express leave of court that the accused may be deemed to have waived his right to present
Bernardo v. CA
evidence and the case considered submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. If the accused has obtained prior leave of court,
130 in case of denial of his motion to dismiss, he retains his right to present evidence in his behalf. The court may also motu proprio dismiss the case on
1997
insufficiency of evidence, but before doing so, it should give the prosecution an opportunity to be heard and to oppose the motion. Under the new rule
Bellosillo, J.
on demurrer to evidence the accused has the right to file a demurrer to evidence after the prosecution has rested its case. If the accused obtained prior
leave of court before filing his demurrer, he can still present evidence if his demurrer is denied. However, if he demurs without prior leave of court, or
after his motion for leave is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution. This power to grant leave to the accused to file a demurrer is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The purpose is to
determine whether the accused in filing his demurrer is merely stalling the proceedings.

Explaining the consequence of a demurrer to evidence, the Court in Villanueva Transit v. Javellana pronounced: "The rationale behind the rule and
doctrine is simple and logical. The defendant is permitted, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is not granted, to
move for a dismissal (i.e., demur to the plaintiff's evidence) on the ground that upon the facts as thus established and the applicable law, the plaintiff
has shown no right to relief. If the trial court denies the dismissal motion, i.e., finds that plaintiff's evidence is sufficient for an award of judgment in
the absence of contrary evidence, the case still remains before the trial court which should then proceed to hear and receive the defendant's evidence
so that all the facts and evidence of the contending parties may be properly placed before it for adjudication as well as before the appellate courts, in
case of appeal. Nothing is lost. The doctrine is but in line with the established procedural precepts in the conduct of trials that the trial court liberally
Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Del
receive all proffered evidence at the trial to enable it to render its decision with all possibly relevant proofs in the record, thus assuring that the appellate
Rosario
131 courts upon appeal have all the material before them necessary to make a correct judgment, and avoiding the need of remanding the case for retrial or
G.R. No. 138739; July 6, 2000
reception of improperly excluded evidence, with the possibility thereafter of still another appeal, with all the concomitant delays. The rule, however,
Panganiban, J.
imposes the condition by the same token that if his demurrer is granted by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant
loses his right to present evidence in his behalf and he shall have been deemed to have elected to stand on the insufficiency of plaintiff's case and
evidence. In such event, the appellate court which reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of
plaintiff's evidence." In other words, defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence retain the right to present their own evidence, if the
trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the
dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render judgment
on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations.
To determine whether the pleading filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider:
1. The allegations in it made in good faith;
Cabador v. People 2. The stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and
132 G.R. No. 186001; October 2, 2009 3. The primary objective of the party filing it.
Abad, J.
In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused's right to speedy trial. This denial is characterized by
unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault of the accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial.
Claudio v. Saraza A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is filed after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection
133 G.R. No. 213286; August 26, 2015 by one of the parties in an action to the effect that the evidence, which his adversary produced, is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to
Mendoza, J. make out a case or sustain the issue.
Felipe v. MGM Motor Trading A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. There is a question of fact when doubt
Corporation arises as to the truth or falsity of the statement of facts. The resolution of a question of fact necessarily involves a calibration of the evidence, the
134 G.R. No. 191849; September 29, credibility of the witnesses, the existence and the relevance of surrounding circumstances, and the probability of specific situations. It is for this reason
2015 that this Court defers to the factual findings of a trial judge, who has had the distinct advantage of directly observing the witnesses on the stand and
Perez, J. determining from their demeanor whether they were speaking or distorting the truth.
Though interlocutory in character, an order denying a demurrer to evidence may be the subject of a certiorari proceeding, provided the petitioner can
Macapagal – Arroyo v. People show that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion; and that appeal in due course is not plain, adequate or speedy under the circumstances. It must
135 G.R. No. 220598; July 19, 2016 be stressed that a writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
Bersamin, J. excess of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Where the issue or question involves or affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision — not the
jurisdiction of the court — the same is beyond the province of a petition for certiorari.
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Adolfo v. Adolfo It stated that in a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there are no ostensible issues at all on account of the defending party's failure to raise an
136 G.R. No. 201427; March 18, 2015 issue in his answer, while in a proper case for summary judgment, such issues exist, although they are sham, fictitious, or not genuine as shown by
Del Castillo, J.

affidavits, depositions or admissions. In other words, a judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, while a summary judgment is
a judgment on the facts as summarily proved by affidavits, depositions, or admissions.
The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious character, on the other, are what
distinguish a proper case for summary judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no
ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending party's answer to raise an issue. On the other hand, in the case of a summary judgment,
issues apparently exist — i.e., facts are asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific
denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer — but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not genuine, as
shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. When the pleadings on file show
that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the
facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts.35 Even if on their face the pleadings
Republic v. Shell Petroleum
appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by
Corporation
the Rules must ensue as a matter of law. The determinative factor, therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is the presence or absence of a genuine
137 G.R. No. 209324; December 9,
issue as to any material fact.
2015
Villarama, Jr., J.
For a full-blown trial to be dispensed with, the party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of genuine
issues of fact, or that the issue posed is patently insubstantial as to constitute a genuine issue. Genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived.
A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, and is based exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the
COMGLASSCO Corporation v.
parties and the accompanying annexes. It is settled that the trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a
Santos Car Check Center
138 party if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed. A genuine issue of fact is that which requires the presentation of evidence,
G.R. No. 202989; March 25, 2015
as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false issue. Come to think of it, under Rule 35, on Summary Judgments, Comglasco had recourse
Reyes, J.
to move for summary judgment, wherein it could have adduced supporting evidence to justify its action on the parties’ lease, but it did not do so.
The CA correctly ruled that there exist genuine issues as to three material facts, which have to be addressed during trial: first, the
fact of default; second, the amount of the outstanding obligation, and third, the existence of prior demand.
Under the Rules, following the filing of pleadings, if, on motion of a party and after hearing, the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and
admissions on file show that, "except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled
Phil. Bank of Communications v. Go
to a judgment as a matter of law," summary judgment may be rendered.
139
2011
“Genuine issue" is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.
Mendoza, J.
When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment
is called for. The party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that
the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have limited authority to render
summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are
disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.

ENTRY OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS
It is argued that the assailed Resolutions in the present cases have already become final, since a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited except
for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only upon express leave first obtained; and that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby becomes
FASAP v. PAL immutable and unalterable, however unjust the result of error may appear.
140 G.R. No. 178083; July 22, 2008
Ynares – Santiago, J. The contention, however, misses an important point. The doctrine of immutability of decisions applies only to final and executory decisions. Since the
present cases may involve a modification or reversal of a Court-ordained doctrine or principle, the judgment rendered by the Special Third Division
may be considered unconstitutional, hence, it can never become final.
THE REMEDIES AGAINST FINAL JUDGMENTS
RULE 37
A motion for new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence is properly granted only where there is concurrence of the following requisites,
Mendezona v. Ozamis
namely: (a) the evidence had been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the
141 G.R. No. 143370; February 6, 2002
exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of such weight that if
De Leon, Jr., J.
admitted, would probably alter the result. All three (3) requisites must characterize the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial.
The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive
one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement of due diligence has relevance. We have held that in order
that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when
the evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is essential is that
Chua v. People the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.
142 G.R. No. 196853; July 13, 2015
Del Castillo, J. The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the movant has exercised due diligence depends upon the particular
circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, it has been observed that the phrase is often equated with "reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the
defendant." In other words, the concept of due diligence has both a time component and a good faith component. The movant for a new trial must not
only act in a timely fashion in gathering evidence in support of the motion; he must act reasonably and in good faith as well. Due diligence contemplates
that the defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances and the facts known to him.
Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance, inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not
Padilla – Rumbaua v. Rumbaua qualify as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be an end to litigation so long as
143 G.R. No. 166738; August 14, 2009 a new counsel could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a
Brion, J. premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the event of conviction, or an adverse
decision, as in the instant case.
The negligence of the petitioner in believing that the case was already terminated resulting to his failure to attend the hearings, is inexcusable. The
Senit v. People Court has ruled in many cases that:
G.R. No. 192914; January 11,
144
2016 It is petitioner’s duty, as a client, to be in touch with his counsel so as to be constantly posted about the case. It is mandated to inquire from its counsel
Reyes, J. about the status and progress of the case from time to time and cannot expect that all it has to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of the case. It
is also its responsibility, together with its counsel, to devise a system for the receipt of mail intended for them.
People v. Li Ka Kim The requisites of newly discovered evidence in order to justify a new trial are that — (a) the evidence is discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could
145 G.R. No. 148586; May 25, 2004 not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material, not merely
Vitug, J. cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight that, if admitted, would likely change the judgment.

Not one of the requisites mentioned is attendant. Appellant's passport could have easily been presented and produced during the trial. Then, too, the
presentation of appellant's passport, would hardly be material to the outcome of the case. Appellant was positively identified by the prosecution
witnesses as being the perpetrator of the crime. Most importantly, appellant even identified himself as Li Ka Kim at the trial and not as Huang Xiao
Wei, 9 that bolsters the conclusion that appellant deliberately concealed his true identity in the nefarious enterprise.
RULES 40 - 45
The distinctions between the various modes of appeal cannot be taken for granted, or easily dismissed, or lightly treated. The appeal by notice of appeal
under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the appeal by petition for review under Rule 42 is a matter of discretion. An appeal as a matter of right, which
refers to the right to seek the review by a superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial court, exists after the trial in the first instance. In contrast,
the discretionary appeal, which is taken from the decision or final order rendered by a court in the exercise of its primary appellate jurisdiction, may
Heirs of Arturo Garcia v.
be disallowed by the superior court in its discretion. Verily, the CA has the discretion whether to due course to the petition for review or not.
Municipality of Iba
146
G.R. No. 162217; July 22, 2015
The plea for liberality is unworthy of any sympathy from the Court. We have always looked at appeal as not a matter of right but a mere statutory
Bersamin, J.
privilege. As the parties invoking the privilege, the petitioners should have faithfully complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court. Their
failure to do so forfeited their privilege to appeal. Indeed, any liberality in the application of the rules of procedure may be properly invoked only in
cases of some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, but definitely not in cases like now where a liberal application would directly subvert
the essence of the proceedings or results in the utter disregard of the Rules of Court.
Estinozo v. CA A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive remedies. Certiorari cannot co-
G.R. No. 150276; February 12, exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The nature of the questions of law intended to be raised on appeal is of no consequence. It may well
147
2008 be that those questions of law will treat exclusively of whether or not the judgment or final order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
Nachura, J. with grave abuse of discretion. This is immaterial. The remedy is appeal, not certiorari as a special civil action.
The settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order when appeal is available notwithstanding, the Court rules that the CA should
have given due course to and granted the petition for certiorari for two exceptional reasons, namely: (a) the broader interest of justice demanded
that certiorari be given due course to avoid the undeserved grossly unjust result that would befall the petitioners otherwise; and (b) the order of the
RTC granting the motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter evidently constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction.
On occasion, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy despite the availability of appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court has declared that the requirement that there must be no appeal, or any plain speedy
Heirs of Sps. Reterta v. Spouses
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law admits of exceptions, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to
Mores
148 a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where
G.R. No. 159941; August 17, 2011
an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in
Bersamin, J.
case of urgency.
Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from
making use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all
other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy is plain,
speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or
agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need not mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled
and set aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules of Court.

Jurisprudence has settled the "fresh period rule," according to which, an ordinary appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, shall be taken within fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the original judgment of the trial court or from receipt of
the final order of the trial court dismissing or denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Manaloto v. Veloso III
The "fresh period rule" finally eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted — from receipt of notice of judgment
149 G.R. No. 171365; October 6, 2010
or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from.
Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes. The "fresh
period rule" is irrefragably procedural, prescribing the manner in which the appropriate period for appeal is to be computed or determined and, therefore,
can be made applicable to actions pending upon its effectivity, such as the present case, without danger of violating anyone else's rights.
This Court had the occasion to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error,
where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) petition for review, where judgment
was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme Court.
The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The
second mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of
Latorre v. Latorre
appeal, provided in Rule 45, is filed with the Supreme Court only on questions of law.
150 G.R. No. 183926; March 29, 2010
Nachura, J.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as
to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a
question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can
determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.
Spouses Alfredo v. Borras In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, this Court reviews only errors of law and not errors of facts. The factual findings of the appellate
151 G.R. No. 144225; June 17, 2003 court are generally binding on this Court. This applies with greater force when both the trial court and the Court of Appeals are in complete agreement
Carpio, J. on their factual findings.
It is axiomatic that findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses and probative weight thereof and its
People v. Corpuz conclusions culled from said findings are accorded by this Court great respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the trial
152 G.R. No. 148198; October 1, 2003 court in observing and monitoring at close range, the conduct, deportment and demeanor of the witnesses as they testify before the trial court. However,
Ynares – Santiago, J. this principle does not apply if the trial court ignored, misunderstood or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered,
would alter the outcome of the case.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the general rule is that only questions of law may be raised by the parties and
passed upon by this Court. Factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on us especially when in complete accord with the findings of
the trial court. This is because it is not our function to analyze or weigh the evidence all over again. However, this general rule admits of exceptions,
to wit:
PAL v. CA
a. where there is grave abuse of discretion;
153 b. when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
2003
c. when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
Austria – Martinez, J.
d. when the judgment of the Court of Appeals was based on a misapprehension of facts;
e. when the factual findings are conflicting;
f. when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;

g. when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion; and,
h. where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions without citation of specific
evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal may be taken only from a final order, and not from an interlocutory one. A final order
is one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution
Augusto v. Risos
what has been determined. An order or judgment is deemed final if it finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some right or rights
154 G.R. No. 131794;
of the parties, either on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and concludes them until it is reversed or set aside.
Calleja, Sr., J.
Where no issue is left for future consideration, except the fact of compliance with the terms of the order, such order is final and appealable. In contrast,
an order is interlocutory if it does not finally dispose of the case.
Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. — A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified,
filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months
Escueta v. Lim after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident,
155 G.R. No. 137162; January 24, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may
2007 be.
The 60-day period is reckoned from the time the party acquired knowledge of the order, judgment or proceedings and not from the date he actually
read the same.
Section 9 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129 vested in the CA the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments, but only those rendered by
Springfield Development Corp. v. the RTCs. It does not expressly give the CA the power to annul judgments of quasi-judicial bodies. Thus, in Elcee Farms, Inc. v. Semillano, the Court
RTC Judge of Misamis Oriental affirmed the ruling of the CA that it has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for annulment of a final and executory judgment of the NLRC, citing
156
G.R. No. 142628; February 6, 2007 Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which only vests in the CA "exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial
Austria – Martinez, J. Courts." This was reiterated in Galang v. Court of Appeals, where the Court ruled that that the CA is without jurisdiction to entertain a petition for
annulment of judgment of a final decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy.
Yuk Ling Ong v. Co
Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions, and Section 2
157 thereof explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of judgment, that is, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Annulment of judgment is an
2015
equitable principle not because it allows a party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment that has long lapsed into finality but because it
Mendoza, J.
enables him to be discharged from the burden of being bound to a judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with.
Thus, while the CA is correct in ruling that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case for reconveyance and recovery of ownership and possession of
a land with an assessed value over P20,000.00, the same cannot be said of its ruling with respect to the RTC. Under Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of
Court, if the MTC tried a case on the merits despite having no jurisdiction over the subject matter, its decision may be reviewed on appeal by the RTC.
De Vera v. Santiago
158 G.R. No. 179457; June 22, 2015 The Court explained that the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 40 contemplates an appeal from an order of dismissal issued without trial of the case on
Peralta, J. the merits, while the second paragraph deals with an appeal from an order of dismissal but the case was tried on the merits. Both paragraphs, however,
involve the same ground for dismissal, i.e., lack of jurisdiction. Verily, the second paragraph refutes respondents' contention that Section 8, Rule 40
refers solely to cases where the MTC dismissed a case filed therein without a trial on the merits and an appeal to the RTC was taken from the order of
dismissal. Therefore, the RTC correctly proceeded to decide the case on the merits despite the MTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
PNCC v. Asiavest Rule 44, Section 13 of the Rules of Court enumerates the required contents of an appellant's brief. In paragraph (e), the appellant's brief must include
159 G.R. No. 172301; August 19, 2015 "[a] clear and concise statement of the issues of fact or law to be submitted to the court for its judgment.
Leonen, J.

Forum non conveniens literally translates to 'the forum is inconvenient. This doctrine applies in conflicts of law cases. It gives courts the choice of not
assuming jurisdiction when it appears that it is not the most convenient forum and the parties may seek redress in another one. It is a device "designed
to frustrate illicit means for securing advantages and vexing litigants that would otherwise be possible if the venue of litigation (or dispute resolution)
were left entirely to the whim of either party.
Under Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (1997 Rules), a petition for review shall be accompanied by, among others, copies of
the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition. Section 3 of the same rule states that failure of
the petitioner to comply with any of the requirements regarding the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
In Galvez v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that there are three guideposts in determining the necessity of attaching pleadings and portions of the
record to petitions under Rules 42 and 65 of the 1997 Rules, to wit:
First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany
Maravilla v. Rios it. The test of relevancy is whether the document in question will support the material allegations in the petition, whether said document will make out
160 G.R. No. 196875; August 19, 2015 a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the petition.
Del Castillo, J.
Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also [be] found
in another document already attached to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned judgment, it
will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached.
Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing
that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits.
The guideposts, which equally apply to a petition for review filed in the CA under Rule 42, reflect that the significant determinant of the sufficiency
of the attached documents is whether the accompanying documents support the allegations of the petition.
A second motion for reconsideration, albeit prohibited, may be entertained in the higher interest of justice, such as when the assailed decision is not
only legally erroneous but also patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the moving party.
The showing of exceptional merit to justify the acceptance of the petitioner's Second Motion for Reconsideration was not made herein. Hence, we deny
the Second Motion for Reconsideration.
For sure, the petitioner's non-compliance with the rule on proof of service and the petitioner's unjustified reliance on the Fresh Period Rule as the basis
Fortune Life Insurance v. COA to extend the period for filing of the special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court were already enough ground to dismiss the
G.R. No. 213525; November 21, petition for certiorari. We need not remind that the Fresh Period Rule applies only to appeals in civil and criminal cases, and in special proceedings
161
2017 filed under Rule 40, Rule 41, Rule 42, Rule 43, Rule 45, and Rule 122.
Bersamin, J.
Hence, liberality could not be extended to the petitioner. According to Ginete v. Court of Appeals, only matters of life, liberty, honor or property may
warrant the suspension of the rules of the most mandatory character. That is not the situation of the petitioner herein. It is also true that other
justifications may be considered, like: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (2) the merits of the case; (3) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (4) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory; and (5) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. But, again, the petitioner has not shown the attendance of any of
such justifications for excepting its petition for certiorari from the stricture of timeliness of filing.

THE REMEDIES AGINST EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS
RULE 38
The rule prohibiting appeals from orders of execution is based on the doctrine of immutability of final judgments. Under this doctrine, a final and
executory judgment "is removed from the power and jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further alter or amend it, much less revoke it." The
The Prov. Gov’t of Aurora v. Marco
judgment remains immutable even if it is later on discovered to be erroneous. The doctrine "is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy
162 G.R. No. 202331; April 22, 2015
and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at some definite date fixed by law. To allow courts
Leonen, J.
to amend final [and executory] judgments will result in endless litigation." The doctrine of immutability of final judgments applies to decisions rendered
by the Civil Service Commission.
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy.
When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court,
and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself
Thomasites Center for of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law
International Studies v. Rodriguez was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.
163 G.R. No. 203642; January 27,
2016 As provided in Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, a party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with two (2) reglementary
Reyes, J. periods: first, the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside;
and second, within a fixed period of six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. Strict compliance with these periods is
required because a petition for relief from judgment is a final act of liberality on the part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any
further the fundamental principle that a judgment, order or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in order to put an end to litigation.
RULE 47
While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court
declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been
issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.
It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a
relief without first ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due process considerations require that judgments must conform to and be
Diona v. Balanque
supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in court. In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, this Court expounded that:
164 G.R. No. 173559; January 7, 2013
Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent
Del Castillo, J.
notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement
that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.
Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process of a defendant who was declared in default than of a defendant who
participated in trial. For instance, amendment to conform to the evidence presented during trial is allowed the parties under the Rules. But the same is
not feasible when the defendant is declared in default because Section 3 (d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court comes into play and limits the relief that may
be granted by the courts to what has been prayed for in the Complaint.
Santos v. Santos The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of
165
G.R. No. 187061; October 8, 2014 reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person declared presumptively dead has never been absent.

Leonen, J.
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the "remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner." The grounds for annulment of
judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Because it is an exceptional relief, the Rules provide that only two grounds may be availed of in a petition for annulment. These are extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction.
Annulment of judgment may only be resorted to if the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies, are no
longer available without the petitioner's fault.
Thus, the petitioner must be able to provide a plausible explanation for not resorting first to the more common remedies enumerated under the Rules.
Lasala v. National Food Authority As annulment is an equitable remedy, it cannot be used to compensate litigants who lost their case because of their negligence or because they slept on
166 G.R. No. 171582; August 19, 2015 their rights. This safeguard has been put in place to address the concern that defeated litigants would use and abuse Rule 47 to avoid or delay an already
Brion, J. final and executory judgment.
Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties
or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit.
Its elements are the following: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity
of parties, of subject matter, and cause of action. There is res judicata when all these requisites concur.
"In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an
absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the petition
because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter is conferred by
Mangubat v. Morga – Seva
law." The RTC's jurisdiction over petitions for revival of judgment had already been upheld by the Court. It was held that "[a]n action for revival of
167 judgment may be filed either 'in the same court where said judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any
2015
other place designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general.'”
Del Castillo, J.
"An interlocutory order refers to a ruling respecting some point or matter between the commencement and end of the suit, but is not a final adjudication
of the claims and liabilities of the parties that are in dispute in that suit.
As a ground for annulment of judgment, extrinsic fraud must arise from an act of the adverse party, and the fraud must be of such nature as to have
deprived the petitioner of its day in court. The fraud is not extrinsic if the act was committed by the petitioner's own counsel.
Sibal v. Buquel
What is certain, for purposes of application of Rule 47, is that mistake and gross negligence cannot be equated to the extrinsic fraud under Rule 47. By
G.R. No. 197825; January 11,
168 its very nature, extrinsic fraud relates to a cause that is collateral in character, i.e., it relates to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation
2016
which is committed outside of the trial of the case, where the defeated party has been prevented from presenting fully his side of the cause, by fraud or
Peralta, J.
deception practiced on him by his opponent. And even in the presence of fraud, annulment will not lie unless the fraud is committed by the adverse
party, not by one's own lawyer. In the latter case, the remedy of the client is to proceed against his own lawyer and not to re-litigate the case where
judgment had been rendered.
Frias v. Alcayde For purposes of summons, this Court holds that the nature of a petition for annulment of judgment is in personam, on the basis of the following reasons:
G.R. No. 194262; February 28, 1. A petition for annulment of judgment is an original action, which is separate, distinct and independent of the case where the judgment sought
169
2018 to be annulled is rendered. It is not a continuation or progression of the same case. Thus, regardless of the nature of the original action in the
Tijam, J.

decision sought to be annulled, be it in personam, in rem or quasi in rem, the respondent should be duly notified of the petition seeking to
annul the court's decision over which the respondent has a direct or indirect interest.
2. A petition for annulment of judgment and the court's subsequent decision thereon will affect the parties alone. It will not be enforceable
against the whole world. Any judgment therein will eventually bind only the parties properly impleaded.
Assuming arguendo, that a petition for annulment of judgment is either an action in rem or quasi in rem, still the observance of due process for purposes
of service of summons cannot be deliberately ignored. For courts, as guardians of constitutional rights cannot be expected to deny persons their due
process rights while at the same time be considered as acting within their jurisdiction.
RULE 39
MODE OF EXECUTION
Villareal, Jr. v. MWSS Execution may be either through motion or an independent action. Execution by motion is only available if the enforcement of the judgment was sought
G.R. No. 232202; February 28, within five (5) years from the date of its entry. On the other hand, execution by independent action is mandatory if the five-year prescriptive period for
170
2018 execution by motion had already elapsed.
Tijam, J.
Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a "judgment may be executed within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes
Davis v. Davis final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action."
171 G.R. No. 233489; March 17, 2018 Nonetheless, this Court held that there had been many instances where it allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years, upon
Velasco, Jr., J. meritorious grounds. These exceptions have one common denominator, and that is: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor
and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.
EFFECT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT

A divorce decree obtained abroad by an alien spouse is a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage. As in any other foreign judgment, a
divorce decree does not have an automatic effect in the Philippines. Consequently, recognition by Philippine courts may be required before the effects
of a divorce decree could be extended in this jurisdiction. Recognition of the divorce decree, however, need not be obtained in a separate petition filed
solely for that purpose. Philippine courts may recognize the foreign divorce decree when such was invoked by a party as an integral aspect of his claim
Sarto v. People
or defense.
172
2018
Before the divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove it as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
Martires, J.
law allowing it. Proving the foreign law under which the divorce was secured is mandatory considering that Philippine courts cannot and could not be
expected to take judicial notice of foreign laws. For the purpose of establishing divorce as a fact, a copy of the divorce decree itself must be presented
and admitted in evidence. This is in consonance with the rule that a foreign judgment may be given presumptive evidentiary value only after it is
presented and admitted in evidence.
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL

Execution pending appeal is allowed when superior circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the damages that may result from the issuance of the
Bañez v. Bañez writ. Otherwise, instead of being an instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ may well become a tool of oppression and inequity.
G.R. No. 132592; January 23,
173
2002 In this case, considering the reasons cited by petitioner, we are of the view that there is no superior or urgent circumstance that outweighs the damage
Quisumbing, J. which respondent would suffer if he were ordered to vacate the house. We note that petitioner did not refute respondent's allegations that she did not
intend to use said house, and that she has two (2) other houses in the United States where she is a permanent resident, while he had none at all. Merely

putting up a bond is not sufficient reason to justify her plea for execution pending appeal. To do so would make execution routinary, the rule rather
than the exception.
A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it should be based upon good reasons to be stated in a special
Santos v. COMELEC order. The following constitute good reasons and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal:
174 G.R. No. 155618; March 26, 2003 1. Public interest involved or will of the electorate;
Ynares – Santiago, J. 2. The shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and
3. The length of time that the election contest has been pending.
There are three requisites for the execution of a judgment pending appeal: a) a motion must be filed by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse
party; b) there must be good reasons for execution pending appeal; and c) the good reasons must be stated in a special order. Execution pending appeal
is, of course, the exception to the general rule. Normally, execution cannot be obtained until and unless (a) the judgment has become final and executory;
(b) the right of appeal has been renounced or waived; (c) the period for appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been filed; or (d) having been filed,
City of Iligan v. Principal the appeal has been resolved and the records of the case have been returned to the court of origin—in which case, execution shall issue as a matter of
Management right.
175
G.R. No. 145260; July 31, 2003
Panganiban, J. On the other hand, when the period of appeal has not yet expired, the execution of a judgment should not be allowed except if, in the court’s discretion,
there are good reasons therefor. Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances that justify the immediate execution of a judgment, lest it become
illusory; or the prevailing party be unable to enjoy it after the lapse of time, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may have no recourse but
to delay. In the case, the ascertainment of good reasons for execution pending appeal lies within sound discretion of trial court and appellate court will
not normally disturb such finding. Intervention by latter may be proper, if it is shown there has been an abuse of discretion.
Discretionary execution is permissible only when “good reasons” exist for immediately executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal or
even before the expiration of the time to appeal. “Good reasons” are compelling circumstances justifying the immediate execution lest judgment
becomes illusory, or the prevailing party may, after the lapse of time, become unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may
FEBTC v. Toh
apparently have no case except to delay. The Rules of Court does not state, enumerate, or give examples of “good reasons” to justify execution. The
176 G.R. No. 144018; June 23, 2003
determination of what is a good reason must, necessarily, be addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In other words, the issuance of the writ
Quisumbing, J.
of execution must necessarily be controlled by the judgment of the judge in accordance with his own conscience and by a sense of justice and equity,
free from the control of another’s judgment or conscience. It must be so for discretion implies the absence of a hard and fast rule. In this case, the trial
court granted Toh’s motion for discretionary execution due to his advanced age.
Execution pending appeal is an exception to the general rule. The requisites for the grant of an execution of a judgment pending appeal are the following:
(a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be good reasons for execution pending appeal; (c) the
Stronghold Insurance v. Felix
good reasons must be stated in the special order. Good reasons consist of exceptional circumstances of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or
177 damage that the losing party may suffer should the appealed judgment be reversed later.
2006
Carpio, J.
The mere filing of a bond by a successful party is not a good reason to justify execution pending appeal as a combination of circumstances is the
dominant consideration which impels the grant of immediate execution.
A review of the records of this case reveals that respondent enforced the Writ of Execution dated March 7, 2000 only on August 24, 2000, as shown
Fajardo v. Quitalig by his August 25, 2000 Report of Service. Within 30 days from receipt thereof and every 30 days thereafter until the judgment is fully satisfied, a
A.M. No. P – 02 – 1535; March 28, sheriff is required by the Rules of Court to render a report on the action taken on a writ of execution. . . . Evidently, respondent was not only remiss in
178
2003 his implementation of the Writ, but likewise derelict in his submission of the returns thereof. [T]he actuations of respondent constitute disrespect, if
Panganiban, J. not outright defiance, of the MTCC's authority. In the absence of instructions to the contrary, a sheriff has the duty to execute a Writ with reasonable
celerity and promptness in accordance with its mandate.
RCBC v. Magwin Marketing Corp. The court may dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur but the real test of the judicious exercise of such power is whether under the
179 G.R. No. 152878; May 5, 2003 circumstances plaintiff is chargeable with want of fitting assiduousness in not acting on his complaint with reasonable promptitude. Unless a party’s
Bellosillo, J. conduct is so indifferent, irresponsible, contumacious or slothful as to provide substantial grounds for dismissal, i.e., equivalent to default or non-

appearance in the case, the courts should consider lesser sanctions which would still amount to achieving the desired end. In the absence of a pattern
or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or of a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in
the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense rather than wield their authority to dismiss.
Dismissing the civil case and compelling petitioner to re-file its complaint is a dangerous, costly and circuitous route that may end up aggravating, not
resolving, the disagreement. In the absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits,
and final disposition of the cases before the court.
Villaruel v. Fernando Settled is the rule that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect except
G.R. No. 136726; September 24, only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. True, this rule admits of certain exceptions. One of these exceptions is whenever circumstances
180
2013 transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
Carpio, J.
We agree with the OCA that respondent judge acted correctly in not issuing a writ of execution/possession. His action was consistent with the Decision
Morta v. Bagagnan
of this Court in G.R. No. 123417 affirming that of the MTC as to damages. Besides, the latter's Order directing defendants not to molest complainants
A.M. No. MTJ – 03 – 1513;
181 in their peaceful possession was rendered moot when they were ousted from the disputed lots by virtue of the final and executory judgments in Civil
November 12, 2003
Case No. 1920 and DARAB Case No. 2413. Indeed, the execution of a final judgment may be refused, as in this case, when there has been a change in
Panganiban, J.
the situation of the parties that would make its execution inequitable.
Generally, the execution upon a final judgment is a matter of right on the part of the prevailing party. It is the ministerial and mandatory duty of the
trial court to enforce its own judgment once it becomes final and executory.
It may happen, however, that new facts and circumstances may develop or occur after a judgment had been rendered and while an appeal therefrom is
pending; or new matters had developed after the appeal has been dismissed and the appealed judgment had become final and executory, which the
Serrano v. CA
parties were not aware of and could not have been aware of prior to or during the trial or during the appeal, as they were not yet in existence at that
182 G.R. No. 123896; June 25, 2003
time.
In the second situation, the execution may be stayed, notwithstanding the affirmance of the appealed judgment by this Court. It is required, however,
that the supervening facts and circumstances must either have a direct effect upon the matter already litigated and settled or create a substantial change
in the rights or relations of the parties therein which would render execution of a final judgment unjust, impossible or inequitable or when it becomes
imperative in the interest of justice.
D’ Armoured Sec. Agency v. Orpia We have ruled that an order of execution of a final and executory judgment, as in this case, is not appealable, otherwise, there would be no end to
183 G.R. No. 151325; June 27, 2005 litigation. On this ground alone, the instant petition is dismissible. Assuming that an appeal is proper, still we have to deny the instant petition.
We note that the xerox copies of Bill No. 1298 and Bill No. 1419 attached by MEVER to its Brief do not contain the "roll-over" notations. However,
Perez v. CA MEVER's own exhibits before respondent Appellate Court, Exhibits "3" and "3-A", do show those notations and MEVER must be held bound by them.
G.R. No. L – 56101; February 20, And although this issue may not have been squarely raised below, in the interest of substantial justice this Court is not prevented from considering such
184
1984 a pivotal factual matter that had been overlooked by the Courts below (Heirs of Enrique Zambales vs. CA, 120 SCRA 897 [1983]). The Supreme Court
Melencio – Herrera, J. is clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision
(Tumalad vs. Vicencio, 41 SCRA 146 [1971]).
An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of a previous judgment which has become dormant
Panotes v. Townhouse Dev. Corp. after the passage of five years without it being executed upon motion of the prevailing party. It is not intended to re-open any issue affecting the merits
G.R. No. 154739; January 23, of the judgment debtor's case nor the propriety or correctness of the first judgment.
185
2007
Sandoval – Gutierrez, J. Here, the original judgment or the NHA Resolution sought to be revived was between Rogelio Panotes and PROSECOR, not between petitioner Araceli
Bumatay and respondent CTDC. Strangers to a case, like CTDC, are not bound by the judgment rendered by a court. It will not divest the rights of a

party who has not and never been a party to a litigation. Execution of a judgment can be issued only against a party to the action and not against one
who did not have his day in court.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the
petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner
Fujiki v. Marinay may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody
186 G.R. No. 196049; June 26, 2013 of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular
Carpio, J. officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will
defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues.
The Rules of Court provide that a final and executory judgment may be executed by motion within five years from the date of its entry or by an action
after the lapse of five years and before prescription sets in. This Court, however, allows exceptions when execution may be made by motion even after
RCBC v. Serra
the lapse of five years. These exceptions have one common denominator: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment obligor and/or
187 G.R. No. 203241; July 10, 2013
is incurred for his benefit or advantage. Where the delays were occasioned by the judgment debtor’s own initiatives and for her advantage as well as
Carpio, J.
beyond the judgment creditor’s control, the five-year period allowed for enforcement of the judgment by motion is deemed to have been effectively
interrupted or suspended.
City of Cebu v. Dedamo Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,
188 G.R. No. 142971; May 27, 2002 or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties
and those in privity with them. Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question already settled
Davide, Jr., C.J.
in a previous case.
The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be
PSALM v. Maunlad Homes, Inc. issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. The duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment debtor
189 G.R. No. 215933; February 8, 2017 not that of a third person. For, as the saying goes, one man's goods shall not be sold for another man's debts. Thus, if the property levied by virtue of a
Peralta, J. writ of execution is claimed by a third person who is not the judgment obligor, Section 16 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
for the remedy of such third party claimant.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
JURISDICTION
SANDIGANBAYAN
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by PD 1606, as amended, not by RA 3019, as amended which defines graft and corrupt practices and
provides for their penalties. Relying on Sec. 4 of PD 1606, Serana contends that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
Serana isolated the first paragraph of Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision. Sec. 4(B) of PD 1606
Serrana v. Sandiganbayan reads: “B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
G.R. No. 162059; January 22, subsection a of this section in relation to their office.” Plainly, estafa is one of those “other felonies.”
190
2008
Reyes, R.T., J. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers
enumerated in PD 1606. While the first part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes
other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction
of the said court.
The Plunder did not absorb the Forfeiture Cases. Let it be stated at the outset that the SB has jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture under RA 1379,
albeit the proceeding thereunder is civil in nature. The civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a criminal offense, thus,
Garcia v. Sandiganbayan such liability is based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties. The action of forfeiture arises when
191 G.R. No. 170122; October 12, 2009 a public officer or employee acquires during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion of his salary and to his other
Velasco, Jr., J. lawful income. Such amount of property is then presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. Thus, if the respondent public official is
unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited
in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State.
For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts
showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough
to merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion
of law. The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his
Escobal v. Gachitorena
office and the discharge of his duties.
192 G.R. No. 124644; February 5, 2004
Callejo, Sr., J.
Moreover, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below
“27,” the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the
petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade “23.” He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC
had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A.
3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already
expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove
the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there
was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause
to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.
People v. Henry T. Go The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be
193 G.R. No. 168539; March 25, 2014 alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together
Peralta, J. with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer
has already died, the private person may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy. If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act
done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor. This means
that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done,
or written by each of them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial. The death of one of
two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors.

AFP-RSBS is a government-owned and controlled corporation, and that its funds are in the nature of public funds. Under Section 4(a)(1)(g) of R.A.
No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by presidents, directors, trustees or managers of government owned
Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan
or controlled corporations. Under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by public
G.R. No. 169727 – 38; August 18,
194 officers and employees in relation to their office, whether simple or complexed with other crimes.
2006
Callejo, Sr., J.
As gleaned from the material averments of the Information in Criminal Case No. 28023, the charge against petitioner is estafa through falsification of
public document in the performance of his duties and in relation to his position as president of the AFP-RSBS.
The Supreme Court held that criminal and civil actions for damages in case of written defamations shall be filed simultaneous or separately with the
RTC to the exclusion of all other courts. A subsequent enactment of law defining the jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply override, in the absence
of an express repeal or modification, the specific provision in the RPC vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations in writing or by
similar means.
People v. Benipayo
Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court, are special in character, and should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction
195 G.R. No. 154473; April 24, 2009
of other courts (such as the Court of First Instance) which is a general law.
Nachura, J.
The grant to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation to (public) office, similar to the expansion of the MTCs, did not
divest the RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written defamation cases regardless of whether the offense is committed in relation to
office. The broad general phraseology of Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, cannot be construed to have
impliedly repealed, or even simply modified, such exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC.
For a crime to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur:
1. The offense committed is a violation of:
a. R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act);
b. R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth);
c. Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery);
d. Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases); or
e. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes;
2. The offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in
Lacson v. Executive Secretary
paragraph a of Section 4; and
G.R. No. 128096; January 20,
196 3. The offense committed is in relation to the office
1999
Martinez, J.
The Sandiganbayan law requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to
have jurisdiction over it. We find the amended informations for murder against Lacson et al wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate
relation/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders.
While the information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime of murder "in relation to their public office, there is, however,
no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties
as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the
latter while in their custody.
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of R.A. 6770 to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any
public official. However, as we held only two years ago in the case of Aguinaldo v. Domagas,[9] this authority "is not an exclusive authority but rather
a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged."
Sanchez v. Demetriou It must, however, be pointed out that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" (191 SCRA
G.R. No. 111771 – 77; November 9, at 550) is not an exclusive authority but... rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense here charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus,
197
1993 the non-involvement of the office of the Ombudsman in the present case does not have any adverse legal consequence upon the authority of the panel
Cruz, J. of... prosecutors to file and prosecute the information or amended information.
There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the petitioner's office as municipal mayor because public
office is not an essential element of the crime charged. The offense can stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not... even alleged in the
information that the commission of the crime charged was intimately connected with the performance of the petitioner's official functions to make it

fall under the exception laid down in People v. Montejo... follow... the crime of rape with homicide imputed to the petitioner was connected with the
discharge of his functions as municipal mayor or that there is an "intimate connection" between the offense... and his office. It follows that the said
crime, being an ordinary offense, is triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code are within
the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan also has
jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no single doubt
Hannah Serrana v. Sandiganbayan
that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his office.
G.R. No. 162059; January 22,
198
2008
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines is performing functions similar to those of the Board of
Reyes, R.T., J.
Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of such board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls within
the category of public officials upon whom this Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a
position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
CTBERCRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 2012

Sec. 21 provides that the RTC shall have jurisdiction over any violation of the provisions of RA 10175 including any violation committed by a Filipino
Disini v. Secretary of Justice
national regardless of the place of commission. Jurisdiction shall lie if any of the elements was committed within the Philippines or committed with
199 the use of any computer system wholly or partly situated in the country, or when by such commission any damage is caused to a natural or juridical
2014
person who, at the time the offense was committed, was in the Philippines. There shall be designated special cybercrime court manned by specially
Abad, J.
trained judges to handle cybercrime cases.
RULE 110
INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS

It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest" "who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the
decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as
Jimenez v. Sorongon
distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real
200 party in interest, the suit is dismissible.
2012
Brion, J.
Procedural law basically mandates that "all criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of a public prosecutor." In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People,
pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code.
SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION

The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. For complaint
or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense
People v. Valdez was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof
G.R. No. 175602; January 18, allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein
201
2012 recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
Bersamin, J. offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The
requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable
him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
Miguel v. Sandiganbayan In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine the validity of the information/suspension, the court believed that the
202
G.R. No. 172035; July 4, 2012 pleadings filed for and against them achieved the goal of the procedure. The right to due process is satisfied not by just oral arguments but by the filing

Brion, J. and the consideration by the court of the parties’ pleadings, memoranda and other position papers. Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due
process requirement, when an accused public official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against a mandatory
suspension under RA 3019, then an accused would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted. It is well settled that to be heard
does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments
or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists.
Where an offense may be committed in any of the different modes and the offense is alleged to have been committed in two or more modes specified,
People v. Soria the indictment is sufficient, notwithstanding the fact that the different means of committing the same offense are prohibited by separate sections of the
G.R. No. 179032; November 14, statute. The allegation in the information of the various ways of committing the offense should be regarded as a description of only one offense and
12
2012 the information is not thereby rendered defective on the ground of multifariousness. Any objection from the appellant with respect to the Information
Del Castillo, J. is held to have been waived failing any effort to oppose the same before trial. He therefore can be convicted of rape through sexual intercourse or rape
by sexual assault, depending on the evidence adduced during trial. (Appellant is guilty of rape by sexual assault and not through sexual intercourse.)
PLACE WHERE ACTION IS TO BE INSTITUTED

Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also
the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this rule is twofold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-
defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction. Second, laying the
Union Bank v. People venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and
G.R. No. 192565; February 28, other facilities for his defense are available.
203
2012
Brion, J. Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal
action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed
or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.
RULE 111
CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM THE OFFENSE IS DEEMED INSTITUTED

In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising
Solidum v. People
from the offense charged. Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts thereby acted
205 G.R. No. 192123; March 10, 2013
capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion amounting
Bersamin, J.
to lack of jurisdiction.
Castillo v. Salvador The law recognizes 2 kinds of acquittal, one on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of which closes the
206 G.R. No. 191240; July 30, 2014 door to civil liability and the second, based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused which is not exempt from civil liability. The acquittal of
Peralta, J. CA is based on reasonable doubt, hence, Salvador is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
SUSPENSION OF CIVIL ACTION

A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender (1) civil
liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil
liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based on “an
Lim v. Kou Co Ping
obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,” as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract
207 G.R. No. 175256; August 23, 2012
or for tort). It may also be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action by
Del Castillo, J.
specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code (“in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries”). Because of the distinct and independent nature
of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or
cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION

Casupanan v. Laroya Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with
208
G.R. No. 145391; August 26, 2002 the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for

Carpio, J. the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil
case for quasi-delict – without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case.
To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny
him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law. Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan
and Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Samson A civil action for damages and cancellation of trademark cannot be considered a prejudicial question by which to suspend the proceedings in the
G.R. No. 205972; November 9, criminal cases for unfair competition. A prejudicial question is that which arises in a civil case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
209
2016 issues to be determined in the criminal case. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also
Bersamin, J. that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action will necessarily be determinative of the criminal case.
EFFECT OF DEATH ON THE CIVIL ACTION

Pursuant to the doctrine established in People vs. Bayotas, the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability
People v. Romero
as well as the civil liability ex delicto. The criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil
210 G.R. No. 112985; April 21, 1999
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. Corollarily, the claim
Pardo, J.
for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
A prejudial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try
and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Magestrado v. People
Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution
211 G.R. No. 148072; July 10, 2007
of the civil case, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
Chico – Nazario, J.
would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine
the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity "that the civil case be determined first
before taking up the criminal case," therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil
and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after
Pimentel v. Pimentel the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was
G.R. No. 172060; September 13, not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action. Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial
212
2010 question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action.There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both
Carpio, J. pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever
the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and
there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil
J.M. Dominguez v. Liclican
action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the
213 G.R. No. 208587; July 28, 2015
principle is to avoid two conflicting decisions, and its existence rests on the concurrence of two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an
Velasco, Jr., J.
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.

RULE 112
DEFINITION / DESCRIPTION
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that
a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
Fenequito v. Vergara
214 G.R. No. 172829; July 18, 2012 A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not
Peralta, J. be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held
for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.
A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case.13 Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been
Burgundy Realty Corporation v. committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. 0054hat in a preliminary investigation, the public
Reyes prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed,
215 G.R. No. 181021; December 10, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a
2012 judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary
Peralta, J. investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence. Precisely, there is a trial to allow the reception of evidence
for both parties to substantiate their respective claims.
WHO MAY CONDUCT

Abando v. Bayona The conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an executive function. The courts must consider the rules of procedure of the Department of
A.M. No. MTJ – 12 – 1804; July Justice in conducting preliminary investigations whenever the actions of a public prosecutor are put in question. The Department of Justice-National
216
30, 2012 Prosecution Service (DOJ-NPS) Manual states that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor should be attached to the information only as far as
Leonardo – De Castro, J. practicable. Such attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules.
Under the procedure for preliminary investigation provided in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, in case
the investigating prosecutor conducts a hearing where there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or witness, “the parties can be present at
Heirs of Nestor Tria v. Obias the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may be asked
G.R. No. 175887; November 24, to the party or witness concerned.” Hence, Non-referral by the Office of the President (OP) to the Department of Justice (DOJ) of the respondent’s
217
2010 motion for reconsideration is not violative of due process.
Villarama, Jr., J.
This Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation when
necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions
PROCEDURE IN METRO MANILA v. OUTSIDE METRO MANILA

Under Sec. 1 of the same set of rules, it defines the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial
Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in cases falling under the Rules on Summary Procedure, namely:
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2. Violations of the rental law;
Uy v. Javellana
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
A.M. No. MTJ – 07 – 1666;
218 4. Violations of Batas Pambansang BIlang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law);
September 5, 2012
5. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not
exceeding one thousand pesos (PhP 1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability
arising therefrom: Provided, however: That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, this Rule shall govern
where the imposable fine does not exceed ten thousand pesos (PhP 10,000.00).

The cited cases in the administrative complaint deal with malicious mischief, and the same is punished by Art. 328 and 329 of the Revised Penal Code.
Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez were charged with the special cases of malicious mischief under Art.
328, then Art. 329 should apply. If the amounts of the alleged damage to property in both cases were PhP 6,000.00 and PhP 3,000.00 respectively, are
proven, then the appropriate penalty would be arresto mayor, in its medium and maximum periods under Art.329, which would be imprisonment for
two months and one day to six months.
The two cases are clearly governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
INQUEST
A person who is lawfully arrested, without a warrant pursuant to paragraph 1(b), Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court 23 should be delivered to the
People v. Valencia nearest police station and proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. 24 Under said Section 7, Rule 112, 25 the prosecuting officer can
G.R. No. 94511 – 13; September file the Information in court without a preliminary investigation, which was done in the accused-appellant’s case. Since the records do not show whether
219
18, 1992 the accused-appellant asked for a preliminary investigation after the case had been filed in court, as in fact, the accused-appellant signified his readiness
Nocon, J. to be arraigned, 27 the Court can only conclude that he waived his right to have a preliminary investigation, 28 when he did, in fact, pleaded "Not
Guilty" upon his arraignment.
QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
It must be stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of
probable cause and to decide whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, theCourt is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's
action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Graveabuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction. TheOmbudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and grossas
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplationof law. The Court's
PCGG v. Navarro – Gutierrez
pronouncement in Ciron v. Gutierrez is instructive on this matter, to wit:xxx this Court's consistent policy has been to maintain noninterference in the
220 G.R. No. 194159; October 21, 2015
determination of the Ombudsman of theexistence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This observed
policy is basednot only on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsmanbut upon
practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitionsassailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaintsfiled before it, in much the same way that the courts would be
extremely swamped with cases if they could be compelled toreview the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each
time they decide to file aninformation in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
De Lima v. Reyes The Secretary of Justice has the discretion, upon motion or motu proprio, to act on any matter that may cause a probable miscarriage of justice in the
G.R. No. 209330; January 11, conduct of a preliminary investigation. This action may include, but is not limited to, the conduct of a reinvestigation. Furthermore, a petition
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2016 for certiorari under Rule 65 questioning the regularity of preliminary investigation becomes moot after the trial court completes its determination of
Leonen, J. probable cause and issues a warrant of arrest.
RULE 113
WARRANTLESS ARREST
In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense
in the presence of the arresting officer. To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in
Saraum v. People
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
G.R. No. 205472; January 25,
222
2016
The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to search the shanty for objects relating to the crime and seize the drug paraphernalia they found.
Peralta, J.
In the course of their lawful intrusion, they inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia. As these items were plainly visible, the police officers
were justified in seizing them. Considering that Saraum's arrest was legal, the search and seizure that resulted from it were likewise lawful. The various
drug paraphernalia that the police officers found and seized in the shanty are, therefore, admissible in evidence for having proceeded from a valid

search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to sustain the
judgment of conviction.
Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal
arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
Comerciante v. People
223 G.R. No. 205926; July 22, 2015
The balance lies in the concept of "suspiciousness" present where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the
experience of the police officer. Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should
have the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves observe — whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic
criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
Luz v. People Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual
G.R. No. 197788; February 29, restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person's voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of
224 actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on
2012
the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
Sereno, J. submission is necessary.
No crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-
Antiquera v. People mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Consequently, the various drug
G.R. No. 180661; Deecember 11, paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure.
225 Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused.
2013
Abad, J. One final note, the failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
We reiterated in People v. Tampis that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on
arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from
People v. Vasquez questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court's jurisdiction." Be that as it may,
G.R. No. 200304; January 15, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation.
226 His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is
2014
deemed lawful.
Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant
is likewise valid.
RULE 114
The requirement of a bail hearing has been incessantly stressed by this Court. In the same vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be
conversant with the law and the Rules and maintain professional competence; and by the very nature of his office, should be circumspect in the
Zuño v. Cabebe performance of his duties. He must render justice without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. Obviously, respondent failed to live up to these
A.M. OCA No. 03 – 1800 – RTJ; standards.
227
November 26, 2004
Sandoval – Gutierrez, J. It bears reiterating that respondent is being charged with knowingly rendering unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law and partiality. We ruled that
in order to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order, respondent judge must have acted in bad faith, with malice or in willful
disregard of the right of a litigant.
Government of Hong Kong Special If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the
228 Administrative Region v. Olalia Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both
G.R. No. 153675; April 19, 2007 are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the
Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a
motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused.
Any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage; where the
appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or
not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the
exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant's case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the
appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the
Leviste v. CA
demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
229 G.R. No. 189122; March 17, 2010
Corona, J.
On the other hand, if the appellant's case falls within the second scenario, the appellate court's stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be
primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so
because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said
circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound
discretion approach.
While the general rule is, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense,
or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is
placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights,
Enrile v. Sandiganbayan
and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
230 G.R. No. 213847; August 18, 2015
and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized. The decision
Bersamin, J.
whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case.
The strength of the Prosecution’s case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to
the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.
The trial court is thus granted the discretion to determine whether there is strong evidence of guilt on the part of the accused. The trial court may also
deny the application for bail when the accused is a flight risk, notwithstanding the prosecution's evidence on the guilt of the accused.
Napoles v. Sandiganbayan
231 In exercising this discretion, the trial court should receive the parties' evidence at a hearing duly scheduled for this purpose. The prosecution and the
2017
accused are granted reasonable opportunity to prove their respective positions: on the part of the prosecution, that the evidence of guilt against the
Reyes, Jr., J.
accused is strong, and on the part of the defense, the opposite. The hearing is summary and limited to the determination of the weight of evidence for
purposes of granting or denying bail. The denial or refusal must be supported by a summary of the prosecution's evidence.
The requirements of Section 17(a), Rule 114 x x x must be complied with before a judge may grant bail. The Court recognizes that not every judicial
error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases within the
Altobano – Ruiz v. Pichay parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where, however, the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if one does not
A.M. No. MTJ – 17 – 1893; know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
232
February 19, 2018
Peralta, J. Respondent judge undeniably erred in approving the bail and issuing the order of release. He is expected to know that certain requirements ought to be
complied with before he can approve [the accused's] bail and issue an order for his release. The law involved is rudimentary that it leaves little room
for error.

It must be emphasized that rules of procedure have been formulated and promulgated by this Court to ensure the speedy and efficient administration
of justice. Failure to abide by these rules undermines the wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the law. Judges should ensure strict compliance
therewith at all times in their respective jurisdictions.
RULE 115
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, there
must be sufficient showing that the property is under appellant's control or possession. The CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of regulated
drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one. Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when
he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns
the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner
Del Castillo v. People
used the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession.
G.R. No. 185128; January 30,
233
2012
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in the place under his control and dominion
Peralta, J.
and the character of the drugs. With the prosecution's failure to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner's control and dominion, there casts a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the status of the accused
— in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in
judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
RIGHT TO BE HEARD
The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity of the information so that the trial court can have a basis to
either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the
proceedings that impairs its validity. That hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash.
While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the
Miguel v. Sandiganbayan
regularity of the proceedings against him, Luciano likewise emphasizes that no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its conduct. With the purpose of
234 G.R. No. 172035; July 4, 2012
a pre-suspension hearing in mind, the absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a suspension order.
Brion, J.
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused public official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on
his possible defenses against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing
was conducted. It is well settled that "to be heard" does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under
People v. Lara custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun
G.R. No. 199877; August 13, 2012 to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating
235
statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at
Reyes, J.
this stage. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification
in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process. This is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted

from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of
the line-up.
The mere failure of the counsel to observe a modicum of care and vigilance in the protection of the interests of the petitioner as the client — as
manifested in the multiple defects and shortcomings discovered in the petition for review — was gross negligence in any language because the defects
Sanico v. People
were plainly avoidable by the simple application of the relevant guidelines existing in the Rules of Court. If the incompetence of counsel was so great
236 G.R. No. 198753; March 25, 2015
and the error committed as a result was so serious that the client was prejudiced by a denial of his day in court, the litigation ought to be re-opened to
Bersamin, J.
give to the client another chance to present his case. The legitimate interests of the petitioner, particularly the right to have his conviction reviewed by
the RTC as the superior tribunal, should not be sacrificed in the altar of technicalities.
RIGHT AGAINST SELF - INCRIMINATION

The right against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence,
whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a
witness against himself." It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a
witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency
to incriminate him for some crime.
People v. Ayson The right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other
237 G.R. No. 85215; July 7, 1989 time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify
Narvasa, J. altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when
a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of
the constitutional guaranty.
The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness,
the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate
time.
RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL

The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14 (2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. This right requires that
there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays. The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified
Villareal v. People
postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive. In
238 G.R. No. 151258; February 1, 2012
determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the
Sereno, J.
scheduled hearings of the case. The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed. Also to be considered are factors such as the
length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant.
RULE 116
Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should be made in open court by the judge himself or by the clerk of court furnishing the
People v. Estomaca accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses stated therein, then reading the same in the language or dialect that is known
G.R. Nos. 117485 – 86; April 22, to him, and asking him what his plea is to the charge. The requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused understands
239 and knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should be strictly followed by trial courts. This the law affords the accused
1996
by way of implementation of the all-important constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be informed of the precise nature of the
Regalado, J. accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an integral
aspect of the due process clause under the Constitution.

No valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment. Since in Alicando the arraignment of appellant therein was void, the judgment of
conviction rendered against him was likewise void, hence in fairness to him and in justice to the offended party that case was remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings. The case at bar being on all fours with the aforementioned cases on the particular determinant issue, we have perforce
to yield to the same doctrine and disposition.
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the
nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him.
People v. Pangilinan
Appellant's belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural defect was cured when his counsel participated in the trial without raising any
240 G.R. No. 171020; March 14, 2007
objection that his client had yet to be arraigned. In fact, his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His counsel's active participation
in the hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges against him; otherwise, his counsel would have objected and informed the
court of this blunder. Moreover, no protest was made when appellant was subsequently arraigned. The parties did not question the procedure undertaken
by the trial court. It is only now, after being convicted and sentenced to two death sentences, that appellant cries that his constitutional right has been
violated. It is already too late to raise this procedural defect.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject
to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment
in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of the Rules
of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial conference. But it may also be made
Daan v. Sandiganbayan during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the
G.R. Nos. 163972 – 77; March 28, Court has held that it is immaterial that plea bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only
241
2008 after the prosecution already presented several witnesses.
Austria – Martinez, J.
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining may be made, i.e.,
that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, and that the plea of guilt should be to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules however use word may in the second sentence of
Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. Trial
courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed
to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.
As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that "all trial judges . . . must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of
guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty,
he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.”
People v. Janjalani
The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a case involving the death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in
G.R. No. 188314; January 10,
242 order to leave no room for doubt on the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the charge and the consequences of the
2011
plea.
Sereno, J.
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained
the consequences of a "guilty" plea to the accused, as it appears in this case. In People v. Alborida, this Court found that there was still an improvident
plea of guilty, even if the accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had explained the consequences of the guilty plea; that he

understood the explanation of his counsel; that the accused understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to him; and that he had not
been intimidated, bribed, or threatened.
We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy
themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and
consequences of their guilty plea. This requirement is stringent and mandatory.
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient
and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused
but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.
While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the . . . provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to
a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the
trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. We clarify that the suspension of the arraignment should always
be within the limits allowed by law.
ABS – CBN Corporation v. Gozon
243 G.R. No. 195956; March 11, 2015
The trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas' arraignment after the 60-day period from the filing of the
Leonen, J.
Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on March 8, 2005. It was only on September 13, 2010 that the temporary restraining order was
issued by the Court of Appeals. The trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal case during the interim period. It had full control and direction
of the case. As Judge Mogul reasoned in denying the motion to dismiss in Crespo, failure to proceed with the arraignment "disregards the requirements
of due process [and] erodes the Court's independence and integrity.”
The rule requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity to apprise the accused of the crime charged with and to enable the
court to pronounce judgment. The particularity must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what the Information means.
The general function of a bill of particulars, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, is to guard against surprises during trial. It is not the function of
the bill to furnish the accused with the evidence of the prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor shall not be required to include in the bill of particulars matters
of evidence relating to how the people intend to prove the elements of the offense charged or how the people intend to prove any item of factual
information included in the bill of particulars.
Although the application for the bill of particulars is one addressed to the sound discretion of the court it should nonetheless exercise its discretion within
Enrile v. People
the context of the facts and the nature of the crime charged in each case and the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
244 G.R. No. 213455; August 11, 2015
accusation against him.
Brion, J.
The grant or denial of a motion for bill of particulars is discretionary on the court where the Information is filed. As usual in matters of discretion, the
ruling of the trial court will not be reversed unless grave abuse of discretion or a manifestly erroneous order amounting to grave abuse of discretion is
shown.
Grave abuse of discretion refers to the capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that amounts or is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law such as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. For the
extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary, or whimsical exercise of power.

RULE 117
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or
implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or with
my conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction or silence of the accused
to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to.
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a
People v. Lacson
criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may
245 G.R. No. 149453; May 28, 2002
be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or
Callejo, Sr., J.
that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations.
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same
offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary investigation. However, in a case wherein after the
provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have
died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted before an
Information is refiled or a new Information is filed.
Upon filing with the prosecutor for preliminary investigation. Act No. 3326 is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide
their own prescriptive periods. Act 3326 provides:“Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
Panaguitan v. DOJ The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
G.R. No. 167571; November 25, dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.”
246
2008
Tinga, J. It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by
justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule
at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted. “the
term ‘proceedings’ should now be understood either executive or judicial in character”. To rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to
obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.
Grounds for Motion to Dismiss/Quash are limited to those enumerated in Sec. 3, Rule 117 of the RRCP. The elements of the crime under Section 3(g)
of Republic Act No. 3019 are as follows: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
People v. Dumlao government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
247 G.R. No. 168918; March 2, 2009 The ground raised by Dumlao in his Motion to Quash/Dismiss is that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. And after examining the
Chico – Nazario, J. information, we find that the facts alleged therein, if hypothetically admitted, will prove all the elements of Section 3(g) as against respondent Dumlao.
Therefore, the motion to quash should not have been granted. It can also be gathered from the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that it did not consider
the ground invoked by Dumlao (that the facts charged do not constitute an offense); otherwise, it could have denied respondent Dumlao’s motion.
Soriano v. People Indisputably, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information under Section 3(e), Rule 11713 of the 1985 Rules of
G.R. No. 225010; November 21, Criminal Procedure. The Rules prohibit the filing of a duplicitous information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. By duplicity of
248
2018 charges is meant a single complaint or information that charges more than one offense.15 Section 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Tijam, J. Procedure clearly states:

Duplicity of Offense. – A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single
punishment for various offenses. Otherwise stated, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one
offense.
Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the court. In thus resolving a
Cerezo v. People
motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the
249 G.R. No. 185230; June 1, 2011
Secretary of Justice. It is the court’s bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written
Nachura, J.
order disposing of the motion. While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the ruling of the SOJ is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings.The
factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice
Co v. New Prosperity Plastic
caused by such delay. Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in
Products
250 judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
G.R. No. 183994; June 30, 2014
case. “While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive the
Peralta, J.
State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time
are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial.”
People v. De Leon Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the
251 G.R. No. 197546; March 23, 2015 defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
Perez, J. without his express consent.
RULE 118
It violates the doctrine of separation of powers by encroaching upon the rule-making power of the Supreme Court under the constitution. Plea-
bargaining is procedural in nature and it is within the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court. The 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress
to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by Supreme Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.
Estipona v. Lobrigo Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the
252 G.R. No. 226679; August 15, 2017 prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but
Peralta, J. depends on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is
necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is
to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged.
RULE 119
In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following conditions must be present, namely:
Salvanera v. People
1. Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
253 G.R. No. 143093; May 21, 2007
2. The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
Puno, C.J.
3. The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
4. The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and

5. The trial court is satisfied that:

a. There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
b. There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
c. The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
d. Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e. Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness
Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning. Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus
254 G.R. No. 152643; August 28, 2008 required that the conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It is also necessary that the accused be notified, so that
Nachura, J. he can attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that
it be conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.
Jurisprudence has defined “grave abuse of discretion” as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner.To resolve a motion to discharge under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, itonly require
Jimenez v. People
that that the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged be substantially corroborated in its material points, not on all points.A trial judge cannot
255 be expected or required, at the start of the trial, to inform himself with absolute certainty of everything that may develop in the course of the trial with
2012
respect to the guilty participation of the accused. It is still the trial court that determines whether the prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the
Brion, J.
accused-witness’ qualifications to be a state witness satisfies the procedural norms. This relationship is in reality a symbiotic one as the trial court, by
the very nature of its role in the administration of justice, largely exercises its prerogative based on the prosecutor’s findings and evaluation.
Sec. 14(2),Art. III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the
proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and
People v. De Grano (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages
256 G.R. No. 167710; June 5, 2009 of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived.Theaccused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies
Peralta, J. available in the Rules against the judgment. However, within 15 days from promulgation of judgment, the accused may surrender and file a motion for
leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state in his motion the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation, and if he proves that
his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within 15 days from notice.
The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the
Asistio v. People
accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent
257 G.R. No. 200465; April 20, 2015
of the accused. There is no double jeopardy in this case as the dismissal was with the accused-appellee's consent, that is, by moving for the dismissal
Peralta, J.
of the case through a demurrer to evidence he is deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy.
Cabador v. People In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused's right to speedy trial. This denial is characterized by
258 G.R. No. 186001; October 2, 2009 unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault of the accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial. This
Abad, J. was the main thrust of Cabador's motion to dismiss and he had the right to bring this up for a ruling by the trial court.
In People v. Sandiganbayan, this Court explained the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final
and cannot be appealed. The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the
People v. Tan case was dismissed without his express consent. The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr., this Court
259 G.R. No. 167526; July 26, 2010 stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Peralta, J.
This exception is inapplicable to the factual milieu herein. RTC did not abuse its discretion in the manner it conducted the proceedings of the trial, as
well as its grant of respondent’s demurrer to evidence. Thus, the question to be resolved, given the factual molding of herein petition, is "did the RTC
violate petitioner’s right to due process?" Petitioner was given more than ample opportunity to present its case as gleaned from the factual antecedents
which led to the grant of respondent’s demurrer.
Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure concededly mandates commencement of the trial within 30 days from receipt of the pre-trial order
260 Imperial v. Joson and the continuous conduct thereof a period not exceeding 180 days, Section 3 A(1), Rule 119 provides that delays resulting from extraordinary
remedies against interlocutory orders shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence.

G.R. No. 160067 and 171622;
November 17, 2010 In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, moreover, courts are "required to do more than a mathematical computation of the number of
Perez, J. postponements of the schedules hearings of the case" and to give particular regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Viewed in the
context of the above discussed procedural antecedents as well as the further assignment of the case to Prosecutor Baligod as a consequence of Prosecutor
Sia's subsequent transfer to another government office, we find that the CA correctly brushed aside petitioner Francisco's claim that the postponements
of the pre-trial conferences in the case before the Sariaya MTC were violate of this right to a speedy trial.
In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order may not be appealed because this would place the
accused in double jeopardy. Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the
People v. Sandiganbayan Rules of Court.
261 G.R. No. 174504; March 21, 2011
For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as
Del Castillo, J.
where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham thus rendering the assailed judgment void. The
burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power
to dispense justice.
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is
limited to the civil liability. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may
be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The
Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite
G.R. No. 172777; October 19, 2011 the acquittal of the accused. Nowhere in Sally’s petition did she even briefly discuss the civil liability of petitioners. It is apparent that her only desire
162
was to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioners. Because bigamy is a criminal offense, only the OSG is authorized to prosecute
Mendoza, J.
the case on appeal. Thus, Sally Go did not have the requisite legal standing to appeal the acquittal of the petitioners.
Well-established is the rule that the Court cannot review an order granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground by
insufficiency of evidence because to do so will place the accused in double jeopardy.
People v. Jose Go The power of courts to grant demurrer in criminal cases should be exercised with great caution, because not only the rights of the accused — but those
263 G.R. No. 191015; August 6, 2016 of the offended party and the public interest as well — are involved. Once granted, the accused is acquitted and the offended party may be left
with no recourse. Thus, in the resolution of demurrers, judges must act with utmost circumspection and must engage in intelligent deliberation and
Del Castillo, J.
reflection, drawing on their experience, the law and jurisprudence, and delicately evaluating the evidence on hand.
The illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability.
It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial
People v. Pepino had commenced and had been completed, and a judgment of conviction had been rendered against her.
G.R. No. 174471; January 12,
264 Police lineup conducted at the NBI was not suggestive. We note that there were seven people in the lineup; Edward was not compelled to focus his
2016
attention on any specific person or persons. While it might have been ideal if there had been more women included in the lineup instead of only two,
Brion, J. or if there had been a separate lineup for Pepino and for Gomez, the fact alone that there were five males and two females in the lineup did not render
the procedure irregular. There was no evidence that the police had supplied or even suggested to Edward that the appellants were the suspected
perpetrators.
The death of the state witness prior to trial proper will not automatically render his testimony during the discharge proceeding inadmissible. The rule
is explicit that the testimony of the witness during the discharge proceeding will only be inadmissible if the court denies the motion to discharge the
People v. Dominguez accused as a state witness. However, the motion hearing in this case had already concluded and the motion for discharge, approved. Thus, whatever
G.R. No. 229420; February 19, transpired during the hearing is already automatically deemed part of the records of Criminal Case and admissible in evidence pursuant to the rule.
265
2018 Mendiola's testimony was not incomplete, contrary to how Miranda paints it to be. The contents of his lengthy narration were more than sufficient to
Velasco, Jr., J. establish his possession of all the necessary qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court to be
eligible as a state witness. The argument of incompleteness even contradicts respondent Miranda's own position since he does not contest here the
RTC's Order granting Mendiola's motion to be a state witness, only the admissibility of his testimony following his demise.

RULE 120
The remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases. Sec. 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, limits the scope of the remedy of
annulment of judgment to the following: “annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional
Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
Llamas v. CA fault of the petitioner.”
266
2009 The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being questioned was rendered in a criminal case. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Nachura, J. Procedure itself does not permit such recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from the enumeration of the provisions of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure which have suppletory application to criminal cases. Sec. 18, Rule 124 thereof, provides: “the provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56
relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar
as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.”
Although the victim's minority was alleged and established, her relationship with the accused as the latter's daughter was not properly alleged in the
Information, and even though this was proven during trial and not refuted by the accused, it cannot be considered as a special qualifying circumstance
that would serve to increase the penalty of the offender. Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which should be given retroactive effect following
People v. Monteclaros
the rule that statutes governing court proceedings will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage,
267 G.R. No. 181084; June 16, 2009
every Information must state the qualifying and the aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime for them to be considered in the
Puno, C.J.
imposition of the penalty. Since in the case at bar, the Information did not state that Ida is the mother of ABC, this circumstance could not be appreciated
as a special qualifying circumstance. Ida may only be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of simple rape, which is punishable by Reclusion
Perpetua.
There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may
be issued to compel action in those matters, when refused. However, mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
Hipos, Sr., v. Bay particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion
G.R. No. 174813 – 15; March 17, to Withdraw Information can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such
268
2009 Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Information; he had already acted on it by denying the same.
Chico – Nazario, J. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such
Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Information, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the
assailed Order of Judge Bay.
The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the
People v. Lorenzo prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction
269 G.R. No. 184760; April 23, 2010 must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited
Perez, J. drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug must be established
with moral certainty.
There is no direct evidence proving that the appellant conspired and participated in committing the crime. However, his complicity may be proved by
circumstantial evidence, which consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred
People v. Baron
according to reason and common experience. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b)
270 G.R. No. 185209; June 28, 2010
the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt
Del Castillo, J.
beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an
unbroken chain that results to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.
It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove
Abellana v. People
the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission
271 G.R. No. 174654; August 17, 2011
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
Del Castillo, J.
reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action. In other words, the extinction of

the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
People v. Asis We must emphasize that the prosecution cannot appeal a decision in a criminal case whether to reverse an acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed
272 G.R. No. 173089; August 25, 2010 in a conviction because it would place him in double jeopardy. Hence, this petition is dismissible not only on the ground of wrong remedy taken by the
Mendoza, J. petitioner to question an error of judgment but also on the ground that such action places the accused in double jeopardy.
The prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the RPC applies only to those who are convicted by final judgment and are serving sentence which
consists in deprivation of liberty, and that the period for prescription of penalties begins only when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping
Basilonia v. Villaruz during the term of his sentence.
G.R. Nos. 191370 – 71; August 10,
273
2015 Applying existing jurisprudence in this case, the Court, therefore, rules against petitioners. For the longest time, they were never brought to prison or
Peralta, J. placed in confinement despite being sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment. Prescription of penalty of imprisonment does not run in their favor.
Needless to state, respondent trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the motion for execution and in
eventually granting the same.
It is well settled that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which means that the acts material and essential thereto
occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have
been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Stated
differently, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part
Morillo v. People committed. Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be filed in any of the places where any of its elements occurred – in
G.R. No. 198270; December 9, particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.
274
2015
Peralta, J. Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that the court of the place where the check was deposited or presented for
encashment; can be vested with jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of BP 22. Thus, the fact that the check subject of the instant case was
drawn, issued, and delivered in Pampanga does not strip off the Makati MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant case for it is undisputed that the subject
check was deposited and presented for encashment at the Makati Branch of Equitable PC IBank. The MeTC of Makati, therefore, correctly took
cognizance of the instant case and rendered its decision in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.
RULE 121
Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of conviction becomes final when new and material evidence has
been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted
Estino v. People would probably change the judgment. Although the documents offered by petitioners are strictly not newly discovered, it appears to us that petitioners
G.R. Nos. 163957 – 58; April 7, were mistaken in their belief that its production during trial was unnecessary. In their Supplemental Motion and/or Motion for New Trial, they stressed
275
2009 that they no longer presented the evidence of payment of RATA because Balabaran testified that the subject of the charge was the non-payment of
Velasco, Jr., J. benefits under the 1999 budget, without mention of the RATA nor the 1998 re-enacted budget. It seems that they were misled during trial. They were
precluded from presenting pieces of evidence that may prove actual payment of the RATA under the 1998 re-enacted budget because the prosecution’s
evidence was confined to alleged non-payment of RATA under the 1999 budget.
For new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the concurrence of the following conditions must obtain: (a) the evidence must
have been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the
Briones v. People evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) the evidence must affect the merits of the case and produce a
276 G.. No. 158009; June 5, 2009 different result if admitted. In this case, although the firearm surfaced after the trial, the other conditions were not established.
Brion, J.
Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the
court below. The determinative test is the presence of due or reasonable diligence to locate the thing to be used as evidence in the trial. Under the

circumstances, Briones failed to show that he had exerted reasonable diligence to locate the firearm; his allegation in his Omnibus Motion that he told
his brothers and sisters to search for the firearm, which yielded negative results, is purely self-serving. He also now admits having taken the firearm
and having immediately disposed of it at a nearby house, adjacent to the place of the incident. Hence, even before the case went to court, he already
knew the location of the subject firearm, but did not do anything; he did not even declare this knowledge at the trial below.
The Pornelos affidavit, which petitioners claim as newly-discovered, was executed by affiant way back in November 29, 2000, as correctly found by
the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, it cannot be considered as newly found evidence because it was already in existence prior to the re-filing of the case. In
fact, such sworn affidavit was among the documents considered during the preliminary investigation. It was the sole annexed document to petitioners’
Supplement to Motion for Reinvestigation, offered to dispute the charge that no public bidding was conducted prior to the execution of the subject
Saludaga v. Sandiganbayan project.
277 G.R. No. 184537; April 23, 2010
Mendoza, J. The case at bench discloses no evident indication that respondent Sandiganbayan acted with arbitrariness, whim or caprice. It committed no error in
refusing to order the conduct of another preliminary investigation. As sufficiently explained by the prosecution, a new preliminary investigation is not
necessary as there was neither a modification of the nature of the offense charged nor a new allegation. Such conduct of preliminary investigation anew
will only delay the resolution of the case and would be an exercise in futility in as much as there was a complete preliminary investigation actively
participated by both petitioners.
Fortuna seeks the introduction of additional evidence to support the defense argument that there was no positive identification of Abadilla’s killers. To
justify a new trial or setting aside of the judgment of conviction on the basis of such evidence, it must be shown that the evidence was “newly
discovered” pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 121. Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence,
Lumanog v. People
have been discovered before the trial in the court below. Movant failed to show that the defense exerted efforts during the trial to secure testimonies
278 G.R. No. 182555; February 8, 2011
from police officers like Jurado, or other persons involved in the investigation, who questioned or objected to the apprehension of the accused in this
Villarama, Jr., J.
case. Hence, the belatedly executed affidavit of Jurado does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that will justify re-opening of the trial and/or
vacating the judgment. In any case, we have ruled that whatever flaw that may have initially attended the out-of-court identification of the accused, the
same was cured when all the accused-appellants were positively identified by the prosecution eyewitness during the trial.
It must be emphasized that an erroneous admission or rejection of evidence by the trial court is not a ground for a new trial or reversal of the decision
Payumo v. Sandiganbayan if there are other independent evidence to sustain the decision, or if the rejected evidence, if it had been admitted; would not have changed the decision.
G.R. No. 151911 and 154535; July
279
25, 2011 It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to
Mendoza, J. secure it. In this case, however, such records could have been easily obtained by the accused and could have been presented during the trial with the
exercise of reasonable diligence.
RULE 122 - 125
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal of a lower court’s decision or final order direct to the Supreme Court.
Macapagal v. People
However, the questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is not a decision or final order from which an appeal may be taken. The Rules of Court
280 specifically provides that no appeal shall be taken from an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can elevate the matter
2014
through a special civil action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the wrong mode of appeal in this petition under Rule 45 instead of the appropriate
Peralta, J.
remedy of Rule 65, the petition merits an outright dismissal.
At the outset, we draw attention to the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case: the appeal throws the whole case open for review and it is the duty
People v. Morales of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. Prevailing jurisprudence
281 G.R. No. 172873; March 19, 2010 uniformly hold that the trial court’s findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are, as a general rule, entitled to great weight and will not be
Del Castillo, J. disturbed on appeal. However, this rule admits of exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight and substance with direct and material bearing
on the final outcome of the case have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied. After due consideration of the records of this case, evidence

presented and relevant law and jurisprudence, we hold that this case falls under the exception. In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
the following elements must first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti
or the illicit drug as evidence.
As a general rule, factual findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to evaluate the testimonial evidence, are accorded respect by this Court.
People v. Quidet
But where the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which can affect the result of
282 G.R. No. 170289; April 8, 2010
the case, this Court is duty-bound to correct this palpable error for the right to liberty, which stands second only to life in the hierarchy of constitutional
Del Castillo, J.
rights, cannot be lightly taken away.
An error in designating the appellate court is not fatal to the appeal. However, the correction in designating the proper appellate court should be made
Balaba v. People
within the 15-day period to appeal. Once made within the said period, the designation of the correct appellate court may be allowed even if the records
283 G.R. No. 169519; July 17, 2009
of the case are forwarded to the CA. Otherwise, the second paragraph of Sec. 2, Rule 50 would apply. It reads: “An appeal erroneously taken to the
Carpio, J.
CA shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.”
Trial courts are mandated not only to look at the direct examination of witnesses but to the totality of evidence before them. In every case, the court
should review, assess and weigh the totality of the evidence presented by the parties. It should not confine itself to oral testimony during the trial. We
cannot convict appellants for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide when the evidence relied upon by the trial court is plainly erroneous
and inadequate to prove appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty, whether it proceeds from
direct or circumstantial evidence. In view of the foregoing, acquittal of the accused-appellants is in order. One final note. The other accused, Joey
People v. Oliva
Zafra, who is identically circumstanced as the other appellants and who was likewise convicted on the same evidence, does not appear to have perfected
284 G.R. No. 177768; July 27, 2009
an appeal from the trial court’s judgment. The record does not show the reason therefor. Be that as it may, the present rule is that an appeal taken by
Quisumbing, J.
one or more several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable
to the latter. Our pronouncements here with respect to the insufficiency of the prosecution evidence to convict appellants beyond reasonable doubt are
definitely favorable and applicable to accused Joey Zafra. He should not therefore be treated as the odd man out and should benefit from the acquittal
of his co-accused. In fact, under similar conditions and on the same ratiocination, Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court has justified the
extension of our judgment of acquittal to the co-accused who failed to appeal from the judgment of the trial court which we subsequently reversed.
As a general rule, the statutory requirement that when no motion for reconsideration is filed within the reglementary period, the decision attains finality
and becomes executory in due course must be strictly enforced as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly
discharge of judicial business. The purposes for such statutory requirement are twofold: first, to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus,
procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and, second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors,
which are precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense
Guasch v. Dela Cruz
for an indefinite period of time.
285 G.R. No. 176015; June 16, 2009
Puno, C.J.
However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving of due course to an appeal by suspending the
enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of procedure. Certain elements are considered for the appeal to be given due course, such as: (1) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not
be unduly prejudiced thereby.
An accused is required to be present before the trial court at the promulgation of the judgment in a criminal case. If the accused fails to appear before
the trial court, promulgation of judgment shall be made in accordance with Rule 120, Section 6, paragraphs 4 and 5. If the judgment is for conviction
People v. Taruc
and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the
286 court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave
2009
of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a
justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.

The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement,
jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal
Once an accused escape from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders
or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. It is indisputable that accused-appellant
herein, by escaping from jail, was not present at the promulgation by the RTC of its Decision dated 29 June 2005 in Criminal Case No. 8010, finding
him guilty of the crime of murder. Accused-appellant failed to surrender and file the required motion within 15 days from the promulgation of the RTC
Decision. This alone already deprived him of any remedy against said judgment of conviction available under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
including the right to appeal the same. The foregoing notwithstanding, the escape of the accused-appellant did not preclude the Court of Appeals from
exercising its review jurisdiction, considering that what was involved was capital punishment. Automatic review being mandatory, it is not only a
power of the court but a duty to review all death penalty cases.
On the issue of double jeopardy, the Court ruled that the elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted
or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.
Tiu v. People These elements are present here: (1) the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 96-413 against Postanes was sufficient in form and substance to sustain
287 G.R. No. 162370; April 21, 2009 a conviction; (2) the MeTC had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 96-413; (3) Postanes was arraigned and entered a non-guilty plea; and (4) the
Carpio, J. MeTC dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-413 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence amounting to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had.
Clearly, for this Court to grant the petition and order the MeTC to reconsider its decision, just what the RTC ordered the MeTC to do, is to transgress
the Constitutional proscription not to put any person "twice x x x in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. "Further, as found by the Court of
Appeals, there is no showing that the prosecution or the State was denied of due process resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MeTC,
which would have allowed an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal of the criminal case.
Colinares v. People Ordinarily, an accused would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for
G.R. N. 182742; December 13, frustrated homicide. But in this case the Supreme Court ruled to set aside the judgment of the RTC and found him only liable for attempted homicide,
288
2011 if the Supreme Court follows the established rule that no accused can apply for probation on appeal, the accused would suffer from the erroneous
Abad, J. judgment of the RTC with no fault of his own, therefore defying fairness and equity.
Only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case, especially if the relief being sought is the correction or review of the judgment
therein. This rule was instituted in order to give life to the constitutional edict against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. It is beyond contention that the accused would be exposed to double jeopardy if the state appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an
acquittal or even to increase criminal liability. Thus, the accused’s waiver of the right to appeal – as when applying for probation – makes the criminal
judgment immediately final and executory.
Villareal v. People
289 Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the
2014
defendant’s guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a process where the government’s power and resources are
Sereno, C.J. once again employed against the defendant’s individual means. That the second opportunity comes via an appeal does not make the effects any less
prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and conscience.
It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments.
We have already explained in our Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state
assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued the criminal judgment.
An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher court authority. The right to appeal is neither a natural
Dungo v. People
right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
290 G.R. No. 209464; July 1, 2015
of law.
Mendoza, J.

Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03, dated October 15, 2004, governs the procedure
on the appeal from the CA to the Court when the penalty imposed is either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.31 According to the said provision,
"[i]n cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing
such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals."
Indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale of marijuana, a prohibited drug, is the submission of proof that the sale of the illicit drug took
place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The element of sale must
be unequivocally established in order to sustain a conviction. In this case, the trial court correctly held that the prosecution failed to establish, much
less adduce proof, that accused was indeed guilty of the offense of illegal sale of marijuana. But it is beyond doubt that he was found in possession of
the same. While no conviction for the unlawful sale of prohibited drugs may be had under the present circumstances, the established principle is that
Manansala v. People possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in possession of another quantity of the prohibited
291 G.R. No. 175939; April 3, 2019 drugs not covered by or included in the sale and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller. In this case, it has been
Bersamin, J. satisfactorily ascertained that the bricks of marijuana confiscated from accused were the same prohibited drugs subject of the original Information. In
this light, we find that the court a quo committed no reversible error in convicting the accused- appellant of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under
Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. Again, it should be stressed that the crime of unlawful sale of marijuana
penalized under Section 4 of R.A. 6425 necessarily includes the crime of unlawful possession thereof. As borne by the records, it has been sufficiently
proven beyond any doubt that the lawful search conducted at the house of the accused yielded a total of 764.045 grams marijuana dried leaves as
verified by the PNP Forensic Chemist.
RULE 126
At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active
participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby
curing any defect in his arrest. An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal
of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
A settled exception to the right guaranteed by the above-stated provision is that of an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not
require a previously issued warrant. For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be present:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Miclat v. People
292 G.R. No. 176077; August 31, 2011
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
Peralta, J.
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and
may be introduced in evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of
the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject
to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the
area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to
eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
People v. Mariacos Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be
293
G.R. No. 188611; June 16, 2010 made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause. With regard to the search of moving

Nachura, J. vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause.
When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a
crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer
effecting the arrest or seizure must have been impelled to do so because of probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must be satisfied
before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. Without probable cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against
the person arrested.
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion
294 People v. Tuan of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the case at bar, the
address and description of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific enough. There was only one house located at the stated address,
which was accused-appellant's residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and composed of several rooms.
What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband concealed about him. Such a "stop-and-frisk" practice
Esquillo v. People
serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may,
295 G.R. No. 182010; August 25, 2010
under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if
warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. In this case, the Court opts to take cognizance of
the petition, as it involves the application of the rules promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making power under the Constitution.
Spouses Marimla v. People
It may be seen that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act
296 G.R. No. 158467; October 16, 2009
on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms on application
filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF. On the other hand, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the
application for search warrant shall be filed with: (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed, and (b) for compelling
reasons, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within
the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
The trial court held that the issuance of a search warrant against the premises of different persons named therein is valid as there is no requirement that
only one search warrant for one premise to be searched is necessary for its validity. Also, the address of the accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia
People v. Punzalan Punzalan was clearly and adequately described. A sketch that specifically identifies the places to be searched was attached to the records and such
G.R. No. 199087; November 11, description of the place was unquestionably accurate that the PDEA agents were led to, and were able to successfully conduct their operation in the
297
2015 premises described in the search warrant. The trial court also ruled that the implementation of the search warrant sufficiently complied with the
Villarama, Jr., J. requirements of the law. Despite accused-appellants' assertion that they were arrested outside their house and were made to board a van parked along
the street beside the river and were not allowed by the PDEA agents to witness the search conducted inside the house, the trial court was convinced
that accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan were in fact inside their house and were physically present during the conduct of the search.


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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1

Atty. Henedino M. Brondial

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COURT OF TAX APPEALS

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ACTIONS INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION

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JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION

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PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

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DISTINCTION BETWEEN JURISDICTION AND VENUE

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EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

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Manotoc v. CA 2. Specific Details in the Return

3. A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

4. A Competent Person in Charge

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JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

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THE REMEDIES AGAINST FINAL JUDGMENTS

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EFFECT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT

EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL

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CTBERCRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 2012

INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS