Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Same; Same; Same; Public Office; University of the Philippines (U.P.); Words and
Phrases; A University of the Philippines (UP) Student Regent is a public
officer; A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law,
by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions
of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public.—Petitioner also
contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or
remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that
We will be called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman, 495 SCRA 452 (2006), We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the
definition of a public officer. The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public
officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes
and jurisprudence. In Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231 (1984), the Court
held that: A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by
law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of
the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public
([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under
our political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all
only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and
conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or
an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am.
Jur. 881).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is not only the salary grade that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan—the Sandiganbayan also has
jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606.—Petitioner claims that
she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-
paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade
that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan
also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v.
People, 451 SCRA 187 (2005), We held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers
only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically
includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and
higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the
said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is
placed there by express provision of law. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly
vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board
of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is,
indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
DUNCANO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Those that fall within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive branch with
Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically enumerated in
Section 4(A)(1)(a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades.—Those that fall
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the
executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically
enumerated in Section 4(A)(1)(a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades. While the
first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials of the executive branch with Salary
Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials
whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express
provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan
to devote its time and expertise to big-time cases involving the so-called “big fishes” in
the government rather than those accused who are of limited means who stand trial
for “petty crimes,” the so-called “small fry,” which, in turn, helps the court decongest
its dockets.—The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time
and expertise to big-time cases involving the so-called “big fishes” in the government
rather than those accused who are of limited means who stand trial for “petty
crimes,” the so-called “small fry,” which, in turn, helps the court decongest its
dockets. Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions
enumerated by the law. In this category, it is the position held, not the salary grade,
which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The specific inclusion
constitutes an exception to the general qualification relating to “officials of the
executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; No other trial court was mentioned in Republic Act
(RA) No. 9165 as having the authority to take cognizance of drug-related cases. Thus,
in Morales v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 282 (1997), the Supreme Court (SC)
categorically named the Regional Trial Court (RTC) as the court with jurisdiction
over drug-related cases.—Notably, no other trial court was mentioned in RA
9165 as having the authority to take cognizance of drug-related cases. Thus,
in Morales v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 282 (1997), this Court categorically named
the RTC as the court with jurisdiction over drug-related cases, as follows: Applying
by analogy the ruling in People v. Simon, People v. De Lara, People v. Santos,
and Ordoñez v. Vinarao, the imposable penalty in this case which involves 0.4587
grams of shabu should not exceed prisión correccional. We say by analogy because
these cases involved marijuana, not methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). In
Section 20 of RA No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the maximum
quantities of marijuana and methamphetamine hydrochloride for purposes of
imposing the maximum penalties are not the same. For the latter, if the quantity
involved is 200 grams or more, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from P500,000 to P10 million shall be imposed. Accordingly, if the quantity
involved is below 200 grams, the imposable penalties should be as follows: x x x x
Clearly, the penalty which may be imposed for the offense charged in Criminal Case
No. 96-8443 would at most be only prisión correccional duration is from six (6)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Does it follow then that, as the
petitioner insists, the RTC has no jurisdiction thereon in view of the
amendment of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, which vested
upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of
the amount of fine and regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties? This Section 32 as thus amended now reads: x x x x The exception in the
opening sentence is of special significance which we cannot disregard. x x x The
aforementioned exception refers not only to Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for
the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases, but also to other laws
which specifically lodge in Regional Trial Courts exclusive jurisdiction
over specific criminal cases, e.g., (a) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A Nos. 1289 and 4363 on written defamation or libel; (b) Decree on
Intellectual Property (P.D. No. 49, as amended), which vests upon Courts of First
Instance exclusive jurisdiction over the cases therein mentioned regardless of the
imposable penalty and (c) more appropriately for the case at bar, Section 39 of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended by P.D. No. 44, which vests on Courts of First Instance,
Circuit Criminal Courts, and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts
concurrent exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving violations of said
Act.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction to hear
drug-related cases. Even Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606, as
amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 10660, touted by the petitioner and the dissents as
a catch-all provision, does not operate to strip the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) of its
exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA No. 9165.—It should occasion no
surprise, therefore, that the Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction to hear drug-
related cases. Even Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, touted by the
petitioner and the dissents as a catch-all provision, does not operate to strip the
RTCs of its exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165. As pointed out
by Justices Tijam and Martires, a perusal of the drugs law will reveal that public
officials were never considered excluded from its scope. Hence, Section 27 of RA 9165
punishes government officials found to have benefited from the trafficking of
dangerous drugs, while Section 28 of the law imposes the maximum penalty on such
government officials and employees.