NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Office of Research and Engineering

Materials Laboratory Division
Washington, D.C. 20594

January 25, 2009

MATERIALS LABORATORY FACTUAL REPORT Report No. 09-103F

A. ACCIDENT

Place : Tallahassee, Florida

Date : 2/28/2009
Vehicle : Bombardier, CRJ-200
NTSB No. : DCA09FA033
Investigator : Bob Benzon

B. GROUP MEMBERS

Joseph Panagiotou NTSB

Steve Magladry NTSB
Elaine M. Summers TSB
Paul Jones Transport Canada
Patrice Piche Bombardier
Kyle Gute ASA
Reginald Johnson ASA
Bob Hendrickson FAA

C. COMPONENTS EXAMINED

• JB-1 junction box and its internal components

• Fluorescent light strip from observer’s oxygen mask stowage box

D. DETAILS OF THE EXAMINATION

JB-1 Junction Box

The JB-1 junction box (figures 1, 2, 3) was recovered from the accident aircraft in the area directly
below the fuselage burnthrough. The wardrobe unit in the flight attendant’s station had to be removed to
reveal this junction box. This junction box consisted of three separate compartments vertically arranged
(figure 4). The junction box case was constructed out of aluminum and the front cover of each of the
compartments was constructed from a fiberglass composite material. The fire damage to the JB-1 unit
was mostly concentrated in the upper compartment, which was associated with the AC external power
and the APU power. This compartment was heavily fire damaged and was missing large portions of the
aluminum case and its entire front cover (figure 1). The lower two compartments of the JB-1 unit
sustained thermal damage and sooting from the outside inwards indicating that a failure had not
originated from within either of the two lower compartments. The top compartment of the junction box
was slowly disassembled to examine the condition of the internal components and external connector
studs for evidence of a failure or an anomaly that may have precipitated the fire.
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The portion of the junction box case surrounding the terminal connector studs for the external
AC service was missing (figure 5). Some of the missing case material had melted and deflected out of
position. Of the three terminal connector studs, the one belonging to terminal A was found with the
outer nut loose. This loose connection was examined for evidence of overheating or arcing. No evidence
of an anomaly was observed and after disassembly of the connector the components had the same
appearance as the components of the other two connector studs (B, C) that were not found loose.

Top compartment

Figure 1: Forward view of JB-1 (as received) with ventilated cover in place

APU Terminal T1

Figure 2: Side view of JB-1 (as received) and location of APU terminal T1
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Figure 3: Back view of JB-1 (as received)

Top compartment

Buss bar connected to

APU terminal T1

Figure 4: Exemplar JB-1 junction box with cover removed

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Terminal C

Terminal B

Terminal A

Loose nut

Figure 5: External AC service terminal studs

Below the external AC connector studs, were the three APU input connector studs. These three studs
were connected to copper buss bars inside the junction box that lead to the contactors in the top
compartment. The buss bar connected to terminal stud T1 (see figures 2 & 4) appeared to have localized
melting along one side of the periphery of its connection to the terminal stud (figure 6). Disassembly of
the terminal stud revealed that the stud, washers, lock washers, and nuts had not melted but were
oxidized. Close examination of the melted portion of the buss bar revealed small circular craters
consistent with out-gassing of the copper while at its incipient melting temperature (figure 7). No
evidence of material transfer such as small beads of metal was observed in the area of melting such as
would be expected if the damage had occurred due to electrical arcing. The other terminal studs and bus
bars connected to the T2 and T3 terminals did not exhibit the same melting. No other areas of similar
damage were observed on any other bus bars within the rest of the JB-1 unit.
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Figure 6: APU terminal T1

Figure 7: APU terminal T1 exhibiting small craters due to out gassing

Inside the top compartment of the junction box were two contactors, K1XB and K3XB (figure 8). Both
had sustained extensive thermal damage. The contactors were disassembled to examine the interior
components. Although the internal components exhibited severe thermal damage, the contacts did not
appear to be stuck of have signs of melting or excessive pitting. A portion of the case enclosing the
internal components of the K1XB contactor appeared to have sustained more thermal damage on the
inside surface (figure 9) than on the outside (figure 10). This damage consisted of a portion of the case
having melted and was surrounded by an area that appeared to have reached its incipient melting
temperature. The internal surface of the case had a larger area of incipient melting that the external
surface.
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K3XB

K1XB

Figure 8: contactors in top compartment of JB-1

Figure 9: K1BX contactor case (interior)

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Figure 10: K1XB contactor case (exterior)

The three AC service bus connectors on the exterior of the JB-1 junction box were connected to heavy
gauge cables. The three cables were insulated with color coded (white, orange, blue) insulation to
differentiate them. Torque measurements on connector studs from AC service bus connectors:

(WHITE) Outboard nut required 7 in-lb of torque to loosen

(WHITE) Inboard nut required 17 in-lb of torque to loosen
(ORANGE) Outboard nut required 4.5 in-lb of torque to loosen
(ORANGE) Inboard nut required 16.5 in-lb of torque to loosen
(BLUE) Outboard nut required 3.5 in-lb of torque to loosen
(BLUE) Inboard nut required 18 in-lb of torque to loosen

Outboard nut refers to the nut on the portion of the connector stud on the exterior of the junction box.
Inboard nut refers to the nut on the portion of the connector stud on the interior of the junction box.

The AC service bus connector studs were disassembled to examine the condition of the hardware. The
stack up of the hardware on the stud connectors was the following: Nut, lock-washer, flat-washer, lug,
nut, lock-washer, flat-washer (figure 11). Below the last washer there would have been a phenolic
material that was consumed by the fire.
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Figure 11: Hardware stack up on stud connector

BLUE cable connector stud:

After disassembly both lock washers of the connector hardware stack up were found flat and no
longer spring like. After removal of the outer nut and the lock-washer, the flat-washer, lug, nut and
lock-washer were stuck to each other. The bottom flat-washer was not stuck to the other
components. A tool had to be used to pry these components apart. All of these components had
sustained thermal damage and had oxidation on their surfaces. No evidence of melting or arcing was
observed.

ORANGE cable connector stud:

The outer nut and lock washer came off the stack up individually and were not stuck to other
components. The flat-washer, lug, nut and lock-washer were stuck to each other in a similar manner
as was observed on the BLUE cable connector stud. The bottom flat washer was not stuck to the
other components. Both of the lock washers were flat and no longer spring like. No evidence of
melting or arcing was observed.

WHITE cable connector stud:

This connector stud appeared to be less thermally damaged than the previous two. This was
evidenced by the appearance of less overall oxidation on the hardware stack up of the stud
connector. The outer nut and lock-washer came off individually and were not stuck to the other
components. The flat-washer, lug, nut, lock-washer and flat-washer were all stuck to each other. The
bottom flat washer came loose from the rest of the stuck component with minimal force. No
evidence of melting or arcing was observed.
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Light strip surrounding observer oxygen mask box

The purpose of the light strip (figure 12) was to illuminate the location of the observer’s supplemental
oxygen mask stowage box. The light strip was found to have a kink along a portion of its perimeter
(figure 13). The area in which the kink was observed had also sustained thermal damage resulting in
charring of the light strip. The char layer was removed and no evidence of melting or electrical arcing
was found. The wiring providing power to the light strip was missing most of its insulation; with small
charred remnants of insulation still adhering to certain areas of the wire’s surface. The only portion of
the wiring that retained its insulation was the last 6 inches just before the light strip. The wiring did not
exhibit any evidence of arcing. A resistance measurement taken between its two power leads registered
a reading of 0.3 Ohm. This is the same reading that registered when the two probes of the Ohmmeter
were in contact with each other.

Figure 12: Light strip surrounding observer’s oxygen mask stowage box
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Kink followed by charred
portion of light strip

Figure 13: kink and charred portion of light strip

Additional components had been collected during the course of the on scene investigation as listed in the
Fire Investigation Factual Report. These components were deemed not to be able to add pertinent
information to the investigation and were not examined as part of the Materials Laboratory report.

Joseph Panagiotou
Fire & Explosion Investigator