VERGARA, LORENZO WILFREDO V.

[G.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990.]

LUZ FARMS, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent.

Facts:
On 10 June 1988, RA 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, was
approved by the President of the Philippines, which includes, among others, the raising of livestock,
poultry and swine in its coverage. Petitioner Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and
poultry business, avers that it would be adversely affected by the enforcement of sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16
(d), 17 and 32 of the said law. Hence, it prayed that the said law be declared unconstitutional. The
mentioned sections of the law provies, among others, the product-sharing plan, including those engaged
in livestock and poultry business.

Luz Farms further argued that livestock or poultry raising is not similar with crop or tree farming. That
the land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than 5% of the total
investments of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. That the land is incidental but not the principal
factor or consideration in their industry. Hence, it argued that it should not be included in the coverage of
RA 6657 which covers “agricultural lands.

Issue:
Whether or not Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988) is unconstitutional.

Held:
Yes. Under Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution “The State shall, by law, undertake an
agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to
own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share
of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may
prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the
payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing”. The court however
found the law ambiguous, which led to construing the transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural”. The committee found that Section II of
R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine
raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial
activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason
to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.

Court found that there is merit in the petition and do hereby declaring Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of
R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as
well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby
DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional

[G.R. No. 93045. June 29, 1992.]

THE TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF DR. JOSE SISON, Represented FERNANDO
CAYABYAB, Petitioners, v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS; SECRETARY PHILIP ELLA
VERGARA, LORENZO WILFREDO V.

JUICO of the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, AND THE HEIRS OF DR. JOSE
SISON, Represented by MANUEL SISON, Respondents.

Facts:
Pursuant to the Operation Land Transfer Program of the Government under Presidential Decree No. 27,
certificates of land transfer were issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to the petitioners, tenants of
the Estate of Dr. Jose Sison, for their respective areas of cultivation. Upon discovering that certificates of
land transfer were being issued to the petitioners, the heirs of Dr. Sison protested to the then Minister of
Agrarian Reform, Conrado Estrella, who ordered that the certificates of land transfer be marked,
"UNDER PROTEST.

After ordering a reinvestigation of the landholdings of the individual heirs, the present Secretary Juico
issued an order modifying the orders of his predecessors. He ruled that the ricelands of Consuelo S.
Nazareno and Peter Sison are exempt from the Operation Land Transfer and that Elisa S. Reyes, Renato
Sison, Jose Sison, Josefina S. Zulueta and Jaime Sison, are entitled to retain not more than seven (7)
hectares of their ricelands, since they are not owners of more than seven (7) hectares of other lands, and
that Alfredo Sison and Manuel Sison are not entitled to retention or exemption of their ricelands from the
Operation Land Transfer because they each own more than seven (7) hectares of other agricultural land.

Petitioner sought relief in the CA but dismissed their petition for Certiorari, hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Heirs of Sison are disqualified by law to be granted the same under the provisions of
P.D. 27, in relation to LOI 474, which grant such retentions or exemptions only "if such landowner is
cultivating such area or will now cultivate it"

Held:
No. There is no merit in the petitioners’ contention that the Heirs of Dr. Sison are disqualified to retain
their shares of the agricultural lands of the estate for failure to comply with the requirements that "such
landowner is cultivating such area, or will now cultivate it" (p. 23, Rollo). The Secretary interpreted that
provision to mean "that the tenants in the exempted and retained riceland areas of the concerned Heirs of
Sison, shall remain as agricultural lessees therein. Which means, that while ownership of the exempted
and retained riceland areas shall pertain to the concerned Heirs of Sison, the petitioners-tenant, as
agricultural lessees, shall remain as such and cultivate the same. The concerned Heirs of Sison therefore,
do not have to cultivate the retained and exempted areas, unless the petitioners, as agricultural lessees,
would voluntarily relinquish the task of cultivation and vacate and surrender the said areas to the Heirs"
(p. 23, Rollo; Emphasis ours).

Respect should be accorded to the Secretary’s construction of the law which his department administers
and implements (Asturias Sugar Central Inc. v. Com. of Customs, 29 SCRA 617; Atlas Consolidated
Mining and Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 166; Sierra Madre Trust v. Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, 121 SCRA 384).

Hence, personal cultivation by the Heirs of Sison is not a mandatory precondition for them to be entitled
to their retention right.
VERGARA, LORENZO WILFREDO V.

[G.R. No. L-29381 September 30, 1969]

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and PANTALEON BINGABING, petitioners,
vs.HON. VALERIANO A. DEL VALLE, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Court of Agrarian
Relations and PAMPILO DOLTZ, respondents

Facts:
PNR, a government-owned corporation, is the registered owner of three (3) strips of land with a uniform
width of 30. meters adjoining one another longitudinally, the same being part of its railroad right of way
running from Manila to Legazpi. Sometime in 1963, PNR awarded the portions of the three strips of land
aforementioned to petitioner Pantaleon Bingabing for a period of three (3) years.

Sometime in March 1965, PNR and Bingabing filed suit against Doltz for recovery of possession of the
premises in the Court of First Instance of Albay. Doltz' answer in that case averred inter alia that the had
been a tenant on the property for over twenty years; that he had been placed thereon by the deceased
Pablo Gomba who leased the property from the then Manila Railroad Company (now PNR)

While the aforesaid Civil Case 3021 was pending in the Albay court of first instance, Doltz registered
with the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) a petition against Bingabing for security of tenure, the
adoption of a sharing ratio of 70-30 of the crops, and reliquidation of past harvests.

CAR promulgated its decision of June 10, 1968 gand maintained Doltz in the peaceful possession of the
parcels of land as tenant.

Issue:
Is the land here involved in agricultural land within the meaning of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the
Agricultural Land Reform Code?

Held:
No. The term "agricultural land" as understood by the Agricultural Land Reform Code is not as broad in
meaning as it is known in the constitutional sense. As interpreted in Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79
Phil. 461, 471, the phrase "agricultural land," constitutionally speaking, includes all lands that are neither
mineral nor timber lands and embraces within it wide sweep not only lands strictly agricultural or devoted
to cultivation for agricultural purposes but also commercial, industrial, residential lands and lands for
other purposes. On the other hand, by Section 166(1) of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, "
"[a]gricultural land" means land devoted to any growth including but not limited to crop lands, salt beds,
fishponds, idle land and abandoned land as defined in paragraphs 18 and 19 of this section, respectively.

The land here in controversy does not fit into the concept of agricultural land. PNR cannot devote it to
agriculture because by its own charter, Republic Act 4156, PNR cannot engage in agriculture.

Indeed, the land — which adjoins the railroad track on both sides — is part of PNR's right of way. That
right of way is not limited to the particular space occupied by the roadbed or its main track. It also
includes the portions occupied by the telephone and telegraph posts. It extends to a width of 30 meters
which reasonably gives the train locomotive engineer a clear commanding view of the track and its
switches ahead of him.

[G.R. No. L-630   November 15, 1947]

ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant, vs.THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF
MANILA, respondent and appellee

Facts:
VERGARA, LORENZO WILFREDO V.

Petitioner Alexander Krivenko, a Russian citizen, bought a residential land in Manila. He was unable to
register said land due to the declaration of war by Japan. Later on in May 1945, he again sought the
registration of the same land but the herein respondent, Register of Deeds, denied the application because
as an alien, Krivenko was disqualified to own land pursuant to the laws of the Philippine jurisdiction.
Krivenko brought the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila which sustained the refusal of the
Register of Deeds of Manila. He then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land

Held:
No. The Court held that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands,
including residential lands.

Sec. 1, Art 13 of the Constitution talks about the conservation and utilization of natural resources. The
said provision embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain. Its purpose is to establish a permanent
and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the nation.
Although it mentions agricultural, timber, and mineral lands, the court held that in determining whether a
parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its
susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes. Hence, “public agricultural land” was construed as
referring to those lands that were not timber or mineral. Therefore, it includes residential lands.

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may
leak into aliens’ hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to
aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the
hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to insure the policy of
nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the
same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the
prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified “to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.” And the subject matter of both sections is
the same, namely, the non-transferability of “agricultural land” to aliens. Since “agricultural land” under
section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning should be attached to “agricultural land
under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction that “a word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear
the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears.” (II Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between “agricultural land” under section 5, is that the former
is public and the latter private. But such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The
lands are the same in both sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony, what is important
is the nature or class of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its citizens.

[G.R. No. 123417. June 10, 1999]

JAIME MORTA, SR. and PURIFICACION PADILLA, Petitioners, vs. JAIME OCCIDENTAL,
ATTY. MARIANO BARANDA, JR., and DANIEL CORRAL, Respondents

Facts:
On January 10 and 21, 1994,3 petitioners Jaime Morta, Sr. and Purificacion Padilla filed two (2) cases4
for damages with preliminary injunction, with the Municipal Trial Court, Guinobatan, Albay, against
respondents Jaime Occidental, Atty. Mariano Baranda, Jr. and Daniel Corral for damages. Respondents
claimed that petitioners were not the owners of the land in question. They alleged that the torrens titles of
the land indicated a certain Gil Opiana as the registered owner. Respondents stated that there was no
annotation on the titles establishing petitioners' right over the land.
VERGARA, LORENZO WILFREDO V.

Municipal Trial Court rendered decision5 in favor of petitioners. It held that petitioners had been in
actual, continuous, open and adverse possession of the land in question for forty-five (45) years. On
appeal, RTC questioned the trial court's jurisdiction contending that the case was cognizable by the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB), to which the CA affirmed.

Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the present cases are not tenancy-related, and, hence, are properly cognizable by the trial
court, not the DARAB.

Held:
Yes. In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals,17 we held that the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian
Reforms is limited to the following: (a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian
reform; (b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land-tenure related problems; and (c) approval and
disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential,
commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses. The regional trial court relied on the findings in
DARAB Case No. 2413 that Josefina Opiana-Baraclan appears to be the lawful owner of the land and
Jaime Occidental was her recognized tenant. However, petitioner Morta claimed that he is the owner of
the land. Thus, there is even a dispute as to who is the rightful owner of the land, Josefina Opiana-
Baraclan or petitioner Morta. The issue of ownership cannot be settled by the DARAB since it is
definitely outside its jurisdiction. Whatever findings made by the DARAB regarding the ownership of the
land are not conclusive to settle the matter. The issue of ownership shall be resolved in a separate
proceeding before the appropriate trial court between the claimants thereof.
17

[GR No. 9864 December 03, 1990]

Vda. de Tangub vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres, now deceased, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte
in March, 1988, "an agrarian case for damages by reason of the(ir) unlawful dispossession . . .was tenants from
the landholding" owned by the Spouses Domingo and Eugenia Martil. Several persons were also impleaded as
defendants, including the Philippine National Bank, it being alleged by the plaintiff spouses that said bank,
holder of a mortgage on the land involved, had caused foreclosure thereof, resulting in the acquisition of the
property by the bank as the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, and in the sale by the latter, some time later, of
portions of the land to the other persons named as its co-defendants (all employees of the National Steel
Corporation), and it being prayed that mortgage and the transactions thereafter made in relation thereto be
annulled and voided.

In an Order rendered on August 24, 1988, respondent Judge Felipe G. Javier, Jr. dismissed the complaint. He
opined that by virtue of Executive Order No. 229 "providing the mechanisms for the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program approved on July 24, 1987" — Executive No. 129-A approved on
July 26,1987, as well as the Rules of the Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform, jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court over agrarian cases had been transferred to the Department of Agrarian Reform.

Court of Appeals upheld decision of Trial Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City was correct in dismissing Agrarian Case No. 1094.

Held:
Yes. RA 6657 echoes the provisions of Section 17 of Presidential Decree No. 229, supra, investing the
Department of Agrarian Reform with original jurisdiction, generally, over all cases involving agrarian laws,
although, as shall shortly be pointed out, it restores to the Regional Trial Court, limited jurisdiction over two
groups of cases. Section 50 reads as follows:
"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture [DA] and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR].

It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide all cases,
disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of
every case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a
uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding before it.

It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, require submission of reports,
compel the production of books and documents and answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena and subpoena
duces tecum and to enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized officers. It shall likewise have the
power to punishdirect and indirect contempts in the same manner and subject to the same penalties as provided
in the Rules of Court.

Section 56 of RA 6657, on the other hand, confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are
Regional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court — at least one (1) branch within each province — to act
as such. These Regional Trial Courts qua Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Section 57 of the same law,
original and exclusive jurisdiction over:
2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under . . [the] Act."
It is relevant to mention in this connection that --
(1) appeals from decisions of the Special Agrarian Courts "may be taken by filing a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt or notice of the decision, . ." [Sec. 60]and
(2) appeals from any "decision, order, award or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian dispute or on any matter
pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws
on agrarian reform may be brought to the Court of Appeals by Certiorari* except as otherwise provided . . .
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof," the "findings of fact of the DAR [being] final and
conclusive if based on substantial evidence." [Sec. 54]
Hence, the DAR has original, exclusive jurisdiction over agrarian disputes, except on the aspects of (a) just
compensation; and (b) criminal jurisdiction over which regular courts have jurisdiction. Here, the case concerns
the rights of the plaintiffs as tenants on agricultural land, not involving the "special jurisdiction" of said Trial
Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, it clearly came within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, or more particularly, the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, established
precisely to wield the adjudicatory powers of the Department.

*[This mode of appeal is sui generis. It is the only instance when an appeal by Certiorari may be taken to the
Court of Appeals. Heretofore, appeals by Certiorari were authorized only when taken to the Supreme Court.]

[G.R. No. 128177            August 15, 2001]

HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO, petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES
BRAULIO ABALOS and AQUILINA ABALOS, respondents.

Facts:
 A piece of land located in Lingayen, Pangasinan is the disputed property in this case. Said land was originally
owned by one Adriano Soriano, subsequently it was leased for a period of 15 years to the Spouses David and
Consuelo with RAMON SORIANO, son of Adriano and herein petitioner, acting as caretaker/tenant of the
property during the duration of the lease. Upon the death of Adriano the lot he owned was divided into TWO and
given to his heirs. One of the lots inherited was sold to the Spouses ABALOS, here. The other lot was also
bought by the Spouses Abalos although not completely (only ¾ of the lot). The lots in question were
subsequently registered in the name of the Spouses Abalos. The courts later declared them to be the undisputed
owners thereof. Soriano questions their ownership of the land and so filed cases against the spouses. Currently
Soriano is still in possession of the land claiming rights of “Security of Tenure” as a tenant of the land.

Issue:
May a winning party in a land registration case effectively eject the possessor thereof

Held:
No. Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment
of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. A
judgment of ownership does not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident. Such declaration pertains
only to OWNERSHIP and does not automatically include possession. This is especially true in the case at bar
wherein petitioner is occupying the land allegedly in the concept of an agricultural tenant. The court says
“allegedly” due to the fact that there is still a pending case in the DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform and
Adjudication Board) on the issue. The issue of ownership of the subject land has been laid to rest by final
judgment; however the right of possession is yet to be resolved. The Tenancy Act, which protects the rights of
agricultural tenants, may limit the exercise of rights by the lawful owners. The exercise of the rights of
ownership yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant. Since the rights of Soriano to possess the
land are still pending litigation in the DARAB he is protected from dispossession of the land until final judgment
of said court unless Soriano’s occupancy is found by the court to be unlawful.