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INTRODUCTION
* This paper is based on my seminar on "Democracy and Development in Nepal: The Pros-
pects," presented at the Southern Asian Institute of the Columbia University in the City of New
York on 26 February 1992. Thanks are due to the two anonymous referees and the editor of the journal
for giving valuable comments. The author alone is responsible for any errors.
44
From December 1960 to April 1990, Nepal was ruled by absolute mon-
archy and its system of government was called partyless panchayat democ-
racy. The king ruled under the partyless panchayat system both as a head
of the state and the government, advised by two centres of political power,
the Council of Ministers and his Palace Secretariat. The partyless system
was originally based on a four-tier system where representation and power
ascended from a village to district, district to zone and zone to the national
legislatures. Until 1980, elections were held indirectly on a strictly nonpar-
tisan basis. The constitutional reforms announced in December 1980
allowed direct voting and an accountable executive, but imposed a ban on
political parties until the overthrow of the system in April 1990. Under the
old constitution, the sovereignty of the country was vested in the king. While
limited fimdamental rights were allowed, all powers - executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial - emanated from the king.
A number of factors, both internal and external, contributed to the resto-
ration of a multiparty democracy in Nepal in early 1990. Four major internal
factors could be attributed to the downfall of the panchayat system. First
there was the relentless and uninterrupted struggle by the banned Nepali
Congress and various Communist factions to restore democracy since the
early 1960s, despite the fact that until 1989, the Nepali Congress and the
United Marxist-Leninist parties vehemently opposed each other. This was
the most influential internal factor for restoring democracy. The second
I Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," in Foreign Policy, no. 87 (Summer 1992), p. 26.
45
factor was the growth in the size of the urban educated middle class, includ-
ing the student force which was the most organized and vociferous opposi-
tional force in the country. The third factor was the systemic crisis in the
panchayat system caused by democratic reforms introduced in 1980. This
led to group formations and interest alliances. The weakening unity of the
panchayat workers and their declining loyalty to the system were evident
from their disagreement and disharmony of interests revealed during the
MRD. In January 1990, the opposition group within the National Pan-
chayat denounced the MRD but at the same time criticized the government
for its divisive and confrontational stance and its failure to correct systemic
distortions. On April 1, 1990, the king dismissed nine of the twenty-nine
ministers for their criticism of the crackdown against the banned political
parties. The fourth factor was the economic situation which included rising
urban unemployment and prices, growing inequalities, and worsening
poverty. The failure of the panchayat system to fulfill the most basic needs
of the majority of the population contributed to its downfall. The absence
of effective political participation, and the lack of political accountability and
sense of commitment, were factors that were responsible for the worsening
poverty and inequality during the panchayat period. The partyless pan-
chayat system bore some of the characteristics of state corporatism. As
defined by Phillipe Schmitter, state corporatism "tends to be associated with
political systems in which territorial subunits are tightly subordinated to cen-
tral bureaucratic power; elections are nonexistent or plebiscitary, party
systems are dominated or monopolized by a weak single party; executive
authorities are ideologically exclusive and narrowly recruited and political
subcultures based on class, ethnicity, language or regionalism are
repressed. " The main flaw of the panchayat system was such that most of
the members who became political shareholders of the state-corporate
worked to maximize profits and dividends for themselves rather than for
the state corporation.2
Two major external factors could be attributed to the success of the
MRD; the international movement for freedom and democracy of the late
1980s, and the impact of Nepal's trade and transit disputes with India. King
Birendra, who succumbed to the demands of the popular movement for
democracy in April 1990, acknowledged in an interview that "unforeseen
economic factors and the question of political change within Nepalese society
coincided with changes in the international arena which were unprecedented
in recent history and monumental in scope and magnitude. " 3 The crisis
2 Gorkhapatra (Kathmandu), 24 January 1990; Phillipe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Cor-
poratism?" in F.B. Pike and T. Stritch, eds., The New Corporatism (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1974), p. 105.
3His Majesty King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev's interview to The Independent (Kathmandu),
8 January 1992.
46
in Nepal-India relations4 after the lapse of the trade and transit treaty in
March 1989 "contributed heavily to inflation, and slow economic
growth" 5 and consequently to lower per capita income. The trade and
transit dispute between the two countries was resolved by the interim gov-
ernment in June 1990.
Nepal's transformation from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy
came relatively quickly as compared with violent struggles elsewhere. A
historic announcement was made by King Birendra on April 8, 1990 within
seven weeks of the launching of the MRD. The king removed the word
"partyless" from the preamble of the constitution and scrapped an act that
banned political parties. Within a week, the National Panchayat, the Pan-
chayat Policy and Evaluation Committee, the class organizations, and the
new Council of Ministers (that was formed on April 6, 1990) were dissolved.
Then the king on April 19, 1990 formed an interim government headed by
Mr. K.P. Bhattarai, the acting president of the Nepali Congress party. As
stated repeatedly by the members of the interim government, its main tasks
were to frame a new constitution and to hold general elections. The mem-
bers of the Constitution Reforms Recommendation Commissions (formed
on May 11, 1990) were grumbling over the amount of representation and
the contents of the draft constitution. Due to the concerns raised by this
group, a new constitution was announced by King Birendra on November
9, 1990. This constitution transferred the untrammeled power of the
monarch to the people. According to the new constitution (2047),
sovereignty is vested in the people. As described by the prime minister of
the interim government, "the people have received the Constitution as a
certificate of people's sovereignty. "X6 Fundamental rights, protection of
liberty and the due process of law are guaranteed in the preamble to the
constitution. The Crown has been declared the symbol of Nepalese nation-
ality and the unity of the people. The constitution also laid down that "all
acts performed by the crown, except those exclusively within the king's
domain, will be performed only with the advice and consent of the council
of ministers. " Under the new constitution, the king's assent will be required
for legislation to become law. However, the king will not be entitled to veto
legislation. The army will be controlled by the elected government under
a National Defense Council. Only on the advice of the government can the
4The late prime minister of India, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, is reported to have admitted that "in
imposing trade and transit restrictions, India had been looking to encourage Nepal's democracy
movement. " See The World of Information, Asia and Pacific Review 1991/1992, 12th ed. (Edison: Hunter
Publishing, 1992), p. 129. (See the review on Nepal.)
5 It was estimated that Nepal "lost about 5 percentage points of its GDP growth over a period
of two years." See Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 1991 (Manila: Asian
Development Bank, 1991), p. 151.
6 See Gorkhapatra (Kathmandu), 15 November 1990.
47
king exercise emergency powers. But within ninety days, both houses of
parliament can choose to endorse this action.
The new constitution was the first major step in the process of institu-
tionalizing democracy in Nepal. The new constitution declared Nepal "a
multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, democratic, independent, sovereign, Hindu
constitutional monarchy. " The constitution provides for a bicameral legis-
lature, a House of Representatives of 205 members elected directly, and a
60-member Upper House elected on a proportional representation sys-
tesm. 7 One-third of the Upper House will retire every two years. The con-
stitution is a product of political and legal speculations and anticipations
between the two major and diametrically opposite political parties. It was
also a compromise between them and the monarchy. It thus reflects many
of the elements of checks and balances, and may also sometimes lead to a
constitutional deadlock or impasse.8
On May 12, 1991, Nepal had its first general election in thirty-two years
for a competitive pluralistic democratic system of government. The Nepali
Congress won 110 seats in a 205-member House of Representatives. This
party obtained 37 percent of the total votes cast. The Communist Party of
Nepal (UML) won 69 seats, obtaining about 28 percent of the total votes
cast, and became the main opposition party. Three other variants of Com-
munist parties won some seats in this election. These are the SanyuktaJan
Morcha (United Peoples Front), the Communist Party of Nepal (demo-
cratic) and the Nepal Workers and Peasants Party (a local variant of a radical
Communist party). The party in power also faced opposition from the Terai-
based party, called the Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Nepal Goodwill Party)
which won six seats. Ironically, two political parties, the National Demo-
cratic Party (Chand) and National Democratic Party (Thapa), comprised
of the former members of the dissolved panchayat system, were able to win
three and one seats respectively. However, by comparison, the former party
(Chand) was able to secure 6 percent of the total votes cast and secured the
third largest vote. According to the Election Commission's final results,
some twenty parties were in the final race, some of which were guided by
ethnic considerations. However, the Nepalese people by and large stood up
above ethnicism, regionalism and cultural parochialism.
I This is based on Droops quota system devised in 1868 which uses the formula: (V/[S + 1] + 1),
where V = total votes, S = number of seats. This method needs a setting of a quota (i.e., number
of votes required to win a seat, i.e., votes/no. of seats).
8 For example, the constitution (2047) requires that treaties related to defense, strategic alliances,
national boundaries, peace pacts, ties of friendship, and the utilization and distribution of natural
resources "have to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the members of both houses of parlia-
ment present and voting in a joint session. " See HMG/N, Ministry of Law andjustice, The Con-
stitution of Nepal (Nepal Adhirajyako Sambidhan 2047) (Kathmandu: Legal Books Management
Committee, 1990), p. 73.
48
9 See, for example, S.M. Lipset, "Some Social Requirements of Democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review, vol. 53, no. 1 (1959),
pp. 69-105.
10 Larry Diamond, "Introduction: Persistence, Erosion, Breakdown, and Renewal," in Larry
Diamond et al., eds., Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989), p. 33. Also
see The World Bank, World Development Report 1991 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1991
p. 9. For a review of works on democracy and development, seeD., Rueschmeyer, "Different Methods
- Contradictory Results? Research on Development andcDemocracy, " InternationalJournal of Com-
parative Sociology, vol. 32, nos. 1-2 (1991), pp. 9-35.-
49
50
12 Dual ownership implies joint ownership of land between landowners and tenants. Various
land reform measures have been enacted since the 1950s to grant tenancy rights to the tillers. One
of the common provisions is that any tiller establishing tenancy rights over the land of the landown-
ers is entitled to own within the maximum limits specified. However, in the first three sessions of
the parliament, the government had not tabled any bill related to land reforms.
13 HMG/N, Ministry of Finance, Budget of the Fiscal Year 1991-92, (Kathmandu: Ministry
of Finance, 1991), p. 3.
51
Under the multiparty system, policy and programs of the ruling party should
be endorsed and supported by the party's members of the parliament. For
example, the Nepali Congress, the ruling party, passed an "economic reso-
lution" in its eighth convention held in February 1992. The members of the
Nepali Congress party are morally as well as politically obliged to work
towards attainment of the goals.
The Nepali Congress, the ruling party, gained comfortable majorities
in local political bodies. Theoretically, local political bodies will be exercising
more political and economic powers under multi-party democracy as com-
pared with the partyless system. This is ensured by the Decentralization Act
passed by the government. The local elections for 4,000 villages and 36 towns
held in May 1992 will contribute to empowering local self-government. This
will be necessary to maintain Nepal's multiethnic mosaic and to mobilize
human and financial resources for development. Very comparable to the
Pakistani scenario, as described by Rose, are the rural elites of Nepal, who
will control about 90 percent of the seats in the parliament. The rural elites
will be more supportive of the democratic system than the urban elites, "who
use the rhetoric of democracy enthusiastically but have reservations about
any system based upon the power-to-the people concept, given the rural-
urban population ratios. "'14 In addition, there is also a whole network of
party workers who should in principle be working to accomplish the govern-
ment's objectives. This kind of political mechanism was totally absent in
the partyless system. Ironically, the only uniting factor in the partyless
system was personal interest, which has been replaced by party interests in
a multi-party system.
The presence of a strong opposition force, represented by the Com-
munist and radical parties from the moderate and extreme left, and by the
vanguards of the old shambles from the far right, have led to a situation of
a political equilibrium. The Nepali Congress party, which represents centre-
left viewpoints, is forced to eke out a policy that may not be optimum but
may be politically acceptable to its opposition. Every issue, vital or trivial,
has the possibility of being scrutinized politically by the opposition. This
may lead to negotiations. Similarly, any issue that is vital for political
interests of various political forces will be opposed to the point whereby all
the political forces find a compromise solution. Depending on the strengths
and weakness of various parties, and political equilibrium and its conse-
quences, opposition and negotiations will prevent the ruling party from
being undemocratic or authoritarian. This inherent check and balance will
impose vigilance and careful consideration on the party of the government.
There are high political costs for lack of progress, inefficiency, corruption
and delays in delivering the goods to the electorate. These political risks have
14 Ibid.
52
53
THE CHALLENGES
"5 Larry Diamond, "Three Paradoxes of Democracy,'"Journal of Democracy, vol. 1, no. 3 (Sum-
mer 1990), p. 48.
16 Some, like Milton J. Esman, view that in federalism or federal-like arrangements, multi-
lingualism would help the multiethnic or multiracial policy to survive. While the "effectiveness"
of specific language policies "tends to be highly contingent, official unilingualism, where practic-
able, seemfs more likely than multilingualism to lead eventually to political community" (p. 381).
See Milton J. Esman, "The State and the Language Policy," International Political Science Review,
vol. 13, no. 4, (1992), pp. 381-96.
54
been absorbed by the Nepali language. Finally, the wrangles over the use
of some of the languages in the parliament are deeply entrenched in nation-
alistic and socioeconomic fabrics. The UML members of parliament
opposed members representing the Terai constituency speaking in Hindi
(which is one of the official languages of India), instead of in Maithili or
Bhojpuri. This action was taken to stop the influence of India in Nepali
politics. The Maithili and Bhojpuri languages are predominant Terai lan-
guages which are spoken by 11 and 7 percent of the total population respec-
tively. Similarly, members from the Terai and the mountain regions opposed
the use of Newari language by some members representing the Kathmandu
Valley, the Newari language being spoken by 3 percent of the population.
This language is considered as the language of the privileged and econom-
ically dominant class of the Kathmandu Valley. Official unilingualism at
the national level and freedom of choice of language at the regional or local
level could best assure political comity in Nepal.
Incidentally, the United Marxist Leninist Party considered the Nepali
Congress to be its arch enemy from the time of its formation until its join-
ing the MRD. Mr. K.P. Bhattarai, the interim prime minister, was some-
how able to win over their friendship and cooperation because of his saintly
and unblemished image. But soon the Communists turned to bitter rivalry
against the Nepali Congress during the May 1991 elections and thereafter.
In fact, some of the Communists'7 are believed to have infiltrated the pan-
chayat system with the goal of supporting the banned Communist parties
in their efforts to overthrow the system. Some of the members of the dis-
solved panchayat system were so concerned about the growing influence of
the Communist faction that they "established a Democratic Panchayat
Forum" to "counter the growing influence of the communist faction" in
the Rastriya Panchayat (the national legislature). Mr. G. P. Koirala, the
prime minister, is considered to be the most outspoken anti-Communist
leader of the Nepali Congress. He, however, prefered to be a pragmatist
and took an accommodative posture towards Communists immediately after
becoming prime minister. He hoped that "the opposition would accept the
harsh realities of the country and provide active support to the government
in the day-to-day administration of the country, in institutionalizing the
development of democracy and in eliminating poverty from the coun-
try. " But the UML and other Communist parties are bent upon ousting
Mr. Koirala from power as early as possible. Mr. Madan Bhandari, the
general secretary of the UML Party - a man who rose from obscurity to
popularity because of his election victory over Mr. K.P. Bhattarai - has
17 For example, the last prime minister of the previous system, Mr. Marich Man Shrestha, was
a "former high school teacher from a peasant background and former communist. " See Far Eastern
Economic Review, Asia 1991 Year Book (Hongkong: 1991).
55
stated repeatedly that his party will do everything to oust the Nepali Con-
gress government as soon as possible. The UML party's opinion is divided
on the extent of the opposition, but a large section of the young and radi-
cal members are determined to dislodge the government and replace it with
a Communist regime. 18
Another staunch opposition party is led by Sayunkta Jana Morcha
(United Peoples Front, also called the Maoist revolutionary party). The lead-
ers of this party advocate that parliamentary democracy only perpetuates
the interests of feudalism and the bourgeoisie. Ideologically, the United
Peoples' Front believes neither in elections nor in democracy. But accord-
ing to the party leaders, the reason the party contested the election was
merely to work to tear it down from the root and establish the so-called Naulo
Janabad (new democracy). In addition, two Communist-oriented parties
(insignificant though if seen individually), the Nepal Workers and Peasants
Party, and the Communist Party of Nepal (Democratic), have been sup-
porting the UML's move to oppose the Koirala government. Another
Communist party known as Mashal (lighted torch), which did not partici-
pate in the election and is believed to represent a Naxalite variant of Maoism,
considers the Nepali Congress as its main enemy. Then there is the Unity
Centre, another radical faction of the Communist party, which organized
a violent agitation in early February 1992 in which seven people were killed.
The centre blamed the government for price increases, corruption, smug-
gling and blackmarketeering and failure to solve the problem of squatters
and landless people.
The future direction of the Communist parties of Nepal with regard to
its India policy will depend on the nature of the Sino-Indian relations. Al-
though the UML is vague on the definition of Nepal's balanced and equit-
able relations with India and China, the role of the Communist parties is
vital for a number of important issues of national interest. The main rea-
son for this is Nepal's constitution. Article 126 of the constitution requires
a two-thirds majority of the house for ratification of an international treaty
or agreement on specific issues related to friendship and cooperation, secu-
rity and strategic matters, boundary, utilization and distribution of benefits
of natural resources. The Nepali Congress does not have a two-third major-
ity in the house and therefore has to rely for both consensus and coopera-
tion on the UML.
For much of the country's travails, the Communists raised the Indian
bogey during the election campaign. Most of the Communist parties see
India as viscerally hegemonistic and expansionist, and treat anti-Indianism
as a synonym for Nepali nationalism. The various Communist parties have
18 See Nepal in The Europa World Year Book 1991, volume 2 (London: Europa Publication, 1991),
p. 1903.
56
been opposing the trade and transit treaties and the memorandum of
understanding on sharing water resources signed by the Nepali prime
minister in December 1991. The members of the main opposition along with
members of other oppositional parties boycotted some of the early sessions
of the winter session of the parliament which began on February 21, 1992.
The opposition parties demanded that the government table the relevant
documents on the understanding concerning water resources with India.
The opposition led by the UML has challenged the constitutionality of some
accords. It has also challenged both the constitutionality and the advantages
for Nepal as claimed by the government of some other accords signed with
India. Indeed, utilization and benefit sharing of water resources between
Nepal and India has been a serious bone of contention since the 1950s.
Viewed from the criticisms levelled by the Communist forces on Gandak
and Koshi river projects in the past, it is no wonder that the Tanakpur bar-
rage project (one of the projects signed between India and Nepal in 1991)
has received by far the most serious attacks from the opposition.19 The
opposition has been criticizing the government for implementing accords
related to issues included in the constitution without their ratification by a
two-thirds majority in the house. From outside the parliament, a lawyer filed
a writ petition at the Supreme Court on December 17, 1991 demanding that
the new treaties and agreements signed with India in December 1991 not
be implemented until they were approved by the parliament. The petition
has serious political implications for Nepal. The prime minister will be under
pressure to resign if the Supreme Court hearing goes against the govern-
ment, the defendant.
The non-Communist opposition in the parliament accounts for little
more than 6 percent of the votes. Most of these members are apt in creat-
ing their identity as well as credibility by means of criticism of the govern-
ment. For this reason, they even align with the Communist factions. For
example, in the winter session of the parliament, the non-Communist mem-
bers, other than those of the Goodwill party, supported the Communists
'9 The opposition alleged that the construction of the Tanakpur barrage will alter the Nepal-
India border. They also demanded that the granting of land by Nepal to India (amounting to
2.9 hectares for the 577-metre afflux bund) must be formally approved by the parliament, and sharing
of the benefits of the boundary river should be equitable. The various Communist parties have been
demanding the resignation of the prime minister by saying that the "understanding" reached between
India and Nepal on water resources including the Tanakpur barrage fall under the category of a
"treaty" and therefore should have been ratified by a two-thirds parliamentary majority as required
under the constitution and the Nepal Treaty Act of 1990. The Communist opposition has also started
a united front movement demanding the resignation of the prime minister following the Supreme
Court's verdict on the writ petition filed by a lawyer in December 1991 asking the Supreme Court
to issue an order stopping the execution of the "understanding" as long as the understanding is not
ratified. The Supreme Court decided in December 1992 that the "understanding" be ratified as
required by Article 126 of the constitution. Following this verdict, the Communist parties decided
to launch ajoint movement demanding the resignation of the prime minister. See Saptahik Bimarsa
(Kathmandu), 18 December 1992.
57
58
21 See Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1991 Year Book (Hong Kong: 1991), p. 177.
22 His Majesty King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev's interview to The Independent (Kathmandu).
59
60
not spend more than half of the resources. The poor performance of the
government led the Nepali Congress president to state that "the people are
dissatisfied because the pace of development has been slow. " 24 The prices
of essential commodities have been rising rapidly since the impasse in Nepali-
Indian relations and especially due to lifting subsidies and raising admin-
istered prices under the economic reform program the government em-
barked on in 1991-92. The devaluation measure taken by the Koirala
government in early July 1991 and the partial convertibility of the rupee
announced in March 1992 contributed to further price increases. The prices
of essential goods and services increased over 20 percent in the last quar-
ter of 1991 compared with an average annual inflation rate of 10 percent in
previous years.
In an attempt to bring about structural adjustment in the economy, the
government embarked upon price reform measures in public utilities such
as electricity and telecommunication, and public goods such as education
and water. The decision to increase prices has been a condition for increased
external loans and grants. Such reform measures which were introduced
with the goal of reducing the government deficit contributed to hyper-
inflation. The hyperinflationary pressure provoked civil servants and the
unionized industrial labour to demand wage increases which have been
partially met, thus setting off a rapid inflationary spiral. The fact that a larg
number of people supported the protest demonstrations organized by one
of the radical factions of the Communist parties in February 1992 indicates
growing public discontent. Much of the failure is attributed to the three
decades of economic mismanagement by the panchayat system. Indeed,
whatever little economic change took place in the past was confined to the
urban areas and their periphery which served the interest of only the vested
interest groups, the elites, and the merchants. But part of the failure to
improve the economy is attributable to the political stalemate type situa-
tion created on the one hand by a strong opposition, and on the other by
the growing rift between the Nepali Congress party and its government.
The government is facing numerous problems as stated above. But the
government is also muddled about economic policy; its policy goals are
developmentalist but its approaches are neoliberalist. There are two distinct
groups within the party, one believing in "democratic socialism" and the
other in a free market approach. This is obvious if one compares the eighth
five year plan (1992-97) and the budget for 1992-93. The former follows
a democratic socialist path while the latter subscribes to liberalization and
privatization. There are also differences in approach. The eighth five year
plan emphasizes the alleviation of poverty using a multisectoral approach
24 Mr. K.P. Bhattarai's interview to the Swatantrata (Kathmandu), 9 July 1992, as translated in
the Nepal Press Digest, vol. 36, no. 28 (13 July 1992).
61
while the budget, which deviates from the first budget (1991-92), concen-
trates on the modern sector, and the government's strategy to privatize state-
owned industries including the traditional sector has received wide criticism.
25 Werner Levi, "Political Rivalries in Nepal," in Far Eastern Survey (July 1954), p. 104. See foot-
note 2.
62
to maintaining law and order and his appeal to the civil servants to be patient
for at least a year, the country's bureaucracy became partially paralyzed
as the pro-leftist faction of the lower ranks of the civil servants went on strike.
The possible threat to democracy is obvious from Mr. Koirala's warning
that "at a time when the reactionary forces were looking for the opportunity
to inflict a blow to the new born democracy, any trouble originating from
the demands can pose a danger to democracy. " But surprisingly the strik-
ing civil servants called off the strikes on 24 August without any gains in
hand. It seems that the failure of the aborted coup attempt in the Soviet
Union and the return of Mr. Gorbachev to power created psychological
effects on both striking civil servants and their political mentors. In order
to reduce politicization and thereby enhance efficiency of the bureaucracy,
the government has embarked upon a two-front strategy. It has offered
monetary incentives by raising salaries of the civil servants in April 1992,
but has also decided to retire about one-third of the total government
employees within the next three years. However, so long as political par-
ties do not make commitment not to use civil servants as an instrument of
their politics, depoliticization of the Nepalese bureaucracy will remain a
fundamental challenge to the government.26
63
Most of the political parties that were born in the aftermath of the
restoration of democracy in 1990 in Nepal are power oriented. For exam-
ple, the two national democratic parties, the Communist party of Nepal
(democratic), and a host of others are guided by the sole objective of gain-
ing power through election. By contrast, the Nepali Congress and the Nepal
Communist (UML) parties are goal oriented in the sense that they have had
certain goals which they have been pursuing partially in some cases, and
wholly in other cases. Some factions of the Communist parties are also goal
oriented because their main goal in the past was to overthrow the panchayat
system.
The Nepali Congress party, which was formed in 1947, is the oldest and
the largest party in the country. The Nepal Communist party was formed
in 1950 and if all the factions are put together, it becomes the second largest
party. Both these political parties have not been able to emerge as fully
institutionalized parties. There are a number of problems. These problems
are discussed first in the context of the Nepali Congress and thence in the
context of the Communist parties. First, the Nepali Congress from its very
inception suffered from an internal crisis that arose due to competition for
leadership and power. Second, the party faced the problem of what can be
called the Weberian syndrome. The party was virtually overwhelmed by
Mr. B.P. Koirala's charismatic personality which remained conspicuous
until his death in 1982. The leadership void left by his death is the greatest
loss for the Nepali Congress. And third, the long and arduous struggle by
the party to restore democracy for nearly three decades has obstructed the
process of institutionalizing and exercising democratic norms and values
within the party. However, the party was able to survive despite internal
crisis brought about by circumstances that occasionally led to serious party
divisions and factionalism.
The success of the democratic movement has definitely enhanced the
Nepali Congress party's position and strength as the results of the general
election have made evident. However, the party has three major interrelated
challenges insofar as its institutional development is concerned. The first
one is that the party lacks a clear and well-identified common national as
well as international vision for the 1990s and beyond. Discussion with the
party leaders and the members of the rank and file gives one the impres-
sion that the party is divided by its economic ideology. Some are strongly
in favour of democratic socialism (developmentalists) whereas others favour
a strong free enterprise system (neoliberalists). Theoretically, the party has
endorsed democratic socialist principles but in reality, this was neither dis-
cussed democratically nor applied wholeheartedly. The second challenge
is the problem of consolidating and strengthening the party as a modern
democratic organization with established rules, procedures, norms and
elections. Up until now, the party, which was a loose body of members with
divided affinity and loyalty, was operating in a policy vacuum. Besides, the
64
party is also facing the problem of how to channel the different but disparate
members scattered all over the country who feel alienated from the party
leadership and the party's government. The party members are also labelled
as "old" and "new," "pure " and " panchayatized," meaning those who
had joined the panchayat system.
As politics is central to power and social status in Third World coun-
tries, perhaps even more so in Nepal, many of the old vanguards of the
Nepali Congress party feel humiliated to see that some of the junior and
unknown entities are appointed by Mr. Koirala to his cabinet and other key
positions. This implies that the neglect of those who are influential and have
been honest all along will only hamper the institutional development of the
party.
The third challenge, which is related to the second, is to effect coordina-
tion between the party and its government. This has been a peculiar problem
since the early 1950s. Apparently it seems that there is a triangular distri-
bution of political power among Mr. G.M. Singh who is the supreme leader,
Mr. K.P. Bhattarai, the party president, and Mr. G.P. Koirala, the prime
minister. The implication of such a triangular distribution of responsibil-
ity and leadership is that those members who have no patron-client nexus
with any of these leaders will have very little chance of benefitting from
political patronage, let alone exercising real powers. The "discretionary
nomination" to the Upper House in July 1991 aroused controversy and
anger among the senior and dedicated workers of the party as the leaders
nominated people according to their personal judgement and their assess-
ment of loyalty and proximity. Some of the Nepali Congress members of
the parliament as well as its party organization felt humiliated by G.P.
Koirala's nomination of one of his relatives relatively unknown either
politically or intellectually in the political circle around the member of the
cabinet.28 Some of the senior party members mentioned that "if it is up to
Mr. Koirala to judge competence, qualification and expertise, it will be no
wonder that he will pick some of his mediocre people around him. " 29
The politics of patronage transpired into a real crisis in mid-September
1991 when Mr. G.M. Singh, the supreme leader of the Nepali Congress
party, asked for Mr. Koirala's resignation or else he would quit politics.
Mr. Singh alleged that Prime Minister Koirala favoured an extreme form
of nepotism and some form of "brahamanism" in making certain key
appointments, including the position of minister of finance.30 The issue
28 The disappointment of some of the Nepali Congress members of the House of Representa-
tives was expressed to the author in several meetings.
29 This is based on the author's discussion with some of the senior party members and the
members of the House of Representatives.
30 See Suruchi (Kathmandu), 15 September 1991, and for Ganesh Man Singh's charge tha
of Mr. Koirala' s appointees was merely an "unweaned infant" see Saptahik Bimarsa (Kathmandu),
13 September 1991.
65
was resolved through some compromise and active persuasion from party
president, Bhattarai. Unfortunately, the conflict of interests between the
prime minister and the supreme leader increased due to the sudden dismissal
of some cabinet ministers in late December 1991. The supreme leader of
the Nepali Congress accused the prime minister of his party of being a
"dictator."3' The conflict of interest became a crisis at the time of the
party's eighth convention held in mid-February 1992.32 The party su-
premo had given a three month grace period, which would expire in May,
to set things right.33 The party's outstanding victory in the local elections
made Mr. Singh less critical of the prime minister's performance, and the
prime minister also pursued a policy of appeasement by appointing some
of Mr. Singh's family members and community friends to high level posi-
tions. However, such a policy only heightened the frustrations and anger
of some of the senior party members who believe that the government is
bogged down in sharing powers and privileges between the families of the
prime minister and the supreme leader. After the death of one of the three
leaders, there will undoubtedly by a split in the party. But considering the
current level of conflict, it is quite probable that the party will break up in
the near future into two major groups, one led by Mr. Koirala, and the other
led by the party president and the supreme leader.
The conflict of interests also aggravated the discontent of the party
workers who did not happen to be as close to any of the leaders as others are,
due to their family relations or affinity. Simmering discontent might grow
into some kind of a canker in the party, which will make the goal of achieving
political stability difficult. The politics of patron-client relations will not dis-
appear in Nepal's multiparty democracy. In fact one of the reasons for the
importance of the studies of patronage and patron-client relations is social
scientists' growing awareness that the "patron-client relations were not des-
tined to remain on the margins of society nor to disappear with the develop-
ment and establishment of democracies with well-functioning political and
economic systems marked by economic development and modernization,
or with the growth of class consciousness among the lower strata. " 34 But
66
35 See Eugene Bramer Mihaly, Foreign Aid and Politics in Nepal (London: Oxford University Press,
1965), p. 17.
36 Werner Levi, "Government and Politics in Nepal," Far Eastern Survey, 17 December 1952,
p. 189.
37 Prior to the formation of the United Marxist-Leninist party in January 1991, two of the major
factions used the terms, "Marxist" and "Marxist-Leninist." In general some draw a distinction
between communism and Marxism. Generally, "all communists claim to be Marxists, but many
Marxists would repudiate the name communists. Marxists accept the teaching of Karl Marx, whereas
all communists are Marxists and accept the teachings of Karl Marx as interpreted by Leninists. "
See Charles Hobday, Communist and Marxist Parties of the World (Essex: Longman Group, 1986), p. 1.
67
38 See the "Interview of the Central Spokesman of the United National People's Movement and
Leader of the NCP (Masal)," Saptahik NepaliAwaj (Kathmandu), 20July 1990, as translated in the
Nepal Press Digest (Kathmandu), vol. 34, no. 31 (30 July 1991).
39 Interview given by the general secretary of the United Marxist-Leninist party. See Nepali Patra
(Kathmandu), 19 July 1991.
68
is that some factions of the Communist party left their party and joined the
Nepali Congress.40
Insofar as Communists believe in constitutional monarchy and
democracy, such cleavages and schisms weaken Communists as political
parties. However, the most serious problem with communism in Nepal is
the lack of conviction and commitment of the majority of the members of
the parties. A great number of the party workers come from middle and
higher middle class families, that is, from the land owning class. Most of
the people who have joined the parties became influenced directly or indi-
rectly in the late 1960s by the ideology of Mao's cultural revolution. The
majority of them became communists because of their anti-Nepali Congress
and anti-India stand while others were encouraged by the supporters of the
panchayati workers as a counterweight against the Nepali Congress party.
Family connection or influence is another factor that influenced some of the
members and supporters of the communist movement. What is noticeable
is that most of young and middle aged communist supporters cherish free-
dom, strive for western life styles, and have high paying jobs. Those who
live in the rural areas or whose families are living in rural areas have been
exploiting the peasants and farmers. However, when it comes to voting or
supporting a particular party, these communists vote for communist backed
candidates. Such a tendency might make it difficult to bring real communism
even to a poor agricultural country like Nepal. Without regard to norma-
tive judgement about the virtues or vices of the dialectical dilemma, it can
be said, such a trend only feeds a reactionary attitude. This may be undesir-
able for healthy democratic development in the country.
Other parties on the political spectrum will undergo metamorphosis.
The absence of ideological philosophy and a common vision on domestic
as well as external perspectives, will contribute to different permutations
as disappearance and merging will be a common feature in the power
oriented new political parties such as the national democratic parties, the
social democratic parties, the parties based on religion and ethnicity.
However, it is in the interest of the preservation of the constitutional mon-
archy that one or two major political parties serve to consolidate multi-party
democracy in the country.
40 For example, the founding members of the United Marxist-Leninist affiliated Nepal Inde-
pendent Workers Union quit their union and joined the Nepali Congress. It was stated that "in the
present age, communist dictatorship has become irrelevant. " The members of the union who quit
the party called on all members to "free themselves from the communist confusion and work" for
democracy. Similarly, the "President of the Nepal Communist Party (sixth convention) joined the
Nepali Congress along with 2,000 members" (Nepali Patra [Kathmandu], 28 November 1991, as
translated in The Nepal Press Digest, vol. 35, no. 48 [2 December 1991]).
69
41 John Elster and Rune Slagstad, Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), p. 2.
70
71