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Democracy and Development in Nepal: Prospects and Challenges

Author(s): Narayan Khadka


Source: Pacific Affairs , Spring, 1993, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Spring, 1993), pp. 44-71
Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2760015

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Democracy and
Development in Nepal:
Prospects and Challenges*
Narayan Khadka

INTRODUCTION

A number of Third World countries have moved either from military


.dictatorships or one-party authoritarianism to pluralistic democracy
in recent years. Nepal, which has a variegated history with respect to
democracy, is one of the countries which changed from an absolute to a
constitutional monarchy. Nepal achieved democracy and restored the po-
sition of the monarchy after the overthrow of the Rana oligarchy in 1951.
In 1959, Nepal held its first parliamentary elections which gave the Nepali
Congress party a landslide victory. However, Nepal's experiment with
parliamentary democracy ended in December 1960 when King Mahendra,
the father of the present king, abruptly dismissed the cabinet and dissolved
the parliament. The king also banned political parties and imposed restric-
tions on the most fundamental human rights. After a brief period of direct
rule, the king introduced a monolithic one-party authoritarian system of
government called "partyless panchayat" in 1962. Nepal's main political
parties, the Nepali Congress and the Nepal Communist party, had been
organizing a resistance movement since the royal takeover in 1960. In Febru-
ary 1990, Nepal's major opposition political parties led by the Nepali
Congress and supported by the United Left Front launched a popular move-
ment for restoring democracy (MRD). Incipient with a series of demon-
strations and protest marches initially concentrated in the Kathmandu
Valley and a few Terai cities, the movement was intensified throughout
the country by early April 1990. Capitulating to popular demand, King
Birendra abolished the panchayat system and restored a multiparty system
by lifting a ban on political parties on April 8, 1990.
Managing democratic change in developing countries has not been easy.
If power-hungry politicians and party workers have been trying to unseat
elected governments, leaders of elected governments have sought more

* This paper is based on my seminar on "Democracy and Development in Nepal: The Pros-
pects," presented at the Southern Asian Institute of the Columbia University in the City of New
York on 26 February 1992. Thanks are due to the two anonymous referees and the editor of the journal
for giving valuable comments. The author alone is responsible for any errors.

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Democracy and Development in Nepal

authority and power. Lack of effective democratic institutions, experience,


training and political skills, and resources are some of the problems which
must be faced in building "a strong cultural and civic infrastructure of
democracy. " 1 A number of new democracies are struggling to establish a
framework for viable legal and economic systems in the midst of growing
economic hardship and rising expectations of their populations. Nepal's
newly acquired democracy faces all these challenges. Peoples' expectations
are turning into frustration because the government, despite promises, has
not been able to provide economic relief measures such as reductions in
prices and increases in supplies of the most essential commodities. It is the
objective of this paper to analyze the prospects for development under
Nepal's newly acquired democracy. The paper is organized into three parts:
the first part provides a short introduction on the transition from absolute
to constitutional monarchy; the second part analyzes the prospects for
development in a democratic framework; and the last part discusses the
challenges facing this new democracy and offers several conclusions.

THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

From December 1960 to April 1990, Nepal was ruled by absolute mon-
archy and its system of government was called partyless panchayat democ-
racy. The king ruled under the partyless panchayat system both as a head
of the state and the government, advised by two centres of political power,
the Council of Ministers and his Palace Secretariat. The partyless system
was originally based on a four-tier system where representation and power
ascended from a village to district, district to zone and zone to the national
legislatures. Until 1980, elections were held indirectly on a strictly nonpar-
tisan basis. The constitutional reforms announced in December 1980
allowed direct voting and an accountable executive, but imposed a ban on
political parties until the overthrow of the system in April 1990. Under the
old constitution, the sovereignty of the country was vested in the king. While
limited fimdamental rights were allowed, all powers - executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial - emanated from the king.
A number of factors, both internal and external, contributed to the resto-
ration of a multiparty democracy in Nepal in early 1990. Four major internal
factors could be attributed to the downfall of the panchayat system. First
there was the relentless and uninterrupted struggle by the banned Nepali
Congress and various Communist factions to restore democracy since the
early 1960s, despite the fact that until 1989, the Nepali Congress and the
United Marxist-Leninist parties vehemently opposed each other. This was
the most influential internal factor for restoring democracy. The second

I Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," in Foreign Policy, no. 87 (Summer 1992), p. 26.

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Pacific Affairs

factor was the growth in the size of the urban educated middle class, includ-
ing the student force which was the most organized and vociferous opposi-
tional force in the country. The third factor was the systemic crisis in the
panchayat system caused by democratic reforms introduced in 1980. This
led to group formations and interest alliances. The weakening unity of the
panchayat workers and their declining loyalty to the system were evident
from their disagreement and disharmony of interests revealed during the
MRD. In January 1990, the opposition group within the National Pan-
chayat denounced the MRD but at the same time criticized the government
for its divisive and confrontational stance and its failure to correct systemic
distortions. On April 1, 1990, the king dismissed nine of the twenty-nine
ministers for their criticism of the crackdown against the banned political
parties. The fourth factor was the economic situation which included rising
urban unemployment and prices, growing inequalities, and worsening
poverty. The failure of the panchayat system to fulfill the most basic needs
of the majority of the population contributed to its downfall. The absence
of effective political participation, and the lack of political accountability and
sense of commitment, were factors that were responsible for the worsening
poverty and inequality during the panchayat period. The partyless pan-
chayat system bore some of the characteristics of state corporatism. As
defined by Phillipe Schmitter, state corporatism "tends to be associated with
political systems in which territorial subunits are tightly subordinated to cen-
tral bureaucratic power; elections are nonexistent or plebiscitary, party
systems are dominated or monopolized by a weak single party; executive
authorities are ideologically exclusive and narrowly recruited and political
subcultures based on class, ethnicity, language or regionalism are
repressed. " The main flaw of the panchayat system was such that most of
the members who became political shareholders of the state-corporate
worked to maximize profits and dividends for themselves rather than for
the state corporation.2
Two major external factors could be attributed to the success of the
MRD; the international movement for freedom and democracy of the late
1980s, and the impact of Nepal's trade and transit disputes with India. King
Birendra, who succumbed to the demands of the popular movement for
democracy in April 1990, acknowledged in an interview that "unforeseen
economic factors and the question of political change within Nepalese society
coincided with changes in the international arena which were unprecedented
in recent history and monumental in scope and magnitude. " 3 The crisis

2 Gorkhapatra (Kathmandu), 24 January 1990; Phillipe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Cor-
poratism?" in F.B. Pike and T. Stritch, eds., The New Corporatism (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1974), p. 105.
3His Majesty King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev's interview to The Independent (Kathmandu),
8 January 1992.

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Democracy and Development in Nepal

in Nepal-India relations4 after the lapse of the trade and transit treaty in
March 1989 "contributed heavily to inflation, and slow economic
growth" 5 and consequently to lower per capita income. The trade and
transit dispute between the two countries was resolved by the interim gov-
ernment in June 1990.
Nepal's transformation from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy
came relatively quickly as compared with violent struggles elsewhere. A
historic announcement was made by King Birendra on April 8, 1990 within
seven weeks of the launching of the MRD. The king removed the word
"partyless" from the preamble of the constitution and scrapped an act that
banned political parties. Within a week, the National Panchayat, the Pan-
chayat Policy and Evaluation Committee, the class organizations, and the
new Council of Ministers (that was formed on April 6, 1990) were dissolved.
Then the king on April 19, 1990 formed an interim government headed by
Mr. K.P. Bhattarai, the acting president of the Nepali Congress party. As
stated repeatedly by the members of the interim government, its main tasks
were to frame a new constitution and to hold general elections. The mem-
bers of the Constitution Reforms Recommendation Commissions (formed
on May 11, 1990) were grumbling over the amount of representation and
the contents of the draft constitution. Due to the concerns raised by this
group, a new constitution was announced by King Birendra on November
9, 1990. This constitution transferred the untrammeled power of the
monarch to the people. According to the new constitution (2047),
sovereignty is vested in the people. As described by the prime minister of
the interim government, "the people have received the Constitution as a
certificate of people's sovereignty. "X6 Fundamental rights, protection of
liberty and the due process of law are guaranteed in the preamble to the
constitution. The Crown has been declared the symbol of Nepalese nation-
ality and the unity of the people. The constitution also laid down that "all
acts performed by the crown, except those exclusively within the king's
domain, will be performed only with the advice and consent of the council
of ministers. " Under the new constitution, the king's assent will be required
for legislation to become law. However, the king will not be entitled to veto
legislation. The army will be controlled by the elected government under
a National Defense Council. Only on the advice of the government can the

4The late prime minister of India, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, is reported to have admitted that "in
imposing trade and transit restrictions, India had been looking to encourage Nepal's democracy
movement. " See The World of Information, Asia and Pacific Review 1991/1992, 12th ed. (Edison: Hunter
Publishing, 1992), p. 129. (See the review on Nepal.)
5 It was estimated that Nepal "lost about 5 percentage points of its GDP growth over a period
of two years." See Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 1991 (Manila: Asian
Development Bank, 1991), p. 151.
6 See Gorkhapatra (Kathmandu), 15 November 1990.

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king exercise emergency powers. But within ninety days, both houses of
parliament can choose to endorse this action.
The new constitution was the first major step in the process of institu-
tionalizing democracy in Nepal. The new constitution declared Nepal "a
multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, democratic, independent, sovereign, Hindu
constitutional monarchy. " The constitution provides for a bicameral legis-
lature, a House of Representatives of 205 members elected directly, and a
60-member Upper House elected on a proportional representation sys-
tesm. 7 One-third of the Upper House will retire every two years. The con-
stitution is a product of political and legal speculations and anticipations
between the two major and diametrically opposite political parties. It was
also a compromise between them and the monarchy. It thus reflects many
of the elements of checks and balances, and may also sometimes lead to a
constitutional deadlock or impasse.8
On May 12, 1991, Nepal had its first general election in thirty-two years
for a competitive pluralistic democratic system of government. The Nepali
Congress won 110 seats in a 205-member House of Representatives. This
party obtained 37 percent of the total votes cast. The Communist Party of
Nepal (UML) won 69 seats, obtaining about 28 percent of the total votes
cast, and became the main opposition party. Three other variants of Com-
munist parties won some seats in this election. These are the SanyuktaJan
Morcha (United Peoples Front), the Communist Party of Nepal (demo-
cratic) and the Nepal Workers and Peasants Party (a local variant of a radical
Communist party). The party in power also faced opposition from the Terai-
based party, called the Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Nepal Goodwill Party)
which won six seats. Ironically, two political parties, the National Demo-
cratic Party (Chand) and National Democratic Party (Thapa), comprised
of the former members of the dissolved panchayat system, were able to win
three and one seats respectively. However, by comparison, the former party
(Chand) was able to secure 6 percent of the total votes cast and secured the
third largest vote. According to the Election Commission's final results,
some twenty parties were in the final race, some of which were guided by
ethnic considerations. However, the Nepalese people by and large stood up
above ethnicism, regionalism and cultural parochialism.

I This is based on Droops quota system devised in 1868 which uses the formula: (V/[S + 1] + 1),
where V = total votes, S = number of seats. This method needs a setting of a quota (i.e., number
of votes required to win a seat, i.e., votes/no. of seats).
8 For example, the constitution (2047) requires that treaties related to defense, strategic alliances,
national boundaries, peace pacts, ties of friendship, and the utilization and distribution of natural
resources "have to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the members of both houses of parlia-
ment present and voting in a joint session. " See HMG/N, Ministry of Law andjustice, The Con-
stitution of Nepal (Nepal Adhirajyako Sambidhan 2047) (Kathmandu: Legal Books Management
Committee, 1990), p. 73.

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Democracy and Development in Nepal

The general elections, the formation of a Nepali Congress government,


and successfully conducting the local elections for village and municipal
development committees (in May 1992) completed the transition from
absolute to constitutional monarchy. The full-fledged democratic era that
began in Nepal in 1990 poses the question: Will Nepal be able to institu-
tionalize pluralistic democracy and foster just and equitable development
in the country? In the following section we examine this issue.

DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: THE PROSPECT

There is no conclusive evidence of a positive correlation between


democracy and economic development. Some political scientists9 found
that modernization theory, measured in terms of socioeconomic indicators,
showed a positive relationship with democracy. But some other recent
studies'0 found that civil liberties and per capita GNP showed inconse-
quential or no positive evidence of this relationship. It is also observed that
democracy is not incompatible with development. Development in this
paper is perceived in a broader context. In more specific terms, develop-
ment is considered as a multidimensional change. The main objective of
development is to bring about desirable holistic change encompassing eco-
nomic, social and political aspects. The goal of economic development and
change can be attained through acceleration of growth, alleviation of
poverty, and reduction of inequalities. The goal of social development and
change can be achieved through positive societal change in attitudes, beliefs,
traditions and values. And the goal of political development and change can
be achieved through guarantee of civil liberties, popular participation,
representative and accountable administrative and political structures,
formalization of institutions and party organizations, and effective and
higher decentralization. It is hypothesized that the democratic exercise in
Nepal will create positive awareness about the socioeconomic and political
development among the poorest but the largest sections of the society. Over
time, this will enlarge the base of the middle class "which has long been

9 See, for example, S.M. Lipset, "Some Social Requirements of Democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review, vol. 53, no. 1 (1959),
pp. 69-105.
10 Larry Diamond, "Introduction: Persistence, Erosion, Breakdown, and Renewal," in Larry
Diamond et al., eds., Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989), p. 33. Also
see The World Bank, World Development Report 1991 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1991
p. 9. For a review of works on democracy and development, seeD., Rueschmeyer, "Different Methods
- Contradictory Results? Research on Development andcDemocracy, " InternationalJournal of Com-
parative Sociology, vol. 32, nos. 1-2 (1991), pp. 9-35.-

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Pacific Affairs

associated in political theory with modernization, tolerance and democ-


racy. ""I It is the belief that in poor countries like Nepal, development will
be lopsided, dualistic and unequal as well as politically unstable in the
absence of a representative democratic system.
Nepal's recent democratic experiment indicates a high degree of political
mobilization through the formation of groups and parties. Immediately after
the dissolution of the partyless panchayat system in April 1990, several pres-
sure groups and political parties were formed. Within days of the forma-
tion of the interim government, most of the pressure groups started to
ventilate their bottled-up grievances which made it difficult for the transi-
tional government to restore order and peace. On a positive note, these
groups also articulated group interests and represented the reactions and
expectations of various classes and sections of the Nepalese society.
The entry of forty different political parties in the May 1991 general elec-
tion not only enhanced political competition, but also brought various
domestic and international issues before the general public. A study of the
election manifestos of various political parties, however, indicates that Nepal
does have very limited choices when it comes to public policy. Where the
parties differed in their ideologies was in their methods of implementation.
Except for the Communist parties, who promoted radical slogans such as
the redistribution of land and house property by confiscation from the richer
sections of the society, most political parties differed very little in their
approaches. Nevertheless, some 1,345 candidates were in the election fray
for a 205-seat house. All those candidates represented people from all over
the country. The proposed programs and plans these candidates put to the
electorate were an opportunity to educate the people and encourage their
participation. This was the first time in thirty-two years that the people had
such an opportunity. From the point of view of political assimilation and
integration, it is important to note the election victory of the pahadis (the hill
men) from the mnadhesoya (Terai) constituencies, and a non-Newar candidate
from the predominantly Newar community. The election results defy the
assumption of the supporters of the panchayat system that democracy divides
peoples rather than uniting them.
Freedom and democracy create political conditions for development.
As stated earlier, a peoples' mandate to a certain political party means a
majority approval of that party's policies and programs. For example, people
gave their mandate to the democratic socialist orientation of the Nepali
Congress for its development policies and programs. The Nepali Congress,
which is now the ruling party in the country, is obliged to fulfill its electoral

11 L. Diamond et al., "Developing and Sustaining Democratic Government in the Third


World" (Paper for the 1986 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association
[Washington, D.C., 28-31 August 1986], p. 29).

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Democracy and Development in Nepal

promises, not only by improving the socioeconomic conditions of the people,


but also by its interest in returning to power in the future. According to the
Nepali Congress's manifesto, the party is committed to enable the majority
of the poorer section of the society to earn an income adequate for meeting
fundamental needs such as food and clothing, education, housing, medi-
cine and entertainment. Guided by these fundamental objectives, the Nepali
Congress candidates, like those of other parties, made several commitments
to their respective constituencies. In general, these promises included
provision for the construction of roads, the delivery of safe drinking water,
health clinics, education and inputs for the establishment of cottage indus-
tries. No such electoral promises were politically possible in the dissolved
partyless system, because those who contested elections were not allowed
to form any group alliance, let alone a political party.
In consonance with the spirit of electoral promises, certain radical
announcements were made by the prime minister of the Nepali Congress
government. One of these announcements was a promise to bring the dual
ownership of land to an end - "a problem left over by the panchayat re-
gime." 12 Similar announcements were made regarding environment,
industrial policy and privatization.
Since 95 percent of Nepal's population lives in rural areas, Nepal's
development means the development of the rural areas. This is clearly the
objective of development in Nepal as spelled out by the government in its
budgets and plans. The government expressed its commitment to "strive
to take the fruits of economic development to the poor and destitute rural
population with a development strategy based on people's participation.
To achieve this objective, the government gives priority to primary educa-
tion, primary health care, potable water supply, rural transportation,
environmental conservation as well as income and employment generat-
ing activities in agriculture and small cottage industry sector. ''13 The
government has planned to invest 70 percent of its total expenditure for rural
development.
It is emphasized here that the political mechanisms for presenting
development policy and programs to the public and getting their approval
or rejection through democratic elections were missing in the previous
system. Even more important than the political mechanisms was the lack
of unity in both policies and their implementation in the partyless system.

12 Dual ownership implies joint ownership of land between landowners and tenants. Various
land reform measures have been enacted since the 1950s to grant tenancy rights to the tillers. One
of the common provisions is that any tiller establishing tenancy rights over the land of the landown-
ers is entitled to own within the maximum limits specified. However, in the first three sessions of
the parliament, the government had not tabled any bill related to land reforms.
13 HMG/N, Ministry of Finance, Budget of the Fiscal Year 1991-92, (Kathmandu: Ministry
of Finance, 1991), p. 3.

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Under the multiparty system, policy and programs of the ruling party should
be endorsed and supported by the party's members of the parliament. For
example, the Nepali Congress, the ruling party, passed an "economic reso-
lution" in its eighth convention held in February 1992. The members of the
Nepali Congress party are morally as well as politically obliged to work
towards attainment of the goals.
The Nepali Congress, the ruling party, gained comfortable majorities
in local political bodies. Theoretically, local political bodies will be exercising
more political and economic powers under multi-party democracy as com-
pared with the partyless system. This is ensured by the Decentralization Act
passed by the government. The local elections for 4,000 villages and 36 towns
held in May 1992 will contribute to empowering local self-government. This
will be necessary to maintain Nepal's multiethnic mosaic and to mobilize
human and financial resources for development. Very comparable to the
Pakistani scenario, as described by Rose, are the rural elites of Nepal, who
will control about 90 percent of the seats in the parliament. The rural elites
will be more supportive of the democratic system than the urban elites, "who
use the rhetoric of democracy enthusiastically but have reservations about
any system based upon the power-to-the people concept, given the rural-
urban population ratios. "'14 In addition, there is also a whole network of
party workers who should in principle be working to accomplish the govern-
ment's objectives. This kind of political mechanism was totally absent in
the partyless system. Ironically, the only uniting factor in the partyless
system was personal interest, which has been replaced by party interests in
a multi-party system.
The presence of a strong opposition force, represented by the Com-
munist and radical parties from the moderate and extreme left, and by the
vanguards of the old shambles from the far right, have led to a situation of
a political equilibrium. The Nepali Congress party, which represents centre-
left viewpoints, is forced to eke out a policy that may not be optimum but
may be politically acceptable to its opposition. Every issue, vital or trivial,
has the possibility of being scrutinized politically by the opposition. This
may lead to negotiations. Similarly, any issue that is vital for political
interests of various political forces will be opposed to the point whereby all
the political forces find a compromise solution. Depending on the strengths
and weakness of various parties, and political equilibrium and its conse-
quences, opposition and negotiations will prevent the ruling party from
being undemocratic or authoritarian. This inherent check and balance will
impose vigilance and careful consideration on the party of the government.
There are high political costs for lack of progress, inefficiency, corruption
and delays in delivering the goods to the electorate. These political risks have

14 Ibid.

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Democracy and Development in Nepal

enhanced prospects for democratic development in the country which were


absent for nearly three decades.
Another factor that imposes political costs on the ruling party is the
media. Since the restoration of democracy, there has been a considerable
growth of news media. For example, the number of newspapers increased
from 476 in 1988-89 to about 509 in 1989-90 (about a 7 percent increase
in a single year). The largest increase was found in the central development
region (which includes the capital region). The number of newspapers in
this region increased from 343 to 367 during this period. More than the
quantity of newspapers, it is the freedom of publication that matters. Polit-
ical interest groups, lobbyists and political forces who are disposed to dis-
credit the government are many. Journalism becomes vulnerable in their
hands and governmental activities are a priority. One could be equivocal
about the authenticity and the reliability of the press in democratic Nepal.
However, the press can sensationalize issues that demand public attention.
This was not the situation during the panchayat regime. Newspapers were
censored and only those who subscribed to the government policy could
survive. The implication is that the growth of public media has a signifi-
cant role to play in enhancing government's efficiency.
During the partyless panchayat periods, the main political debates were
over the system of government. The debate as to what system of govern-
ment is best has in fact absorbed the energy and resources during the last
three decades. Even the Communists and the supporters of the partyless
system have participated in the on-going democratic process which should
create conditions for strong opposition and check and balances. This not
only marks the end of the struggle over the system but should contribute
to reaching the people through democratic opposition. The wide support
for constitutional monarchy throughout the country by various political
groups (except for a few so-called republicanists) and the king, should con-
tribute to political stability which is a necessary condition for development.
The Nepali Congress government has been encouraging serious political
challenges since its formation, both from within and outside the parliament.
Unlike in many fledgling democracies, Nepal's politics is controlled by two
ideologically hostile parties, the Nepali Congress, and the United Marxist-
Leninist (which includes various other Communist factions). These par-
ties have fundamentally different approaches to a number of domestic policy
issues. However, the most important factor that distinguishes them is their
perceptions about Nepal's relations with India. In the following section, we
discuss some of the challenges the government has been facing in its efforts
to institutionalize democracy and promote development.

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THE CHALLENGES

Democracy, as stated by Larry Diamond, "is the most widely admired


type of political system but also perhaps the most difficult to maintain. " 15
Nepal's transformation from an authoritarian to a pluralistic multiparty
democracy has been difficult as the country has experienced every imagin-
able kind of political ferment. The unity between the two opposite politi-
cal parties, the Nepali Congress and the United Leftist, which worked
together to restore democracy and facilitate transition to the elected govern-
ment, turned into open hostility and competition for power during the elec-
tions and thereafter. Ever since the formation of the Nepali Congress
government, it has been encountering serious political challenges.

I. The Role of the Opposition

Unhealthy democratic trends began to surface with the inaugural ses-


sion of the country's first parliamentary session. Considering that democ-
racy was absent in the country for thirty-two years, the exchange of heated
debates over various issues was not unexpected. As theJuly 1991 and Febru-
ary 1992 sessions of the parliament have shown, creating healthy parlia-
mentary precedents in the country has remained one of the major problems.
The use of different regional languages by some parliamentary members,
rather than the national language as specifically prescribed in the house
regulations, created procedural impasses in the parliament. The parliament
ruled that members could speak in their native language if they wished (there
are about forty languages spoken by fifty ethnic groups). However, a ruling
was made that the Nepali language, which is the lingua franca and is spoken
by 58 percent of the total population, would continue to be used for official
and Parliamentary business.
In a multiethnic and multilingual country, democracy should be a
means to maintain cultural and linguistic identity. Insofar as the policy of
allowing multilingualism at the national government level is concerned, such
a policy may lead to conflict and controversy. First, Nepal is not a federal
state.'6 Second, even if Nepal is a multilinguistic society, there is no
dominance of one particular language in a particular region or territory.
Third, a large number of the languages and dialects are extinct and have

"5 Larry Diamond, "Three Paradoxes of Democracy,'"Journal of Democracy, vol. 1, no. 3 (Sum-
mer 1990), p. 48.
16 Some, like Milton J. Esman, view that in federalism or federal-like arrangements, multi-
lingualism would help the multiethnic or multiracial policy to survive. While the "effectiveness"
of specific language policies "tends to be highly contingent, official unilingualism, where practic-
able, seemfs more likely than multilingualism to lead eventually to political community" (p. 381).
See Milton J. Esman, "The State and the Language Policy," International Political Science Review,
vol. 13, no. 4, (1992), pp. 381-96.

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Democracy and Development in Nepal

been absorbed by the Nepali language. Finally, the wrangles over the use
of some of the languages in the parliament are deeply entrenched in nation-
alistic and socioeconomic fabrics. The UML members of parliament
opposed members representing the Terai constituency speaking in Hindi
(which is one of the official languages of India), instead of in Maithili or
Bhojpuri. This action was taken to stop the influence of India in Nepali
politics. The Maithili and Bhojpuri languages are predominant Terai lan-
guages which are spoken by 11 and 7 percent of the total population respec-
tively. Similarly, members from the Terai and the mountain regions opposed
the use of Newari language by some members representing the Kathmandu
Valley, the Newari language being spoken by 3 percent of the population.
This language is considered as the language of the privileged and econom-
ically dominant class of the Kathmandu Valley. Official unilingualism at
the national level and freedom of choice of language at the regional or local
level could best assure political comity in Nepal.
Incidentally, the United Marxist Leninist Party considered the Nepali
Congress to be its arch enemy from the time of its formation until its join-
ing the MRD. Mr. K.P. Bhattarai, the interim prime minister, was some-
how able to win over their friendship and cooperation because of his saintly
and unblemished image. But soon the Communists turned to bitter rivalry
against the Nepali Congress during the May 1991 elections and thereafter.
In fact, some of the Communists'7 are believed to have infiltrated the pan-
chayat system with the goal of supporting the banned Communist parties
in their efforts to overthrow the system. Some of the members of the dis-
solved panchayat system were so concerned about the growing influence of
the Communist faction that they "established a Democratic Panchayat
Forum" to "counter the growing influence of the communist faction" in
the Rastriya Panchayat (the national legislature). Mr. G. P. Koirala, the
prime minister, is considered to be the most outspoken anti-Communist
leader of the Nepali Congress. He, however, prefered to be a pragmatist
and took an accommodative posture towards Communists immediately after
becoming prime minister. He hoped that "the opposition would accept the
harsh realities of the country and provide active support to the government
in the day-to-day administration of the country, in institutionalizing the
development of democracy and in eliminating poverty from the coun-
try. " But the UML and other Communist parties are bent upon ousting
Mr. Koirala from power as early as possible. Mr. Madan Bhandari, the
general secretary of the UML Party - a man who rose from obscurity to
popularity because of his election victory over Mr. K.P. Bhattarai - has

17 For example, the last prime minister of the previous system, Mr. Marich Man Shrestha, was
a "former high school teacher from a peasant background and former communist. " See Far Eastern
Economic Review, Asia 1991 Year Book (Hongkong: 1991).

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stated repeatedly that his party will do everything to oust the Nepali Con-
gress government as soon as possible. The UML party's opinion is divided
on the extent of the opposition, but a large section of the young and radi-
cal members are determined to dislodge the government and replace it with
a Communist regime. 18
Another staunch opposition party is led by Sayunkta Jana Morcha
(United Peoples Front, also called the Maoist revolutionary party). The lead-
ers of this party advocate that parliamentary democracy only perpetuates
the interests of feudalism and the bourgeoisie. Ideologically, the United
Peoples' Front believes neither in elections nor in democracy. But accord-
ing to the party leaders, the reason the party contested the election was
merely to work to tear it down from the root and establish the so-called Naulo
Janabad (new democracy). In addition, two Communist-oriented parties
(insignificant though if seen individually), the Nepal Workers and Peasants
Party, and the Communist Party of Nepal (Democratic), have been sup-
porting the UML's move to oppose the Koirala government. Another
Communist party known as Mashal (lighted torch), which did not partici-
pate in the election and is believed to represent a Naxalite variant of Maoism,
considers the Nepali Congress as its main enemy. Then there is the Unity
Centre, another radical faction of the Communist party, which organized
a violent agitation in early February 1992 in which seven people were killed.
The centre blamed the government for price increases, corruption, smug-
gling and blackmarketeering and failure to solve the problem of squatters
and landless people.
The future direction of the Communist parties of Nepal with regard to
its India policy will depend on the nature of the Sino-Indian relations. Al-
though the UML is vague on the definition of Nepal's balanced and equit-
able relations with India and China, the role of the Communist parties is
vital for a number of important issues of national interest. The main rea-
son for this is Nepal's constitution. Article 126 of the constitution requires
a two-thirds majority of the house for ratification of an international treaty
or agreement on specific issues related to friendship and cooperation, secu-
rity and strategic matters, boundary, utilization and distribution of benefits
of natural resources. The Nepali Congress does not have a two-third major-
ity in the house and therefore has to rely for both consensus and coopera-
tion on the UML.
For much of the country's travails, the Communists raised the Indian
bogey during the election campaign. Most of the Communist parties see
India as viscerally hegemonistic and expansionist, and treat anti-Indianism
as a synonym for Nepali nationalism. The various Communist parties have

18 See Nepal in The Europa World Year Book 1991, volume 2 (London: Europa Publication, 1991),
p. 1903.

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Democracy and Development in Nepal

been opposing the trade and transit treaties and the memorandum of
understanding on sharing water resources signed by the Nepali prime
minister in December 1991. The members of the main opposition along with
members of other oppositional parties boycotted some of the early sessions
of the winter session of the parliament which began on February 21, 1992.
The opposition parties demanded that the government table the relevant
documents on the understanding concerning water resources with India.
The opposition led by the UML has challenged the constitutionality of some
accords. It has also challenged both the constitutionality and the advantages
for Nepal as claimed by the government of some other accords signed with
India. Indeed, utilization and benefit sharing of water resources between
Nepal and India has been a serious bone of contention since the 1950s.
Viewed from the criticisms levelled by the Communist forces on Gandak
and Koshi river projects in the past, it is no wonder that the Tanakpur bar-
rage project (one of the projects signed between India and Nepal in 1991)
has received by far the most serious attacks from the opposition.19 The
opposition has been criticizing the government for implementing accords
related to issues included in the constitution without their ratification by a
two-thirds majority in the house. From outside the parliament, a lawyer filed
a writ petition at the Supreme Court on December 17, 1991 demanding that
the new treaties and agreements signed with India in December 1991 not
be implemented until they were approved by the parliament. The petition
has serious political implications for Nepal. The prime minister will be under
pressure to resign if the Supreme Court hearing goes against the govern-
ment, the defendant.
The non-Communist opposition in the parliament accounts for little
more than 6 percent of the votes. Most of these members are apt in creat-
ing their identity as well as credibility by means of criticism of the govern-
ment. For this reason, they even align with the Communist factions. For
example, in the winter session of the parliament, the non-Communist mem-
bers, other than those of the Goodwill party, supported the Communists

'9 The opposition alleged that the construction of the Tanakpur barrage will alter the Nepal-
India border. They also demanded that the granting of land by Nepal to India (amounting to
2.9 hectares for the 577-metre afflux bund) must be formally approved by the parliament, and sharing
of the benefits of the boundary river should be equitable. The various Communist parties have been
demanding the resignation of the prime minister by saying that the "understanding" reached between
India and Nepal on water resources including the Tanakpur barrage fall under the category of a
"treaty" and therefore should have been ratified by a two-thirds parliamentary majority as required
under the constitution and the Nepal Treaty Act of 1990. The Communist opposition has also started
a united front movement demanding the resignation of the prime minister following the Supreme
Court's verdict on the writ petition filed by a lawyer in December 1991 asking the Supreme Court
to issue an order stopping the execution of the "understanding" as long as the understanding is not
ratified. The Supreme Court decided in December 1992 that the "understanding" be ratified as
required by Article 126 of the constitution. Following this verdict, the Communist parties decided
to launch ajoint movement demanding the resignation of the prime minister. See Saptahik Bimarsa
(Kathmandu), 18 December 1992.

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on the sensitive issue concerning the understanding reached between Nepal


and India on water resources. The non-Communist opposition parties are
either regional or ethnocentric in orientation. Legally, the constitution (1990)
bars the Election Commission from recognizing political parties based on
religion, caste, community, tribe, or region or parties founded for the
purpose of disturbing the national unity. In practice, it is hard to control
these premises as none of the parties describes its goals as those which are
forbidden by the constitution. But if one looks into the membership or the
issues promoted, their political orientation becomes self-evident. In their
search for a regional identity and political viability, these parties' opposi-
tion is limited to their goal orientations. For example, the Goodwill party
has been opposing the government for its failure to solve the grievances of
the Terai region. The people of the lowland commonly known as the "Ter-
ai" feel that they have been discriminated against in matters concerning
citizenship, employment, and representation in civil and military service.
Issues such as citizenship were critical even during the last period of the
previous system, and the Sadbhavana party (the Goodwill party), was suc-
cessful in capitalizing on these issues. Both the Nepali Congress and the
various Communist factions also have a sizeable representation among the
Terai population.
Some other parties like the Nepal National People's Liberation Front,
which did not win a single seat in the general elections, demanded a "fed-
eral state, provincial autonomy, and political representation to [sic] ethnic
groups in proportion to their population. X20 However, serious ethnic and
regional problems could emerge if the government fails to ensure equity and
fairness in its public policy decisions. Another risk is that in odd times, such
political parties may become gullible to both internal and external forces and
be subject to manipulation and coercion.
The vanguards of the old regime masquerading under the veil of
democratic parties were routed at the polls. All the former prime ministers
of the partyless regime were defeated and their parties fared so poorly in the
election that their parliamentary opposition is almost insignificant. But it
is certain that the supporters of the old system could become a force to be
reckoned with in the near future. As the parties of the former supporters
of the panchayat system are vying for being an alternative to the Nepali
Congress, the two parties, the National Democratic party (Chand) and
National Democratic party (Thapa) have merged and formed the United
National Democratic party in February 1992. Another group of the former
panchayat supporters has formed the National Party Alliance in February
1992 with the objective of becoming an alternative to the Nepali Congress.

20 Gorkhapatra (Kathmandu), 5 February 1991.

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Democracy and Development in Nepal

II. The Fear of a Royal Backlash

Constitutional monarchy can be a positive factor in institutionalizing


democracy in Nepal. Unfortunately there still exist some clouds of mistrust
and misunderstanding between the political parties and the monarchy. Two
major events in the early transitional phase contributed to further the mis-
understanding between the major political parties and the monarchy. The
first was the formation of the seven-member Constitution Reforms Recom-
mendation Commission by the king on May 11, 1990 "without consult-
ing" the prime minister about its membership. Mr. G.P. Koirala, the then
general secretary of the Nepali Congress, alleged that some of the members
of the commission were "undesirable" and that the people wanted not a
reformed constitution, but "a new, and separate constitution. " The king
on May 15, 1990, however, dissolved the commission and constituted a new
commission on the recommendation of the prime minister. The second event
was the release of a draft of the constitution on October 21, 1990 which it
claimed to have been "prepared in consultation with the Prime Minister. "
Mr. Bhattarai denied that the "royal palace draft had been prepared in con-
sultation with him. " The king's counter draft of the constitution, if trans-
pired, would have left his "executive, legislative and judiciary powers intact,
as under the Panchayat system. The draft empowered the King to dismiss
the prime minister, dissolve the House of Representatives under emergency
powers and appoint a new one. It deleted all references to the historic
democracy movement contained in the draft prepared by the Constitution
Commission endorsed by the (interim) Cabinet. " 21
The royal action created confusion and uncertainty and consequently
sparked off a wave of protest across the nation. A new constitution, which
fulfilled people's aspirations, was finally promulgated on November 9, 1990.
Some political circles were critical of the royal appointment of ambassadors
made during the interim government without consulting the prime minister.
All these events created distrust and misunderstanding about the role of the
king. But the king seems to be well reconciled with this reality and has been
staying within constitutional limits. He has clearly stated that the institu-
tion of monarchy in Nepal "always abided by the value and norms prevail-
ing at any time. In more recent time, it is the Constitution in existence which
has guided the monarchy. In this context I have abided by the spirit and
provisions of the 1990 Constitution, which institutionalizes multi-party
democracy in a constitutional monarchy. " 22 The king also told me that he
would like to see that constitutional monarchy become well embedded in
Nepali politics.

21 See Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1991 Year Book (Hong Kong: 1991), p. 177.
22 His Majesty King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev's interview to The Independent (Kathmandu).

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One of the problems in fragile democracies is that political events change


very fast and tend to become unpredictable. The speculation that the palace
might be forced to take over if the democratic government fails to maintain
law and order in the country has created some degree of political uncertainty
in Nepal. Moreover, the Nepali Congress government has not been able
to buy the loyalty and commitment of the military and police force. The
thirty-five-thousand-strong military force is still very loyal to the palace. This
is obvious from the circular sent on June 23, 1991 by the Military Opera-
tion and Staff Duties Unit of the G Branch of the Royal Army Headquarters
to all army units. It directed them to submit a suggestion to the Constitu-
tion Recommendation Commission stating that the king should remain the
supreme commander-in-chief and field marshall of the Royal Nepal Army.
It also directed them to suggest that "sovereignty must be vested in His
Majesty, who should control the army." Fortunately, the aborted coup
attempt and the victory for democracy and freedom in the Soviet Union in
August 1991 highlights the fact that democracy cannot always be taken back
from the people. So long as the monarchy remains within the constitutional
limits, it will be in the best interest of the country to preserve monarchy which
is the oldest political institution in the country. In a geopolitically sensitive
country like Nepal, the retention of the constitutional monarchy will help
maintain balance between different communities and political forces. If both
the king and the political forces are guided by the constitution, monarchy
can make positive contributions towards institutionalizing democracy in the
country by way of resolving any parliamentary crises that may occur from
time to time.

III. Fulfillment of Peoples' Expectation

Another serious challenge before the democratic government is the


rising expectations of the people. It is correctly stated that "democracy will
not be valued by the people unless it deals effectively with social and eco-
nomic problems and achieves a modicum of order and justice."23 Nepal's
poverty is too obvious when one examines socioeconomic indicators such
as literacy, health and sanitation, drinking water facilities, average calorie
intake, etc. Poverty is rampant in rural areas where the majority of the popu-
lation live. About 60 percent of the population in rural areas are estimated
to have income below the poverty line.
The government so far has failed to make a dent on Nepal's economic
problems. The economy grew moderately (by about 3 percent) in 1991-92
but agricultural growth was reduced to 1.5 percent which intensified hard-
ships for the majority of the population. Although 70 percent of the develop-
ment budget was allocated for rural development, the government could

23 Diamond, "Three Paradoxes of Democracy," p. 49.

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Democracy and Development in Nepal

not spend more than half of the resources. The poor performance of the
government led the Nepali Congress president to state that "the people are
dissatisfied because the pace of development has been slow. " 24 The prices
of essential commodities have been rising rapidly since the impasse in Nepali-
Indian relations and especially due to lifting subsidies and raising admin-
istered prices under the economic reform program the government em-
barked on in 1991-92. The devaluation measure taken by the Koirala
government in early July 1991 and the partial convertibility of the rupee
announced in March 1992 contributed to further price increases. The prices
of essential goods and services increased over 20 percent in the last quar-
ter of 1991 compared with an average annual inflation rate of 10 percent in
previous years.
In an attempt to bring about structural adjustment in the economy, the
government embarked upon price reform measures in public utilities such
as electricity and telecommunication, and public goods such as education
and water. The decision to increase prices has been a condition for increased
external loans and grants. Such reform measures which were introduced
with the goal of reducing the government deficit contributed to hyper-
inflation. The hyperinflationary pressure provoked civil servants and the
unionized industrial labour to demand wage increases which have been
partially met, thus setting off a rapid inflationary spiral. The fact that a larg
number of people supported the protest demonstrations organized by one
of the radical factions of the Communist parties in February 1992 indicates
growing public discontent. Much of the failure is attributed to the three
decades of economic mismanagement by the panchayat system. Indeed,
whatever little economic change took place in the past was confined to the
urban areas and their periphery which served the interest of only the vested
interest groups, the elites, and the merchants. But part of the failure to
improve the economy is attributable to the political stalemate type situa-
tion created on the one hand by a strong opposition, and on the other by
the growing rift between the Nepali Congress party and its government.
The government is facing numerous problems as stated above. But the
government is also muddled about economic policy; its policy goals are
developmentalist but its approaches are neoliberalist. There are two distinct
groups within the party, one believing in "democratic socialism" and the
other in a free market approach. This is obvious if one compares the eighth
five year plan (1992-97) and the budget for 1992-93. The former follows
a democratic socialist path while the latter subscribes to liberalization and
privatization. There are also differences in approach. The eighth five year
plan emphasizes the alleviation of poverty using a multisectoral approach

24 Mr. K.P. Bhattarai's interview to the Swatantrata (Kathmandu), 9 July 1992, as translated in
the Nepal Press Digest, vol. 36, no. 28 (13 July 1992).

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while the budget, which deviates from the first budget (1991-92), concen-
trates on the modern sector, and the government's strategy to privatize state-
owned industries including the traditional sector has received wide criticism.

IV. Politicization of the Bureaucracy

It would be wrong to assume that Nepal's bureaucracy is a Weberian


type ideal bureaucracy. On the contrary, bureaucracy in Nepal has emerged
as a potential threat to its fragile democracy. Indeed, since the early 1950s,
the bureaucracy absorbed the tradition of being a political instrument. The
agitation by the Nepali Congress party in the fall of 1953 "which went so
far that in September 1953 B.P. Koirala was arrested and confined to the
Kathmandu Valley" was supported by the civil servants. B.P. Koirala him-
self was accused of "trying to disaffect the civil servants by writing a letter
to them. " The Supreme Court declared in November 1953 that the arrest
was illegal and as a consequence of B.P. Koirala's action "the civil servants
were required to turn over all correspondence which they received from
political parties and were forbidden to engage in political activity. " The civil
service of Nepal worked as an invisible political opposition to the partyless
regime. It was a well-known fact even among the rank and file of the pan-
chayat system that the majority of the middle class civil servants, who were
university graduates, subscribed to either the Nepali Congress or to the
Communist ideology. Since the civil service was banned from unionization,
these two diametrically opposite groups did not fight with each other.
Instead, they indirectly and passively lent moral and political support to
political parties or groups. Interestingly, one of the most organized voices
against the first democratic government came from the civil servants who
began their political agitation when a coalition interim government was in
place, agitation which was withdrawn after the government constituted a
pay recommendation commission. However, immediately after the forma-
tion of the Nepali Congress government, the civil servants renewed politi-
cal agitation, which is claimed by the members of the ruling party as a move
to discredit the government.25
The Nepal Civil Servants Organization had its first national conference
in mid-September 1990 which demanded that its entity be officially recog-
nized. The unrest by the 150,000 civil servants in the summer of 1991
demanding increases in salaries and housing and health allowances definitely
disturbed the process of institutionalizing democracy. Within days of the
formation of the Koirala government maintenance of law and order became
again a major problem. In defiance of the prime minister's commitment

25 Werner Levi, "Political Rivalries in Nepal," in Far Eastern Survey (July 1954), p. 104. See foot-
note 2.

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Democracy and Development in Nepal

to maintaining law and order and his appeal to the civil servants to be patient
for at least a year, the country's bureaucracy became partially paralyzed
as the pro-leftist faction of the lower ranks of the civil servants went on strike.
The possible threat to democracy is obvious from Mr. Koirala's warning
that "at a time when the reactionary forces were looking for the opportunity
to inflict a blow to the new born democracy, any trouble originating from
the demands can pose a danger to democracy. " But surprisingly the strik-
ing civil servants called off the strikes on 24 August without any gains in
hand. It seems that the failure of the aborted coup attempt in the Soviet
Union and the return of Mr. Gorbachev to power created psychological
effects on both striking civil servants and their political mentors. In order
to reduce politicization and thereby enhance efficiency of the bureaucracy,
the government has embarked upon a two-front strategy. It has offered
monetary incentives by raising salaries of the civil servants in April 1992,
but has also decided to retire about one-third of the total government
employees within the next three years. However, so long as political par-
ties do not make commitment not to use civil servants as an instrument of
their politics, depoliticization of the Nepalese bureaucracy will remain a
fundamental challenge to the government.26

V. The Amorphous Political Parties

In democracy, political parties work as foundations on which govern-


ments are formed. Political parties not only organize voters into majorities
behind leaders and ideology, but they also try to mobilize the diffuse elec-
torate as a means of bringing dominant issues into focus. Parties also work
as platforms that are institutions for rational tests of leadership and states-
manship. Political parties can be studied in many ways: by their ideologi-
cal orientation, by their objectives, by their national and international
perspectives, etc. Ideologically, political parties can generally be grouped
into three major groups: the conservatives, the progressives (with a Com-
munist connotation) and the centrists. With specific objects in mind the
political parties can be divided into two types: goals-oriented, and power-
oriented. Power-oriented parties can also at the same time be goal-oriented
because gaining power is invariably associated with attainment of other
political goals. Downs' hypothesis that "parties formulate policies in order
to win election, rather than win election in order to formulate policies' 1 27
is applicable to the power-oriented parties. By implication, political parties
appear and disappear or reappear in relation to political power. The mem-
bers of predominantly power oriented parties are not bound by ideologi-
cal or any sound political philosophy.

26 See the Gorkhapatra, 16 September 1990.


27 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), p. 28.

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Most of the political parties that were born in the aftermath of the
restoration of democracy in 1990 in Nepal are power oriented. For exam-
ple, the two national democratic parties, the Communist party of Nepal
(democratic), and a host of others are guided by the sole objective of gain-
ing power through election. By contrast, the Nepali Congress and the Nepal
Communist (UML) parties are goal oriented in the sense that they have had
certain goals which they have been pursuing partially in some cases, and
wholly in other cases. Some factions of the Communist parties are also goal
oriented because their main goal in the past was to overthrow the panchayat
system.
The Nepali Congress party, which was formed in 1947, is the oldest and
the largest party in the country. The Nepal Communist party was formed
in 1950 and if all the factions are put together, it becomes the second largest
party. Both these political parties have not been able to emerge as fully
institutionalized parties. There are a number of problems. These problems
are discussed first in the context of the Nepali Congress and thence in the
context of the Communist parties. First, the Nepali Congress from its very
inception suffered from an internal crisis that arose due to competition for
leadership and power. Second, the party faced the problem of what can be
called the Weberian syndrome. The party was virtually overwhelmed by
Mr. B.P. Koirala's charismatic personality which remained conspicuous
until his death in 1982. The leadership void left by his death is the greatest
loss for the Nepali Congress. And third, the long and arduous struggle by
the party to restore democracy for nearly three decades has obstructed the
process of institutionalizing and exercising democratic norms and values
within the party. However, the party was able to survive despite internal
crisis brought about by circumstances that occasionally led to serious party
divisions and factionalism.
The success of the democratic movement has definitely enhanced the
Nepali Congress party's position and strength as the results of the general
election have made evident. However, the party has three major interrelated
challenges insofar as its institutional development is concerned. The first
one is that the party lacks a clear and well-identified common national as
well as international vision for the 1990s and beyond. Discussion with the
party leaders and the members of the rank and file gives one the impres-
sion that the party is divided by its economic ideology. Some are strongly
in favour of democratic socialism (developmentalists) whereas others favour
a strong free enterprise system (neoliberalists). Theoretically, the party has
endorsed democratic socialist principles but in reality, this was neither dis-
cussed democratically nor applied wholeheartedly. The second challenge
is the problem of consolidating and strengthening the party as a modern
democratic organization with established rules, procedures, norms and
elections. Up until now, the party, which was a loose body of members with
divided affinity and loyalty, was operating in a policy vacuum. Besides, the

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Democracy and Development in Nepal

party is also facing the problem of how to channel the different but disparate
members scattered all over the country who feel alienated from the party
leadership and the party's government. The party members are also labelled
as "old" and "new," "pure " and " panchayatized," meaning those who
had joined the panchayat system.
As politics is central to power and social status in Third World coun-
tries, perhaps even more so in Nepal, many of the old vanguards of the
Nepali Congress party feel humiliated to see that some of the junior and
unknown entities are appointed by Mr. Koirala to his cabinet and other key
positions. This implies that the neglect of those who are influential and have
been honest all along will only hamper the institutional development of the
party.
The third challenge, which is related to the second, is to effect coordina-
tion between the party and its government. This has been a peculiar problem
since the early 1950s. Apparently it seems that there is a triangular distri-
bution of political power among Mr. G.M. Singh who is the supreme leader,
Mr. K.P. Bhattarai, the party president, and Mr. G.P. Koirala, the prime
minister. The implication of such a triangular distribution of responsibil-
ity and leadership is that those members who have no patron-client nexus
with any of these leaders will have very little chance of benefitting from
political patronage, let alone exercising real powers. The "discretionary
nomination" to the Upper House in July 1991 aroused controversy and
anger among the senior and dedicated workers of the party as the leaders
nominated people according to their personal judgement and their assess-
ment of loyalty and proximity. Some of the Nepali Congress members of
the parliament as well as its party organization felt humiliated by G.P.
Koirala's nomination of one of his relatives relatively unknown either
politically or intellectually in the political circle around the member of the
cabinet.28 Some of the senior party members mentioned that "if it is up to
Mr. Koirala to judge competence, qualification and expertise, it will be no
wonder that he will pick some of his mediocre people around him. " 29
The politics of patronage transpired into a real crisis in mid-September
1991 when Mr. G.M. Singh, the supreme leader of the Nepali Congress
party, asked for Mr. Koirala's resignation or else he would quit politics.
Mr. Singh alleged that Prime Minister Koirala favoured an extreme form
of nepotism and some form of "brahamanism" in making certain key
appointments, including the position of minister of finance.30 The issue

28 The disappointment of some of the Nepali Congress members of the House of Representa-
tives was expressed to the author in several meetings.
29 This is based on the author's discussion with some of the senior party members and the
members of the House of Representatives.
30 See Suruchi (Kathmandu), 15 September 1991, and for Ganesh Man Singh's charge tha
of Mr. Koirala' s appointees was merely an "unweaned infant" see Saptahik Bimarsa (Kathmandu),
13 September 1991.

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Pacific Affairs

was resolved through some compromise and active persuasion from party
president, Bhattarai. Unfortunately, the conflict of interests between the
prime minister and the supreme leader increased due to the sudden dismissal
of some cabinet ministers in late December 1991. The supreme leader of
the Nepali Congress accused the prime minister of his party of being a
"dictator."3' The conflict of interest became a crisis at the time of the
party's eighth convention held in mid-February 1992.32 The party su-
premo had given a three month grace period, which would expire in May,
to set things right.33 The party's outstanding victory in the local elections
made Mr. Singh less critical of the prime minister's performance, and the
prime minister also pursued a policy of appeasement by appointing some
of Mr. Singh's family members and community friends to high level posi-
tions. However, such a policy only heightened the frustrations and anger
of some of the senior party members who believe that the government is
bogged down in sharing powers and privileges between the families of the
prime minister and the supreme leader. After the death of one of the three
leaders, there will undoubtedly by a split in the party. But considering the
current level of conflict, it is quite probable that the party will break up in
the near future into two major groups, one led by Mr. Koirala, and the other
led by the party president and the supreme leader.
The conflict of interests also aggravated the discontent of the party
workers who did not happen to be as close to any of the leaders as others are,
due to their family relations or affinity. Simmering discontent might grow
into some kind of a canker in the party, which will make the goal of achieving
political stability difficult. The politics of patron-client relations will not dis-
appear in Nepal's multiparty democracy. In fact one of the reasons for the
importance of the studies of patronage and patron-client relations is social
scientists' growing awareness that the "patron-client relations were not des-
tined to remain on the margins of society nor to disappear with the develop-
ment and establishment of democracies with well-functioning political and
economic systems marked by economic development and modernization,
or with the growth of class consciousness among the lower strata. " 34 But

31 See Saptahik Bimarsa (Kathmandu), 3 January 1992.


32 The government daily, The Rising Nepal, reported, "the infighting in the Nepali Congress
erupted today into a political volcano sending shock tremors threatening to push the party to the
brink of a sudden collapse." The Rising Nepal (Kathmandu), 16 February 1992.
33 The three months time given by the supreme leader Mr. Singh expired on 16 May 1992.
Mr. Singh raised the issues of price controls, improvement in law and order, impartial administra-
tive reforms, and a balanced representation in government appointments. He said that if the party
failed to resolve these issues soon, he would quit politics. President K.P. Bhattarai has said that he
would do everything to settle the dispute between Mr. Singh and the prime minister. See Deshantar
(Kathmandu), 17 May 1992.
34 S.N. Eisenstadt and Luis Roniger, "The Study of Patron-Client Relations and Recent
Developments in Sociological Theory, " in S. N. Eisenstadt and R. Lemarchand, eds., Political Clien-
talism, Patronage and Development (London: Sage Publications, 1981), p. 272.

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Democracy and Development in Nepal

unless political justice is done by leaders commanding powers and resources,


it is very unlikely that a party system could be well institutionalized.
The Communist party, the party that is now in the opposition, is more
amorphous than the Nepali Congress party. The Communist movement
in general in Nepal has a very distorted history. The first Communist party
was founded in 1950 under the leadership of Pushpa Lal. The Communist
party of Nepal, "to its everlasting regret, had not taken part in the
revolt" 35 against the autocratic Rana regime. According to Levi, "the vast
majority of Nepali living in India and all political groups pledged cooper-
ation with the movement" against the Rana regime. "The Communists
were the exception. They demanded commitment to an anti-Indian policy
as their price, a price never paid by the Nepali Congress."36
Factionalism has been an inherent feature of the Communist movement
in Nepal especially since the Third Convention of the party held in 1965.
Prior to the Third Convention, the Communist movement was split into
two disparate groups, one group supporting the Soviet line adopting a
moderate attitude towards the panchayat system and monarchy. The other
group, that is, the pro-Chinese group, adopted a revolutionary strategy
against the panchayat system and the monarchy. The pro-Chinese Com-
munists in opposition to the pro-Soviet group convened the Third Conven-
tion in 1965. However, it soon became divided along ideological and
strategic grounds. Those supporting the Soviet policy split into four main
camps in the immediate aftermath of the national referendum. The pro-
Chinese faction was divided into more than twenty different variants during
1965-1989. Seen in this perspective, many of the Communist parties oper-
ating under different suffixes37 are fairly new. The United Left Front, a
loose unity of seven Communist parties, was created in January 1990 to
launch a movement for the restoration of democracy. In December 1990
four of the seven Communist parties (not represented in the interim govern-
ment) broke away from the United Left Front. In January 1991 the two
major factions of the Communist parties, the CPN (Marxist) and the CPN
(Marxist-Leninist) merged to form the United Marxist-Leninist party.
The Communists of Nepal are divided on various issues. In the 1960s,
the main issue was the Sino-Soviet conflict. By the late 1960s, other issues

35 See Eugene Bramer Mihaly, Foreign Aid and Politics in Nepal (London: Oxford University Press,
1965), p. 17.
36 Werner Levi, "Government and Politics in Nepal," Far Eastern Survey, 17 December 1952,
p. 189.
37 Prior to the formation of the United Marxist-Leninist party in January 1991, two of the major
factions used the terms, "Marxist" and "Marxist-Leninist." In general some draw a distinction
between communism and Marxism. Generally, "all communists claim to be Marxists, but many
Marxists would repudiate the name communists. Marxists accept the teaching of Karl Marx, whereas
all communists are Marxists and accept the teachings of Karl Marx as interpreted by Leninists. "
See Charles Hobday, Communist and Marxist Parties of the World (Essex: Longman Group, 1986), p. 1.

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Pacific Affairs

divided the Communists of Nepal sharply. Those issues were Mao's


propaganda for cultural revolution; the Nepali Congress and its strategy;
the Indo-Soviet alliance and the creation of Bangladesh; the debate whether
to use revolutionary means or to infiltrate the panchayat system; the role
of monarchy in Nepal; and the question of Naxalite-type strategy for
exterminating the rural landlords. There were differences in both ideolo-
gy and strategy between various local and regional Communist groups,
especially whether or not to stage an anti-zamindar movement.
Added to the changing face of communism in the international arena
and to the crisis in the Communist movement in Nepal is its lack of a leader
of national stature and vision. The Communist movement has suffered from
a lack of consensus on politico-economic issues since its inception. Some talk
about "new democracy" in which "peasants, workers, and national capi-
talists will be supreme, and exploitation by feudal, merchants and capitalist,
and other privileged groups will be abolished." 38 Another group repre-
sented by the United Marxist-Leninist party seems to be utterly confused.
According to the general secretary of the United Marxist-Leninist Party
(UML) "the new democracy" envisioned by the group is not socialist, nor
Communist. It is entirely a new kind of capitalist system which encourages
national capitalism and creates conditions for the transition to socialism.
The theoretical link of "new democracy" is "with both socialism and com-
munism. " 39 Such a division of opinion is an apparent reason for faction-
alism, but the implication is that such confusing views hamper growth of
political parties.
The most demoralizing psychological effect has been caused by the col-
lapse of communism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. The Hoenecker-
Ceausescu example of the misuse and corruption of power for building
family fortunes amidst mass suffering and discontent gave a serious blow
to the Communists of Nepal. The pro-democracy movement in China in
the summer of 1989, the economic catastrophes faced by the Soviet Union,
and the historic transformation of the Soviet Union into a commonwealth
of republics that took place in late December 1991 came as a moral crisis
for the Communists of Nepal. The choking of the middle class by the provin-
cial Communist government of West Bengal on the one hand, and the failure
to improve the conditions of the working class on the other, further demoral-
ized the Communists of Nepal. These are the recent international events
that contributed to the sharp division of the Communists along both ideo-
logical and methodological lines. One of the consequences of this situation

38 See the "Interview of the Central Spokesman of the United National People's Movement and
Leader of the NCP (Masal)," Saptahik NepaliAwaj (Kathmandu), 20July 1990, as translated in the
Nepal Press Digest (Kathmandu), vol. 34, no. 31 (30 July 1991).
39 Interview given by the general secretary of the United Marxist-Leninist party. See Nepali Patra
(Kathmandu), 19 July 1991.

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Democracy and Development in Nepal

is that some factions of the Communist party left their party and joined the
Nepali Congress.40
Insofar as Communists believe in constitutional monarchy and
democracy, such cleavages and schisms weaken Communists as political
parties. However, the most serious problem with communism in Nepal is
the lack of conviction and commitment of the majority of the members of
the parties. A great number of the party workers come from middle and
higher middle class families, that is, from the land owning class. Most of
the people who have joined the parties became influenced directly or indi-
rectly in the late 1960s by the ideology of Mao's cultural revolution. The
majority of them became communists because of their anti-Nepali Congress
and anti-India stand while others were encouraged by the supporters of the
panchayati workers as a counterweight against the Nepali Congress party.
Family connection or influence is another factor that influenced some of the
members and supporters of the communist movement. What is noticeable
is that most of young and middle aged communist supporters cherish free-
dom, strive for western life styles, and have high paying jobs. Those who
live in the rural areas or whose families are living in rural areas have been
exploiting the peasants and farmers. However, when it comes to voting or
supporting a particular party, these communists vote for communist backed
candidates. Such a tendency might make it difficult to bring real communism
even to a poor agricultural country like Nepal. Without regard to norma-
tive judgement about the virtues or vices of the dialectical dilemma, it can
be said, such a trend only feeds a reactionary attitude. This may be undesir-
able for healthy democratic development in the country.
Other parties on the political spectrum will undergo metamorphosis.
The absence of ideological philosophy and a common vision on domestic
as well as external perspectives, will contribute to different permutations
as disappearance and merging will be a common feature in the power
oriented new political parties such as the national democratic parties, the
social democratic parties, the parties based on religion and ethnicity.
However, it is in the interest of the preservation of the constitutional mon-
archy that one or two major political parties serve to consolidate multi-party
democracy in the country.

40 For example, the founding members of the United Marxist-Leninist affiliated Nepal Inde-
pendent Workers Union quit their union and joined the Nepali Congress. It was stated that "in the
present age, communist dictatorship has become irrelevant. " The members of the union who quit
the party called on all members to "free themselves from the communist confusion and work" for
democracy. Similarly, the "President of the Nepal Communist Party (sixth convention) joined the
Nepali Congress along with 2,000 members" (Nepali Patra [Kathmandu], 28 November 1991, as
translated in The Nepal Press Digest, vol. 35, no. 48 [2 December 1991]).

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Pacific Affairs

COMMITMENT AND CONSENSUS

Immediate post dictatorial regimes are generally weak and fragile in


securing political legitimacy. Generally, weak and fragile political systems
are unable to fulfill the expectations of the people. Political stability is a neces-
sary condition in order for democracy to create sound conditions for develop-
ment. However, political stability cannot be achieved automatically in
democratic regimes. Some fundamental preconditions of democracy must
be fulfilled to attain political stability. First of all, people must believe
in individual freedom and in social order. Second, democratic idealism
demands that people must be prepared to listen to reason and respect each
other's view point. Third, people must submit to the majority's decisions.
They should also agree to concede to others according to the rule of law, (that
is, "a government of laws and not of men"), and constitutionalism, which
refers to "limits on majority decisions, more specifically, limits that are in
some sense self-imposed. " 41 Fourth, people in the government must direct
their efforts to attain social and economic justice. This is especially impor-
tant in countries like Nepal where societies are characterized by massive
socioeconomic inequalities. Fundamentally, people must try to create not
just a democratic government but also a democratic social order by apply-
ing democratic values in real-life situations.
It must be stated that democratic political development depends on how
strong and structured political parties become in establishing sound links
between electorates and legislators. Political parties are also instruments of
facilitating political transition peacefully when the government of a particular
party fails to perform satisfactorily and another party gets elected. The
strength of political parties reduces the possibility of abortive coups by power-
hungry zealots. Therefore, political parties in Nepal should be structured
and developed along healthy political cultures and traditions. Democracy
would mean very little for countries like Nepal, with so much socioeconomic
inequality between the urban rich and the rural poor. The government and
the politicians must make every effort to reduce socioeconomic inequalities
in order for every citizen to have an equal opportunity for the development
of his individual personality. Democracy should not be a vehicle for rich and
educated people to govern the poor and uneducated.
As Nepal's hard-earned democracy is also passing thrugh a very deli-
cate period, political parties must apply reason before embarking on major
decisions that would affect the sociopolitical fabric of the country. The Com-
munist parties which fought to restore democracy and have now been elected
democratically must be mentally prepared to follow democratic norms and
traditions. The determined efforts of some sections of the Communist parties

41 John Elster and Rune Slagstad, Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), p. 2.

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Democracy and Development in Nepal

to remove the democratically elected government contradicts their current


political faith in democracy and could prove very costly for the newly
acquired democracy. However, the Communists of Nepal should learn les-
sons from history. What is required on the part of the various Communist
parties is an abiding faith in democracy and commitment to the rule of law.
The Communist party could set an upper limit for opposing the ruling party
and a lower limit for compromise. The upper and lower limits should be
determined by the parameters of democracy. This means any opposition
or compromise that undermines democracy should be avoided.
The ruling party should also try to seek cooperation on some of the burn-
ing issues. Indeed, some sort of a consensus on major national and inter-
national issues that determine the destiny of the country could be useful in
the process of institutionalizing democracy. It also puts contending politi-
cal forces to the acid test of elections. The change in attitudes and values
of the urban elites and political workers is also necessary and desirable. If
such a change is not forthcoming, this may impede the task of widening the
base of popular participation at the grass roots level. Here the major polit-
ical parties, and especially the ruling Nepali Congress, should urge their
members to sincerely work for the underprivileged and the deprived sec-
tions of society. But this will not be possible when internal dissension is brew-
ing concerning the sharing of power and responsibilities. In a parliamentary
system based on party politics, the leaders must develop a culture of trust
and confidence in their party workers. Also, honest efforts must be made
by both Mr. G.M. Singh and Mr. G.P. Koirala to grant authority and
responsibility to senior and capable party members and loyalists and avoid
by all means the practice of running the nation as a family business.

Ottawa, Canada, November 1992

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