Changing management

strategies in
industrial relations
How have employers responded to deterior-
ating economic conditions in their strategies
for managing industrial relations? Here the
author, using empirical data for 1977-83, dis-
cusses the changes taking place in management
strategies and the rationales behind them.

ONDITIONS of economic recession have decentralised as the responsibility for more

C stimulated interest in the changes taking
place industrial relations[ll. One area of
in
debate concerns the changes employers are
making to their strategies for managing indus-
trial relations in response to the changed
market conditions. Two possible employer re-
actions have been recognised. First, one might
expect the recession to lead to ‘an even greater
centralisation of decisions as top management
seeks to rationalise production and costs’.
Second, ‘companies would decentralise control
in order to maximise their ability to exploit the
possibilities of increased efficiency with a
quiescent workforce”2 I.
The argument put forward here is that
employers are not following either one strategy
or the other, but that they are pursuing both
strategies. An overview of changes in industrial
relations strategies in four large multi-plant
companies over the period 1977 to 1983 re-
veals that employers are moving in the direc-
tion of both greater centralisation and decen-
tralisation in their control of industrial relations.
On the one hand managerial control is be-
coming more centralised as more strategic
industrial relations decisions are being taken
out of the hands of plant and divisional man-
agers and located at head office. On the other
hand, managerial control is becoming more
0N . J. Kinnie is Lecturer in industrial Relations in the
School of Management at Bath University.
operational aspects of industrial relations is
being given back to local managers.
This centralisation of strategic decision
making and decentralisation of operational
issues brings changes in decision making dis-
cretion enjoyed by plant personnel and indus-
trial relations managers. Local specialists find
that their discretion has declined or dis-
appeared altogether on some strategic issues,
such as the setting of policy, which have
become subject to greater control from head
office. However, their discretion has expanded
on other issues concerned with the negotiation
of agreements and operation of policy as head
office involvement has declined.
At first these two trends appear to be contra-
dictory, although further analysis shows them
to be complementary and a consequence of a
combination of long run and short run pres-
sures. Changes in management organisation
and collective bargaining structure in the long
run have encouraged moves in the direction of
centralisation and decentralisation in order to
keep managers who make strategic industrial
relations decisions separate from union repre-
sentatives seeking to negotiate collective agree-
ments. Short term pressures emanating from
the changes in market conditions have stimu-
lated an increase in the control exercised by
head office managers in order to cut costs and
an expansion in the autonomy of plant
managers to allow them to respond to local
product and labour market conditions.

17
 Following the review of previous research
there are three main sections t o this paper.
First, the two main trends in these strategies are
identified and analysed. Second, the reasons
for these changes are analysed by reference to
long run and short run pressures. Finally, in a
conclusion, the results of this paper are dis-
cussed in the context of previous findings and
future research needs.
Previous research
Perhaps the greatest difficulty encountered
when analysing recent changes in strategies for
managing industrial relations is the lack of up t o
date information. Observers have noted the
‘extreme paucity of information on recent
developments’[3] so that ‘we still d o not have a
clear picture of the changes which have occur-
red at company and plant level’[41. The most
recent survey of British industrial relations
adopted the workplace paradigm revealing
little on managerial activities at company level,
and was carried out in 1980, a time recognised
by many as an economic watershedL51. How-
ever, some up to date information is available
in Batstone [6] which presents useful compar-
ative data o n developments in the workplace
over the period 1978 to 1983.
Two areas of interest emerge from the infor-
mation which is available: first, the extent a n d
depth of changes taking place in managerial
strategies; and second, the changes in specific
aspects of these strategies such a s collective
bargaining and joint consultation.
Two points of view can be recognised over
the extent and depth of changes taking place.
First, Chadwick[71 among others argues that a
change in economic circumstances will lead to
an end of the measures which h e sees em-
ployers taking. Moreover, Batstone [81suggests
that there appears to have been little in the way
of ‘concerted and successful onslaught o n the
institutional basis of trade unionism in the
workplace’. On the other hand, Hyman and
Elgerl91 look at the ‘increasingly radical and
successful attack mounted by capital and the
state’ in railways, steel, newspapers and motor
vehicles on ‘restrictive practices’ a n d argue that
these changes represent a fundamental shift in
managerial attitudes, a n employers’ offensive
on the very core of trade unionism. Similarly,
Bright et al. conclude that the changes they
observe in the north-east ‘are more consistent
with the process of fundamental and per-
manent change’[lO].
18
Two main developments within managerial
strategies can be identified: the growth of joint
consultation a n d changes in collective bargain-
ing structure.
Several authors point t o the growth of joint
consultation, for example Daniel and Mill-
wardFl01 discovered that just over o n e third of
their workplaces had consultative committees,
two fifths of which had been established in the
previous five years. Chadwick goes further a n d
argues that management are ‘introducing con-
sultative arrangements t o settle many of the
issues previously determined by collective bar-
gaining’ [ 121.
Few changes appear t o be taking place in the
level at which collective agreements are m a d e .
Daniel and Millward[l31 found that pay bar-
gaining levels for manual workers were con-
sistent with those collected by Brown three
years earlier in 1977[141. Both surveys show
that single employer bargaining was the most
important level of pay bargaining and within
single employer bargaining agreements made
at plant level were most significant. An analysis
of individual cases reveals n o clear pattern,
with some companies such a s Philips moving to
corporate bargaining, while others such as Pilk-
ington and Reed changing to some kind of
local bargaining [15l.
Within the workplace Batstone shows that in
over 4 0 % of plants there was an increase in
union involvement and participation over the
period of 1978 a n d 19831161. While Terry
argues that managers are going t o great lengths
t o protect the position of shop stewards to pre-
serve their established relationships thereby
achieving a ‘reduction in the power and scope
of shop steward organisations while maintain-
ing much of their formal structure’[l71.
Changes in managerial strategies
for industrial relations
Attempts to study managerial strategies by
looking at the enterprise level encounter prob-
lems because of the lack of a n established
theoretical framework. Recent studies have
pointed to the problems associated with the
concept of strategy in industrial relations. In
particular the term strategy is thought to impute
intention t o managerial action where none
exists; t o omit the problems involved with the
formulation of strategy; a n d t o assume that a
strategy once formulated would be imple-
mented [181.
This paper attempts t o overcome these prob-
 Changing management strategies in industrial relations

lems by looking at the level at which strategic
decisions are taken in industrial relations.
Strategic decisions include not only industrial
relations policy decisions, but also key oper-
ating decisions such as limits on wage offers,
the settlement of disputes, and the interpre-
tation of policy[l9]. In particular attention is
focused on the allocation of discretion on
strategic industrial relations decisions through-
out the organisation and how and why this
changes over time.
To study this the analysis will focus on three
specific areas. First, the formal organisation for
making strategic industrial relations decisions,
and in particular the size and location of indus-
trial relations staffs. Second, the co-ordinating
controls used by managers at head office and
divisional level to restrain actual decision
making in the plants. Finally, the specialist col-
lective bargaining structures developed to
negotiate agreements with trade unions, and in
particular the level at which agreements are
made. Table 1 summarises the changes in the
cases studied [201.
Centralisation of managerial
control over industrial relations
One clear trend observed in the organisations
studied has been an increase in the central-
isation of managerial control over two types of
strategic industrial relations decisions. First,
managers at head office are more involved in
making industrial relations policies designed to
provide a framework for all plants in the group.
Second, senior managers at group level are
now more likely to be involved in making key
operating decisions on issues such as the hand-
ling of disputes and the awarding of pay in-
creases which affect directly industrial relations
in the plants. Strategic industrial relations
decisions are, it appears, becoming too impor-
tant to be left in the hands of plant managers
who find some important decisions have been
taken away from them and their discretion
reduced on some of those issues which they
retain.
To achieve this, changes have taken place in
two areas: first, alterations to the managerial
organisation for industrial relations leading to
changes in the way in which decisions are
made at group and plant level; second, modifi-
cations to the co-ordinating controls regulating
the implementation and administration of
industrial relations policies in the plants.
Management organisation
In all four companies studied, management

Table 1: Changes in managerial strategies for industrial relations: illustrations

from four companies, 1977-1983
Location of co-ordination
Management organisation controls for Collective bargaining
for industrial relations industrial relations level and form
Group level - formal
4 product divisions Divisional Plant level - informal
Integrated to to to
3 product divisions Reformed division Group level - formal
Plant level - less informal
2 product divisions Divisional Plant level - formal
Amalgamated to to to
Single g r o w Grouo Plant level - areater intensitv
8 product divisions Divisional Plant level - formal
Federated to to to
2 product divisions Grow Plant level - areater intensitv
No divisions Group Site and plant level - informal
Autarky to to to
No change No channe Plant level - formal
~~

Brief details of the companies studied, which are all in the engineering industry, are as follows. Integrated produces a
narrow range of closely related products in around thirty highly interdependent plants. Amalgamated manufactures a
narrow product range in around a dozen plants which are partly interdependent. Federated produces a wide range of
related products in over seventy plants, some of which are interdependent. Autarky manufactures a highly diversified
product range in over 130 usually independent plants.
The term group refers t o the most senior level of decision making within the organisation, while division is an inter-
mediate level between group and plant which, while not present in all organisations, is usually based on product range
or geographical area.

19
 have been simplifying the organisation used to
structure decision making o n industrial re-
lations issues. Most of these changes have
centred around the decision making discretion
of the divisional tier of management. In some
cases the divisions have disappeared to be re-
placed by other mechanisms of control result-
ing in a substantial decline in the importance of
and numbers employed at the divisional level.
In other companies, previously separate
divisions have been merged leading t o major
modifications in the responsibilities and plants
covered by divisional managers. Three
examples of the impact of these changes o n
strategic decisions making are given below: o n
key operating decisions; the interpretation of
industrial relations policy; and the setting of
efficiency targets.
Fundamental changes have been made to
the managerial organisation in Federated
where originally there were eight separate
divisions each with its own board and per-
sonnel specialists. Six of these boards have
since been dismantled and the rump of their
responsibilities transferred to senior managers
who report directly t o the board. These senior
managers direct the activities of plants arranged
in business areas and are held personally res-
ponsible for their financial performance but n o
longer have personnel specialists working for
them. In the words of o n e senior group
manager: “We’re trying to remove the ‘cotton
wool’ between head office and the plants.’’ In
the industrial relations context this means that it
is now group rather than divisional level which
is responsible for making policies a n d key oper-
ating decisions such as the handling of indus-
trial disputes at plant level.
In two of the companies, previously separate
divisions have been combined. Initially, Inte-
grated had four product divisions, each with its
own specialist industrial relations manager,
covering plants in several European countries.
Since then, two of these European divisions
have been combined to form a single organ-
isation and the interpretation of group-wide
policies now takes place at this new divisional
level. Following similar organisational changes
in Amalgamated, managers at head office
launched a group-wide efficiency drive setting
targets for productivity improvements in each
of the plants. In the fourth case, Autarky,
where there are n o formal divisions, the size of
the group personnel department has been in-
creased following the group’s resignation from
its employers’ association.
20
Co-ordinating controls
Alterations to co-ordinating controls regulating
industrial relations reflect the changes in
management organisation [21I. These controls,
which require only a very small staff to operate,
appear to have changed in two ways: first, they
are exercised from a more senior level within
the organisation; second, there are fewer co-
ordinating controls, but those which remain are
enforced more strongly. Examples of change in
these controls are given in the areas of pay,
conditions of employment, customs and prac-
tices, and industrial relations advice.
In Amalgamated, the wage limits for each
plant are now set at group rather than
divisional level a n d group managers are giving
more precise instructions t o local managers
over what they can and cannot d o . Originally,
divisional managers simply tried to limit the
amount of money available for wage increases,
but more recently group managers have tried
to intervene to influence the distribution of
available money between basic, premium and
bonus rates. In the words of o n e plant industrial
relations manager, ‘when the “tablets of stone”
come down, we’ve got very little room to man-
oeuvre’. Group guidelines in Federated are
now enforced more strictly o n conditions of
employment issues so that local managers have
little or n o scope for discretion o n subjects such
as the length of the working week and holiday
entitlements.
In Integrated the newly formed divisional
organisation has extended the previous
attempts to identify and restrain customs and
practices negotiated in the plants. There is now
a closer monitoring of issues dealt with locally
such as discipline and working arrangements
with the aim of making these practices more
consistent between plants. The expanded
specialist staffs in Autarky now provide more
extensive advice to plants o n issues such a s dis-
putes procedures a n d industrial tribunals.
Decentralisation of managerial
control over industrial relations
A second trend observed in the companies
studied has been an increase in the decentral-
isation of some aspects of managerial control
over industrial relations. In all the companies
studied, local managers find that they are
subject to less detailed control from group and
divisional levels and are able t o exercise their
discretion over a wider range of issues than in
the past. Local managers are becoming more
 Changing management strategies in industrial relations
involved in introducing new practices and
rationalising production and find less need to
be concerned about the problems of consist-
ency between plants for what are essentially
local issues. In addition, local managers find
they are being encouraged to take a more
active and visible role in the negotiation and
administration of collective agreements. Group
managers are exhorting them to adopt a higher
profile in collective bargaining than in the past.
Meanwhile managers at head office find that
there has been a reduction in the number of
issues settled at plant level which they are able
to influence.
Changes have been made in two areas to
improve the reality and appearance of dis-
cretion of local managers: first, alterations to
the co-ordinating controls exercised by group
and divisional management; second, changes
to the collective bargaining structures
employed with greater emphasis placed on
collective bargaining conducted at plant level.
Co-ordinating controls
In the companies studied, reductions in the
number and strength of many co-ordinating
controls have led to a genuine increase in the
autonomy of local managers. Plant level man-
agers have demanded and frequently received
the freedom which they feel is necessary to
negotiate the changes required to respond to
the challenges they face. Bargaining in the
workplace is becoming more active as shop
stewards and local managers are more in-
volved in solving problems which can only
really be solved at plant level. Three areas of
change can be recognised: the introduction of
new technology; improving efficiency and
changing working practices; and reducing
numbers employed.
In Integrated local managers found their dis-
cretion increased on issues primarily concerned
with the introduction of new technology. Ex-
tensive investment in new technical processes
meant that the burden for negotiating changes
in the organisation of work required fell o n
local managers. This situation was not always
greeted with outright enthusiasm by local
managers: “Group spend the money, but it’s us
who have to spend half the night solving the
nitty-gritty problems,” was a typical comment.
Nevertheless, decisions and agreements were
ultimately made which were highly specific to
each plant and shop.
The group-wide efficiency drive launched by
senior managers in Amalgamated forced each
plant to devise its own plan to meet the targets
set for it by head office. In one plant local
managers identified over fifty working practices
which they wanted to change, leading to inten-
sive negotiations with local union represent-
atives.
Local managers in Federated found that
while many personnel restraints have dis-
appeared, new and stronger financial limit-
ations have been placed o n their autonomy so
that their freedom to meet tightly enforced pre-
determined targets increased. In order to stay
within their budgets managers in many plants
were forced to engage in extensive redundancy
programmes, leading to reductions in the
workforce of up to 50% in some plants. Inten-
sive negotiations and consultations were essen-
tial in plants of this kind faced with the need to
reduce numbers employed
Collective bargaining structure
Changes in bargaining structure, particularly
bargaining level and form, have also been
made to improve both the reality and image of
local managers’ discretion.
In only one company, Autarky, were major
changes made to bargaining level leading to a
genuine increase in local autonomy. In the past
Autarky had pursued the policy of having a
single set of agreements for each of its large
multi-establishment sites. Midway through the
period this practice was discontinued as the
single agreements were broken up so that each
establishment o n site negotiated its own
separate agreement. These agreements were
negotiated by the newly appointed local per-
sonnel specialists and were based upon the
establishment rather than the site ability to pay.
This change, leading to pay differentials be-
tween establishments o n the same site being
disturbed, was not achieved without cost since
there were major strikes on two large sites.
Changes in collective bargaining in Feder-
ated, Amalgamated and Integrated were more
subtle and aimed at promoting the image of
local plant management autonomy. In Feder-
ated and Amalgamated, local managers were
encouraged t o negotiate agreements, out-
wardly the result of their own initiative, o n
issues which were highly significant for pro-
moting the uniqueness of each plant. In Amal-
gamated, changes were introduced in the
salary structures involving the addition of incre-
ments based on service which were incon-
sistent between the plants. Trade unions found
it difficult to carry out comparisons o n a like for
 like basis, since the new salary structures
introduced an element of what was referred to
by o n e manager as ‘studied blurring’ between
agreements. Similarly, in Federated differences
between redundancy packages in each plant
were introduced deliberately to frustrate trade
union arguments about comparability between
plants.
In Integrated the changes made t o stress the
uniqueness of each plant included quality
circles to increase employee interest in their
own jobs and their attachment to the plants
and, in some plants, producing local employee
newsletters encouraging employees t o identify
with their own plant a n d its products diverting
attention away from the comparisons of terms
and conditions between plants.
Pressures from within and without
The changes observed in managerial strategies
are responses not only to influences peculiar t o
industrial relations, but are also part and parcel
of the wider restructuring taking place within
organisations. Industrial relations consider-
ations revolve largely around the policy of pre-
serving managerial prerogative by maintaining
a separation between the levels at which
strategic decisions and collective agreements
are madel231. Changes in managerial structure
are influenced strongly by the business strategy
of the organisation which is in turn affected sig-
nificantly by product market conditions[241.
As a consequence of these pressures senior
managers have adopted two key control tech-
niques traditionally associated with the multi-
divisional organisation: the separation between
strategic and operational decision making, and
the use by head office of co-ordinating con-
trols. These developments will be analysed by
looking at the evolution of managerial strategy
since the 1950s, and the more recent changes
in the last five years or so.
Multi-divisional organisations
and bargaining structure
Traditionally managers of industrial relations
have sought to maintain their prerogative by
keeping separate the institutions of collective
bargaining and strategic decision making, In
the last thirty years a combination of changes in
management organisation and bargaining
structure have placed this policy in jeopardy.
Before World War Two, managerial pre-
rogative at plant level was maintained by nego-
22
tiating agreements at industry level and having
as little contact as possible with trade unions in
the plants. After 1945 this practice became un-
workable for two reasons. First, the emergence
of shop steward activity in the workplace led t o
the development of informal bargaining at
plant level. Second, the growth via merger and
acquisition of the multi-divisional and holding
companies produced organisations covering a
wide variety of industries a n d services which
were unsuited t o industry level bargaining.
Gradually, in the 1960s, a new pattern of two-
tier bargaining emerged with agreements being
made at both industry and plant level. How-
ever, this pattern itself began to change in the
1970s because of the further decline of industry
level bargaining a n d the increasingly formalised
nature of bargaining at plant level. This latter
development in particular meant that shop
stewards became more closely involved with
managers who made key decisions at plant
level. Consequently, the separation between
the institutions of decision making and
collective bargaining was under threat as shop
stewards sought to challenge increasing
numbers of plant management decisions.
In response to this challenge to their
authority, employers tried t o re-establish their
institutional separation by redefining strategic
and operating decisions a n d ensuring that
union negotiators and strategic decision makers
were kept apart.
Group a n d divisional managers, while still
largely avoiding the development of strategies,
began to get involved in strategic decisions
such as policy changes, pay awards and indus-
trial disputes, which affected directly plant
industrial relations. Employers also adapted to
industrial relations existing co-ordination tech-
niques such as close financial monitoring of
plant performance and the use of internal pro-
motion of managers to reward good profit
records. These co-ordinating techniques make
a n essential contribution t o institutional separ-
ation by allowing plant bargaining t o continue
a n d encouraging local managers t o follow
group policy.
This inconsistency between the levels of
strategic decision making a n d collective bar-
gaining could prove a problem for managers as
shop stewards try t o organise outside the plant
a n d challenge managers who actually make the
key decisions[261. However, in the present
economic climate, this is unlikely because
stewards find it difficult t o organise sympathetic
action and to form combine committees[271.
 Changing management strategies in industrial relations
Product market conditions and
organisational restructuring
In the short term the link between changes in
market conditions, business strategy a n d indus-
trial relations strategy was seen clearly in all
four companies studied. Three aspects of the
economic recession have particular importance
for business strategy a n d industrial relations
strategy: the reduction in the level of demand;
the increase in product market competitive-
ness: and the changes in the nature of con-
sumer d e m a n d , Together these pressures pro-
vided a strong incentive for senior managers to
increase their control- over profitability, to
reduce costs, and to gain the flexibility neces-
sary to react to local product and labour market
conditions.
All the companies studied encountered a re-
duction in the level of demand in some or all of
their markets. As fewer orders were being
placed, managers realised that they had excess
productive capacity a n d found they had to
rationalise production in order to react t o lower
levels of activity. This required a top down
review of the company since they were making
decisions about which plants to run down or
close and which plants to expand. Senior man-
agers either made the necessary changes them-
selves, or set targets to be achieved by plant
managers. Combining or abolishing divisional
tiers of management not only reduced staffing
levels but also increased head office control
over plant managers. At the level of the plant
the manpower targets had to be translated into
expansion o r redundancy programmes. More
often than not local managers were deciding
the details of who was to be made redundant
and what was the best way of carrying out the
programme.
Second, the firms found themselves in at, in-
creasingly competitive product market environ-
ment with new competition both from home
and overseas. In these circumstances the
market became very price sensitive a n d res-
ponsive to product quality. Senior managers
interpreted these market pressures by drawing
up efficiency programmes which concentrated
on ways of improving productivity and quality,
and taking control over key decisions, such as
pay, affecting costs. Plant managers were then
given the task of implementing these changes
by devising efficiency packages involving
changes in areas such a s the flexibility and
mobility of employees.
Finally, there was the pressure from changes
in consumer demand leading to the need to
innovate a n d t o create new products. Head
office managers were faced with key decisions
about whether to invest in new products in the
s a m e market or to move into new markets.
Decisions of this kind required information
about running costs, profitability a n d potential
of each plant to be collected via the co-ordin-
ating controls. Where new investments were
made they almost inevitably involved intro-
ducing new technology and new products into
plants and consequently changes were needed
in the organisation of production a n d working
practices. Whatever changes were decided, it
was plant managers who were given the res-
ponsibility for negotiating these changes with
shop stewards.
Conclusion
T h e trends identified in this paper suggest that
a new strategy for managing industrial relations
is emerging in the cases studied. A pattern is
developing whereby strategic decisions are in-
creasingly taken at a senior level within the
organisation, while collective bargaining a n d
operational decision making takes place quite
separately at a lower level. T h e most common
two-tier pattern is to make strategic decisions at
group level and collective agreements a n d
operational decisions at plant level. An alter-
native pattern, as shown in o n e case, is where
collective bargaining takes place at group level
and strategic decisions making is carried out at
a level above this, possibly at holding company
or cross national level. N o doubt other combin-
ations are also possible.
Further analysis suggests that these trends
are likely to persist after the current recession.
The changes have been brought about not just
because of the decline in industrial activity, but
also because of the more fundamental changes
in, management organisation a n d bargaining
structure. Indeed. it is possible that these com-
panies are moving irrevocably towards the
A m e r i c a h o d e l where 'the formal structure of
bargaining still exhibits a high degree of decen-
tralisation . . . (and) control over key strategic
decisions . . is quite highly centralised' such
,
that 'an amazing amount of centralisation exists
regardless of the type of bargaining
structure"281. O n e characteristic of the
American model is, however, unlikely t o
appear in the near future. A trend towards
group bargaining looks to be improbable since
such a move would erode the institutional
23

separation so carefully protected by recent
employer policies. In practice shop stewards
would be sitting across the table from strategic
decision makers: the buffer zone between
senior managers and union negotiators would
disappear.
Although there have been few changes in
the level of bargaining, negotiations between
management and union representatives have
become more intensive and there has been a
re-emergence of joint consultation. We are
witnessing, therefore, the reinforcement of
workplace unionism, where managers attempt
to limit the reference group and resources of
shop stewards to plant level, while strategic
decisions are taken increasingly at head office
level.
These findings raise questions for further re-
search which point to the need to develop the
theoretical concepts for the study of managerial
strategies. First, what changes are taking place
in the way other organisations make strategic
industrial relations decisions and can any
patterns of change be identified? Existing
typological approaches need to be made more
dynamic to take account of the changes taking
place in managerial strategies. Second, what
are the most important influences on these
strategies and what changes are likely to take
place in these influences in the near future?
Research into influences o n managerial strat-
egies should take account not only of factors
unique to industrial relations, but those factors
affecting business policy more generally. These
developments would produce a framework for
study which links managerial strategies to wider
business policy decision making processes and
to product market conditions.
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7 . Chadwick. M. G.. op. cit.
8. Batstone. E . . o p . cit.. p.254
9. Hyman, R. and Elger. T . . 'Job Controls. the
Employers' Offensive, and Alternative Strategies',
Capital and Class. 15, Autumn 1981. p.141.
10. Bright, D.. et al.. p.33.
11. Daniel, W. W. and Millward. N . . op. cit.. p 287.
12. Chadwick, M. G.. op. cit.. p.6.
13. Daniel, W . W. and Millward, N..op. cit.. p.189.
14. Brown, W. A , , The Changing Contours of British
Industrial Relotions. Blackwell. Oxford. 1981, p 8.
15. Income Data Service Brief N o . 349. March. 1981.
Incomes Data Service Brief No. 400. May 1980.
16. Batstone. E., op. cit.. p.284.
17. Terry. M.. op. cit., p.55.
18. Thurley, K. and Wood, S. (eds.). Industria/ Relations
and Monagement Strategy. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1983. p.221.
19. Kochan, T. et al.. 'Strategic Chdice and Industrial
Relations Theory', Industrial Relations, Vol. 2 3 No. 1.
Winter 1984.
20. Empirical data was collected by means of interviews
with representatives of management and trade unions
at group. division and plant level, and by studying
various kinds of written information. Further details of
the cases are available in Kinnie. N . J . . 'Single
Employer Bargaining: Structures and Strategies',
Industrial Relations Journal. Vol. 14 No. 3. 1983,
pp. 76-81.
21. The existence of these co-ordinating controls is well
established in the literature, see Marsh, A. I.,
Employee Relations Policy and Decision Making.
Gower. Aldershot. 1982, p.161. Kinnie. N . J . . 1983.
op. cit.
22. Batstone. E.. op. cit.. p.208.
23. Palmer, G . , British Industrial Relations. Allen and
Unwin, London, 1983, p.219.
24. Channon. D. F., The Strotegy and Structure of British
Enterprise. Macmillan. London, 1973.
25. Batstone. E., op. cit.. pp. 66-70.
26. Kinnie, N . J . , 'Local u Centralised Bargaining: the
Dangers of a Half-Way House', Personnel Monoge-
ment. Vol. 14 No. 1. 1982.
27. Brown. W . A,. 'Britain's Unions: New Pressures and
Shifting Loyalties', Personnel Management. Vol. 15
No. 11, 1983.
28. Kochan. T . . et al.. o p . cit.. pp. 199-200.