Music and Time

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

Master of Arts

in

DIGITAL MUSICS

by

David Andrew Kant

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

Hanover, New Hampshire

May 2012

Examining Committee:

Chairman_______________________
Larry Polansky

Member________________________
Michael Casey

Member________________________
Aden Evens

___________________
Brian W. Pogue
Dean of Graduate Studies
 UMI Number: 1534291

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Abstract

This thesis proposes that the temporal arts play a role in shaping our perception of time. It

advocates for a theory of music based in the perception of time and formalizes a

dynamics of temporal perception. It is the counterpart to a body of auditory, visual and

textual creative works that play with the ways in which the temporal arts can inform our

perception of time. It provides a context for the body of work and formalizes the ideas

expressed by it. This thesis examines the historical context of music in the philosophical

and psychological literature on time perception, illustrating that the study of time

perception has been informed by the temporal arts. It puts these ideas in conversation

with contemporary music theory, discussing the need for a music theory grounded in time

in the context of the ideas of James Tenney and John Cage, whose own writings point

towards a theory of music grounded in time. It develops a formulation of a dynamics of

temporal experience. Representing temporal experience as a basis model, it examines the

ways in which events accumulate within a timespan. Finally, it discusses these ideas in

relation to my own creative work. This thesis is both motivated and informed by the

philosophical literature and empirical sciences, but, ultimately, it functions in a different

capacity. It develops a theory and presents it to individual experience, with the hope of

causing individuals to question and consider their own perception of time and its

relationship to the temporal arts.

ii
Acknowledgements

Thanks to my committee members Larry Polansky, Michael Casey and Aden Evens. A

very special thanks to David Dunn whose insight and intellectual support was invaluable

in working through these ideas. My gratitude also extends to John King for his time and

thought, to Spencer Topel and to my classmates Joshua Hudelson, Alexander Dupuis,

Alison Mattek, Alex Wroten, Phillip Hermans, Ryan Maguire and Jessica Thompson. A

special thanks to Beau Sievers and to Rebecca Fawcett

iii
Table of Contents
Abstract ..............................................................................................................................ii
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................ iii
1 Introduction.......................................................................................................................1
1.1 Time Perception......................................................................................................... 2
1.2 Motivations................................................................................................................ 4
1.3 The Enactive Approach..............................................................................................5
1.4 The Project................................................................................................................. 7
2 John Cage, James Tenney and the Theory of Time.........................................................10
2.1 Cage and Tenney on Time........................................................................................11
2.2 Music on Multiple Timescales................................................................................. 16
2.3 Previous Ideas.......................................................................................................... 18
3 Music and The Study of Time Consciousness................................................................ 20
3.1 Clay, James and The Specious Present.................................................................... 21
3.2 Husserl's Living Present...........................................................................................23
3.3 Music and the Study of Time Consciousness.......................................................... 26
4 A Basic Formulation of Dynamical Accumulation......................................................... 29
4.1 Example 1................................................................................................................ 31
4.2 Example 2................................................................................................................ 40
4.3 Remarks................................................................................................................... 48
5 A Basis Model of Dynamical Accumulation...................................................................50
5.1 A Basis Representation............................................................................................ 50
5.2 Windowing...............................................................................................................52
5.3 Window Persistence................................................................................................. 54
5.4 Basis Persistence......................................................................................................55
5.5 Trajectories...............................................................................................................56
5.6 Multiple Windows....................................................................................................59
5.7 Summary.................................................................................................................. 61
5.8 Effects...................................................................................................................... 61
5.9 Remarks................................................................................................................... 62
6 Music Composition.........................................................................................................64
6.1 Variation II............................................................................................................... 65
6.2 Variation V............................................................................................................... 69
6.3 Variation VII............................................................................................................ 72
6.4 Variation XXVII (Quartet for Ruth)........................................................................ 75
6.5 Variation XIVb.........................................................................................................77
6.6 Variation XXIIIb...................................................................................................... 80
6.7 Future Work............................................................................................................. 82
7 Conclusions.....................................................................................................................83
8 References.......................................................................................................................85

iv
List of Figures
Figure 1: Sequence of Events in Ex. 1...............................................................................32
Figure 2: DA of Ex. 1.........................................................................................................33
Figure 3: Ratios of DA to Time in Ex. 1............................................................................ 35
Figure 4: Ratios of DA to DA in Ex. 1...............................................................................39
Figure 5: Rate of Change of Ratios of DA to DA in Ex. 1................................................40
Figure 6: Sequence of Events in Ex. 2.1............................................................................41
Figure 7: Sequence of Events in Ex. 2.2............................................................................41
Figure 8: DA of Ex. 2.2......................................................................................................43
Figure 9: Ratios of DA(a) to Time in Ex. 2.2.................................................................... 44
Figure 10: Ratios of DA(b) to Time in Ex. 2.2.................................................................. 44
Figure 11: Rate of Change of Ratios of DA(a) to Time in Ex. 2.2....................................46
Figure 12: Absolute Value of Rate of Change of Ratios of DA(a) to Time in Ex. 2.2......47
Figure 13: Variation XXIIIb Signal Diagram.................................................................... 81

v
 1 Introduction

Music is universal. All cultures exhibit a form of musical practice. Despite its

ubiquity, however, the purpose of music is not clear. Charles Darwin reflected on the

mystery of the function of music in his The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to

Sex:

...as neither the enjoyment nor the capacity of producing musical notes are
faculties of the least direct use to man in reference to his ordinary habits of life,
they must be ranked amongst the most mysterious with which he is endowed
(Darwin 333).

Music serves many functions in modern western society. Music indicates who's calling

our cell phones, helps us to work, distracts us from work, provides entertainment and

relaxes us at the dentist's office. We hear music at concert halls, restaurants, cafes, bars,

parks, religious events and sporting events. We engage in musical experiences with others

and also listen in isolation through headphones and portable playback devices. Why is

music a universal human phenomena? And what purpose might it serve?

Darwin set an initial precedent when he hypothesized a role for music in sexual

selection. In The Descent, he explains that the vocal organs of animals play a strong role

in sexual selection, and are probably developed in relation to the propagation of the

species. Recently, however, musicologists have rekindled this question, offering a more

multifaceted answer, including, in addition to sexual selection, group coordination,

parental care and homology with language. Musicologists have demonstrated that the

study of music can shed light on language evolution, the study of human migration

1
patterns and the history of cultural contacts, the evolution of the hominid vocal tract, the

structure of acoustic-communication signals, human group structure, the division of labor

at the group level, the capacity for designing and using tools, symbolic gesturing,

localization and lateralization of the brain function, melody and rhythms in speech, the

phrase-structure of language, parent-infant communication, emotional and behavioral

manipulation through sound, interpersonal bonding and synchronization mechanism, self-

expression and catharsis, creativity and aesthetic expression and the human affinity for

the spiritual and the mystical (Brown, Merker and Wallin 11). Music is clearly complex

phenomena; it serves a multitudinous array of functions and offers insights into even

more facets of human life. While music may not have one clear role, it permeates

innumerable aspects of human life. Not limited to just our experience in the concert hall,

we appreciate the musical quality of speech, or of the busses passing on the street.

Musicality lies along a spectrum of the sonic, and its position grows as we open our ears

and minds. Its role may not be clear, but it touches many aspects of our lives.

This thesis proposes to add to yet another role to the list: time perception. It is

framed by the idea that music has a role in the development of time perception, and that

its study can offer insight to the mechanism of time perception.

1.1 Time Perception

We are aware of time's passing. We sense an event's happening, and we sense its

duration. We distinguish past events from one another, and we perceive degrees of

pastness. With remarkable resolution, we are able to distinguish long events from short

events and varying degrees between. Moreover, we anticipate future events and act

2
purposefully in time with knowledge of future actions. We carry out complex sequences

of events with precision and confidence. We do all this with ease, such ease, that it often

masks the complex perceptual act of time perception. What is the mechanism that allows

for purposeful action in time? What is the mechanism that allows for a sense of duration?

What is the mechanism that allows for a continuous experience through time?

The perception of time is far from understood. When thinkers first asked these

questions, they began to glimpse the unending conundrums and contradictions present.

St. Augustine was one of the earliest thinkers to wrestle with questions of the nature of

time. In his Confessions, written between 397 and 398 AD, Augustine offers profound

insight, such that decades later, in the introduction to his masterwork on time

consciousness, Edmund Husserl claims that any reader interested in the problem of time

consciousness must study Augustine's work. Augustine identifies a central problem. He

concludes that the present moment is without duration, and he asks how we can know of

the durations of actions if the present is without duration, the past is no longer present

and the future is yet to be. His solution is memory and expectation, which hold the past

and future in mind, together with the present. The past, present and future exist together

in the soul, and that it is by this coexistence that we are aware of the duration of time:

What now is clear and plain is, that neither things to come nor past are. Nor is it
properly said, "there be three times, past, present, and to come": yet perchance it
might be properly said, "there be three times; a present of things past, a present of
things present, and a present of things future." For these three do exist in some
sort, in the soul, but otherwhere do I not see them; present of things past,
memory; present of things present, sight; present of things future, expectation
(Augustine Book XI).

3
Through the example of reciting a psalm, Augustine illustrates how memory and

expectation interact to allow for purposeful action in time. He describes a process in

which his action passes from expectation, which contains what he is about to repeat, to

memory, which contains what he has repeated. Augustine demonstrates that time

consciousness is a perceptual phenomena. Time consciousness is a sense; it is constructed

by some perceptual mechanism. Just as the sonic and visual arts engage the senses of

audition and vision, the temporal arts engage the sense of time.

1.2 Motivations

Music engages the sense of time. It excites us to action and coordinates our

action. In premodern societies, music serves as a means of group coordination. It

functions in ritual behavior and ceremony to coordinate individuals in action and in a

shared experience. These origins speak loudly to the purpose and power of music. While

modern concert music does not always engage listeners in a shared experience of music

making, it nevertheless engages listeners in a shared temporal experience. The vestige of

such a coordination function manifests in the listener's experience and makes possible the

very way performers are able to coordinate their playing experience.

Even the very material of music is time. The perception of sound is really the

perception of time on a very small time scale. When events become so close together

such that we do not hear them as individual events, we hear them as one. We hear pitch,

or noise, or some quality between, as determined by the temporal relationship of events.

Evenly spaced events correlate to the perceptual phenomena of pitch, while irregularly

4
spaced events correlate to the perceptual phenomena of noise, with a continuum of

qualities between.

Music is a unique temporal medium. It simultaneously addresses the perception of

time, on multiple different time scales. It occurs in time, and its material is temporal in

nature. Perhaps unsurprisingly, thinkers throughout history have turned to music when

grappling with the perception of time. Much of the time consciousness literature is rife

with references to music and sound. Augustine illustrates his ideas with a description of

reciting a psalm, and philosophers from Locke to Husserl similarly make reference to

music and sound.

1.3 The Enactive Approach

How exactly could music function in the development of time perception? The

concept of enaction offers insight into this question. The concept of enaction is described

by cognitive scientists and philosophers Franceso Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor

Rosch in their The Embodied Mind. Enaction proposes that cognition emerges from a

recurrent, cyclic structure of perception and action. It offers a reconciliation of two

extremes: realism, which proposes that cognition mirrors an independent, external world;

and idealism, which proposes that cognition reflects only its own internal system.

Enaction offers a middle-path, by the mechanism of embodied action. The enactive

approach consists of two main points:

(1) perception consists in perceptually guided action and (2) cognitive structures
emerge from recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be
perceptually guided (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 173).

5
The reference point for understanding perception is not constant, but rather, it is in

constant flux. The perceiver changes her local situation through action, which is, in turn,

influenced by her perception. Cognition emerges from this recursive structure.

Understanding cognition amounts to understanding the structure between perception and

action through continued interactions. Through the mechanism of embodied action, the

enactive approach stresses action. An understanding of the world arises from interaction

with the world.

The implications for the arts are profound. Enaction gives us agency in forming

perceptions of the world. The arts play a crucial role in exercising this agency. Our

everyday actions undoubtedly inform our perceptions; the mechanism that Varela,

Thompson and Rosch describe is in operation continuously. The situation of arts,

however, call special attention to it. The arts exercise our perception. They explore its

boundaries, push beyond them and come to understand our perception. They present to

our attention its anomalies; they demonstrate its boundaries; and they attempt to expand

its possibilities. But, far from simply exercising our perception, the arts play an integral

role in forming our perception. The mode of action of art is unique from other action in

that it is towards our perception. It is a mode of play, and it is characterized by

purposelessness. Play acts without practical purpose. Engaged in play, our senses

function not merely to read traffic light indications or alert us to our cell phone calls.

Rather, when engaged in play, our senses are self-aware and towards only their own

perception.

Music, and the temporal arts in general, shape our sense of time perception

through enaction. As noted earlier, it is likely that music originally functioned through

6
group participation, and it continues to do so in some societies. One could even argue that

this is the case in modern club culture, where DJs adjust the music to the audience,

granting the audience some form of influence over the music through their action.

Nevertheless, even in concert situations, music elicits a physiological response. It affects

the heart rate, respiratory rate and nervous system. Most importantly, however, listening

itself embodies a form of action. Listening is not a passive act. David Dunn's Purposeful

Listening in Complex States of Time illustrates this by instructing the performer to direct

her auditory attention in a rather virtuosic sequence of actions. Music stimulates this form

of mental action in directing and attempting to direct our auditory attention. These

various kinds of action guide our perception in an enactive mode of cognition.

1.4 The Project

The central premise of this thesis is that the temporal arts play a role in shaping

our perception of time. It is the written in counterpart to body of auditory, visual and

textual creative works, which explore the perception of time and the role of the temporal

arts in its perception. This document serves to explicate, in written prose, the ideas

expressed by these works.

The works takes interest in the way in which events unfold within a timespan.

Time is an integrative act. Perception holds events together in order to provide a

continuous experience in time. The works explore the dynamics by which events

accumulate within a timespan, and this written document formalizes the dynamics that

these works explore. This thesis illustrates the phenomena, with the hope of bringing

7
people to question and consider the nature of their perception of time. It is speculative in

nature, and aspires to stimulate discussion and further work.

The second chapter more closely examines the motivation for considering the role

of music in time perception and discusses how music could function in such a capacity. It

introduces the idea of the material of sound being temporal in nature and puts this idea in

conversation with contemporary musical thought. In particular, it addresses the ideas of

such twentieth century theorists as John Cage and James Tenney, whose own writings

point towards a theory of music grounded in time.

The third chapter turns toward the field of time perception. It examines the

concept of the present as an interval, with a width that extends towards the past and

future, rather than as the instantaneous conterminous of the past and future. This concept

first appears in the psychological literature as E. R. Clay and William James' specious

present, and then later in phenomenological literature as Husserl's living present. All

three writers make copious references to musical examples in their writings. The chapter

suggest that music was instrumental not only on the forming of this theoretical concept,

but in the development of the perceptual mechanism itself.

The fourth chapter begins to formalize the dynamics of time perception. It

discusses the dynamics that emerge when considering a sequence of perceptions that

accumulate within a window rather than as a sequence that occur in non-consideration to

one another. Through simplified musical examples, it illustrates that, because of the

mechanism of accumulation, the dynamics become non-linear. It claims that these

dynamics are available to our perception and that any theory of time perception should

rest upon the foundation of this mathematics.

8
 The fifth chapter extends these basic dynamics towards a more sophisticated

model of temporal perception. It addresses the reasons for the simplifications of chapter

three, and introduces variables to account for situations that are more complex. It shows

how these basic dynamics can be built into a more complex model resembling something

that approaches temporal perception.

Finally, the sixth chapter discusses how the ideas expressed in this document are

expressed in my music compositional work. It discusses the work leading up to these

ideas as well as current work, and charts possibilities for future work.

Any theory of music must also contain a theory of time perception, and any

theory of time perception must be informed by the temporal arts. The temporal arts offer

access to our perception of time. To claim that they offer a testing ground, an arena in

which to play and exercise our temporal sense mechanism, does not claim enough.

Through a playful engagement with temporality, the temporal arts develop and codify our

mechanism of time perception.

9
 2 John Cage, James Tenney and the Theory of Time

The western music theoretical discourse has been historically dominated by the

precedence of pitch. From Pythagoras and Aristoxenus through Arnold Schoenberg and

the early twentieth century, pitch has been of primary concern. Music theory revolved

around discussions of the classification of consonant and dissonant pitch relationships,

taking the form of prescriptive rules for their proper use. Though inchoate in Hermann

von Helmholtz's theory of beats, which he proposed in the later half of the nineteenth

century, it wasn't until the early twentieth century that the primacy of pitch was properly

challenged.

Around the turn of the century, composers such as Erik Satie and then Anton

Webern began to organize music according to lengths of time. In Charles Seeger's 1930

article “On Dissonant Counterpoint,” he declared temporal harmony tantamount to tonal

harmony and called for a classification of the harmony of both rhythm and form (Seeger

25). Seeger influenced many thinkers, among them Henry Cowell, who studied with

Seeger, and whose own New Musical Resources rigorously explores alternative harmonic

systems for organizing rhythm (Cowell; Spilker). These ideas found even further

resonance in the work of Conlon Nancarrow, whose studies for player piano, first dating

back to 1948, explored rhythmic ideas proposed by Cowell through the mechanical

employment of a player piano to implement rhythmic accuracy beyond human capacity

(Gann).

The primacy of pitch was also challenged by an expanded palette of musical

sound. In 1913, Luigi Russolo's futurist manifesto Art of Noises exhorted to expand the

10
palette of musical sound to all noises, and the 1920's witnessed a deluge, compared to

decades past, of new timbral musical materials: Edgard Varèse's Ionization (1929-31), for

a percussion ensemble of thirteen percussionists; George Antheil's Ballet Mécanique

(1926), featuring a cacophony of propellers, sirens and percussion; and Henry Cowell's

Banshee (1925), making use of extended piano techniques, such as sweeping and

scraping the strings.

The historical primacy of pitch was beginning to be dissolved by interests for both

time and an expanded musical material. Their concurrence indicates a central relationship

between sound and time that began to surface once the dominance of pitch started to

falter. In particular, the ideas of John Cage and James Tenney parallel this trend, and their

examination illustrates a reciprocal relationship between sound and time that suggests the

need for a music theory grounded in time perception.

2.1 Cage and Tenney on Time

Cage advocated an expansion of the musical palette and a theory of music based

in time. Cage proposed that the musical palette encompass all sounds, and he shrewdly

noted that the new materials would not fit the orthodox methods of organization, which

were structured around pitch. A new system would be required. He turned to time. In a

1937 talk, Cage claimed:

The present methods of writing music, principally those which employ harmony
and its reference to particular steps in the field of sound, will be inadequate for
the composer, who will be faced with the entire field of sound. The composer
(organizer of sound) will be faced not only with the entire field of sound but also
with the entire field of time (Cage, “Future” 4).

11
Cage turns to time because duration is the only characteristic of sound that applies to both

sound and its necessary counterpart, silence:

Sound has four characteristics: pitch, timbre, loudness, and duration. The
opposite and necessary coexistent of sound is silence. Of the four characteristics
of sound, only duration involves both sound and silence. Therefore, a structure
based on durations (rhythmic: phrase, time lengths) is correct (corresponds with
the nature of the material), whereas harmonic structure is incorrect (derived from
pitch, which has no being in silence) (Cage, “Forerunner” 64).

Cage began to structure pieces according to lengths of time, called rhythmic structures. In

1939, his First Construction (in metal) marked his first use of fixed rhythmic structures

in composition (First Construction (in metal)).

In his 1983 writing John Cage and the Theory of Harmony, James Tenney puts

Cage's ideas in the context of a new theory of music. Tenney notes the broadening rift

between harmonic theory and practice in Western music. He attributes it, in part, to a

narrowing of the meaning of the word “harmony” to the extent that it only applies to the

antiquated musical practices of past centuries. Tenney proposes a broadening of the

definition of the word “harmony” to a theory of harmonic perception, which would,

moreover, be part of a more general theory of musical perception:

It seems to me that what a true theory of harmony would have to be now is a

theory of harmonic perception (one component in a more general theory of
musical perception) —consistent with the most recent data available from the
fields of acoustics and psychoacoustics, but also taking into account the greatly
extended range of musical experiences available to us today (Tenney, “John
Cage” 57).

12
 Tenney cites Cage's ideas as among the most important contributions to a new

such theory. Tenney locates his own theory of harmonic space, which he expounds in the

same writing, as only part of a larger theory of musical perception, which should have its

basis in time. Tenney acknowledges the limits of a theory of harmonic perception when

confronting music with no salient pitch quality. Even the broad definition he proposes of

harmonic perception would not be relevant:

A theory of harmony, therefore, can only be one component in a more general

theory of musical perception, and that more general theory must begin—as the
work of John Cage repeatedly demonstrates—with the primary dimension
common to all music: time (Tenney, “John Cage” 79).

Tenney lauds Cage for emphasizing the fundamental importance of time in music,

but he calls attention to a fundamental flaw of the primacy of time. Music is not defined

purely by time lengths. In order for durations to be perceived, they must be articulated by

some other quality of sound. Tenney calls attention to the contingent relationship of

duration to material. Material is necessary to articulate time:

On the one hand, all music manifests some sort of temporal structure (including
harmonically organized music; Beethoven), and on the other hand, neither
Webern nor Satie nor Cage himself had ever managed to “define” the successive
parts of a composition purely “by means of time lengths.” Such time lengths—in
order to be perceived as “parts”—must be articulated by some other means...
(Tenney, “John Cage” 67)

Cage, however, was also aware of this contingent relationship of duration to

material, and he reflects on it in his own writing. In particular, his Lecture on Nothing,

itself organized according to a rhythmic structure, discusses the relationship of duration

13
to material. The lecture is divided in a self-similar manner, from larger parts down to

individual measures of lines. The rhythmic structure is articulated by words and

punctuation. It opens:

(Cage, “Lecture” 109)

Claiming that he has nothing to say, Cage seems to suggest that the words serve no

purpose other than to articulate the rhythmic structure. His pursuit is silence, but, as Cage

notes, silence requires that its duration is marked by words. It requires that he goes on

talking. While his words say nothing in particular, they are necessary.

Tenney, on the other hand, turned his interest in a music theory of time towards

the material. In search for a theoretical framework for the radically new musical materials

of twentieth century music, his Meta + Hodos, written in 1961, is an early application of

gestalt perceptual psychology to musical perception. The elements themselves of music

changed drastically in the twentieth century, effecting our very way of listening, and

requiring a new theory altogether. Meta + Hodos presents a theory of musical gestalt. It

discusses the factors and conditions by which material is articulated and parsed. It is, in

many ways, a complementary theory to Cage's ideas of structure. Where as Cage focuses

on the division of time into rhythmic structures, the boundaries of which must necessarily

14
be articulated by material, Tenney's ideas explain the ways in which material articulates

its boundaries (Tenney, Meta + Hodos).

The relationship between duration and material, however, is characterized by

reciprocity, rather than contingency. Material is necessary for duration, but duration, or

time, is also necessary for material. While it is the case that all musical material manifests

in time, the nature of the reciprocity, however, is even more fundamental: sound is the

perception of time. The very material of music is time. Duration is more than just a

property of both sound and silence. It is their essence.

The perception of sound is the perception of time on a small time scale. Events

that are too close together to be heard as distinct events, are heard rather as a single event,

a sound, the quality, or timbre, of which is determined by the temporal relationship of the

events—the degree of periodicity, the degree of their regularity, how close in time they

occur. The perception of sound is a integrative act, consolidating multiple events into a

singular perceptual event. I propose that timbre is the perceptual phenomena of

perceiving multiple events as one. It occurs when the time scale of events is too small to

be heard as discrete events. Timbre is is the perceptual phenomena of time on a smaller

timescale.1

1 The definition of timbre is much debated. There is no unanimously accepted well-defined conception.
One of the reasons for this confusion is that timbre is often considered one of many multi-dimensional
qualities of sound perception, including frequency and loudness. I propose, rather, that timbre, instead
of being defined alongside as one of many multi-dimensional parameters of sound, rather, encompasses
all of them, excluding those that are defined through time, such as duration and morphology. While this
conception of timbre may be too broad to have practical repercussions for more specific timbre
research, it is important to decouple it from the other multi-dimensional parameters of sound. Rather,
timbre encompasses them, e.g., pitch is quality of timbre; loudness is quality of timbre.

15
 A music theory should be grounded in the very essence of sound, the perception

of time. Time perception informs music, and, inversely, music is uniquely situated to

explore time perception.

2.2 Music on Multiple Timescales

Music is uniquely situated in relation to time perception because it encompasses a

simultaneous perception of time across multiple timescales. From the smaller time scale

of timbre to the larger time scale of musical form, music allows access to the perception

of time. This point has not gone unnoticed. Rather, it has been a subject of much play in

twentieth century music.

The shattering of the pitch paradigm marked a step towards sound as the

perception of time. No longer beholden to organize music according to the consideration

of just part of the timbral continuum, the very nature of sound as consisting of time was

ripe for exploration. While Cage does not explicitly state that he considered the material

of sound to be time, it is implicit in his ideas. Well before the tools were available, Cage

was thinking about the perception of time across timescales. This is exemplified by his

self-similar rhythmic structures, in which he divides time into successively smaller

sections in proportion to the larger structure. Cage even remarks about the nature of of

time perception at the level of the waveform when he says:

...whereas a portrait of Beethoven repeated fifty times per second on a sound

track will have not only a different pitch but a different sound quality (Cage,
“Future” 4).

16
 Of course, these ideas could not be fully realized until the advent of electronic

music tools in the 1950's. Just years after he set up the WDR Cologne Studio for

Electronic Music, Karlheinz Stockhausen produced his seminal Kontakte, which

implements his musical ideas pertaining to the timescales of temporal perception.

Stockhausen divides musical perception into three timescales. Kontakte famously

illustrates these scales of perception with a tone that descends through the three rhythmic

duration ranges:

Perhaps I should mention here that each of the three large musical time-spheres—
frequency duration, rhythm duration, and form duration—are of approximately
equal size: each has a compass of about seven “octaves” (where “octave signifies
a relation of 1:2) (Stockhausen 43).

Music simultaneously presents information across multiple timescales, and our

attention is sensitive and flexible to it. Tenney calls attention to the flexible nature of our

perception to focus on different timescales. He proposes that, while our attention may not

be focused directly on the minute fluctuations of a particular timescale, we are still

sensitive to its action in the form of a statistical measure. We perceive the variable

quantity as a single quantity. He offers the example of the complexity of pitch perception.

Small fluctuations in pitch occur, but our perception is closer to a singular quantity. He

proposes that our attention across timescales is governed by relevance to the parametric

profile on which we are concentrating:

If our listening is such that we do not hear them, it is not because we cannot do
so, but rather because our attention is focussed on a different perceptual level—a
different temporal scale—at which these smaller variations are not relevant in the
determination of a parametric profile (Tenney, Meta + Hodos 68).

17
2.3 Previous Ideas

A theory of music grounded in time perception is not without precedence. Music

has always been about time to some extent, because music necessarily occurs in time. In

what way has music dealt with time in the past? What form might such a theory and

corresponding practice take today?

Theories of musical form have engaged with time perception since the beginnings

of music. Cage even claims that form will be our only connection with the past. As

music moves toward a new means of organization not centered around pitch, time will be

its only shared concern with musics past. Musical form, however, is only one part of the

larger concern. It is one of multiple time scales operative in music.

The principles of form will be our only constant connection with the past,
although the great form of the future will not be as it was in the past, at one time
the fugue and at another the sonata, it will be related to these as they are related
to each other (Cage, “Future” 5).

As discussed, both Tenney and Cage were among the first to espouse musical

practices informed by temporal concerns. More recently work has been done on musical

time. Jonathan Kramer collected disparate work on musical time in his 1988 tome The

Time of Music. Kramer's approach, however, is an exposition of what he refers to as

musical time. He constructs a dichotomy between ordinary lived time and musical time,

claiming that the experience of time in music is radically different from the experience of

time in our ordinary daily lives. His book investigates the way in which his notion of

musical time functions. A theory of music grounded in time perception, however, should

18
not be founded in the poetic sense of time that music invokes, but, rather, in music's

relationship to what Kramer refers to as ordinary lived time (Kramer).

David Huron's comprehensive book Sweet Anticipation approaches temporality in

music from the perspective of the psychology of expectation. Building on Leonard

Meyer's earlier work dealing with the importance of expectation in the emotional content

of music, Huron revisits Meyer's ideas in light of contemporary research. Huron's work,

however, is just one piece of the puzzle (Meyers). He focuses specifically on expectation

in music, corroborating with empirical evidence, the intuitive techniques that have been

passed down in the music composition tradition from teacher to student. Huron's project

explains how the devices composers use to manipulate expectation function in terms of

mind science (Huron).

The relationship of music to time perception is complex and multifaceted. The

diverse set of approaches all offer valuable contributions and serve as many faces to the

same issue. The approaches mentioned above, however, are closely concerned with

music. This thesis extends a theory of music based in time to time perception in general.

The following chapters consider music informed from the perspective of time perception.

19
 3 Music and The Study of Time Consciousness

This Chapter examines the role of music in the development of the concept of the

time consciousness. From the introduction of the term specious present by E. R. Clay

through Husserl's living present, it examines the influence of music on their thought,

showing that, although music was a large motivation, music itself did not receive

attention as a source of insight into the workings of time consciousness.

The study of time consciousness continually arrives at a central paradox:

experience knows not just of the immediately present moment, but holds other moments,

too, in relation. In order to know of the succession of two events, some cognitive

mechanism must hold them simultaneously in relation in a single instantaneous cognitive

act. Time consciousness relies on some kind of integrative act that holds experience

together in the present. In 1882, E. R. Clay named this mechanism the specious present.

A few years later, in 1890, William James famously addressed this mechanism,

expanding the idea and putting it in dialog with psychological experiments intended to

quantify it. Later, in 1928, Edmund Husserl solved the paradox left unanswered by James

in offering a thorough phenomenological account of such a perceptual mechanism. Three

of the most influential modern thinkings on time consciousness, they make constant

reference to music, while never once turning towards music for answers. This chapter

traces the development of this idea, alongside reference to music.

20
3.1 Clay, James and The Specious Present

The notion of the specious present comes from E. R. Clay's The Alternative: A

Study in Psychology (1882):

The relation of experience to time has not been profoundly studied. Its objects are
given as being of the present, but the part of time referred to by the datum is a
very different thing from the conterminous of the past and future which
philosophy denotes by the name Present. The present to which the datum refers is
really a part of the past—a recent past—delusively given as being a time that
intervenes between the past and the future. Let it be named the specious present,
and let the past that is given as being the past be known as the obvious past (Clay
168).

Clay explains that the present of conscious experience is something more than the

conterminous of the past and future, the instantaneous moment that is their shared

temporal edge boundary. Rather, the present of conscious experience retains something of

the past. He calls this the specious present.

Immediately following his coining of the term specious present, Clay make

reference to music:

All the notes of a bar of a song seem to the listener to be contained in the present
(Clay 168).

Clay makes reference to both music and the visual perception of motion throughout his

writing. His references, however, always serve to illustrate a perceptual phenomena

requiring explication. He never addresses music with regard to the way in which it could

help inform the perception of phenomena.

21
 In his Principles of Psychology (1890), William James expands Clay's notion of

the specious present:

In short, the practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with

a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in
two directions into time. The unit of composition of our perception of time is a
duration, with a bow and a stern, as it were—a rearward- and a forward-looking
end. It is only as parts of this duration-bock that the relation of succession of one
end to the other is perceived. We do not first feel one end and then feel the other
after it, and from the perception of the succession infer an interval of time
between, but we seem to feel the interval of time as a whole, with its two end
embedded in it. The experience is from the outset a synthetic datum, not a simple
one; and to sensible perception its elements are inseparable, although attention
looking back may easily decompose the experience, and distinguish its beginning
from its end (James 610).

James expands Clay's notion to include something of the future in addition to something

of the past. He calls the present a saddle-back, from which we see in two directions into

time, into the past as Clay claimed, but also into the future. James regards this saddle as a

duration-block, containing the image of an interval of time. He explains that we feel this

interval as one, as a whole, rather than as a succession of a beginning and then an end.

James regards this duration-block as the primary unit of time perception, and proceeds to

discuses attempts in the field of experimental psychology to quantify it:

But the original paragon and prototype of all conceived time is the specious
present, the short duration of which we are immediately and incessantly sensible
(James 631).

James acknowledges the relevance of sound when he comments on the primacy of

the sense of hearing in the perception of time:

22
 Hearing is the sense by which the subdivision of durations is most sharply made
(James 611).

James' ensuing discussion of work in the field experimental psychology attempting to

quantify the specious present resembles a conversation that could have occurred at the

WDR electronic music studio in Cologne in the late 1950's. James discusses the limits of

time perception. He discusses such things as the maximum and minimum number of

impressions that can be distinctly felt as a whole, the maximum and minimum empty

durations that can be distinctly felt, the maximum and minimum filled durations that can

be distinctly felt, the smallest interval that can be felt between two event, the number of

events that can be perceived within the duration of a second and the effect of the number

of events on their perception as distinct events. These investigations share many ideas in

common with the work being done in early electronic music studios. In particular,

Stockhausen's Kontakte famously explores the thresholds of temporal perception on

various time scales. James even claims that the sense of time can be “sharpened by

practice,” but does not acknowledge music as having any role in exercising this capacity,

despite the many references to music throughout the literature (Principles 618). Despite

what are, today, clear parallels between James' ideas and ideas explored in music, they

were not available at the time of James' work, and James did not turn towards music.

3.2 Husserl's Living Present

Another key figure in the study of time consciousness, Edmund Husserl, perfected

this phenomenological conception of time consciousness in his On the Phenomenology of

the Consciousness of Internal Time (1928). Husserl solves a paradox that is central to

23
most accounts of time, including James'. Previous accounts take some notion of the

specious present as the solution to the problem of time consciousness, without explaining

how the specious present itself is possible. Embedded in the solution of the specious

present, however, is the paradox that this act of consciousness that structures experience

is itself structured in time. It itself has a temporality. Husserl resolves this paradox by

showing how this act of consciousness itself functions.

Throughout his analysis, Husserl makes constant reference to music. The example

of a melody appears throughout his explication of the consciousness of internal time. It

appears in detail when Husserl first describes the experience of the way sensations

remain in consciousness:

When a melody sounds, for example, the individual tone does not utterly
disappear with the cessation of the stimulus or of the neural movement it excites.
When the new tone is sounding, the preceding tone has not disappeared without
leaving a trace. If it had, we would be quite incapable of noticing the relations
among the successive tones; in each moment we would have a tone, or perhaps an
empty pause in the interval between the sounding of two tones, but never the
representation of a melody. On the other hand, the abiding of the tone-
representations in consciousness does not settle the matter. If they were to remain
unmodified, then instead of a melody we would have a chord of simultaneous
tones, or rather a disharmonious tangle of sounds, as if we had struck
simultaneously all the notes that had previously sounded. Only because that
peculiar modification occurs, only because every tone-sensation, after the
stimulus that produced it has disappeared, awakens from out of itself a
representation that is similar and furnished with a temporal determination, and
only because this temporal determination continuously changes, can a melody
come to be represented in which the individual tones have their definite places
and their definite tempos (Husserl 12).

Despite his frequent reference, for illustrative purposes, to music, Husserl, as is the case

with both Clay and James, does not acknowledge music as having any potential analytic

relevance.

24
 Husserl does, however, make an interesting comment pertaining to the concept of

play as discussed in the previous chapter. He notes the role of phantasy in music when he

explains how it forms representations of the future:

On the basis of the appearance of momentary memory, phantasy forms the

representations of the future in a process similar to that by which, under the
appropriate circumstances, we arrive at representations of certain new sorts of
colors and sounds by following known relations and forms. In phantasy, we are
able to transpose into other registers a melody that we have heard in a definite
key and on the basis of a completely determined tonal species. In making such a
transposition, it could very well happen that, proceeding from familiar tones, we
would come to tones that we have never heard at all. So in a similar way
phantasy forms—in expectation—the representation of the future out of the past
(Husserl 14).

He explains that phantasy is a flexible mechanism that forms representations of the

future, and, in doing so, can arrive at sensations that we have never heard before.

Phantasy has the ability to transform representations following known relations and

forms. Husserl's concept of phantasy is remarkably similar to the concept of play

proposed in the previous chapter, and which is essential to the function of art as a space

in which to exercise our perception. It is a space in which we exercise new possibilities.

Husserl recognizes the importance of this concept. A mechanism that allows us to be

towards the future is necessary to the structure of his time consciousness. Husserl uses

musical example to describe it, clearly acknowledging that this behavior is present in

musical practice, but still stepping short of acknowledging any significance of musical

practice to time consciousness.

Husserl makes another interesting comment later when describing the perception

of a single tone:

25
 Each tone has a temporal extension itself. When it begins to sound, I hear it as
now; but while it continues to sound it has an ever new now, and the now that
immediately precedes it changes into a past. Therefore at any given time I hear
only the actually present phase of the tone, and the objectivity of the whole
enduring tone is constituted in an act-continuum that is in part memory, in
smallest punctual part perception, and in further part expectation (Husserl 25).

The mechanism of perception perceives a tone, even though, at an present moment, we

hear only a momentary phase of the tone. While Husserl is probably not thinking

explicitly in these terms, his comment resembles digital sampling theory. The process of

sampling illustrates that at any given moment we sense only one momentary amplitude of

a signal modulating continuously through time. We perceive this physical stimulus,

however, not as a succession of unrelated amplitudes, but, rather, through an integrative

process, as a quality of timbre, the result of considering many oscillations in time

together as one. As is the case with James, Husserl's ideas resonate with ideas explored in

the musical discourse decades later.

3.3 Music and the Study of Time Consciousness

The idea that the present has a width has been central to the study of time

consciousness since, at least, St. Augustine's writing in 398 AD. Different thinkers have

proposed different conceptions of the present and different approaches to its study, but the

question of a width of temporal experience remains a lasting paradox in the study of time

perception. Together, Clay, James and Husserl offer by no means an exhaustive survey of

the study of time perception. Such a list would have to include Gilles Deleuze, Henri

Bergson, Baruch Spinoza, Immanuel Kant, Gottfried Leibniz as well as many others.

Clay, James and Husserl, however, exhibit a strong connection to music and were

26
influential on the modern conception of time consciousness in both philosophical and

psychological fields. Music serves a prominent example in all of their work, and, the

early work described by Clay and James describing the psychology of time perception

bears a profound resemblance to the ideas explored half a century later in electronic

music studios. They demonstrate that that music and sound were central to the

development to modern conceptions of time consciousness.

James notes that hearing is the sense that best marks the passing of time. Music,

however, serves a stronger role than simply marking time and illustrating its passing.

Music functions as a malleable playground where we exercise our capacity for temporal

perception. As discussed in the first chapter, in the situation of music we are uniquely

engaged with temporality in a purposeless way. Rather than engaging with time's passing

to coordinate our work schedules, we engage with it simply to experience it. Through this

purposeless being towards temporality, we engage and develop our sense of time.

Why then, was music not further explored as a source of insight into time

consciousness? Given music's role in illustrating these theories, it seems that the study of

musical practices would offer some contribution. To consider so, however, would be to

attribute some purpose to music, and James states clearly that he believes music has no

purpose. Only recently has the field of evolutionary musicology emerged to claim

evolutionary purpose for the role of music. More significantly, the kinds of music

practices that deal explicitly with the questions addressed in these writings did not

develop until many decades later, with the advent of technology. While they study of any

musical practice would undoubtedly have something to offer, the time lag of a more

27
explicitly relevant musical practice could have prevented these thinkers form turning

towards music.

28
 4 A Basic Formulation of Dynamical Accumulation

As discussed in the previous chapter, temporal perception must be something

more than the succession of unrelated instantaneous moments. Experience wells up in a

present that retains enough of the past and knows enough of the future in order to provide

a continuous experience through time. We act purposefully in time, with the knowledge

of past events and the intention of future actions. Temporal perception is an integrative

act. Temporal events do not occur as isolated instantaneous moments but rather through

time and in relation to one another. The experience of time involves a kind of duration

block, a window in which experience collects. Present experience has a width that allows

for the sense of time and duration.

Temporal experience is not a a one-dimensional succession of experiences.

Rather, it is the result of experience being held together in some window or memory

space. Experience accumulates, and this accumulation is part of the mechanism of

temporal perception. We know of a succession of experiences because they are held

together in relation to one another. Temporal experience is a result of accumulation, and

so it is important to consider the way in which experience accumulates within a window.

We analyze the accumulation of experience within a window, investigating how

experience accumulates within a window over time. In order to have a meaningful

measure of accumulation, we consider not just the raw value accumulated, but rather

scale it by the size of the window. We consider the accumulation of experience in relation

to the size of the window, expressing accumulation as a ratio of the accumulated value of

a given experience to the total duration of the window. Furthermore, in the case of

29
multiple experiences, we consider how the experiences occupy the window in relation to

one another. Experience marks time, and our sense of the extension of our perceptual

memory windows are marked not by absolute durations but rather by other events. In this

sense, it is important to measure accumulation not just in relation to the entire window,

but in relation to the other experiences present, expressing accumulation as a ratio of the

accumulated value of a given experience to the accumulated values of other experience.

Dynamical accumulation is a tool for describing how events accumulate in a

window through time. It refers to the sum total duration of events through the timespan.

We consider how these durations change over time with regard to both time and to one

another. It is achieved through integration. Integration considers the accumulation of

events within a timespan, considering events as through time rather than in isolation,

allowing us to consider them in relation to one another and to time.

The following examples illustrate how structures of time unfold within a

timespan. We analyze how the structures unfold by considering the sum total duration of

events through the timespan. The examples in this chapter are simplified. They hold

many factors constant in order to demonstrate the complex, non-linear dynamics

underlying even the simplest cases. Both examples consider one and only one timespan

that increases linearly with time to encompass the entire duration of the example. In both

examples, the partitioning of time into events a and b is simple and binary: events do not

overlap, and are either present or not, with no finer degree of resolution. Most situations

are much more complex. Events are not so clearly parsed into discrete sections; this

parsing occurs in time, constantly rewriting its own history; many timespans may be

present, overlapping and unfolding non-linearly.

30
 This chapter does not propose a model of temporal attention, nor does it even

purport that a model is inchoate. Rather, it serves simply to articulate the complex

dynamics that operate when considering temporality as having a width, in order to

suggest that a model would have to have these dynamics as an underlying structure.

Dynamical accumulation is not Husserl's retention of the living present nor is it a model

of a larger scale act of memory. Rather, dynamical accumulation is a tool for describing

how events accumulate in a window through time, as a precursor to any specific

integrative act.

The examples in this chapter are overly simplified in order to clearly illustrate the

fundamental dynamics. These dynamics are fundamentally non-linear and that they are

necessary to consider because they are somehow present to our perception of time.

4.1 Example 1

To begin, consider a simple example that consists of two events in sequence.

Example 1 occurs in two sections. The two events occur in sequence, the first, event a,

immediately followed by the second, event b. The first event occurs for a relatively short

duration of time, and the second event continues indefinitely. We will consider the

dynamical accumulation each section over a timespan that increases linearly with time

over the duration of the entire piece.

31
 Example 1

a b

Figure 1: Sequence of Events in Ex. 1

We arrive at an equation describing the dynamical accumulation of events over time by

integrating a representation of the occurrence of events a and b in the timespan as a

function of time.2 We represent the sequence of events as the sum of two piece-wise

functions, one for each event:

a (t) = 1 (ocurring) for 0 ≤ t < 1

= 0 (not ocurring) for 1 ≤ t

b(t) = 0 (not ocurring) for 0 ≤ t < 1

= 1 (ocurring) for 1 ≤ t

where t is time and the events a and b are considered to be either occurring or not.

Because the durations of the events are not determined, let time t = 1 represent the

beginning of event b. We encode 'occurring' as 1 and 'not occurring' as 0 to indicate that

the first section consists only of event a and the second only of event b, and that both

2 Events a and b are labelled with lower case letters because they are the objects of integration and it is
mathematical convention to denote a function and its integral with upper and lower case letters.

32
persist evenly with time. Later, coefficients will be introduced to encode more variable

behavior. Integrating, we have:

DA (a) = A (t ) = t for 0 ≤ t < 1

= 1 for 1 ≤ t

DA (b) = B(t ) = 0 for 0 ≤ t < 1

= t−1 for 1 ≤ t

The integrated functions of A and B represent the dynamical accumulation, abbreviated

DA(event), of the events from the beginning of the timespan through the given time t.

The two integrated functions are plotted in figure 1, showing the dynamical accumulation

of each event through time.

Figure 2: DA of Ex. 1

33
 For reference, in figure 2 the dashed diagonal line indicates the sum total duration

of time passed in the timespan. Because the timespan is simply equal to time, its

dynamical accumulation is equivalent to time passed thus far. Later, a warping function

will be introduced to modify the timespan. Event a starts at the beginning of the timespan

and persists up to time t = 1. As such, DA(a) rises along the dashed line. Event a ends at

time t = 1. As such, DA(a) is a constant of value 1 for the remainder of the timespan,

indicating that the event persisted for a sum total duration of 1 and then stopped

occurring. The relationship between DA(a) and the dashed line illustrates the relationship

of the sum total duration of the event a to time through the duration of the timespan.

Similarly, because b doesn't not start until time t = 1, DA(b) is 0 for the duration of time

less than t =1. At time t = 1, b begins and persists until the end, and so DA(b) begins to

rise parallel to the dashed line. DA(b) increases with time, but because b started at time t

= 1 unit into the timespan, DA(b) is always one unit less than the sum total duration of

time passed. As with a, the relationship between DA(b) and the dashed line illustrates this

relationship of the sum total duration of the event b to time through the duration of the

timespan.

Now that we have equations describing the dynamical accumulation of events a

and b through time, we can consider how these durations change in relation to one

another and to time. For both a and b, we consider the ratio of its dynamical

accumulation at a given moment to the total time passed up to that moment. This is

expressed by dividing DA by time:

34
 DA (a) A(t)
= = 1 for 0 ≤ t < 1
t t
1
= for 1 ≤ t
t
DA (b) B(t)
= = 0 for 0 ≤ t < 1
t t
t−1
= for 1 ≤ t
t

Figure 3 plots the relationships of the dynamical accumulation of a to time and the

dynamical accumulation of b to time through time.

Figure 3: Ratios of DA to Time in Ex. 1

Again for reference, the dashed line indicates the ratio of the sum total duration of

time passed to time, which is a constant value 1 throughout the timespan. The ratios of

35
 DA (a) DA (b)
t and t , however, as the plot illustrates, change through time. Because
DA (a)
event a starts at the beginning of the timespan and persists up to time t = 1, t

remains constant value 1 along the dashed line. Because event a ends at time t = 1, for
DA (a) 1
time t > 1, t decreases inversely with time along the curve t . The curve

approaches a horizontal asymptote of value 0 due to the initial occurrence of event a. The
1
numerator 1 of the curve t corresponds to the duration of the first section in which event

a persists. The ratio's trajectory along the curve encodes its history. This encoding,

however, is a statistical encoding, as will be discusses later. Similarly, because event b

DA (b)
doesn't start until time = 1, t is 0 for the duration of time less than t = 1. Because

event b begins at time t = 1 and persists until the end of the timespan, for time t > 1
DA (b) DA (b)
t increases with time. The value of t increases towards a horizontal

asymptote of value 1, again, due to the initial delay of event b until time t = 1. As with
t−1
event a, the ratio's trajectory along the curve t statistically encodes its history. Note

that the two dynamical accumulation functions for events a and event b sum to 1, the

ratio of the sum total of time passed to time, for all time t. Later, when warping is
DA (a) DA (b)
introduced to the timespan, t and t will be warped accordingly. Most

importantly, note that the curves are non-linear due to the introduction of the variable

time in the denominator. The act of considering the total sum durations of events in

relation to time causes its dynamics to be non-linear.

Now we consider how the durations of events a and b change in relation to one

another. We examine the ratio of dynamical accumulation of a to b, and of b of a. This is

36
expressed by dividing the dynamical accumulation expression of one by the dynamical

accumulation expression of the other:

DA (a) A(t)
= = ∞ for 0 ≤ t < 1
DA (b) B(t)
1
= for 1 ≤ t
t−1
DA (b) B(t)
= = 0 for 0 ≤ t < 1
DA (a) A(t)
= t−1 for 1 ≤ t

Figure 4 plots the relationships of the dynamical accumulation of a to the dynamical

accumulation of b and vice versa through time. The first section of time t < 1 consists

only of event a, and the second section from t > 1 consists only of event b, yet the

sections of the graph look very different. Because event b does not begin until time t = 1,
DA(b) DA (a)
DA(a) is zero and DA (b) is equivalent to infinity for time t < 1, with a vertical
DA (a) DA (b)
asymptote at time t = 1. After time t = 1, DA (b) decreases and DA (a) increases,

because event b is now occurring and event a is not. The ratios are equal at time t = 2,

reflecting that at this time event a has occurred for as long as event b has occurred. After
DA (a) DA (b)
time t = 2, DA (b) tends towards a horizontal asymptote of value 0 while DA (a)
DA (a)
steadily rises. The value of DA (b) gets smaller and smaller, approaching 0, but, because

of the initial occurrence of event a, it only reaches 0 as a limit of time t approaching

37
infinity. As with the previous plot, the ratios' histories are encoded statistically in their

trajectories.

In contrast to figure 3 in which the ratios of the dynamical accumulation of events

a and b to time vary non-linearly, in figure 4, the ratio of the dynamical accumulation of

event a to b varies non-linearly, where as the ratio of the dynamical accumulation of

event b to a varies linearly from time t > 1. This is illustrated in figure 5, which plots the
DA (a) DA (b)
rates of change of DA (b) and of DA (a) as expressed by taking the derivatives of

these quotients:

( ) ( )
' '
DA (a) A (t )
= = ∞ for 0 ≤ t < 1
DA (b) B(t )
1
= 2
for 1 ≤ t
t −2t+1

( ) ( )
' '
DA (b) B(t )
= = 0 for 0 ≤ t < 1
DA (a) A (t )
= 1 for 1 ≤ t

DA (a)
The ratio of DA (b) is initially dropping rapidly from time t > 1. Its rate of change is a

large negative from time t > 1, but slows to -1 at time t = 2, and then continues to slow
DA(a) DA (b)
for time t > 2 as DA (b) approaches its horizontal asymptote. The ratio of DA (a) ,

however, increases at a constant rate from time t > 1. Its rate of change is a constant value
DA (a) DA (b)
1 once event b begins to occur at time t = 1. DA (b) and DA (a) vary through time not
DA(a)
only in opposite directions but also in kind. The rate at which DA (b) changes through

38
 DA (b)
time changes, where as the rate at which DA (a) changes remains constant. The values
DA (a) DA(b)
of DA (b) and DA(a) are changing it equal rates at only one moment in the timespan,
DA (a) DA (b)
time t = 2. Before time t = 2, DA (b) is changing more rapidly then DA(a) , and after
DA (a) DA (b)
time t = 2, DA (b) is changing more slowly than DA (a) . This demonstrates that as an

event follows another event, the following event varies linearly with the first, where as

the first event varies non-linearly with the second.

Figure 4: Ratios of DA to DA in Ex. 1

39
 Figure 5: Rate of Change of Ratios of DA to DA in Ex. 1

4.2 Example 2

These dynamics are available to our perception and that they impact it in some

way. Because our perception of events through time holds things in relation to one

another and to time passed, these dynamics of accumulation of events through time are at

work. The first example outlined the basic dynamics. Now a second example applies

these ideas to a polyphonic context in order to illustrate the kinds of structures that

emerge from applying these ideas in more complicated context, and to show how they

can pertain to explaining certain kinds of perceptual phenomena.

40
 Example 2.1

a b

a b

a b

a b

a b

Figure 6: Sequence of Events in Ex. 2.1

Example 2.2

b a a a a

a b a a a

a a b a a

a a a b a

a a a a b

Figure 7: Sequence of Events in Ex. 2.2

41
 Example 2 examines polyphony of multiple simultaneous events, being one—

unison—as compared with being many—staggered—in time. I will refer to the different

streams of simultaneous events as performers. An example in two parts, in example 2.1

simultaneous events occur in unison, and in example 2.2 simultaneous events occur

staggered. Example 2.1 occurs in two sections, event a and event b. In the first section,

all of the performers simultaneously sustain event a for an equal duration. In the second

section, all of the performers simultaneously sustain event b for a duration four times as

long as that of event a. This example is equivalent to example 1, considered in unison by

many performers. Example 2.2 occurs in five sections. Rather than occurring

simultaneously, events are staggered such that exactly one performer sustains event b in

each section. Examples 2.1 and 2.2 are organized in contrast to illustrate the significance

of staggering events in time.

Beginning with example 2.1, we consider the dynamical accumulation of each

event over a timespan that increases linearly with time over the duration of the entire

example. We would like to consider each performer separately, but, because the example

is in unison, each performer produces an identical analysis. The example's time structure

is analogous to that of example 1, and produces the same analysis as in the previous

example.

Example 2.2, however, produces a different analysis. Because the performers are

staggered, the two events do not occur simultaneously across performers. Rather, event b

is staggered across performers. For performers 2, 3 and 4, event b occurs twice, separated

by event a. For performers 1 and 5, event b occurs only once. For each performer, we will

42
consider both of these separate occurrences of event a as contributing to the accumulation

of the same event. Figure 8 plots the dynamical accumulation of events a and b for each

performer as expressed by integrating a piece-wise function representing the events a and

b through time. For each performer, event a rises to 1 and then remains constant. The

time t at which event a rises for each performer is staggered across the five plots. Event b

rises for all time values t, except when event a is rising.

Figure 8: DA of Ex. 2.2

Now we consider the ratio of the dynamical accumulation of events a and b to the
DA (a) DA (b)
sum total duration of time passed. This is expressed by t and t . Figure 9
DA (a)
plots the dynamical accumulation of event a over time t for each player, and
DA (b)
figure 10 plots the dynamical accumulation of event b over time t for each player.

43
Figure 9: Ratios of DA(a) to Time in Ex. 2.2

Figure 10: Ratios of DA(b) to Time in Ex. 2.2

44
 Considering first the dynamical accumulation of event a, after the initial

occurrence of event a, performers 2, 3, 4 and 5 rise to an intersection with the previous

performer(s). Performer 2 intersects performer 1 at time t = 2, performer 3 intersects

performer 2 and 3 at time t = 3, and so on. At these intersection points, they have

performed event a for equal durations; their ratios of the dynamical accumulation of

event a to time are equal. Note, however, that, although they approach the same value,

the increasing segments and decreasing segments to not approach the intersection at the

same rate. For example, from time t = 2 to time t = 3, performers 1 and 2 decreases from
1 1 1
2 to 3 , while performer 3 increases from 0 to 3 . Both groups approach the same
1
value, but performer 3 changes by 3 where as performs 1 and 2 change by only
1 1 1
− =
2 3 6 . The trend continues for other performers.

This variety of different rates is caused by the staggering. First, the increasing

segments of performers 2-5 do not ascend in parallel. They increase along separate

trajectories. As noted in the first example, the duration of time before event a determines
t−d
the curve. A performer that rests for duration d before event a rises along the curve t

. The rates of change differ as a result of the staggering. Secondly, after the point of
1
intersection, however, the performers decrease together along the same curve t . At the

point of intersection, the performers are statistically equivalent. They have performed

event a for the same sum total duration, even though the events occurred at different

times.

45
 These observations are confirmed by the plotting the rates of change of the curves

as expressed by their derivatives. Figure 11 plots the rates of change of the ratio of

dynamical accumulation of event a to time for each performer. We see that the rate of

change for each performer's increasing segment differ, although by less and less as the

delay factor, d, increases. Figure 12 plots the absolute value of the rates of change in

order to compare their magnitudes. The magnitudes of the rate of change of the

increasing segments are greater than those of the decreasing segments. The difference

increases as the duration of the initial occurrence of event a, increases, and for performer

2 with d = 1, there is no difference.

Figure 11: Rate of Change of Ratios of DA(a) to Time in Ex. 2.2

46
 Figure 12: Absolute Value of Rate of Change of Ratios of DA(a) to
Time in Ex. 2.2

Because the performers increase along separate curves but all decrease along the

same curve, the rates of change as they approach intersections differ. The ratio of the

dynamical accumulation of event b to time exhibits the same behavior. Similarly,

considering the dynamical accumulation of events a and b to one another rather than to

time also exhibits the same behavior. Although, when considering the ratios of events a

and b to one another rather than to time, the increasing segments increase linearly rather

than non-linearly. As noted in the previous example, this is a result of considering event a

in relation to a constant rather than the variable time t.

Through the mechanism of accumulation, a polyphony of shifting ratios emerges

from the staggered structure. In contrast to the first movement, in which the events occur

simultaneously, staggering the events causes them to exhibit a quality of difference, while

still retaining a quality of sameness. The events retain a quality of sameness because they

47
are of the same kind. The events exhibit a quality of difference due to their temporal

displacement. Considering them in relation to one another through the mechanism of

accumulation articulates this difference. When considered in relation to the entire

timespan, the staggering of occurrences is manifest in their shifting ratios of

accumulation.

These dynamics in some form impact perception. Experience of the present holds

moments in relation to one another. It accumulates experiences. Whether it is Husserl's

living present or a larger scale memory, the dynamics of accumulation operate. They are

available to perception, and considering them can inform our understanding of the

perception of such phenomena.

4.3 Remarks

The examples in this chapter are greatly simplified. They make many

assumptions, and hold many variables constant. The events are expressed as either

occurring or not, with no gradation between. The events persist evenly, without variable

weighting through the event. The structure is partitioned such that one and only one event

is occurring at a given moment. Moreover, the structure is partitioned in advance, and

does not change through the timespan. The timespan only grows, fixed to increase

linearly with time, and never contracts, encompassing the entirety from the beginning of

time. Events within the timespan are weighted evenly. Furthermore, only one timespan is

considered.

The examples are simplified in order to construct a stable foundation. What they

express, then, is how events accumulate within a timespan, given all the aforementioned

48
assumptions of the nature of the events and the nature of the timespan. It examines the

way in which the partition of time unfolds. Even in this case, however, complex and

interesting dynamics emerge.

The dynamics thus far is far from a model of anything yet. Any real world

perceptual situation would be far more complex, with a more complex parsing of events,

and multiple and overlapping non-linear timespans. Most importantly, a real world model

would include a perceptual model of similarity to parse the events in realtime as they

come. The next chapter constructs a more sophisticated dynamics, introducing variables

to address the factors currently held constant. These dynamics could be used to construct

a more sophisticated model that might suit something such as musical memory or the

perceptual mechanism of the specious present.

49
 5 A Basis Model of Dynamical Accumulation

The previous chapter introduced the basic dynamics of accumulation. It illustrated

these dynamics through examples that consider the accumulation of events within a

timespan. These examples, however, represent some of the simplest cases, holding many

variables constant. This next chapter introduces a more general model and studies its

dynamics. Reconsidering the nature of the encoding of the temporal experience, it

generalizes to a basis representation, which could represent not only discrete sections, as

in the previous formulation, but other parameters of experience as well. Expanding on the

previous formulation, it examines its latent assumptions and introduces variable functions

for the factors that are implicitly held constant, such as the boundaries of integration and

weightings. This chapter is informed and motivated by perceptual experience, but it does

not present a perceptual model. It presents a dynamical model, which is motivated by

perception, of the accumulation of bases within a timespan.

5.1 A Basis Representation

In the previous chapter, we considered a perceptual experience as a sequence of

events through time. We divided the timespan of the experience into discrete events and

examined the dynamics of their unfolding in time. We encoded events simply as either

occurring or not, with no finer gradation. Everyday experience, however, is often less

clearly parsed. It is often not clear where one event ends and another begins, or even what

constitutes an event in general. In this chapter we introduce a more general formulation.

Rather than expressing experience as a sequence of discrete events, we express it as the

50
combination of a set of bases B = {b1 , b2 , b3 ,... , bn } according to a set of coefficients

C = {c1 (t ) , c2 (t ) , c3 ( t ) ,... , cn (t )} that vary with time. We represent the material f (t )

of some timespan ts as

f (t ) = c 1 (t )b1 + c2 (t )b2 + c3 ( t )b3 + ... + c n (t ) bn

We can now represent the perceptual experience as the sum of functions that vary with

time, rather than as constants. This formulation may represent distinct events, but may

also represent other kinds of events that vary in degree in time, such as the presence of

components of the perceptual experience, a measure of similarity or some other

parameter, such as loudness or rhythmic mean.

In the previous chapter we considered the dynamics of the two events a and b. In

this more general formulation, each term of f (t ) corresponds to the behavior of one of

the bases. For the sake of notation, let f i (t ) correspond to the ith term of f (t ) , such

that f i (t ) = ci (t )bi and f (t ) = f 1 (t ) + f 2 (t )+ f 3 ( t )+ ... + f n (t ) . As before, we will

consider the accumulation of each basis separately. Let F represent the entire set, and let

it be expressed as the set consisting of the integrals of each term: F = {F i ∣ bi ∈B }

where F i = ∫ f i (t ) dt .

As in the previous chapter, we want to consider how F i changes through time.

We are interested in the accumulation of experience through time. As before, we consider

how the accumulation of experience changes through time by considering how its integral

51
over time changes through time: F i (T ) = ∫ f i (t ) dt where 0 ≤T ≤timespan . T is the

independent variable time as we consider it through the timespan. It is real-time, the time

of the moment we are considering. For each T, F i (T ) represents the integral of each

term at the given time T within the timespan. The integrated variable t indicates that at

each time T we integrate over a function of time t from 0 to t occurred thus far. In

considering how the integral changes through time, we consider F i (T ) through time.

We will introduce additional variables to the expression of F i (T ) in the following

sections.

5.2 Windowing

In the previous chapter, we integrated over the entire timespan as it occurred. As

we moved through the timespan, we considered events in relation to everything thus far.

The domain of integration was from 0 to t, increasing at the rate of time. Our experience

of time, however, seems to expand and contract. The perception of time feels, at times,

myopic and, at other times, expansive. At times we hold many experiences in mind and at

other times few. Now, we introduce variability in the domain of integration, decoupling it

from the passing of the timespan. We integrate within a shifting window that expands and

contracts within the unfolding timespan. The window of integration changes as we move

through the timespan. The windowing function consists of a minimum and maximum

boundary that varies through time, and we integrate with these bounds. Let

w(T ) = ( min (T ) , max (T ) ) where min(T ) is a minimum window boundary function

and max (T ) is a maximum window boundary function. We will assume that min(T )

52
and max (T ) are bounded by time = 0 and time = T, so that the window does not extend

beyond the current time. Now, we have

max(T )
F i (T ) = ∫ ci (t)bi dt
min(T )

The window might expand to encompass the entire timespan as was illustrated in

the previous chapter, or the window might encompass only part of the timespan. The

window might remain a constant width over, for example, the past 15 seconds of

experience, or it might vary according to the duration of and event. The window might

also be defined piece-wise and only encompass similar events.

In the previous chapter we scaled the raw accumulated duration by considering it

in proportion to time thus far. Now we have the option of scaling by time thus far, or by

the duration of the accumulation window. In order to scale by the duration of the

accumulation window, we divide F i (T ) by the duration of the window, which amounts

to integrating a constant value 1 over the integration domain:

F i (T )
max(T )
∫ 1 dt
min(T )

53
5.3 Window Persistence

In the previous chapter, we integrated over the entire timespan evenly. We

considered events at the beginning, middle and end of the timespan equally. Not all

events, however, are held equally in attention. Events grow distant before they vanish

from attention, and recent events demand the most of our attention. We introduce a

persistence weighting function l (t ) to weight bases through the integration window.

max(T )
F i (T ) = ∫ l(t)c i (t)bi dt
min(T )

The function might weight the beginning of the window heavily and decrease

through the end of the window. It might decrease at a constant rate, according to some

consideration of the events in the window or as a result of some external consideration. It

might emphasize events within the window that are similar to the current event.

Now when scaling by the window duration we have the option of accounting for

the window persistence weighting:

F i (T )
max(T )
∫ l(t) dt
min(T )

54
5.4 Basis Persistence

In the previous chapter, we assumed that events persist evenly. The formulation

considers them equal in magnitude from the beginning through the end of an event.

Regardless of its duration, its accumulation increases by equal value. The beginning of

the event is just as significant as its middle and end. In everyday experience, however,

events do not continue to be of equal importance as they persist. Change captures our

attention. New events spark our attention, and our attention grows dull to continuing

events. We introduce a persistence weighting function p (t ) to to scale the basis

coefficient, emphasizing some parts of the events and deemphasizing others. This

weighting function is similar, in effect, to l(t) , but l (t ) is applied to the entire window

of integration, where as p (t ) is applied to specific events. The event weighting function

p (t ) weights individual events, where as the window weighting function l (t ) weights

all event withing a window. Now, we have

max(T )
F i (T ) = ∫ l(t) p i (t)ci (t)bi dt
min(T )

The function might weight the initial occurrent of the event heavily and then

gradually decrease as the event persists. The weighting function might decrease at a

constant rate or by a factor of the duration of the other bases. The weighting function

55
might also fluctuate according to some external consideration, such as a measure of the

activity of the event.

5.5 Trajectories

Finally, in the previous chapter, the parsing of the timespan into events remained

fixed through time. We divided the timespan into events a and b and then integrated over

their functions, plotting successive integrations from time t = 0 to time = t, as t increased

through the duration of the entire timespan. With each successive integration, the parsing

of the timespan into events a and b remained the same. Perception of temporal objects,

however, is malleable through time. We are interested in real-time perception, that is, how

perception unfolds through time. Past experience remains in flux, constantly being

modified by the current experience. Present perception informs past perception, as the

structure of the temporal experience gradually settles into shape. Current experience can

cause us to perceive the past experience differently then we first perceived it.

Now, rather than fixing the bases, we allow them to shift and modify through the

timespan. Let B T = {bT1 , bT2 , bT3 ,... ,bTn } and C T = {c T1 (t ) , cT2 (t ) , c T3 (t ) ,... , c Tn ( t )}

represent the bases and coefficient functions at a given moment T in the timespan. For

each T, the coefficient functions are are defined for all t ≤T . The superscript T indicates

that the function definition over all t ≤T is specific to time T. Now we express the

experience at time T as f T (t ) = cT1 (t ) bT1 + c T2 ( t )bT2 + cT3 (t )bT3 + ... + cTn (t )bTn and its

accumulated duration:

56
 T
max (T )
F i (T ) = ∫ T T T T
l (t) p i (t)ci (t) bi dt
minT (T )

where cTi ( t ) is defined for all t ≤T .

For each T , C T and B T represent an independent parsing of past experience.

They may correspond for different values of T, and they may differ. At each moment T in

the timespan, we consider the history as informed up to that moment. We integrate the

variable t over all time passed thus far. From moment to moment, however, the function

definitions may change as new experience informs past experience, changing the way

experience is parsed into bases. The bases themselves may change, new bases may be

added, old bases may be subtracted, and the basis coefficients change as a result. We are

considering the accumulation of individual bases i in time, but while allowing the bases

to change dynamically. At each moment T, we consider the accumulation of a given basis

according to how the present knowledge of experience parses it through time.

In addition to the bases and coefficient functions, we allow all of the parameters

—bases, basis coefficients, persistence functions and windowing functions—to be

modified dynamically through the timespan. The persistence functions might be fixed in

advance, but they also might depend on the bases, or on what is happening or has

happened thus far. The windowing functions might similarly be fixed in advance, depend

on the bases, or depend on what is happening or has happened thus far. In the previous

chapter, all of these variables were fixed throughout the timespan: the window function

57
was determined in advance and did not change, and the parsing of events was determined

in advance and did not change.

Now, we allow the definitions of the functions themselves to vary through time.

We update these functions according to the real time position as it moves through the

timespan. Let P T = { pT1 (t ) , pT2 (t ) , pT3 (t ) , ... , pTn (t )} represent event persistence

functions at a given moment T in time. Let w T (T ) be a windowing function at a given

moment T in time, where each window has maximum and minimum boundary functions

T T T T
w (T ) = (max (T ) , min (T )) and a window persistence function l (t) that also

changes dynamically according to T. The integral F i (T ) is now expressed as

T
max (T )
F i (T ) = ∫ T T T T
l (t) p i (t)ci (t) bi dt
minT (T )

Each moment T in the timespan projects an independent past history. Each of the

basis coefficient, persistence and windowing functions l T (t) , pTi (t ) , cTi ( t ) , and

T
w (T ) are defined over all past time in the timespan. They are defined for all t ≤T .

The definition of these functions over t describes a history of how the experience is

parsed into bases, how the windowing and persistence weights change over this history

and how the windows and their boundaries evolve. For each moment T , however, the

functions may differ, describing differing values over t and differing histories from one

moment to the next. The history described at one moment of T may not be consistent with

58
the history described at another moment of T. The values that occurred at an earlier time

T may differ from the values described by the history of a later time T. As we integrate

over t the functions described by some value T, they may be different from the values that

occurred at those earlier times t = T. The integration at each point T is over an

independent history, that may or may not differ from the history that occurred. When they

are the same, we say that they are along the same trajectory, and when they differ they are

on separate trajectories. The integration at a given moment is over what current situation

implies for the past, reflecting that the present perception influences the perception of the

past by considering the past experience as informed by the current present.

Again, when scaling we have the option of accounting for trajectories:

F i (T )
T
max (T )
∫T
T
l (t) dt
min (T )

5.6 Multiple Windows

In the previous chapter, we considered only one window within the timespan. We

considered the relation of all of the events together within the timespan, integrating over

the entire timespan. Perception, however, does not hold all experience in relation to all

other experience. Attention and memory only span so far, and they vary from person to

person. Moreover, we hold certain experience in relation to certain other experience for

reasons beyond temporal proximity. Similar events recall one another, and dissimilar

events ossify one another into shape. We would like to provide for multiple windows

59
within a timespan. This could be achieved by a set of windows with where each window

T
w (T ) = (max w (T ) , min w (T )) contains its own minimum and maximum boundary
T T

windowing functions, as well as its own window persistence function l w (t) . F i (T ) is

T

now expressed as the sum of all windows:

max w (T )T

F i (T ) = ∑ ∫ l w (t) pTi (t) c Ti (t)bTi dt

T

wT ∈W T min w (T ) T

There could be separate windows corresponding to each event. The separate

windows could overlap or not, or together comprise the entirety of the timespan. There

could be a window for each basis that increases only as the basis is present. The

windowing could also be determined by a measure of difference and correspond to

similarity of events.

When scaling, we can account for multiple windows by similarly summing their

integrals:

F i (T )
max w (T )
T

∑
T T
∫ l w (t)dt
T

w ∈W minw (T ) T

60
5.7 Summary

In summary, accounting for event persistence, window persistence, window

boundary and multiple windows, all of which change dynamically through the timespan,

given a temporal experience f (t) that is expressed through time as the combination of

bases B T = {bT1 , bT2 , bT3 ,... ,bTn } with coefficient functions

T T T T T
C = {c 1 (t ) , c 2 (t ) , c 3 (t ) ,... , cn ( t )} as

T T T T T T T T T
f (t ) = c1 (t ) b1 + c 2 ( t )b2 + c3 (t )b3 + ... + c n (t )b n

with event persistence functions P T = { pT1 (t ) , pT2 (t ) , pT3 (t ) , ... , pTn (t )}

and with windows W T = {w T1 , w T2 , wT3 ,... , wTm } where each window w T ∈W T has

T
corresponding windowing boundary functions w (T ) = (max w (T ) , min w (T )) and a T T

corresponding persistence function l w ( t ) where the superscript T denotes that the

T

function definitions are specific time time T, the set F of F i (T ) = ∫ f i (t ) dt can be

expressed as

max w (T )
T

F = {F i ∣ bi ∈B } where F i (T ) = ∑ ∫ l w (t ) p Ti ( t )c Ti (t )bTi dt .
T

wT ∈W T min (T ) T
w

5.8 Effects

If we express a temporal experience as the combination of multiple bases,

considering F i through time expresses the dynamics of the way in which these bases

61
unfold in time, considered within a set of changing time windows with variable event and

window persistence. The result of adding variable parameters to the simpler dynamics

formulated in the previous chapter is that its dynamics may be orders of degree more

complex. In the previous chapter, the events were expressed as constants, so their

integration yielded functions of linear degree. It wasn't until we considered the

accumulation of those events in relation to one another or to time that their dynamics

became non-linear. Introducing variables for persistence and windowing allows for the

possibility that the accumulation of the bases themselves are non-linear, before even

considering them in relation to one another and to time. Adding variable parameters to

the formulation also provides for more possibilities when considering bases in relation to

one another and to time. We can consider them in relation within windows or across

windows, and in relation to all of time passes or to time passed within a window.

5.9 Remarks

This chapter expands the previous formulation into a more general and flexible

basis model. Temporal experience is represented as a set of bases over time, with variable

functions for weighting and windowing the domain of integration. With an interest in the

dynamics of real-time perception, the variable parameters are flexible to change

trajectory dynamically, as we consider the integral through the timespan. This is informed

by the idea that experience is in constant flux, constantly informing and reshaping itself

across time.

It is far from complete and is not fixed. It is a model only of the dynamics. It is

flexible to be updated dynamically, but requires a model of real-time perception. A model

62
of real-time perception would parses experience as it occurs, updating the dynamically

variable parameters. A model of real-time perception might implement a measure of

similarity in order to parse the bases, and would also include any other features that the

variable functions consider. Furthermore, the current formulation is not fixed. I hope that

the discussion in the current and previous chapter demonstrate how to introduce

additional parameters to meet specific concerns that may be beyond the current

formulation. The model is flexible such that it can be applied in a modular fashion,

simultaneously and across multiple timescales.

This chapter is informed and motivated by perceptual experience, but it does not

present a perceptual model. It presents a dynamical model of the accumulation of bases

within a timespan. It does so for the purpose of exploring these dynamics in hypothetical

abstraction, and, as will be discussed later, as a music compositional structure. The

factors are chosen to have perceptual significance, and it is hoped that their play will

inform perception.

63
 6 Music Composition

Much of my creative work over the past few years has been motivated by the

ideas of dynamical accumulation presented in this thesis. This final chapter discusses

how dynamical accumulation manifests in my creative work and addresses the

compositional decisions made. It focuses on an ongoing series of works titled Variations

for Functions and Partitions of Time, but also discusses more general creative

applications and future works.

Variations takes particular interest in dynamical accumulation. While I claim that

dynamical accumulation is available to our perception, it is not necessarily the focus of

our attention. Rather, it is a latent mechanism. It is implicit in the dynamic unfolding of

experience, and it illuminates the perception of certain experience, but it is rarely the

object of perception. Rarely does our attention turn towards the way in which our

perception holds experiences together, yet it is an essential mechanism by which we are

able to act purposefully in the world. Variations foregrounds dynamical accumulation,

emphasizing it as the primary compositional mechanism. The set of works explores ways

of calling attention to dynamical accumulation. The subject of the works becomes

dynamical accumulation itself, treating it as an object of play.

Variations implements a computer sampling process in order to invoke dynamical

accumulation. The sampling process records events into memory and plays back samples

of the recorded events. The sampling and playback reflect the dynamical accumulation of

events, and the sampling playback process implements the dynamical accumulation

function. The samples are chosen probabilistically from within a window region of the

64
memory, and events are weighted according their accumulation. The probability of

hearing a sample of a given event is a result of its accumulation according to its

dynamical accumulation function. The playback offers access to the dynamical

accumulation. Rather than presenting the total accumulation of events at once, the

playback chooses between events according to their accumulation. As the probabilities of

playback change, dynamical accumulation is foreground as a field of changing rhythms.

The compositional decisions are directed towards the shifting playback

probabilities. The pieces are constructed with care towards the interaction of the events

with their sampled playback and the way the playback probabilities change over the

course of the piece. The compositional decisions are motivated that these factors become

the foreground of the piece and give it interest.

The works focus on the shifting probabilities in order to call attention to

accumulation dynamics. The accumulation dynamics expressed by the works are

hypothetical. An accurate expression of the accumulation dynamics present to an

individual's experience would be specific to inaccessible factors of that individual's

experience. The works are a simplified hypothetical instance in order to turn attention

towards the dynamics. They appeal to individual experience with the hope of causing

individuals's to turn an inquisitive ear towards the nature of their own temporal

experience.

6.1 Variation II

Variation II, for solo performer and electronics, is composed using the partition

discussed in example 1 in chapter 4, in which there are two events, one following the

65
other, the second lasting a greater duration than the first. The piece occurs in two

movements. Each movement is divided into two sections. The first section of each

movement occurs just briefly, and the second section sustains for a greater duration of

time. The length of the second section is indeterminate, in part determined by the length

of the first section and in part determined by chance during performance.

66
67
 The playback window extends over the entire duration of the movement, its lower

boundary remaining fixed at the beginning of the piece, and its upper boundary

increasing equal to time. The window encompasses everything played thus far. There are

no additional weightings, so the probability of playback of an event is analogous to the

duration for which the event has occurred thus far. Samples are played back at a constant

rate of one sample every 200ms, hocketting between samples of the two sections in ratios

according to their accumulation.

The first movement begins with a rest, followed by a long sustained tone. Until

the tone begins, the playback consists only of samples of silence. When the rest ends and

the sustained tone begins, the playback begins to hocket between samples of the sustained

tone and the silence. As the rest continues, the playback samples more and more

sustained tone, in ratios analogous to the dynamical accumulation of each. The ratios shift

as illustrated in figure 3.2. The sustained tone is sustained until the playback of samples

of the sustained tone obscure samples of the rest. This is often determined in advance by

choosing a duration, such as four seconds, and sustaining the tone until the playback has

sampled four seconds of sustained tone uninterrupted by any samples of silence. The

second movement repeats the process, but reverses the order of tone and rest. The first

movement begins with silence and becomes gradually filled by sound. The second

movement begins with sound and becomes gradually filled by silence. The two

movements are often elided in performance. The duration of the piece is long, at least 30

minutes per movement, but ideally much longer.

68
6.2 Variation V

Variation V, for fiver performers and electronics, is composed using the partition

discussed in example 3.2, in which there are five staggered events of equal duration.

Variation V also occurs in two movements. The movements, however, exhibit contrasting

partitions. The first movement occurs in two sections of unequal duration, where as the

second movement occurs in five sections. The movements are of equal duration.

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 Variation V features a separate instance of the sampling and playback processing

for each player. Each instance maintains an independent memory specific to a given

player, and plays back samples independently of the other instances. As in Variation II,

the playback window extends over the entire duration of the movement, its lower

boundary remaining fixed at the beginning of the piece, and its upper boundary

increasing equal to time, with no additional probability weightings, so the probability of

playback of an event is analogous to the duration for which the event has occurred thus

far. Playback is synchronized. Each instance plays back samples at the the same time and

at a constant rate, but the samples are independently chosen from the instance's sampling

window, hocketting between samples of the events accumulated by that player.

The first movement begins with a sustained tone, followed by a rest of duration

four time greater than the sustained tone. Until the rest begins, playback consists only of

samples of the sustained tone, then gradually more and more samples of silence occur as

the rest continues. Because this occurs independently for each player, five instantiations

of playback are heard, though the accumulation ratios for each are equal because the

players play in unison. The ratios shift as illustrated in figure 3.2.

In the second movement, however, does not occur in unison. Each player

performs only two events, rest and a sustained a tone. The entrances are staggered,

however, such that, in each of five sections, only one player sustains a tone. The players

exhibit different accumulation dynamics. The playback ratios of hocketting between

sound and silence vary independently over the course of the movement, as illustrated in

figures 3.6 and 3.7, demonstrating the effect of staggering.

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 The movements are composed in contrast in order to demonstrate the effect of

staggering on accumulation dynamics. In the first movement the players play in unison,

but in the second movement they are staggered. The sampling process is identical in each

movement, but has a radically different effect, as a result of the staggering. Again, the

duration of the piece is long, at least 30 minutes per movement, but ideally much longer.

6.3 Variation VII

Variation VII differs from the previous two variations in that it features a

continuously changing event, rather than a discrete partitioning of events. Composed for

cello and electronics, the cellist first plays a slowly rising glissando, followed by a slowly

falling glissando, over the interval of a whole step.

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 The playback window first expands as the glissando rises, its lower boundary

remaining fixed at the beginning of the piece, and its upper boundary increasing equal to

time = 5 minutes. The playback window then contracts as the glissando falls, its lower

boundary still remaining fixed at the beginning of the piece, but its upper boundary

decreasing linearly with time. By the end of the piece, at time = 10 minutes, the playback

window has contracted to encompass nothing, with lower and upper boundary both equal

to time = 0. The result is that as the glissando rises, its sound is added to the computer’s

memory, and as the glissando falls, its sound is subtracted from the computer’s memory.

There are no additional weightings, and the rate at which new samples are chosen is

initially quick, slows as the glissando rises, and quickens back to the original rate as the

glissando decreases.

The interaction of the cello with its own sampled sound causes audible beating,

which increases in intensity as the interval widens, and decreases in intensity as the

interval narrows. Where as in the previous variations in which the dynamical

accumulation manifests as hocketting rhythms between samples of discrete events,

Variation VII accumulates distance from the cello tone. As the glissando rises, the

window accumulates pitched material spanning the interval of an entire whole step. The

interaction of the cello with its sampled sound causes audible beating. The beating is

slow when the interval is small, and fast when the interval as large. The accumulation

manifests as a greater possibility of rates of audible beating. As the glissando rises, the

variation in beating intensity increases, and as the glissando falls, the variation in beating

intensity diminishes.

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6.4 Variation XXVII (Quartet for Ruth)

Variation XXVII (Quartet for Ruth), for four performers and electronics, is an

example of a piece in which the window lower boundary does not remain fixed.

Variation XXVII is inspired by Ruth Crawford-Seeger's 1931 String Quartet. The melodic

material is derived from the third movement of Crawford-Seeger's string quartet in which

clusters of harmony slowly ascend and then descend, the harmony changing one pitch at

a time. An homage to Seeger's ideas, Variation XXVII (Quartet for Ruth) implements a

similar idea by means of the Variations series computer processing.

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 The quartet plays in unison the melodic line extracted from Crawford-Seeger's

third movement while the computer processing records and plays random samples from

the past twenty seconds. The lower boundary of the window increases with time, equal to

time - 20 seconds, and the upper boundary increases equal to time. There is a separate

instance of the computer playback processing for each player. Playback is not

synchronized across players, creating a field of changing harmonies out of the most

recent 20 seconds of the melody.

The result is that of a random access delay network. The past 20 seconds are

maintained in memory and randomly sampled. The accumulation dynamics manifest as

an expanding and contracting field of harmony that correlates to how quickly the melody

is changing at a given moment, within a 20 second window. The more pitches that occur

within the past 20 seconds, the richer the polyphony of the field of harmony. As fewer

pitches that occur within the delay window, the independent sampling voices begin to

converge towards a unison.

6.5 Variation XIVb

The works discusses thus far have dealt with the medium of sound. The pieces

have involved acoustic instruments in conjunction with electronically reproduced

samples of the live instruments, and the interaction between the live and electronically

reproduced sound has been a driving compositional concern. The interaction between live

and electronically reproduced sound is unique in that microphone positioning may allow

us to two hear the two at once, mixing acoustically in the space, while continuing to

sample only the live sound, avoiding feedback of the electronically reproduced sound

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into the sampling process. The microphone is often positioned near the acoustic

instrument, and the sound mixes in the space, without significant feedback into the

sampling microphone. We hear the two at once, while isolating only one as the input back

into the system. Video, on the other hand, offers a different possibility. The following

video works implement feedback. The sampled output is fed back into the input of the

sampling process. The output of the sampling process is projected back onto the surface

that is sampled, mixing in the room according to the properties of light, and feeding back

into the sampling process. The following video pieces explore the use of feedback in the

sampling process.

In Variation XIVb, light is projected onto a colored surface. A video camera

monitors the surface, recording and playing back samples of the surface, which are in

turn projected back onto the surface. The result is, in effect, a modified video projection

feedback system. Rather than feeding back directly, it is mediated through the sampling

process. The color of the projection surface changes through the piece by swapping out

different pieces of colored construction board. The projection surface changes according

to the following structure:

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 The piece explores combinations of the three primary light colors, red, green and

blue. Combinations occur between the color of the projected sample and the color of the

projection surface. The piece is partitioned such that all combinations may occur. At first,

red is the only color available to the sampling process, and it produces combination of red

with red, produced by the sampled red being projected back onto the original red surface.

Once the the projection surface is changed to green, the process produces combinations

of red on green and green on green between the projected samples, which now consists of

samples of both red and green in proportion to their dynamical accumulation, and the

green projection surface. The projection surface then changes back to red in order to

produce combinations of green on red, in addition to the already seen combinations of red

on red. The order of colors is determined such that, each time a new color is introduced,

all previous combinations are reiterated. The durations of sections are scaled such that, by

the end of the piece, each color has been the projection surface for an equal duration of

time. Moreover, the form is mirrored, with a sampling window that expands to

encompass the entire duration of the piece at the exact middle and then contracts back to

nothing, as in Variation VII. The effect of the interaction of the projection surface with its

sampled projection produces gradations of color combinations that alternate in rhythm

proportional their dynamical accumulation.

6.6 Variation XXIIIb

Variation XXIIIb is a live video projection piece using three separate projection

surfaces. The processing of one surface is project on the following surface, ordered left to

right with the processing of the third surface projected onto the first surface. Rather than

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a direct feedback of the surface with its projected sample, as in the previous example, the

feedback is iterated over the three surfaces.

surface 1 surface 2 surface 3

Figure 13: Variation XXIIIb Signal Diagram

The piece begins with the projection surfaces all the same color red, and moves

through all 27 possible combinations in equal duration. The window and weighting

functions offer control over how quickly the feedback propagates through the system.

The window is initially set to encompass the entire timespan, its lower boundary fixed at

the beginning of the piece and its upper boundary increasing with time. The window

weighting function offers the most flexible control. Weighting the most recent part of the

window causes the feedback to propagate more quickly, and weighting the more distant

part of the window causes the feedback to propagate more slowly. This weighting is

dynamically adjusted in performance, offering real-time control of the system. The result

of the accumulated duration of different configurations is not as direct as in some of the

other pieces. The sampled accumulated duration doesn't directly correlate to sampled

events, but rather to feedback states, or directions in which the feedback is moving.

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6.7 Future Work

The Variations series offers one particular approach to composing with dynamical

accumulation. Through electronic processing, it makes audible the dynamical

accumulation of experienced events in the form of sampled playback. Much of my future,

work, however, focusses on generating notated acoustic music from the dynamical

accumulation curves. Formalizing the mathematics of dynamical accumulation allows it

to be used as a generative compositional tool. dynamical accumulation trajectories can be

specified in advance, complete with windowing and weighting functions, and realized

into music. The process, however, requires a mechanism to generate musical figures from

dynamical accumulation basis data. Such a mechanism would be the inverse of the kinds

of parsing functions used to parse experience into bases. As the basis model is general, a

generative function could be any of a large span of functions, from simply representing

the presence of pre-determined events, to modulating musical parameters, to a highly-

sophisticated inverse parsing function. Music composed by means of dynamical

accumulation data would function as a testing ground between the formalization and

perceptual experience.

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 7 Conclusions

In this thesis I have presented an approach to the consideration of dynamical

accumulation. I hope that this work will stimulate interest and that others will expand and

explore these ideas, their application and implications in and beyond the fields of

temporal arts.

Dynamical accumulation can be useful as both an analytic and generative tool.

The proposed dynamical accumulation model is general, and needs to be coupled to a

either a parsing or generative mechanism to translate between experience and the basis

model. The vast variety of possibilities is ripe for exploration and could have unexpected

creative results.

The tool of dynamical accumulation is descriptive in nature. Through certain

couplings to perceptual parsing models, however, it could serve as a predictive tools as

well, predicting perceptual states and how they might be interpreted.

Composers have always worked intuitively with ideas of accumulated experience

in structuring works in time. Dynamical accumulation formalizes the mechanism

underlying these ideas. I hope that its use as an analytic tool can shed light on

composition in a way that generates new thought and informs our perception of time.

Importantly, dynamical accumulation is only part of the issue. Addressing past

experience is only part of a complex dynamics that also includes expectation. A dynamics

of future expected accumulation should complement dynamical accumulation.

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 This work is framed by the idea that the temporal arts play a role in shaping our

perception of time. While the scope of this thesis has not been to comprehensibly

corroborate this hypothesis, I hope that it provides a piece of the puzzle. I hope that a

formalization of dynamical accumulation can contribute to a music theory grounded in

time perception, and that the use of dynamical accumulation as a creative tool illustrates a

way in which music functions as perceptual study.

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