REMEDIAL LAW

CHAIR’S CASES
REMEDIAL LAW
CIVIL PROCEDURE

Accion Publiciana is Cognizable Either by MTC or RTC Depending on the Assessed Value

Although the Badillo family correctly filed a case for accion publiciana, they pleaded their case before the
wrong court. In civil cases involving realty or interest therein not within Metro Manila, the MTC has exclusive
original jurisdiction only if the assessed value of the subject property or interest therein does not exceed
P20,000.00. As the assessed value of the property subject matter of this case is P26,940.00, and since
more than one year had expired after the dispossession, jurisdiction properly belongs to the RTC. Hence,
the MTC has no judicial authority at all to try the case in the first place. “A decision of the court without
jurisdiction is null and void; hence, it could never logically become final and executory. Such a judgment
may be attacked directly or collaterally.” Padre vs. Badillo, 640 SCRA 50, G.R. No. 165423 January 19,
2011

The Value of Property as Stated in the Document Sued Upon may be the Basis of Jurisdiction

Since Civil Case No. 4633-2K5 is a real action made so by the Amended Complaint later filed, petitioners
should have observed the requirement under A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC relative to declaring the fair market
value of the property as stated in the current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR). Since no such allegation was made in the Amended Complaint, then the value of the subject
property as stated in the handwritten document sued upon and restated in the Amended Complaint should
be the basis for determining jurisdiction and the amount of docket fees to be paid. Trayvilla vs. Sejas, 782
SCRA 578, G.R. No. 204970 February 1, 2016

There is NO Forum Shopping when One Forum does NOT Exercise Quasi-Judicial Power

Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or more actions
or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition. Here, there can be no forum shopping precisely because the CHED is without quasi-
judicial power, and cannot make any disposition of the case—whether favorable or otherwise. University
of Santo Tomas vs. Sanchez, 626 SCRA 126, G.R. No. 165569 July 29, 2010

A Co-Owner may By Himself Alone Bring an Action for the Benefit of the Co-Owners

Anent the SPA, we find that given the particular circumstances in the case at bar, an SPA is not even
necessary such that its efficacy or the lack of it would not in any way preclude the case from proceeding.
This is because upon Roberto Sr.’s death, Roberto Jr., in succession of his father, became a co-owner of
the subject property together with his mother, Beata. As a co-owner, he may, by himself alone, bring an
action for the recovery of the co-owned property pursuant to the well-settled principle that “in a co-
ownership, co-owners may bring actions for the recovery of co-owned property without the necessity of

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joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit
of his co-owners.” Basbas vs. Sayson, 656 SCRA 151, G.R. No. 172660 August 24, 2011

Appealing Party must be a Real Party-In-Interest and NOT just a Nominal Party

The Secretary of Labor is not the real party-in-interest vested with personality to file the present petitions.
A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. As thus defined, the real parties-in-interest in these cases would have
been PALCEA-SUPER and PJWU-SUPER. It would have been their duty to appear and defend the ruling
of the Secretary of Labor for they are the ones who were interested that the same be sustained. Of course,
they had the option not to pursue the case before a higher court, as what they did in these cases. As to the
Secretary of Labor, she was impleaded in the Petitions for Certiorari filed before the CA as a nominal party
because one of the issues involved therein was whether she committed an error of jurisdiction. But that
does not make her a real party-in-interest or vests her with authority to appeal the Decisions of the CA in
case it reverses her ruling. Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only real parties-in-interest who
participated in the litigation of the case before the CA can avail of an appeal by certiorari. Republic vs.
Namboku Peak, Inc., 730 SCRA 64, G.R. No. 170091 July 18, 2014

What is Controlling are the Allegations in the Pleading, NOT its Caption

It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that are controlling. The inclusion of the
names of all the parties in the title of a complaint is a formal requirement under Section 3, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court. However, the rules of pleadings require courts to pierce the form and go into the substance.
The non-inclusion of one or some of the names of all the complainants in the title of a complaint is not fatal
to the case, provided there is a statement in the body of the complaint indicating that such complainant/s
was/were made party to such action. Genato vs. Viola, 611 SCRA 677, G.R. No. 169706 February 5,
2010

Supplemental Pleading Assumes that the Original Pleading is to Stand

In the case at bar, the subsequent answer could neither validly amend the first answer nor result in the
withdrawal of the latter. It is to be noted that the new Union officers, upon their election, moved for their
intervention and substitution on the premise that they became the real party in interest since the defendants
in the case have ceased to be the legal representatives of the Union. Certainly, their election as new officers
is an occurrence which arose after the filing of the first answer. Hence, the purported amended answer
should have been designated as a supplemental answer. A supplemental pleading states the transactions,
occurrences or events which took place since the time the pleading sought to be supplemented was filed.
A supplemental pleading is meant to supply deficiencies in aid of the original pleading and not to dispense
with or substitute the latter. It does not supersede the original, but assumes that the original pleading is to
stand. As such, the Answer with Counterclaim filed by Aquino and Frisnedi did not result in the withdrawal
of the Answer with Cross-Claim filed by the original defendants in this case, but was merely supplemented
by the subsequent answer. Loy, Jr. vs. San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-Philippine
Transport and General Workers Organization (SMCEU-PTGWO), 605 SCRA 212, G.R. No. 164886
November 24, 2009

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A President of a Corporation has the Authority to Sign Verification Even Without Written Authority

It is clear that Albao, as President and Manager of Cebu Metro, has the authority to sign the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping even without the submission of a written authority from the board.
As the corporation’s President and Manager, she is in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness
of the allegations in the petition. In addition, such an act is presumed to be included in the scope of her
authority to act within the domain of the general objectives of the corporation’s business and her usual
duties in the absence of any contrary provision in the corporation’s charter or by-laws. Cebu Metro
Pharmacy, Inc. vs. Euro-Med Laboratories, Philippines, Inc., 633 SCRA 320, G.R. No. 164757 October
18, 2010

Service and Filing of Pleadings by Courier Service is NOT Allowed by the Rules

Indeed, its filing or service of a copy thereof to petitioners by courier service cannot be trivialized. Service
and filing of pleadings by courier service is a mode not provided in the Rules. This is not to mention that
Planters Development Bank (PDB) sent a copy of its omnibus motion to an address or area which was not
covered by LBC courier service at the time. Realizing its mistake, PDB refiled and resent the omnibus
motion by registered mail, which is the proper mode of service under the circumstances. By then, however,
the 15-day period had expired. Palileo vs. Planters Development Bank, 738 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 193650
October 8, 2014

Personal Service of Summons may be Relaxed when Defendants Engage in Deception

The purpose of summons is two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and to notify
the defendant that an action has been commenced so that he may be given an opportunity to be heard on
the claim against him. Under the circumstances of this case, we find that respondent was duly apprised of
the action against him and had every opportunity to answer the charges made by the petitioner. However,
since respondent refused to disclose his true address, it was impossible to personally serve summons upon
him. Considering that respondent could not have received summons because of his own pretenses, and
has failed to provide an explanation of his purported “new” residence, he must now bear the consequences.
Sagana vs. Francisco, 602 SCRA 184, G.R. No. 161952 October 2, 2009

Ground for Failure to Answer AND Meritorious Defense must be Shown to Lift Order of Default

The spouses Magtoto are unable to show that their failure to timely file an Answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence and, more importantly, that they have a meritorious defense
pursuant to Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, viz.: (b) Relief from order of default.—A party declared
in default may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the
order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set
aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice. Magtoto vs. Court
of Appeals, 686 SCRA 88, G.R. No. 175792 November 21, 2012

Filing of Motions Seeking Affirmative Relief are Considered Voluntary Submission to Jurisdiction

In regard to the Motion for Leave to Take Deposition, it is important to note that there are two instances
when the defendant can take depositions under Section 1 of Rule 23: (1) after the court has acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant or the property subject of the action; and (2) after an answer has been

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served. Both instances presuppose that the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the defendant. By
seeking the relief contained in this provision, petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, petitioner may be held to have waived his objections regarding
the lack of jurisdiction over his person by seeking affirmative relief through the said provision. While
petitioner bewailed the mode of service of summons on him and questioned the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction over his person, he has rendered his own arguments moot by his voluntary appearance or
submission to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Jurisprudence holds that an objection based on lack
of jurisdiction over the person is waived when the defendant files a motion or pleading which seeks
affirmative relief other than the dismissal of the case. Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, 623 SCRA 354, G.R.
No. 175730 July 5, 2010

Inclusion of Grounds aside from Lack of Jurisdiction over the Person is not Voluntary Appearance

The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides: Sec.
20. Voluntary appearance.—The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to
service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. Thus, a defendant who files
a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person, together with other grounds raised
therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. What the rule on voluntary
appearance—the first sentence of the above-quoted rule—means is that the voluntary appearance of the
defendant in court is without qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack
of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons. Lhuillier vs. British Airways, 615
SCRA 380, G.R. No. 171092 March 15, 2010

Notice of Hearing is NOT Required in a Non-Litigious Motion

As to petitioner’s claim that the subject motion is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, the CA correctly
ruled that the subject motion is a non-litigious motion. While, as a general rule, all written motions should
be set for hearing under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, excepted from this rule are non-litigious
motions or motions which may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing the rights of the adverse
party. In this case, respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter of right
and petitioner is powerless to oppose the same. Hence, the subject motion falls under the class of non-
litigious motions. At any rate, the trial court gave petitioner an opportunity to oppose the subject motion as
in fact he filed a Comment/Opposition on March 1, 2004 before the trial court. Petitioner cannot, therefore,
validly claim that he was denied his day in court. Delos Reyes vs. Ramnani, 621 SCRA 254, G.R. No.
169135 June 18, 2010

A Motion for Extension of Time must be Filed Before the Expiration of the Period

It is a fundamental rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time must be filed before the expiration
of the period sought to be extended; otherwise, the same is of no effect since there would no longer be any
period to extend, and the assailed judgment or order will have become final and executory. Thenamaris
Philippines, Inc. (Formerly Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc.) vs. Court of Appeals , 715 SCRA 153,
G.R. No. 191215 February 3, 2014

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Dismissal for Failure to Submit a Compromise Agreement is NOT Allowed by the Rules

The trial court in Civil Case No. 5703-R committed grave abuse of discretion in terminating or dismissing
the case for failure of the parties to submit a compromise agreement. In Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 212 SCRA 498 (1992), the Court held that dismissing the action without allowing the parties to
present evidence and after ordering them to compromise is tantamount to deprivation of due process, and
the “dismissal of an action for failure to submit a compromise agreement, which is not even required by any
rule, is definitely a harsh action.” Macedonio vs. Ramo, 719 SCRA 647, G.R. No. 193516 March 24, 2014

An Order Denying a Motion for Intervention is Appealable

With the consequent denial of its intervention and dismissal of its complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case
No. 666-I, petitioner should have appealed such denial. “An order denying a motion for intervention is
appealable. Where the lower court’s denial of a motion for intervention amounts to a final order, an appeal
is the proper remedy.” Having failed to take and prosecute such appeal, petitioner acquired no right to
participate in the proceedings in Civil Case No. 666-I, even question the judgment of the RTC consequently
rendered in said case. “A prospective intervenor’s right to appeal applies only to the denial of his
intervention. Not being a party to the case, a person whose intervention the court denied has no standing
to question the decision of the court, but only the trial court’s orders denying his intervention, not the
decision itself.” Republic vs. Heirs of Diego Lim, 788 SCRA 61, G.R. No. 195611 April 4, 2016

In a Summary Judgment, the Facts as Pleaded should Appear Undisputed

“Whether the issues raised by the Answer are genuine is not the crux of inquiry in a motion for judgment
on the pleadings. It is so only in a motion for summary judgment. In a case for judgment on the pleadings,
the Answer is such that no issue is raised at all. The essential question in such a case is whether there are
issues generated by the pleadings.” “A ‘genuine issue’ is an issue of fact which requires the presentation
of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded
appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and
summary judgment is called for.” Adolfo vs. Adolfo, 753 SCRA 580, G.R. No. 201427 March 18, 2015

There should be a Motion and a Hearing in a Summary Judgment

The filing of a motion and the conduct of a hearing on the motion are therefore important because these
enable the court to determine if the parties’ pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of, or against, the
motion are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and adequately justify the finding that, as a matter
of law, the claim is clearly meritorious or there is no defense to the action. The non-observance of the
procedural requirements of filing a motion and conducting a hearing on the said motion warrants the setting
aside of the summary judgment. Calubaquib vs. Republic, 652 SCRA 523, G.R. No. 170658 June 22,
2011

Judgment Based on a Compromise Agreement Cannot be the Subject of Appeal

From the express language of Rule 41, therefore, the MTC’s denial of petitioners’ Motion to Set Aside
Decision could not have been appealed. Indeed, a decision based on a compromise agreement is
immediately final and executory and cannot be the subject of appeal, for when parties enter into a
compromise agreement and request a court to render a decision on the basis of their agreement, it is
presumed that such action constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal said decision. While there may have

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been other remedies available to assail the decision, petitioners were well within their rights to institute a
special civil action under Rule 65. Pasco vs. Heirs of Filomena de Guzman, 625 SCRA 342, G.R. No.
165554 July 26, 2010

Guideposts in Determining Necessity of Attaching Pleadings to Petitions under Rules 42 and 65

In Galvez v. Court of Appeals, 695 SCRA 10 (2013), this Court held that there are three guideposts in
determining the necessity of attaching pleadings and portions of the record to petitions under Rules 42 and
65 of the 1997 Rules, to wit: First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached
to the petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is
whether the document in question will support the material allegations in the petition, whether said
document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give due
course to the petition. Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be
appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also [be] found in another document already attached
to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned
judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached. Third, a petition lacking
an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due course or reinstated (if earlier
dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the
higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits. The guideposts, which equally apply to a
petition for review filed in the CA under Rule 42, reflect that the significant determinant of the sufficiency of
the attached documents is whether the accompanying documents support the allegations of the petition.
Maravilla vs. Rios, 767 SCRA 522, G.R. No. 196875 August 19, 2015

Residual Jurisdiction Exists Upon Perfection of Appeal but Prior to Transmittal of Records

“The ‘residual jurisdiction’ of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to
have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon
the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the
transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its
so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.” Angeles vs. Court of
Appeals, 735 SCRA 82, G.R. No. 178733 September 15, 2014

Lack of Due Process is an Additional Ground to Annul a Judgment

While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based
only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process
as additional ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 20 (1997), this Court
declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its
patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.
Diona vs. Balangue, 688 SCRA 22, G.R. No. 173559 January 7, 2013

Principle of the “Law of the Case” Controls a Case throughout its Subsequent Stages

The issue of GSIS’s alleged exemption under RA 8291 had been finally decided against GSIS in G.R. No.
173391, when this Court denied GSIS’s petition for review. The denial rendered the CA Decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 87821 final and executory. GSIS’s attempt to resurrect the same issue by interjecting the same
in this proceeding is barred by the principle of “law of the case,” which states that “determinations of

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questions of law will generally be held to govern a case throughout all its subsequent stages where such
determination has already been made on a prior appeal to a court of last resort.” The Decision in G.R. No.
173391 allowing the execution of the judgment against GSIS is the “law of the case” and controls the
proceedings below which are already in the execution stage. Dela Merced vs. Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), 661 SCRA 83, G.R. No. 167140 November 23, 2011

An Order of Execution is Based on the Disposition, NOT on the Body, of the Decision

It has always been the rule that “the only portion of the decision that may be the subject of execution is that
which is ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion. Whatever may be found in the body of the decision
can only be considered as part of the reasons or conclusions of the court and serve only as guides to
determine the ratio decidendi.” “Where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion of the decision
and the body thereof, the dispositive portion controls irrespective of what appears in the body of the
decision. While the body of the decision, order or resolution might create some ambiguity in the manner of
the court’s reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof that finally invests rights upon the
parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes corresponding duties or obligation.”
NAPOCOR vs. Tarcelo, 734 SCRA 413, G.R. No. 198139 September 8, 2014

When there is Ambiguity in the Dispositive Portion, Reference to the Entire Record may be Had

True, the dispositive portion of the DOLE Resolution does not specifically enumerate the names of those
who actually participated in the strike but only mentions that those strikers who failed to heed the return-to-
work order are deemed to have lost their employment. This omission, however, cannot prevent an effective
execution of the decision. As was held in Reinsurance Company of the Orient, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 198
SCRA 19 (1991), any ambiguity may be clarified by reference primarily to the body of the decision or
supplementary to the pleadings previously filed in the case. In any case, especially when there is an
ambiguity, “a judgment shall be read in connection with the entire record and construed accordingly.”
Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 650 SCRA 545, G.R. No.
168382 June 6, 2011

Requisites to Apply Res Judicata as a Bar By Prior Judgment

Petitioner BPI’s prayer in the instant petition to set aside the award of separation pay is likewise barred by
the principle of res judicata. In its concept as a bar by prior judgment under Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, res judicata dictates that a judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction operates as an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same cause of action since
that judgment is conclusive not only as to the matters offered and received to sustain it but also as to any
other matter which might have been offered for that purpose and which could have been adjudged therein.
To apply this doctrine, the following essential requisites should be satisfied: 1) finality of the former
judgment; 2) the court which rendered the judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and 4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity
of parties, subject matter and causes of action. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Coquia, Jr., 646 SCRA
215, G.R. No. 167518 March 23, 2011

Exceptions to the Principle of Immutability of Final Judgment

To stress, the October 27, 1999 Decision of the RTC has already attained finality. “Such definitive judgment
is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal. Upon finality of the judgment, the Court

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loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Except for correction of clerical errors or the making
of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment is void, the judgment
can neither be amended nor altered after it has become final and executory. This is the principle of
immutability of final judgment.” Montemayor vs. Millora, 654 SCRA 580, G.R. No. 168251 July 27, 2011

PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

Grant or Denial of Writ of Preliminary Injunction is Final unless there is Grave Abuse of Discretion

The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is discretionary upon the trial court because the assessment
and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive
determination. For this reason, the grant or the denial of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be disturbed
unless it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Sy vs.
Autobus Transport Systems, Inc., 686 SCRA 707, G.R. No. 176898 December 3, 2012

Only Local Taxes, NOT National Internal Revenue Taxes, may be Restrained through Injunction

A principle deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is that taxes being the lifeblood of the government should
be collected promptly, without unnecessary hindrance or delay. In line with this principle, the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC) expressly provides that no court shall have the authority to grant
an injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by the
code. An exception to this rule obtains only when in the opinion of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) the
collection thereof may jeopardize the interest of the government and/or the taxpayer. The situation,
however, is different in the case of the collection of local taxes as there is no express provision in the LGC
prohibiting courts from issuing an injunction to restrain local governments from collecting taxes. Thus, in
the case of Valley Trading Co., Inc. v. Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch II, 171 SCRA 501 (1989),
cited by the petitioner, we ruled that: Unlike the National Internal Revenue Code, the Local Tax Code does
not contain any specific provision prohibiting courts from enjoining the collection of local taxes. Such
statutory lapse or intent, however it may be viewed, may have allowed preliminary injunction where local
taxes are involved but cannot negate the procedural rules and requirements under Rule 58. Angeles City
vs. Angeles Electric Corporation, 622 SCRA 43, G.R. No. 166134 June 29, 2010

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION

Certiorari is NOT a Substitute for a Lost Appeal

A basic requisite of the special civil action of certiorari, which is governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
is that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Where
appeal is available, certiorari generally does not lie. Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost or
lapsed remedy of appeal. In this case, an appeal was not only available, but also mandated by Sections 11
and 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (1939), or the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Notably, in
Keswani v. Republic, 524 SCRA 145 (2007), we declared that the remedy from a decision by the trial court
admitting an individual as a Filipino citizen is through an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Republic vs. Yang
Chi Hao, 602 SCRA 220, G.R. No. 165332 October 2, 2009

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Exceptions to the Rule that Certiorari is Dismissible when Appeal is Available

The National Power Corporation may have pursued the wrong remedy when it filed a petition for certiorari
instead of an appeal since the ruling on attorney’s fees is already a ruling on the merits. However, we find
that the trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ordered
NPC solidarily liable with the plaintiffs for the payment of the attorney’s fees. The rule that a petition for
certiorari is dismissible when the mode of appeal is available admits of exceptions, to wit: (a) when the writs
issued are null; and, (b) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
Clearly, respondent has shown its entitlement to the exceptions. Gubat vs. National Power Corporation,
613 SCRA 742, G.R. No. 167415 February 26, 2010

The Rules NO Longer Prescribe At Least Two Bidders for a Valid Auction Sale

The use of the word “bids” (in plural form) does not make it a mandatory requirement to have more than
one bidder for an auction sale to be valid. A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, as amended, no longer prescribes the
requirement of at least two bidders for a valid auction sale. We further held that “Except for errors or
omissions in the notice of sale which are calculated to deter or mislead bidders, to depreciate the value of
the property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair price, simple mistakes or omissions are not considered
fatal to the validity of the notice and the sale made pursuant thereto.” Certeza, Jr. vs. Philippine Savings
Bank, 614 SCRA 442, G.R. No. 190078 March 5, 2010

Issuance of a Writ of Possession is Ministerial even during the Period of Redemption

In Sulit v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 441 (1997), we withheld the issuance of a writ of possession
because the mortgagee failed to deliver the surplus from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale which is
equivalent to approximately 40% of the total mortgage debt. Sulit was considered as an exception to the
general rule that it is ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of possession even during the period of
redemption. We explained that equitable considerations prevailing in said case demand that a writ of
possession should not issue. In the subsequent case of Saguan v. Philippine Bank of Communications,
538 SCRA 390 (2007) however, we clarified that the exception made in Sulit does not apply when the
period to redeem has already expired or when ownership over the property has already been consolidated
in favor of the mortgagee-purchaser. In other words, even if the mortgagee-purchaser fails to return the
surplus, a writ of possession must still be issued. In the instant case, the period to redeem has already
lapsed. Thus, following the ruling in Saguan, the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the petitioner
is in order. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., vs. Lamb Construction, 606 SCRA 159, G.R. No. 170906
November 27, 2009

Issuance of Writ of Possession is NOT Ministerial when a Third Party is in Adverse Possession

As a rule, it is ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of possession after the foreclosure sale and during
the period of redemption. Section 7 of Act No. 3135 explicitly authorizes the purchaser in a foreclosure sale
to apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for
that purpose “in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special
proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law” with the Regional Trial Court of
the province or place where the real property or any part thereof is situated, in the case of mortgages duly
registered with the Registry of Deeds. Upon filing of such motion and the approval of the corresponding
bond, the law also directs in express terms the said court to issue the order for a writ of possession.
However, this rule is not without exception. In Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 358
(1988), we held that the obligation of a court to issue an ex parte writ of possession in favor of the purchaser

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in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in
possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. Parents-
Teachers Association (PTA) of St. Mathew Christian Academy vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.
, 614 SCRA 41, G.R. No. 176518 March 2, 2010

Until the Foreclosure Sale is Annulled, the Issuance of Writ of Possession is Ministerial

In Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Tarampi, 573 SCRA 537 (2008), it was held: To stress the ministerial
character of the writ of possession, the Court has disallowed injunction to prohibit its issuance, just as it
has held that its issuance may not be stayed by a pending action for annulment of mortgage or the
foreclosure itself. Clearly then, until the foreclosure sale of the property in question is annulled by a court
of competent jurisdiction, the issuance of a writ of possession remains the ministerial duty of the trial court.
The same is true with its implementation; otherwise, the writ will be a useless paper judgment — a result
inimical to the mandate of Act No. 3135 to vest possession in the purchaser immediately. Gatuslao vs.
Yanson, 746 SCRA 520, G.R. No. 191540 January 21, 2015

Public Lands Can Be the Subject of Forcible Entry Cases

Notably, even public lands can be the subject of forcible entry cases as it has already been held that
ejectment proceedings may involve all kinds of land. Thus, in the case at bench, while the parties are
fighting over the possession of a government land, the courts below are not deprived of jurisdiction to render
judgment thereon. Courts must resolve the issue of possession even if the parties to the ejectment suit are
mere informal settlers. Villondo vs. Quijano, 686 SCRA 694, G.R. No. 173606 December 3, 2012

A Mere Caretaker of a Land has NO Right of Possession, thus, Cannot Sue for Forcible Entry

In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 315 SCRA 626 (1999), we held thus: Actual possession of land consists in
the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as those a party would naturally exercise over
his own property. It is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of land should himself occupy the property
as someone in his name may perform the act. In other words, the owner of real estate has possession,
either when he himself is physically in occupation of the property, or when another person who recognizes
his rights as owner is in such occupancy. This declaration is [in conformity] with Art. 524 of the Civil Code
providing that possession may be exercised in one’s own name or in the name [of] another. The CA
therefore correctly cited the case of Dalida v. Court of Appeals, 117 SCRA 480 (1982), where it was held
that a mere caretaker of a land has no right of possession over such land. Heirs of Rogelio Isip, Sr. vs.
Quintos, 678 SCRA 104, G.R. No. 172008 August 1, 2012

Even the Lawful Owner Can Be Ousted by a Lessee in an Action for Ejectment

In a summary action of ejectment, even the lawful owner of a parcel of land can be ousted or evicted
therefrom by a lessee or tenant who holds a better or superior right to the material or physical (or de facto)
possession thereof by virtue of a valid lease or leasehold right thereto. Bradford United Church of Christ,
Inc. vs. Ando, 791 SCRA 337, G.R. No. 195669 May 30, 2016

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In Forcible Entry, Possession is Illegal at the Inception even if Tolerated upon Discovery

“In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.” “Where the defendant’s possession of the property is illegal ab
initio,” the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) is the remedy to recover possession. In their
Complaint, petitioners maintained that the respondent took possession and control of the subject property
without any contractual or legal basis. Assuming that these allegations are true, it hence follows that
respondent’s possession was illegal from the very beginning. Therefore, the foundation of petitioners’
complaint is one for forcible entry—that is “the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who
has entered without right.” Thus, and as correctly found by the CA, there can be no tolerance as petitioners
alleged that respondent’s possession was illegal at the inception. Corollarily, since the deprivation of
physical possession, as alleged in petitioners’ Complaint and as earlier discussed, was attended by strategy
and force, this Court finds that the proper remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for Forcible
Entry and not the instant suit for unlawful detainer. Del Rosario vs. Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc., 651
SCRA 414, G.R. No. 170575 June 8, 2011

Defense of Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Person is NOT Allowed to Dismiss an Ejectment Suit

Although it is alleged that there may be a technical error in connection with the service of summons, there
is no showing of any substantive injustice that would be caused to IPI so as to call for the disregard of the
clear and categorical prohibition of filing petitions for certiorari. It must be pointed out that the Rule on
Summary Procedure, by way of exception, permits only a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter but it does not mention the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person.
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of all
others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. From this it can be gleaned that allegations on the matter of
lack of jurisdiction over the person by reason of improper service of summons, by itself, without a convincing
showing of any resulting substantive injustice, cannot be used to hinder or stop the proceedings befor the
MCTC in the ejectment suit. With more reason, such ground should not be used to justify the violation of
an express prohibition in the rules prohibiting the petition for certiorari. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals, 622 SCRA 131, G.R. No. 168062 June 29, 2010

Submission of Pleading Containing Derogatory Statements Constitutes Direct Contempt

A pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge in which
the proceedings are pending is equivalent to “misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court
or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same” within the meaning of Rule 71, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, and therefore, constitutes direct contempt. Cruz vs. Gingoyon, 658 SCRA 254, G.R. No.
170404 September 28, 2011

An Indirect Contempt CANNOT be Based Merely on Written Pleadings

This Court cannot grant petitioners’ plea to resolve the merits of their petition for indirect contempt; it is the
CA that should properly try the same. Aside from the fact that the CA is the court against which the alleged
contempt was committed, a hearing is required in resolving a charge for indirect contempt. The respondent
in an indirect contempt charge may not be convicted on the basis of written pleadings alone. Silverio, Sr.
vs. Silverio, Jr., 730 SCRA 152, G.R. No. 186589 July 18, 2014

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Filing of Contempt in Court is Allowed Only when Quasi-Judicial Entities Have No Such Power

Where contempt is committed against quasi-judicial entities, the filing of contempt charges in court is
observed only when there is no law granting contempt powers to these quasi-judicial entities. Under Section
12, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court on Contempt, it is thus provided: Sec. 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial
entities.—Unless otherwise provided by law, this Rule shall apply to contempt committed against persons,
entities, bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall have suppletory effect to such rules
as they may have adopted pursuant to authority granted to them by law to punish for contempt. The
Regional Trial Court of the place wherein the contempt has been committed shall have jurisdiction over
such charges as may be filed therefor. Trinidad vs. Fama Realty, Inc., 792 SCRA 295, G.R. No. 203336
June 6, 2016

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Publication of Extrajudicial Settlement is NOT Needed to Pass Title to Heirs

The sale to respondents was made after the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate.
The extrajudicial settlement of estate, even though not published, being deemed a partition of the inherited
property, Jose could validly transfer ownership over the specific portion of the property that was assigned
to him. Alfonso vs. Andres, 626 SCRA 149, G.R. No. 166236 July 29, 2010

Sale of Properties of Wards by Guardians without Court Approval is Void

The minor children of Conrado inherited by representation in the properties of their grandparents Remigia
and Januario. These children, not their mother Victorina, were the co-owners of the inherited properties.
Victorina had no authority or had acted beyond her powers in conveying, if she did indeed convey, to the
petitioner’s mother the undivided share of her minor children in the property involved in this case. “The
powers given to her by the laws as the natural guardian covers only matters of administration and cannot
include the power of disposition. She should have first secured the permission of the court before she
alienated that portion of the property in question belonging to her minor children.” In a number of cases,
where the guardians, mothers or grandmothers, did not seek court approval of the sale of properties of their
wards, minor children, the Court declared the sales void. Hebron vs. Loyola, 623 SCRA 231, G.R. No.
168960 July 5, 2010

Multiple Appeals are Allowed in Special Proceedings

Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for partition of property with accounting, in
the special civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale behind allowing more
than one appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate
and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final. In such a case, the filing of a record on
appeal becomes indispensable since only a particular incident of the case is brought to the appellate court
for resolution with the rest of the proceedings remaining within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Roviro vs.
Heirs of Jose C. Deleste, 616 SCRA 573, G.R. No. 160825 March 26, 2010

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In an Amparo Petition, Government Involvement is an Indispensable Element

We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private
individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo
petition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an
indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy.
Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the
government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military
or governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation
to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark
of State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing
person. Navia vs. Pardico, 673 SCRA 618, G.R. No. 184467 June 19, 2012

The Writ of Kalikasan is an Extraordinary Remedy to Prevent Grave Environmental Damage

The writ is categorized as a special civil action and was, thus, conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy,
which aims to provide judicial relief from threatened or actual violation/s of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology of a magnitude or degree of damage that transcends political and territorial
boundaries. It is intended “to provide a stronger defense for environmental rights through judicial efforts
where institutional arrangements of enforcement, implementation and legislation have fallen short” and
seeks “to address the potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats.” Under Section 1 of
Rule 7, the following requisites must be present to avail of this extraordinary remedy: (1) there is an actual
or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or
threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private
individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces. Expectedly, the Rules do not define the exact nature or degree of environmental damage but
only that it must be sufficiently grave, in terms of the territorial scope of such damage, so as to call for the
grant of this extraordinary remedy. The gravity of environmental damage sufficient to grant the writ is, thus,
to be decided on a case-to-case basis. Paje vs. Casiño, 749 SCRA 39, G.R. No. 207366 February 3,
2015

The Writ of Kalikasan is an Exception to Rule 45 as it Allows Appeal Questions of Fact and Law

It is worth noting that the Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan allow the parties to raise, on appeal, questions of
fact — and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court — because of the extraordinary
nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ of kalikasan. Thus, we shall review both
questions of law and fact in resolving the issues presented in this case. Paje vs. Casiño, 749 SCRA 39,
G.R. No. 207366 February 3, 2015

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Responsible Persons Not Included in the Complaint must be Included in the Information

Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court mandates that all criminal actions must be commenced either by
complaint or information in the name of the People of the Philippines against all persons who appear to be
responsible therefor. Thus the law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the charges against
whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible for the offense. The proper remedy under the

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circumstances where persons who ought to be charged were not included in the complaint of the private
complainant is definitely not to dismiss the complaint but to include them in the information. Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company vs. Reynado, 627 SCRA 88, G.R. No. 164538 August 9, 2010

Extinction of Criminal Action does NOT Necessarily Carry with it the Extinction of Civil Liability

It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence
of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist. When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended
party in the same criminal action. In other words, the “extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not exist.” Abellana vs. People, 655 SCRA 683, G.R. No.
174654 August 17, 2011

Probable Cause Need NOT Be Based on Clear and Convincing Evidence of Guilt

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has
been committed and was committed by the suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely
not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In disapproving the recommendation of Prosecutor
Bayag, Jr. and adopting instead that of Agbada, respondent Gonzalez as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
was merely exercising his power and discharging his duty as mandated by the Constitution and by laws. It
is discretionary upon him whether or not he would rely mainly on the findings of fact of Prosecutor Bayag,
Jr. in making a review of the latter’s report and recommendation. He can very well make his own findings
of fact. Thus, given this vast power and authority, he can conduct a preliminary investigation with or without
the report from COA. The findings in the COA report or the finality or lack of finality of such report is irrelevant
to the investigation of the Office of the Ombudsman in its determination of probable cause, as we declared
in Dimayuga v. Office of the Ombudsman, 495 SCRA 461 (2006). Thus, the filing of the Information against
petitioner notwithstanding the lack of certification on her cashbook examination could not in any manner be
said to be premature much less whimsical or arbitrary. Public respondents cannot be said to have gravely
abused their discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. De Guzman vs. Gonzalez III, 616 SCRA
546, G.R. No. 158104 March 26, 2010

Determination of Probable Cause is the Function of the Prosecutor

A prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause justifying the
filing of criminal information against the respondent since the determination of the existence of a probable
cause is the function of the prosecutor. Judicial review is allowed only where respondent has clearly
established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion. Corpuz vs. Del Rosario, 638 SCRA
368, G.R. No. 149261 December 15, 2010

Once an Information is Filed in Court, Any Disposition of the Case Rests on Judicial Discretion

Petitioner’s argument fails to persuade. There is nothing procedurally improper on the part of the trial court
in disregarding the result of the preliminary investigation it itself ordered. Judicial action on the motion rests
in the sound exercise of judicial discretion. In denying the motion, the trial court just followed the

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jurisprudential rule laid down in Crespo v. Judge Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 (1987), that once a complaint or
information is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused rests on the sound discretion of the court. The court is not dutifully bound by such finding of
the investigating prosecutor. Evangelista vs. People, 620 SCRA 134, G.R. No. 163267 May 5, 2010

Search Warrant may be Applied in Courts with no Territorial Jurisdiction for Compelling Reasons

Generally, the Search Warrant (SW) application must be filed with the court which has territorial jurisdiction
over the place where the offense was alleged to be committed. This, however, is not an iron-clad rule. For
compelling reasons, which must be expressly stated in the application, an SW application may be filed in a
court other than the one having jurisdiction over the place where the purported offense was committed and
where the SW shall be enforced. Petron Gasul LPG Dealers Association vs. Lao, 797 SCRA 65, G.R.
No. 205010 July 18, 2016

A Hearing is Required to Determine whether the Evidence of Guilt is Strong

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: Section 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required. Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court also states that no person charged with a
capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. Thus, from the above
cited provisions and in cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong which is a matter of judicial discretion that remains with the judge.
The judge is under legal obligation to conduct a hearing whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of
the court to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it against the accused to enable the judge
to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. “The court’s grant or refusal of
bail must contain a summary of the evidence of the prosecution on the basis of which should be formulated
the judge’s own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused.”
In People v. Plaza, 602 SCRA 457 (2009), the Court defined a summary hearing and expounded the court’s
discretionary power to grant bail to an accused. “A summary hearing is defined as ‘such brief and speedy
method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose
of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail.’ On such hearing,
the Court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be
allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on
what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the
discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial
matters, avoiding unnecessary examination and cross-examination.” People vs. Sobrepeña, Sr., 812
SCRA 145, G.R. No. 204063 December 5, 2016

The Grant or Denial of Demurrer to Evidence is Final unless there is Grave Abuse of Discretion

“The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling
on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion.” As to effect, “the
grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place
the accused in double jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.” When grave abuse of discretion is present, an

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order granting a demurrer becomes null and void. People vs. Go, 732 SCRA 216, G.R. No. 191015 August
6, 2014

Requiring Convict to Appear for Promulgation of Judgment of the Appellate Court is NOT Allowed

The practice of requiring the convict to appear before the trial court for “promulgation” of the judgment of
the appellate court should, therefore, be immediately discontinued. It is not only an unauthorized surplusage
entailing unnecessary expense, but it could also create security problems where the convict was already
under detention during the pendency of the appeal, and the place of confinement is at some distance from
the station of the court. Upon receipt of the certified copy of the judgment of the appellate court if the convict
is under detention, the trial court should issue forthwith the corresponding mittimus or commitment order
so that the prisoner may be considered remitted or may be transferred to the corresponding prison facility
for confinement and service of sentence. When the convict is out on bail, the trial court shall immediately
order the bondsman to surrender the convict to it within ten (10) days from notice and thereafter issue the
corresponding mittimus. In both cases, the trial court shall submit to this Court proof of the execution of
judgment within fifteen (15) days from date of such execution. It is clear from the foregoing that the practice
of requiring convicts to appear before the trial courts for promulgation of the affirmance or modification by
this Court or the CA of judgments of conviction in criminal cases is no longer allowed. Hence, we find no
error on the part of the RTC in denying the Motion for Repromulgation of the RTC’s September 8, 1998
Decision which was reinstated in People v. Court of Appeals, 431 SCRA 610 (2004). Almuete vs. People,
693 SCRA 167, G.R. No. 179611 March 12, 2013

EVIDENCE

An Accused may be Convicted by Circumstantial Evidence

Considering that there were no witnesses to the commission of the crime charged herein, the weight of the
prosecution’s evidence must then be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule that an accused can be
convicted even in the absence of an eyewitness, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented
by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime. Circumstantial
evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact
may be inferred according to reason and common experience. It is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences were derived have been
established; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Diego vs. Court of Appaeals, 615 SCRA 399, G.R. No. 173510 March 15, 2010

Only Admissions in Violation of the Rights of Custodial Investigation are Excluded

While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial questioning by the
customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12 of Article III of the
Constitution, we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision prohibits as
evidence are only confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself. Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste,
555 SCRA 255 (2008), the Court categorically ruled that “the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights
render inadmissible ‘only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation.’
The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and are not otherwise excluded
by law or rules, are not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.” Ho Wai
Pang vs. People, 659 SCRA 624, G.R. No. 176229 October 19, 2011

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Best Evidence Rule does NOT Apply if there is NO Dispute Regarding the Contents of a Document

The appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best Evidence Rule states that
when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the best evidence is the original document itself
and no other evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule.
The original is preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the document. In the
instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule because there is no dispute
regarding the contents of the documents. It is admitted by the parties that the respondents’ Deed of Sale
referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the petitioners’ Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer referred
to TCT No. T-62836 as its subject, which is further described as located in Barangay Murong. The real
issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and correctly express the true
intention of the parties. As to the Deed of Sale, petitioners (and RBBI) maintain that while it refers to TCT
No. T-62096, the parties actually intended the sale of the Lantap property (covered by TCT No. T-62836).
Marquez vs. Espejo, 629 SCRA 117, G.R. No. 168387 August 25, 2010

Parol Evidence Rule does NOT Apply if One of the Parties is NOT Privy to the Document

Even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at bar. In the first place, respondents
are not parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the written
contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as “between
the parties and their successors-in-interest.” The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at least
one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written document in question, and does
not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument. Moreover, the instant
case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as provided in the second paragraph of Rule
130, Section 9: However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: (1) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement; (2) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto. Marquez vs. Espejo, 629 SCRA 117, G.R. No. 168387 August 25, 2010

Verbal Declaration of the Deceased’s Alleged Admission is Inadmissible

DARAB Case No. R-03-02-3520-96, which was filed in 1996 or long after Pedro’s death in 1984, has no
leg to stand on other than Amanda’s declaration in her July 10, 1996 Affidavit that Pedro falsely represented
to Makapugay and to her that he is the actual cultivator of the land, and that when she confronted him about
this and the alleged alternate farming scheme between him and petitioners, Pedro allegedly told her that
“he and his two sisters had an understanding about it and he did not have the intention of depriving them
of their cultivatory rights.” Petitioners have no other evidence, other than such verbal declaration, which
proves the existence of such arrangement. No written memorandum of such agreement exists, nor have
they shown that they actually cultivated the land even if only for one cropping. No receipt evidencing
payment to the landowners of the latter’s share, or any other documentary evidence, has been put forward.
What the PARAD, DARAB and CA failed to consider and realize is that Amanda’s declaration in her Affidavit
covering Pedro’s alleged admission and recognition of the alternate farming scheme is inadmissible for
being a violation of the Dead Man’s Statute, which provides that “[i]f one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the
undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.” Thus, since
Pedro is deceased, and Amanda’s declaration which pertains to the leasehold agreement affects the 1996
“Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa” which she as assignor entered into with petitioners, and which is now
the subject matter of the present case and claim against Pedro’s surviving spouse and lawful successor-
in-interest Dominga, such declaration cannot be admitted and used against the latter, who is placed in an

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unfair situation by reason of her being unable to contradict or disprove such declaration as a result of her
husband-declarant Pedro’s prior death. Garcia vs. Robles Vda. de Caparas, 696 SCRA 649, G.R. No.
180843 April 17, 2013

Independently Relevant Statements are Admissible as Evidence

The testimony of NBI Agent Segunial that while he was investigating Reyes, the latter confided to him that
he (Reyes) heard petitioner telling Sotero “Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon” and that he
saw the two (petitioner and Sotero) armed with a .45 caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively, before
boarding a red car, cannot be regarded as hearsay evidence. This is considering that NBI Agent Segunial’s
testimony was not presented to prove the truth of such statement but only for the purpose of establishing
that on February 10, 1997, Reyes executed a sworn statement containing such narration of facts. This is
clear from the offer of the witness’ oral testimony. Moreover, NBI Agent Segunial himself candidly admitted
that he is incompetent to testify on the truthfulness of Reyes’ statement. Verily then, what the prosecution
sought to be admitted was the fact that Reyes made such narration of facts in his sworn statement and not
necessarily to prove the truth thereof. Thus, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial is in the nature of an
independently relevant statement where what is relevant is the fact that Reyes made such statement and
the truth and falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a case, the statement of the witness is admissible as
evidence and the hearsay rule does not apply. Espineli vs. People, 725 SCRA 365, G.R. No. 179535
June 9, 2014

Resort to Handwriting Experts is NOT Mandatory

As we have often said, forgery is not presumed but must be proved by clear, positive and convincing
evidence by the party alleging it. It is established by comparing the alleged forged signature with the genuine
signatures. Considering the technical nature of the procedure in examining forged documents, handwriting
experts are often offered as expert witnesses. But although their testimonies are useful, resort to these
experts is not mandatory or indispensable because a finding of forgery does not depend entirely on their
testimonies. Judges must also exercise independent judgment in determining the authenticity or
genuineness of the signatures in question, and not rely merely on the testimonies of handwriting experts.
Mendez vs. Court of Appeals, 672 SCRA 200, G.R. No. 174937 June 13, 2012

Service of Written Interrogatories is Required to Compel Adverse Party to Give Testimony in Court

As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed,
unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25 of the
Rules, which provides — Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.—Unless thereafter allowed
by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party not served with written
interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a
deposition pending appeal. One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and
needless delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a
party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most likely be unable
to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its witness.
Instead, the process could be treated as a fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the proceedings; it
produces no significant result that a prior written interrogatories might bring. Afulugencia vs. Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Co., 715 SCRA 399, G.R. No. 185145 February 5, 2014

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 REMEDIAL LAW
Non-Compliance with the Chain of Custody Rule may be Excused on Justifiable Grounds

It is of no moment that Forensic Chemist Alejandro De Guzman who conducted the laboratory examination
was not presented as a witness. The non-presentation as witnesses of other persons who had custody of
the illegal drugs is not a crucial point against the prosecution. There is no requirement for the prosecution
to present as witness in a drugs case every person who had something to do with the arrest of the accused
and the seizure of the prohibited drugs from him. To stress, the implementing rules are clear that non-
compliance with the requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. People vs. Collado, 698 SCRA 628, G.R. No.
185719 June 17, 2013

Objection to Evidence Cannot Be Raised for the First Time on Appeal

The records of the case is bereft of any showing that appellant objected before the RTC regarding the
seizure and safekeeping of the shabu seized from him on account of the failure of the police officers to
maintain an unbroken chain of custody of the said drugs. The only time that appellant questioned the chain
of custody was before the CA but not on the ground of lack of physical inventory or non-taking of
photograph, but on the alleged gap between the time of confiscation of the specimen and the time of its
submission to the PNP Crime Laboratory. But even then, it was already too late in the day for appellant to
do so. Appellant should have raised the said issue before the trial court. In similar cases, the Court brushed
aside the accused’s belated contention that the illegal drugs confiscated from his person were inadmissible
because the arresting officers failed to comply with Section 21 of RA 9165. “Whatever justifiable grounds
may excuse the police officers from literally complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because
[appellant] did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Objection to evidence
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered,
he must so state in the form of an objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the
first time on appeal.” People vs. Cabrera, 740 SCRA 41, G.R. No. 190175 November 12, 2014

An Evidence Not Formally Offered may still be Admitted if Two Requisites Concur

It is true that the prosecution did not formally offer in evidence the Certificate of Inventory and the formal
request for examination of the confiscated substance. Be that as it may, the Court has previously held that
even if an exhibit is not formally offered, the same “may still be admitted against the adverse party if, first,
it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it has itself been incorporated in the
records of the case.” PO3 Velasquez categorically testified that an inventory of the seized drugs was
performed, a corresponding certificate was prepared, and a formal request for examination was made. He
further narrated that together with the formal request, he submitted and delivered the confiscated drugs to
the crime laboratory. On the basis of the said formal request, P/Insp. Roderos examined the specimen and
she likewise testified on this. Appellant’s counsel even asked the said prosecution witnesses regarding
these documents. Considering the said testimonies and the fact that the documents were incorporated in
the records of the case, they are therefore admissible against appellant. People vs. Baturi, 734 SCRA 55,
G.R. No. 189812 September 1, 2014

Both Original and Photocopy may be Formally Offered in Evidence

While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a mere photocopy, there is no harm
if in a case, both the original and a photocopy thereof are authenticated, identified and formally offered in
evidence by the party proponent. Santos vs. Alcazar, 718 SCRA 636, G.R. No. 183034 March 12, 2014

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 REMEDIAL LAW
Lessee is NOT Estopped from Denying the Title of Lessor Existing After Commencement of Lease

It is clear in Sec. 2 (b) Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that what a tenant is estopped from denying is the
title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is
one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the
presumption will not apply. Hence, “the tenant may show that the landlord’s title has expired or been
conveyed to another or himself; and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or
evicted by title paramount.” Santos vs. National Statistics Office, 647 SCRA 345, G.R. No. 171129 April
6, 2011

Burden to Prove the Status of a Purchaser in Good Faith and For Value Lies Upon Him

It must be emphasized that “the burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value lies
upon him who asserts that standing. In discharging the burden, it is not enough to invoke the ordinary
presumption of good faith that everyone is presumed to act in good faith. The good faith that is here
essential is integral with the very status that must be proved. Heirs of Spouses Joaquin Manguardia and
Susana Manalo vs. Heirs of Simplicio Valles and Marta Valles, 733 SCRA 668, G.R. No. 177616
August 27, 2014

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