See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/261061839

Risk Assessment for Belt Conveyor-Related Fatal Incidents in the US Mining

Industry

Article · January 2008

CITATIONS READS

3 11,499

4 authors, including:

Vladislav Kecojevic Dragan Komljenovic

West Virginia University Hydro-Québec
81 PUBLICATIONS   1,030 CITATIONS    106 PUBLICATIONS   990 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE SEE PROFILE

William A Groves
Pennsylvania State University
36 PUBLICATIONS   924 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Holistic Multi-Failure Mode Prognosis Approach for Complex Equipment View project

Asset management View project

All content following this page was uploaded by Vladislav Kecojevic on 25 May 2014.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

Risk Assessment for Belt Conveyor-Related
Fatal Incidents in the U.S. Mining Industry

V. Kecojevic, Z.A. Md-Nor, D. Komljenovic, and W. Groves*

The paper presents the results of a research work aimed at developing a risk assessment process that can be used to
more thoroughly characterize risks associated with belt conveyor-related fatal incidents in the U.S. mining industry.
The assessment is based on historical data obtained from Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) investi-
gation reports, which includes 49 fatal incidents that occurred from 1995 through 2006. The risk assessment process
used in this research involves three basic steps: (i) identification of the risks; (ii) risk analysis; and (iii) risk evalu-
ation. The Preliminary Hazard Assessment (PHA) method is used in identifying and quantifying risks. Risk levels are
then developed using a pre-established risk matrix that ranks them according to probability and severity. The result-
ing assigned risk value can then be used to prioritize risk control/mitigating strategies. A total of six hazards were
identified. The hazards “Failure to provide adequate maintenance procedure” and “Failure to follow adequate
maintenance procedure” were the two most severe and frequent hazards and they fell into the category of “very
high” risk. Therefore, the largest portion of the available resources should be allocated to prevent and control these
hazards.

1. Introduction ities attributable to the Equipment category ranged from 39

Historically, mining has been one of the most hazardous
work environments in many countries around the world.
Although progress has been made - over the last century the
number of U.S. mining fatalities, fatality incidence rates, and
injuries have decreased - the number and severity of mining
incidents and injuries remains unacceptably high. According
to MSHA (2007) records, for the time period from 1995
through 2006, there were a total of 914 mining fatalities. The
highest number is attributed to the general category of
Equipment - a total of 516. The proportion of total mine fatal-
* V. Kecojevic, Z.A. Md-Nor, W. Groves, The Pennsylvania State University,
154 Hosler Building, University Park, PA 16802-5000, USA
Tel.: +1 814 865 4288; E-mail: vuk2@psu.edu
D. Komljenovic, Department of Industrial Engineering, University of Que-
bec, Trois-Rivières, Canada, Hydro-Québec, Canada,
E-mail: komljenovic.dragan@hydro.qc.ca
percent in 1999 to 86 percent in 1997. In the same period,
there were a total of 49 belt conveyor-related fatalities. These
data clearly indicate the need to develop effective interven-
tion strategies to further reduce fatal incidents in the U.S.
mining industry.
Risk management is a well-known loss control methodology
that has been applied by many industries including chemical,
oil and natural gas, nuclear, military, aviation, environment
and aerospace. These industries consider risk management as
an integral part of their daily business. A number of “gener-
ic” risk assessment and management standards and guide-
lines are available (CAN/CSA, 2002; MIL-STD, 2000;
AS/NZS, 2004; DIN-EN, 1997). Several countries have start-
ed to develop risk assessment approaches for mining indus-
try. The U.K. guidance document describes procedures for
carrying out risk assessment at surface mining operations
(Doc. No. 5995/2/98-EN, 1999). The Minerals Council of
Australia was the initiator of a project seeking to improve
risk assessment in the Australian minerals industry. The

Bulk Solids & Powder – Science & Technology • Vol. 3 (2008) No. 2 63
 V. Kecojevic et al.: Risk Assessment for Belt Conveyor-Related Fatal Incidents in the U.S. Mining Industry
University of Queensland, Minerals Industry Safety and
Health Centre (MISHC) produced a guideline which aims to
provide advice on risk assessment within the Australian min-
ing industry (JOY and GRIFFITHS, 2004). The Minerals Indus-
try Cooperation Initiative (MICI) project at the University of
Queensland, Australia, launched a new website called
MIRMgate to improve the way mining, minerals processing
and quarrying industries access hazard related information
using Internet technology (http://www.mirmgate.com/; KIZIL
and JOY, 2005). In South Africa the mining industry has es-
tablished a Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment pro-
gram (HIRA-2003) to identify and record significant risks.
While the development of risk management programs for
other industries, or for mining operations in other countries
provides valuable reference information, experience has
shown that a simple transfer of processes is not effective due
to characteristics related to specific industries and local con-
ditions.
There have been many attempts to understand the fundamen-
tal causes of injury incidents related to the mining equipment
(HELANDER and KROHN , 1983; HELANDER et al, 1983;
BUTANI, 1986; SANDERS and SHAW, 1989; PHIRI, 1989; MAY,
1990; KLISHIS et al., 1993; TURIN et al., 2001; KECOJEVIC and
RADOMSKY, 2004; MCCANN, 2006; BURGESS-LIMERICK,
2006; BURGESS-LIMERICK and STEINER, 2007; K ECOJEVIC et
al, 2006, 2007; G ROVES et al, 2007; K OMLJENOVIC et. al,
2007). However, these studies do not systematically identify,
quantify and evaluate risks related to operating or being near
mining equipment. Additionally, these studies do not specifi-
cally address the risks associated with the belt conveyors.
Therefore, the main objective of this research was to develop
a risk assessment process, which is a part of an overall risk
management that can be used by the industry professionals
and health and safety related governmental agencies to more
thoroughly characterize risks associated with belt conveyor-
related fatalities.
2. Methodology
This research study is based on historical fatality data for the
period from 1995 through 2006. Data on belt conveyor-relat-
ed fatalities were obtained from the MSHA investigation re-
ports (MSHA, 2007), which are publicly accessible from the
MSHA web site. Almost 500 pages of investigation reports
were examined. A typical report is approximately ten-pages
long and contains the age and work experience of the victim,
a description of the incident investigation, discussion, root
cause analysis, and conclusions.
Based on a review of the MSHA investigation reports, a data-
base containing the following information was developed:
ordinal number of fatality; date of incident; a short narration
of incident; hazards associated with the incident; and the
location and activity during the incident. These data are given
in the Appendix of this paper. Information about “incident
location” and “activity during the incident” was classified
according to previous studies by MCCANN (2006) and
BURGESS-LIMERICK (2006). Classifications and terms used in
the National Institute of Occupational Health and Safety
64
(NIOSH) information circular IC 9454 were also used wher-
ever appropriate (TURIN et al, 2001).
As noted previously, risk assessment is a part of an overall
risk management process (Fig. 1). It is a formal method of
defining the potential risk(s) and is used to answer the fol-
lowing questions: 1) What can go wrong - where and when
can it go wrong? 2) How and why can it go wrong? 3) What
is the likelihood that it would go wrong? and 4) What are the
consequences? The ultimate goal is to examine the potential
risks so that they can be controlled. According to B RAUER
(2006), H AIMES (2004), and various internationally recog-
nized standards (CAN/CSA, 2002; MIL-STD, 2000;
AS/NZS, 2004), the risk assessment process involves three
steps 1) risk identification, 2) risk analysis, and 3) risk eval-
uation.
Fig. 1: Stages of a holistic risk management process (AS/NZ 4360, 2004)
The Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) method was select-
ed for this study based on the nature of the information avail-
able from MSHA investigation reports, and the ability of
PHA to assist in preventing fatal incidents that occur in iden-
tical and repeatable systems like mining. This method is usu-
ally applied early in the design stages. However, it can be
used at any time throughout the life of the mine as a contin-
uous safety improvement program.
According to KATES and KASPERSON (1983), risk is a hazard
measurement, taking into consideration its likelihood and
consequences. In the current study, the first step consists of
identifying the situations that have the potential to cause a
fatality i.e. identifying hazards associated with operating or
being near a belt conveyor. Hazard is defined as something
with the potential to cause harm. Hazard is also known as
“immediate cause” or “symptom” in the H EINRICH (1959)
incident dominos sequence. The Committee on Underground
Coal Mine Safety (NRC, 1982) defined hazard as an unsafe
situation in mines. This definition was further developed by
RAMANI (1992) to include unsafe acts. In this study, hazard is
defined as the immediate cause of the fatality. MSHA defines
immediate cause as a causal factor that if eliminated, would
have either prevented the incident or mitigated its conse-
quences. The Hazard Inventory Table containing all identi-
fied hazards was compiled and shown in Section 3 of this
Vol. 3 (2008) No. 2 • Bulk Solids & Powder – Science & Technology
 V. Kecojevic et al.: Risk Assessment for Belt Conveyor-Related Fatal Incidents in the U.S. Mining Industry
paper. This table can be updated each time a new hazard is
identified.
Risk analysis is the second stage of the risk assessment
process. It may be performed quantitatively, qualitatively or
semi-quantitatively. According to JOY (2004), if the severity
(consequence) of the loss can be measured objectively and
the frequency (probability or likelihood) of the event can be
determined from the historical data, then a quantitative risk
assessment can be performed. If the severity and probability
cannot be specified but can be estimated based on judgment
or opinion, then a qualitative or semi-quantitative risk assess-
ment can be performed. In this study, quantitative risk analy-
sis was considered to be appropriate. The risk (R) associated
with a particular activity is judged by estimating both the
probability (Pr) and the severity (S), in relative terms such as
“low”, “medium”, “high”, or “very high”. This way of ex-
pressing the risk is adequate for many types of evaluation,
allowing a structured approach to be adopted in situations
where more quantitative methods would be difficult to imple-
ment. In the context of this study, probability is considered as
the likelihood that the hazard will cause a fatality in a future
year, and is calculated as the number of years in which a
fatality was attributed to a given hazard divided by the total
number of years. Severity was judged from the total number
of fatalities associated with the hazard in the twelve-year
study period. The proposed severity and probability classifi-
cations are shown in Table 1 and 2, respectively, while Fig. 2
shows the resulting risk assessment matrix.
Risk evaluation is the final step in the risk assessment process
and focuses on the decisions required to address the analyzed
risks. BRAUER (2006) suggested that this step consists of two
components: risk aversion and risk acceptance. Risk aversion
involves estimating how well risk can be reduced or avoided
through various strategies such as behavioural principles and
technological advances as recommended by K ECOJEVIC and
RADOMSKY (2004). Risk acceptance involves creating stan-
dards for deciding what risks are acceptable for miners, com-
panies, or society. However, setting a standard is a compli-
cated task as an acceptable level of risk may differ for each
group. In the Underground Coal Mine Commission report
(GRAYSON et al., 2006) it was proposed that the only accept-
able levels were zero fatalities and zero serious injuries. It is
appropriate that those levels be applied for the mining indus-
Table 1: Severity classification
Table 2: Probability Classification
Bulk Solids & Powder – Science & Technology • Vol. 3 (2008) No. 2
try as a whole. However, the main objective of this research
was to develop a risk assessment process that can be used to
more thoroughly characterize risks associated with belt con-
veyor-related fatalities, and therefore, no attempt was made
to define acceptable levels of risk.
The first step of risk evaluation is to identify the locations of
hazards in the risk assessment matrix (Fig. 2). These loca-
tions can be used to rank risks which have to be addressed
and in what order to prioritize control efforts. Risks in the
highest priority cells are located in the upper left part of the
matrix, while risks in the lowest priority cells are in the lower
right corner. It should be noted that at the end of the risk
assessment process, risks are ranked according to their prob-
ability and severity in a relative manner rather than in an
absolute form. This will help to avoid underestimating or
overestimating risks involved in this assessment. The result-
ing relative risk rankings are sufficient to prioritize resource
allocations and control strategies.
This study also examined the relationship among the number
of fatalities attributed to different sources of hazards, activity
during the incidents, type of the mining operations, age and
working experience of the victims. Hazard sources were sort-
ed into three categories: human error, equipment failure, and
working environment. Type of mining operations were clas-
sified as surface or underground coal, metal, and non-metal
mine with specifics on whether it is coal, sand and gravel,
crushed stone or copper/gold mine.
Victim’s age (Age) was stratified into ten groups and desig-
nated as Age 1: from 18 to 25; Age 2: from 26 to 30; Age 3:
from 31 to 35; Age 4: from 36 to 40; Age 5: from 41 to 45;
Age 6: from 46 to 50; Age 7: from 51 to 55; Age 8: from 56
Fig. 2: Risk assessment matrix
65
 V. Kecojevic et al.: Risk Assessment for Belt Conveyor-Related Fatal Incidents in the U.S. Mining Industry

to 60; Age 9: from 61 to 65;

and Age 10: > 65. Mining
experience was considered as
the total number of years that
the victim spent in the mining
industry. Victim’s mining
experience (Mexp) was strati-
fied into eight groups and
designated as Mexp 1: <1;
Mexp 2: from 1 to 5; Mexp 3:
from 6 to 10; Mexp 4: from
11 to 15; Mexp 5: from 16 to
20; Mexp 6: from 21 to 25;
Mexp 7: from 26 to 30; and
Mexp 8: > 30. This methodol-
ogy is consistent with previ- Fig. 3: Distribution of belt conveyor related fatalities between 1995 and 2006
ous studies by BENNET
(1982), BUTANI (1988) and
PHIRI (1989). ical conditions.” Finally, the fatal incident caused by the col-
lapse of mechanical structure of belt conveyor is classified as
“Failure of mechanical components”.
3. Results and Discussion
The hazards “Failure to provide adequate maintenance pro-
cedures” and “Failure to follow adequate maintenance proce-
According to MSHA (2007) records, there were 49 fatal inci-
dure” contributed to almost 90 percent of all belt conveyor-
dents attributed to the belt conveyors between 1995 and
related fatalities. These are the two most hazardous condi-
2006. There were six reports without any indication on vic-
tions. The hazard “Failure to provide safe crossing facility”
tim’s age and five reports without data on victim’s mining
contributed to two fatalities over the examined period. The
experience. Fig. 3 shows the distribution of belt conveyor
remaining three hazards contributed to a total of three fatali-
related fatalities for the examined period. The highest (7) and
ties. The identified hazards, their probability and severity are
lowest (0) number of fatalities were recorded in 1997 and
shown in Table 4.
2003, respectively.

A total of six hazards were identified and they are presented
in the Hazard Inventory Table - Belt Conveyor (Table 3). Fa-
tal incidents which occurred during the belt conveyor clean-
ing, repair, assembling or dismantling were classified either
as “Failure to provide adequate maintenance procedure” or
“Failure to follow adequate maintenance procedure.” These
hazards were classified in such a manner since the former
was caused by the failure of the management to provide ade-
quate procedures or because safe procedures were not estab-
lished to protect workers, whereas the latter was triggered by
the workers who failed to follow adequate maintenance pro-
cedures prepared by the management. The hazard associated
with failure of the management to build crossing facility over
the belt conveyor is classified as “Failure to provide safe
crossing facility”, whereas the failure of workers to use such
crossing facility or to make shortcuts is classified as “Failure
to use safe crossing facility.” The fatal incident caused by the
roof failure is designated as the hazard “Adverse site/geolog-
It can be noted that hazards “Failure to provide adequate
maintenance procedure” and “Failure to follow adequate
maintenance procedure” were the most frequent and severe
hazards. However, the latter was less severe and slightly less
frequent.
The completed risk assessment matrix for belt conveyors is
shown in Fig. 4. It is based on the generic risk matrix shown
in Fig. 2. There is no hazard categorized as “almost certain”
in the probability category. Two hazards are categorized as
“very likely”, one as “likely” and three hazards as “possible”.
There are two hazards categorized as “high” in severity cate-
gory and four hazards are classified as “low”.
It can be noted that “Failure to follow adequate maintenance
procedure” and “Failure to provide adequate maintenance
procedure” were two hazards falling into the category of
“very high” risk. The risk assessment matrix indicates that

Table 3. Hazard Inventory Table - Belt Conveyor

66 Vol. 3 (2008) No. 2 • Bulk Solids & Powder – Science & Technology
 V. Kecojevic et al.: Risk Assessment for Belt Conveyor-Related Fatal Incidents in the U.S. Mining Industry
Table 4: Probability and Severity in Hazards Inventory Table - Belt Conveyor
highest priority should be given to these hazards. Their exis-
tence is very likely and can contribute to a high number of
fatalities. Examining the investigation reports, it was found
that most of the fatal incidents happened during the process-
es of cleaning the belt or repairs while the belt was in motion.
Special attention should be focused on preventing any main-
tenance work on a moving belt conveyor. Therefore, the
largest portion of the available resources should be allocated
to prevent and control these hazards. There is one hazard
placed in “medium” risk category and three hazards in “low”
risk category. Additional resources can be allocated to avoid
or mitigate these four hazards. Although having a lower prob-
ability of occurrence, they still contribute to fatal incidents.
Ignoring these hazards could also increase their frequency of
occurrence and severity in the future.
A total of 44 fatal incidents occurred during the maintenance
procedures including cleaning the belt conveyor, repairs,
assembling or dismantling the conveyor and cleaning the
hopper. Two fatalities occurred because of crossing over and
crossing below the moving belt conveyor, while one fatal
incident occurred during the gathering material samples com-
ing off the bin feeder of the conveyor belt.
All fatalities but two were contributed to human error or
human performance (96 percent). One is contributed to
Fig. 4: Risk Assessment Matrix Table for Belt Conveyors
Bulk Solids & Powder – Science & Technology • Vol. 3 (2008) No. 2
equipment failure and one to hazardous working environ-
ment. This conclusion indicates a key importance of address-
ing human factor in future analyses regarding corrective
actions aimed at reducing or eliminating fatalities related to
belt conveyors. Additional research is required to better char-
acterize hazard sources and identify appropriate corrective
actions. For example, human error might be caused by lack
of training, lack of knowledge, or lack of experience.
Fig. 5 shows the relationship between number of fatal inci-
dents and the type of mining operations. It can be noted that
most of the fatalities (21) occurred in sand and gravel surface
mines. A total of 16 fatalities were recorded in surface
crushed stone operations, eight in underground coal opera-
tions, two in surface copper and gold mines, one in surface
coal mine and one at surface preparation plant of an under-
ground coal mine.
The relationship between the number of belt conveyor-relat-
ed fatalities and victims’ age and mining experience was also
studied. Table 5 shows the distribution of number of fatalities
and victim’s age while Table 6 shows the same distribution
for the victim’s mining experience.
According to this study, employees with five years or less
experience were at a considerably higher-than-average risk
67
 V. Kecojevic et al.: Risk Assessment for Belt Conveyor-Related Fatal Incidents in the U.S. Mining Industry
Fig. 5: Relationship between mining type and number of fatalities
Table 5. Age of the victim and number of fatalities
Table 6. Victim’s mining experience and number of fatalities
(66 percent of all fatalities), while employees with more than
15 years experience were at a lower-than-average risk (29.5
percent of all fatalities). This study also found that the min-
ers between the age 36 and 40 were involved in a highest
number of fatalities. It should be noted that the experience
and age distributions for all employees was not known, there-
fore, it could not be determined whether the number of fatal-
ities for a given experience or age categories were different
than what would be expected for that group based on the
makeup of the workforce.
Hazards identified in this study are a symptom of failures in
the safety system involving belt conveyors in the U.S. mining
industry. Generally, an incident resulting in injury or fatality
is multi-causal, hence it is imperative that all hazards associ-
ated with operating or being near a piece of equipment be
identified and understood. However, in a previous study
(LEVENS, 1998) it was noted that only the immediate circum-
68
stances associated with an
incident were listed in MSHA
reports, and no discussion of
the preceding events leading
to the incidents was provided.
Further, significant variability
in the format and level of
detail provided in incident
investigation reports for the
period examined in this study
was noted; therefore, only the
most immediate contributors
to a fatality could be consid-
ered for analysis. This is a
limitation of the data used in
this study which serves to
emphasize the need for 1)
additional research to better characterize the “root cause” of
the fatalities, and 2) a systematic and thorough approach to
incident investigation.
4. Conclusions and Future Research
Risk assessment is a recognized, useful and effective method-
ology to identify, quantify and evaluate risks. In this study,
risks of operating or being near belt conveyors were exam-
ined.
Two hazards were placed into the category of “very high”
risk including “Failure to provide adequate maintenance pro-
cedures” and “Failure to follow adequate maintenance proce-
dure” They contributed to almost 90 percent of all belt con-
veyor-related fatalities. The risk assessment matrix indicates
that the largest portion of the available resources should be
allocated to prevent and control these two hazards.
Additional resources can be allocated to avoid or mitigate
hazards located in the lower probability and severity cells.
Although having a lower frequency of occurrence, they con-
t r i bute to fatalities. Ignoring these hazards could also
increase their probability and severity in the future.
Human error is the most significant contributor to these fatal-
ities. Thus, it should be determined whether the human error
is caused by lack of training, lack of knowledge, lack of
experience, or some other factors. This way, the most effec-
tive corrective/mitigating strategies can be determined. Fi-
nally, since risk assessment is just a part of an entire risk
management process, future research efforts should also in-
clude risk control, and implementing and maintaining control
measures.
Acknowledgement
This paper is a part of a detailed study on Risk Assessment of
Equipment Related Fatalities in Mining sponsored by the
Western U.S. Mining Safety and Health Training and
Translation Center. We gratefully acknowledge the financial
contribution from this Center.
Vol. 3 (2008) No. 2 • Bulk Solids & Powder – Science & Technology
 V. Kecojevic et al.: Risk Assessment for Belt Conveyor-Related Fatal Incidents in the U.S. Mining Industry
References
[1] Anon, 1982, “Toward Safer Underground Coal Mines,”
National Research Council, Committee on Underground
Coal Mine Safety, Washington, DC, 190 pp.
[2] Bennett, J.D., 1982. Relationship between workplace
and worker characteristics and severity of injuries in
U.S. underground bituminous coal mines, 1975-1981.
PhD Thesis. The Pennsylvania State University.
[3] Bennett, J.D., Passmore, D.L., 1986. Multinomial logit
analysis of injury severity in U.S. underground bitumi-
nous coal mines. Accident Analysis and Prevention, Vol.
17, No. 5, 399-408.
[4] Brauer, R.L., 2006, Safety and Health for Engineers,”
2nd edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New
Jersey.
[5] Burgess-Limerick, R., 2006, “Identifying injury risks
associated with underground coal mining equipment,”
Proceedings of the International Erg o n o m i c s
Association Congress 2006, Pikaar, R.N., Koningsveld,
E.A.P. & Settels, P.J.M. (Eds.), Amsterdam: Elsevier.
[6] Burgess-Limerick, R. and Steiner, L., 2007, “Preventing
equipment related injuries in underground U.S. coal
mines,” Mining Engineering, SME, October 2007,
pp.20-32.
[7] Butani, S.J. (1986), “Hazard Analysis of Mining
Equipment by Mine Type and Geographical Region.”
Engineering Health and Safety in Coal Mining, Khair,
W. (ed.), SME Proceedings, SME.
[8] Butani, S. J., 1988. Relative risk analysis of injuries in
coal mining by age and experience at present company.
Journal of Occupational Accidents, Vol. 10, No. 3, 209-
216.
[9] CAN/CSA Q850-97, 2002. Risk Management:
Guideline for Decision Makers. Canadian Standard
Association, Standard.
[10] DIN EN 1050, 1997. Safety of Machinery - Principles
for Risk Assessment; Version EN 1050:1996, DIN-
adopted European Standard.
[11] Doc. No 5995/2/98-EN, 1999, “Guidance for Carrying
out Risk Assessment at Surface Mining Operations
Safety and Health Commission for The Mining And
Other Extractive Industries,” Committee on Surface
Workings, England.
[12] Groves, W., Kecojevic, V., Komljenovic, D. (2007).
Analysis of Fatalities and Injuries Involving Mining
Equipment. Journal of Safety Research. Vol. 38, Issue 4,
pp. 461-470, Elsevier.
[13] Grayson, L.R. et al., 2006, “Improving Mine Safety
Technology and Training: Establishing U.S. Global
Bulk Solids & Powder – Science & Technology • Vol. 3 (2008) No. 2
Leadership,” National Mining Association and Mine
Safety and Training Commission Report.
[14] Haimes, Y.Y., 2004, Risk Modeling Assessment, and
Management, 2nd edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
Hoboken, New Jersey.
[15] Heinrich, H.W., 1959, Industrial Incident Prevention: A
Scientific Approach, 4th Edition, McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 480 pp.
[16] Helander, M.G. and Krohn, G.S., 1983. “Human Factors
Analysis of Underground Metal and Non mental
Mines,” United State Bureau of Mines (USBM) report
PB84-158732.
[17] Helander, M.G., Krohn, G.S. and Curtin, R., (1983),
“Safety of roof-bolting operations in underground coal
mines,” Journal of Occupational Accidents, Vol. 5 pp.
161-175
[18] Joy, J. and Griffiths, D., 2004, “National Industry Safety
and Health Risk Assessment Guideline,” Minerals
Industry Safety and Health Centre (MISHC), University
of Queensland, Australia, 157 pp.
[19] Joy, J., 2004, “Occupational safety risk management in
Australian mining,” Occupational Medicine, Vol. 54,
No. 5, pp. 311-315.
[20] Kates, R.W. and Kasperson, J.X., 1983, “Comparative
Risk Analysis of Technological Hazards (A Review),
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America, Vol. 80, No. 22 [Part 2:
Physical Sciences].
[21] Kecojevic, V. and Radomsky, M., 2004, “The causes and
control of loader- and truck-related fatalities in surface
mining operations,” Injury Control and Safety
Promotion, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 239-251.
[22] Kecojevic, V., Komljenovic, D., Groves, W (2006). Risk
Analysis of Equipment-Related Fatalities in U.S.
Mining Operations. Proceedings of the 15th
International Symposium on Mine Planning and
Equipment Selection. Torino, Italy, pp. 119-125.
[23] Kecojevic, V., Komljenovic, D., Groves, W., Radomsky,
M. (2007). An Analysis of Equipment-Related Fatal
Accidents in U.S. Mining Operations: 1995-2005.
Safety Science. Vol. 45, Issue 8, pp. 864-874, Elsevier.
[24] Kizil, G.V. and Joy, J., 2005, “The Development and
Implementation of a Minerals Industry Risk
Management Gateway,” Proceedings of 32 conference
on Application of Computers and Operation Research in
Mineral Industry, Dessureault, Ganguli, Ke c o j evic,
Girard-Dawyer (eds), 2005, Tucson, AZ, Francis and
Taylor.
[25] Klishis, M.J., Althouse, R.C., Stobbe, T.J., Plummer,
R.W., Grayson, R.L., Layne, L.A., and Lies, G.M.
69
 V. Kecojevic et al.: Risk Assessment for Belt Conveyor-Related Fatal Incidents in the U.S. Mining Industry
(1993),”Coal mine injury Analysis: A Model for
Reduction through Training. Volume V111-Accident
Risk during the Roof Bolting Cycle: Analysis of
Problems and Potential Solutions. Morgantown, WV:
West Virginia University.
[26] Komljenovic, D., Groves, W., Kecojevic, V. Injuries in
U.S. Mining Operations - A Preliminary Risk Analysis.
Safety Science. Elsevier. in press.
[27] Kowalski-Trakofler, K, Steiner, L, Schwerha, D., 2005,
“Safety considerations for the aging workforce,” Safety
Science, Vol. 43, No. 10, pp. 779-793.
[28] Leigh, J., Waehrer, G., Miller, T., Keenan, C., 2004,
Cost of occupational injury and illness across industries.
Scandinavian Journal of Work Environment and Health,
Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 199-205.
[29] Levens, R. 1998. A general framework for prioritizing
research to reduce injuries and diseases in mining.
Human and Ecological Risk Assessment 4(6), 1285 -
1290.
[30] May, J.P., 1990, “Analysis of dump-point accidents
involving mobile mining equipment,” Information
Circular 9250, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of
Mines, Pittsburgh Research Centre, 19 pp.
[31] McCann, M., 2006, “Heavy equipment and truck-relat-
ed death on excavation work sites,” Journal of Safety
Research, Vol. 37, pp. 511-517.
[32] MIL-STD-882D, 2000. Military Standard, Standard
Practice for System Safety, Department of Defence,
Standard.
70
[33] Minerals Industry Risk Management Gateway
( M I R M gate), Hazard-Related Database for Mineral
Industry, Available from: http://www.mirmgate.com/
[34] Mine Safety and Health Administration, 2007,
Equipment safety and health information. Available
from: <www.msha.gov>.
[35] Phiri, J., 1989. The development of Statistical Indices for
the Evaluation of Hazards in Longwall Face Operations
Ph.D. Thesis, The Pennsylvania State University
[36] Ramani, R.V., 1992, “Personnel Health and Safety,”
Mining Engineering Handbook (ed. Hartman, H.), Vol.
2, 995 pp.
[37] Sanders, M.S., and Shaw, B.E., 1989. “Research to
determine the contribution of system factors in the
occurrence of underground injury accidents. Pittsburgh,
PA: United States Bureau of Mines (USBM) Open File
Report (OFR) 26-89
[38] South African Mining Industry Guide to Hazard
Identification & Risk Assessment (HIRA), 2003, SA
Safety Adviser’s Office Chamber of Mines of South
Africa, Standard.
[39] Standards Australia, Standards New Zealand (AS/NZS
4360; 2004). Risk Management, Homebu s h ,
Wellington, Standard. ISBN 073372647 X.
[40] Turin, F.C., Wiehagen, W.J., Jaspal, J.S. and Mayton,
A.G., 2001, “Truck Dump Site Safety: An Examination
of Reported Injuries,” Information Circular 9454, U.S.
Dept of Health and Human Service, Public Health
Service, CDC.
Vol. 3 (2008) No. 2 • Bulk Solids & Powder – Science & Technology
 V. Kecojevic et al.: Risk Assessment for Belt Conveyor-Related Fatal Incidents in the U.S. Mining Industry

Bulk Solids & Powder – Science & Technology • Vol. 3 (2008) No. 2 71
 V. Kecojevic et al.: Risk Assessment for Belt Conveyor-Related Fatal Incidents in the U.S. Mining Industry

72 Vol. 3 (2008) No. 2 • Bulk Solids & Powder – Science & Technology
 V. Kecojevic et al.: Risk Assessment for Belt Conveyor-Related Fatal Incidents in the U.S. Mining Industry

Bulk Solids & Powder – Science & Technology • Vol. 3 (2008) No. 2 73

View publication stats