Safety Science 48 (2010) 1054–1061

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Safety Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ssci

Safety culture aboard fishing vessels

Jon Ivar Håvold *
Ålesund University College, N-6025 Ålesund, Norway

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Safety at sea is a serious issue for the commercial fishing industry. Injury and fatality rates are between
Received 22 December 2008 25 and 40 times the national average in many European counties, Australia and the USA. A 50-item safety
Received in revised form 29 August 2009 culture questionnaire was developed, using items from published research combined with some original
Accepted 4 November 2009
items. The questionnaire was distributed to fishermen who completed the responses. A total of 209
questionnaires were collected. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) revealed nine factors, all with a Cron-
bach’s Alpha higher than 0.68. The factors were tested using ANOVA, t-tests, correlations and regression
Keywords:
analysis.
Safety culture
Safety climate
The findings indicate significant differences between age groups, vessel types, occupations, and
Safety attitudes whether or not a close family member is a fisherman. It was also found that the safety attitude of man-
Fishery agement had a strong influence on a company’s safety policy. Fishermen who had sought medical atten-
tion during the preceding year as a result of an accident showed a significantly less positive attitude to
rules and regulations and had a less positive safety attitude in general. Fishermen who had been involved
in a serious accident/incident showed a significantly more positive attitude to rules and regulations.
Ó 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
1.1. A dangerous occupation
‘‘The fishery people are going to take risks, while the fishery is
there, bigger risks than the other people. Some people are more
successful at it than others, and some people are not taking as
big a risk as long as they make a go of it, you know. That’s
the nature of people, the way I see it” (Murray and Dolomount,
1994).
One of the world’s most dangerous occupations is commercial
fishing. From a global perspective, the International Labour Organi-
zation (ILO) estimates that approximately 24,000 deaths and 24
million non-fatal injuries occur each year in fisheries (NIOSH,
2002). The occupational accident rate in Norway was reported to
be 25.38 per 1000 fishermen in 1999/2000 but decreased year by
year to 13.93 in 2007/2008 (Table 1/Norwegian Maritime Director-
ate, 2008).The occupational death rate for Norwegian fisheries
workers was on average101 per 100,000 fisherman-years from
1980 to 1989 and recent reports indicate current rates remain at
the same level, between 90 and 150 per 100,000 fisherman-years
(Bull et al., 2001; Norwegian Maritime Directorate, 2008). High
fatality and accident rates are also reported in the UK, Australia,
Denmark and the USA (ILO, Bull et al., 2001; Roberts, 2002; Hansen
* Tel.: +47 70161223; fax: +47 70161300.
E-mail address: jh@hials.no
et al., 2008) and extremely high fatality and accident rates are re-
ported in many developing countries, between 3 and 10 times
higher than those of countries in Western Europe and North Amer-
ica (Petrusdottir et al., 2001).
There are no standardized accident reporting systems in the
maritime domain, so the comparative data have to be treated with
some caution because of differences in measurement parameters
and statistical groupings. Nevertheless, the numbers describe an
occupation that has some of the highest accident and fatality rates
in the world.
A safety notice issued on the 20th of May 2008 by the Norwe-
gian Maritime Directorate (2008) indicates that accidents involv-
ing personnel on board fishing vessels are considered a serious
safety problem by the Norwegian Maritime authorities:
Accident statistics for occupational accidents show a disturb-
ingly high proportion of accidents involving personnel on board
fishing vessels. The degree of seriousness vary, but many inci-
dents involve severe injuries resulting in prolonged sick leave,
and in some cases also injury of a permanent character. Most
of these types of accidents happen during work on deck or in
the hold. The fishermen in the age range 18–29 are overrepre-
sented in the statistics for occupational accidents, which gives
rise to additional concern.
It may seem that in some cases, the training routines have failed
seriously, risk assessment and safety evaluation of work opera-
tions have been inadequate and preventative measures and also
supervision of workers with little experience have been inade-
quate. These are circumstances which represent violations of

0925-7535/$ - see front matter Ó 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2009.11.004
 J.I. Håvold / Safety Science 48 (2010) 1054–1061 1055

Table 1
Development in number of accidents and the most common reasons for personal accidents among Norwegian fishermen 1999–2008. Source: Norwegian Maritime Directorate
(2008)

Type of accident 1999–2000 2001–2002 2003–2004 2005–2006 2007–2008

Falls on board 32% 28% 23% 30% 30%
Trips/knocks/bruises 27% 25% 28% 24% 22%
Hit by object 16% 15% 15% 18% 20%
Accident involving tool 8% 13% 17% 15% 19%
Lifting, carrying 8% 14% 11% 4% 2%
Explosions and fire, electrocution, chemicals, poisoning 6% 3% 3% 5% 3%
Other 3% 2% 3% 4% 4%
Fall overboard 1% 1% 1% 1% 0%
Number of accidents 747 587 510 397 287
Number of accidents per 1000 fisherman-years (main employment) 25.38 21.95 20.67 18.04 13.93

the Regulation concerning the work environment, health and
safety of workers on board ship” (Norwegian Maritime Direc-
torate, 2008).
1.2. Fishing vessel accidents in Norway
(2007) analysed fatal fisheries-related accidents for an 11-year
period between 1997 and 2007. The number of fatal accidents var-
ied between 4 and 16, with an average of 10 each year. Single-
masted smacks are strongly overrepresented in the founding, cap-
sizing, grounding and the falling or pulled overboard accident cat-
egories (Aasjord et al., 2005).

The fishing industry in Norway is complex, ranging from ship-
ping companies with several trawlers with formal onshore organi-
zations to small, one-person vessels operating in coastal waters
Table 1 shows accident data grouped on the most common
causes for personal accidents among Norwegian fishermen be-
tween 1999 and 2008 (Norwegian Maritime Directorate, 2008).
The three most common causes for non-fatal injuries are ‘Falls on
board’, Trips/knocks/bruises’ and ‘Hit by object’. The accident trend
seems to be positive, showing a decrease in the number of acci-
dents per 1000 fishermen years of nearly 50% from1999/2000 to
2007/2008. The reasons for personal accidents seem to be relative
stable over the same time period. The highest injury incidence
rates are among the younger workers (Rubenstein et al., 1999).
In an analysis of Norwegian statistics, Bull et al. (2001) found that
the highest injury rates among fishery workers were in the 20
to29 year old group, decreasing progressively with age over
30 years. Bruises, fractures, cuts and sprains were the most fre-
quent injuries. This finding corresponds well with the safety notice
issued by the Norwegian Maritime Directorate (2008) cited above.
It has been well documented that age and accident rates are nega-
tively related (probably because older workers have more on-the-
job experience and have greater work knowledge, patience, and
skills than younger counterparts). Five times as many non-fatal
accidents are reported in the medium coastal vessel group than
in the small coastal vessel group, while deep sea fishing vessels re-
port 10 times as many accidents (Aasjord, 2007; Norwegian Mari-
time Directorate, 2008).
Reported fatal accidents in fishery vessels show the opposite
trend. When injuries do occur, older workers are usually more se-
verely hurt, and fatalities occur more frequently among older
workers. The average age of a Norwegian full time fisherman in
2009 was 46 years but the majority of the fishermen on the smack
fleet are over 50. When it comes to fatal accidents Aasjord (2007)
found that most of the smack fishermen who suffered fatal acci-
dents were older; mostly in the 40–60 age group. The risk of death
in the small coastal vessel group was 280 per 100,000 fisherman-
years, which is more than 5 times as high as in the medium coastal
group and more than 10 times as high as for the deep sea vessels.
Most fishermen killed on the job drowned or succumbed to
hypothermia in the water after a boat sank or capsized, or after
they fell overboard. Bad weather and rough seas combined with
engine breakdown are often factors. Falls overboard may result
from a wave, a trip, and a slippery boat deck, entanglement in fish-
ing equipment or alcohol abuse (Aasjord et al., 2005). Aasjord
1.3. The human factor and the concepts of safety culture and safety
climate
In order to formulate effective interventions to improve safety,
a comprehensive understanding of both the nature of safety and
lack of it is a prerequisite. Analyses of safety among fishermen
and fishing vessels should go beyond the direct causes and effects
of accidents like sinking, capsizing falls, trips/knocks/bruises or hit
by object and take into consideration the human and organiza-
tional factors. Many authors claim that the main reason for acci-
dents in the fishing industry is human error, which is said to
account for between 75% and 96% of all accidents in the industry
(Umberti, 2001; Rothblum, 2000).
The constructs of safety culture and safety climate are closely
related to human error and can be used to understand and analyze
human error and guide employees and managers in efforts to im-
prove safety. The most widely used definition of ‘safety culture’
is the one proposed by the Advisory Committee on Safety of Nucle-
ar Installations in 1993 (ACSNI, 1993), and it includes values, atti-
tudes, competencies, behavior and commitment to safety at work.
Most definitions of ‘safety climate’ are normally not as broad as the
definition of ‘safety culture’, but there is considerable overlap be-
tween the two concepts, with employees’ attitudes towards, and
perceptions of, health and safety behavior featuring in both.
Since the mid 1990s the concepts of safety culture and climate
have been the subject of an ongoing discussion that is similar to
the discussion of organizational climate and culture (Håvold,
2007). Guldenmund (2000) lists 18 different definitions of safety
culture and climate in a review paper and concludes that most
researchers have defined safety culture or safety climate in their
publications to the extent that they wish to explore them.
The present paper presents the view that safety culture and
safety climate, broadly defined, can be regarded as a single
construct.
1.4. Fishing vessels and regulations
Legislation plays an important role in controlling the design and
equipment of fishing vessels and the provision of proper training
and working conditions. However, international conventions and
other legal instruments, agreements and arrangements having a
bearing on those engaged in fishing are difficult to enforce, and
safety legislation that is accepted by the merchant fleet as a result
of effective enforcement are often met with reluctance in the fish-
1056 J.I. Håvold / Safety Science 48 (2010) 1054–1061
eries sector. The working environment, working conditions and
practices in fishery are difficult to control because they take place
at sea, out of sight of the law enforcers.
The IMO (International Maritime Organization) has tried to reg-
ulate fishing vessel safety, but the great differences in design and
operation between fishing vessels and other types of ships proved
a major obstacle to their inclusion in the Conventions on Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS) and Load Lines. While other vessels load cargo
in port, fishing vessels must sail empty and load their cargo at sea.
A 1977 Convention (Torremolinos International Convention on the
Safety of Fishing Vessels) included safety requirements for the con-
struction and equipment of new, decked, seagoing fishing vessels
of 24 m in length and over, including those vessels that also pro-
cess their catch. The Convention defined stability requirements
for fishing vessels as well as including chapters concerning con-
struction, watertight integrity and equipment, machinery and elec-
trical installations and unattended machinery spaces, fire
protection, detection, extinction, and fire fighting, protection of
the crew, life-saving appliances, emergency procedures, musters
and drills, radiotelegraphy and radiotelephony, and ship-borne
navigational equipment. In the 1980s, it became clear that the
1977 Convention was unlikely to enter into force, largely for tech-
nical reasons, and the IMO decided to prepare a replacement in the
form of a Protocol. The safety provisions addressed by the Protocol,
incorporating and amending the 1977 Convention, are included in
an annex consisting of 10 chapters. The provisions include auto-
matically controlled machinery spaces, improved life-saving appli-
ances, immersion suits and thermal protective aids, and satellite
communication systems, together with other components of the
global maritime distress and safety system (IMO, 2009).
The Code of Safety for Fishermen and Fishing Vessels is a volun-
tary code adopted in 2005, providing guidelines for the safety and
health of fishermen (Part A) and for the construction of fishing ves-
sels 24 m of more in length (Part B). This code is wider in scope
than the Torremolinos Protocol mentioned above (IMO, 2009).
The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certifi-
cation and Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel (STCW-F)
1995 is yet another convention that is not in force, but which
was an attempt to establish by common agreement, international
standards of training, certification and watchkeeping for personnel
on board fishing vessels. The Convention was intended to promote
the safety of life at sea and the protection of the marine environ-
ment. It makes provision for personnel serving on fishing vessels
of 24 m or more in length for skippers and officers in charge of a
navigational watch and for chief and second engineer officers
where the main propulsion machinery of a fishing vessel is
750 kW or more.
A relatively new ILO Convention No. 188 on Work in the Fishing
Sector (2007) was adopted at the 96th Session (June 2007) of the
International Labour Conference, by an overwhelming majority.
The Convention applies to all fishers and all fishing vessels engaged
in commercial fishing operations and it will come into effect once
ratified by 10 ILO member States (including eight coastal Sta-
tes).The Convention, with the Recommendation (No. 199) that
accompanies it, provides a global labour standard that is relevant
to all fishers, whether on large vessels on international voyages
or in small boats operating in domestic waters close to shore.
The Convention addresses, in particular, working situations and
conditions faced in the fishing industry. The Convention is flexible,
so that it is relevant to all types of commercial fishing and can be
implemented by governments around the world, whatever their
particular circumstances (ILO-FAO, 2009).
The International Collective in Support of Fishworkers (ICSF),
which is an international non-governmental organization working
towards sustainable fisheries, is very positive about this ILO Con-
vention and says:
Convention No. 188 and Recommendation No. 1999 replace five
of the existing seven ILO instruments specific to the fishing sec-
tor. The adoption of this instrument is a very important step in
improving the working and living conditions on board fishing
vessels of all sizes everywhere in the world. It is envisaged that
the Convention is likely to achieve widespread ratification and
should, therefore, soon enter into force (ICSF, 2009).
1.5. Purpose of the paper and hypotheses
The research reported in the present paper was designed to ex-
plore human factors, safety and safety culture on medium to large
fishing vessels, by studying attitudes towards safety and safety
practices.
The aims of this cross-sectional study were as follows: (1) To
explore associations between factors using factor analysis (2) To
explore differences in safety measures due to the type of fishery,
type and size of vessel, the length of time a fisherman has worked
in his trade, and his education.
The following five null hypotheses were examined:
H1: There is no difference in the safety culture factors between
different types of fishing vessels/equipment.
H2: There is no difference in safety culture factors between ves-
sels of dependent size.
H3: There is no difference in safety culture factors between fish-
ermen with different specialities.
H4: There is no difference in safety culture between fishermen of
different ages.
H5: The families of fishermen do not influence attitudes towards
safety.
In addition, the following hypothesis about influences upon
safety policy was examined:
H6: Positive safety policy is influenced by several of the factors
identified in the factor analysis.
2. Methods
2.1. Sampling/respondents
The data used in this paper were collected by students as a part
of their bachelor theses at Aalesund University College. The sample
consists of fishermen working on different kinds of vessels using
fishing gear such as long lines, trawls, fishing nets, closing nets
and Danish seines. The collection of data took place alongside the
quay in Aalesund harbour on four random days at the end of March
and beginning of April 2004. Because of limitations in time and
money and the belief that the sample represents a true cross sec-
tion of fishermen from different kinds of medium-sized to large
fishing vessels a convenience sampling approach was used. Espi-
noza (1999) and Hsieh and Hiang (2004) pointed out that when
studying the relationship among variables at the same time as fac-
ing problems of limited resources using convenience sampling is
acceptable. All in all, 209 respondents took part in the study, (esti-
mated response rate 40%). Most of the fishermen in this survey
worked on the seagoing vessels. All participants were male. Most
of the respondents were in their early twenties to early forties,
with a mean age of 32.8 years (SD = 11.8). The average experience
on the job was 12.5 years (SD = 11.7). A large percentage of the
employees classified themselves as fishermen (87%) and 9% of
the sample classified themselves as masters.
 J.I. Håvold / Safety Science 48 (2010) 1054–1061 1057

2.2. Instrument Table 3

Means, standard deviations for the nine factors from the factor analysis.

The questionnaire had a total of 50 questions measuring Mean SD

respondent characteristics and elements of safety culture. Ten of F1: Attitudes towards rules and regulations 3.5 1.1
the questions were nominal questions asking for information F2: Safety training and drills 3.6 1.0
about age, sex, education, occupation, type of fishery, how long F3: Job satisfaction 4.5 1.0
they had been a fisherman, if they had family member who was F4: Fishermen’s safety attitude 4.4 0.9
F5: Positive development of safety 4.1 1.3
a fisherman, and whether they had been involved in accidents in F6: Stress and negative influence from work 3.1 1.2
the last year. One overall question was included that asked about F7: Conflict between work and safety 3.9 1.2
the ‘total safety on the vessel’. Most items and scales for the 49- F8: Pressure 3.9 1.2
item safety questionnaire were adapted from earlier research on F9: Managements safety attitude 3.8 0.8
safety climate/culture. (Lee and Harrison, 2000; Mearns et al.,
2000; Williamson et al., 1997; Cox and Cheyne, 2000; Glendon
Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations (SD) for the
and Litherland, 2001; Rundmo and Hale, 2003; Håvold, 2002).
nine factors from the factor analysis. ANOVA and post hoc tests
The design of the questionnaire drew upon scales that had been
were performed on the sample and showed significant differences
developed and used in studies by Norwegian, Australian and UK
between occupation and type of fishery for some of the factors.
researchers, and as such the study contains a ‘European’ bias. Even
Occupational differences were found for the ‘‘job satisfaction”
though some of the safety culture scales originally used five-point
(F3) and ‘‘management safety attitude” (F9) factors. ANOVA
scales, the present research used a six-point Likert scale (a seven-
showed significant differences between vessels that used different
point scale without a neutral position), because an even number of
kinds of fishing gear for F1 (F = 3.816, p = 0.011) ‘‘attitudes to rules
response alternatives forces commitment from the respondents,
and regulations”; F3 (F = 8.828, p = 0.000) ‘‘job satisfaction”; F5
and research indicates that scales with more response categories
(F = 3.710, p = 0.013) ‘‘positive development of safety” and F7
tend to result in higher reliability (Weng, 2004).
(F = 5.132, p = 0.002) ‘‘conflict between work and safety”. The fish-
ermen were relatively satisfied with their work (job satisfaction,
3. Results and discussion mean 4.5 and SD = 1.0 6, where six is most positive). The most po-
sitive responses were given by those who worked on vessels that
3.1. Factor analysis and ANOVA used closing nets, and the least positive were those who worked
on vessels that used fishing nets. The masters were more positive
A KMO of 0.750 and a significant result to Bartlett’s test indicate than the fishermen and the engineers (F = 3.313, p = 0.038).
that the data are suitable for factor analysis (Hair et al., 2006). A The ANOVA showed significant differences between the groups
factor analysis with varimax rotation was applied to the items in aged less than 25, between 25 and 40 and more than 40 years old
the safety questionnaire. With an Eigenvalue over 1 (Latent Root for F6 and F7. The older the respondent, the higher the stress level
Criteria), nine factors were extracted from the material. Since no (F6; F = 1.583; p = 0.020) and the lower the conflict between work
distinct knee appeared on the scree plot, the 9-factor solution and safety (F7; F = 1.452, p = 0.050). ANOVA showed no significant
was chosen. The nine factors shown in Table 2 explain approxi- difference between types of fishing vessels for the factors from the
mately 57% of the variance and were relatively easy to name. factor analysis.
Inspection of histograms and plots showed that items and factors
were skewed to the same side, so no transformations were per- 3.2. Associations between factors and background variables
formed, because factor analysis is generally robust in non-normal-
ity (Hair et al., 2006). After examining the loadings, the appropriate Table 4 indicates significant correlations between as many as 26
number of components (scales) was retained and interpreted. In of the 36 correlations between the factors from the factor analysis.
order to verify the reliability of the components, the Cronbach’s al- A total of 53% of the correlations were above Cohen’s (1988)
pha was calculated for each scale. The results were judged satisfac- threshold, which says that correlations must exceed 0.20 to be
tory, with a Cronbach’s alpha exceeding 0.60 for all scales. acceptable.

Table 2
Summary of the results of a varimax rotated principal component factor analysis with example items.

Items and factors No. of items Range of factor loadings Alpha R2

Factor 1. Attitudes to rules and regulations 3 .73–.80 0.82 8.2
I get the work done better by ignoring some rules.
Factor 2. Attitudes to safety training and drills 5 .40–.82 .76 8.2
All new crew members get proper safety training before they start work
Factor 3. Job satisfaction 3 .53–.70 .073 7.6
I am satisfied with my work
Factor 4. Fishermen’s safety attitude 3 .52–.81 0.71 6.4
I am concerned about safety
Factor 5. Cooperation and working conditions 2 .68–.79 0.78 6.0
Cooperation is better now than earlier
Factor 6. Stress and negative influence from work 3 .67–.83 0.71 5.8
Work pressure leads to sleeplessness
Factor 7. Conflict between work and safety 2 .70–.74 0.76 5.3
Efficiency goals often conflict with safety goals
Factor 8. Pressure 2 .74–.75 0.76 5.1
Sometimes the situation keeps me from working safely
Factor 9. Managements safety attitude 3 .45–.48 0.68 4.4
Management is concerned about employees’ health

The questionnaire and list of items for each factor can be obtained from the author (in Norwegian).
1058 J.I. Håvold / Safety Science 48 (2010) 1054–1061

Table 4
Correlation between factors from the factor analysis (Pearson).

F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9
F1: Attitudes to rules and regulations 1
F2: Safety training and drills 0.244** 1
F 3: Job satisfaction 0.194** 0.267** 1
F 4: Fishermen’s safety attitude 0.180** 0.255** 0.455** 1
F 5: Cooperation and working conditions 0.259** 0.271** 0.552** 0.301** 1
F 6: Stress and negative influence from work 0.262** 0.161* 0.304** 0.197** 0.189** 1
F 7: Conflict between work and safety 0.299** 0.218** 0.197** 0.113 0.110 0.315** 1
F 8: Pressure 0.342** 0.064 0.107 0.055 0.012 0.232** 0.317** 1
F9: Managements safety attitude 0.047 0.481** 0.226** 0.239** 0.338** 0.015 0.007 0.061 1
*
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

3.3. Regression analyses and t-tests
Assumptions of regression analysis, such as linearity, normality,
homoskedasity, and multicollinearity were tested and found satis-
factory. First, a standard multiple regression analysis was per-
formed to evaluate the relationship between the ‘overall’ variable
of ‘‘positive safety policy (company)” and the safety culture vari-
ables measured using the nine factors, together with age and expe-
rience. Several regression models were calculated by using
backward elimination. The final model is presented in Table 5.
The figures indicate that factors F9, F4 and F2, ‘‘management’s
safety attitude”, ‘‘fishermen’s safety attitude” and ‘‘safety training
and drills” respectively, explain almost 60% of the variance for ‘‘po-
sitive safety policy (company)”. It seems that F9, ‘‘management’s
safety attitude”, influences the dependent variable twice as much
as the other two factors (F4 and F2). Fig. 1 indicates that the influ-
ence of ‘‘management’s safety attitude” is even stronger since it
indirectly influences ‘‘safety training and drills” and ‘‘fishermen’s
safety attitude”. One problem of validation is connected to the
common variance method, however, because all measures come
from the same self-reporting source.
Several regression analyses were performed on the nine factors
identified in the factor analysis in order to describe links between
them. The results of the standardized coefficient b are shown in
Fig. 1. The arrows and the figures on the arrows describe the direc-
tion and strength of relationships between the variables. This
shows that ‘‘job satisfaction” (F3) was positively influenced by
‘‘fishermen’s safety attitude” (F4) and ‘‘cooperation and working
conditions” (F5) but negatively influenced by stress (F6).
More ‘‘safety training and drills” (F2) and a more positive safety
attitude from managers (F9) leads to less ‘‘conflict between work
and safety” (F7), while increased ‘‘pressure” (F8) leads to more.
A positive attitude towards safety training and drills (F2) is
influenced by a positive safety attitude from management (F9)
and a positive safety attitude from the fishermen (F4). The positive
effect from managers on safety training and drills (F2) was three
times as strong as the effect of fishermen’s attitude.
Table 6 shows significant results when all factors from the fac-
tor analysis (Table 2) were tested using the following three back-
ground variables:
(1) Whether or not the fisherman had to seek medical attention
due to work accidents in the previous year.
(2) Whether or not the fisherman had been involved in any seri-
ous accident/incident in the previous year.
(3) Whether the fisherman had close relatives who were also
fishermen.
Fishermen who sought medical attention (N = 24) had on aver-
age a less positive attitude than others toward rules and regula-
tions (F1) (mean 3.4 compared to 4.4 on a 6-point scale;
p = 0.00); a less positive safety attitude (F4) (mean 3.9 compared
to 4.5; p = 0.04); and were more stressed (F6) (mean 3.6 compared
to 3.0; p = 0.02).
Fishermen who had been involved in a serious incident or acci-
dent (N = 76) had on average a more positive attitude towards
rules and regulations (mean 3.7 compared to 3.3 on a 6-point scale;
p = 0.02); were on average more stressed (F6) (mean 3.3 compared

Fig. 1. Results of regression analyses showing significant relations between factors.

 J.I. Håvold / Safety Science 48 (2010) 1054–1061
to 2.9; p = 0.02); showed a higher conflict level between work and
safety (F7) (mean 4.3 compared to 3.7; p = 0.00) and felt greater
pressure (F8) (mean 4.2 compared to 3.7; p = 0.01).
Eklöf and Törner (2002) claimed that the implementation of
safety measures in fisheries is low despite a high accident fre-
quency. In other words, the fishermen/managers do not learn from
experience. However, the present study might indicate a ‘‘learning
effect”, since fishermen involved in serious accidents/incidents in
the previous year have a more positive attitude towards rules
and regulations. On the other hand, those who had reported seek-
ing medical attention in the previous year had a less positive atti-
tude towards rules and regulations, which supports Eklöf and
Törner’s findings.
Fishermen with close family ties to other fishermen (N = 141)
showed on average greater job satisfaction (F3) (mean 4.6 com-
pared to 4.3 on a 6-point scale; p = 0.10).
3.4. Influence on accident causation
As mentioned in the introduction, many authors claim that the
main reason for accidents is human error, and that this is respon-
sible for between 75 and 96% of all occupational accidents. There
seems to be an important relationship between safety climate/cul-
ture factors and safety performance, as can be seen in the fact that
factors like pressure, stress, risk taking behavior and demographic
issues have an influence that goes beyond the direct causes and ef-
fects measured and reported in accident statistics (see Table 1).
Consequently, a robust measure of safety climate/culture can be
used as a predictive indicator of safety performance (e.g. Siu
et al., 2003; Hetherington et al., 2006; Håvold, 2007; Larsson
et al., 2008). The closest measures to ‘‘outcome variables” in this
paper are the two questions about whether the fishermen had to
seek medical attention due to work accidents in the previous year
and whether the fisherman had been involved in any serious acci-
dent/incident the previous year.
In the following section the nine factors from the factor analysis
are briefly discussed in relation to behavior, to evaluate their pos-
sible role as precursors to accident causation:
 Attitudes to rules and regulations covers willingness to report
incidents, and how practical and easy the rules are to follow
and understand. This factor seems to be one of the most impor-
tant factors in explaining behavior (Poggie and Pollnac, 1997;
Mearns et al., 2000; Håvold and Nesset, 2009).
 Attitude to safety training and drills When individuals become
members of an organization they normally receive some degree
of training in terms of specific job tasks and skills that are required
for safety and organizational policies and practices. Research has
shown that the nature of the socialization process will affect the
degree to which the new employee accepts organizational values
and polices (Jones and James, 1979; Fullagar et al., 1992).
 Job satisfaction covers employee’s satisfaction. Job satisfaction is
defined as ‘‘the extent to which people like or dislike their jobs”
(Spector, 1997, p. 2). The job satisfaction–safety link is strongly
supported in the empirical literature showing that employees
who are satisfied with their jobs care about the quality and
safety of their work, have a relatively lower accident involve-
ment rate, are more committed to the organization and are more
productive than those who dislike their job (Barling et al., 2003;
Gyekye, 2005; Probst, 2002). Employees experiencing low levels
of job satisfaction are more likely to display lower safety moti-
vation and knowledge, and as a consequence lower safety com-
pliance. Labour turnover is also relatively strongly correlated
with job satisfaction and there is clear evidence that low satis-
faction causes turnover (Argyle, 1989) High turnover might in
turn influence competence and job pressure and thereby safety.
1059
 Fishermen’s safety attitude measures how concerned the fisher-
man/employee is about safety. It is argued that employee atti-
tudes are one of the most important indices of safety climate
and behavior (Cox and Cox, 1991; Donald and Canter, 1994).
 Cooperation and working conditions Working conditions address
how people perceive their work. Several authors include work
conditions as one of the factors influencing behavior (Mearns
et al., 2000; Lee and Harrison, 2000). Martin (1992) and Richter
and Koch (2004), introduce the notions of conflict and ambiguity
into the study of organizational culture/climate.
 Pressure covers the link between pressure and safe behavior.
Several researchers (e.g. Flin et al., 2000; Mohamed, 2002) have
discussed the influence of work pressure on safety behavior, and
found that workers who take shortcuts while performing their
tasks seem to be one of the major causes of accidents. Brown
et al. (2000) reported a spike in accident rates during periods
of peak production at virtually every plant they investigated.
 Stress and negative influence from work A stress response can
occur whenever a worker feels threatened or unable to cope,
i.e. when there is an imbalance between the requirements of a
job and a worker’s capability to meet those demands. Work-
related stress includes factors dealing with the occupation or
job itself (e.g., role conflict, role ambiguity, problems with
coworkers or management, etc.) The empirical evidence sug-
gests that stress can contribute to human error and, thereby,
to accidents (Cartwright et al., 1996; Kolich and Wong-Reiger,
1999).
 Conflict between work and safety covers whether there are suffi-
cient staff to carry out the required work, whether completion
schedules are realistic and whether workloads are balanced.
Several authors refer to conflict between work and safety as
one of the main factors influencing behavior (Rundmo, 1996;
Rundmo and Hale, 2003).
 Management’s safety attitude covers the extent to which manage-
ment identifies safety as a core value of the organization. Com-
mitment to safety is therefore reflected in the ability of
management to demonstrate a positive attitude towards safety,
and to promote safety actively and consistently across the orga-
nization. This is referred to by many authors as the most impor-
tant factor in safety culture/climate and one of the factors that
influence behavior most (Rundmo and Hale, 2003; Håvold,
2007).
4. Conclusions and future research
This paper set out to evaluate the safety and safety culture/cli-
mate on medium- to large- sized fishing vessels by measuring atti-
tudes towards safety and safety practices. Safety in commercial
fishing is a complex issue. Fisheries are inherently dangerous,
although the actual levels and types of occupational health and
safety risks vary across fisheries and over time. This points to the
role of social, economic, cultural and regulatory factors in influenc-
ing risk within the industry. Risks associated with small boat fish-
eries tend to differ from those associated with large vessel
fisheries. Fishermen accept the danger associated with their cho-
sen occupation, but some may not take the danger as seriously
as they should (Kaplan and Kite-Powell, 2000). Experience from
accidents or near accidents could be expected to be associated with
learning from experience. The present study seems to indicates
such a ‘learning effect’, since fishermen involved in serious acci-
dents/incidents in the previous year had a significantly more posi-
tive attitude towards rules and regulations.
The influence of family on occupational and educational attain-
ment has been a subject of great interest to researchers who have
long recognized that families play a major role in shaping chil-
dren’s educational and career decisions. This research indicates
1060 J.I. Håvold / Safety Science 48 (2010) 1054–1061

that having more than one family member working in fishery can Table 7
have a positive influence on job satisfaction. The six hypotheses.

Three of the factors from the factor analysis have an effect on
the company’s safety policy: (1) fishermen’s safety attitude, (2)
safety training and drills, and (3) management’s safety attitude. Ta-
ble 5 shows that management’s safety attitude is the most impor-
tant, accounting for almost 55% of the influence on company’s
safety policy. This confirms findings from shipping and other
industries (Håvold, 2005).
Table 7 shows that four of the hypotheses outlined in Section
1.5 are rejected and two are accepted.
The results of this study suggest important relationships among
safety issues. However, the results have to be interpreted in the
light of a number of limitations. The respondents were not selected
according to any special criteria or at random. Fishermen from the
smallest vessels, the smack fleet (less than 12.9 m in length and of-
ten manned and handled by a single person) was not represented
in the sample. However, the smack fleet as much as twice the rate
of fatal accidents as larger fishing vessels (Bye and Lamvik, 2007;
Aasjord, 2007).
The under-reporting of injury seems to be a major problem in
fisheries. A large survey conducted by Rogaland Research in Nor-
way in 2004 (Allred et al., 2004) shows that 71% of accidents were
never reported to the Norwegian Maritime Directorate. The under-
reporting of injuries might be more of a problem on the smallest
vessels since they recorded at least twice the rate of fatal accidents
compared to larger vessels, but only recorded between a 10th and
a fifth as many non-fatal accidents in the same period, compared
with small coastal and the deep sea fishing vessel groups. Manage-
ment will not be able to improve the level of safety on the job if
Table 5
Result of the multiple regressions of the factors from the factor analysis on ‘Positive
safety policy (company).
B Std. b t
Error
(Constant) 1.506 .354
X1 Safety training and drills .233 .063 .189
X2 Fishermen’s safety attitude .275 .065 .195
X3 Managements’ safety .945 .082 .587
attitude
B = Unstandardized coefficients; b = Standardized coefficients.
Dependent variable Y: Positive safety policy (company).
R = 0.77; R2 = 0.60; Adjusted R2 = 0.59.
H1 Rejected
H2 Accepted
H3 Rejected
H4 Rejected
H5 Rejected
H6 Accepted
they do not study and learn from incidents in order to avoid their
occurrence in the future. In addition, inaccurate injury reporting
skews company injury rates to a level that may be misleading.
On paper, a company may appear to safer and relatively inci-
dent-free, when, in reality; accidents are occurring and are simply
never reported. This can become a vicious cycle in which company
safety is never improved because upper management may not
even realize that a problem exists.
A review of the available literature revealed four recurring fac-
tors that contribute to under-reporting of injuries in the construc-
tion industry. These factors are lack of management commitment,
negative or skewed perceptions of construction costs and their
relationship to safety, poorly designed and implemented safety
incentive programmes, and workers’ fear of reprisals from their
supervisors.
Economic pressures have caused fishermen to stay at sea to in-
crease their catch, despite bad weather or the need for boat repairs.
Money may be a major reason why some boat operators cut cor-
ners on equipment or maintenance.
Studies of the effect of compulsory safety programmes have
been conducted in several European countries, including Norway.
Safety programmes have tended to focus on training and it appears
that fatalities and incident rates have generally been reduced (see
Table 1 for Norwegian statistics).
This research should be broadened to include more participants
and assessments from a greater diversity of fishermen (as well
Sig.
from those who work in smacks). Measurement of attitudes should
be combined with accident statistics to avoid problems connected
4.260 .000
with common method variance.
3.659 .000
4.205 .000 Measures of attitudes are often relatively general and there are
11.522 .000 always problems related to predicting a specific behavior on the
basis of more general predictors (Ajzen, 1991).
Despite the above limitations, the current research provides an
additional insight into the important role that human factors/
safety culture play in safety in the fishery sector. It adds to the lit-
erature on the importance of safety culture factors in influencing
occupational safety.

Table 6
Statistically significant differences on safety factors from three background variables: Acknowledgements
(1) ‘‘within the last year, have you had to seek medical attention due to work
accidents?”; (2) ‘‘within last year, have you been involved in any dangerous accident
or any incidents that could have developed into a serious accident?” and (3) ‘‘are I would like to thank Jan Tore Madsen, Harald Knotten and Stein
there any other fishermen in your close family?”. Arne Dyb, the three students who collected the data used in this
paper.
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