783670

research-article2018
GASXXX10.1177/0891243218783670Gender & SocietyGlas et al. / Re-Understanding Religion

Re-Understanding Religion
And Support For Gender
Equality In Arab Countries

SASKIA GLAS
NIELS SPIERINGS
PEER SCHEEPERS
Radboud University, the Netherlands

Much is said about Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) publics opposing gender
equality, often referring to patriarchal Islam. However, nuanced large-scale studies
addressing which specific aspects of religiosity affect support for gender equality across
the MENA are conspicuously absent. This study develops and tests a gendered agentic
socialization framework that proposes that MENA citizens are not only passively social-
ized by religion but also have agency (within their religiosity). This disaggregates the
influence of religiosity, highlights its multifacetedness, and theorizes the moderating roles
that gender and sociocognitive empowerment play via gendered processes of agentic dis-
sociations. Using 15 World Values Surveys and multilevel models, our analyses show that
most dimensions of religiosity fuel opposition to gender equality. However, the salience of
religion in daily life is found to increase women’s support for gender equality and cushion
the negative impact of religious service attendance. Also, gender and education moderate
the impacts of several religiosity dimensions; for instance, women’s (initially greater) sup-
port for gender equality more sharply declines with increased service attendance than
men’s. Altogether, this study finds that religious socialization is multifaceted and gendered,
and that certain men and women are inclined and equipped to deviate from dominant
patriarchal religious interpretations.

Keywords: Middle East and North Africa; gender equality; public opinion; Islam; agency

A rab Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) publics report one of
the world’s lowest rates of support for gender equality (Norris 2009;
Price 2016), and, consequently, the Arab MENA shows relatively large

AUTHORS’ NOTE: This project was funded by the NWO (406-16-517). We thank three
anonymous reviewers for their insightful feedback. Correspondence concerning this
article should be addressed to Saskia Glas, Radboud University, Nijmegen, 6500 HE,
the Netherlands; e-mail: s.glas@ru.nl
GENDER & SOCIETY, Vol 32 No. 5, October, 2018  686­–712
DOI: 10.1177/0891243218783670
© 2018 by The Author(s) 
Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions
 Glas et al. / RE-UNDERSTANDING RELIGION  687

political and socioeconomic inequalities between men and women

(Paxton, Kunovich, and Hughes 2007). Thorough knowledge of what
drives the MENA publics’ resistance to gender equality is thus pivotal to
address real-world inequalities. However, previous public opinion research
and Western public debates explain opposition to gender equality in the
MENA by pointing rather unidimensionally to Muslims’ (vs. non-
Muslims’) patriarchal religious socialization (Alexander and Welzel 2011;
Inglehart and Norris 2003; Lussier and Fish 2016; Moaddel 2006; Rizzo,
Meyer, and Ali 2007). This narrative breathes Orientalism: a homogenous
MENA “other” characterized by irrationality, oppression, passiveness,
and, most of all, patriarchal Islam is opposed to “the self,” the progressive,
active, secular West (Abu-Lughod 2002; Korteweg 2008; Said 1979),
without acknowledging or theorizing how religiosity is a multifaceted and
gendered force.
The present study aims to understand relations between religiosity and
support for gender equality in the Arab MENA in a more sophisticated
manner by developing and testing new theoretical notions of “agentic
socialization.” These notions build on multidisciplinary insights from
classic sociology, in-depth qualitative studies, and feminist scholarship
(e.g., Avishai and Irby 2017; Charrad 2011; Elder, Johnson, and Crosnoe
2003; Sewell 1992; Spierings 2015). The agentic socialization framework
rejects claims that MENA inhabitants are solely and uniformly passively
socialized to oppose gender equality. Instead, it proposes that MENA
citizens have agency—even within dominant patriarchal socialization—
and that socialization processes are gendered (see also Moghissi 2011;
Read and Bartkowski 2000; Zion-Waldoks 2015). The framework thus
stresses that women and men might “live” their religion differently and
have the ability to bargain with their religion and interpret it in ways that
deviate from the dominant patriarchal mainstream (Hall 1997; Kandiyoti
1988; Rinaldo 2014).
In applying our framework, we propose that religious socialization may
be gendered and particularly women may be more inclined to make up their
own minds on gender equality and religion and that sociocognitive empow-
erment may equip people to agentically deviate from patriarchal religious
interpretations. We thus theorize specifically how gender and education
shape religious reinterpretations. This implies that relations between peo-
ple’s religiosity and their support for gender equality differ by gender and
education, which we test empirically (Khurshid 2015; Prickett 2015).
To understand how religion can be both a source of emancipatory rein-
terpretations and patriarchal socialization, we argue that it is necessary to
688  GENDER & SOCIETY/October 2018

take a more refined approach to individual-level religiosity than to focus

on differences between Muslims and non-Muslims, as is done in most
MENA public opinion studies (e.g., Alexander and Welzel 2011; Lussier
and Fish 2016; Price 2016). We therefore disaggregate the concept of
religion and conceptualize it multidimensionally. Sociology of religion
scholars have shown that religiosity is indeed multidimensional and com-
plex, identifying among others: communal practices (e.g., attending reli-
gious services), doctrinal beliefs (e.g., textualism), devotion (e.g., religious
self-perception), and salience (e.g., religion-driven daily choices)
(Cornwall et al. 1986; Kellstedt et al. 1996; Stark and Glock 1968).
Appreciating these distinctions allows us to address more precisely in
which ways religiosity might have different implications for women and
more highly educated citizens than for men and lower educated citizens.
Altogether, our research question reads: To what extent are different
dimensions of religiosity related to support for gender equality in the Arab
MENA, and how do these relations differ for women and more highly
educated individuals?

Religious Socialization Reconsidered

The Agentic Socialization Framework

Our agentic socialization framework aims to understand support for
gender equality in the Arab MENA in a nuanced manner by refining and
integrating classic sociological frames and gender theories (Abu-Lughod
2002; Avishai and Irby 2017; Elder, Johnson, and Crosnoe 2003; Kandiyoti
1988; Korteweg 2008; Sewell 1992; Stark and Glock 1968). At its core,
the framework emphasizes that MENA citizens are embedded in domi-
nantly patriarchal religious structures, but that socialization processes
within those structures differ between men and women. Moreover, citi-
zens have the agency to reinterpret their religion; women and men in the
MENA are not solely passively socialized to follow prevailing religious
interpretations but can give alternative, progressive meanings to their
religiosity that are more conducive to support for gender equality.
Our framework departs from life course theory (Elder, Johnson, and
Crosnoe 2003) and agency-structure duality’s (Sewell 1992) assertion that
people are always embedded in spatio-temporal contexts with pre-existing
(socially constructed) structures that shape their lives. Here we focus on
the established patriarchal interpretations of religion in which MENA
citizens are embedded from birth and childhood on (Al-Hibri 1982; Mir-
 Glas et al. / RE-UNDERSTANDING RELIGION  689

Hosseini 2006; Moghissi 2011). Integration in and socialization by these

pre-existing religious structures shape MENA citizens’ lives, including
the meanings they attach to gender. In other words, the more integrated
individuals are in this patriarchal religion in general, the less likely they
are to support gender equality. Simultaneously, these theories propose that
people have the agency to construct their own lives within their contexts
rather than to merely reproduce patriarchal interpretations from genera-
tion to generation (Elder, Johnson, and Crosnoe 2003, 11).
Regarding agency and gender, Kandiyoti proposed in her influential
work that women use strategies to maneuver specific patriarchal contexts
(1988, 275). In the following debate, some argued that women’s agency is
found in resisting religion, which equates agency to secularism and thus
denies religious women their agency while still conceptualizing religion
as a unidimensional force that singularly oppresses women (Abu-Lughod
2002; Korteweg 2008). Other scholars emphasized “illiberal agency,”
which claims that religious women might exercise agency in actively
being orthodox even when that reinforces patriarchal religious structures
(Avishai 2008; Mahmood 2005). This position has been criticized for
stretching “agency” so far that it becomes a hollow term (Moghissi 2011;
Rinaldo 2014).
In our framework, we transcend both views and integrate them into
contemporary sociological theories. Our premise is that people are
indeed—to different degrees—socialized by patriarchal religious struc-
tures, but that people embedded in these patriarchal religious structures
have the agency to subvert dominant religious interpretations to promote
their (gendered) interests (see also Korteweg 2008; Rinaldo 2014).
Paradoxically, dominant patriarchal religious structures thus provide the
very conditions for agentic re-interpretations of religion (Jansen 2004;
Mir-Hosseini 2006; Prickett 2015). Religious MENA citizens—especially
women—thus should not be considered to be solely passively socialized
by patriarchal religious structures but capable of actively negotiating reli-
gious meanings attached to gender by drawing on alternative religious and
secular sources (Read and Bartkowski 2000).
This framework signifies “religion” as dynamic and negotiable, allow-
ing room to advance support for gender equality but simultaneously as
containing rigid oppressive structures that socialize citizens into patriar-
chal worldviews. To understand how religious socialization shapes peo-
ple’s support for gender equality in negotiable ways, we argue that
religiosity needs to be conceptualized in a multidimensional way because
different manifestations of individual-level religiosity have different
690  GENDER & SOCIETY/October 2018

Figure 1:  Conceptual Scheme of Religiosity

implications regarding socialization and negotiability, as will be theorized

more concretely below.
In line with classic and more contemporary distinctions, we firstly
differentiate between (external) religious practices and (internal) reli-
gious beliefs (see Figure 1) (Cornwall et al. 1986; Hall 1997; Kellstedt
et al. 1996; Stark and Glock 1968). We further subdivide religious
practices into two categories: private religious behaviors that are acted
out without others, and communal practices, such as attending religious
services, that imply exposure to the institutional patriarchal establish-
ment’s home (Aune 2015; Mir-Hosseini 2006; Nyhagen 2017).
Concerning religious beliefs, a further distinction can be made as well.
Doctrinal beliefs stipulate the interpretation of one’s religion, whereas
affective beliefs relate to feelings of attachment to religion regardless
of the specific content of those beliefs. Affective beliefs encompass a
more general and abstract attachment to religion in and of itself (“devo-
tion”) and feelings that religion specifically guides daily life choices
(“salience”). Below, we apply our theoretical framework to communal
practices (attendance), doctrinal beliefs (textualism), and affective
beliefs (devotion and salience), the dimensions we could incorporate
empirically.

Multidimensional Religious Socialization

Whereas previous quantitative MENA studies have predominantly
drawn on unidimensional socialization perspectives (e.g., Alexander and
Welzel 2011; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Lussier and Fish 2016; Price
2016), our multidimensional framework emphasizes that different dimen-
sions of religiosity link differently to socialization and support for gender
equality. First, attending religious services entails exposure to the MENA’s
structural “ruling patriarchal establishment,” which generally preaches
 Glas et al. / RE-UNDERSTANDING RELIGION  691

gendered worldviews of men and women being complementary and hier-

archically related (Al-Hibri 1982, ix; Bolzendahl and Myers 2004).
Frequent attendance therefore is expected to increase the likelihood that
such messages will be internalized, corroding support for gender equality
(Hervieu-Léger 1998; Sumerau 2012). Second, doctrinal beliefs are
expected to influence support for gender equality (Al-Hibri 1982;
Kucinskas 2010; Moghadam 2013; Spierings 2015). The doctrinal belief
we specifically focus on is “textualism” (Rinaldo 2014): the belief that
religious texts have one static literalist meaning—voiced by the institu-
tionalized patriarchy—instead of a spirit to be interpreted in light of the
time they were written (Masoud, Jamal, and Nugent 2016; Moghissi
2011). For example, the Quran and Hadith can be interpreted textually, or
literally, as a point-blank condemnation of taking your own life,1 while
contextualists have proposed more lenient conclusions based on the cur-
rent rapid expansions of Muslim-majority countries’ populations (Shapiro
2013). Textualist readings generally oppose gender equality. For instance,
interpreting the Quran’s proclamations on inheritance textually stipulates
that women’s shares should literally be half of men’s (4:11, Khan trans.).
Contextual interpretations stress an emancipatory spirit as women are
allocated more than the nothing they generally had in the seventh century
before Islam (Mir-Hosseini 2006; Selim 2003). Altogether, we thus expect
that: The frequency of communal religious service attendance and holding
textualist beliefs are negatively related to support for gender equality
(Hypothesis 1).
Drawing attention to affective beliefs, our framework however sug-
gests that religiosity might actually fuel support for gender equality.
Counter to doctrinal beliefs, religious affect does not reflect a certain
(patriarchal) content of beliefs, but rather it reflects on the attachment to
religion in and of itself, to the main undercurrents of religion. These
main religious tenets of monotheistic religions have been argued to
involve benevolent traits related to mercy, generosity, and fairness
(Schwartz and Huismans 1995). Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche’s
review (2015, 205), for instance, points out that “the major religious
traditions all emphasize compassion.” Regarding Islam, one of the five
pillars, Zakat, specifically concerns charity, and the Quran designates
Allah as al-Rahman (Most Merciful) and al-Rahim (Compassionate).
Similarly, El Fadl (2001, 9) has illustrated the Islamic ethos as one of
general egalitarianism: “Islam rejects elitism and emphasizes that truth
is equally accessible to all Muslims regardless of race, class, or gender.”
Altogether, we hypothesize that: The stronger peoples’ affective ­religious
692  GENDER & SOCIETY/October 2018

beliefs (devotion and salience), the higher their support for gender
equality (Hypothesis 2).

Gendered Socialization and Agentic Reinterpretation

As our agentic socialization framework proposes that citizens are not
uniformly passively sculpted by dominant religious interpretations, but
that socialization processes may differ for different societal groups, the
impact of individuals’ religiosity may vary with their gender and educa-
tion (Khurshid 2015; Rinaldo 2014). Several mechanisms lead us to
expect that religiosity’s impact on support for gender equality is gendered,
including women’s personal interests and the gender conservative sociali-
zation in the MENA region overall (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004).
Concerning people’s interests, gender equality is generally considered to
be more in the direct interest of women than men. Currently men benefit
from being designated head of households with greater legal rights.
Therefore, women may be more inclined to diverge from patriarchal reli-
gious messages and seek or accept alternative interpretations that allow
them more rights, as several in-depth studies have shown (Jansen 2004;
Masoud, Jamal, and Nugent 2016; Moghissi 2011; Prickett 2015; Read
and Bartkowski 2000; Rinaldo 2014; Selim 2003; Zion-Waldoks 2015).
Women may also be socialized differently than men. While men tend to
be taught to be aggressive, competitive, household leaders, women’s
socialization accentuates their supposedly emotional, affectionate, caring,
gentle, and overall benevolent nature (Gonzalez 2011; Lueptow, Garovich-
Szabo, and Lueptow 2001). Women’s socialization into benevolence—
apart from religious benevolence—has been shown to translate to greater
social compassion and support for gender equality (Eagly et al. 2004).
Both gendered interests and gendered socialization thus lead us to expect
that women will support gender equality more than men, but also that
religion’s impact will vary between women and men. Still, as Lussier and
Fish (2016, 35) note, “surprisingly little has been written about the inter-
section between sex and religious identification with regard to attitudes
about gender inequality.”
Filling this lacuna, first we propose that the gender gap in support for
gender equality will close with stronger integration in the established
religious patriarchy. Low integration in institutionalized religion—that is,
not frequenting services and not adhering to strict textualism—is expected
to bolster space to deviate from patriarchal religious interpretations.
Given gendered socialization and interests, we then propose that espe-
 Glas et al. / RE-UNDERSTANDING RELIGION  693

cially women will use that space (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004), whereas
men have no incentive to reinterpret their religion on top of their more
conservative socialization.
However, stronger integration in the institutional patriarchy—with its
authoritative truth-claims of the proper interpretation of religion—is
expected to leave little wiggle room for those agentic deviations. Religious
service attendance and textualism thus are expected to shrink spaces that
particularly women use, impeding especially women’s propensity to
benevolent reinterpretations. At the same time, it is also theoretically pos-
sible that, for instance, women who frequent services represent a selective
group that is more gender conservative even before attendance. Still, here
it should be noted again that intergenerational transmissions of religiosity
and the structural character of religious institutions render this possibility
less likely. Also, the most conservative women might not attend services
because there are no facilities or because they believe they should pray at
home. Not attending services is thus not one-to-one translated to being
less conservative, which is also illustrated by the fact that a substantial
number of women attend services at least once a week, but even more do
so less often.2 Moreover, a wealth of ethnographic research in this area
shows that even if attendance is partly a process of self-selection, it seems
unlikely that women’s gender attitudes also are unaffected by attendance
(see Bartkowski and Read 2003; Prickett 2015; Read and Bartkowski
2000). Several studies have even pointed out that women who attend reli-
gious services start off more progressive but amend their views following
service attendance (see Chong 2006; Griffith 1997). Altogether, we expect
that, compared to men’s, women’s initially greater support for gender
equality will be more sharply reduced when they attend services and
adhere to textualist beliefs, narrowing the gender gap in support for gen-
der equality. Or formulated in more technical terms: Negative relation-
ships between religious service attendance and textualism and support for
gender equality are stronger for women than men (Hypothesis 3).
Women’s reinterpretations are however not expected to be stonewalled
by all dimensions of religiosity, drawing our attention to affective beliefs.
Affective religious beliefs—feelings of attachment to religion rather than
particular beliefs regarding its proper content—are expected to enlarge
room for reinterpretations as they are disconnected from the institutional
religious patriarchy and, as noted, may inspire interpreting religion benev-
olently. Women’s socialization into compassion and incentives to reinter-
pret their religion are expected to drive women especially to make good
use of affective beliefs’ space for renegotiations (Prickett 2015; Read and
694  GENDER & SOCIETY/October 2018

Bartkowski 2000; Rinaldo 2014). We thus expect that: Affective religious

beliefs are positively related to support for gender equality especially
among women rather than among men (Hypothesis 4).
Agentic socialization also draws attention to being better equipped to
diverge from patriarchal religious socialization, which might have par-
ticular implications for the role of education. As others have argued, more
highly educated people’s cognitive skills allow them to reconcile more
easily seemingly contradictory views such as strongly religious and femi-
nist ones (Moghadam 2013). Also, their advantaged social position
implies that the more highly educated are more likely to encounter diver-
gent views on (religious interpretations of) gender norms, increasing their
awareness of alternatives (Shamaileh 2016). Because of these resources,
more highly educated people are expected to deviate from patriarchal
religious interpretations more often, provided space for such renegotia-
tions exists. Thus, among those who are less integrated in the institutional
religious patriarchy, the more highly educated are expected to support
gender equality more. However, this educational gap in support for gender
equality will close with greater service attendance and textualism. In tech-
nical terms: Negative relations between religious service attendance and
textualism and support for gender equality are stronger among the more
highly educated than the lower educated (Hypothesis 5).
Still, as seen, affective religious beliefs do not imply integration in the
institutional religious patriarchy and are expected to inspire benevolent
reinterpretations. Following their greater cognitive skills and awareness of
alternatives, especially more highly educated people are expected to use
this space and renegotiate religious meanings of gender (Moghadam
2013). Particularly the more highly educated may thus translate affective
beliefs into support for gender equality: Affective religious beliefs are
positively related to support for gender equality especially among the
more highly educated rather than the lower educated (Hypothesis 6).
Finally, regarding the different dimensions of religiosity, our agentic
socialization framework also proposes that citizens can reinterpret their
religion in its own terms. Greater religious affect might make people
rethink, contest, or buffer some dominant oppressive religious interpreta-
tions, as affective beliefs are expected to create knowledge of and adher-
ence to religion’s main benevolent messages (Bloom, Arikan, and
Courtemanche 2015; Schwartz and Huismans 1995). For instance, attach-
ment to the general notion of “love thy neighbor” could be expected to
make more devoted people less passively receptive to patriarchal views
voiced in services. Similarly, considering the benevolent side of religion,
 Glas et al. / RE-UNDERSTANDING RELIGION  695

it is expected that when religion is more saliently guiding people’s daily

life choices, textualism is translated less strongly to judging others,
including prescribing how women should behave. We thus expect that:
Relations between attending religious services and textualism and support
for gender equality are weaker with higher levels of religious affect, that
is, devotion and salience (Hypothesis 7).

Methods

This study uses the MENA subset of the World Values Survey. Of
these, 15 surveys (2001-2014) included the items needed. They represent
12 countries: Algeria (2x), Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan (2x), Lebanon,
Libya, Morocco (2x), Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Yemen. All
surveys target representativeness for the population of 18 years and older,
using stratified random sampling. These data are representative regarding
gender and age for most populations, and sometimes for education and
regional distributions as well.3 The initial dataset contained 20,254
respondents; after listwise deletion 19,009 respondents (94 percent)
remained. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics.

Support for Gender Equality

We operationalize support for gender equality using three widely used
items on gender equality in the public sphere in particular. The three items
asked respondents to which extent they agreed with the statements: “On
the whole, men make better political leaders than women do” (four-point
scale), “A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl”
(four-point scale), and “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right
to a job than women” (three-point scale) (e.g., Blaydes and Linzer 2008;
Kostenko, Kuzmuchev, and Ponarin 2016; Price 2016; Spierings 2014).
Factor analyses showed that these items tap into the same underlying fac-
tor overall and in 16 of 17 surveys separately,4 indicating measurement
equivalency (Van de Vijver and Leung 1997). All items were recoded so
that higher scores indicate greater support for gender equality. To approx-
imate a normal distribution, we took the square root of the mean scores of
the three items, weighted by their factor loadings to create the index sup-
port for gender equality. For ease of interpretation, the final scale was
rescaled to run from 0 to 100. The descriptive analyses present a simple
summed scale, as is mentioned.
696  GENDER & SOCIETY/October 2018

Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics of All (Prestandardized) Variables

N Min. Max. Mean SD

Dependent variable
  Support for gender equality 19,009 0 100 35.37 24.10
Religion variables
  Religious service 19,009 0 1 0.59 0.39
attendance*
 Textualism* 19,009 0 1 0.92 0.16
 Devotion* 19,009 0 1 0.78 0.32
 Salience* 19,009 0 1 0.95 0.12
Agency variables
 Gender 19,009  
  Men 0 1 0.51  
  Women 0 1 0.49  
 Education* 19,009 0 1 0.45 0.34
Control variables
 Denomination 19,009  
  Muslim 0 1 0.96  
  Non-Muslim 0 1 0.04  
 Age* 19,009 18 93 37.03 14.00
 Age2,* 19,009 324 8,649 1566.92 1199.35
  Marital status 19,009  
  Not married 0 1 0.33  
  Separated 0 1 0.03  
  Widowed 0 1 0.04  
  Married 0 1 0.60  
  Employment status 19,009  
  Full-time employed 0 1 0.28  
  Part-time employed 0 1 0.09  
  Self-employed 0 1 0.13  
  Retired 0 1 0.05  
  Homemaker 0 1 0.25  
  Student 0 1 0.10  
  Non-employed 0 1 0.10  
Robustness check variables
 Prayer 11,456  
   Prayer WVS 4* 1,132 0 1 0.71 0.43
   Prayer WVS 5* 1,067 0 1 0.87 0.34
   Prayer WVS 6* 9,257 0 1 0.75 0.40
 Particularism 14,959  
  Not particularistic 0 1 0.61  
  Particularistic 0 1 0.39  

NOTE: Min. = minimum; Max. = maximum; SD = standard deviation.

SOURCE: WVS.
*Variable is z-scored for analyses.
 Glas et al. / RE-UNDERSTANDING RELIGION  697

Religiosity
We measure the frequency of religious service attendance with the ques-
tion “Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend
religious services these days?” (never, less than once a year, once a year,
only on holy days, once a month, once a week, more than once a week).
The scores were rescaled to a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1.
Textualism—interpreting religious texts statically and literally instead of
contextually—is measured by the proxy of respondents’ views regarding the
justifiability of euthanasia and suicide. As noted in the theory section, taking
your own life (by euthanasia or suicide) is textually prohibited but contextu-
ally permitted, making these measurements useful proxies for textualism
(Shapiro 2013). These measurements, however, only pertain to one particu-
lar issue (i.e., taking one’s own life). Had the data permitted it, it would have
been ideal to include other issues or a more direct measurement, although
we have no strong reason to expect that being a textualist on other issues
relates differently to support for gender equality. Moreover, as discussed
below, in our robustness tests we included particularism as an alternative
measurement of doctrinal beliefs, which was measured unrelated to specific
issues, and it is similarly related to support for gender equality. To opera-
tionalize textualism, we averaged the two 10-point items and rescaled it to
a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1. Higher values signal greater
textualism. As the distributions of the two scales were similar, respondents
were included if they had a valid score on at least one indicator.
Concerning affective beliefs, we distinguished devotion and salience
(see Stark and Glock 1968). Devotion—an abstract attachment to religion
itself—is measured using two items that have been shown to tap the same
concept before (Spierings 2014): (a) “Independently of whether you
attend religious services or not, would you say you are” a religious person
(scored as 1), not a religious person, or a convinced atheist (following
Rizzo, Abdel-Latif, and Meyer [2007], the last two are both scored 0); and
(b) “Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at
home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important?”
Respondents who chose “religious faith” were considered to be more
devoted (1) than others (0). The scores of respondents with at least one
valid answer were averaged to the scale “devotion.”
Salience—a specific attachment to religion as a guide in (daily) life—
was measured by another two items: “How important is God in your life?”
(ten-point scale, 0 to 1), and “For each of the following, indicate how
important it is in your life. Would you say religion is very important (1),
698  GENDER & SOCIETY/October 2018

rather important, not very important, or not at all important (0)?” If at least
one item was answered validly, scores were averaged to the continuous
scale “salience.”
Our measurements of devotion and salience are less distinct from
each other than the theoretical concepts, as there are no data available
on the salience of religion in specific daily life choices. However,
empirically devotion and salience are not very strongly related and do
not cause multicollinearity issues (see online Appendix 1). We thus
include both in our analyses to make our results as nuanced and inform-
ative as possible.

Gender and Education

To study the gendered effects of religiosity, we measure respondents’
gender as observed by the interviewer (0: woman; 1: man). Education, the
second moderator, includes four categories across surveys: “no formal edu-
cation completed” (0); “complete elementary” and “incomplete secondary”
(combined into “elementary,” 0.33); “complete secondary” and “incomplete
university education” (combined into “secondary,” 0.67); and “complete
university education and higher” (1).

Control Variables
Denomination, age, marital status, and employment status are included
as control variables. Respondents’ self-reported denomination, distinguish-
ing between Muslims and non-Muslims, is controlled in our models, and
we also established our results are substantially similar when we estimate
models for Muslims separately. The Bahrain 2014 survey does not include
denomination, but virtually all native Bahrainis are Muslim and considered
as such here. Unfortunately, a more refined distinction among either
Muslims or non-Muslims was not available in the majority of the surveys;
comparing Muslims and non-Muslims does make our results comparable
to other studies (e.g., Lussier and Fish 2016; Norris 2009). Age is a con-
tinuous scale; respondents under 18 were excluded as they were not sam-
pled in all surveys. Age squared is included to capture important life course
effects. Marital status is distinguished by four groups: married, widowed,
separated, and never married. Employment status encompasses “fulltime
employed,” “part-time employed,” “self-employed,” “retired,” “home-
maker,” “student,” and “non-employed” (including “unemployed” and
“other non-employed”).
 Glas et al. / RE-UNDERSTANDING RELIGION  699

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Men Women

Figure 2:  Mean Support for Public Gender Equality per Gender per Survey
(N = 19,009)

Analytic Strategy
Our data have to be modeled using multilevel models to control for
clustered observations within country-years and countries; one-level
models would deflate our p-values and increase the chance of type I
errors. Random intercepts are included at the higher levels (country-time;
country).5 This takes into account the clustered structure of the data and
prevents us from drawing false positive conclusions. To further increase
the rigor of our tests we also conducted various robustness checks, which
we briefly discuss after our main results as they yielded similar findings.

Support For Gender Equality In The

New Millennium

How supportive of gender equality (focused on equal participation in the

public sphere) are MENA publics in the new millennium? Figure 2 presents
the mean scores on the three items used to measure support for gender
equality (without taking their square root) and shows that respondents score
an average of 36 out of 100 in the WVS data. As a point of reference, when
we analyze all countries included in the most recent WVS wave, the MENA
region has the lowest pooled average in the WVS. It is several points below
that of the next United Nations–defined regions—Southern Asia and West
Africa—and substantially below the total sample average. Still, we also see
700  GENDER & SOCIETY/October 2018

considerable differences within the MENA region; for instance, women’s

average support is 43, while men’s is less than 30.

Explaining Support For Gender Equality

Table 2 presents the multilevel regression results for support for gender
equality. Model 1 includes all direct effects of religiosity (Hypotheses 1
and 2); in Models 2 and 3, the moderations between religiosity and gender
and education are added, respectively (Hypotheses 3 through 6); Model 4
includes interaction terms between the different dimensions of religiosity
themselves (Hypothesis 7). All models include the control variables,
which relate to support for gender equality as expected (see Lussier and
Fish 2016; Price 2016); for instance, education has a clear positive impact,
and women tend to be considerably more supportive of gender equality:
more than 15 points on a scale ranging from 0 to 100.

Multidimensional Religiosity
Model 1 suggests that religiosity mostly fuels opposition to gender
equality. MENA inhabitants who attend religious services more fre-
quently, who interpret their religion textually, and who are more devoted,
all oppose gender equality more. However, the salience of religious
beliefs is the exception to the rule, as it shows no clear significant relation-
ship to support for gender equality. Additional analyses indicate this is
partly due to contradictory effects in different contexts (see online
Appendix 2). Altogether, these results support hypothesis 1 and lead us to
reject hypothesis 2.

Gender and Education

Turning our attention to Model 2, we should first repeat that, as
expected following gendered socialization and gendered interests, wom-
en’s support for gender equality overall is far greater than men’s, as is the
case after taking religiosity and other factors into account (cf. Figure 2).
Thus, women can and do interpret gender equality differently from men,
“even” in patriarchal MENA countries (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004).
Model 2 furthermore shows that several dimensions of religiosity also
are differently related to support for gender equality for women and men.
First, service attendance is associated with a sharper decline in support
for gender equality among women than among men. As expected, when
 Glas et al. / RE-UNDERSTANDING RELIGION  701

Table 2:  Multilevel analyses of support for public gender equality

(N = 19,009)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

  b SE b SE b SE b SE

Religious service −1.12 0.18 −0.56 0.26 −1.13 0.18 −1.16 0.18
attendance
 *Women −0.86 0.36  
 *Education −0.61 0.16  
 *Devotion 0.15 0.17
 *Salience 0.42 0.19
Textualism −0.88 0.17 −0.97 0.24 −0.92 0.17 −0.81 0.18
 *Women 0.17 0.33  
 *Education 0.14♂ 0.17  
 *Devotion 0.17* 0.15
 *Salience 0.07 0.11
Devotion −0.62 0.18 −0.14 0.24 −0.59 0.18 −0.56 0.18
 *Women −1.12 0.34  
 *Education −0.13 0.18  
Salience −0.30 0.19 −1.53 0.24 −0.32 0.19 −0.19 0.21
 *Women 2.70 0.35  
 *Education 0.16♀ 0.18  
Gender: Women (ref. = men) 15.46 0.42 15.65 0.42 15.35 0.42 15.50 0.42
Education 3.24 0.19 3.22 0.19 3.25 0.19 3.23 0.19
Denomination: Muslim (ref. −4.83 0.89 −4.90 0.89 −4.95 0.89 −4.87 0.89
= non-Muslim)
Age −0.53 1.05 −0.54 1.04 −0.40 1.05 −0.53 1.05
Age2 0.78 1.01 0.82 1.01 0.64 1.01 0.77 1.01
Marital status
  Not married 0.61 0.48 0.71 0.48 0.66 0.48 0.61 0.48
 Separated 2.73 0.96 2.70 0.96 2.76 0.96 2.69 0.96
 Widowed −1.45 0.86 −1.50 0.86 −1.38 0.86 −1.45 0.86
Employment status
  Part-time employed −1.08 0.62 −1.02 0.62 −1.09 0.62 −1.10 0.62
 Self-employed −2.24 0.55 −2.29 0.55 −2.29 0.55 −2.27 0.55
 Retired −1.11 0.85 −1.24 0.85 −1.21 0.85 −1.13 0.85
 Homemaker −5.08 0.57 −5.31 0.57 −4.92 0.57 −5.07 0.57
 Student 0.28 0.69 0.17 0.69 0.25 0.69 0.24 0.69
 Non-employed −1.09 0.62 −1.23 0.62 −1.14 0.62 −1.10 0.62
Intercept 34.73 1.85 34.58 1.85 34.86 1.83 34.71 1.85
Variance
 Country-year 38.1 38.1 37.4 38.3
 Individual 473.0 471.1 472.6 472.8

NOTE: Bold coefficients indicate significance at α = 0.05, italics at α = 0.10. *, ♀, and ♂

indicate parameter is only significant in the Muslim subsample, female subsample, or male
subsample, respectively.
SOURCE: WVS.
702  GENDER & SOCIETY/October 2018

55

Support for public-sphere 50

gender equality
45

40

35

30
-3SD Mean Max
Salience of religion
men women

Figure 3:  Gendered Relations between Salience and Support for Gender
Equality (N = 19,009)

women do not attend religious services, they are more supportive of gen-
der equality than men (about 50 vs. 35), but service attendance reduces
women’s support with (−0.56 − 0.86) −1.42, while it only reduces men’s
with –0.56. These findings provide support for hypothesis 3, but only
partially, as a similar effect is not found for textualism. Face-to-face
exposure to members of the religious patriarchy voicing authoritative
messages thus probably shrinks spaces for emancipatory reinterpreta-
tions that especially women are initially inclined to use, reducing the
gender gap in support.
Second and interestingly, religious salience turns out to be negatively
related to support for gender equality among men (−1.53), but actually
increases support for gender equality among women (−1.53 + 2.70 =
1.17), as is illustrated in Figure 3. So, women who are more affectively
attached to their religion support gender equality more, while among men
the stronger believers support gender equality less. We did not find this for
devotion; thus, only partial support is found for hypothesis 4. These find-
ings illustrate that among women, salience—that is, the importance of
religion in daily life—is the religiosity dimension that also functions as a
help, not a hurdle, to support for gender equality.
Relations between several religiosity indicators and support for gender
equality also are moderated by educational attainment. Model 3 first indi-
cates that the negative impact of religious service attendance strengthens
when education increases. As expected, more highly educated individuals’
initially more progressive views are reduced more sharply when they fre-
quently partake in religious services (see Figure 4). The same is not found
for textualism, however; hypothesis 5 is thus only partially supported.
 Glas et al. / RE-UNDERSTANDING RELIGION  703

45

Support for public-sphere

43
41
gender equality
39
37
35
33
31
29
Min service Mean service Max service
attendance attendance attendance

No education Elementary Secondary Tertiary

Figure 4:  Religious Service Attendance and Support for Gender Equality
per Education Level (N = 19,009)

Model 3 furthermore shows that, among women, the negative impact of

salience, but not devotion, is weakened by education; these findings sup-
port hypothesis 6, but only in one specific case. Overall, Models 2 and 3
suggest that while womanhood and education form a buffer against the
impact of one’s own beliefs, socialization via religious services reduces
the room for agentic reinterpretations deviating from societally dominant
norms, diminishing women’s and more highly educated citizens’ initially
greater support for gender equality.

Interdependent Religiosity
Finally, Model 4 shows that salience and devotion weaken the impact of
service attendance and textualism, respectively.6 For instance, across the
MENA, people who attend services (one standard deviation) more often
show increased opposition to gender equality, with 1.2 points, as compared
to citizens for whom religion is averagely salient. All other things being
equal, among individuals for whom religion and God are more important
in their lives (salience) the impact of attending religious services is only
(1.16 – 0.42) 0.7. Not all expected interaction effects were found to be
statistically significant, but they were all in the expected direction. These
findings thus provide some support for hypothesis 7; the patriarchal influ-
ence of doctrinal religious beliefs and communal practices seems to be
mitigated by having stronger affective religious beliefs (i.e., salience or
devotion). What is more, all results together pinpoint religious salience as
the only dilutor of service attendance’s impact, emphasizing that the influ-
704  GENDER & SOCIETY/October 2018

ence of exposure to the institutional religious patriarchy may not be buff-

ered by womanhood or education, but it is by (affective) religion itself.

Robustness Tests
We conducted additional analyses as robustness checks. As mentioned
above, we estimated our models on subsamples (only Muslims, women, and
men) and within individual country-years; divergent results are indicated in
Table 2 and Appendix 2. We also varied the inclusion and operationalization
of the religiosity variables by including respondents with missing scores
on denomination and service attendance (classifying them as a separate
group); additionally distinguishing between the nonreligious and religious
non-Muslims; and including prayer and particularism, although then
many cases have to be excluded from the analyses.7
Our main results are robust for each of these alternatives. For instance,
our additional measurements of religiosity relate to support for gender
equality as expected, which provides further support for hypothesis 1 in
particular (see online Appendix 3). As individual prayer is not signifi-
cantly related to support for gender equality, it seems that it is the actual
exposure to others in services that serves a patriarchal socialization func-
tion, and not practicing religion in and of itself. Moreover, particularism
shows a clear negative relation with support for gender equality, which
further supports our conclusion that adherence to orthodox doctrinal
beliefs diminishes support for gender equality—also when the measure is
not focused on one particular issue (as textualism was).

Conclusion

This study addressed relations between different dimensions of religios-

ity and support for gender equality, and how they differed for women and
more highly educated individuals in the Arab MENA. We did so based on
a newly developed agentic and gendered socialization framework, which
we tested on data from 15 WVS surveys from between 2001 and 2014. At
its core, the agentic and gendered socialization framework proposes that
while MENA citizens are embedded in dominantly patriarchal religious
structures, they are not solely or uniformly passively socialized by religios-
ity, as previous large-scale studies implied (cf. Inglehart and Norris 2003;
Price 2016). Instead, the framework proposes that religious socialization is
gendered and that people can reinterpret their religion and thus actively
deviate from patriarchal interpretations (Elder, Johnson, and Crosnoe
 Glas et al. / RE-UNDERSTANDING RELIGION  705

2003; Kandiyoti 1988; Korteweg 2008; Rinaldo 2014; Sewell 1992).

This framework implies that a disaggregated, multidimensional con-
ceptualization of religiosity is needed, instead of focusing on differences
between Muslims and non-Muslims, as previous studies have done (e.g.,
Inglehart and Norris 2003; Lussier and Fish 2016; Norris 2009). This is
because rigid patriarchal religious structures obstruct support for gender
equality while other dimensions of religiosity stimulate emancipatory
advancements (see Cornwall et al. 1986; Hall 1997; Nyhagen 2017; Stark
and Glock 1968). Indeed, our results consistently showed that while reli-
gious service attendance, textualism, and devotion decreased support for
gender equality, the salience of religious beliefs in life choices had no
singularly negative impact. Among women we even found that religious
salience increases support for gender equality (cf. Scheepers, Gijsberts,
and Hello 2002). Moreover, even though religious salience does not con-
sistently fuel support for gender equality (as was expected), it was the
only moderator in our analyses that buffered the negative impact of expo-
sure to the institutional patriarchy in religious services. All in all, these
findings showed that most but not all dimensions of religiosity serve
patriarchal socialization, and that using religion as a guideline in daily life
is thus the main (or only) safeguard to the patriarchal influence of expo-
sure to religious institutions. Translating findings from in-depth qualita-
tive studies, religious salience thus seems to be the key to reinterpreting
religion along more emancipatory lines (e.g., Aune 2015; Jansen 2004;
Mir-Hosseini 2006).
At the core of our framework are genderedness and agency.
Consequently, we also proposed that relations between religiosity and
support for gender equality vary between different societal groups.
Indeed, religious service attendance was more strongly negatively related
to support for gender equality among women and more highly educated
individuals, as service attendance reduced women’s and more highly edu-
cated citizens’ initially greater support (see Lueptow, Garovich-Szabo,
and Lueptow 2001; Moghadam 2013; Zion-Waldoks 2015). So it seems
that among those who have the space to deviate from dominant patriarchal
interpretations, that is, those exposed less to patriarchal religious institu-
tions, especially women and more highly educated individuals use that
space to progressively reinterpret their religion (Al-Hibri 1982; Moghissi
2011; Prickett 2015; Read and Bartkowski 2000).
Also, the negative impact of (internal) religious beliefs, particularly
religious salience, was weaker among women and more highly educated
individuals. Again it seems that given the space for renegotiations, women
706  GENDER & SOCIETY/October 2018

and more highly educated individuals more often seek or accept emanci-
patory reinterpretations of their religion conducive to support for gender
equality, as suggested by previous qualitative studies (Avishai, Jafar, and
Rinaldo 2015; Kandiyoti 1988; Khurshid 2015; Prickett 2015). Women
and more highly educated citizens thus tend to be at the forefront of rene-
gotiating the religiosity–gender inequality coupling.
Based on this summary of results, two core contributions of this study
to the literature can be highlighted. First, we have shown that religiosity
is a medley. Previous quantitative studies mainly studied denomination
(e.g., Alexander and Welzel 2011; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Lussier and
Fish 2016), while we theorized a more fine-grained and gendered version
of religion’s relation to support for gender equality. We showed in greater
detail how (disaggregated) religiosity works and that it is not always a
hindrance to support for gender equality in the MENA. Especially, reli-
gious salience (among women) cushions the blow to support for gender
equality of other religiosity dimensions.
Second, previous public opinion studies focused on patriarchal sociali-
zation, implying that individuals in the MENA are passive beings (see
Said 1979; Spierings 2015). This study provided evidence that people
who are more inclined (women) and sociocognitively better equipped
(higher educated) can and do cushion patriarchal interpretations of their
religiosity. Future research would do well to not only consider MENA
citizens as unilaterally passively socialized but also as active agents in a
gendered context.
Other important avenues for future research can be derived from some
of the challenges we faced, particularly regarding data availability. First,
despite taking considerable steps forward, we were unable to tap into
every form of religious socialization. For instance, no data were available
on religious socialization in schools or parental homes. The socialization
processes in these domains may be similar to religious socialization that
our data did cover, but that remains an empirical question to tackle in
future research. Second, panel data provide more insights into the assumed
causality of religious socialization, but such data are currently unavaila-
ble. Consequently, we could not empirically show that women’s and more
highly educated citizens’ support for gender equality is reduced due to
service attendance, instead of women and more highly educated citizens
who attended services being more conservative from the start. However,
there are distinct reasons to assume some causality; MENA citizens are
embedded in religious structures by birth, and previous studies have pro-
posed religious socialization processes are ever-present, implying that
 Glas et al. / RE-UNDERSTANDING RELIGION  707

religious socialization predates people forming their opinions on gender

equality. Moreover, our models controlled for core variables linked to
religiosity and gender equality attitudes, such as education (Alexander
and Welzel 2011; Aune 2015).
Third, some indicators of religiosity leave room for improvement. For
instance, textualism could not be measured directly. We expect that other
aspects of textualism would provide similar results—an expectation sup-
ported by our results concerning particularism—but further empirical
study is welcome. Similarly, regarding salience we had no measures on
the importance of religion in specific daily choices (Scheepers, Gijsberts,
and Hello 2002). However and if anything, most likely this has led to an
underestimation of salience’s relation to support for gender equality.
Finally, we recommend that future researchers look into different
domains of support for gender equality. Although our theory predicts
roughly similar patterns, only empirical study can verify this. The vast
majority of large-scale quantitative studies pertain to public sphere atti-
tudes; studying support for equality in the private sphere or sexual eman-
cipation would greatly add to our knowledge (e.g., Inglehart and Norris
2003; Lussier and Fish 2016; Price 2016). Current data do not permit this,
however. For instance, the WVS includes an item on the justifiability of
divorce, but it is hard to discern whether men and women filling out the
questionnaire had talaq or khul’ in mind—men’s unilateral right to
divorce or divorce that women can initiate (Shehada 2016).
Still, to our knowledge, this study has included more precise and
nuanced measurements of religiosity’s impact on gender equality attitudes
than any other MENA study. Studying the multidimensional facets of
religiosity, as well as their interrelated and particularly agency-moderated
influences, has provided important and more nuanced insights into the
gendered impact religiosity has on support for gender equality in the
MENA, which is pivotal for women in the MENA as well as for public
debates around the world.

Notes

1. The Quran states, “And no person can ever die except by Allah’s leave and
at an appointed time” (3:145, Khan trans.), and Bukhari’s Hadith (4.56.669)
reports Allah’s response to a man who has taken his own life, “My Slave hurried
to bring death upon himself so I have forbidden him (to enter) Paradise.”
2. In our sample, women attended services less than men; still, about one-third
frequents religious services weekly or more.
708  GENDER & SOCIETY/October 2018

3. http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
4. In the Bahrain 2014 survey, employment and education loaded on two fac-
tors. The pooled analysis showed high factor loadings (0.78 [politics], 0.63 [edu-
cation], 0.72 [employment]) on one dimension, although Cronbach’s alpha was
moderate (0.50), probably because of the number of items.
5. F tests showed that support’s variation over time is marginal compared to
between countries, justifying our data structure. Also, the much debated minimal
number of higher-level units is not very relevant, as we add no higher-level predictors.
6. The interaction terms largely (just) lose their statistical significance in the
men-only model, but they remain similar in the women-only and Muslim-only
subsamples.
7. Eleven surveys include frequency of private prayer. We standardized scores
per survey. Thirteen surveys included particularism as follows: “On this list are
various groups of people. Which would you not like to have as neighbors?” The
answer “from a different religion” is scored 1, others 0. Details can be obtained
from the authors.

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Saskia Glas is a PhD candidate in sociology at Radboud Social and

Cultural Research, Radboud University (the Netherlands). The project,
712  GENDER & SOCIETY/October 2018

funded by the NWO, focuses on religion, support for gender equality, and
Muslim feminism in Arab countries. Her research interests include socio-
political attitudes, political structures, and gender equality.

Niels Spierings is assistant professor in sociology at Radboud Social and

Cultural Research, Radboud University. His expertise includes women’s
socioeconomic position, religion, migration, political behavior, and socio-
political attitudes. Two of his current projects are funded by NWO and
focus on Islamic religiosity and politcosocial attitudes in Arab countries.

Peer Scheepers is professor of comparative methodology at Radboud

Social and Cultural Research, Radboud University. He focuses on cross-
national research on social cohesion (e.g., religiosity), on which he has
published widely (H-index=48). He is member of the Royal Dutch Academy
of Arts and Sciences and of Academia Europeae.