Deep Ecology K - DDI 2021

K - Deep Ecology- 2021 DDI
1NC Shell
Water to be “purified” is built upon the false ontological grounding that the
natural “pure” state of water is separate from humans, falling back into the
technocratic notion that there is a fundamental split between society and
nature which reifies modern anthropocentricism
Linton and Krueger 20 (Jamie Linton, Professor working at the Geolab in the Université de
Limoges, Tobias Krueger, Professor of Geography at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, “The
Ontological Fallacy of the Water Framework Directive: Implications and Alternatives,” Water
Alternatives 13(3), pgs. 513-515)//JRD
We argue that the European Union Water Framework Directive (WFD) is based on an ontological fallacy and that
it needs to be rethought for the end of the third planning cycle in 2027. By attributing the failure to achieve WFD implementation
goals to an ontological fallacy, we suggest that there is a basic problem in the theoretical underpinnings of the directive .
The
problem, in effect, is in the conceptual separation of people from nature . The WFD articulates a
set of propositions that presume a radical ontological distinction between nature and human
beings or human society; humans are placed in a realm separate from nature and then a set of
rules is constructed which is based on this separation. As This critique was already well advanced when the
Water Framework Directive was being developed and adopted into law. Motivated in part by crises erupting in (or producing)
problems that were evidently neither purely 'natural' nor entirely 'social', these critiques came from different theoretical and
ideological positions; though they highlighted different issues and called for different (political) responses, they can be said to have
converged on the same basic ontological problem of nature/society dualism that is characteristic of modern Western thought and
practice (Castree, 2005). Reflecting our reading of this broad critique, this paper employs several theoretical approaches and
languages in order to make the argument that nature/society dualism operates in various ways within the WFD. Nature/society
dualism has become such an entrenched aspect of modern Western thought that it is
sometimes difficult to recognise. One of its better-known critics, philosopher and science studies scholar Bruno
Latour, helps clarify this; he defines what he describes as "the modern Constitution", arguing that being
modern means, by definition, subscribing to the idea that there is a basic ontological separation
between nature and human society (Latour, 1993).1 According to Latour, "Nature and Society" (which he
capitalises in order to emphasise their separation), "must remain absolutely distinct" (ibid: 32). This distinction
works in an epistemological sense, allowing for the production of objective 'scientific'
knowledge, that is to say knowledge that appears to be free from human values. As this
epistemological stance became hegemonic , however, "it eventually turned from a dominant
epistemology to a dominant ontology, that is a strong belief that the world was actually
ontologically split into things natural and things social " (Swyngedouw, 2004: 14). This ontological
position has provided the basis for much action; it has allowed for uninhibited human involvement in the world
because, as per the modern Constitution, messing with a supposedly external Nature could hardly affect us
in harmful ways (Latour, 1993). With the appearance of environmental crise s, however, we now find
ourselves surrounded by proof of the fallacy of this very notion of separation ; the proof presents itself
in the form of a range of problems (such as climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion) which are
neither social nor natural, but are always both . For a time, Latour argues, these products of human hyper-
intervention, which he terms socionatural "hybrids", posed little problem "because they did not exist publicly and because their
monstrous consequences remained untraceable" (Latour, 1993: 42); however, as with
problems such as water
pollution, aquifer depletion, eutrophication of surface water bodies, and the hydrological effects of
human-induced global warming, their presence can no longer be ignored . The problem is that we
tend to revert to the modern ontological stance when attempting to fix these problems,
shoring up the purity, integrity and sustainability of Nature , a process Latour describes as
"purification" (ibid: 31); we thus drive ourselves ever more deeply into the modern predicament of
creating problems whose ontological messiness – or hybridity – makes them impossible to recognise
and deal with by the usual methods. The WFD, we argue, amounts to just such an exercise; it
'purifies' water, defining its natural condition as being entirely free of human involvement .
Ironically, by so doing, the WFD’s effectiveness in terms of reducing/mitigating problems like water
pollution, aquifer depletion and eutrophication is greatly limited; this is attested to by the failures noted in the following
subsection. The basic ontological argument that we are making with respect to the WFD has already been pointed out directly or
indirectly by researchers, especially in France. In 2007, for example, Bouleau (2007: 86), building on Aspe’s (1995) critique of the
social construction of environmental norms, argued that the WFD is built on "rendering humans guilty with respect to nature".2
Steyaert and Ollivier (2007) havewith all constructions that are founded on this ontological distinction, the WFD inevitably manifests
certain difficulties. In describing the conceptual separation of people from nature as an ontological fallacy, we draw from a broad
critique emanating from diverse disciplines and approaches that over the past three decades have called attention to the injustices,
crises and absurdities produced by cleaving to this dualism (see, for example, Smith, 1984; Haraway, 2004 [1985], 1992; Deleuze and
Guattari, 1987; Latour, 1993; Willems-Braun and Castree, 1998; Ingold, 2000; Castree and Braun, 2001; Braun, 2004; Castree, 2005).
shown that the concept of "good ecological status" – perhaps the key operational concept of the directive – is defined
through an approach known as 'compositionalism'; this approach defines the integrity of biotic
communities in terms of specific compositions of biota in a way that considers Homo sapiens to
be fundamentally separate from nature (see Callicott et al., 1999).3 Further, as discussed in detail below, numerous
researchers have critiqued the "reference conditions" defined by the directive as being built on an idea of
nature that explicitly excludes people. Despite these arguments, and despite the failure of member states to achieve
the directive’s basic objective of good ecological status for European water bodies, the WFD itself has been subject to relatively little
theoretical criticism. Undertaking a meta-analysis of journal articles published in Englishlanguage academic journals, Boeuf and
Fritsch (2016: 14) found "a conspicuous lack of theory in WFD scholarship. Authors tend to describe implementation patterns and, at
times, to apply normative frameworks, but only a minority of studies refer to theory (…)". We note, however, that there is more
critical and theoretical analysis of the WFD
The impact is the death of nature-- guarantees ecological and social violence on
a massive scale through the categorical oppression of the non-human “object.”
Ahkin 10 [Mélanie, Monash University, “Human Centrism, Animist Materialism, and the
Critique of Rationalism in Val. Plumwood’s Critical Ecological Feminism,” Emergent Australasian
Philosophers, 2010, Issue 3, http://www.eap.philosophy-
australia.com/issue_3/EAP3_AHKIN_Human_Centrism.pdf]
These five features provide the basis for hegemonic

centrism insofar as they promote certain conceptual
and perceptual distortions of reality which universalise and naturalise the standpoint of the
superior relata as primary or centre, and deny and subordinate the standpoints of
inferiorised others as secondary or derivative. Using standpoint theory analysis, Plumwood’s reconceptualisation of
human chauvinist frameworks locates and dissects these logical characteristics of dualism, and the conceptual and perceptual distortions of
reality common to centric structures, as follows. Radical
exclusion is found in the rationalist emphasis on
differences between humans and non-human nature, its valourisation of a human rationality
conceived as exclusionary of nature, and its minimisation of similarities between the two
realms. Homogenisation and stereotyping occur especially in the rationalist denial of
consciousness to nature, and its denial of the diversity of mental characteristics found within
its many different constituents, facilitating a perception of nature as homogeneous and of i ts
members as interchangeable and replaceable resources. This definition of nature in terms of its lack of
human rationality and consciousness means that its identity
remains relative to that of the dominant human
group, and its difference is marked as deficiency, permitting its inferiorisation . Backgrounding and
denial may be observed in the conception of nature as extraneous and inessential background to the foreground of human culture, in the
human denial of dependency on the natural environment, and denial of the ethical and political constraints which the unrecognised ends
and needs of non-human nature might otherwise place on human behaviour. Thesefeatures together create an
ethical discontinuity between humans and non-human nature which denies nature’s value
and agency, and thereby promote its instrumentalisation and exploitation for the benefit of
humans.11 This dualistic logic helps to universalise the human centric standpoint, making
invisible and seemingly inevitable the conceptual and perceptual distortions of reality and
oppression of non-human nature it enjoins. The alternative standpoints and perspectives of
members of the inferiorised class of nature are denied legitimacy and subordinated to that
of the class of humans, ultimately becoming invisible once this master standpoint becomes
part of the very structure of thought.12 Such an anthropocentric framework creates a variety
of serious injustices and prudential risks, making it highly ecologically irrational.13 The hierarchical value prescriptions
and epistemic distortions responsible for its biased, reductive conceptualisation of nature strips the non-
human natural realm of non- instrumental value, and impedes the fair and impartial
treatment of its members. Similarly, anthropocentrism creates distributive injustices by
restricting ethical concern to humans, admitting partisan distributive relationships with non-human nature in the forms
of commodification and instrumentalisation. The prudential risks and blindspots created by anthropocentrism are problematic for nature
and humans alike and are of especial concern within our current context of radical human dependence on an irreplaceable and
increasingly degraded natural environment. These prudential risks are in large part consequences of the centric structure's promotion of
illusory human disembeddedness, self-enclosure and insensitivity to the significance and survival needs of non-human nature: Within
the context of human-nature relationships, such a logic must inevitably lead to failure, either
through the catastrophic extinction of our natural environment and the consequent collapse
of our species, or more hopefully by the abandonment and transformation of the human centric
framework.15 Whilst acknowledging the importance of prudential concerns for the motivation of practical change, Plumwood
emphasises the weightier task of acknowledging injustices to non-humans in order to bring about adequate dispositional change. The
model of enlightened self-interest implicit in prudentially motivated action is inadequate to
this task insofar as it remains within the framework of human centrism. Although it acknowledges the
possibility of relational interests, it rests on a fundamental equivocation between instrumental and
relational forms of concern for others. Indeed it motivates action either by appeal to humans'
ultimate self-interest, thus failing to truly acknowledge injustices caused to non-human
others, remaining caught within the prudentially risky framework of anthropocentrism, or else
it accepts that others' interests count as reasons for action- enabling recognition of injustices- but it does so in a manner which treats the
intersection of others' needs with more fully-considered human interests as contingent and transient. Given this analysis, it is clear
that environmental concern must be based on a deeper recognition of injustice , in addition to that
of prudence, if it is to overcome illusions of human disembeddedness and self-enclosure and
have a genuine and lasting effect.
The alternative embraces Interbeing, a method of self-actualization that
restores humans’ biological connection to Earth and rejects consumerist,
individualistic definitions of the self
Anderson and Guyas, 12 (Tom Anderson, PhD, Emeritus Professor of Art Education at
Florida State University, “Earth Education, Interbeing, and Deep Ecology,” Studies in Art
Education, 2012) http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00393541.2012.11518865 //cb
Deep Ecology, Interbeing, and Self Realization If material goods do not guarantee happiness beyond very a
moderate level (Leonard, 2010; Louv, 2008), and overconsumption is endangering the biosphere, we
should define a new non-consumptive paradigm of well-being. Such a paradigm would be non-
acquisitive/non-consumerist and non-hierarchical in relation to our place on Earth. It
would focus on our relationships, our sense of self, of place, and of community (Anderson &
Milbrandt, 2005). It would engender a deep understanding of what it means to belong :
individually, communally, and environmentally (hooks, 2009). Such a paradigm would see all life as sacred
and interrelated, not simply as resources to be exploited (Henning, 2002). It would be Earth-based and
relational, as opposed to detached, objective, and metaphysical (Hanh, 2008; Kahn, 2010; Jackson, 1994; Weil, 2004). It would
recognize that we belong to the earth, rather than it belonging to us (Halifax, 1990). It would
recognize self-actualization and searching for connectedness as valid research, and ideally would
result in conscious love and care for the planet (Milton, 2002; Sardello, 2001). To achieve this, the
proposed paradigm adheres to the principles of deep ecology (Foundation for Deep Ecology, 2010)
first articulated by Arne Naess (2008), consisting of eight foundational principles: 1. All living things have intrinsic
value. 2. The richness and diversity of life has intrinsic value. 3. Except to satisfy vital needs, human beings do not have the right
to reduce this diversity and richness. 4. It would be better for humans if there were fewer of them, and much better for other living
creatures. 5. Today, the extent of human interference in the various ecosystems is not
sustainable, and the lack of sustainability is rising. 6. Decisive improvement requires considerable changes: social, economic,
technological, and ideological. 7. An ideological change would essentially entail seeking a better quality of
life rather than a raised standard of living. 8. Those who accept the aforementioned points are responsible for
trying to contribute directly or indirectly to the necessary changes.1 (p. 28) The deep ecology model, attributed to Naess in 1973
(Drengson, n.d.), came to be in a larger context. Environmentalism emerged as an important movement in the 1960s, stimulated by
such books as Rachel Carson’s (1962/2002) Silent Spring and E. F. Schumaker’s (1972) Limits to Growth. In this context, deep ecology
was designed to address environmental concerns at a deep level, looking for fundamental causes through deep questioning.
Naess and others postulated that a root cause of the environmental crisis was the dominant
industrial/consumerist model of society and argued that the whole social/economic system needed to be changed to
recover ecological balance (Bookchin, 2005; Kahn, 2010; orr, 1994, 2004, 2009; Shiva, 2005). Many writers (de Silva, 1990; Fromm,
1976; Leonard, 2010; orr, 2009; Speth, 2008) demonstrated through argument and example that Western societies
have assumed “to have,” rather than “to be,” as the operational model. We argue that this
“having” paradigm must shift to a “being” paradigm if we are to restore balance to the Earth. In the
being model, the value of life is central; reciprocity (between living systems and beings)
is key; a commitment to future generations of all species, thus, is inherent; and ethics trumps technology (deSilva, 1990; Hanh,
2008; Weil, 2004). The Earth Education model, in adhering to the “being” model and the principles of deep
ecology, seeks to “re-enchant nature and restore a balanced relationship with it ” (Barry,
1999, p. 17). We promote the idea of human beings as a part of the larger web of life , that no
one is above or beyond the natural world, and that we all (microbes, algae, giraffes, pelicans, people) have an intrinsic
right to our place in the system. This construct can be framed and named interbeing (Hanh, 2008).
Interbeing suggests we are all one (de Silva, 1990; Henning 2002; Hanh, 2008), and collectively, we are
the life force of the planet. Framed this way, interbeing requires a collective shift of
consciousness in which the self is fully realized, not through consuming, but through
transpersonal relationships (naess, 2008). We are of nature, having evolved on Earth, and it is in our nature to be in
relationship to the ecosystems that shape us. our brains, eyes, and lungs; our abilities to run, eat, and think; as well as our
emotions have co-evolved with the “physical regularities and principles of the physical world” (Levitin, 2008, p. 146). This
realization of our biological connection to the Earth is central to the principles that follow for teaching
and learning, but here it is most important to focus on the idea that rather than the modernist conception of
self as an isolated individual ego, the ecological self is only fulfilled and self-realized in
relationship to other beings and aspects of the web of life. Our adherence to deep ecology and interbeing as utopian
principles should not be viewed as a departure from critical thinking. We believe a self-critical attitude and constant questioning are
central to our aspirations for better living conditions and social and ecological equity, and, in that context, it is important that we
note some influential ecopedagogy sources that give us critical direction: critical ecopedagogy (Kahn, 2010), ecological literacy
(Stone, Barlow & Capra, 2005), social ecology (Bookchin, 2005), ecological education (orr, 2009, 2004, 1994), place-based education
(Gruenewald & Smith, 2007; Graham, 2007), humane education (IHE, 2011; Weil, 2004), and eco-justice and peace education
(Ecojustice Education, 2011; Wenden, 2004).
Links
Generic
The aff’s environmental rhetoric creates unconscious associations that make
detachment from market-driven decision-making impossible
Muradian and Gómez-Baggethum, 21 (Roldan Muradian, PhD, Adjunct Professor at
Universidade Federal Fluminense and Erik Gómez-Baggethum, PhD in Ecology and
Environmental Sciences, Corresponding author at the Department of International Environment
and Development Studies, “Beyond ecosystem services and nature’s contributions: Is it time to
leave utilitarian environmentalism behind?” Ecological Economics 185, 2021)
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800921000963 //cb
ES=ecosystem services
NCP=Nature’s Contributions to People
2. The power of metaphors We agree with Lakoff and Johnson’ (2003) proposition that most conceptual systems are
“metaphorical in nature”. We interpret both the ES framework and the NCP approach as essentially a set of metaphors.
Why are these metaphors so important for understanding human-nature relations? We posit that t he way we name the
environment determines how we perceive it and interact with it. Metaphors reflect and set our
cognitive frames. Namely, they conform mental representations that determine and at the same
time reflect the way we perceive and understand the world . In cognitive science, frames refer to mental
structures that condition the way we think, perceive, organize and classify experiences, relate to, and make sense of them
(Cornelissen and Werner, 2014). Such frames also shape how we attribute values (importance and meaning) to
the world. Metaphors activate and reflect particular cognitive frames and block out others (Lakoff,
2010). Typically, metaphors are shared by a community that also share a worldview. A shift of metaphor is not a mere
language twist. It implies a shift in the way we see, understand, give sense, represent and
communicate the world. Namely, shifting metaphors implies a cognitive reframing (MacGill, 2018).
Metaphors play an important role in at least three domains (Höijer, 2011; Rateau et al., 2012): (i) Anchoring
experience into analytical categories , (ii) Establishing causal relationships, and (iii) Conveying
symbolic meaning. First, metaphors define the cognitive processes that determine what we
perceive and how. This includes how things are classified and the organization of experience into pre-established categories.
The classification of NCP or ES, for instance, are not mere abstract representations. They also determine what we see (and how we
see it), and what we do not see, as well as what we look for, and we do not look for through a process of matching sensorial
experience with abstract categories. Advocates of the ES approach see them in places where other people (using different frames)
see other socio-ecological phenomena. In summary, experience
is strongly mediated by our discursive framing ,
as well as by the analytical categories and classification systems we adopt .
Second, social conventions (expressed in metaphors) shape mental representations inferring

cause-effect relations. For instance, ES or NCP are assumed to be channels establishing relations
between the condition of the natural environment and human well-being . Causal relationships reflect
cognitive biases. Assumptions of causal relationships determine , among other things, how problems are
perceived (including their origin), and what types of solutions are envisioned. For instance, in the
interpretation of the ES framework, the degradation and loss of ecosystems is the result of either
economic externalities (market failures stemming from the incapacity of agents to value and incorporate ES into decisions) or
lack of information about the value of those services to society as a whole. From this perspective, solutions then tend to be
associated with economic and non-economic valuation, able to support decision making processes by means of estimating and
showing the economic and social value of ES.
Third, symbols establish emotional and often unconscious associations. Such associations are historical constructs
and part of the social imaginary. That is, the set of common understandings, normative notions and expectations that make social
life possible (Taylor, 2004). Symbolic
meaning can be a powerful determinant of attitudes and
behavior. The ES framework and related policy instruments (such as payments for ES), for instance, have often been
associated with market relations, privatization, neoliberal environmentalism and the expansion
of capitalism (Büscher, 2012). Even when such associations might not necessarily have a solid basis, the symbolic meaning of
the ES framework can explain part of the opposition to it among, for instance, deep ecologists, critical theorists and environmental
activists. The choice and use of metaphors is inevitable in social sciences, since any analytical development requires the adoption of
a particular cognitive framing. The issue is then that the
epistemic community that adopt such metaphors
should be aware of the implications , not only from a conceptual point of view, but also in terms of the moral
and political stands embodied in such choices.
An anthropocentric worldview abdicates us of our moral responsibility to

prevent ecocide and species extinction
Kopnina, 16 (Helen, PhD, researcher and lecturer at The Hague University of Applied Science,
“Nobody Likes Dichotomies (But Sometimes You Need Them),” Anthropological Forum, 2016)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00664677.2016.1243515 //cb
Anthropocentric Bias
An anthropocentric bias extends to poaching and to dislocation, since critics of conservation do not discuss
non-human displacements or indeed colonisation in a broader sense. The defining characteristic of ‘colonisation ’ in
general, along with the increase of social inequalities , is the ever-greater instrumentalism in human
engagements with non- human inhabitants (Strang 2016). This entails the self-proclaimed right to
undermine another species’ very existence and the evolutionary unfolding in the noble quest for social justice
(Kopnina 2012a, 2012b, 2014a; Cafaro and Primack 2014), in effect condon- ing ‘nonhuman genocide’ (Crist 2012,
140). Accusations that conservationists are ‘out of control ’ to save the near-extinct species (Büscher 2015)
testifies to a robust anthropocentric bias , and a refusal to acknowledge the legal
repercussions of ecocide (Higgins 2010).
The perpetuation of social inequality and the increasing extinctions of non-human species
fundamentally alter the ethics of anthropological practice. These ethics are subject to value judgements – of what or
who is accorded rights, and in what proportion. Caplan (2003) has argued that extreme cultural relativity (in which
it is possible, for example, to ignore major abuses of human rights) is an abdication of moral responsibility . By the
same token, presenting even the concern over loss of biodiversity as a social construction of
sentimental elites, or by profit-seeking neo-colonial regimes, abdicates moral responsibility to non-humans.
The proponents of social justice keep perpetuating the dichotomies between the indigenous communities and the Western elites
(e.g. Chapin 2004), or between poor rural peasants and neoliberal conservationists (e.g. Holmes 2013). However, historically,
protected areas were rarely created to benefit particular groups of people (such as tourists), because
most national parks
have been established for the people, everywhere in the world, and not just in post-colonial nations (e.g.
Doak et al. 2015). In fact, national parks can be seen as protecting cultural identity against severe
changes to the local environment, such as logging. As Brosius (1999, 39) has noted in the case of Penan in Malaysia,
‘logging not only undermines the basis of Penan subsistence but, by transforming sites with biographical, social, and historical
significance, also destroys those things that are iconic of their existence as a society’. Conservation does not threaten
people’s liberty, as Fletcher (2009) would have it – rather it enables one to live in a world of natural
richness . In the words of Wakild (2015, 44):
The aff upholds shallow ecology – it perpetuates the dismissal of ecocentric

values by political systems
Kopnina 12 – lecturer, researcher at The Hague University of Applied Science Helen Kopnina,
The Hague University of Applied Science, International Business Management Studies ,
University of Applied Science , The Hague , The Netherlands, “The Lorax complex: deep ecology,
ecocentrism and exclusion,” Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences, (2012),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1943815X.2012.742914?
scroll=top&needAccess=true
In this article, we have discussed the differences between anthropocentric and ecocentric perspectives. Anthropocentrism
only grants intrinsic value and , in prolonga- tion, rights and interests to human beings . Powerful
international organizations such as the United Nations (2012) and the World Bank represent
non-human species as ecosystem services or natural resources . Conceiving biodiversity in these utilitarian
terms does not guarantee protection of those species that are not directly useful to humanity. It was argued that mass extinction
could conceivably come to pass without jeopardizing the survival of the human species. People might be materially sustained by a
technological biora made to yield services and products required for human life.
In contrast to this anthropocentric paradigm, ecocentrism’s proponents assert the intrinsic value of
each individual living organism, including humans, plant and animal species and ecosystems .
Different dimensions of biospheric altruism include emotional (the feeling of sadness when something
valued gets destroyed); cognitive (the judgment that it is wrong to destroy this valued object); and philosophical
(intrinsic value of nature) elements.
An analysis of environmental problems suggests that the effect of private actions is limited unless it is combined with organizing for
public change through collective political action. It was proposed that the failure of the current political system to
address biodiversity loss stems from the fact that ecocentric values are underrepresented in
the most powerful strata of society. While private expressions of biophilia are acceptable, the more pronounced
publicly expressed deep ecology position is discouraged as radical.
Human consciousness is another intricacy of nature – it should not be turned a

weapon to rationalize a hierarchy of species
Kober, 13 (Gal, Associate Professor of Philosophy, primarily applied ethics and bioethics, at
Bridgewater State University, “For They Do Not Agree in Nature: Spinoza and Deep Ecology,”
Indiana University Press, (2013)), https://www-jstor-
org.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/stable/10.2979/ethicsenviro.18.1.43#metadata_info_tab_con
tents
Spinoza claims that animals can feel, very differently from Descartes’s view on the matter. 28 They are different from humans, but it
is more of a quantitative difference than it is one of quality; their feelings are also different from us, but are still legible to us insofar
as we are similar. Given Spinoza’s account of the unity of body and mind, there is no ground for assuming a sharp divide between
the feelings of humans and those of other creatures, as they are still both subject to the same laws of nature, created necessarily of
the same initial cause, and are both modes of the same attributes and substance. “All this means that the possession of
reason does not separate human beings out from the rest of nature. Rather, it makes us
aware of our integration with it ” (Lloyd 1994, 155). Still, this integration with nature does not entail
a moral obligation of any kind to the rest of nature . Lloyd (1980) tries to account for this seeming tension by
introducing the idea of a moral community of humans, within which such obligations could exist, but which excludes non-humans.
Animals may feel , but as their sensations are different, they cannot be seen as fully agreeing with our
nature, and thus they are not part of the human moral community inside which humans are
acting in a way that is useful to one another in order to secure their own benefits. In relation to
animals and the rest of nature, humans can attain their benefits without needing to take others’ considerations into account. While
some rights may be derived from each creature’s striving to exist and power to act, moral rights are a separate level of rights,
species-relative, ones that apply within a moral community of creatures who collaborate with each other in the pursuit of reason in
a way which is particular and common only to humans.29 Spinoza’s acknowledgement of the fact that animals could feel, is then by
no means a basis for concern for the well-being of animals or of nature.
The aff’s attempts at conservation is merely shallow ecology and ignores the
intrinsic values of nature
Kopnina 15 (Helen, The Hague University of Applied Science, International Business
Management Studies , University of Applied Science , The Hague , The Netherlands, “Revisiting
the Lorax complex: Deep ecology and biophilia in cross-cultural perspective ,” Environmental
Sociology (2015)), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23251042.2015.1048765?
journalCode=rens20
HEP [Human Exemptionalism Paradigm] can be equated with ‘strong anthropocentrism’ (Norton 1984; Hargrove 1992) in which
exploitation of nature for the benefit of humans is always morally justified . In HEP, protection
of environment is contingent on human needs – the position similar to the ‘shallow ecology’
perspective (Naess 1973). Crist (2012, 151) has noted that the genocide of nonhumans is something about
which the majority of academics , aside from a committed margin , refuse to talk about . Millions of cattle or
chickens are slaughtered every day, millions of mice are used for scientific experiments, thousands of acres of forest are cleared for
the ever-expanding agricultural development and this is not questioned as being unjust. Speciesism, or discrimination
about entire species, is willfully avoided (e.g. Pluhar 1995; Baxter 2005; Desmond 2013 ). Some of the
opposition to speceism is tacit, primarily expressed through reaffirmation of market
mechanisms propitiated by neoliberal commodification of nature (Foster 2002). This
commodification promotes disregard for the intrinsic value of habitats through accelerating
resource degradation if revenues are used to buy extractive equipment (Langholz 2003). Although the dominant paradigm
governing conservation policy in neoliberal societies is based on a limited anthropocentric version of utilitarianism, alternative
ethical positions with implications for conservation and animal protection are in evidence. These reject the utilitarian view of the
environment drawing inspiration from traditional cultures and a broader concept of ‘compassionate conservation’ (Munro 2001;
Ramp and Bekoff 2015), and include spiritual ecology (Sponsel 2014) and deep ecology perspectives (Naess 1973). While there
is still some debate whether intrinsic value should be attributed to individuals or to entire
species or to entire ecosystems and biosphere (e.g. Singer 1975; Taylor 1991; Ferry 1995), or even to ‘natural
objects’ (Stone 1974), the common concern is the moral consideration beyond human boundaries
(Crist and Kopnina 2014). This consideration is rooted in biophilia, or love for life.
Shallow environmental conservation efforts are simply becoming corporate
interests – they ignore local communities and true environmental altruism
journalCode=rens20
This article has outlined the critique that neoliberal conservation may be too proximate to political and
corporate power holders . This criticism of Western environmentalism as elitist (Igoe and Brockington 2007; West
and Brockington 2012; Fletcher 2014) tends to conflate all environmentalism pitching ‘environmentalists’
against local communities. Yet, these critics tend to ignore the evidence of traditional environmental
values, as well as the power of industrial, corporate, and neoliberal hegemonies that
increasingly influences traditional practices and value s. This reevaluation brings in the mix of cross-cultural studies and
theoretical environmental justice to more directly address what I see as a weakness in conservation critics’ analysis. This article has demonstrated that
conservation has many sources, inspirations, and participants. There is evidence that grassroots environmentalism, as well as individual activism is a
global phenomenon that, although not necessarily shared by all individuals, transcends social class, national and racial boundaries. The Lorax
complex is manifested through indigenous activism as well as individual altruism. There is
also evidence that compassion originating from identification with nature is common in all
cultures, testifying to the human need and propensity to affiliate with other living organisms
(e.g. Wilson 1984; Kellert and Wilson 1995).In the case of Dongria Kondh tribe (‘They Are the Lorax, They Speak for the Trees’), the world could be a
better place if we listened to what they have to say (Acharya 2010). Environmentalists can draw inspiration from the
commitment of dedicated individuals as well as on traditional cultures’ ideological reserves in
order to ethically ground their actions .
It is not a debate between humans and other species – it’s a reconciliation of

the intrinsic values of nature
journalCode=rens20
This hope is encompassed in realization that the place of humans is neither exceptional nor
superior in this system, recognizing intrinsic value of nonhuman species as well as
interdependency of all species (e.g. Devall and Sessions 1985; Callicott 1989; Jamieson 1998;
Regan 2003). As Siddharth Chakravarty, an Indian Captain of the Sea Shepherd Conservation
Society’s ship, has remarked: ‘While whales in the Southern Ocean or pilot whales in the Faroe
Islands are far removed from the realm of most Indians, it is important to preserve the
biodiversity of the planet. If the oceans die, we die.’
Despite differences in opinion, most shallow and deep ecology proponents may agree that
humans are dependent on the ecosystem, and thus human interests are congruent with the
health of the ecosystem . The Lorax also speaks for ‘Barbaloots’ – creatures ambiguously drawn
by Dr Seuss to resemble both bears and humans.
I am the Lorax! I speak for the trees, Which you seem to be chopping as fast as you please; But I
also speak for the brown Barbaloots, Who frolicked and played in their Barbaloot suits, Happily
eating Truffula fruits. Now, since you’ve chopped the trees to the ground There’s not enough
Truffula fruit to go ‘round! And my poor Barbaloots are all feeling the crummies Because they
have gas, and no food, in their tummies.
The Lorax does not just worry about the trees, but also about food for the Barbaloots that the
Traffula fruits provide (shallow ecology, weak anthropocentrism). Still, the Lorax’s interference,
whatever the motivation is, seeks to protect nature from the Once-ler, with his pursuit of the
short-term economic gains. And here, i n the common humanism and compassio n, in Western
and non-Western, and in industrial and rural contexts, the opportunity for reconciliation of
social and biospheric interests lies . The affinity we humans have for the rest of nature, as well
as dependency on our environment, the process of remembering that attraction, and the urge
to express it through creation of restorative environments, can help confer resilience across
both social and ecological scales (Tidball 2012).
Recognizing that the defenders of nature are not bound by country, culture or social class offers
an opportunity for reconciliation between human and ecological interests. While we may never
know what the ‘driving force’ of environmental activism is, it is clear that it is not nationally or
culturally bound. It is not just a false dichotomy between protecting humans and protecting
nature, or between Western neoliberalist ideology and traditional practices that needs to be
examined. It is the cross-cultural environmentalism itself that offers a broader ethical support
base for conservation . Without advocating for particular conservation philosophies,
‘reconciliation’ opportunity between advocates of social and ecological justice can be found in
these shared values.
Deep ecology is the goal – shallow ecology ignores key biocentric values and
instead continues human-centered interests
Omorovie 20 (Mark, Associate professor, Delta State University, Abraka, Nigeria, “Deep
Ecology Philosophy and Biodiversity Conservation in Nigeria’s Niger Delta,” European Journal of
Sustainable Development, (2020)). http://ecsdev.org/ojs/index.php/ejsd/article/view/1011
An important aspect of Deep Ecology is what is called the platform. The eight points in the
platform as enumerated by Naess ((2013) are: (1 ) all beings have intrinsic value , (2) diversity
and variety are values , (3) humans can make use of nature only for essential needs , (4)
there is need to decrease human population to conserve other beings , (5) vital life processes
are being destroyed by humans , (6) socio-economic policies should be made to reverse
environmental degradation, (7) standard of life is not more important than quality of
life, and (8) there is a moral obligation for those who accept the above principles to
act for ecological conservatio n. Naess (2013) remarks that: ‘...in the deep ecology movement
we are biocentric or ecocentric. For us it is the ecosphere, the whole planet, Gaia, that is the
basic unit, and every living being has an intrinsic value’ (p. 34). Taking statements directly from
Naess, Cooper (2001) writes that:Deep ecology is deepbecause it explores the ‘fundamental
presuppositions’ of our values and experience of the world. It is deep ecology, not because
it is the empirical science of ecosystems, but because the attitudes it endorses, though
inspired by several sources, receive ‘rational justification’ from the ecologists’
demonstration of ‘the intimate dependency of humanity upon decent behaviour towards the
natural environment’. p. 213.
Naess (1973) says shallow ecology is human-centered and is simply concerned with
pollution , resource depletion and the health and wellbeing of people in advanced
countries. At the heart of deep ecology is the call for biocentric egalitarianism, self-
realization, and intrinsic value of biodiversity among many other values . DeepEcology affirms
that all beings have intrinsic value and non-human beings do not simply exist for human usage.
Naess affirms that the self includes all and all beings have equal value. Cooper (2001) has
noted that Naess took his notion of self from Spinoza’s concept of one substance (God or
nature) and the Hindu concept of Atman(self). Humans are one with nature and should
experience nature as such, Naess opines. In the words of Taylor & Zimmerman (2008); ‘In the
last analysis, for Naess, it is personal experiences of a profound connection with nature and
related perceptions of nature’s inherent worth or sacredness, which gives rise to deep ecological
commitments’ (p. 458). He notes that humans realize themselves by identifying with nature
and working forthe good of the whole of nature. Humans according to Naess (2013) have
to make sacrifice to improve their quality of life even if it implies decreasing human
populations, ending affluent and consumerist lifestyles.
Water as a Resource
The 1AC’s view of nature as “resources” to be managed relies on analysis
grounded in supposedly neutral Anthropocentric modes of scientific and
technological mastery. That terminally dooms their project and reifies the
dualistic human to non-human split
Sessions 87 (George Sessions, chairman of the philosophy department at Sierra College in
Rocklin, “The Deep Ecology Movement: A Review,” Environmental Review, Summer 1987, Vol.
11, No. 2 (Summer, 1987), pp. 105-125)//JRD
It is generally acknowledged that Rachel Carson's Silent Spring ushered in what can appropriately be called the Age
of Ecology. Her attack on pesticides coincided with increasing public awareness of the extent of pollution and the overall
environmental destruction that had taken place since the Second World War. Carson's indictment of pesticide use
confirmed growing doubts concerning the technological ability of humans to manage the
"resources" of the planet successfully. She also challenged anthropocentrism: "The 'control of nature' is a
phrase conceived in arrogance, born of the Neanderthal age of biology and philosophy, when it
was supposed that nature exists for the convenience of man."'2 Given the state of environmental
deterioration by the early 1960s, the administration of John F. Kennedy was about to launch the third major conservation effort of
the century (the first two occurred during the administrations of the two Roosevelts). Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall
signaled that effort with the publication of The Quiet Crisis in 1963. Like Silent Spring, it too was a best seller and outlined
the
"conservation" crisis. Although there was no extended discussion of Aldo Leopold, in a footnote Udall observed that Sand
County Almanac was the one book that pointed to "a noble elegy for the American earth and a plea for a new land ethic. " Udall's
book, however,
reflected the dominant American anthropocentric "resource" approach to the
environmental crisis. The revolutionary ecocentric ideas of Henry David Thoreau, John Muir, and Leopold either
were not understood or were ignored. Udall did point to changing attitudes in the 1960s towards the nature religions
and "land wisdom" of the American Indians: "Today the conservation movement finds itself turning back to ancient Indian land
ideas, to the Indian understanding that we are not outside of nature, but of it. . . . We are recovering a sense of reverence for the
land."3 Many environmental historians, ecophilosophers, and anthropologists now agree that primal
societies throughout the world practiced a spiritual "ecological" way of life in which everything
was to be respected in its own right. This "ecocentric" religious approach accounts for their
cultural success for thousands of years and can provide modern humans with historical models for the
human/Nature relationship.4 Lynn White, Jr., brought the anthropocentrism issue into dramatic focus as the basis for the
environmental debate. White argued in a 1967 article that orthodox anthropocentric Christianity must assume a
large share of the responsibility for the environmental crisis as a result of desacralizing nature
and producing a world view (metaphysics) that sees humans as separate from and superior to
nature. He further argued that the ideologies that shaped modern, urban-industrial societies have
failed to emancipate themselves from essentially Christian ideas, including human domination over nature
and a belief in perpetual progress. Another radical strain in White's analysis was his claim that Western cultural
ideas of the domination and control of nature had shaped the development and thrust of
modern science and technology. That argument challenged widely held opinions about the supposed
"objectivity" and cultural neutrality of theoretical science. Because "modern science and
technology are permeated with orthodox Christian arrogance toward nature," White claimed that we will
have a worsening crisis "until we reject the Christian axiom that nature has no reason for existence
save to serve man." White's solution to the environmental crisis was to suggest a return to the ecological egalitarianism of St.
Francis whom he considered "the greatest spiritual revolutionary in Western history." St. Francis "tried to substitute the idea of the
equality of all creatures, including man." He attempted, according to White, to disuade humans from the idea of dominating nature
and to "set up a democracy of all God's creatures."5 Clarence Glacken reinforced White's analysis by pointing out that the
architects of the scientific revolution (Bacon, Descartes, and Leibniz) were all philosophizing within a
Christian matrix. Modern science and the direction of technological society, were developed
with the specific goal of conquering nature. And by that time, the anthropocentrism of classical Greek
humanism (Plato and Aristotle) had already been absorbed into Christian doctrine and was exerting an
independent influence.6 White's essay reached a wider audience when it was republished in the Sierra Club Bulletin and
discussed approvingly in Paul Ehrlich's The Population Bomb. Along with other deep ecology classics of the 1960s, White's article was
reprinted in several anthologies. Garrett Hardin's provocative essay, "The Tragedy of the Commons," a philosophical and ecological
sophistication of the anthropocentric position, also appeared in these anthologies.' For their part, Christian theologians and
scientists either denounced White's thesis or reexamined their own religious beliefs and values. Conferences were organized and
received wide press coverage. White claimed with some justification to have created "the theology of ecology." As a consequence,
many theologians now advocate a less exploitive attitude toward naturereferred to as "stewardship"-that has much in common with
the orthodox position of conservationists. Few, if any, were willing to follow White in advocating St. Francis and ecological equality.
8 Thus, what had begun as another wave of the conservation movement had turned by the late 1960s into a radical critique of the
basic assumptions of modern Western society. Carroll Pursell called this a move "from conservation to ecology."9 Much of this
radical critique, however, was developed by professional biologists and ecologists relying on their scientific training and experiences,
in addition to the literature of social critics such as Huxley and Orwell, and the Zen Buddhist vision of harmony with nature. Even
before White published his provocative essay, Marston Bates had chided
professional philosophers for "dallying
in their academic groves" when the need for a new ecologically-based philosophy was
imperative. He pointed to the unnatural Christian separation of humans from nature and proposed St. Francis
as the patron saint of ecologists. Through this period the widely read anthropologist Loren Eiseley also was focusing attention upon
the narrow anthropocentrism and environmental destructiveness of modern man. '0 Raymond Dasmann, who wrote influential
books from a broad social perspective, was advocating a move to the "future primitive" and "ecosystem people" ways of life by the
1970s. According to John Milton, a self-professed Zen Buddhist, Zen taught that "there is really no distinction between the organism
and its environment. " And Frank Egler proposed a new world view called Human Ecosystem Science: "I look to Hinduism, Buddhism,
and Taoism . . . as the womb from which a humanitarian-oriented Human Ecosystem Science may yet arise. " " I Paul Shepard's
essay, "Ecology and Man," was another landmark in the critique of Western anthropocentrism. Influenced by the Zen Buddhist views
of Alan Watts, Shepard discussed the different metaphysics resulting from an ecological perception. He characterized ecology as the
subversive science or subject: "the ideological status of ecology is that of a resistance movement. Its Rachel Carsons and Aldo
Leopolds are subversive." Since the publication of his first book in 1967, Shepard has been one of the most provocative thinkers in
the development of the emerging ecological world view. 12 Ecologists have continued to provide philosophical direction for this
revolution in thinking. The Canadian, John Livingston, combined ecological insight with a critique of Western anthropocentrism.
He argued against the treatment of plants and animals primarily as human resources. Livingston's
colleague, Neil Everndon, pointed out that the idea of interrelatedness goes beyond the usual scientific sense of causal
connectedness; from
an ecological standpoint there are no discrete entities . Recently Everndon has
critiqued anthropocentric "resourcism" and developed a phenomenological approach to philosophical ecology. ' 3 In
The Arrogance of Humanism David Ehrenfeld leaned heavily on the writings of George Orwell in developing his powerful critique of
anthropocentric humanism and the failure of modern technology. He argued that the exclusive
emphasis upon reason
has divorced us from the crucial survival functions of instinct, emotion, and intuition . Ehrenfeld
discussed the failure of viewing the world in terms of resources and referred approvingly to Charles Elton's
ecocentric and religious reasons for protecting ecological diversity. Anne and Paul Ehrlich argued in 1981 for the ecological necessity
of vast expanses of unmanaged wilderness as species habitat. Nonhuman species, they claimed, have intrinsic value
and the right to exist which is "the first and foremost argument for the preservation of all nonhuman species." More
recently, Paul Ehrlich has claimed that "the main hope for changing humanity's present course may lie . . . in the development of a
world view drawn partly from ecological principles-in the so-called deep ecology movement. " '4 The emergence of the Age of
Ecology was, of course, heavily indebted to earlier writers. St. Francis was unique for attempting to divert mainstream Christianity
back to a position of ecological equality. During the rise of modern science in the seventeenth century, Spinoza had attempted to
undercut the materialistic scientism of Hobbes and the mind-body dualism and domination of nature themes of Descartes and to
establish instead a holistic nonanthropocentric pantheism. His system influenced Goethe and other writers of the European
Romantic movement, now understood as a natureoriented, countercultural force aligned against the rise of the narrowly scientific
industrial society. That countercultural force took shape in America in the Transcendentalism of Whitman, Emerson, and Thoreau. In
the late nineteenth century, John Muir moved away from the subjectivism of Romanticism and Transcendentalism and arrived at the
major generalizations of ecology through direct experience of ecological interrelatedness. There were also forewarnings by George
Perkins Marsh and John Stuart Mill. The latter could see no ultimate value in conquering nature and called for a "stationary state" in
population and economics. At the beginning of the twentieth century, George Santayana attacked the anthropocentrism of the
dominant Western philosophy and religion and called for a new "noble moral imagination" that would extend the democratic
principle "to the animals, to inanimate nature, to the cosmos as a whole." In effect, Muir and Santayana at the beginning of the
twentieth century were challenging America to develop an ecocentric philosophy and a new ecological way of life. '5 After the First
World War, the development of an ecological perspective continued mainly in the writings of literary figures such as D. H. Lawrence
Robinson Jeffers, Aldous Huxley, and Joseph Wood Krutch. More recently Alan Watts, Gary Snyder, and Edward Abbey have carried
on this tradition. Poets from T. S. Eliot to Archibald McLeish warned of the "diminishment of man" as a result of industrial society.
Radical ecologists since the 1960s have gained inspiration from Thoreau and Muir, from the Zen Buddhism of Huxley, Watts, and
Snyder, and from the antiutopian social critiques of Huxley and Orwell. In discussing the significance of the antiutopian novels for
the human-nature relationship, Wayland Drew referred to an early novel by the Russian, Eugene Zamiatian. The dichotomy
between wild nature and the technological society is sharply drawn in his book. Zamiatian claimed in
defending wilderness that "the separation of man from nature is imperfect so long as man might
recognize that a separation has occurred." ' 6
Economy
Promotion of economic growth is a form of shallow ecology that threatens
water security – it’s fundamentally incompatible with deep ecology
Akamani 20, (Kofi Akamani is an Associate Professor of Forest Recreation and Conservation Social
Science in the Department of Forestry at Southern Illinois University, “Integrating Deep Ecology and
Adaptive Governance for Sustainable Development: Implications for Protected Areas Management,”
7/17/2020, Sustainability, https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/14/5757 // ECL)
Ethically, shallow ecology is informed by an anthropocentric or human-centered perspective that views

humans as the source of all values, and assigns instrumental values to nonhuman natural
entities based on their usefulness as means to meeting the needs of humans [42,82,99]. Arne Naess
used anthropocentrism to refer to “the tendency to look at nonhumans and the ecosphere in
general from the point of view of narrow utilitarianism, a devaluation of anything but humans
and a focus on their narrow, shallow interests, not their deep ones” [100] (p. 231). For instance, a
central emphasis of the Brundtland Report is the promotion of economic growth as a strategy for meeting
basic human needs and improving upon environmental conditions [12,18,101]. However, the capacity
of the earth’s ecosystem to support the rate of economic growth recommended in the Brundtland Report
has been questioned [101]. This over-emphasis on economic growth could be seen as one of the
key problems associated with the SDGs that could potentially result in the countering of sustainability
objectives [27]. As a result, the sustainable development agenda has been critiqued for adopting an
anthropocentric perspective that prioritizes human needs over the value of other forms of life
[20,102]. The problems associated with the lack of integrated approaches to sustainable
development are best illustrated in policies on food, energy and water resource systems, where
the pursuit of narrow sectoral approaches have often resulted in adverse consequences that
threaten food, energy and water security [103,104,105].
In contrast, deep ecology is non-anthropocentric in its orientation, as it recognizes the intrinsic

values or inherent worth of the nonhuman natural world and considers humans as ordinary
members of the biotic community [42]. Deep ecology’s deep-seated respect for all forms of life is expressed in the
principle of biospherical egalitarianism—the equal right of all to live and blossom [82,86,87]. Based on these principles, deep
ecology offers a radical agenda that replaces the ideology of economic growth with ecological
sustainability . The goal of long term ecological sustainability entails the protection and
sustenance of the richness and diversity of life on earth [84,106]. Socially, deep ecology calls for
promoting the diversity of cultures through the removal of all forms of domination, exploitation
and suppression [38,86]. From a deep ecology perspective, “cultural diversity is an analogue on the human
level to the biological richness and diversity of life forms ” [38] (p. 267). The diversity of human cultures and
non-human life forms enhances the chances of survival and also contributes to overall quality of life. Policies that erode this
diversity also threaten opportunities for self-realization [86].
The “Worldeater” of capitalism thrives off of the “progress” of resource
extractions. This mindset destroys solidarity and leaves climate change to doom
us all.
Dunlap ‘21 (Alexander, postdoctoral research fellow at the Centre for Development and the
Environment, "The politics of ecocide, genocide and megaprojects: interrogating natural
resource extraction, identity and the normalization of erasure." Journal of Genocide Research
23.2 (2021): 212-235, MX)
It is no secret that capitalism, guided by its growth imperative , is organized to control, process
and consume the natural resources of the planet, hence its qualification as “The Worldeater.”
This is accomplished by enforcing colonial/statist logics; fusing market relationships into every
individual, its culture and its relation to nature itself; as well as employing discursive
frameworks such as “ecosystem services ” to justify this continuous ecological conquest .98
Recognizing the colonial imperative (positioned in the name of saving life99) that is bent on
industrialization, resource extraction and techno-capitalist development is precisely what the
Genocide Machine and post-liberal perspectives bring into question. Keeping the case studies
described above in mind, this section will offer considerations to advance the post-liberal
genocide perspective. The purpose, especially given the activist history and orientation of
genocide studies, is to assist the discipline in mapping and discussing the “slow industrial
genocide” 100 taking place against the earth and its inhabitants.
In Oaxaca, in an area with distinct Zapotec and Ikoot identities, eliminating and reconfiguring the
subsistence practices for (corporate and extractive) wind energy development, by any
reasonable standard, fits the category of a “slow,” “creeping” developmental genocide – a
position already argued at length in other works.101 The case of Oaxaca bares strong similarities
with the coal and copper extraction activities of the German and Peruvian projects, yet the latter
cases do not share the same intensities of violence or distinct Indigenous identity that was
important to the former. The inhabitants of the three cases all experienced high-levels of social
opposition and/or militant resistance . National, regional and local politicians – or “leaders” 102
– served as key collaborating forces to initiate or make these projects possible (despite majority
opposition ). Resource extraction efforts, or ecological mass killing, were only possible with the
deployment of coercive counterinsurgency protocols to beat, kill and intimidate land defenders.
Meanwhile, the companies simultaneously employed social engineering initiatives to curtail
resistance, divide the population and solidify extractive hegemony in each region. This could
be deemed a counterinsurgency strategy, perpetrating and enabling systematic and continues
process of ecological mass killing that culminates into ecocide.
Each project entailed various levels of deforestation and flora disruption – degradation and
extermination in particular locals and bioregions. Water usurpation or pumping from aquifers,
rivers and, in the case of Peru, potential desalinization facilities taking water from the sea that
had not undergone an environmental impact assessment (which was often half-hearted,
incomplete and non-participatory). Additionally, water contamination with concrete and related
solidifying chemicals in ground aquifers in the case of wind turbine foundations was a big
issue,103 as it drained aquifers and disrupted hydrological cycles, specifically the water that
would normally replenish the Lagoon.104 Polluted water run-off from coal spoil heaps and
copper tailing ponds also cause serious socio-ecological problems. Animal habitat is cleared for
roads, foundations and mining sites, which affects the fauna, flora and water in order to create
profits and (limited) employment. Avian life is significantly threatened with the placement of
wind turbines, but also – to a degree – other habitat disruptions and loss. Placed near these
green and conventional extraction sites, humans also experience or risk various and severe
negative health impacts based on the air, noise, water, and emissions pollution.
Natural resource extraction interventions are significant and, although often naturalized, have
been a source of conflict since mining mechanization. For centuries these processes have been
sold to the public as progress and development, as they form the modus operandi of techno-
capitalist development.105 Natural resource control, and the technological development
culminating from and inspiring it, thus draws a firm and continuing line between colonial
conquest, state formation and the current environmental conflicts taking place across the world.
The “slow industrial genocide,” highlighted by Huseman and Short, is not new. That said (main
steam) genocide studies has resisted this level of societal and generalized self-reflection,
marginalizing post-liberal perspective (despite its cross-disciplinary support), which entailed
sidelining Indigenous populations and others struggling against capitalist development as
“activists.” 106 The present onslaught of climate change , extinction and generalized ecological
crisis, or official recognition thereof, is testimony to the increasing importance of the post-liberal
genocide perspective.
The fact is, capitalism – or the techno-capitalist civilized system – is bent on absorbing or
destroying anything that is antithetical , different or threatening to its project of human and
nonhuman resource control and accumulation. Dunlap and Jakobsen have gone so far as to
describe the techno-capitalist system as “ the Worldeater,” 107 whose body manifests with
industrial infrastructure, giving rise to climate change and the so-called “Anthropocene,” all the
while consuming the planet with its sights set on resource exploitation on Mars. Central here,
and at the root of techno-capitalist development, is the politics of engineering populations,
harnessing energy and economic growth that is presently mass killing entire species, solidifying
past genocidal campaigns against Indigenous populations and repressing or absorbing any
oppositional difference. Human and nonhuman peoples are organized as raw material for
warfare and industrial development by a multiplicity of means – “structure.” It involves the
concerted killings and confinement – “event” – of anything that challenges the “ war of
progress :” 108 anti-colonial, anti-state and anticapitalist actions. Recognizing that anything
challenging the grid of state authority, seeking autonomy and developing anti-capitalist (socio-
ecological) relationships – especially as these reinforce each other – will be steamrollered by
waves of repression, cooptation and assimilation techniques in order to bring about a state of
exhaustion. As Carlo Manzo, in the epigraph, reminds us: “Anyone living in the region near this
new infrastructure is being targeted for the sake of development and the current national
priority of energy generation.” People, however, experience different and variated scales of
“hard” and “soft” repression in different times and places,109 which are also culturally
conditioned. Affinities emerge through a myriad of tensions, actions and projects challenging
state and corporate control of human and nonhuman resources. Indigenous autonomy, urban
squatting, territorial land defense and communal/collective health and food initiatives all seek to
reconfigure and counter world destroying progress. Geographical difference, language,
motivation, emphasis and recognition of other struggles condition connections and solidarity .
Furthermore, people experience different intensities of absorption or “digestion” into
colonial/statist systems, which will lead people to identify the causes of socio-ecological
destruction (or “enemies”) in different ways, more below on these points.
Market logics economize the environment and paper over nature outside of its
utility to humans
Dryzek 13( John S. Dryzek, Centenary Professor at the Centre for Deliberative Democracy
and Global Governance at the University of Canberra's Institute for Governance and Policy
Analysis, )"The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses", Google Books, 2-7-
2013, https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Politics_of_the_Earth.html?
id=EJM1OTeZ0sgC)//guyB
Economic rationalism's world is populated by economic actors. Homo economicus can appear as a
consumer or producer; and if producers are organized into firms, the firm still behaves like an individual. Markets, prices, and
property have real existence. At some level government exists too as something more than a collection of economic
individuals. However, economic rationalist discourse is ambiguous and troubled on this point . Some
economic rationalists treat government as staffed entirely by Homo economicus individuals, all concerned only with their own
material interest, exploiting the public for personal benefit. This is why they always prefer markets to politics (see for
example Mitchell and Simmons, 1994). But even these die-hard economic rationalists require someone, somewhere to be steering
the system in the public interest, otherwise who is going to enact the appropriate arrangement of private property rights they seek?
Notably missing from economic rationalism are citizens (of the sort populating democratic pragmatism). Also,
environments do not exist in any strong sense. At most, "the environment" is only a pathway
for some human decisions to have effects on other people -for example, through pollution. The
existence of ecosystems, let alone ecosystems that often defy understanding, cut across chunks
of private property, and impose constraints on human activity, is not perceived. There is no
such thing as wilderness, only wilderness experiences ( that is, human perceptions of LEAVE IT TO THE
MARKET: ECONOMIC RATIONALISM I 135 wilderness amenity). There is an odd affinity here with postmodernists ,
for whom "nature" is a human social construction . This lack of recognition of nature is driven home by Anderson
and Leal's (2001: 27) comment on migratory bison that stray from Yellowstone National Park onto cattle ranches, potentially
spreading brucellosis: "The migration of the Yellowstone bison is like other cases of pollution in which the actions of one party, in
this case the National Park Service, affect another, in this case Montana cattle ranchers:' So the bison are not recognized as part of
the Yellowstone ecosystem, but instead demeaned as pollutants, at most the medium for one set of people (National Park Service
officials) to affect another set of people (ranchers). Unlike Prometheans, economic
rationalists recognize the
existence of natural resources, which is why it is crucial to establish the right kinds of property
rights to these resources. In further contrast to Prometheans, economic rationalists would not necessarily dismiss
the existence of limits to human activity imposed by finite resources . Assumptions about natural
relationships Economic rationalism assumes that the basic relationship across individuals and
collective actors (such as firms) is competitive. The cooperative problem solving sought by
democratic pragmatists is ruled out. Corresponding to its thoroughly ambiguous attitude toward the
existence of government as anything more than an assemblage (or sometimes tool) of rational
egoists out to plunder the public purse, economic rationalism is confused about the existence
of hierarchy within government. Administrative rationalism, as seen in Chapter 4, happily accepts hierarchy based on
expertise. When it comes down to it, economic rationalists have to do the same, because some experts must be in a position of
authority to implement appropriate private property rights, or to design green taxes. Of course, the experts themselves must be
economic rationalists; but they cannot be economic actors, for if they were they would devise schemes in their own personal
interest, not in the public interest. The
other kind of hierarchy implicit in economic rationalism is between
humans and the natural world . Economic rationalism is thoroughly anthropocentric: nature
exists only to provide inputs to the socioeconomic machine, to satisfy human wants and
needs. The appropriate expertise to manipulate these environmental inputs is taken for
granted. Once appropriate property rights and incentives are in place, individual actors have no
problem in deploying expertise to produce good results for society as a whole .
Redefining property rights for <x> is a futile attempt to reassemble the social
machine, a calculative mechanism that reads the environment only as a
quantifiable input
Agents and their motives The main

agents for economic rationalists are Homo economicus ones,
motivated by material self-interest, and pursuing it rationally. But, as I have just noted, exemption is granted for a few
agents in governmental positions, who are allowed to be motivated by concern for the public interest, albeit defined in economic
rationalist terms. Fretwell (2009) is explicit: wise managers concerned with the long term should take precedence over politicians. Of
course, the governmental actors who populate horror stories are not allowed any such public interested motivation; they are
treated as rational egoists, whose interaction produces all kinds of perverse outcomes (Higgs and Close, 2005). Missing
from
economic rationalism is any notion of active citizenship; economic rationalism abolishes
citizenship. When I received a circular from the economic rationalist government of the state of
Victoria, where I used to live, it was addressed "Dear Customer:' There were no citizens in
Victoria. Key metaphors and other rhetorical devices Like the Promethean discourse analyzed in Chapter 3, the basic
metaphor of economic rationalism is mechanistic . The social world is treated as a machine
whose products meet human needs and wants, which can be understood through reference to
its components and their functions. Unlike Prometheans, economic rationalists believe the machine may need
to be reassembled, through, for example, redefinitions of property rights . Once we get the
property rights in order, the machine will work smoothly . Environmental resources are treated
as inputs to the social machine, be they raw materials for production or amenities such as
wilderness and clean air. Economic rationalists are skilled rhetoricians. Intervention by government administrators
in the environmental affairs of industry and commerce used to be known, accurately and simply enough, as "regulation:'
Economic rationalists oppose regulation, so succeeded in stigmatizing it as "command as
control:' As John Baden, Chairman of FREE puts it, "There is wide agreement that FME [free market environmentalism] is
intellectually dominant: no responsible scholar still supports the old command-and control resource management of the Progressive
Era" (Baden, 2012). Little command and control actually occurs in environmental administration; there
is much more in the way of informal cooperative relationships between government officials and
polluters (see Chapter 4). So as a description of the real world, the term is laughable ; but as a
rhetorical ploy, it is brilliant. Following the collapse of Soviet-style systems which really did
work by command and control, who could possibly favor such a system (except perhaps the military)? An
equally clever rhetorical ploy involves use of the adjective "free;' especially to describe markets . A market
is a market is a market; so why does it need to be called a free market , especially given that markets
can only operate if government supplies a supportive legal context ? Relatedly, why are capitalist
corporations styled free enterprise? The answer is that the standard set of freedoms in liberal
democratic societies is very popular. In free markets and free enterprise, coercion is abolished
if not in fact, then in rhetoric. A third pervasive rhetorical strategy in economic rationalism is the
horror story involving governmental action that produces perverse, inefficient, and costly
results (for good selections, see Nelson, 1993; Stroup and Shaw, 1993). In the United States, one of the most widely circulated
environmental horror stories picks up on the analysis of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments carried out by Ackerman and Hassler
(1981) (who ironically are not themselves economic rationalists). Ackerman and Hassler demonstrate the disastrous results
of a particular episode in legislation for environmental regulation . Eastern producers of high-sulfur coal
combined with environmentalists to persuade Congress to mandate that all new coalburning power plants install scrubbers to
remove sulfur dioxide from their emissions, irrespective of how low the sulfur content of the coal was being burned, and so how
much sulfur dioxide was being emitted. This measure effectively discriminated against western low-sulfur coal producers, and
ensured that the ambient air quality targets would be met at a cost billions of dollars greater than could have been achieved with a
switch to low-sulfur coal. Moreover, the legislation allowed existing coal-burning plants to operate with no additional controls, thus
ensuring that old and dirty plants would gain a competitive edge over new plants, and so stay in use longer, thus actually
encouraging increased pollution.
The idea that markets are the solution, or economic rationalism, reduces the
citizen to the consumer and the environment to an input- that’s antithetical to
broader sustainability efforts
id=EJM1OTeZ0sgC) **edited for gendered language//guyB
The fairyland of neoclassical microeconomics in which economic rationalist argument for

market-oriented policy instruments is rooted is very different from the real world . The good
fairies are not in charge of policy design and implementation . In the United States, economic
rationalists blame the collapse in the price of sulfur dioxide permits between 2005 and 2012 on
EPA regulators who did not treat the permits with the respect true property rights demanded . In
particular, the EPA decided not to allow "banked" (unused) permits from previous years to be traded; and reduced the quantity of
emissions a given permit allowed (Anderson and Libecap, 2012). Stavins (2002) points out that in the United States, environmental
laws are written by a Congress full of lawyers who do not understand economics, and who are attracted by the symbolic politics that
can please all sides by combining stringent standards with lax enforcement. Perhaps surprisingly, the rightward shift of
Congressional Republicans following the 2008 election of President Obama proved to be bad news for economic rationalism in
environmental policy. These Republicans started to refer to "cap and trade" as "cap and tax;' attacking the system of tradeable
permits for carbon dioxide emissions that had been on Congress's climate change agenda for some time (though never adopted).
Republicans carried over their hostility to the idea of doing anything at all about climate
change to the main instrument on the table, which just happened to be a centerpiece of
economic rationalism. A gap between theory and practice is also evident in markets for offsets
for greenhouse gas emissions. If the offsets involve forestry, there is no guarantee the
promised trees will actually be planted, or that they will not be sold to more than one buyer .
Even if they are planted, the trees may displace land use that is both sustainable and crucial to
the livelihoods of local people. The trees in question will one day die, be cut down, or burn-and
when that happens, the carbon they stored will re-enter the atmosphere . Depending on their price,
offsets may also look like an easy option to polluters-who might even increase their pollution as
a result of the availability of offsets. To get at deeper reasons for resistance to economic rationalism we need to treat it
as a discourse rather than just a set of proposals for policies and institutions. Recall that the basic agents and motives
recognized by economic rationalism treat people only as Homo economicus consumers and
producers. There are no citizens in economic rationalism. Dobson ( 2004: 1-5) suggests that economic
incentives alone are unlikely to yield the substantive and multifaceted changes in behavior that
a sustainable society requires . More seriously, such incentives may actually undercut ecological
citizenship. Sagoff (2008) argues that all individuals have both consumer preferences and citizen
preferences, and that these point in different directions. As a consumer, I may want to make use
of freeways to get to work more quickly; as a citizen, I may demonstrate against construction of
the freeways because they destroy communities and natural areas . We would normally put our
citizen preferences first, though only if given the chance to express them in political settings . But
economic rationalists count only consumer preferences, repressing citizen preferences. Theirs is
a world unlikely to please environmental citizen-activists , which may be why environmentalists
have often opposed economic rationalist schemes . When we visit a national park, we do so as citizens. Part of the
experience of being there is that it is indeed a national park, emblematic of what it means to be a Canadian, an American, a Costa
Rican, or a Japanese; a repository of common trust and community pride. And visiting national parks in other nations can also
involve recognition of and respect for the identity and citizenship of others. These are experiences that Walt Disney could never
provide. Opposition may also arise as a result of the way economic rationalism treats or, rather, does not treat
the environment. Recall that in economic rationalist discourse, the environment exists only as a
medium for the effects of some human actions on other humans , and as a source of inputs for
the socioeconomic machine. It is in this light that Anderson and Leal (2001: 27) can refer to migrating buffalo
as "pollution'' because they may carry diseases that affect cattle . Thus the environment has no
intrinsic value, and chunks of it can be bought or sold at will, depending only on the most
profitable human use. When it comes to pollution, economic rationalism attaches no stigma :
rights to pollute are just like any other commodity, to be bought or sold . As Kelman (1981) notes, this
failure to stigmatize pollution in moral terms makes many environmentalists uneasy. Goodin
(1994) compares this selling of pieces of the environment by governments to the selling of
indulgences by the medieval Catholic Church. In both cases, individuals can have their sins forgiven
if they can afford to pay. But just as places in heaven were not the church's to sell ( only for God or St
Peter to decide), so pieces of the environment are not government's to sell . Martin Luther (who attacked
indulgences) and opponents of green taxes have much in common. In short, no matter how attractive economic
prescriptions may be in instrumental terms, even to committed environmentalists, they help
con - stitute a discourse, and a world, which those according higher priority to citizenship,
democratic, and ecological values find unattractive (see Dryzek, 1995). This is especially the case when
prescriptions are tied to a general right-wing market agenda , as they are in the United States
by "free market environmentalists;' who thereby undermine the political prospects for the
policies they favor. Paradoxically, some of these policies have been more easily implemented in social democratic North
European countries, precisely because they do not attract right-wing ideological baggage there. The paradox is heightened inasmuch
as the tie is increasingly rejected by rightwing Republicans, who reject any policy for the environment, especially if it involves climate
change. Styling policy "free-market environmentalism'' apparently makes no difference . With the
loss of this right-wing constituency, the prospects for economic rationalist environmental policy in the United States look bleak. In
the United Kingdom and Australia too, rightwing think tanks that once backed free-market environmentalism become increasingly
Promethean, attacking green taxes and emissions trading as unnecessary governmental actions. Ironically it is international
institutions such as the European Union and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and states such as
China, where these policy instruments are now more welcome. A
further limitation of economic rationalism arises
from its basically mechanistic metaphorical structure . The idea that the world may be full of
complex ecological and social systems interacting in variable and uncertain ways is implicitly
denied by economic rationalism. Economic rationalists have no way to deal with such
interactions, which may violate the boundaries of private property rights, no matter how carefully drawn.
For example, proposals for tradeable quotas in ocean fisheries inevitably treat species in isolation .
But rational management of a single species is impossible . Whether the species survives or flourishes depends
not just on how many tons of it are caught per year, but on what is happening to other species that are predators, prey, or
competitors for the same ecological niche. Moreover, other
factors such as pollution or development may
affect the habitat of the species. Finally, economic rationalism as a discourse gets into all kinds of
tangles in its treatment of government. Its attitude to government is thoroughly ambiguous: at
one level government is populated by rational egoists feeding at the public trough, plundering
the public purse, and thoroughly indifferent to environmental values. At another level public-
spirited government action is needed in order to put economic rationalist prescriptions into
institutional and policy practice, and so economic rationalism depends crucially on
administrative rationalism. The "public choice" school of economic rationalists has thrived on horror stories about
government in theory and practice; in fact, without quite realizing it, the public choice school has demonstrated that political order
is impossible if everyone is a rational egoist (see Dryzek, 1992b). When it comes to environmental affairs, if everyone is a rational
egoist, then the commons will always be abused, polluters will continue to generate externalities, and government will do absolutely
nothing to remedy the situation. The obvious inference is that economic rationalism is inadequate as an orientation to
environmental affairs (see Dryzek, 1996b). In this light, economic rationalism's real usefulness may come in detailing very precisely
the destructive effects of Homo economicus, and the need for their proclivities to be controlled by more socially, politically, and
ecologically benign human motivations. Economic rationalism, unlike democratic pragmatism and green radicalism, has had nothing
to say about these alternative wellsprings of human action.
Environmental utilitarianism” necessitates a view of nature as an economic

market, which perpetuates anthropocentric domination over the envionrment
Muradian and Gómez-Baggethum 21 (Roldan Muradian, PhD, Adjunct Professor at
3. Seeing nature through the lenses of ecosystem services
The concept of ecosystem services (ES) was introduced by scholars in the 1980s, aiming to stress human dependency on the
natural environment (Daily, 1997; Norgaard, 2010). It is
part of a long-standing tradition that tries to spread
the environmental agenda by means of appealing to utilitarian motives (Kronenberg, 2015). Once a
marginal notion, in a matter of three decades the ES framework has become a very influential, or even
hegemonic, discourse to frame human-nature relationships in environmental science and policy (Chaudhary et
al., 2015). By hegemonic discourse here we mean a body of concepts, categories,and metaphors that comes to dominate a particular
field (Keller, 2005). As discussed below, such
discourses are associated with a particular worldview and
institutional setting, involving specific actors, resources and power relations.
Advocates of the ES framework have always insisted that instrumental arguments for environmental conservation are
complementary, and not substitutes, to conservationist motives derived from the notion of the intrinsic value of nature (Costanza,
2006). However, an underlying assumption for the development of the framework was that intrinsic values (usually associated with
protected areas for the conservation of biodiversity) have failed to prevent massive loss of ecosystems worldwide (Dempsey, 2016).
Hence, a key argument put forward is that the maintenance of ecosystem services is crucial for the
thrive of the economy (and human societies in general), and therefore such utilitarian need should
constitute a bonding element for unifying diverse reasons and motivations to be concerned about
ecosystems’ protection (Costanza et al., 1997, 2017; TEEB, 2010). Even though the aim of the ES framework is not
necessarily to translate ES to monetary flows, and its current theory and practice go far beyond monetization, economic
valuation has been extensively used as a strategy to increase societal support for the protection
of ecosystems (Braat and de Groot, 2012).
Due to its emphasis on economic valuation (especially in the 1990s and 2000s, less so at present), the ES framework
has also been symbolically associated with the commoditization of nature (McCauley, 2006). Despite
the fact that non-monetary valuation methods have become increasingly influential in the ES
literature (Schmidt et al., 2017; Gomez-Baggethun ´ and Martín-Lopez, ´ 2015; Jacobs et al., 2016), a main concern surrounding
the ES approach remains its emphasis on the utilitarian value of ecosystems as a strategy to
promote their conservation. In fact, the ES framework relies heavily on economic metaphors,
including the conception of ecosystems as stocks of natural capital providing flows of services .
Assessments of ES are often structured around market-inspired categories, such as ‘ES supply and demand’ or ‘ES cascades’ that evoke commodity
supply and value chains (Chen et al., 2019). These metaphors have important implications, since they reflect a specific way of conceiving and
representing human-nature relations (Raymond et al., 2013).
Summarizing, the ES framework reflects a particular worldview ultimately anchored in some of the core foundations of modern Western culture. We
consider the following as the most important ones of those precepts:
(i) A clear-cut human-nature divide . The ES framework is part of a Western tradition that
separates human societies from the natural world (Glacken, 1976). In graphical representations, ES are drawn as channels connecting
nature to society, and the latter two are depicted as separate categories. In this worldview, humans and non-humans are assumed as
entities with differentiated characteristics and the natural world is seen as lacking agency. The
separation of humans from nature became a core foundation of Western culture in the Age of the Enlightenment (Descartes, 1996) but the roots of the
Cartesian worldview are often traced back to Judaeo-Christian mythology (Haila, 2000) and the Greek classical era
(Aristotle, 2016). It also constitutes a core pillar of Western science, since it underpins the distinction
between object and subject, without which modern science would not be possible.
(ii). Anthropocentrism. The society/nature division is a prerequisite for a worldview that

establish hierarchical relations between humans and the natural environment . Humans are perceived not only
as separated from the rest of nature, but also above it. In this moral philosophy , humans are assumed to hold entitlements to
allocate property rights over the natural environment and the resources (or services) derived from it.
Nature, or for that matter ES, is assumed then to be an asset that can be owned, traded and destroyed.
(iii) A
predominance of utilitarian (instrumental) values towards nature. The worth of the natural
environment (including ES) is assumed to be determined by its contribution to human well-being .
Given the current importance of market mechanisms in creating wealth, the natural environment is often perceived
by utilitarian environmentalists as being instrumental for economic prosperity and growth , a
proposition that constitutes the foundation of the notion of the green economy (Gomez- ´ Baggethun and Muradian, 2015; Fletcher
et al., 2018; Mandle et al., 2019). The
perception of the natural environment as an economic asset and a
particular type of capital (natural capital) is
part of a process of expansion of the market into previously
non-marketed social and environmental domains that has characterized global capitalism in the 19th Century,
associated to the great influence of economic liberalism ideology during this historical period (Polany, 2001; Gomez-Baggethun, ´
2015)
In the ecosystem services framework, the
combination of the three above-mentioned tenets is reflected in the
depiction of society-nature interaction as a stock-and-flow system , in which ecosystems are seen as a stock, from
which services are derived. The role of economic valuation consists in estimating the monetary value of such flows (Rode et al., 2016) and the goal of
non-monetary valuation is to estimate different types of contributions to human societies, using a variety of variables, methods and approaches (Jacobs
et al., 2020). The common element to all valuation tools of ES, both monetary and non-monetary, is to assume human societies as beneficiaries and to
perceive the natural environment as a provider of benefits. Therefore, ecosystems functions gain value to the extent they
serve human interest (Peterson et al., 2010; Dempsey, 2016).
Economic agendas for sustainability ignore the intricacies of biodiversity

Management Studies , University of Applied Science , The Hague , The Netherlands, “The Lorax
complex: deep ecology, ecocentrism and exclusion,” Journal of Integrative Environmental
Sciences, (2012)), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1943815X.2012.742914?
However, there is a debate about exactly how much biodiversity needs to be preserved. Is a human-centered utilitarian
perspective sufficient to protect all biodiversity? While Isbell et al. (2011) argue that plant biodiversity needs to be
preserved in order to benefit complex human systems, others argue that preservation of ‘‘some’’ biodiversity would be sufficient to satisfy human
needs. In provocative publication Plastic Panda, Haring (2011) argues that only some select species are needed for human survival and welfare, and that
most of these species are domesticated and ‘‘adopted’’ for human needs rather than ‘‘wild’’. In fact, monocultures such as genetically manipulated
crops or cattle will satisfy most of human needs (Haring 2011). Biodiversity protection is not necessarily contingent with social and economic interests,
such as deriving medicines from wild plants (Crist 2003).The limits-to-growth or sustainable development framework may be inadequate in addressing
biodiversity loss because Mass extinction could conceivably come to pass without jeopardizing the survival of the human species; and because people
might be materially sustained by a technologically biora made to yield services and products required for human life (Crist 2003:65). Recently, some
authors have argued that market-based valuation techniques are inadequate as they do not seem to
capture the expanse, nuances, and intricacies of many of the ecosystem services as well as
ecological identity and emotional attachments to nature the value of which is not readily
understood by the economists (Kumar and Kumar 2008). Critics have noted that green GDP requires
measurement of the benefits arising from public goods provided by nature for which there
are no market indicators of value (Boyd 2007). In the words of David Quammen (1998): If the world’s air is clean for humans to
breathe but supports no birds or butterflies, if the world’s waters are pure for humans to drink but contain no
fish or crustaceans or diatoms, have we solved our environmental problems ? Well, I suppose so, at least
as environmentalism is commonly construed. That clumsy, confused, and presumptuous formulation ‘‘the environment’’ implies viewing air, water, soil,
forests, rivers, swamps, deserts, and oceans as merely a milieu within which something important is set: human life, human history. But what’s at issue
in fact is not an environment; it’s a living world . . . It is thus questionable whether purely economic approach to
biodiversity conservation is adequate to address the loss of all species . Similar point can be made about
different types of animals – those kept for consumption (farm animals), medical experimentation and companionship (pets) or entertainment (zoos,
circuses) and those ‘‘left over’’. To take a historical perspective on human–animal relationships, Shepard (1993) made a clear distinction between wild
animals and those that we use as companions or as food: From this metonymic stew of animal as friend and object emerges the paradox that primal
peoples kept their distance from animals – except from their in-taking as food or prototypes – and could therefore love them as sacred beings and
respect them as other ‘‘peoples’’ while we, with the animals in our laps and our mechanized slaughterhouses, are less sure of who they are and
therefore who we are (Shepard 1993:289).
Attempts at a green capitalist approach is only meant to contain awareness of

the increasing ecological harms posed by capitalism.
Ewing ‘17 (J. A., professor in the Sociology department @ University of Oregon, (2017). Hollow
Ecology: Ecological Modernization Theory and the Death of Nature. Journal of World-Systems
Research, 23(1), 126-155. https://doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2017.611, MX)
In effect, while “ green capitalist ” approaches to the environment have myriad evident
weaknesses impeding their ability to address environmental crisis, they perfectly package
environmental concern in terms friendly to the environmentally destructive profit-and-growth
priorities of firms and states within the CWS. In this context, even apparent “green”
prescriptions are often wedded to economic proposals that undermine any potential of
ecological gains, as was the case with the Rio+20 summit:
Rather than concede the fundamental irrationality of industrialized provisioning, the

transnational ruling class asks the World Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, and UNEP to insert green growth and sustainable development into structural
reform policies on a country by country basis [. . . b]ut at the same time, “innovative
instruments” for high tech financing are to be consistent with the Doha Development Round of
multilateral trade negotiations. The Future We Want builds on Agenda 21, the Johannesburg
Declaration, Monterrey Consensus, Istanbul Programme for Least Developed Countries, and the
Bali Strategic Plan for Technology Support and Capacity Building. (Salleh 2015)
Just as “green capitalist” approaches to environmental governance were initially developed and
promoted by capitalists and their representatives to circumscribe “green” prescriptions within
the constraints of the profit-and-growth priorities of capitalists and capitalist states (Bernstein
2012; Sklair 2001), so has their influence continued in current policy discussions towards the
same purposes. “Green capitalist” solutions were never intended to solve our ecological crises
as much as they were intended to contain increasing public awareness of environmental crises
within a direction that preserved or hopefully amplified profit and growth (and without
substantially addressing the existing relations between the core and periphery ), all at the
expense of our ecological future . While this seems to be the primary EMT goal as well, it
remains to be explained why this approach has retained influence within environmental
sociology to the extent that it has.
Centering financial logic around biosecurity has recreated the problems of

planetary instability. Extinction is a permanent characteristic under this system.
McBrien ’16 (Justin, Ph.D. candidate in modern American environmental and political history
@ University of Virginia, "Accumulating extinction." Anthropocene or capitalocene (2016): 116-
137, MX)
In what follows, we make sense of the Necrocene in four stages. I begin with the “Columbian
exchange” that accompanied the conquest of the Americas after 1492 (Crosby 1972). Pangea
was restored through theintercontinental and transoceanic exchanges of crops, humans,
animals— and commodities. The decimation of indigenous populations made for another
“discovery”: the idea of extinction. Extinction became a problem of knowledge . Second, the
reorganization of capital through scientific management and fossil fuel extraction made
extinction an apparent problem: one that needed “ stewardship .” Capitalism’s dialectic of
accumulation and extinction coevolved with a conceptualization of knowledge of “ risk ” and
“environment.” Capitalism did not ignore environmental risk; it made it the central problem of
its survival. Third, the post-World War II “Great Acceleration” witnessed the convergence of
financial, actuarial, military strategic, and environmental risk around biosecurity . These
emerged primarily from the problems of nuclear warfare and the environmental consequences
of nuclear testing. Finally, biosecurity disappeared into catastrophic nihilism and the embrace of
necrosis; the “ survival economy ” of neoliberalism as the Donner Party. The belief in our
alienation from nature became embodied in the perspective of the human being as the
monstrous all-powerful offspring of nature. The problem of extinction was rendered intrinsic to
human nature rather than to capital.4 The history of environmentalism is the history of
capitalism realizing its own principle of becoming extinction through the conceptual system of
planetary catastrophism. This in turn produced a being toward extinction as a permanent
characteristic .
The “Anthropocene” displaces the origins of the contemporary crisis onto the human being as
species rather than as capital . It reinforces what capital wants to believe of itself: that human
“nature,” not capital , has precipitated today’s planetary instability . The Anthropocene says
“humanity” put the earth under its power, that it could either save or destroy it—yet it also says
the unintended consequences of this power only accelerate our powerlessness over earth’s
inevitable revenge. We have mistaken who “we” are (as some kind of undifferentiated human
mass) from what “we” perform through capital . We have mistaken a historical condition of our
economic organization for an innate aspect of the human being. Planetary Catastrophism has
become the ideology of capitalism, and in this catastrophism begets catastrophe. The more
capital attempts the real subsumption of the earth, the more the earth subsumes it. In the
Necrocene, capitalism’s farce runs concurrent with its tragedy.
.
Environmental Personhood
Ascribing personhood and legal rights to natural entities relegitimizes denial of
those rights and otherizes nature
Jha and Ghosh 18 (Akshita Jha and Adrija Ghosh, students of WB National University of
Juridical Sciences, “Is Being a Person Essential for the Environment to Hold Rights: Assessing the
Legitimacy of Environmental Personhood and Alternative Approaches,” NUJS Law Review, 2018)
http://nujslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/11.3-Akshita-Jha-IS-BEING-A-
%E2%80%98PERSON%E2%80%99-ESSENTIAL-FOR-THE-ENVIRONMENT-TO-HOLD-RIGHTS_-
ASSESSING-THE-LEGITIMACY-OF-ENVIRONMENTAL-PERSONHOOD-AND-ALTERNATIVE-
APPROACHES.pdf //cb
The Uttarakhand High Court has not only declared the two rivers and the “glaciers including Gangotri and Yamunotri, rivers, streams,
rivulets, lakes, air, meadows, dales, jungles, forests wetlands, grasslands, springs and waterfalls” to be legal persons but has also
accorded them substantive rights as possessed by a living person, while imposing upon them duties and liabilities similar to that of a
living person.226 However, the Court has not defined the content of these rights and duties, nor has the Court determined how the
balance between the rights of these natural entities and the rights as well as interests, both economic and social, of natural persons
shall be struck.
There is no clarity as to the content of the rights possessed by the rivers and it is not
clear from the judgments if the rights of the rivers shall extend to the creatures in its ecosystem
or even whether all the rights of the rivers are to be given precedence over human interests in
their exploitation for fulfilling everyday needs.227
Merely saying that rivers possess rights does not serve as an effective guideline .228 The High Court has
also not sufficiently justified why only these natural entities should be considered to be legal
persons, and should henceforth, enjoy rights, while other natural entities are denied such status.
In fact, the
fallacy that exists in the belief that simply giving rights to nature will solve our
environmental problems has been pointed out.229 Cynthia Giagnocavo and Howard Goldstein believe that it does
great harm to simply ascribe rights to the natural environment.230 They argue that once nature is
given a “voice” in the Court and its rights are denied by the courtsin the interest of human
needs, there is a legitimisation of such a denial of nature’s rights, and thus, protection of the
environment takes a backseat.231
The above, for instance, has already happened in Ecuador and Bolivia, where human interests in
developmental activities have been given precedence over the rights of nature .232 Rights of nature
arguments have been successful only in a few cases and have never been successful against large extractive
industries.233 For instance in Ecuador, the 2009 Mining Law was upheld by the Constitutional Court even when
it prejudiced the rights of nature .234 Such a result has the effect of laying down a precedent, justifying the deprivation
of the rights of nature so as to allow the continuance of extremely harmful activities undertaken by humans for the fulfilment of
their ever growing needs. If the Inter-American Court of human rights also happens to uphold the decision of the Constitutional
Court of Ecuador, the rights of nature will effectively be reduced to insignificance.
Cynthia Giagnocavo and Howard Goldstein also pointout that while rights generate discourse, they destroy the
feeling of community or collectiveness, as now humans and corporations view the environment
as the “other”, possessing competing rights.235 They also highlight how when it comes to adjudication, the
competing interests and rights of the State may always be allowed to prevail over those of
nature.236 Even in Ecuador, as argued above, the results are always not in line with the rights of nature philosophy.237 In the
case concerning the open-pit mining project in El Condor Mirador, a biodiversity hotspot, the Court allowed the
mining to proceed even when the environmental impact assessment had established that there
would be contamination of the spot, which would possibly result in the extinction of at least three
endemic amphibian species and one reptilian species found there.238 The Court held that the public interest in
developmental activities would always be allowed to prevail over the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of nature.239
Therefore, it becomes all the more important to delineate the scope of rights that nature possesses such that we are able to clearly
identify the range of human activities that are allowed in circumstances where the interests of nature also need to be considered.
The interest theory of rights needs to be adopted such that the grant of rights to nature stem from duties owed by humans. Thus,
the rights of nature need to be located in the duties that humans owe to nature instead of
ascribing rights to nature in the abstract . As such, having a defined set of duties that humans must perform, from
which emanate the rights of nature, will help the implementation and protection of these rights. This will lead to a better balancing
of interests, as we shall clearly understand the scope of nature’s rights and their relationship with the duties and obligations that
humans have towards nature.
We shall now seek to highlight the benefits of such an approach. Nature does not remain a mere object of protection (although
humans still owe obligations and duties to nature), as an eco-centric ethic emerges240 from the recognition of nature’s rights, based
on these duties.. It is not our argument that granting nature rights shall prove to be a redundant effort, and thus, we argue that the
benefit of such an approach of locating the rights of nature in human duties shall be the generation of discourse. Rights generate
discourse, and at this juncture, it may be observed that any effort towards the preservation of nature is going to be slow in reaping
benefits, in light of the anthropocentric discourse which dominates. Rights when granted will be weak, and sometimes human
interests will be given precedence but the recognition of nature’s rights, as a result of the need to protect valuable interests of these
natural objects will help develop an eco-centric ethic in environmental law, thereby giving momentum to preservation efforts.
Recognition of rights will lead to growing normalcy and care for these rights.241
However, care must be taken to ensure to prevent the ‘otherisation’ of nature . Nature’s interests should
not be seen as competing interests, and thus, it is important to recognise mankind’s duties towards nature. From these duties, we
can identify different rights that nature possesses. As part of this approach, based on the interest theory of rights, it also must be
understood that ‘interests’ are to be interpreted objectively and not subjectively.
The rights of nature movement argues that natural entities have interests and preferences that if recognised by way of some legal
fiction can be politically expressed and legally enforced.242 Thus, applying the interest theory of rights, we in turn argue that since
natural entities have interests requiring protection, they qualify as holders of rights. While this approach may seem to be a dilution
of the rights of nature theory, which concentrates more on the intrinsic value of nature than on the duties owed by humans to
nature,243 it is really not an erosion of the tenets of the theory. Recognition of duties is important for the success of the rights of
nature movement as the problems of merely ascribing nature rights in the abstract, may counteract
any move towards the development of an eco-centric approach to the protection of the
environment. The interest theory of rights is not a compromise, as even though we shall locate nature’s rights in the duties
owed by human beings, we will also be recognising nature as a holder of rights on the basis that it has interests worthy of being
furthered through the recognition of these rights. Acknowledgement of nature’s rights because of its intrinsic
value which requires protection is distinct from protecting nature solely for human welfare .
Green Technology
Focus on reductions of individual emissions abates the individual
responsibilities we have to combat climate change.
Baard ’15 (Patrik, post-doctoral fellow at Malmö University, "Managing climate change: A view
from deep ecology." Ethics & the Environment 20.1 (2015): 23-44, MX)
Our normative frameworks therefore “ collapse ” in the face of the scope required for managing
climatic changes . While not arguing that they lead to moral corruption, Jamieson suggests that our view on
moral responsibility is so inadequate that we assume no sense of responsibility at all, or as
suggested: “We face the possibility that the global environment may be destroyed, yet no one will
be responsible” (Jamieson 1992, 145). Again, the reason for such inadequacy concerns the spatial and
temporal scope of climatic changes, the complex causality , and the proposed negligent levels of
individual emissions . Since every emission contributes in such a marginal way to raising the probability
and magnitude of climatic changes, we can hardly say that even a person going on a Sunday drive, with
no particular intent than enjoyment, violates a human right. This is so despite the fact that the
act can easily be foregone , that it does not fulfill any basic need , and that it adds emissions
that drive anthropogenic climate change, thus increasing the likelihood and magnitude of climatic
changes. Instead of basing normative demands on consequentialist reasons, we should develop
green virtues as non-calculative generators of action: “when it comes to large-scale collective-action problems,
calculation invites madness…because the sums are impossible to do” (Jamieson 2010, 318). Green virtues, such as
humility, temperance, mindfulness, cooperativeness, and respect for nature, are required to guide behavior.
Callicott (2014, 97) speaks of the inadequacy of both anthropocentric and biocentric viewpoints, suggesting that “[a] thing is right
when it tends to preserve the beauty of the biotic community and to disturb it only at normal spatial and temporal scales. It is wrong
when it tends otherwise.”3 Thus, he has a holistic view on normative demands and moral consideration, and base normative
demands on moral sentiments and care. Only
a holistic view on demands and moral sentiments can provide
us with reasons why we should act in the long term, something that rationality, often geared
toward short-term self-interest , cannot. This includes care for immediate posterity and the
unknown future. Immediate posterity designates currently existing younger generations and
“caring what kind of world they will have to live in as they progress through their lifetimes” (Callicott 2014, 297).
This care can stretch into the unknown future by, for instance, care for the preservation of human civilization, which will require that
we live as part of our biotic communities on the basis of the mentioned maxim.
Green capitalism/policy solutions amplifies commodity fetishism by destroying

ecological rationality.
Ewing ‘17 (J. A., professor in the Sociology department @ University of Oregon, (2017). Hollow
Ecology: Ecological Modernization Theory and the Death of Nature. Journal of World-Systems
Research, 23(1), 126-155. https://doi.org/10.5195/jwsr.2017.611, MX)
The factors that contribute to ecologically harmful overconsumption practices are amplified by
those keeping consumers in the CWS under-informed of the ecological quality of the goods
they consume. Individual consumers in the CWS tend to be blind to the process of production, and therefore the social (Marx
1990) and ecological (Jones 2011) relations and processes that created the commodity, a phenomena Marx discussed in terms of
commodity fetishism (Marx 1990). This commodity fetishism is amplified by the increasing distance
between production and consumption in the CWS, the proliferation of marketing (as it drowns out
neutral information and thus increases the cost of acquiring it) (Hudson and Hudson 2003), and
copyrights, patents, and trademarks (Schor 2011). These phenomena collectively reduce the likelihood
that consumers understand the true ecological cost of individual consumption . As information
asymmetries between producers and consumers tend to cause the average value of a
commodity to decrease (Akerlof 1970), this can easily extend to the diminishment of the ecological
quality of goods over time (Kuhn 1999).
Consumer blindness to the true ecological costs of their consumption

cannot adequately be solved within the CWS by
the common “ green capitalist” advocated eco-labeling proposal due to profit-oriented corporate
“greenwashing.” Greenwashing emerges from the reality of ‘ ecological rationality’ being at best
a secondary concern for firms (if at all) against their aforementioned biases towards profit
maximization . This effectively guarantees that “in the absence of a compulsory system, corporations will continue
to hold a strong incentive to appear socially responsible while avoiding the costs of actually
doing so” (Alves 2009), producing a rampant tendency towards greenwashing at either the firm-level or the product-level
(Delmas and Burbano 2011). The TerraChoice Group has categorized product-level greenwashing into
the “seven sins” of greenwashing, including (among others) the ‘Sin of No Proof’, where
environmental claims cannot be substantiated , and the ‘Sin of Worshipping False Labels’, where
a product gives the impression of a third-party endorsement but no such endorsement exists
(TerraChoice Group 2010). For example, of the 5,296 home and family consumer products examined in the 2010 ‘Sins of
Greenwashing’ report, over 95% of ‘greener’ products commit at least one of the seven Sins of Greenwashing.
“ Greenwashing ” amplifies consumer eco-blindness while eroding confidence in green firms and products (Delmas and
Burbano 2011), and cannot
form a primary solution to our ecological woes within the context of the CWS. In
short, there are no organic tendencies towards reliable prioritization of ecological rationality in
either production or consumption within the CWS.
The aff’s solutions are limited under what “fits” within capitalist logic.
Gunderson et al. ’20 (Ryan, Department of Sociology and Gerontology, Miami, Diana Stuart,
environmental sociologist @ Northern Arizona University, and Matthew Houser, Environmental
Resilience Institute and Department of Sociology, PhD @ Indiana, "A political‐economic theory
of relevance: Explaining climate change inaction." Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour
50.1 (2020): 42-63, MX)
This project revisits the conflictual conversation between phenomenology and critical theory by
bringing Adorno's sociology and critique of phenomenology into conversation with Schutz's
theory of relevance. We develop a political-economic theory of relevance that places the
problem of relevance, “why these facts and precisely these are selected by thought from the
totality of lived experience and regarded as relevant” (Schutz, 1967c, p. 250), in political-
economic context. We argue that the drive to accumulate capital influences why particular
facts are regarded as relevant in experience (topical relevance) as well as how relevant material
is interpreted (interpretative relevance) and acted toward (motivational relevance). We apply
this framework to the problem of climate change inaction, or the question of why societies
have failed to effectively respond to climate change. We illustrate the fruitfulness of our
framework by analyzing interpretations of the IPCC's (2018) special report on the prospect of
catastrophic climate change and strengthening Ollinaho's (2016) Schutzian explanation for
climate change inaction.
A political-economic theory of relevance offers a neglected, yet critical, perspective in

understanding climate change inaction and ineffective action. While much attention has
focused on macrolevel phenomena , such as well-funded denialist campaigns, weak
international agreements, and the ineffectiveness of carbon markets (McCright & Dunlap, 2010;
Beck, 2010; Klein, 2014; Stuart et al.,2019), others have focused on psychological factors
regarding how individuals perceive and process information about climate change (e.g., Dietz
et al., 2007; Feygina, et al., 2010; Shwom et al., 2010; McCright, Dunlap, & Xiao, 2014). A
political economy of relevance illustrates how these two realms intersect and specifically how
social-structural context shapes what receives attention, what seems rational , and what seems
possible in response to climate change. The imperative to accumulate capital acts as the
ultimate, and in some cases invisible, “structural because-motive” that constrains
interpretations of climate change and limits individuals to solutions that fit within capitalist
logic . Therefore, more effective solutions that break free of this logic are rendered irrelevant.
The aff is a form of consumption constantly demanding “safer commodities.”

Gunderson ’14 (Ryan, Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology and Gerontology @
Miami University, "Problems with the defetishization thesis: ethical consumerism, alternative
food systems, and commodity fetishism." Agriculture and human values 31.1 (2014): 109-117,
MX)
The planet is warming , biodiversity loss is rampant, freshwater sources are dwindling and
tainted, and public health is at risk due to environmental pollutants . One of the largest efforts
to stop the looming socio-ecological catastrophe(s) is shopping . In a study funded by the Co-operative Bank,
Cowe and Williams (2000) have correctly recognized that ‘‘ shoppers who care have increasingly been able to
find something to fit their [ ethical] principles’’ (p. 18). Indeed. Organic baby food, eco-friendly
wood, energy efficient light bulbs, and recycled versions of nearly everything are available for
‘‘shoppers who care.’’ Ethical consumerism (Hilton 2003) 2 has grown steadily since the 1980s (Lang and
Gabriel 2005). The fundamental premise of ethical consumption is that shopping for commodities
from more humane , just, and environmentally friendly origins can create progressive social change and bring
humans to a more sustainable relationship with the rest of the biosphere.
But where did the idea originate that one can create progressive social change through
shopping? Consumption especially consumption to meet survival needs (such as food), has traditionally been
associated with the joy gained through attainment , desire fulfillment, and/or bodily incorporation (see,
for instance, Sartre 1956), not an act conceptualized as (im)moral , save etiquette and custom,3 or aligned with a
political program, save consumer boycotts. Modern movements for progressive change traditionally focused
on altering production through political means, not on altering consumption habits through
marketplace choices . To use an analogy, older social movements wanted a larger piece of the pie (e.g., populist
progressives, social democrats) or wanted to take the whole bakery (e.g., socialists, communists, anarchists). But when did buying
A critical account of
pie with fairly traded ingredients at the organic bakery become a symbolically progressive act?
ethical consumerism must comprehend its historically contingent character.
Lang and Gabriel (2005) have presented a helpful history of activism revolving around consumption.4 The midtwentieth century
‘‘value for money’’ consumer phase was primarily concerned with the control of the price and quality of non-essential consumer
goods. This type of consumer ‘‘activism’’ is still epitomized by the influential magazine, Consumer Reports (Johnston 2008).
Naderism’s grassroots consumerism followed the thriftiness of the post-war period. Instead
of hierarchical flows of
information on how to get ‘‘more bang for your buck, ’’ Naderism emphasized grassroots
approaches to end the hazardous or potentially hazardous character of unregulated consumer goods .
Consumers were expected to form groups to combat the anarchy of the market, demanding
safer commodities and accountability from corporations. The current phase of consumer activism is ethical consumerism.
Ethical consumerism arose out of environmentalism (Johnston 2008) and was quickly adopted by a range of movements concerned
with corporate power, neoliberal economic globalization,5 social justice, and human rights abuses. Ethical consumers have
demanded a variety of ethical commodities, such as clothes not derived from sweatshops (Mandle 2000), fairly traded coffee, and
organic and locally grown foods.
That form of “ethical consumerism” fails to recognize that producers are the
primary influencers of consumption under a capitalist system.
MX)
Capitalism is a mode of production that reproduces itself through intensification, geographical

expansion , and, of course, the expropriation of surplus value . It must get bigger to maintain
its structures or it will suffer severe, recurring economic crises (and, as Marx knew, growth too
can bring about crises). Despite the radical structural transformations that have taken place in
capitalism since Marx’s time, his ‘‘general formula’’ for capital (money– commodities–more
money ) still holds true as much as it did in 1867 (Marx 1977; see Me´sza´ros 1995).7 This
equation must continuously take place on an ever increasing and ever-expanding scale if
capitalism is to survive . Many scholars have argued that the inherent expansionary
mechanisms of capitalism make hope for a ‘‘ sustainable capitalism’’ unlikely . This general view
is epitomized by Schnaiberg’s (1980) ‘‘treadmill of production’’ (ToP) theory, which argues that
in a profit-maximizing socioeconomic system, production must continually expand, creating a
production cycle that necessarily increases inputs (natural resource extraction ) and outputs
( pollution ) (for similar theses see O’Connor 1998 and Foster 1999). In relation to consumption,
ToP theorists argue the following: (1) production is at the root of environmental degradation
(Schnaiberg 1980), (2) consumers have little control over happenings in production regimes
(Gould et al. 2004), (3) producers are actually much more likely to influence what consumers
want via advertising than consumers making independent choices (Schnaiberg 1980; cf. Weber
1978), and (4) consumer choice for green and ethical commodities have little to no effect on
how the ToP operates at large (Gould et al. 2004) (cf. excellent discussion in Foster et al. 2010).
Thus, to be ecologically sustainable, capitalism would need to (1) slow economic growth so it
does not overstep natural limits and (2) plan production to meet the basic needs of human
beings and the rest of the biosphere. Bookchin (1980) accurately described the problem with
the former necessity: ‘‘[o]ne might more easily persuade a green plant to desist from
photosynthesis than to ask the bourgeois economy to desist from capital accumulation’’ (p. 66).
Simply, capitalism is growth dependent and exists to expand and accumulate capital and,
empirically, environmental degradation increases as economies grow (for a good review, see
York et al. 2010). The latter necessity (i.e., planned production concerned with meeting needs
rather than increasing private gain) would require a radically different conception of what
human labor ought to be utilized for—a conception free from profit motive and rooted in
substantive rather than instrumental reason. Both necessities fall outside what capitalism ‘‘is.’’
As O’Connor (1998, p. 235) put it, ‘‘a systematic answer to the question, ‘Is an ecologically
sustainable capitalism possible?’ is, ‘Not unless and until capital changes its face in ways that
would make it unrecognizable to bankers, money managers, venture capitalists, and CEOs
looking at themselves in the mirror today.’’’
There is no “green innovation” under the current system. It only reifies our
mistakes and allows for capitalism to reinvent itself.
Larsen ‘19 (Tibbe, Lund University, "The Hegemony of Green Capitalism: A critique of the
imaginary that the environmental crisis can be solved by capitalism." (2019), MX)
There are several points of criticism of the theory about green growth and green capitalism. The
first and most evident criticism of green growth lies in the fact that there is no scientific
foundation to the idea that it is possible (Foster et. al. 2010; Hickel & Kallis 2019; Wanner
2015; Wright & Nyberg 2015). Other points of criticism relate to the fact that it does not
challenge the logic of capitalism, which aims to expand and maximise profits ( Browne 2017;
Klein 2017; Malm 2016; Smith 2015; Swyngedouw 2011; Wright and Nyberg 2015).
The agenda of green growth is closely connected to the reinvention of capitalism as green
capitalism. Because the idea of growth is so tied to modernist conceptions of prosperity and
welfare it is supported by many international intergovernmental institutions (Screpanti &
Zamagni 2005: 69). However, there is actually no empirical evidence that this is possible (Hickel
& Kallis 2019). The main idea in green growth is that decoupling is possible, albeit, it has been
proven elusive (Wright & Nyberg 2017: 17). Hickel and Kallis (2019) offer an extensive review on
studies that examine the possibility for green growth under various circumstances.
Decoupling is commonly measured by dividing GDP by domestic material consumption16 (DMC),

a calculation which gives an indication of the efficiency of the economy (Hickel & Kallis 2019: 3).
It is important to distinguish relative from absolute decoupling and to fathom what is measured.
For instance, in OECD’s measures of DMC the use of fossil fuels is not included, nor is the
“material impact of production and transport of imported goods” incorporated in DMC
calculations (Hickel & Kallis 2019: 3). If it is not clear whether we are talking about relative or
absolute decoupling when, say, politicians claim to achieve decoupling, we cannot determine
the actual status of said decoupling. Similarly, it is relevant to know whether we are dealing
with decoupling GDP from fossil fuel consumption or material consumption in general.
A study referenced by Hickel and Kallis (Hickel & Kallis 2019: 3) shows that when resource use is
included in the calculations we see a negative process of decoupling economic growth in GDP
from that of resource use in USA, Japan, UK, OECD countries, and EU countries. Studies based on
future projections suggest that relative decoupling may be possible, however, it requires that
environmental policies are significantly changed, as well as a certain level of material efficiency
and technological innovation . Nothing currently suggests that such actions or developments
will happen (Hickel & Kallis 2019: 5). Evidence suggests that growth in GDP simply cannot be
absolutely decoupled from overconsumption of resource use (Ibid.). Because GDP growth
cannot continue indefinitely, it is problematic to develop growth-oriented policies based on the
assumption that decoupling is possible (Hickel & Kallis 2019: 7). The idea of growth is so
fundamental to modernisation theory that it is almost unthinkable for any nation to limit growth
even if it may be ecologically necessary (Hickel & Kallis 2019: 15). To rethink prosperity and
wellbeing and detach these conceptions from growth in GDP is, however, necessary.
Capitalism relies on the very nature it destroys (Browne 2018: 437; Fraser 2014). It is inherently
incompatible with protecting the environment nor people (Smith 2015: 50). As Monbiot
concludes in a recent article in the Guardian: it is not about the adjective – capitalism is
capitalism . The nature of capitalism does not change because you put ‘green’ in front of it
(Monbiot 2019). At the core of capitalism lies the principle of maximising profits. To this end,
those with the means of production can increase their capital by buying labour and selling the
commodities made with a profit (Malm 2016: 283; Marx 1976: 251). As such, capitalism defines
a certain kind of social relationship between those who sell their labour power and those with
the means to buy it in exchange for wages, which can buy the necessary commodities to live,
such as food and housing, thereby workers can reproduce their ability to work – sell their labour
power (Stoll 2014: 372). Capitalism relies on expansion and the fictitious commodification of
labour and nature (land) in order to reproduce itself (Foster 2010: 160; Polanyi 2001: 75-76;
Smith 2015: 50; Wright & Nyberg 2015: 59). Therefore, the effects of capitalism are exemplified
in this quote by Stoll (2014): “Capitalism’s strive for the ceaseless creation of surplus value at
all costs is behind virtually all examples of environmental degradation .”
I-Law – Generic
I-Law is ecological bankrupt and must be rejected to form new ideological
structures
Mattei 18, (Ugo Mattei is the Alfred and Hanna Fromm Professor of International and
Comparative Law at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, in San Francisco,
California and a full Professor of Civil Law in the University of Turin), “The ecology of
international law: towards an international legal system in tune with nature and community,”
The Commons and a New Global Governance, December 28 2018,
https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781788118507/9781788118507.00020.xml //SDD
We now turn to this very narrow body of knowledge which is called ‘international law’ and which only makes
sense if understood in the broader geopolitical context in which it is deployed and entrenched (Monateri,
2018: p. 4). Indeed, talking about international law per se, as much as talking about law in general, does not make much sense. Such
abstract reasoning does not allow us to understand much about its nature. If we want to understand something about international
law – as well as about law in general – we have to look at it in context. For that purpose, we first need a good ecological
understanding of international law, which means placing the object under observation within the community of relationships in
which it actually functions. In this sense, the
ecology of international law would be composed of the
whole of connections that make it a living part of a much more complex organism – which is
the political, economic and geographical context. In a way, this means adopting a systemic approach to international law. This
approach is not only interested in international law within its own box, but intends to also think
beyond its confines, by
studying it in its relationships and in its life, in a more complex manner. This is one first important
meaning of an ecology of international law. Now, let us try to see international law in practice: how it
functions, how it works, what kind of losers and winners it produces, what kind of effects it has on sustainability, and whether it is
part of the solution or the problem. Perhaps, if we look at international law within its own context, and we consider its impact on
the overall social organization, it may be more part of the problem than of the solution. We
cannot assume that it is
inherently ‘good’. This is something that a critical thinker must always be aware of: nothing is beyond questioning. The
more you find people who become true believers of lovely ideas ( for example, international
human rights), the more a concept attracts consensus, the more it is worth questioning because
usually this is where ideology hides. Usually, international law is a trendy thing to do in law school; but you need to
understand what you are talking about. So how do we actually understand whether a concept is ecologically desirable or not? What
do we mean by ecologically desirable? Here we put another question on the table – that is, how we determine whether some sort of
concept or some sort of institution is actually ecologically desirable or not. This notion is normative in nature. Indeed, according to
the traditional understanding in social sciences, there are two ways to look at reality: on the one hand, descriptive/analytical claims
(‘how can I describe international law in a way that is thick enough to make sense and become an interesting topic of analysis?’), and
on the other hand, normative claims (‘what do we mean by ecologically desirable?’). The question we put forward in this chapter is
nothing less than this: do we want international law or not? Is international law a good thing to begin with? Some centuries ago,
Voltaire (1694–1778), wrote an entry entitled ‘law’ in the Encyclopédie, which said that if you wanted good laws, you
should throw away all old laws and define new ones. Essentially, in his view, the only way to have good
laws in a context of radical critique of the Ancien Régime, is to discard all the old and existing laws and to start afresh. We could
possibly argue something similar in international law. We could argue that international law is – at least in part – responsible for the
International law is arguably deeply part of the extractive
state of the world that we described above.
system that today dominates the world. International law is indeed a very important part of the global order
today, and therefore it might share some responsibility for today’s state of affairs – after all, the law is the
way in which a community gives to itself a shared resolve and the way we manage such things as a global community is through
international law. For example, if
we realize that global warming is taking place, we may decide
that we want to come down with a good international agreement to handle global
warming. In fact, the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP) of the Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris was an
attempt to confront the issue through international law (United Nations, 2015). If the way we act globally is
through international law, and if global efforts tend to be poor, one argument could be that
international law is dysfunctional and that we should declare international
bankruptcy. So, as was done by Voltaire with the laws of the Ancien Régime, we could say today that all international
law instruments such as the UN Charter or other international human rights instruments
are just words and good intentions. Institutionally, international law could be declared
to be broke and we should then get rid of it.
International law was created to TRASFORM commons into capital – separating

the “Cartesian self” from nature
If we can assume that technology

is introducing a certain kind of disconnection, is taking away empathy, is
creating some sort of a dramatic separation within the world of the subject–object, we get an idea of how to
build an ecology of international law – that is to say, to look at international law from the point of view of sustainability
and resilience. The technology of international law – the means to an end that is desirable per se – is actually in the making of
modernity. Modernity produced a very broad and significant transformation of legal systems that were based on ‘commons’
institutions, into individual systems. Tremendous economic resources were needed to establish the centralized institutional settings
that would usher in what economic historian Karl Polanyi called the ‘great transformation’ at the dawn of modernity (1944). The
‘primitive’ accumulation of capital, necessary for the jump-start of any early capitalist social organization, was
generated not only by enclosures and the transformation of the biological time of communal life into the quantifiable, alienated
time of factory work, but also by seeking resources from abroad (Mattei and Nader, 2008). There was in the pre-modern
era, in the Ancien Régime, a large abundance of commons – both physical and social. Capital was still very scarce at that
time. Every peasant could, for example, enjoy the products of forests. Commons were also social institutions. Village economies
were based on use value, and not exchange value. Families were commons. A lot of enterprises were run as commons: the guilds of
notaries, painters and so on. People were not living by themselves, but as part of an organized structure where they would be living
their whole lives. The
early political territorial powers required almost unlimited capital to complete
the centralization of state authority . The legal constructions of modernity were therefore carried out by denying legal
dignity to previous (commons-based) legal institutions. Jurists mixed together the doctrine of private property and public
sovereignty, manipulating materials of Roman times. They made the assumption that all things – especially lands – that were not
already deemed private property could be occupied. Ownership and sovereignty became the two organizational principles of legal
modernity, structuring the individual-centred vision of law that is still with us today. Rationalist natural law was, thus, instrumental
in constructing the conditions for plunder. The early acts of incorporation, which created a legal personhood as a rational expansion
of physical personhood, gave corporations limited liability and the right to bear arms in order to guarantee their own survival (Mattei
and Quarta, 2018). This legal artefact led to tremendous colonial expansion and exploitation. Roman law, rationalized by the natural-
law school, provided the language and the rituals to justify the oppression. The fundamental vision – given great prestige by writers
such as Nicolò Machiavelli, Jean Bodin, and Thomas Hobbes – was that, in secular matters of sovereignty, might makes right (Capra
and Mattei, 2015: pp. 74–6; Monateri, 2018). International law as we know it today was created by Hugo Grotius (de Groot) (1583–
1645), a Protestant Dutch lawyer and politician who founded what is known as the northern school
of natural law, which
was based on a Cartesian vision of rational natural laws. For most of his life, Grotius worked as a hired gun
serving the interests of the Dutch East India Company, the first global corporation. He demonstrated a staggering capacity to deduct,
from objective and universal principles of reason, legal solutions that favoured his powerful corporate clients yet remained
acceptable to ‘civilized’ sovereign nations (Meiksins Wood, 2012). Of special importance was Grotius’ ability to offer legal
advantages to private corporations over states. For instance, in his book Mare Liberum (The Free Sea), he argued in favour of the
East India Company’s right to attack and plunder a Portuguese ship. Grotius argued that Portugal’s claim of exclusivity on certain
routes on the high seas was against the natural openness of this ‘global common’, thus justifying the attack as actually protecting the
rational order. Thus the discipline of international law was born in an act of corporate plunder, paradoxically justified by a brilliant
jurist deploying the Roman legal concept of the high seas as a natural common (res communis omnium). The Peace of Westphalia
(1648) finally simplified the international legal order around a system of nation-states, fiercely independent from one another. These
European states were ownersof their territories, just as the ancient Roman paterfamilias had been the owner of his land (Capra and
Mattei, 2015: pp. 63–4). This is very important to understand the current situation, because
today we are in a way
discounting the consequences of the construction of a legal landscape that gives privileged
status to certain kinds of institutions, as well as to the unlimited accumulation of wealth. The corporation was
born together with international law. That was again a way to transform commons into capital , one of
the tools in order to transform use value into exchange value. You create a corporate charter to give incentives to people who want
to invest money to put them in a very safe position knowing that if things go badly, they will only lose that part of capital. We were
very successful in this enterprise. As humankind, we were so successful in the process of transforming commons into capital that
today wedo not have commons anymore but huge amounts of capital . In essence, international law
was responsible for shaping the legal landscape that made this transformation of commons into capital
possible. By producing the same kind of capitalist landscape as private law, international law was able to transform all commons
into capital. Today, every single commons is suffering, and the capital is over-abundant – that became clear during the 2008
economic crisis. The problem is that the conditions upon which we determine and review these legal institutions have completely
changed. Now we have too much capital and too little commons. And yet, we still have the same fundamental international legal
structure in place. International legal institutions still work in transforming more commons into capital. International law has
not produced any fundamental rethinking of the discipline. Since its foundation by Hugo Grotius,
international law has remained based on individualized Cartesian building blocks – legal persons
in competition with each other within a mechanistic, depoliticized vision of law – rather than being
interpreted as a genuine global network of relationships where actual power ratios between and within
communities make it impossible to distinguish law from politics (Capra and Mattei, 2015: pp. 117–18). The only commons that are
left are social commons like friendship, which themselves are becoming capital. Nowadays, friendship is marketed on Facebook,
Twitter and so on. Your personality becomes a commodity. What counts for these companies is the amount of knowledge they have
about you, so that they can sell it to third parties for advertisement or control purposes. We are again in a moment of massive
transformation. In this state of affairs, the changes we need are radical. We need institutions that try to serve opposite purposes to
what the legal institutions in force are doing today. This is what the ecology of international law is about: what kind of institutions do
we need for sustainability? Are therefundamental laws of nature and reproduction of life on the planet that should not be conflated
with the human law that we deploy in organizing our society? My point is that the
laws of nature are based upon
principles that are plainly ignored by human law. There is a big gap between what the needs of reproduction on
the planet are (systemic thinking) and the way we look at our own laws (individual-centred and based on a pattern of extraction).
International law is itself an extractive setting in need of progressive regeneration and conversion, because while we think globally,
we act locally, where physical and cultural resistance can happen (Capra and Mattei, 2015: p. 156). International law,
however, organizesthe extractive machine par excellence – the centralized state, with the fiction of formal equality
between states and with a pattern of commutative justice without
the holistic distributive justice to which we
actually need to resort.
I-Law is beyond repair –prioritizes the needs of the individual and the
destruction of the commons – incompatible with an ecological view
This chapter has sought to provide a radical ecological reading of international law by articulating the ‘evil
technology hypothesis’. For this purpose, Section 2 started with the basic assumption that because we, humans, have only
one planet, our ecological footprint should be equal to one planet. This is the criterion against which the sustainability of our
actions on the international plane should be determined. Section 3 introduced Martti Koskenniemi’s indeterminacy thesis, whereby
the uncertain political grounds of the liberal project behind international law have made the latter
prone to become an instrument that is able to justify even radically opposing outcomes , depending on the
political motivations a certain international lawyer may decide to pursue in each particular case. This has been followed by a brief
foray into Anghie’s theory about the colonial genesis of international law and, most importantly, hisdepiction of
international law as a technology, i.e., as a means to pursue ends, around which the value judgements are assumed to
be uncontroversial. This section restated, as the starting point for our further argument, the idea of international law as
incrementally transformed by corporate interests into imperial law, a reactive institutional
setting which effectively precludes the possibility of distribution in favour of weaker actors . Section
4 then investigated the possibility that technology in general – far from being a form that can accommodate different uses – is
actually ‘evil’ in itself, in that it privileges certain modes of relation to the human and other-than-human world that systematically
favours objectification of the ‘other’ and an ethos of domination over people and the planet. Secondly, the
ability of
technology to channel energies into narrow pursuits has been regarded as one possible factor
behind the unsustainable growth of civilization, understood as a pattern of human living that (based as it is on
elevation of the reproductive interest of a certain human community above the possibility for
other human and other-than-human communities equally to renew themselves) is incapable of being supported by the land
base and requires trade and extraction of resources. These insights, articulated in ecological literature, have then been translated in
the field of international law in Section 5. It has been said that international
law is at odds with the way nature is
actually organized. Nature is organized around commons and open patterns – not conservation
of power or extraction. The kind of rules that we should look for are therefore generative rules – rules that allow life to
reproduce according to its own processes and give subjectivity not just to humans (especially human individuals), but larger living
communities that include humans and non-humans. International law has to open up and understand that its functioning can only
become resilient if it is capable of allowing the natural process of life to reproduce itself. This is why there is a more radical,
fundamental critique of international law – because international law operates on too large a scale. Sustainability works only on a
localized basis. The small scale of legal institutions is extremely important, because legal and political institutions serve the commons
only when they are very close to the context from which they emerge. The moment these institutions become abstract artefacts,
professionalized notions of law that remain in the domain of the ‘transcendent’, is when the solution becomes the problem. This is
why I consider international law to be beyond repair.
I-Law – Evil Tech Thesis
I-Law encourages violent technology that further separates the individual from
nature – legitimizing exploitation
Much of the mythology of the neutrality of international human rights remains. The idea that there are certain kinds of universal
ideas that actually are per se good to share and to spread is still very much alive among international lawyers and lawyers in general
– and in policy-making discussions. There is still quite a heavy professionalized ideology that is hidden behind the question of
desirability itself. Therefore, the argument I seek to make here goes one step further than Anghie’s thesis. I assume as a starting
point that the international legal project incrementally turned into the global framework of imperial law (Mattei, 2003), by excluding
global resource redistributions other than those maintaining the bottom line. As an incrementally expanding ‘reactive’ institutional
setting, international law has seized the historical opportunity produced by the demise of the Soviet model (Mamyluk and Mattei,
2011) to develop a strong global alliance with corporate power. This alliance has transformed
international law into a
disorder-spreading technology (Keizer et al., 2008), thus producing a global institutional scenario that
progressively transfers common resources in corporate control by legitimizing plunder (Mattei and
Nader, 2008). In particular, I contend here that such global transformation does not even require conscious political agency at this
point. Indeed, the very interposition of a technology in the pursuit of a particular interest increases the distance between oneself
and the ‘other’, and this invariably works to enable the expansion of unsustainable and exploitative relationships with the human
and other-than-human inhabitants of the planet, even under the best of intentions. This, in other words, is the ‘evil technology
hypothesis’. For instance, the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), which hosted a conference entitled ‘Towards a
Radical International Law’ in May 2011, built a majestic New Academic Building (NAB). The seven-something-storey building radiated
newness and modernity. The perfect building, one would say, to embody the ethos of excellence of the contemporary university.
And yet, natural light was distinctivelylacking. Small, encased windows and a see-through ceiling were not nearly enough to provide
sufficient illumination, requiring the backup of copious artificial lighting. Additionally, stairs were apparently available only up to the
first two floors, leaving elevators as the preferred means of transport to reach any higher floors. What kind of person might the
architects who designed the building have had in mind as they set out to draw the plans? Clearly, the person must have been
someone oblivious to the difference between natural and artificial light. Additionally, that person must also have been someone who
values the minimization of ‘body usage’ to reach the classroom, bodies being simply brain vessels. So, technology (lights and
elevators) in the building crucially made it possible for people to hold or develop an ethos of separateness from nature, as well as
one’s body. And not even to question its awkwardness: all of the conference participants were, in fact, bathing in artificial light and
taking those elevators, without even noticing the kind of detachment from their bodies and the world around them that the
infrastructure was silently promoting. The mind did not need to be transported by the body, but by elevators. And, thus, there
is
a disconnect between mind and body . The subject is objectively separated from nature. This disconnection between
human and nature, and human body and human mind, is symbolized in the NAB. Most banks today are similar. The urban life is also
dramatically disconnected from the light of Gaia. The fact that more than half of the world’s population is urbanized makes
technology indispensable in order to channel resources to sustain these territories. We get addicted to technologies.
The dis-empathizing potential inherent in the use of technology – of any technology – is also nicely
illustrated through a hypothetical example offered by radical ecologist Ran Prieur in his book Civilization Will Eat Itself (2001). Prieur
suggests imagining a group of super-intelligent monkeys that learn to use spears. Spears make it easier for monkeys to kill, as
opposed to using their bare hands (Prieur, 2001: pp. 27–8): So spear-using monkeys would kill in more ordinary circumstances, and
more often. They would learn that spear-killing could get them better land, and better food, and better mates. They would get used
to pleasures they could get only through spear-killing. Worse, they would lose the skills they needed to live without spears. Now, to
give up their habit of making and using spears would be so painful that it would be impossible if you had the self-discipline of a
monkey. Now, if you have the awareness of a monkey, you will experience your spearkilling societal pattern as an uncompromisable
necessity, and you will viciously attack anything that threatens it. But what threatens it is the expansion of your own empathy. If you
– or other monkeys – start feeling as close to a monkey at the end of a 30-foot spear throw as you used to feel to a monkey right in
front of you, if it starts to get as hard for monkeys to kill with spears as it used tobe to kill with bare hands, then you fear that the
spear-killing technology will become emotionally unsustainable, and your civilization will collapse, and you will lose your economic
advantages, and you and your friends and family will suffer and maybe die. So you viciously attack the expansion of your own
empathy, and the empathy of others. Monkeys learn and teach others to stick a boundary between ‘self’ and ‘other’, to sustain fear
and hatred indefinitely, to greet the unfamiliar with mistrust and discomfort and hostility, not curiosity and excitement and
acceptance. And here, I say, is where the monkeys become what we call evil: when dependence on a harmful behavior leads them to
inhibit their love. This is where technology can bring about evil outcomes. While in Prieur’s example the focus is solely on the
empathy between ‘monkeys’, it is submitted that the example could well be extended – at least from the
perspective of
‘deep ecology’ – beyond the feeling of empathy between beings of the same species. Deep
ecology is the ‘branch’ of ecology that focuses not just on ‘conservation’ for anthropocentric
survival concerns, but on re-defining the basic paradigm of the relation between humans and
nature (Holder and Lee, 2007: pp. 48–50). It posits an underlying kinship between human and other-than-human beings, which
has been explained, for instance, through a panpsychist understanding of the world that regards consciousness
as a property inherent in all matter. In this framework, human consciousness simply becomes a
property emerging out of the complex interaction of consciousness already present in matter .
Adopting such a perspective, it becomes possible to argue that a basic empathy between human
and otherthan-human beings is at the root of life on the planet, so that something meaningful is also lost
whenever the other-than-human world is objectified and made subservient to human needs. Returning to the ‘evil technology
hypothesis’, once
technology enables ‘a disconnection and contraction of consciousness, a forced
channelling of wider energies to serve narrower interests’ (Prieur, 2001: p. 10), a growth mechanism is
set in motion whereby those narrower interests (such as the reproduction of a particular community), after being
‘privileged’ through technology, find room to expand and take a life of their own: You start doing it because it gives your pinched-off
perspective (your side, your cause, your ‘self’, your status, your money) some advantage, and then you get yourself drawn
into doing it more and bigger, and you forget how to get along without it, and you use it to build and
maintain ways of being that you don’t know how to build and maintain without it. (Ibid.: pp. 10–11) Here, then, is the essence of the
‘evil technology hypothesis’: technology enables specialized care of certain narrow interests,
which are consequently abstracted from the environment they originate from – and aresymbiotically embedded in – to begin with.
This separation facilitates the subordination of the same environment to such narrower
interests, igniting positive feedback loops that reinforce their expansion. In relation to human communities, in particular, the use
of technologies can be seen as the spark that, by positing ‘man’ in antithesis to the ‘environment’, sets off the exploitation of the
latter by the former, ignitingthe growth of unsustainable human communities that are out of sync with the
landbase they dwell on and require secure inflows of energy to sustain themselves. Most importantly, as a community takes
the path of technology, it grows increasingly unaccustomed to living without technology, looking
down on non-technological ways of living as being somewhat backwards, and re-defining its own standard of living as the ‘correct’
one (Prieur, 2001: pp. 30–31)
I-Law – Distributive Justice
Distributive Justice has been rejected in favor of commutative justice – focusing
solely on the “individual”
The scholastic concern with distributive justice and, thus, the organic well-being of society continued to view the
human as part of a holistic community. The humanistic spirit of the time, however, injected into this vision
an unprecedented degree of concern with the rational individual as an ‘atom’ of society, capable of finding its
way within itself and not simply as a member of all-pervasive collectivity. Sixteenth-century social and legal studies, developing in
academic settings, could no longer resist the movement towards examining society as an algebraic sum of its component parts.
Moving from the scholastic thinkers of Salamanca to Leiden with Hugo Grotius, natural law was reduced to a system
of relationships between distinct sovereigns (physical or moral persons; the latter is a legal term for something like
a state or a corporation) governed by a common law based on reason. Distributive justice was lost and only
commutative justice remained in later international law writings (Capra and Mattei, 2015: pp. 62–3Now, if
we look at the relationships between states through the lens of commutative justice, then y ou might accept the status
quo and not care at all that some countries like Burkina Faso have an ecological footprint of 0.10
while others like the United States consume six planets. The only sort of justice international
law cares about is justice ‘in exchange’. Grotius also laid the foundations of modern international
law by asserting that the relationship between sovereigns either can be voluntary (by treaty) or can
be governed by principles of ‘just war’ waged by a legitimate sovereign, a notion he inherited from the Spanish scholastics (Capra
and Mattei, 2015: p. 63).
International Org – UN
Western policy frameworks profit off of un-developed countries – utilizing
international organizations as a means of exploitation
Nothing less than our planet Earth concerns us in this chapter, since our object of inquiry is international law. The basic starting
point for my contribution is that because we, humans, have only one planet, our ecological footprint should be
equal to one planet – that is, we should consume only a fraction of our common wealth, enabling anyone else in the world to
do the same, while maintaining conditions suitable to sustain and reproduce life (Capra and Mattei, 2015). The ecological footprint is
basically the rate of sustainability of a given organization. This means that the ecological footprint of the Earth should be one planet.
The current ecological footprint of our planet, however, is 1.5, which means that we would need 1.5 planets to sustain
our global standard of living. If you are optimistic, you may think that 1.5 planets is not too bad . Yet, if we
disaggregate the number, we realize that the ecological footprint of , for example, the Bay Area (the region
surrounding the San Francisco estuary in the State of California) where the best technologies and businesses are all represented , is
six. This realization becomes worrisome when we consider that developing countries take the way of life of this
region as a model of ‘development’. Indeed, were everyone in the world to livelike those in San Francisco, then we
would need six planets to survive. It would be like consuming six times the same amount of a given capital every year. Consequently,
the question arises: if the United States and Western Europe consume so much, why is the total footprint still limited to 1.5 planets?
In fact, the footprint is 1.5 only because many people in the Global South live far below the
standard of one planet, due to material poverty. There are places in the world where the ecological footprint only
represents 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, . . . and which do not consume any fair share of the whole planet . The West, however, consumes
much more than its fair share. So, if the vision is planet Earth as a whole, as it should be under
international law, then we have to start drawing some connections: the fact that the planet is still functioning
(even if it is in decline), is because a large portion of the world’s population remains very poor . Moreover,
some people are under-developed because other people are over-developed. International
organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund all have
‘development’ plans. The idea that the Global South is under-developed is a platitude. Yet, we never talk about over-
development. In fact, you could argue that if your ecological footprint is six, you are over-developed – you are exploiting far more of
the common wealth than you should in order to preserve everyone’s fair share of the planet. Our admiration for people who over-
consume is in fact quite astonishing. This
reasoning conjures up the image of a person invited to a buffet
where food is freely accessible , and rather than sharing the buffet with others, rushes in an attempt
to maximize the amount of calories that can be stored at the expense of others, efficiently consuming the largest
possible amount of food in the least possible time. Imagine that this person would state that he is simply maximizing his calorie
intake, that efficiency is an important value of social organization, that he is not over-developed and that it is the others’ problem if
they are not efficient enough. He
would argue that the others are the ones to blame because they are
not fast enough, not big enough to behave in such a way. Normally, everybody would be outraged in such circumstances. Yet,
that is an accurate metaphor for what is going on globally today. A tiny minority of individuals organize themselves in political
organizations – mostly, states – and try to consume as much as possible of the commonpool that is the Earth. The more states
consume, the better they perform in terms of their gross domestic product . In other words, in the
dominant rankings, the virtuous ones are the ones who behave exactly like the person in our example. This peculiar ideology around
consumption habits, aroundextraction, around the contribution to the possible sustainability of the common-pool of resources
which is our living planet, is the problem: the world is upside down. We accuse the losers of being social
profiteers, we call them ‘under-developed’, we call them ‘poor’, we de-humanise them, we deny them
political agency and we think that we can resolve their problems by filling up their bellies after we have filled ours obscenely.
However, this idea of development is at odds with the very principle of sustainability of the planet .
Global warming is just one of the – probably, most visible – consequences of the law of nature, which is the law of reproducibility of
life itself on the planet.
Global institutions allow for moral corruption – enabling inaction towards

stopping catastrophic disasters such as climate change
Baard 15, (Patrik Baard is a post-doctoral fellow at Malmö University), “MANAGING CLIMATE
CHANGE A VIEW FROM DEEP ECOLOGY” 2015, Ethics and the Environment,
http://content.ebscohost.com/ContentServer.asp?
T=P&P=AN&K=103221341&S=R&D=aph&EbscoContent=dGJyMNLr40Sep7E4yOvqOLCmsEmep7
NSr6m4TLOWxWXS&ContentCustomer=dGJyMPGrsk%2BxrLJRuePfgeyx44Dt6fIA //SDD
The mechanisms, causes, and harmful effects of climate change have been known since at least 1990 when the IPCC released its first
assessment report, which
led to goals, such as the primary objective of the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change to “avoid dangerous climate change .” Reaching this goal will require that
global mean temperatures do not exceed a 2°C increase compared to pre-industrial times, something that will require that
concentration levels of GHGs are kept within specified limits. What exactly those limits are depends on assumptions regarding
climate sensitivity, but according to several estimates, we are well on our way toward, and perhaps beyond, dangerous thresholds
(IPCC 2014). Moreover, some claim that we will experience severe impacts at a 1.5°C increase or that climate sensitivity is greater
than assumed and that we will reach a 2°C increase before the estimated concentration levels (cf. Hansen et al. 2008). There
are
treaties devoted to limiting emissions of GHGs to reach the target of avoiding dangerous
interference with climatic systems, the most prominent one being the Kyoto Protocol, resulting in national
mitigation policies. Notwithstanding, as suggested earlier in the introduction, total emission levels continue to
increase despite the awareness that they constitute the main driver of climate change, with the attendant devastating
consequences. Indeed, average annual increases in the period 2000-2010 were double the average annual increases in the period
1970-2000 (IPCC 2014, 6). The necessary goals for avoiding dangerous climate change are not being tackled. Several scholars have
claimed that the lack of efficient action is due to ill-equipped normative frameworks . This claim comes
from several environmental philosophers and ethicists, such as Gardiner (2011), Jamieson (2014), and Callicott (2014), to name a
few. For instance, it has been suggested that the scope, both temporal and spatial, of climate change makes it difficult for us to
handle. Gardiner (2011) suggests that climate change combines three different “storms” and gives way to moral corruption. The
three converging storms are the global storm, the intergenerational storm, and lack of robust
ethical theories. The global storm concerns the asymmetry between the rich and the poor, the
former having emitted the most historically, has the greatest ability to mitigate and enhance the adaptive capacities of vulnerable
nations, but still tends to be mostly concerned with its own self-interest. This self-interest
is often translated to
increasing economic growth, which in turn requires more emissions and resource depletion.
Regarding the intergenerational aspect, it is tempting to pass the buck to future generations who might
have greater resources and more apt knowledge, thus providing us with reasons to do very little,
despite suggestions that emissions should decline rapidly in the coming years. One such belief in a future ability to mitigate climate
change via the development of efficient technologies such as geo-engineering, is a risky assumption (cf. Gardiner 2011).
Furthermore, as Gardiner suggests, “even our best moral and political theories are poorly placed to deal with many of the issues
characteristic of long-term global problems such as climate change” (Gardiner 2011, 213). Our institutions
have a short
planning time-frame, which is not adequate for planning around the long-term perspectives of climatic changes, and we are
tempted to evade responsibility. For these reasons, moral corruption becomes a fact, and we
rationalize our way to doing nothing. In its stead, Gardiner proposes an ethics of transition to muddle through the
storms (Gardiner 2011). Dale Jamieson is another philosopher who has discussed the inadequacy of normative frameworks, since at
least 1992 when he gave an example of the sort of situations in which our normative frameworks work best: Consider an example of
the sort of case with which our value systems deals best. Jones breaks into Smith’s house and steals Smith’s television set. Jones’s
intent is clear: she wants Smith’s TV set. Smith suffers a clear harm; he is made worse off by having lost the television set. Jones is
responsible for Smith’s loss, for she was the cause of the harm and no one else was involved. (Jamieson 1992, 148) Our normative
frameworks therefore “collapse” in the face of the scope required for managing climatic changes. While not arguing that they lead
to moral corruption, Jamieson suggests that our view on moral responsibility is so inadequate that we assume no sense of
responsibility at all, or as suggested: “We face the possibility that the global environment may be destroyed, yet no one will be
responsible” (Jamieson 1992, 145). Again, the reason for such inadequacy concerns the spatial and temporal scope of climatic
changes, the complex causality, and the proposed negligent levels of individual emissions. Since every emission contributes in such a
marginal way to raising the probability and magnitude of climatic changes, we can hardly say that even a person going on a Sunday
drive, with no particular intent than enjoyment, violates a human right. This is so despite the fact that the act can easily be foregone,
that it does not fulfill any basic need, and that it adds emissions that drive anthropogenic climate change, thus increasing the
likelihood and magnitude of climatic changes. Instead of basing normative demands on consequentialist reasons, we should develop
green virtues as non-calculative generators of action: “when it comes to large-scale collective-action problems,calculation invites
madness...because the sums are impossible to do” (Jamieson 2010, 318). Green virtues, such as humility, temperance, mindfulness,
cooperativeness, and respect for nature, are required to guide behavior. Callicott (2014, 97) speaks of the inadequacy of both
anthropocentric and biocentric viewpoints, suggesting that “[a] thing is right when it tends to preserve the beauty of the biotic
community and to disturb it only at normal spatial and temporal scales. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”3 Thus, he has a holistic
view on normative demands and moral consideration, and base normative demands on moral sentiments and care. Only a holistic
view on demands and moral sentiments can provide us withreasons why we should act in the long term, something that rationality,
often geared toward short-term self-interest, cannot. This includes care for immediate posterity and the unknown future. Immediate
posterity designates currently existing younger generations and “caring what kind of world they will have to live in as they progress
through their lifetimes” (Callicott 2014, 297). This care can stretch into the unknown future by, for instance, care for the
preservation of human civilization, which will require that we live as part of our biotic communities on the basis of the mentioned
maxim. The above discussion shows that many have argued in favor of the claim that climate change is a great challenge for us and
that, from a normative perspective, we are ill-equipped at managing it. However ,
despite the many analyses and
suggestions, the perspective from deep ecology remains absent, surprisingly so since it is a framework that
intends to revise our fundamental norms on the basis of incremental change (cf. Reed and Rothenberg 1993, 110). But in what ways
can it contribute? This is the focus of the next section
Innovation/Technology
Focusing on innovations as the KEY to solving future issues IGNORES
environmental degradation and other life forms
Naess 05, (ARNE NAESS was a Norwegian philosopher who coined the term "deep ecology"
and was an important intellectual and inspirational figure within the environmental movement
of the late twentieth century. Næss cited Rachel Carson's 1962 book Silent Spring as being a key
influence in his vision of deep ecology), 2005, “The Deep Ecology Movement Some Philosophical
Aspects,” https://openairphilosophy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/02/OAP_Naess_Deep_Ecology_Movement.pdf //SDD
EDUCATION AND SCIENTIFIC ENTERPRISE Shallow approach: The degradation of the environment and
resource depletion necessitate the further 8 OpenAirPhilosophy.org | The Deep Ecology Movement: Some
Philosophical Aspects training of experts who can advise on how to combine economic growth with
the maintenance of a healthy environment. We are likely to need highly manipulative
technology when global economic growth makes further degradation inevitable . The scientific
enterprise must continue giving priority to the “hard” sciences. This necessitates high educational standards with intense
competition in relevant “tough” areas of learning .
Deep approach: Education should concentrate on increased
sensitivity to non-consumptive goods and on such consumables as we have enough of for all,
provided sane ecological policies are adopted . Education will therefore counteract the excessive valuation of things
with a price tag. There should be a shift in emphasis from “hard” to “soft” sciences , especially those
that stress local culture and global cooperation. The educational objective of the World Conservation Strategy,
“building support for conservation,” should be accorded priority within the deeper framework of respect for the biosphere. In the
future, there will be no shallow movement, if shallow policies are increasingly adopted by governments and, thus, need no support
from a special social movement
Science strives to better the human condition at the expense of the

environment.
Intongpan, 19 (Praves, Faculty of Humanities, Kasetsart University, “Climate Change through
Environmental Ethics and Buddhist Philosophy”, PSAKU International Journal of Interdisciplinary
Research, Vol. 8, No. Special Issue, June 30, 2019) http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3546290//ac
The anthropocentric view has a solution by inventing and producing new technologies to solve problems, such as carbon dioxide
emissions from burning, or the emergence of a global environmental protection organization, or providing hunting reserves. The
highlight of the anthropocentric view is the development of technology, which must start from a scientific perspective, science can
only be developed when humans see the problem and therefore seek a solution.
The disadvantage of developing too
many science concepts is excessive consumption . Science tries to make human beings have a
better life, but instead of using more resources, looking at problems with human interpretations
makes understanding the problem not deep enough to change most human thought. In
addition, the anthropocentric view does not give nature the value that it should have, but sees
nature only as important in the production and consumption process . 2. The eco-centric view focuses on
sustainability when changing human concepts to solve problems. To achieve harmony with nature, we must
change the human perspectives of nature. It emphasizes viewing the environment as a whole,
not giving value to only one thing. It focuses on sustainable development and careful
consumption of resources . It supports technological advances in order to provide appropriate and sustainable solutions
to environmental problems. It changes all the old ethical concepts that were too focused on the human
body and made humans less able to see value in the environment less, changing philosophical
concepts in order to lead to a new understanding of the environment. The solution to
environmental problems must begin by changing the perspective and the person . The disadvantage
of this concept is that it causes slower development of technology. If we understand that we are part of a large
ecosystem, some consumption or action will have a wide impact, causing the ecosystem to lose
balance. However, humans still need to consume continuously, and therefore, we are unable to stop consumption that affects
the environment. The way to solve this problem starts with changing the perspective, focusing on looking at the environment as a
whole, and not giving value to just one thing. Focus must also be given to changing philosophical concepts in order to lead to a new
understanding of the environment in which all things have intrinsic value and value is given to diversity.
Human innovation, advancement are the root cause of environmental

destruction.
Bonnett, 20 (Michael, PhD in Philosophy (University of London), Visiting Research Fellow,
University of Bath, Member Philosophy of Education Society, Great Britain Editorial Board,
Cambridge Journal of Education, held senior teaching and research positions in the UK
universities of Cambridge, London, and Bath. Formerly he was a Visiting Professor at the
University of the Aegean, “Towards an ecologization of education”, The Journal of
Environmental Education, March 10, 2020)
https://doi.org/10.1080/00958964.2019.1687409//ac
It is clear that, in common with environmental education research in general, the field of philosophy of environmental education has
burgeoned and intensified over recent decades.
This has been prompted by a number of factors that include:
the ever-growing evidence of anthropogenic impacts on the natural environment and the severe
and extensive problems to which they give rise; the growing sense of urgency in addressing
these problems; the need for critical evaluation of dominant ideas , terminology and policies
such as education for sustainable development that have emerged in response to these
problems; the rise of movements such as postmodernism and poststructuralism within
philosophy and intellectual culture more generally that question long held assumptions
concerning the nature of reality and our descriptions of it—including those of the natural world.
Indeed, with regard to anthropogenic impacts on the natural environment, some, following
Crutzen and Stoermer (2000), believe that these are now so extensive that we need to think of
humankind entering a new geological epoch: the “Anthropocene,” where human behavior has
become a geological force , leaving an irreversible imprint in the planet’s rock and ice strata and
atmosphere. Worryingly, these deposits betoken something even more fundamental: an era in
which long established natural processes, rhythms and cycles that have maintained an
equilibrium that supports life, and from which we have benefitted since the dawn of the
Holocene epoch, are being sufficiently disrupted as to be in danger of breaking down. From a
philosophical perspective this scenario raises a number of pressing questions, the most salient
of which I have argued (Bonnett 2004) are those of what is our relationship with nature , and
what would count as a right relationship with nature? E xploration of these questions leads to a wide range of
collateral questions such as: What is nature? How can/do we know nature? Against what criteria
should humankind judge its progress /success/flourishing in relation to the natural world? For
some, these questions that revolve around nature and the character of our relationship with it
have seemed rather peripheral. There have been those (e.g., Giddens 1994; McKibben 1989; Rorty 1994) who question
either the continued existence of nature or the usefulness of the concept . It has been argued that, under the all-
pervasive impact of human activity on the biosphere, the idea of some autonomous nature is
now an anachronism and in a Western de-traditionalizing society the authority of the idea of
nature simply withers away, becomes redundant—sometimes continuing only as a shadowy
construction serving questionable political ends (Haraway 1991; Giddens 1994). Others, impressed by
the depth of our current environmental crisis, focus on what they take to be the central issue of
what policies and technologies we need to pursue in order to guarantee continued human
flourishing. This latter attitude is reflected in one of the most influential ideas to arise in response to this crisis: “sustainable
development.” It received its classic articulation in the report of the Brundtland Commission (1987)
where it is defined as “a development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” In addition to arguing
that, taken as a policy, sustainable development so conceived is highly problematic
semantically (e.g., precisely what is to be sustained—economic growth? Existing ecosystems? Some
“natural” equilibrium?) and epistemologically (e.g., how is nature best “known” and how do we establish a knowledge base
sufficient to “managing” natural systems in their extreme complexity and temporal and geographical extent?), (Bonnett 1999, 2002),
I have also taken up the towering anthropocentrism that pervades it. In this context, I have explored the idea of the holding sway in
Western culture of a superordinate “metaphysics of mastery” whose ambition is to make all subject to the human will .
I have
argued that this—and the scientism that it spawns—are both precisely the root cause of our
current environmental crisis and the chief obstacle to human flourishing : they alienate us both
from nature and our own nature. I set out briefly the bones of this argument below as prelude to a theme that is central
to my developing position: the reassertion of an idea of transcendent nature that is deeply constitutive of our form of sensibility.
Technoscientific capitalism has transformed human and environmental

relationships into data for profit.
Birch et al. ‘20 (Kean, Associate Professor @ York University, Margaret Chiappetta,
Postdoctoral Researcher in the Department of Social Studies of Medicine @ McGill University,
and Anna Artyushina, research fellow @ York U, "The problem of innovation in technoscientific
capitalism: data rentiership and the policy implications of turning personal digital data into a
private asset." Policy Studies 41.5 (2020): 468-487, MX)
On the one hand, contemporary capitalism is constituted and defined by technoscientific

innovation , discursively and materially. Notions like “disruptive innovation” propagated by
business scholars like Clayton Christensen extol the virtues of continuous technological change,
while proliferating digital data systems generate “network effects” through (increasingly
monopolistic) technological platforms and firms like Facebook, Uber, Amazon, Google, etc.,
which all rely on exploiting personal data (Keen 2015). On the other hand, and following on
from the first point, technoscience is constituted and defined by financial logics , knowledges,
and practices – that is, it is increasingly “financialized” (Krippner 2005; also see Aalbers 2019).
The influence of finance and financial investment, and especially the notion of “the investor”
(Ortiz 2014; Muniesa et al. 2017), means that finance has come to supplant other logics (e.g.
productivity) in the pursuit and organization of research and innovation (Birch 2017a, 2017b;
Tyfield et al. 2017).
At one and the same time, this logic subsumes innovation into finance – by which we mean the
generation of returns on investments to investors, over and above other considerations (e.g.
societal benefits ). As a result, technoscientific capitalism is increasingly constituted by the
“ extractive potential ” of the innovation-finance nexus; that is, the transformation of human life
(e.g. personal relationships) and non-human life (e.g . environmental processes ) into resources
that can be configured as property and can be capitalized as future earnings (i.e. turned into an
asset) (Birch and Muniesa 2020; also see Kuch, Gulson, and Kearnes 2020). Personal data is a
prime example of this transformation, which we turn to next.
Innovation drives us into the new age of assetization instead of

commodification. The temporal dimension of asset valuation exacerbates the
problem of monopolies.
Here we outline a number of aspects of the assetization process that differentiate it from the
commodification arguments usually applied to personal data, as seen above. First, assets are
legal constructions. The ownership and control of an asset like personal data rest specifically on the
state enforcement of intellectual property (IP) rights and contract law ; moreover, ownership and
control rights can be separated from each other , and from the “thing” under consideration (e.g.
personal data ), and then sold as distinct rights (cf. POLICY STUDIES 473 physical commodity which is tied to the
right) (Dreyfuss and Frankel 2015; Pistor 2019). Second, assets entail specific forms of rights, distinct from a
commodity, such as flowthrough rights (i.e. control rights) that limit the ability of buyers to
reproduce or copy anything controlled by the asset-holder (Frase 2016). Third, assets are often highly
specific and tend towards monopoly (Teece 1986), in that they cannot be reproduced easily or cheaply
by others; for example, personal data collected by one business are unique and not accessible by
other firms (Birch 2017a). Fourth, the supply and demand dynamic underpinning assets has a
particular logic, in that rising demand does not (and even cannot) stimulate new market entrants (e.g. it
is difficult to create substitutes for a data monopoly), meaning that rising demand tends
towards rising asset values (Birch and Tyfield 2013). However, fifth, asset values are not inherent or configured
by some fundamental characteristic (e.g. labour); rather, valuation is managed (Birch 2017a), in that the
value of something like personal data can be increased, reduced, transferred, transformed, etc.
Hence, asset valuation has a temporal dimension to it, since asset value can change over time,
whereas commodity value is determined at a specific point of exchange between buyer and
seller. Sixth, asset values and valuation are dynamic being constituted by an active and ongoing
management of value within a wider ecosystem comprising a diverse array of financial, technoscientific,
political, etc. actors (e.g. lawyers, stockbrokers, stock analysts, regulators, scientists, etc.) (Birch 2016; Muniesa et al. 2017);
this contrasts with commodities where value is constituted at the point of market exchange. Finally, assets are “organized”
being centred in and by organizations like firms, universities , etc., where they can be used, for
example, to facilitate inter-organizational relationships (Lezaun and Montgomery 2015).
Technological “solutions” only drive private surveillance to make a profit, not

for any societal benefits.
First, personal data has to be – and already is – understood and treated as a private asset, with
its pervasive collection legitimated and embedded in new business models and techno-
economic platforms (e.g. Amazon, Uber, Google, Facebook, etc.) (Langley and Leyshon 2017;
Srnicek 2017; Edwards 2018; Zuboff 2019). The reason for this is that the aggregation and
accumulation of personal data – even when there is no obvious use at present – has become
an increasingly dominant innovation strategy and business model (Sadowski 2019; West 2019;
Zuboff 2019). Personal data are expected to be the key resource of future business success;
this is an expectation also held by financial investors meaning that financial value is equated
with the accumulation, processing, and analysis of personal data (Sadowski 2019). However,
such expectations are premised on a “winner-takes-all” outcome in which investors expect firms
to capture whole markets or sectors (e.g. Uber) and invest accordingly to ensure that this then
happens (Kenney and Zysman 2016; Nieborg and Poell 2018). Obviously, this has significant
policy implications; for example, this has led to the growth of personal data monopolies – so-
called “Big Tech” (e.g. Facebook, Google, Amazon, etc.) – whose continuing existence is
dependent on accumulating more and more personal data, implying the need to extend
( private) surveillance further and further (Couldry and Mejias 2019; Zuboff 2019).
The dominance of Big Tech is illustrated by their histories of acquisition and market control. On
the one hand, Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple have spent tens of billions of dollars on
purchasing new companies and their data over the last two decades (e.g. Facebook’s purchase
of Instagram and WhatsApp) (Kamepalli, Rajan, and Zingales 2019). On the other hand,
Facebook has become infamous for its use of third-party data to track Facebook users across
the Internet (Griffin 2018). Google represents an even more vivid illustration of the connection
between personal data monopolies and data rentiership. Almost every internet user is a
Google customer in some way or another; this is because Google controls about 90 percent of
online search in most countries (Epstein 2018; Statista 2019), as well as owning the world’s
most popular video platform (YouTube), the dominant mobile operating system (Android), and
the most used browser (Chrome) (Desjardins 2018). Google also takes shares in the market of
smartphone applications, with Google Maps and Google Play being among the most widely
used products globally. Companies like Google also access personal data though agreements
with governments and state agencies ; for example, in 2016 the UK’s National Health Service
provided DeepMind with access to healthcare data on 1.6 million patients (Hodson 2016). A
British AI startup, DeepMind had been bought by Google in 2014, but the company claimed to
have kept significant degree of autonomy including the right to deny Google access to its user
base. In 2018, Google integrated DeepMind into its main organization once again sparking public
controversy over its plans for the patient data (Hern 2018; see also Prainsack 2020b).
Technological solutions are counterintuitive under capitalism – they only help

further growth and dependence on energy.
Gunderson et al. ’20 (Ryan, Department of Sociology and Gerontology, Miami, Diana Stuart,
environmental sociologist @ Northern Arizona University, and Matthew Houser, Environmental
Resilience Institute and Department of Sociology, PhD @ Indiana, "A political‐economic theory
of relevance: Explaining climate change inaction." Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour
50.1 (2020): 42-63, MX)
Relying on technological solutions to climate change represents a convenient and widely

popular approach that is associated with the idea of a “ win-win” scenario for the economy and
the environment. Examples of this belief include the Breakthrough Institute, dedicated to
finding technological solutions to environmental problems (Breakthrough, 2018), Bill Gates (who
publicly and financially supports geoengineering), and former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
who interprets climate change as an “engineering problem” (Lukacs, 2017). Technological
solutions to climate change remain widely popular as they maintain the current social order
while increasing profits for high-tech investors; however, how most of these technologies are
currently used, or proposed to be used, is counterintuitive as they allow for the continued
burning of fossil fuels and increasing greenhouse gas emissions (Gunderson et al., 2018). We
should note that in addition to technological mitigation strategies, technological innovations for
adaptation to climate change are also being discussed and developed as part of a “realist” or
“ pragmatist” strategy (e.g. see Hulme, 2018, Breakthrough Institute, 2018). However, these
approaches were not the focus of responses to the October 2018 IPCC report in news sources.
All three popularizations of the special report in the media above represent widely supported
ideas about how to address climate change. However, all three solutions fail to draw attention
to the radical implications of the report and instead focus attention on, and extrapolate from,
comparatively brief and minor aspects of the report. The unsustainability of the current social
order and necessity of social transformation are clear in the report: the first line of the IPCC
special report press release (IPCC, 2018) states that, limiting warming to 1.5 degrees C will
“require rapid , far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society.” However,
the above popularizations of the special report thematize aspects that are amendable to current
conditions and beliefs while excluding the direst predictions and radical statements. That is, in
terms of our theory, only aspects of the special report that do not challenge the current social
order are made topically relevant.
Increasing evidence demonstrates that it is because current strategies further economic growth
that they will fail to limit warming. Data illustrates a positive relationship between economic
growth and greenhouse gas emissions (Stern, 2006; Jorgenson & Clark, 2012; York et al., 2003).
GDP growth correlates with carbon emissions: a 1% increase in GDP equals a 0.5–0.7% increase
in carbon emissions (Burke, Shahiduzzaman, & Stern, 2015; see Hickel & Kallis, 2019). It is also
increasingly clear that technologies cannot “ decouple ” the relationship between growth and
carbon emissions. Economic growth generates the need for more energy and in consequence
the generation of nonfossil fuel energy over the past five decades did not displace the use of
fossil fuels (York, 2012). Two climate scientists studying carbon budgets, Anderson and Bows
(2011, 2012), conclude that reductions in economic growth are necessary to effectively address
climate change.
Management of Environment
Environmental regulation and deep ecology are mutually exclusive – deep
ecology does not look to the legal system for answers, but rather looks to the
self for a new form of ontology
- Could also be an indict of environmental management
Giagnocavo & Goldstein 90 – (Dr. Cynthia Giagnocavo, Universidad de Almería,

Department of Economics and Business. Howard Goldstein, Environmental Researcher. “Law
Reform or World Re-form: The Problem of Environmental Rights”, McGill Law Journal, 1990).
https://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/wp-content/uploads/pdf/613675-Giagnocavo.pdf, sj
Deep ecology, when it speaks of the rights of all living things, is not envisioning a courtroom full of advocates
litigating on behalf of beavers, trees, and other mistreated forms of life. Neither is it attempting to formulate an ethic(s) which
would allow us to ascertain in each "hard-case" conflict whose interest (between the human and non-human) is more vital. Instead,
deep ecology offers us an alternative picture of ontology , one which emphasizes the
constitutive role which other beings have for our being . This, coupled with the principle of biospherical
egalitarianism, forms a different kind of environmental philosophy unlike the "vapid environmentalism"
alluded to earlier. Deep ecology does not look to technological or legal innovation as the antidote
to environmental degradation. Its focus is not outward, but inward, in the belief that only by changing ourselves (and our
notion of "us"), can we hope to change the world. As a result of its non-solipsistic relational ontology, deep ecology challenges the
develop-and-consume telos of our age. If a separation between ourselves and the world is ontologically indefensible, we must
profoundly reconsider the ends, and not just the means, which we wish to pursue. Hence, the impact that such a revised ontology as
deep ecology can have on our teleology is immense. Onlyafter we have carefully considered and revised our
accounts of who we are (ontology) and what end it is that we are trying to attain (teleology), will we be
in a position to reconsider the instrumental tactics and methods (like law and technology) needed to
realise those ends. Deep ecology's strength is that it emphasizes that a metaphysical reconsideration of our world crisis must
precede instrumental strategizing; in fact, it has been our propensity to privilege instrumental thought at the expense of
metaphysics that has so greatly contributed to our problem. Once we have reconsidered ourselves as part of the world, and re-
evaluated our mutual needs, we can begin considering the most appropriate means for satisfying those needs. There is much which
we can do'33 to increase our responsiveness to the world, but that which we do must be done in the right spirit. A lifestyle informed
by the spirit of deep ecology is not concerned for the world in a self-interested way . Instead it places
primary importance on the manifestation of genuine care for the planet. Furthermore, it eschews shallow
environmentalism and its stop-gap measures which, in the course of its reformist policies ,
attempts to salvage as much of our current consumeristic lifestyle as possible. This difference in
lifestyle can best be understood by use of an illustration. Shallow environmentalists and neo-rights advocates point to
the growing number of so-called environmentally sensitive products to show that increased public
awareness, coupled with legal instrumentalism, is helping to solve our environmental crises. But
this does not impress the deep ecologist, for the deep ecologist realises that bio-degradable
packaging only begs the question of why we need so much packaging (or why we need some of these
products) in the first place."3 The deep ecologist is baffled by our preference for state-of-the-art plastics
when a simpler, more traditional solution has always been available, namely the wicker basket. Simple in
means, rich in ends is one of the organising mottos for applied deep ecology. 3' The notion of simplicity is primarily meant to denote
an aversion to attempts through high technology to limit environmental destruction and a preference for a reduction in personal,
and thereby cultural, consumption. Richness of ends, on the other hand, captures the primacy for deep ecology of revising our
teleology to foster increased care for the world. This profound concern for living things (be they human or not),
distinguishes it from more reformist variants of environmentalism and results in a more
sharply
radical approach to practical problems.
Military
The aff’s attempt to make the military more green erases past environmental
atrocities and militarizes future environmental changes
Havlick, 07 (David, PhD in Geography, Professor of Geography and Environmental Studies,
“Logics of change for military-to-wildlife conversions in the United States,” GeoJournal 69)
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10708-007-9086-8#Sec2 //cb
M2W = Military-to-Wildlife
While most national wildlife refuges operate with certain restrictions on visitor usage and
activities in order to protect wildlife and plant resources, at M2W refuges limited public access
comes less from ecological concerns. Many M2W refuges currently operate with severe limits on
public access or use simply because the DOD has not cleaned most of these closed bases to any
thorough degree and the FWS has neither the money nor the expertise (in most cases) to
conduct the cleanup itself. Thus, M2W conversions may present the appearance of a greening,
diminished military presence while creating an interagency dynamic where the FWS is largely
dependent upon DOD funding and/or technical support for any cleanup of military hazards.
Beyond the particular cases of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal or other sites currently in the midst of their own M2W conversions,
before accepting M2W conversions as desirable we should also work to understand as fully as
we can how questions of authority, control, contamination, and justice are being resolved in
these places. However much we support wildlife protection or may appreciate the apparent shift toward environmental
protection by the military, there are political and moral ramifications to these views. If we accept the position that
military activities are compatible with conservation or that militarized spaces are suitable for public recreation
and environmental education purposes consonant with the U.S. National Wildlife Refuge System, we may find that we fail
to recognize an array of practices and processes that retain a critical presence in these lands .
Merely as a result of the shifting nomenclature of these sites we risk the historical erasure of
military operations in exchange for the easy acceptance of a new conservation mission (see Figs. 1
and 2). In fact, a deeper look at these places where logics of conversion apply reveals that militarism and conservation continue to
co-exist. Ecological militarization, after all, does not correspond to demilitarization so much as it reflects a representational shift in
our perception of certain places as well as a transfer of military control across particular places. Even
as the Rocky
Mountain Arsenal becomes more formally a national wildlife refuge, the place also perseveres
as a militarized site with its Army-owned chemical landfills, subterranean barriers to contain
toxic groundwater, and ongoing soil, odor, and water treatment efforts . The military presence at the site
as a chemical weapons facility has subsided, but the actions, authority, and impact of the military in many ways
will remain in perpetuity.
As the lasting military presence at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal ought to suggest, the
phenomenon of M2W
conversions does not necessarily correspond to a more ecological or diminished U.S. military . In
fact, the DODs 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission Report makes clear that the latest round of military
restructuring in the U.S. comes, ‘in the context of a stable or increasing force structure’ (p. iii).
Bases such as the Jefferson Proving Ground in Indiana—now the site of the Big Oaks National
Wildlife Refuge—have closed and converted to new uses not because the United States no
longer intends to develop its military capacity, but rather because it seeks to expand it . Thus, the
operations formerly conducted at the 50,000-acre (20,000 ha) Jefferson Proving Ground site were reassigned to the Yuma Proving
Ground that covers approximately 20 times that territory.
With shifts in militarization along these lines to more remote and vast bases, as well as such expanding practices as building
temporary U.S. bases internationally or training military support and security personnel through private contractors including
Blackwater USA and Halliburton, M2W conversions may facilitate U.S. efforts to decrease the visibility of its domestic military
presence while fortifying its global reach. M2W
conversions also serve a very real rhetorical purpose in
providing examples where the DOD can point to the possible greener futures for their active
bases. With this, the DOD may deflect public criticism of its current operations by highlighting
environmental programs on active and closed bases (Woodward 2004, makes a similar point). What M2W
conversions may put at risk, then, is not simply the character and budget of national wildlife refuges in the United States, but the
broader understanding of what it means to militarize certain places. When tourists at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife
Refuge can exclaim in surprise—as I witnessed in one of my visits there—that the site was once a chemical weapons manufacturing
center, it signifies not only an encouraging shift in contemporary land use but also a dangerous loss of land use history. In this, the
discourse of ecological militarization carries obvious peril along with its promise of newfound military–
environment compatibility. As Ross (1996, p. 15) pointedly notes, ‘If the Pentagon succeeds in its kinder, gentler
missions, it may result not in the greening of the military but in the militarization of greening .’
Population increase for short-sighted economic, military, and other purposes

are shallow approaches to sustainability.
Patrika 19 (Vidyamandira Patrika, UGC Arts & Humanities. “Vidyamandira Patrika (A multi
disciplinary Peer-Reviewed Research Journal)”)
http://vidyamandira.ac.in/pdfs/publications/journal/Vidyamandira%20Patrika
%202019%20special%20issue.pdf#page=143 RW
Deep ecology proposes a major reshuffling of our worldviews, cultures and lifestyles consistent
with the new ecological perspective. It aims at preserving the integrity of nature for its own
sake, irrespective of its benefits to any privileged species like humans . It is based on this conviction that
the Earth ‘does not belong to humans’. [2] Rather we have to change our lifestyles, if required. Hence, deep ecology
transcends the limit of any particular science of today, including systems theory and scientific
ecology. For the shallow thinkers, the resources of Earth belong exclusively to the human beings
who have the technology to exploit them. Here the resources are valuable only as resources for humans. For the
supporters of deep ecology, no natural object should conceive as mere resource for humans.
Naess’s deep ecology initiates an eco-centric approach in contemporary environmentalism,
rather than a platform for consideration merely of isolated life-forms of local situations. Shallow
ecology may be concerned about (human) over-population in developing and underdeveloped countries, but may not be worried
about over-population in an industrially developed country. Deep ecology moves forward with a definite universal goal. It puts
emphasis not only on stabilizing human population, but also of reducing it to a sustainable minimum by humane means, which do
not require violence or dictatorship. In
shallow approach, one may condone or may applaud population
increase in one’s own (developed) country for short-sighted economic, military and for other
purposes. An increase in number of humans may be considered as valuable in itself or as
economically profitable. Deep ecology recognizes that excessive pressure on planetary life stems from the human
population explosion. Hence, population reduction should be given the highest priority in all societies, be it developed, developing,
or underdeveloped. Vidyamandira Patrika 2019 138 The
shallow approach toward pollution seeks higher
technology to purify air and water. In deep approach, pollution is evaluated from a total
biospheric point of view. Its supporters do not focus exclusively on its effects on human life and
health, but rather on planetary life as a whole. They are committed to the view that it is our
responsibility to save the nature for both present and future generations, be they human or
non-human. Naess said, “The aim…is not a slight reform of our present society, but a substantial
reorientation of our whole civilization”. [3] Hence, deep ecology is actually founded on two basic ideas. One is a
scientific insight into the interrelatedness of various systems of life on the Earth, together with the rejection of anthropocentrism as
a misguided way of seeing things. The second basic idea of deep ecology is the need for ‘Self-realization’. Instead of identifying with
our small individual egos or merely with our immediate families, we should learn to identify ourselves with all animals and plants,
i.e., ultimately with the whole ecosphere.[
Modeling Advantages
Reject the aff’s paternalistic relationship to diplomacy in favor of
transformative change through local autonomy and decentralization. (note: this
could link to global/international cooperation too not just modeling)
Akamano, 20 (Kofi, Associate Professor of Forest Recreation and Conservation Social Science,
Southern Illinois, PhD. Natural Resources: University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho, U.S.A, MPhil.
Culture, Environment and Sustainability: University of OsloBSc. Planning: Kwame Nkrumah
University of Science and Technology, Kusmasi, Associate Editor/Editorial Board Member:
Journal of Contemporary Water Research and Education; Society & Natural Resources, Section
Editor/Special Issue Editor: SAGE Open; Sustainability, Faculty Senate representative on the SIU
Chancellor’s Diversity Task Force, “Integrating Deep Ecology and Adaptive Governance for
Sustainable Development: Implications for Protected Areas Management”, Sustainability, July
17, 2020) https://doi.org/10.3390/su12145757//ac
The institutional dimensions of the sustainable development agenda have also received some
criticism. Reference [85] describes the emergence of a global “green diplomacy” since the 1972 Stockholm Conference as a
mechanism for the implementation of the sustainable development agenda. The author defines green diplomacy as
“a way of seeing the world from a managerial perspective: a style of negotiating a solution to
the problems facing the world that takes as its starting point a view of nature solidly based in
Enlightenment thought” (p. x). Green diplomacy represents a top-down institutional mechanism
that involves negotiations by government representatives and representatives of international
organizations, through which agreements are reached on how to address global conservation
and development challenges. Global efforts on climate change illustrate the shortfalls of the
top-down managerial approach of green diplomacy. Until recently, global efforts to negotiate an international
agreement on the mitigation of anthropogenic climate change under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
had gone on for over two decades, without resulting in an effective treaty [116,130,131]. Politically, deep ecology
recognizes the need for transformative changes in existing social and political institutions in
order to achieve the goal of long term sustainability [38,132]. As [86] (p. 5) noted, “The
vulnerability of a form of life is roughly proportional to the weight of influences from afar,
from outside the local region in which that form has achieved an ecological equilibrium.” In this
regard, deep ecology rejects the paternalistic and imperialistic relationships between
industrialized societies and less powerful nonindustrial cultures that characterize current
approaches to pursuing sustainable development. Rather, deep ecology embraces local
autonomy and decentralization as governance mechanisms for promoting local self-sufficiency
and self-determination [38,42,43,86]. One way to promote such decentralized forms of governance is to replace nation-
states with bioregions as governance units [42]. Such bioregional communities could provide opportunities for the emergence of
sense of place, the development of local ecological knowledge and the expression of local culture [122]. Beyond the local level, deep
ecology also recognizes the need for coordinated action at the global level in order to effect the needed changes [38]. However,
more clarity is needed on the political and institutional agenda of deep ecology [42 ].
In view of the shortfalls associated
with the top-down approach to addressing global climate change and other sustainability
challenges [116,133], increased attention is being paid to the search for governance
mechanisms that coordinate the role of governments and the private sector across multiple
levels, in the mobilization and sharing of information and resources for realizing the SDGs [2].
Consistent with the focus of deep ecology on decentralized governance and local autonomy, the adaptive governance approach
emphasizes the use of polycentric systems as a response to the shortfalls of conventional governance mechanisms [75,90,134].
Unlike monocentric systems in which decision-making authority is centered at one level,
polycentric systems comprise multiple governing units at multiple levels, with some degree of
autonomy at each level [130]. Within polycentric systems, responsibilities among the governing units are allocated at the
lowest most appropriate level according to the principle of subsidiarity [131]. Polycentric institutions are also characterized by an
overlap and redundancy in functions among governing units at the various levels [90,134]. Polycentric governance systems offer
several potential benefits, such as enhanced opportunities for experimentation and learning, enhanced trust and cooperation
through opportunities for communication and interaction, as well as enhanced resilience and reduced vulnerability [130,131,134 ].
Thus, it appears the relatively well-developed institutional attributes of adaptive governance
could potentially serve as a framework for the operationalization of the deep ecology agenda .
Although the emerging literature on polycentric systems highlight several challenges, including high transaction costs, inadequate
consideration of power dynamics and the potential for undesirable outcomes [29,134,135], it appears that a commitment to
decentralization and local autonomy from a deep ecology perspective could help overcome some of these institutional challenges in
adaptive governance.
Modeling upholds a management paradigm that perpetuates human

domination over nature – locks in the exploitation and suppression of diversity.
Ethically, shallow ecology is informed by an anthropocentric or human-centered perspective

that views humans as the source of all values, and assigns instrumental values to nonhuman
natural entities based on their usefulness as means to meeting the needs of humans [42,82,99].
Arne Naess used anthropocentrism to refer to “the tendency to look at nonhumans and the
ecosphere in general from the point of view of narrow utilitarianism , a devaluation of anything
but humans and a focus on their narrow, shallow interests, not their deep ones” [100] (p. 231).
For instance, a central emphasis of the Brundtland Report is the promotion of economic growth as a strategy for meeting basic
human needs and improving upon environmental conditions [12,18,101]. However, the capacity of the earth’s ecosystem to support
the rate of economic growth recommended in the Brundtland Report has been questioned [101]. This
over-emphasis on
economic growth could be seen as one of the key problems associated with the SDGs that could
potentially result in the countering of sustainability objectives [27]. As a result, the sustainable
development agenda has been critiqued for adopting an anthropocentric perspective that
prioritizes human needs over the value of other forms of life [20,102]. The problems associated with the
lack of integrated approaches to sustainable development are best illustrated in policies on food, energy and water resource
systems, where the pursuit of narrow sectoral approaches have often resulted in adverse consequences that threaten food, energy
and water security [103,104,105].
In contrast, deep ecology is non-anthropocentric in its orientation, as
it recognizes the intrinsic values or inherent worth of the nonhuman natural world and
considers humans as ordinary members of the biotic community [42]. Deep ecology’s deep-
seated respect for all forms of life is expressed in the principle of biospherical egalitarianism —
the equal right of all to live and blossom [82,86,87]. Based on these principles, deep ecology
offers a radical agenda that replaces the ideology of economic growth with ecological
sustainability. The goal of long term ecological sustainability entails the protection and
sustenance of the richness and diversity of life on earth [84,106]. Socially, deep ecology calls for
promoting the diversity of cultures through the removal of all forms of domination,
exploitation and suppression [38,86]. From a deep ecology perspective, “cultural diversity is an
analogue on the human level to the biological richness and diversity of life forms” [38] (p. 267). The
diversity of human cultures and non-human life forms enhances the chances of survival and
also contributes to overall quality of life. Policies that erode this diversity also threaten opportunities for self-
realization [86]. Similar to deep ecology, the adaptive governance approach addresses the need for adaptive and integrated
management goals in the pursuit of sustainable development [32,107]. Adaptive governance regimes provide flexible institutional
mechanisms for the implementation of integrated management goals covering the social, economic and ecological components in
ecosystem-based management processes in the face of unpredictability [7,31,70,108]. Ecosystem-based management often involves
actors with diverse values and interests as well as competing knowledge claims who are dispersed across various scales. Managing
these differences in perspectives calls for mechanisms for conflict management, such as those entailed in adaptive governance
processes [68,72]. A key requirement of adaptive governance is analytic deliberation, a process of deliberation among scientists and
resource managers that is also informed by scientific analysis [68,109,110]. Analytic deliberation serves as a means of managing
conflicting values and knowledge uncertainties, thus making adaptive governance a promising approach for dealing with wicked
problems in ecosystem management processes [49,111]. For instance, in their analysis of three case studies on the role of adaptive
governance in ecosystem management, reference [31] found that the adaptive governance approach had led to procedural benefits,
such as enhanced capacity for monitoring, communication, and responding to changes, as well as substantive benefits, such as the
provision of multiple ecosystem services.
The authors identified the role of adaptive governance in these
processes to include system-wide knowledge mobilization to create awareness, facilitation of
collaboration and negotiation across scales, and the utilization of formal and informal
institutional mechanisms. However, in the absence of clear ethical guidelines, there is the risk of
promoting human-centered goals in the pursuit of adaptive governance and other resilience-
based management approaches, thereby perpetuating the pattern of human domination over
nature that is typical of the conventional management paradigm. Moreover, given the
differences in knowledge, resources and political influence of stakeholders engaged in adaptive
governance processes, there is the potential for adaptive governance processes to result in
unjust outcomes and the perpetuation of pre-existing social inequalities. As [112] noted, the question of
what constitutes “a desirable, fair and feasible future” in the process of social-ecological transformation has not yet been answered.
Similarly, reference [113] highlighted the likelihood for resilience-based policies to entrench socially unjust and environmentally
unsustainable conditions in their quest to maintain the status quo. Thus,
it appears the focus of deep ecology on
the nurturing of cultural and ecological diversity based on the principle of biocentric
egalitarianism holds promise for promoting inter and intra-species equity in adaptive
governance processes.
They are in the wrong direction – exporting western technology without regard
to differences in cultural context is rooted in enlightenment thinking. Prefer a
critical analysis of Western technology.
Another distinction between deep ecology and shallow ecology could be made with regard to their epistemological positions on
science and technology. Shallow ecology endorses the Cartesian view of the universe as composed of atomistic elements that could
be understood through the method of reductionism. As
such, shallow ecology engenders the fragmentation of
knowledge [42]. The shallow ecological approach also emphasizes the training of experts in the
hard sciences to manage the environment in a way that combines economic growth with
environmental health. Consistent with this approach, the adoption of Western technology is
promoted without regard to differences in cultural context [38]. In the Brundtland Report, the need for
technological solutions to emerging problems is strongly emphasized as a requirement for sustainability [18]. For instance, the
report endorses the depletion of non-renewable natural resources where technological substitutes are available .
This
mainstream approach to sustainability has also been critiqued for its overreliance on science
and technology , a further reflection of the enlightenment roots of the sustainable
development agenda [85]. From the perspective of Enlightenment thinkers, such as Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes, the
purpose of science was to serve as an instrument for the domination and exploitation of nature to ensure human progress [85,114].
The type of science that is promoted from the Enlightenment perspective is positivist science that emphasizes the use of quantifiable
data to derive generalizable explanations about objective realities [115]. The dominance of positivism has contributed to the
fragmentation of disciplines and the marginalization of other ways of knowing [85,115]. For instance, policies on climate change
mitigation and adaptation have continued to emphasize the search for engineering solutions, thus, limiting opportunities for the
utilization of the social sciences, as well as local and traditional knowledge [116,117,118 ]. In view of these shortfalls,
recent years have seen a growing appreciation of the knowledge systems of non-Western
societies [119]. In line with these trends, deep ecology embraces epistemological pluralism that
accommodates scientific and non-scientific ways of knowing as a means of achieving broader
social ideals, such as freedom and quality of life [120,121] . From this perspective, the promotion of cognitive
diversity is seen as an integral part of efforts to enhance cultural diversity [120,122 ]. In this regard, deep ecology
endorses a shift from the hard sciences to the soft sciences in a way that advances local and
global cultures, promotes a critical analysis of Western technology by non-industrial societies
to inform adoption decisions and promotes culturally-sensitive local soft technologies [38].
Consistent with the deep ecology perspective, there is growing awareness that realization of the SDGs for global sustainability will
require the mobilization of knowledge across scales and sectors through collaboration across disciplines, as well as between
academics and non-academics [2,123]. In this regard, the adaptive governance approach promotes the integration of diverse sources
and types of knowledge, including scientific and local knowledge [68,72,98]. The adaptive governance approach also provides
institutional mechanisms for connecting actors within and across scales in promoting knowledge mobilization through social learning
and knowledge co-production processes [9,30,32,77]. For instance, in their analysis of three successful case studies on ecosystem-
based management, reference [31] identified the broad mobilization of various types of knowledge among diverse actors, including
scientists, farmers and conservationists through adaptive governance mechanisms as a key ingredient in generating awareness and
support for collective responses to the perceived crises in each of the cases. However, success in building integrated knowledge
about social-ecological systems has not been widespread. Knowledge integration across disciplines, including the natural and social
sciences, is often constrained by differences in metaphysical assumptions about the world, explanatory models, as well as methods
and criteria for knowledge validation [124,125,126,127]. Similarly, the integration of science and traditional knowledge, as well as
knowledge co-production through co-management and other participatory processes, is frequently thwarted by lack of trust among
participants, as well as differences in power and worldviews [37,128]. Breaking
away from the pattern of
marginalization of the social sciences and traditional knowledge [127,129] through adaptive
governance calls for an explicit emphasis on deep ecology’s principle of epistemological
pluralism.
The segregation of humankind from nature cannot be divorced from western
ideology and justifies exploitation – refuse their dichotomization and preserve
our moral responsibility toward nature.
Louw, 16 (Gert Petrus Benjamin, University of South Africa School of Humanities, Master of
Arts in Philosophy, “DEEP ECOLOGY: SHOULD WE EMBRACE THIS PHILOSOPHY?”, University of
South Africa, March 2016) https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/83637623.pdf//ac
Until recently humankind was seen as the conqueror-hero, but of late humankind has been
considered to be a tyrant — there is recognition that whatever humanity subjugates is despoiled
and nature is the victim . If the majority of people can realise that each organism has an
Aristotelian formal and final cause and an end (a telos), then there might be a more widespread
recognition that each organism has something to conserve , something for which it stands,
namely its life and its existence. As humans we have more understanding of the natural world now than ever before.
We have more predictive power to foresee the intended and unintended results of our actions
and more power to reverse undesirable consequences. In my opinion, the continuous maelstrom of killing and
insensitivity to all forms of life is ethically callous. It seems as if humanity lacks the cognitive capacity to
realise what it is doing. Since the ancient Greeks, a major theme in Western Philosophy has
been the idea that humanity is unique and set apart from the rest of nature. Western
segregation of humankind from nature has become a veritable cachet of Western ideology .
According to Guo (2012:108), ancient Greek and medieval philosophy, as a rule, dichotomise the integral world into a metaphysical
spiritual sphere and a physical material sphere. Following this tradition, Descartes divided the world into an internal, spiritual and an
external, objective world. This system of dichotomies is not taught in the major Eastern philosophical traditions. Chinese Philosophy
has surpassed metaphysics, aggregating many relative facts rather than separating them by means of a dichotomy. From the
viewpoint of Fang (2009c:53-54), ancient Greek philosophy and medieval philosophy dichotomise, as a rule, the integral world into a
metaphysical, spiritual sphere and a physical, material sphere. Descartes, as mentioned, contributed to this endeavour by dividing
the world into an internal, spiritual world and an external, objective world. He
says that the continual
dichotomisation of the world into two parts brings about severe problems of association. It is here
that Chinese Philosophy, unlike Western Philosophy, has surpassed metaphysics by aggregating many relative facts rather than
separating them by means of dichotomy, thus eliminating the gap between the two layers created by the act of dichotomising. This
viewpoint, says Guo (2012:108), is valuable because it reveals the difference between Western and Chinese thinking, even if, to a
certain extent, such a view denies dualism because it clings to monism. He is nonetheless of the view that the East upholds equality
and treats dualism and Advaita45 as equal and, simultaneously, does not cling either to dualism or Advaita .
We should
neither dichotomise nor be dichotomised, because when we split the world into two parts, we
are setting our external world apart from nature, and in doing so, we should then ask ourselves
if we – being set apart from nature – have any moral responsibility toward nature. I believe that we
do have a moral relationship with the nonhuman environment. Such a moral relationship, according to Cheney
(1987:139-140), must depend upon a complex understanding of what it is to be a human being
and our response to other human beings. Secondly, such a moral relationship will depend on an
understanding how complex webs of relationship that constitute the human moral community
might expand to include the nonhuman and to understand what it might mean to care and
respond to something in the nonhuman environment as being a member of one’s own moral
community. If we however bring about a schism in the world by dichotomising concepts and entities into ‘us’ and ‘them’, then
we may easily condone what Odysseus, our ancestors and Apartheid did. According to Smith (2011:62), mid-century readers of
Leopold’s work were well aware of the fact that the injustices of slavery were mainly defended on the basis of property rights.
Property and the way we see property, with the important role it portrays in satisfying (even though it seldom does) our egoistic
greed, recall what Leopold (1989:201) wrote in an extract he took from Homer: “When god-like Odysseus returned from the wars in
Troy he hanged all on one rope a dozen slave-girls of his household, whom he suspected of misbehaviour during his absence.” This
hanging, according to Leopold, involved no question of propriety because the girls were considered to be property, and the disposal
of property was then a matter of practicality, not a matter of right and of wrong. What
Odysseus did was not in line
with what Cheney (1987:139-140) proposed regarding ethical behaviour towards our fellow
human beings and the environment, namely to expand the moral community by attempting to
grasp what it mean to care and respond to any other member of one’s moral community. The
mental act of dichotomisation is, by nature, anthropocentric . It suits an anthropocentric
mentality to place a rift between it and other entities in order to exploit those entities. Such
exploitation is later justified on the basis that those entities may be exploited because they do
not fall within the dichotomised sphere of humankind. However, in my opinion, the classical position of the
schism between humanity and the non-human world has been overturned during the epistemological-evolutionist shift. Hume’s
epistemological arguments undermine the uniqueness of human intellect and provided inspiration to Darwin for his naturalistic
world view, which contributed to his work on evolution and natural selection. Brown
(2007:92) emphasises that we
should rethink those dualities which structure and colonise traditional moral thinking. In my
view, this can be done by taking a phenomenological/holistic approach and returning to the
moral ‘things themselves’, that is, our actual experiences of phenomena. The distinctions between
human and animal and between reason and emotion have been inadequately characterised by the moral tradition. The prima facie
form of rationality in moral experience is not separate or discontinuous from subjectivity, emotion, animality or particularity. In
contrast to a phenomenological/holistic approach, traditional moral theory is monistic in that it assumes a monistic criterion of what
and who matters morally. I recommend that humanity should follow the main argument which Calarco (2008:149) postulates in his
Zoographies, that we should simply let the human-animal distinction go, or, at the very least, not insist on maintaining it at all.
Apart from its tendency to proliferate dichotomies , Western philosophy has also been labelled
as anthropocentric in its composition. In the section to follow, I will discuss some viewpoints on the anthropocentric
nature of Western philosophy. It is important to address this anthropocentric nature because I consider it to be the single most
important reason why the environmental situation on our planet is as dismal as it is.
Western ideology structures a destructive relationship with nature – in the face

of environmental degradation we need to orient ourselves towards living in
unison with nature.
From the above discussions it follows that Western Philosophy does indeed contribute to
structuring an anthropocentric and destructive mind-set towards nature . There is, however, a
Western philosophical tradition which is not anthropocentric, that is, the tradition espoused by
the Native American Indians who possess a rich philosophy of living in unison with the land and
nature as a whole . Deloria (1999a:46) mentions that the real interest of the old Native American Indians, for example, was
not to discover the abstract structure of physical reality, but rather to find the proper road along which, for the duration of a
person’s life, individuals were supposed to walk. This has three important implications: first, the universe is a moral universe;
second, there is a proper way to live in the universe and, finally, the sum-total of our life experiences has a meaningful reality. The
universe is, accordingly, seen as proceeding in a preordained direction, empirically exemplified in the physical growth cycles of
childhood, youth and old age, with the corresponding responsibility of every entity to enjoy life, fulfil itself and increase in wisdom
and the spiritual development of personality. As Westerners we can also foster such a mode of thinking and
such a mode of living that is in right relation to all of life. There is a Cree proverb47 that reads: “Only when the
last tree has died and the last river been poisoned and the last fish been caught will we realise we cannot eat money.” The
current state of environmental degradation leads one to wonder if we will ever collectively
realise this truth.
The aff models HARMFUL western tech ideology to less developed countries –
incentivizing overconsumption and ecological degradation
POPULATION Shallowapproach: The threat of (human) overpopulation is seen mainly as a problem

for developing countries. One condones or even cheers population increases in one’s own country for shortsighted
economic, military, or other reasons; an increase in the number of human beings is considered a value in itself or as economically
profitable. The issue of optimum population for humankind is discussed without reference to the
question of the optimum population of other life-forms . The destruction of wild habitats caused
by an increasing human population is accepted as an inevitable evil. Drastic decreases of wild life-forms
tend to be accepted as long as species are not driven to extinction. Animal social relations are ignored . The longterm
substantial reduction of the global human population is not seen as a desired goal. One has a right to defend one’s own borders
against “illegal aliens,” no matter what the population pressures elsewhere .
Deep approach: It is recognized that excessive
pressures on planetary life conditions stem from the human population explosion. The pressure
stemming from industrial societies is a major factor , and population reduction must have a high
priority in those societies, as well as in developing countries. Estimates of an optimal human population vary. Some
quantitative estimates are 100 million, 500 million, and 1,000 million, but it is recognized that there must be a long-range human-
population reduction through mild but tenacious political and economic measures. This will make possible, as a result of increased
habitat, population growth for thousands of species that are now constrained by human pressures. CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND
APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY Shallowapproach: Industrialization of the kind manifested in the West is
held to be the goal for developing countries . The universal adoption of Western technology is compatible with mild
cultural diversity and the conservation of good (from the Western point of view) elements in present-day non-industrial societies.
There is a low estimate of deep cultural differences that deviate significantly from Western standards. Deep approach: Cultural
diversity is an analogue on the human level to the biological richness and diversity of life-forms. We should give high
priority to cultural anthropology in education in industrial societies . We should limit the impact
of Western technology on nonindustrial countries and defend the Fourth World against
foreign domination. Political and economic policies should favor subcultures within industrialized societies. Local, soft
technologies will allow a basic cultural assessment of any technical innovations. The deep approach freely criticizes so-called
advanced technology and concepts of “progress.”
National Parks
Conservation of natural parks only affirms an unsustainable outlook that
exploits nature for human benefit and profit
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00664677.2016.1243515 //cb
The proponents of social justice keep perpetuating the dichotomies between the indigenous communities and the Western elites
(e.g. Chapin 2004), or between poor rural peasants and neoliberal conservationists (e.g. Holmes 2013). However, historically,
protected areas were rarely created to benefit particular groups of people (such as tourists), because
most national parks
have been established for the people, everywhere in the world, and not just in post-colonial nations (e.g.
Doak et al. 2015). In fact, national parks can be seen as protecting cultural identity against severe
changes to the local environment, such as logging. As Brosius (1999, 39) has noted in the case of Penan in Malaysia,
‘logging not only undermines the basis of Penan subsistence but, by transforming sites with biographical, social, and historical
significance, also destroys those things that are iconic of their existence as a society’. Conservation
does not threaten
people’s liberty, as Fletcher (2009) would have it – rather it enables one to live in a world of natural
richness . In the words of Wakild (2015, 44):
... history in many cases shows that people were not kicked out; national parks were designed with them in mind. Yet, the
ways
parks and peoples merged did not stop the rapaciousness of development around them . The lack
of historical introspection, context, or nuance in denunciations like Chapin’s beg a re-evaluation of the
broader conservation landscape.
The critics of the national park model forget that the point of the American Wilderness Act (1964) was the protection of wilderness
for the people (Shoreman-Ouimet and Kopnina 2015b). While the critics talk of exclusion, the
parks were in fact created
in order to be accessible to the public, and in most cases allowing people to either profit from or
enjoy nature as a national and widely shared good (Doak et al. 2015). Local communities are often direct
beneficiaries of biodiversity conservation, which also alleviates poverty and provides nutrition for the most vulnerable communities
(e.g. Goodall 2015). Thus, while in some cases, dichotomies between the ‘guilty’ and the ‘victimised’ are necessary, in other cases
they obscure realities. To quote Crist (2015, 93):
The literature challenging traditional conservation strategies as locking people out, and as locking away sources of human livelihood,
rarely tackles either the broader distribution of poverty or its root social causes; rather, strictly protected areas are scapegoated,
and wild nature, once again, is targeted to take the fall for the purported betterment of people, while domination and exploitation
of nature remain unchallenged. The prevailing mindset of humanity’s entitlement to avail itself of the
natural world without limitation is easily, if tacitly, invoked by arguments that demand that
wilderness (the last safe zone for species, processes, ecologies, nonhuman individuals, climatic disruption, and indigenous
ways) offer up its ‘natural resources’—in the name of justice.
Allowing all people to profit from nature is not realistic in the long term . Due to population pressures
and increasing scarcity of land, supposedly ‘traditional’ practices, such as slash and burn agriculture or
swidden farming (Henley 2011), are occurring in so many localities, and without restrictions, that the
‘sustainability’ of even ‘traditional’ farming on this scale becomes highly questionable .
The Yellowstone model of conservation is based on flawed ecological

assumptions, prioritizes human recreation, and marginalizes local communities
Akamani 20, (Kofi Akamani is an Associate Professor of Forest Recreation and Conservation Social
Science in the Department of Forestry at Southern Illinois University, “Integrating Deep Ecology and
Adaptive Governance for Sustainable Development: Implications for Protected Areas Management,”
7/17/2020, Sustainability, https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/14/5757 // ECL)
The establishment of protected areas has been gaining increased recognition as a key component
of global conservation strategies aimed at addressing the loss of biodiversity
[13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54,5
5,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,92,93,94,95,96,97,
98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105,106,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,114,115,116,117,118,119,120,121,122,123,124,125,126,127,128,
129,130,131,132,133,134,135,136,137,138]. Protected areas refer to “clearly defined geographical space,
recognized, dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means, to achieve the
long-term conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values” [138] (p.
5). The conventional approach to managing protected areas, known as the “Yellowstone model”
has been characterized by the reliance on government representatives as resource owners and
decision-makers. This model of protected areas management typically employs expert-driven rational-
comprehensive planning processes aimed at achieving a narrow range of goals, particularly
nature preservation and provision of opportunities for recreation and tourism [139,140]. While this
conventional approach has been largely successful in the United States [141], its application in the developing world
has received several criticisms, including the separation of humans from nature, the neglect of
local socio-economic concerns, the abuse of human rights through forced displacement and the
failure to achieve biodiversity goals [137,142,143,144,145]. In recent decades, alternative approaches to protected
areas management, such as co-management and community-based conservation have emerged in response to the shortfalls of the
conventional model [139,144,146,147]. Nonetheless, the conventional approach to protected areas management continues to
receive support [148]. Ongoing work on principles for good governance of protected areas suggest the need for governance
mechanisms for promoting integrative goals and inclusive decision-making processes, as well as addressing uncertainties and ethical
considerations [138,149,150]. Here, I offer a brief overview of the history and key features of the conventional Yellowstone model of
protected areas management, following which, I identify its key shortfalls and discuss how they could be addressed using ideas from
adaptive governance and deep ecology.
The establishment of Yellowstone National Park in the USA in 1872 as the world’s first national
park ushered in the role of national governments in the ownership and management of
protected areas [151]. Yellowstone National Park was established to be managed as a “public park or pleasuring ground for the
benefit and enjoyment of the people” [152] (p. 37). Following the establishment of Yellowstone National Park, the role of
national parks as places for the recreational enjoyment of the American public became
entrenched in early US national park policy, notably the National Park Service Organic Act of
1916, which states the purpose of the parks as “to conserve the scenery and the natural and
historic objects and the wild life therein … unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations”
[153] (p. 12). Early preservationists, notably John Muir, supported the promotion of mass tourism in US national parks as it was seen
as an important strategy to create awareness and political support for the National Park System [152,154]. Under the first director of
the National Park Service, Stephen Mather, recreation
and tourism became entrenched as the primary focus
of national parks in the US [155]. However, far from being a benign land use, the adverse impacts of
mass tourism on ecosystems and recreational experience became clearer over time. Through the
works of Aldo Leopold, Arthur Carhart and Robert Marshall, among others, the wilderness values of national parks gained popularity
and policy attention over the years, eventually culminating in the adoption of the Wilderness Act of 1964, which provided a legal
mandate for the designation of wilderness areas on public lands managed by federal land management agencies [152]. The
Wilderness Act states that “A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own works dominate the landscape, is
hereby recognized as an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor
who does not remain” [152] (p. 4). What
has come to be commonly known as the Yellowstone model of
protected areas management represents the management of protected areas by government
representatives for ecosystem preservation and the provision of opportunities for nature-based
recreation and tourism [139]. In this model, the resource is typically owned by a government agency that also has the
authority and responsibility for managing the resource to achieve specific goals [138,156]. Over the years, several criticisms have
been levelled against the application of the Yellowstone model in the management of protected areas in the developing world.
First, the Yellowstone model has been critiqued for its flawed ecological assumptions . The
primary management approach of drawing legal boundaries around parks and protecting them
from natural and anthropogenic disturbances as a means of preserving their naturalness [157]
has been linked to the outdated balance of nature paradigm and its associated climax theory
[153]. The balance of nature paradigm depicted ecosystems as closed, self-regulating systems,
separate from nature, and possessing a single equilibrium state that was reached through a
linear, predictable development trajectory [158,159]. Based on these assumptions, climax theory posited
that “all vegetation was at, or was returning to, a fully developed climax stage of succession that
was natural and characteristic of the region ” [153] (p. 15). However, the emergence of new ecological
insights on the dynamic and complex nature of ecosystems has challenged the assumption of stable ecosystems
fluctuating predictably around a single equilibrium [140,160,161]. Additionally, new evidence on the
role of Native Americans in shaping the landscape prior to European settlement has challenged
the idea of naturalness [142,153,162].
In view of these insights, building the resilience of park ecosystems to uncertainties and change is beginning to receive attention as a
useful goal in the management of protected areas [160,163]. Although these emerging perspectives offer promise for the
sustainable management of protected areas, much of the discussion has largely focused on the ecological component of protected
areas [157]. An application of deep ecology and adaptive governance to protected areas management promises to advance a truly
holistic perspective on the complex and evolving relationships between social and ecological systems across space and time. Such a
holistic approach broadens the aspirations of protected areas managers from building the resilience of park ecosystems against
uncertainties, to building social-ecological resilience in protected areas as integrated systems of humans and nature [161] using
adaptive management and other planning approaches for managing uncertainty [70].
Second, the
Yellowstone model of protected areas has also been critiqued for its narrow focus on
nature preservation and nature-based tourism [139]. As has been noted previously, the establishment of
Yellowstone National Park in the US began the tradition of managing protected areas for the purpose of recreation and tourism
[151,152]. Following the adoption of the Wilderness Act in 1964, the management of protected areas shifted from
its previous anthropocentric focus on recreational enjoyment toward an ecocentric or biocentric
focus, which emphasized managing to preserve naturalness and solitude in protected areas [152].
In spite of the changing management philosophies, a common feature of the Yellowstone model of protected
areas is its focus on park ecosystems to the neglect of local socio-cultural concerns [145]. The
increased adoption of this model of protected areas management in the developing world has generated major
adverse consequences. Reference [164] argued that tropical regions in the developing world that are
considered biodiversity hotspots, where protected areas are needed are also social hotbeds,
characterized by various socio-economic and political challenges that are neglected in the
management of protected areas. The establishment of protected areas in these regions is often
characterized by forced evictions that lead to physical, economic and cultural displacement
[137,165,166,167]. This authoritarian approach to managing protected areas also leads to social conflicts that threaten
biodiversity conservation [139,143,168]. Finally, established protected areas in the developing world tend to be poorly
managed, with most of them existing as paper parks [148].
In view of these shortfalls, people-centered conservation approaches, such as community-based conservation (CBC) and integrated
conservation and development projects (ICDPs) have emerged to address the need for community involvement and access to
conservation benefits [137,164,169]. ICDPs aim to reduce local pressures on protected areas, by providing various incentives
through the integration of local development needs with park management goals, particularly in the buffer zones of protected areas
[137,170]. While ICDPs and CBC are often treated synonymously in the literature, reference [137] notes that CBC goes beyond ICDPs
by emphasizing local community involvement in park management as a means of achieving conservation and local development
goals. In all, the implementation of people-centered conservation initiatives has been critiqued for promoting socio-economic goals,
such as sustainable livelihoods and poverty reduction, at the expense of biodiversity conservation [143,146,170]. The focus of ICDPs
on the buffer zones of individual protected areas has been critiqued for failing to account for external forces stemming from the
broader political economy [164]. Other shortfalls associated with people-centered conservation initiatives include a lack of
recognition of community complexity [171], and poor design and implementation mechanisms [170,172]. In view of these shortfalls,
a resurgence of interest in the protectionist Yellowstone model of protected areas has been occurring [143,148,169,173]. This
pattern of narrow sectoral approaches to protected areas management highlights the need for ethical guidelines that
simultaneously account for the social and ecological dimensions of protected areas [169,174].
Managing protected areas to achieve long term sustainability and resilience requires
consideration of ecological, economic, cultural and community issues in a broader regional
context [161]. This goal could be realized using the focus of adaptive governance on the integration of multiple values [68,72]
and the ethical guidelines of deep ecology on the promotion of biological and cultural diversity
[38,106]. The deep ecology principles also provide ethical foundations in support of the call for
greater social justice, human dignity and cultural integrity in protected areas management
[144,169,175].
Third, a defining feature of the Yellowstone model of protected areas management is its reliance
on government representatives as owners and managers of protected areas [139,156]. Consistent with
its reliance on centralized institutions, decision-making also follows the rational-comprehensive model
[140], a planning approach that aims at choosing the best means for maximizing the common
interest, based on the assumption of the availability of comprehensive data on planning problems and societal values [176]. The
reliance on centralized institutions and expert-driven planning processes in the Yellowstone
model offers limited opportunities for community participation [175], and often leads to the
marginalization of local knowledge and local institutions in protected areas management [141]. For
instance, decisions on the legal designation of protected areas often occur without the input of the
communities that will be impacted by these decisions [144,175]. The widespread existence of paper
parks in the developing world also reflects the limited capacity and interest of governments in the developing
world in the implementation of the Yellowstone model [148,177]. The legitimacy of conservation decisions
based on the authoritarian approach of the Yellowstone model has also been questioned
[137,169].
Offshore Drilling
Efforts for offshore drilling inevitably destroys organisms and habitats – deep
ecology reverses it
There is constant phenomenon of digging the soil to lay pipelines in the Niger Delta. In the experience of this present author when the trees and forests
are felled to lay pipelines the trees are just thrown disorderly into the neighboring land. There is no way that you can drill for
oil without destroying plants and animals . The negative impact of the extractive industries and other anthropogenic
factors on biodiversity in the region is acknowledged by many scholars Zabby (2004), Ugochukwu & Ertel (2008), Kadafa (2012), Mmon &
Arukoyo (2009), and Agbagwa (2014).
In terms of animals, a wide varieties use to be common in the Niger Delta. The urbanization of many towns
into cities, the building of oil companies and oil drilling facilities,and roads has destroyed
the habitat of many animals . Ekpo (2004) narrates that after the discovery of oil till date people in Oguagba, Edo
State have complained that their ecosystems have been destroyed and the flora and fauna are at a stage of extinction; and this
is compounded by the constant pollution of land and the atmosphere . As Ekuerhare (2007) relates
through death and degradation, fishes and other organisms in the rivers and environment of the region are no more and
this has been caused by gas flaring and other oil activities. Moro (2008) equally bemoans the impact of oil activities
and gas flares by stating that the abundant fishes in the rivers have disappeared and those
that are left are poisoned as a result of chemical pollution by oil companies and seismic
activities . Various ethnic groups of the Niger Delta in various bills of rights such as the Ogoni Bill of Rights by the Movement for
the Survival of the Ogoni People (1990), and the Kalama Declaration of the Ijaw Youths of the Niger Delta (1998) have all expressed
that their plants and animals and environment have been destroyed by oil companies. Further resources showing that there is
constant destruction of biodiversity in the Niger Delta are too many to be enumerated here but they includeAdeola (2009),
Nwaomah (2011), and Glazebrook & Olusanya (2011).
The fact is clear that there is biodiversity loss in the region. When there is biodiversity loss a great deal of the benefits that
they bring is lost. These include as Srivastava (2010) and Rajagopalan (2011) note: loss of food, fuel, drugs, fiber, pharmaceutical
resources, social-cultural values, aesthetic value, ecosystem services, etc. In the Niger Delta valuable sources of food, medicine,
culture and even tourism has been lost as a result of devastation caused by oil companies . In the midst of
biodiversity loss the philosophy of deep ecology can offer a contribution.
Deep ecology acknowledges human essential needs – oil companies go beyond

barriers and reshapes nature against environmental education and biodiversity
There are certainly challenges against deep ecology. And it would not be possible to list all of them here. The challenges not
withstanding there are positive aspects in deep ecology that can help in preservation in the Niger Delta. One of the
things that have contributed to biodiversity loss is the human attitude of anthropocentrism and domineering over
nature. The perception that nature is there for human utility and that humans can do
whatever they desire with nature . Deep ecology affirms that while for essential needs
humans can use nature they should not devalue or devastate nature. Humans have a
responsibility to conserve and protect. This attitude of ethical with ecological responsibility, need to be accepted by individuals,
groups, and oil company in the Niger Delta. Oilcompanies should be attentive to the tremendous
benefits that biodiversity have for humans and also the ecosystem services they render . This
new understanding of self is important. The self is not just the solitary self. Humans are one with and linked with nature and
other beings. What impacts nature negatively also impacts humans negatively. In the Niger Delta, with more care and
ecological caution, many more species of plants and animals can be preserved. Economic profit is not always more important than
the wellbeing of other beings. Preservation of sacred groves and forests at times are vital to even the survival of present
and future generations.
Conserving the environment of the Niger Delta requires deep environmental awareness and education. The role of
environmental education in the Niger Delta can never be overemphasized. In Naess’ own native land, Norway, the notion of
self-realization and environmental concern forms aspects of the Norwegian core curriculum and the Latvian Project in
Environmental education (Cooper 2001). When people recognize that they are interdependently linked with the earth and other
beings, they are more likely going to preserve biodiversity. There is need to renew environmental education in the Niger
Delta. Children and many others in the region do go to school without learning about environmental conservation. Rolston
(2013) rightly notes that humans have duties to non-human species for ‘pragmatic, economic, political and scientific; deeper
down it is moral, philosophical,and religious. Species embody fertility on earth that is sacred’ (p. 234). Environmental education in
the Niger Delta should impact this consciousness in people in the region. Knowledge is important for as the Greek
philosopher Socrates opines people err out of ignorance. Though this is not always true, environmental knowledge of the
negative impact of human activities in the region and especially of the fundamental reasons to conserve biodiversity can help a great
deal in combating the loss. Environmental awareness and education in the Niger Delta need to be deeply enriched with
experience of the natural places through field trips, nature tour, excursions, etc. People should experience nature not
simply in the classroom but in the open field and forests.Experience of natural places was a great emphasis of Naess. Yet, if
oil companies destroys most of the natural places and pollute them through their
drilling activities it becomes difficult to experience nature in a healthy and peaceful
manner . Education against pollution of nature by both individuals and companies should
be encouraged . Philosophy has a great role to play in this education in the Niger Delta. Niger Delta philosophers and
philosophers in the Niger Delta should campaign and speak for nature.The teachings and writings of philosophers in the Niger
Delta should be ecologically transformative and help foster a sustainable environment.
Pollution
Shallow ecological projects, like pollution mitigation, are anthropocentric and
forgo self-realization by maintaining an egoistic conception of the self
Cochrane 06 – (Alasdair, London School of Economics and Political Science. “Environmental
Ethics”, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2006) https://iep.utm.edu/envi-eth/, sj
Deep ecology is perhaps most easily understood when considered in opposition to its “shallow” counterpart. According to
deep ecologists , shallow ecology is anthropocentric and concerned with pollution and
resource depletion. Shallow ecology might thus be regarded as very much the mainstream wing of
environmentalism. Deep ecology , in contrast, rejects anthropocentrism and takes a “total-field” perspective.
In other words, deep ecologists are not aiming to formulate moral principles concerning the
environment to supplement our existing ethical framework. Instead, they demand an entirely new
worldview and philosophical perspective. According to Arne Naess, the Norwegian philosopher who first outlined
this shallow-deep split in environmentalism, deep ecologists advocate the development of a new eco-
philosophy or “ecosophy“ to replace the destructive philosophy of modern industrial society (Naess, 1973). While the various
eco-philosophies that have developed within deep ecology are diverse, Naess and George Sessions have compiled a list of eight
principles or statements that are basic to deep ecology: The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have
value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent worth). These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human
world for human purposes. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in
themselves. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs. The flourishing of human life
and cultures is compatible with a substantially smaller population. The flourishing of non-human life requiresa smaller human
population. Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening. Policies must
therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, technological and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will
be deeply different from the present. The ideological change will be mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of
inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the
difference between bigness and greatness. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to
try to implement the necessary changes (Naess, 1986). But while Naess regards those who subscribe to these statements as
supporters of deep ecology, he does not believe it to follow that all such supporters will have the same worldview or “ecosophy”. In
other words deep ecologists do not offer one unified ultimate perspective, but possess various and divergent philosophical and
religious allegiances. Naess’s own ecosophy involves just one fundamental ethical norm: “ Self-
realization !” For Naess, this norm involves giving up a narrow egoistic conception of the self in favor of
a wider more comprehensive Self (hence the deliberate capital “S”). Moving to this wider Self involves recognizing that as human
beings we are not removed from nature, but are interconnected with it. Recognizing our wider Self thus involves identifying
ourselves with all other life forms on the planet. The Australian philosopher Warwick Fox has taken up this theme of self-realization
in his own eco-philosophy, “transpersonal ecology”. Fox does not regard environmental ethics to be predominantly about
formulating our moral obligations concerning the environment, but instead views it as about the realization of an “ecological
consciousness”. For Fox, as with Naess, this consciousness involves our widest possible identification with
the non-human world. The usual ethical concern of formulating principles and obligations thus becomes unnecessary,
according to Fox, for once the appropriate consciousness is established, one will naturally protect
the environment and allow it to flourish, for that will be part and parcel of the protection and flourishing of oneself
(Fox,1990).
Reformist attempts at fighting pollution only attempt to preserve the way of life
for those already at the top of society and sees nature as an environment in
which humans operate, not the other way around.
Kibert et al 12 – (Dr. Charles Kibert, Professer @ UoF Sr. School of Construction Management
with a focus on architectural sustainability. Dr. Leslie Thiele is a distinguished professor @ UoF
with a focus on the intersection of politics and sustainability. Anna Peterson, Professor of Social
Ethics, Environmental Ethics, Religion and Politics in Latin America @ UoF. Dr. Martha Monroe,
Extension Specialist in environmental education @ UoF School of Forest Resources and
Conservation. “The Ethics of Sustainability”, University of Florida, 2012)
https://www.cce.ufl.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Ethics%20of%20Sustainability
%20Textbook.pdf, sj
One of the most thoroughly and explicitly holistic types of environmental ethic is Deep Ecology, a strain of environmentalism
that was first developed in the 1970s by Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss. Naess was already well-known both as a mountaineer
and a philosopher when, in the 1960s, he became a radical environmentalist – influenced, he said, by Silent Spring. His systematic
reflections on environmentalism began with a 1973 article, “The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movements,”
in which he defined “deep ecology” over and against “shallow ecology.” Naess defined shallow ecology , which he
saw as the predominant trend in environmentalism, as the anthropocentric practice of protecting

resources and fighting pollution primarily for the sake of the quality of life of the “well-off” in
society . Here the natural world is seen as the environment in which humans operate, and the
goal of its protection is human wellbeing . Næss contrasted this view with deep ecology, an ecocentric
(nonanthropocentric) venture that places humans squarely in the natural world as beings who are
interdependent with and morally equal to other life forms on the planet. According to Naess’s “biospherical egalitarianism,”
all organisms have an equal right to live and flourish.9 Deep ecology is thus more holistic, viewing
nature as a large community that must be protected and valued for its own sake because it has intrinsic value, rather than the
instrumental value of shallow ecology. Naess and the many subsequent advocates of Deep Ecology argue that humans should
live in harmony with nature by realizing their selves in relation to nonhuman nature . With an
expanded sense of self, humans are defined not by isolated individualism but by their interactions and
relations with the many facets of nature . In this, some have seen the parallels between deep ecology and certain
forms of religion, such as Buddhism and New Age religions. Naess himself was influenced by Buddhism, as are later Deep Ecologists
such as the Australian John Seed and the American Joanna Macy. Deep ecology is considered a form of radical environmentalism and
exists today in a number of forms that are distinguished according in relation both to spirituality and to political militancy.
The aff’s attempt to solve pollution through technology is a form of shallow

ecology that only serves to export it to developing countries.
Naess, 05 (Arne, University of Oslo and its Center for Development and Environment,
honorary doctorates from Stockholm University and The Norwegian National University of
Sports and Physical Education, Norway’s St. Olav’s Order and the Peer Gynt Award, Denmark’s
Sonning Prize, the Nordic Council Award for Nature and Environment, the Uggla Prize for
Humanistic Studies from Stockholm University, and the Mahatma Gandhi Prize for Non-violent
Peace, founder and editor of the journal Inquiry, “The Selected Works of Arne Naess”, edited by
Alan Drengson, Springer Link) https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-1-4020-4519-
6#editorsandaffiliations//ac
Shallow approach: Technology seeks to purify the air and water and to spread pollution more
evenly. Laws limit permissible pollution. Polluting industries are preferably exported to
developing countries. Deep approach: Pollution is evaluated from a biospheric point of view,[5]
not centering on its effects on human health, but on life as a whole, including life conditions of
every species and system. The shallow reaction to acid rain is to avoid action by demands for
more research, demands to find species of trees tolerating high acidity, and so on, whereas the
deep approach concentrates on what is going on in the total ecosystem and asks for a high-
priority fight against the economy and technology responsible for acid rain. The priority is to
fight deep causes of pollution, not merely the superficial, short-range effects. The Third and
Fourth worlds cannot afford to pay the total cost of the war against pollution in their regions,
and consequently they require the assistance of the First and Second worlds. Exporting pollution
is not only a crime against humanity, but also against life.
The problem and technical solution framework of the aff fails to achieve
meaningful, long-term social change
Besthorn, 11 (Fred H., School of Social Work, Wichita State University, “Deep Ecology's
contributions to social work: A ten-year retrospective”, Wiley Online Library, December 9 2011)
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1468-2397.2011.00850.x//ac
For Naess, cultivating a deeply relational view of the person with environment necessarily
requires engagement in a process of deep questioning of prevailing constructions of human
identity formation. In a 1985 interview, Naess (in Devall & Sessions, 1985) enumerated the
deeper questions which he said the science of ecology does not ask: ‘what kind of a society
would be the best for maintaining a particular ecosystem . . . [and what are] society's
underlying assumptions’ (p. 74). For him, Deep Ecology's approach to a broad range of
environmental and social issues involves integrating one's intuitive experience of person with
environment and manifesting this by questioning ‘deeply and publicly, insistently and
consistently’ (Naess, 1995a, p. 75). He rejects the problem definition and technical solution
approach of shallow scientific environmentalism, justice and social reform, seeing it as
insufficient and ultimately failing at the task of meaningful, long-term social change. His person-
with-environment as one unit is core to his social and epistemological activism inhering in a
deep questioning of prevailing knowledge, values and social institutions which maintain an
abstract and dualistic view of conventional social and environmental structures. Naess'
ecosophy is based on his recognition of the intrinsic value of all life forms, that is, the intrinsic
worth of all beings and of ecological diversity, in all of its manifestations (Drengson & Devall,
2010). This intrinsic value stems from the belief that all beings have deep, interdependent
relationships with one another as part of a greater whole. In other words, being a well-
integrated part of a greater whole gives all life forms equal intrinsic worth and the right to
flourish and develop to their full expression independently of their perceived usefulness for
human purposes (Naess, 1989). Hence, humans as nature must respect the rest of nature and
live in ways which have minimal impact so humanity's role becomes one of ‘plain citizen’ (Devall
& Sessions, 1985, p. 68) rather than ‘master-slave’ (Naess, 1995d, p. 4). In other words, Naess
eschewed the idea of a hierarchy in which humans control or have dominance over nature.
The aff’s evaluation of the effects of pollution are rooted in anthropocentrism –

focus on human impacts can only combat the symptoms rather than the root
cause of environmental problems.
Horsthemke, 09 (Kai, Wits School of Education, University of the Witwatersrand, fellow at
the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics, Doctorate, Associate Professor and teaches Philosophy of
Education at KU Eichstätt-Ingolstadt, “Learning for the natural environment: The case against
anthropocentrism”, US-China Education Review, October 2009)
http://edoc.kueichstaett.de/20548/1/Learning_for_the_natural_environment.pdf//ac
Is pollution (e.g. from coal-burning stoves) bad because children in relevant areas suffer more
from asthma and chest colds than children elsewhere (De Beer, Dreyer & Loubser, 2005, p. 2)?
Or is it bad in itself? If an anthropocentric response is given, then one is unlikely ever to get
beyond fighting the symptoms. Stellenbosch philosopher and environmental ethics specialist
Johan Hattingh provides a discussion of anthropocentric perspectives, in which he makes a
distinction between the following value positions: ruthless development and exploitation,
resource development and conservation, and wilderness preservation—for human benefits and
enjoyment of unspoilt nature, recreational, aesthetic and the like (Hattingh, 2005, pp. 74-81).
Although the last looks like non-anthropocentrism, the value of nature and the environment is
entirely instrumental. The problem here is that their values depend entirely on human
recreational and aesthetic benefits. Should human preferences change? There would be no
axiological basis for concern. In ecocentric value positions, by contrast (Hattingh, 2005, pp. 82-
89), life in general and ecosystems as wholes are accorded intrinsic value—value in and of
themselves, regardless of how humans can benefit from them. As humans evolved and
developed, so did their values—through interaction with the land. According to Aldo Leopold,
we are therefore not the sole authors of our values. The shift mapped here is one from a focus
on relations between individuals (the decalogue) via that on the integration of individuals into
society (the Golden Rule) and integration of social organization to the individual (democracy) to
a focus on the relation of human individuals to animals, plants and the land (Leopold’s Land
Ethic) (Hattingh, 2005, p. 82). In his discussion of so-called radical value positions (deep ecology,
ecofeminism, social ecology, and bioregionalism—all of which might also be termed radical
environmentalism), Hattingh perceives an emphasis on incisive, definitive and fundamental
transformation, in order to address the root causes of our environmental problems (Hattingh,
2005, pp. 89-93). According to Hattingh, the practical consequences between this three-way
split between anthropocentric, ecocentric and radical value positions is that they have no
shared vision (but they do, arguably!), no unified voice and no common public language to
communicate effectively with public decision makers and policy formulators (Hattingh, 2005, p.
94). Hattingh considers this the problem of ethical monism in environmental ethics—while its
advantages are theoretical coherence and internal consistency, it is problematic when it comes
to the formulation of practical policy proposals (ibid.). Hattingh proposes what he calls
environmental pragmatism, acknowledgement and acceptance of the coexistence of theories
and value positions, until a comprehensive environmental ethic emerges. I submit that this, like
Le Grange and Loubser’s, is a rather pale proposal. By the time such an ethic is imminent that it
may already be too late.
Focus on pollution in industrialized nations is a form of shallow ecology that

forecloses the fundamental changes in values that come from embracing deep
ecology.
Drengson et al, 11 (Alan Drengson, University of Victoria, Bill Devall, Humboldt State
University, Mark A Schroll, Co-Editor, Restoration Earth, “The Deep Ecology Movement: Origins,
Development, and Future Prospects (Toward a Transpersonal Ecosophy”, The Deep Ecology
Movement International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 101 The Deep Ecology Movement:
Origins, Development, and Future Prospects, Toward a Transpersonal Ecosophy) International
Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 2011) http://cista.net/tomes/Somagetics/The%20International
%20Journal%20of%20Transpersonal%20Studies,%202011,%20Volume%2030.pdf#page=106//ac
Naess said that supporters of the deep ecology movement embrace its principles as a result of a
deep questioning of mainstream values, beliefs, and practices to arrive at intuitions that are at
the level of ultimate norms and hypotheses. By comparison, the shallow movement does not go
to the ultimate level in values and conceptions of the world. It is concerned primarily with
pollution and resource depletion in industrialized nations, and only with minor reform of the
system without fundamental changes in values and practices. It is concerned with the health
and affluence of industrial nations. Of the deep approach Naess wrote, “Ecologically responsible
policies are concerned only in part with pollution and resource depletion . There are deeper
concerns which touch upon principles of diversity, complexity, autonomy, decentralization,
symbiosis, egalitarianism, and classlessness” (Drengson & Inoue, 1995, p. 3; Naess, 2008a). In his
detailed discussion, Naess used terms such as “biocentric egalitarianism in principle” to try to
articulate the underlying intuitions that supporters of deep changes felt are needed in industrial
societies, in relation to the way natural and built environments are treated. Later, for a variety
of reasons, he dropped this egalitarian terminology when he articulated the Platform Principles
for the deep ecology movement. As will be seen, the first two principles approach the essence
of some of these intuitions, since they recognize the intrinsic worth of all living beings (Platform
Principle No. 1) and the intrinsic worth of diversity and richness (Platform Principle No. 2).
Postmodern
Post modernist readings of nature that see the it solely as a social construct fail
to recognize its existence prior to human appropriation
Discourse is important, and conditions the way we define, interpret, and address environmental affairs. This should
not be taken to mean that there is only discourse when it comes to environmental problem s.
Postmodernists believe that there is no escape from specific viewpoints (for an environmental
application, see Bennett and Chaloupka, 1993), such that "nature" and "wilderness" are mainly social
constructions, understood culturally as the product of societies that have, among other things,
removed indigenous peoples from their landscapes . But even those such as Cronon (1995) and Soper (1995) who
make this argument also stress that their position does not diminish environmental concern . Thus nature
should not be treated as merely a subcategory of culture, as an extreme postmodern position
would require. Such an extreme position would be just another anthropocentric turn in the
colonization of nature for human purposes ( Crist, 2004), an arrogance that fails to recognize
nature's existence prior to human appropriation. The extreme postmodern lesson has actually
been adopted most effectively by organized climate change deniers in the United States, for
whom climate science is just a social construction that serves a political purpose, requiring in
their response a social construction of nature that does not allow human caused climate
change. Just because something is socially interpreted does not mean it is unreal . Climate is
changing as a result of greenhouse gas emissions, pollution does cause illness, species do
become extinct, ecosystems cannot absorb stress indefinitely, tropical forests are disappearing .
But people can make very different things of these phenomena and-especially-their
interconnections, providing grist for political dispute . The existence of these competing understandings is why
we have environmental politics ( or any kind of politics) to begin with. Sometimes particular constructions can be
exposed as misguided-as, for example, when automobile company executives in the 1950s
dismissed the possibility of smog in cities such as Los Angeles by claiming that car exhaust
emissions were simply absorbed by the atmosphere . More often, it is hard to prove constructions right or wrong
in any straightforward way. But one might say the same about scientific worldviews, political ideologies, or governmental
constitutions. It
is still possible to engage in critical comparative judgment, to apply evidence and
argument, and to hope that in so doing we can correct some errors, and so move toward better
overall understanding of environmental issues and problems . As Litfin puts it, it is possible to subscribe to
both a hermeneutic epistemology (i.e., an interpretive philosophy of inquiry) and a realist ontology (i.e., a commitment to the actual
existence of problems) (1994: 26-7, 50
Reform
Calls to reform contemporary ecological crises within the traditional
anthropocentric framework are shallow ecology, seeing all the world’s
problems as something to be technologically purified and enslaved for service
to the human
Das 19 (Surajit Das, Professor of philosophy at JNU, “Ecological Values: Shallow & Deep,”
Vidyamandira Patrika, August 2019, ISSN No.: 23219076, pp. 137-139)//JD
Shallow ecology holds that the environmental crisis can all be technologically resolved. Shallow
approach keeps faith in technological optimism, economic growth, scientific management, and the
continuation of existing industrial societies, so it is limited to the traditional and anthropocentric
moral framework. It also presupposes that men would not accept any significant change of their
traditional lifestyle. The supporters of shallow ecology think that reforming human relations
towards nature can be done within the existing structure of society. It does not challenge the
philosophical presuppositions and fundamental validity of the industrial social paradigm of reality. Naess
said, “Its concerns are relatively local and selective, only for the health and affluence in the developed countries”.[1]
Deep ecology proposes a major reshuffling of our worldviews, cultures and lifestyles consistent with the new ecological
perspective. It aims at preserving the integrity of nature for its own sake, irrespective of its benefits
to any privileged species like humans. It is based on this conviction that the Earth ‘does not belong to humans’. [2]
Rather we have to change our lifestyles, if required. Hence, deep ecology transcends the limit of any particular science of today,
including systems theory and scientific ecology. For
the shallow thinkers, the resources of Earth belong
exclusively to the human beings who have the technology to exploit them . Here the resources
are valuable only as resources for humans. For the supporters of deep ecology, no natural object
should conceive as mere resource for humans . Naess’s deep ecology initiates an eco-centric approach in
contemporary environmentalism, rather than a platform for consideration merely of isolated life-forms of local situations. Shallow
ecology may be concerned about (human) over-population in developing and underdeveloped countries, but may not be worried
about over-population in an industrially developed country. Deep ecology moves forward with a definite universal goal. It puts
emphasis not only on stabilizing human population, but also of reducing it to a sustainable minimum by humane means, which do
not require violence or dictatorship. In shallow approach, one may condone or may applaud population increase in one’s own
(developed) country for short-sighted economic, military and for other purposes. An increase in number of humans may be
considered as valuable in itself or as economically profitable. Deep ecology recognizes that excessive pressure on
planetary life stems from the human population explosion . Hence, population reduction should be given the
highest priority in all societies, be it developed, developing, or underdeveloped. The shallow approach toward pollution
seeks higher technology to purify air and water. In deep approach, pollution is evaluated from a total biospheric
point of view. Its supporters do not focus exclusively on its effects on human life and health, but rather on planetary life as a whole.
They are committed to the view that it
is our responsibility to save the nature for both present and future
generations, be they human or non-human. Naess said, “The aim…is not a slight reform of our present society, but a
substantial reorientation of our whole civilization”.[3] Hence, deep ecology is actually founded on two basic ideas. One is a scientific
insight into the interrelatedness of various systems of life on the Earth, together with the rejection of anthropocentrism as a
misguided way of seeing things. The second basic idea of deep ecology is the need for ‘Self-realization’. Instead of identifying with
our small individual egos or merely with our immediate families, we should learn to identify ourselves with all animals and plants,
i.e., ultimately with the whole ecosphere.[4] II In order to integrate his deep ecology, Naess formulates seven basic principles.[5]
These basic principles of deep ecology are as follows: 1. Rejection of the ‘man-in-environment’ image in favor of the relational, total-
field image: According to Naess’s deep ecology, organisms are knots in the biospherical net or field of intrinsic relations. An intrinsic
relation is defined here as relation between two things A and B such that the relation belongs to the basic constituents of A and B,
and as such, without the relation, A and B are no longer the same things. The total-field approach dissolves the ‘man-in-
environment’ concept. Instead, it draws a relational, total-field image based on metaphysical interrelatedness of things and beings.
2. Biospherical egalitarianism ‘in principle’: Deep ecology believes in biospheric egalitarianism. It means all biotic communities,
including abiotic nature, have equal right to live and blossom. The ‘in principle’ clause is later inserted, as it was felt that any realistic
praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation, and suppression. We have no right to destroy other living beings without sufficient
reason. 3. Diversity and symbiosis: Diversity increases the level and potentiality of survival, thereby enhancing novelty and richness
of life-forms. Naess said, “To maximize Selfrealization we need maximum diversity and maximum symbiosis”. [6] ‘Symbiosis’ means
living in harmony with other fellow members. We should remember that ‘live and let live’ is more powerful ecological policy than
‘either you or me’. 4. Anti-class posture: It is sometimes thought that the enhancement of life-quality of humans depends on
suppression and exploitation of other life forms. But contemporary ecological investigations demonstrate that this mode of thinking
is wrong, rather symbiosis enhances the potentialities of survival, the chances of new mode of life, and the richness of forms. In
contrast, the class posture adversely affects their potentialities of Self-realization. 5. Fight against pollution and resource depletion:
In the fight against pollution and resource depletion shallow ecologists find a lot of supporters.
But their attempts do not comply with the ‘total stand’ when they focus on pollution and
resource depletion of a country or of a locality in isolation, without taking other related matters
seriously. When projects are implemented to reduce pollution, the project-managers do not
take other associated problems into account that might surface . Naess rejects such shallow ecological
stand, and advocates for sustainable policies of deep ecology.
Sustainable Development
Sustainable development is environmentally unethical, it’s anthropocentric,
humans are still wielding resources to their own end.
Kopnina 12 – lecturer, researcher at The Hague University of Applied Science
Helen Kopnina, The Hague University of Applied Science, International Business Management
Studies , University of Applied Science , The Hague , The Netherlands, “The Lorax complex: deep
ecology, ecocentrism and exclusion,” Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences, (2012),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1943815X.2012.742914?
Environmental problems are associated with ethics through a number of issues, such as justice in the distribution of natural resources (such as timber)
and burdens (such as pollution), fairness in the processes of environmental decision-making, and the moral claims of future generations of humans
(O’Neill and Spash 2000). The sustainable development discourse is permeated by the ‘‘global ethic’’ of
caring for the poor and reducing inequality (United Nations 2012; World Bank 2012). However, this global
rhetoric rarely includes environmental ethics. Early inspirations for environmental ethics writers were English poet William
Wordsworth, and American transcendentalist writers, Henry David Thoreau and Ralph F. Waldo Emerson, and later an American ecologist and
environmentalist Aldo Leopold. Environmental ethics posed a challenge to traditional anthropocentrism by questioning the assumed superiority of
human beings to members of other species and by investigating the possibility of rational arguments for assigning intrinsic value to the natural
environment and its non-human contents (Brennan and Lo 2002). Anthropocentric and ecocentric values can be placed on a continuum varying from
weak to strong anthropocentrism, as ‘‘deep’’ or ‘‘shallow’’ ecology (Naess 2001). Anthropocentric thinkers treat modern societies as ‘‘exempt’’ from
ecological constraints and to share belief in human (technical) ingenuity and ability to solve environmental or social problems (Catton and Dunlap 1978;
Dunlap and Catton 1979, 1983; Kopnina, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). I n anthropocentric thought, humans are largely in
control of the surrounding world and that problems arising from modern living can be taken
care of through technological development (Lundmarck 2007). Ecocentric theorists postulate that
the current ecological crisis stems from the ‘‘arrogance of humanism’ ’ (Ehrenfeld 1978). Sustainable
development advocates often subscribe to ‘‘shallow ecology’’ which encompasses concerns that connect human
health, wealth and environment, the central objective of which is welfare of people in the developed countries (Kopnina 2012a,b). In
anthropocentric view, animal rights are subservient to human rights and can be thought
about at best when human rights are fully addressed , or at worst a non-issue (Finsen and Finsen 1994; Desmond
2013). Our acts toward animals are judged on the basis of how they affect human beings only and not on how they affect other species (Guither 1998;
Nibert 2002). While sexism and racism are easily acknowledged in the contemporary Western liberal society , specieism is treated as a
non-issue (Watson 1993; Best and Nocella 2011). By contrast, deep green ecology is concerned about the intrinsic value of ‘‘nature’’ or
‘‘environment’’ with or without humans and rights that are associated with this value (Devall and Sessions 1985; Regan 2001). While in anthropocentric
thought, concerns center around individuals or groups within one species (men and women, different ethnic groups, individuals with sexual
orientations) and rights can be attributed on the basis of group characteristics or possessions (the rich and the poor). Discriminating human minorities
or creating wealth inequality is seen as morally ‘‘bad’’ by current Western neo-liberal intellectuals, such the author’s academic colleagues. Within deep
ecology, there is an ethical debate as to what degree intrinsic value should be attributed to individuals within the species (Regan 1984), entire species
(Taylor 1991; Ferry 1995) or even entire ecosystems (Singer 1975; Regan 2003; DesJardins 2005). Ecocentric thinkers argue that if moral considerations
underlying present-day social issues such as racism, sexism, and wealth inequality are to be extended to other species, the contrast in ethical values
and anthropocentric bias is quite striking. While the utilitarian attitude to nature seems almost common-sense, as human survival and
economic growth are dependent on energy and material resources that are extracted from
natural ecosystems (Rees 1992), the non-anthropocentric perspective is more difficult to explain. Many scholars of environmental ethics
have agreed that an environmental ethic should explicitly consider the consistency of our
environmental actions with our values (Seligman 1989).
Criticisms of status quo “sustainable development” reaffirm an
anthropocentric, resource-focused view of the Earth that actually furthers
capitalist development
Smith, 17 (William, PhD, Masters in Agricultural Science, Research Associate at RMIT
University, “Deep Ecology and Secondary Schooling: Exploring Ecocentric Alternatives,” doctoral
thesis submitted to RMIT University, 2017) https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/83609152.pdf //cb
2.2.3 Criticisms of sustainable development. The concept of “sustainable development ”, which was used
interchangeably with “sustainability” in the literature (Tilbury, 1995; Tilbury & Mulà, 2009), became synonymous with the
priorities and policies of neoliberal capitalism (Chester, 2011). Carruthers (2001) is also critical of the language of
sustainable development: The language of sustainability was once a discourse of resistance , fusing radical
environmental consciousness with a critical rethinking of a failed development enterprise. It provoked challenging questions about
scarcity and limits, affluence and poverty, global inequality, and the environmental viability of Westernization. By today,
sustainable development has been transformed, stripped of its critical content, and
reconfigured for compatibility with the larger priorities of the post-Cold War era. (2001, p. 93)
Carruthers (2001) recast ESD as an anthropocentric, ineffective approach to environmental decay
that is “made palatable to the widest possible audience ” (p. 99). His criticism extended to the “Earth
Summit” held in Rio in 1992 where “Agenda 21 boldly shed any vestige of the discourse of scarcity and limits. In order to
achieve the broad support of national governments, the drafters recognized that economic growth
would have to be recast from villain to hero ” (p. 99). Porritt (2012) saw sustainability as a “strange bedfellow” to
capitalism, but asserted that we must accept capitalism as the dominant paradigm within which sustainability must operate. At the
same time, Scott (2002) asserted that blind acceptance of ESD was considered to be not serving the best interests of children by
robbing them of the opportunity to explore and evaluate the idea for themselves. Parr (2012) believed that sustainability had been
hijacked by capitalist and corporate interests as a kind of brand theft. However, there are also examples of companies taking
corporate responsibility for their sustainable practices (Australian Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility, 2015). Capitalist
economies are typically extractive with respect to natural resources, and ecological integrity and
social equity usually have to be imposed by society from the outside by regulation or
government (Ikerd, 2005). In 2012, at the United Nations Rio+20 Earth Summit , an informal group met to
discuss their concerns that the mainstream conference failed to address the dominant capitalist model (Thematic Groups of the
Thematic Social Forum, 2012). Their criticisms of the UN approach to ESD were directed at Wall Street
along with its attendant commodification, privatisation, and financialisation of nature and its
functions: This summit should have been called to face the deep existing imbalances between
human beings and nature, brought about by the capitalist system and productivism, dogmatic belief
25 in the possibility of limitless growth, and anthropocentrism, which has made the human being
lord and master of the entire planet. (2012, p. 7) Their argument was not new. Worster (1995) had previously asked,
“Is a sustainable society one that endures for a decade, a human lifetime, a thousand years?” (p. 419). Worster claimed that there
was too much talk of resources and economics and not enough about Earth ethics and
aesthetics, pointing out that sustainability for economists is about continuous growth in investments and profits, for politicians it
is maintaining public support and holding on to power, and for social institutions it is the perpetuation of their own existence. Scott
(2002) also labelled sustainable development as political “fudge words ” (p. 1) and EfS as a principle where the for
“represents an instrumental view of education in the service of government in pursuit of the goal of sustainable development, and a
denial of the essence of education within a liberal democracy which aims to aid learners to think for themselves” (p. 3). The central
tenet of Scott’s (2002) argument is consistent with that of the Thematic Groups noted above: More appropriately, and more
democratically perhaps, we ought to want schools to help learners develop critical understandings of sustainable development, and
help them achieve levels of critical environmental literacy that will enable them to develop and continually adapt their own
understandings and make up their own minds as to how (and whether) to change the ways that they live. (pp. 2-3) Scott’s comments
accord with the idea that environmental education should be about a liberal democracy (Scott, 2002), consistent with a socially
critical model where environmental education learning occurs within a “context of power relations, rules, expectations, historical
narratives, and perceptions of group and individual interests” (Gough, S., 2002, p. 2). In terms of the research questions for this
thesis, the
capitalist model of ESD is relevant to the thesis because it describes a resource-hungry world
that clashes with deep ecology
The aff’s focus on minor reforms to remedy pollution is a form of shallow

ecology that ignores the social dilemmas and misconceptions at the root of all
environmental degradation
Drengson and Devall 2010 – (Alan, Philosopher and Professor of Environmental Studies @
University of Victoria. Bill, Sociologist, Author, Environmental Lecturer, and founder of North
Coast Environmental Center. “The Deep Ecology Movement: Origins, Development & Future
Prospects”, The Trumpeter, 2010) https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.951.3956&rep=rep1&type=pdf, sj
Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess first used the shallow-deep distinction in a talk at the World Future Research
Conference in Bucharest in 1972. Naess regarded his presentation as a preliminary account of the
environmental movement. It was based on empirical studies, questionnaires, and an
examination of texts and documents. During the 1980s and 1990s, Naess continued to revise the points of
characterization that he had introduced in his talk and its published summary. Thus, he coined the terms deep ecology movement
and ecosophy in “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary” (first published in Inquiry, 16, 1973, now
reprinted in Naess 2005 Vol. 10 and also online in Naess 2008d). He
contrasted the mainstream shallow ecology
movement with the deep ecology movement, which stresses the need for extensive changes in
values and practices, especially in industrial nations . Naess said that supporters of the deep ecology
movement embrace its principles as a result of a deep questioning of mainstream values,
beliefs, and practices to arrive at intuitions that are at the level of ultimate norms and
hypotheses. By comparison, the shallow movement does not go to the ultimate level in values and
conceptions of the world. It is concerned primarily with pollution and resource depletion in
industrialized nations, and only with minor reform of the system without fundamental changes
in values and practices. It is concerned with the health and affluence of industrial nations. Of the deep approach Naess
wrote, “Ecologically responsible policies are concerned only in part with pollution and resource
depletion. There are deeper concerns which touch upon principles of diversity, complexity,
autonomy, decentralization, symbiosis, egalitarianism, and classlessness ” (Drengson and Inoue, 1995,
p. 3). In his detailed discussion Naess used terms like “biocentric egalitarianism in principle” to try to articulate the underlying
intuitions that supporters of deep changes felt we need in industrial societies, in relation to the way we treat the natural and built
environments. He later, for a variety of reasons, dropped this egalitarian terminology when he articulated the platform principles for
the deep ecology movement. As we will see, the first two principles approach the essence of some of these intuitions, since they
recognize the intrinsic worth of all living beings (platform principle #1) and the intrinsic worth of diversity and richness (platform
principle #2). Deep Ecology Movement Platform Principles Supporters of the long-range deep ecology
movement mostly agree on the general “platform principles” of the movement. This is true for supporters of other movements
as well. Social-political movements often unite people with different religions and personal philosophie s.
Such movements cannot be precisely defined, but are more often characterized by fairly general goals and aims which are stated in
something like a platform. There will be variations in applying such principles within a broad movement, since in specific places
different direct actions might be required; people live in quite different ecosystems and cultures, and they have different personal
philosophies. While there have been several articulations of the deep platform by different philosophers and activists, we will focus
on Naess’ version. His articulation of these principles distills what to us seem to be the shared principles in the movement from a
wide, cross-cultural literature, and also as gleaned from activists’ statements. The gist of the original principles is now incorporated
in many documents and agreements. Similar distillations of platform principles have been done within the social justice and peace
movements. Naess and others see the three great movements as compatible and complementary. Each does
important work and should remain focused on its own platform. The front of all these movements is very long and deep.
There is something each of us can do in our own place to support all three.
Western Ideologies
Western consciousness and culture are predominately individualistic – it is
incompatible with self-realization and precludes viewing the self as part of a
greater whole
Fairbanks, 10 (Sandra Jane, BA degree in philosophy from Wheaton College, M.Phil. from the
University of Edinburgh, JD from the University of Maine School of Law. PhD from the University
of Minnesota, “Environmental Goodness and the Challenge of American Culture”, Indiana
University Press, 2010) https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Environmental-Goodness-and-
the-Challenge-of-Culture-Fairbanks/62fccee87a4c9f75aad43daf736e68dd9b5f3076//ac
Environmental philosophies all recognize virtues of sympathy, love, and care for nature or the
entire biotic community. For example, drawing on Leopold’s Land Ethic, J. Baird Callicott argues
that ecocentrism endorses an enlargement of the ethical universe from humanity to the biotic
community that includes “soil, water, plants, and animals or collectively: the land” (2008, 153).
He combines Darwin’s theory of ties of kinship among all forms of life with Hume’s moral
psychology, which bases morality on the natural sentiments of sympathy and affection. The
result is an ethical holism, based upon moral sentiments, that promotes the “ preservation of
the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community ” (Callicott 2008, 154). From the
perspective of the Land Ethic, virtuous behavior towards the environment requires not only the
cultivation of a sympathetic and caring disposition, but a holistic view of the biotic community.
These qualities may be especially difficult to achieve in that mainstream modern philosophy,
which is predominantly atomistic and individualistic , has dominated Western consciousness
and culture . Deep Ecology also requires the development of sympathy and care for the
biosphere. According to Arne Naess, With maturity, human beings will experience joy when
other life forms experience joy and sorrow when other life forms experience sorrow. Not only
will we feel sad when our brother or a dog or a cat feels sad, but we will grieve when living
beings, including landscapes, are destroyed. In our civilization, we have vast means of
destruction at our disposal but extremely little maturity in our feeling. Only a very narrow range
of feelings have interested most human beings until now. (Devall and Sessions 1985, 75) Deep
Ecology links our ability to sympathize with, and care for, nature with a view of the self that is
interconnected with nature . According to Deep Ecology, our ability to identify and empathize
with other species, natural objects, and the biotic community as a whole, represents the height
of spiritual and moral growth (Devall and Sessions 1985). Self-realization, as understood by
Deep Ecology, is achieved when the self is at one with the natural world and sees itself as an
integral part of a greater whole (DesJardins 2006).
The logic of the aff’s modeling cannot be divorced from the domination
paradigm of technocratic-industrialized societies – it isolates humans as
superior to nature in the same way it structures the domination of Western
cultures over non-Western cultures.
De Jonge, 11 (Eccy, philosophy academic, specializing in deep ecology and philosophy, author
of Spionza and Deep Ecology, Policing and Public Trust, and Individual and Structural
Determinants of Environmental Practice, “An Alternative To Anthropocentrism: Deep Ecology
And The Metaphysical Turn”, Brill and The Hague Academy of International Law, July 14, 2011)
https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004214941/Bej.9789004187948.i-348_016.xml//ac
Anthropocentrism is regarded by deep ecologists not merely in its literal sense as ‘human
centredness’ but as the view that humanity has been conditioned to regard itself as a superior
species.Deep ecologists have sought to focus on criticising ‘ the dominant worldview ’ which
sees human centredness as the underlying cause of the ecological crisis . As I have argued
elsewhere, however, this position is too general, for not all humans play an equal part in the
domination of the natural environment. Anthropocentrism represents the human will to
dominate and threatens the human world as much as the non-human world . 2 This raises the
question of how a change in attitude from one of domination to one of deep concern can be
achieved, which shifts the focus from concentrating on the symptoms of the e nvironmental
crisis, such as pollution, urban expansion and global warming , to understanding why we see
ourselves as separate and superior to both the natural environment and other human beings .
The historian Lynn White Jr . was one of the first environmentalists to link the root cause of the
environmental crisis to the doctrine of anthropocentrism, which he saw as deeply rooted in the
JudaeoChristian tradition of domination.3 In this tradition, humans are seen as guardians of the
Earth, superior to non-human beings who exist not for their own sake but for the sake of
humanity . In this sense, ‘anthropocentrism’ denotes humanity’s superiority over the
nonhuman world, on the basis that humans occupy a higher position on the Great Chain of
Being . Taking Lynn White Jr .’s thesis a step further, Bill Devall and George Sessions identified
anthropocentrism as being the dominant worldview of technocratic-industrialised societies .
Devall and Sessions argued that our understanding of human nature has been so conditi oned
by the paradigm of domination —a paradigm that regards humans as isolated and
fundamentally separate and superior to the rest of nature—that it has come to include all
aspects of dom - ination, e . g . masculine over feminine, the powerful over the poor, Western
cultures over non-Western cultures, and so on . 4 If anthro - pocentrism covers all forms of
domination, then it would seem that focusing on any one form of domination, for example,
racism or sex - ism, would help to root out the underlying cause of domination in general .
However, while the dominant worldview is to be rejected, any counter-movements or criticisms
of this view are seen by deep ecologists to exist only as the result of the dominant paradigm,
which, while worthy as causes in their own right, only help to reinforce the paradigm they are
opposing . Deep ecologists thus object to focusing on counter-movements, which they see as
reinforcing anthropocentrism by privileging only their own cause: instead of dispelling the
dominant paradigm, they hope to be able to integrate their own cause into the paradigm itself.
However, to dismiss counter movements to the dominant paradigm as being ‘just like’ those
members of the paradigm who proclaim themselves as superior rather than oppressed, risks
alienating those humans who have, historically and interculturally, been sidelined in a similar
(though clearly not identical) way to non-human nature. While non-anthropocentrists may wish
to hold a basic attitude in relation to environmental catastrophe, they fail to recognise that the
problem of domination applies equally to fellow humans. The reason why anthropocentrism
needs to be challenged is therefore more complex than one which seeks to confront the
human/ nature divide. It must recognise that our notions of the ‘other’ include counter-cultures,
sub groups and members of the anthropocentric paradigm itself. And here we encounter a
dilemma. If the reason why human beings are able to dominate non-human nature is because
this ‘nature’ is not like us, we need to explain how this applies to human beings over whom
others feel superior. What discerning attributes does the other need to hold to not be worthy of
moral consideration? Irrationality? One-leggedness? A bad temper? Or does the issue depend
not on who we are but what we do, so we can discount the serial killer perhaps? Or will visiting
a mosque or an abortion clinic do? The underlying problem with defining the essence of
‘otherness’ is not easily dismissed in the context of anthropocentrism, for any discernible
attributes that can be found to privilege the morally considerable, e.g. rationality, self-
awareness and so on, exclude not only most non-human beings but also certain humans:
imbeciles, infants and the senile.
Western domination reflects an anthropocentric attitude towards the

environment and human lives – the logic used to justify dominating over other
humans structures the value we place on the environment.
Where moral superiority is heralded as a reason for conflict, anthropocentrists should take
note . As early as 2001, the US govern - ment heralded the invasion of Afghanistan as a victory
even though Hamid Karzai, the US sanctioned leader, had failed to establish effec - tive control
over the country . 9 This led reporters, led by the Independent’s Patrick Cockburn, to argue that
the insurgence had given rise to ‘a mood of extraordinary imperial arrogance’ that more recent
effects and United Nations statistics verify . 10 While there has been condemnation and outrage
over the death of US and UK soldiers in the Western press, there have been limited reports of
civilian deaths or environmental catastrophe, due to the US government spending millions of
dollars buying up ‘civilian satel - lite imagery of the effect of the bombardment, so as to limit its
dissemination’ . 11 As Hill states: ‘the absence of imagery of the destruc - tion produced by the
assault can be seen to have created a blind spot in Western perceptions of Afghanistan, at once
serving to cover up the destruction wrought by the assault, and the scale of the recon - struction
effort needed’ . 12 While it may seem inconsistent to focus on the insurgencies of the west
while ignoring the treacheries of the Taliban, it is predominantly the US / UK governments that
have made the case for the moral high ground . Since many deep ecologists insist that the root
cause of anthropocentrism is the Judaeo-Christian tradition, with its accep - tance that God
commanded the human race to have dominion over all the earth, it is somewhat ironic that both
George W . Bush and Tony Blair, both instrumental in the attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan, have
declared God’s influence in their decisions . 13 If we take the anthropocentrist attitude as
indicative of human dominance, it is clear that the environment and human lives have suffered
equally in Afghanistan un der dominating sources , with the only case made against the invasion
by mainstream Western media being the relatively small casualties—in comparison to the
civilian population—of Western soldiers . Though arguments are posed for remaining in
Afghanistan, the destruction of the landscape, the use of depleted uranium, the destruction of
Afghan villages and village life rarely makes the UK papers. To reject anthropocentrism as
human centredness is thus less important than recognising the tendency to place a set of given
moral attitudes and beliefs at the centre of concern. Although it is difficult to drop the idea that
human life takes precedence, where genocide is prevalent and human beings continue to be
tortured, imprisoned, raped and murdered by more powerful groups, there is a huge difference
between the geo-politics carried out by the war in Afghanistan (with its creepy resemblance to
George Orwell’s ‘War in Eurasia’ as depicted in the novel 1984) justified in the name of
‘liberation’, and the reasons given for destruction of the environment that are, predictably, only
considered when it poses a threat to human life. Anthropocentrism is much more than some
generalised attribute; it must, by necessity, be a strategy that some humans adopt for their own
purposes: an intersubjective egoism which many, but not all, humans possess.Yet again,
however, this view of anthropocentrism does not put human beings at the centre of the
universe but only certain humans : those who, for one reason or another, choose to dominate
others. But is anthropocentrism a competition? If I can reason better than a child with Down’s
Syndrome but the child can love more, which of us wins in the superiority stakes? Without an
ingrained metaphysics which seeks to define the actual essence of human beings, the
alternative to anthropocentrism is doomed to failure, on the grounds that a dismissal of
anthropocentrism often includes elements of human nature that play into the
anthropocentrists’ court. For instance, Gary Steiner regards as deeply prejudicial those
philosophers who maintain that humans (as opposed to the non-human world) are the only
beings who can perfect their nature. 14 A philosophy that hopes to argue against an attitude of
domination by getting rid of traits and values that most of us consider to be quintessentially
human is deeply problematic.
Agriculture
Industrial agriculture is rooted in a paradigm of domination and exploitation

Shiva 16, (Vandana Shiva is a scholar, environmental activist, food sovereignty advocate, ecofeminist
and anti-globalization author with a Masters in the philosophy of science and a PhD in philosophy. She has
done interdisciplinary research in science, technology, and environmental policy at the Indian Institute of
Science and the Indian Institute of Management, and received the Right Livelihood Award, Sydney Peace
Prize, and more for her activism, “Who Really Feeds the World?: The Failures of Agribusiness and the
Promise of Agroecology,” 2016, North Atlantic Books, https://books.google.com/books?
id=YL1IDAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false // ECL)
We are facing a deep and growing crisis rooted in how we produce, process, and distribute our
food. The planet’s well-being, people’s health, and societies’ stability are severely threatened by
an industrial globalized agriculture driven by greed and profits . An inefficient, wasteful, and
nonsustainable model of food production is pushing the planet, its ecosystems, and its diverse
species to the brink of destruction. Food, whose primary purpose is to provide nourishment and health, is today the
single biggest health problem in the world: nearly one billion people suffer from hunger and malnutrition,
two billion suffer from diseases like obesity and diabetes, and countless others suffer from
diseases, including cancer, caused by the poisons in our food .1
Instead of remaining a source of nourishment, food has been transformed into a commodity : something to
be speculated on and profiteered from. This leads to rising food prices and creates social
instability everywhere. Since 2007 there have been fifty-one food riots in thirty-seven countries ,
including Tunisia, South Africa, Cameroon, and India.2 The food system is badly broken on every measure that
counts: sustainability, justice, and peace.
Today, an alternative has become an imperative for our survival, so let us begin by asking the question, “Who
feeds the world?”
Food and agriculture have become sites for major paradigm wars. Under each paradigm, a certain type of
knowledge, economics, culture, and, of course, farming is being promoted. Each paradigm claims to feed the world; in reality, only
one does.
The dominant paradigm is industrial and mechanized, which has led to the collapse in our food
and agricultural systems. This crisis is not an accident ; it is built into the system’s very design. At
the heart of this paradigm is the Law of Exploitation , which sees the world as a machine and
nature as dead matter. This paradigm sees humans as separate from nature , and every part of
nature as separable from the rest: the seed from the soil, the soil from the plant, the plant from the
food, and the food from our bodies. The industrial paradigm is also based on seeing humans and nature
as mere inputs in a production system. The productivity of the Earth and its people is made
invisible by a sophisticated intellectual infrastructure that puts the twin constructs of capital and
corporations at the center of its economics.
The paradigm of industrial agriculture is rooted in war : it very literally uses the same chemicals
that were once used to exterminate people to destroy nature. It is based on the perception that
every insect and plant is an enemy to be exterminated with poisons , and is constantly seeking new
and more powerful instruments of violence, including pesticides, herbicides, and genetically
engineered pesticide-producing plants. While the technologies of violence grow more
sophisticated, the knowledge of ecosystems and biodiversity shrinks . The deeper the ignorance of the
planet’s rich biodiversity and ecological processes, the greater the arrogance of corporate destroyers who claim to be creators. Life
is thus redefined as an invention of those whose only desire and capacity is to poison and kill it.
Tools governed by the Law of Exploitation and the Law of Domination harm people’s health and
the environment. These tools are often poisons marketed as “agrochemicals,” and we are told
that farming is impossible without them. In reality the corporations that make these chemicals are
shaping the paradigm of possibility. They define what constitutes scientific knowledge, what an
efficient food production system looks like, and what the boundaries of research and trade
should be. When applied to agriculture and the food system, a paradigm rooted in the violence of war and a
militarized mindset brings the war to our fields, to our plates, and to our bodies.
The industrial, mechanized paradigm of food production wages war on the

environment and people and produces hunger, destruction, and lies instead of
food
Shiva 16, (Vandana Shiva is a scholar, environmental activist, food sovereignty advocate, ecofeminist
and anti-globalization author with a Masters in the philosophy of science and a PhD in philosophy. She has
done interdisciplinary research in science, technology, and environmental policy at the Indian Institute of
Science and the Indian Institute of Management, and received the Right Livelihood Award, Sydney Peace
Prize, and more for her activism, “Who Really Feeds the World?: The Failures of Agribusiness and the
Promise of Agroecology,” 2016, North Atlantic Books, https://books.google.com/books?
id=YL1IDAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false // ECL)
“Who feeds the world?” The answer depends on which paradigm we use as our lens, because
the meaning of “food” and “world” vastly differs between the two. First, let’s examine this from the
perspective of the dominant paradigm: industrial, mechanized agriculture . Under this paradigm,
“food” is a mere commodity to be produced and traded for profits, and the “world” is a global
marketplace where seeds and chemicals are sold as farming inputs and commodities are sold as
food. If the planet is seen through this lens, it is chemical fertilizers and pesticides, corporate seeds and GMOs, agribusiness, and
biotechnology corporations that feed the world.
Yet thereality is that only 30 percent of the food that people eat comes from large-scale
industrial farms. The other 70 percent comes from smallscale farmers working on small plots of
land.3 Meanwhile, industrial agriculture accounts for 75 percent of the ecological damage being
done to the planet.4 These figures are routinely ignored, hidden, and denied, and the myth that industrial agriculture feeds
the world is promoted worldwide.
A mechanized, violent paradigm shapes dominant views around the knowledge, science,
technology, and policies for food and agriculture. In reality, a food system that destroys
nature’s economy —the ecological foundation on which food production rests— cannot feed
the world . An agricultural system designed to displace small-scale farmers, who form the social foundation of real farming,
cannot feed the world. Every aspect of industrial agriculture is rupturing the fragile web of life and
destroying the foundations of food security.
Industrial agriculture is killing pollinators and friendly insects . Years ahead of his time, Einstein cautioned,
“When the last bee disappears, humans will disappear .” Today 75 percent of bee populations in
some regions have been killed over the last three decades because of toxic pesticides .5 Chemical
pesticides kill beneficial insects and, in their place, create pests. Synthetic fertilizers destroy soil fertility by killing
soil organisms that naturally create living soil, and in turn, contribute to soil erosion and soil
degradation.
Industrial agriculture mines and pollutes water . Seventy percent of the water on the planet is
being depleted and polluted by the intensive irrigation that is required in chemical-intensive
industrial agriculture.6 The nitrates in water from industrial farms are creating “dead zones” in the
oceans: spaces where no life can exist.
Industrial agriculture is primarily a fossil-fuel-driven agriculture. Replacing people with fossil

fuels has been made to look efficient under a logic that treats people as raw material or farming
inputs. But the financial and ecological costs of fossil fuels are astronomical . In US agriculture, each
worker has more than 250 hidden energy slaves behind her. An energy slave is the fossil-fuel
equivalent to a person, and if we take into account the fossil-fuel intensity of our food
production and consumption systems, it is all too clear that industrial agriculture consumes
more than it produces. As Amory Lovins pointed out, “In terms of workforce, the population of the
earth is not 4 billion but about 200 billion, the important point being that about 98 percent of
them do not eat conventional food.”7 That is because they’re not people; they’re energy slaves, and they eat oil.
Industrial agriculture uses ten units of fossil-fuel energy as an input to produce one unit of food
as an output. The wasted energy goes toward polluting the atmosphere and destabilizing our
climate.
The industrial paradigm of agriculture is causing climate change. Forty percent of all
greenhouse gas emissions responsible for climate change come from a fossil-fuel-based global
system of agriculture.8 The fossil fuels used to make fertilizers, run farm machinery, and wastefully move food thousands of
miles across the globe contribute to carbon dioxide emissions. Chemical nitrogen fertilizers emit nitrous oxide,
which is 300 percent more destabilizing for the climate than carbon dioxide. 9 Additionally, factory
farming is a major source of methane, another toxin responsible for global warming. In 1995 the United Nations
calculated that industrial agriculture had pushed more than 75 percent of agro-biodiversity —the
biodiversity found in agriculture— to extinction. Today, the number is likely to have reached 90
percent.
Paradoxically, whilethis ecological destruction of natural capital is justified in terms of “feeding

people,” the problem of hunger has grown. One billion people are permanently hungry, and
another two billion suffer from food-related diseases like obesity. These conditions are two sides of the
same coin: a nutrition crisis. As the McDonaldization of food spreads processed junk food across the globe, even those
who do get enough to eat are rarely getting the nutrients they need. Contrary to popular belief, obesity
isn’t about rich people eating too much: it’s often the poor in developing countries who bear the harshest brunt of diet-related
diseases. Additionally, diseases linked
to an industrial diet and poisons in our food, including cancer,
are steadily growing. Commodities don’t feed people; food does.
the corporate industrial agriculture system creates hunger , even though it contributes
Even though
only 25 percent to the food system while using 75 percent of the Earth’s resources , and even though
it is a dominant force of ecological destruction and a disruption of the natural systems on which
food production depends, the myth that industrial agriculture feeds the world continues to be
perpetuated. This myth is constructed on the basis of an obsolete paradigm, one that has, in fact, been discarded by science.
False ideas of nature as dead matter and as something that can be manipulated at will by
humans have allowed us to think that the more poisons we put into the food system, the more
food we will grow. An ecologically destructive and nutritionally inefficient food system has
become the dominant paradigm in our minds and the most touted practice on our lands , even
though, in reality, small, biodiverse farms working with nature’s processes produce most of the food we eat.
Industrial agriculture is intolerant of diversity. Diversity is nourishing and naturally resistant, but in order to
increase profits, industrial agriculture makes crops dependent on external inputs such as
chemical fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, and genetically modified seeds . Not only does
industrial agriculture look more and more like chemical warfare against the planet, the
distribution of food also looks like war , with so-called “free trade” treaties pitting farmer
against farmer, and country against country, in perpetual “competition” and conflict. “Free
trade” allows corporations and investors to grab every seed, every drop of water, and every inch of land; it
limitlessly exploits the Earth, the farmers, and all citizens. This model sees profits as the endgame, where no
thought or care is given for the soil, for producers, and for people’s health. Corporations do not
grow food; they grow profits.
The industrial paradigm replaces truths with manipulation, and reality with fictions. The first
fiction is the fiction of the corporation as a person. Acting under this guise of personhood,
corporations write the rules of production and trade to maximize their profits and exploit living
beings. A second fiction is that “capital”—not the ecological processes of nature and the hard and intelligent work of
farmers—creates wealth and food. People and nature are reduced to mere inputs. The third fiction
is that a system that uses more inputs than it produces is efficient and productive. This is manipulated by hiding the financial
costs of fossil fuels and chemicals, as well as the devastating health and environmental costs of a
chemical-intensive system to the planet and its people. A fourth fiction is that which is profitable
to corporations is profitable and good for farmers. Actually, as the profits of corporations in food
and agricultural systems grow, farmers become poorer by getting deeper in debt and are finally
forced off their land. The fifth fiction is that food is a commodity. The reality is that the more
food is converted into a commodity, the more it is taken from the poor, which creates hunger,
and the more it is degraded in quality, which leads to disease.
What we are talking about here is not a food system—it is anti-food. Food comes into conflict
with itself as it is violently pulled out of the food web and local economies to then be traded for
profit and thrown away as waste. The result is ecological catastrophe, poverty, and hunger. The
future of food depends on remembering that the web of life is a food web. This book is dedicated to this remembering, because
forgetting the ecology of food is a recipe for famine and extinction.
Impacts
Extinction
Human exploration and development of nature is based on the idea that
humans are removed from the world – drives endless consumption in the name
of civilization
Kingsnorth & Hine 09 – modern history major from Oxford University, ecology
expert and writer; ecology journalist
Paul & Dougald, THE DARK MOUNTAIN MANIFESTO
The myth of progress is founded on the myth of nature. The first tells us that we are destined for
greatness; the second tells us that greatness is cost-free. Each is intimately bound up with the
other. Both tell us that we are apart from the world; that we began grunting in the primeval
swamps, as a humble part of something called ‘nature’, which we have now triumphantly
subdued. The very fact that we have a word for ‘nature’ is [5] evidence that we do not regard
ourselves as part of it. Indeed, our separation from it is a myth integral to the triumph of our
civilisation. We are, we tell ourselves, the only species ever to have attacked nature and won.
In this, our unique glory is contained. Outside the citadels of self-congratulation, lone voices
have cried out against this infantile version of the human story for centuries, but it is only in the
last few decades that its inaccuracy has become laughably apparent. We are the first
generations to grow up surrounded by evidence that our attempt to separate ourselves from
‘nature’ has been a grim failure, proof not of our genius but our hubris . The attempt to sever
the hand from the body has endangered the ‘progress’ we hold so dear, and it has endangered
much of ‘nature’ too. The resulting upheaval underlies the crisis we now face. We imagined
ourselves isolated from the source of our existence. The fallout from this imaginative error is
all around us: a quarter of the world’s mammals are threatened with imminent extinction; an
acre and a half of rainforest is felled every second ; 75% of the world’s fish stocks are on the
verge of collapse; humanity consumes 25% more of the world’s natural ‘products’ than the
Earth can replace — a figure predicted to rise to 80% by mid-century. Even through the
deadening lens of statistics, we can glimpse the violence to which our myths have driven us.
And over it all looms runaway climate change . Climate change, which threatens to render all
human projects irrelevant ; which presents us with detailed evidence of our lack of
understanding of the world we inhabit while, at the same time, demonstrating that we are still
entirely reliant upon it. Climate change, which highlights in painful colour the head-on crash
between civilisation and ‘nature’; which makes plain, more effectively than any carefully
constructed argument or optimistically defiant protest, how the machine’s need for permanent
growth will require us to destroy ourselves in its name. Climate change, which brings home at
last our ultimate powerlessness. These are the facts, or some of them. Yet facts never tell the
whole story. (‘Facts’, Conrad wrote, in Lord Jim, ‘as if facts could prove anything.’) The facts of
environmental crisis we hear so much about often conceal as much as they expose. We hear
daily about the impacts of our activities on ‘the environment’ (like ‘nature’, this is an
expression which distances us from the reality of our situation). Daily we hear, too, of the
many ‘solutions’ to these problems: solutions which usually involve the necessity of urgent
political agreement and a judicious application of human technological genius. Things may be
changing, runs the narrative, but there is nothing we cannot deal with here, folks . We perhaps
need to move faster, more urgently. Certainly we need to accelerate the pace of research and
development. We accept that we must become more ‘sustainable’. But everything will be
fine. There will still be growth, there will still be progress: these things will continue, because
they have to continue, so they cannot do anything but continue. There is nothing to see here.
Everything will be fine.
Techno-optimists are wrong – growth is terminally unsustainable and exerting

more control over nature steers us towards self-destruction
Fellows 19, (Andrew Fellows, PhD, is a classical Jungian Analyst, Program Director and Training Analyst
at ISAP Zurich, an independent researcher and author, and a deep ecologist with a Doctorate in Applied
Physics (Dunelm) and two decades of international professional engagement with renewable energy,
sustainable development and environmental policy, “Gaia, Psyche and Deep Ecology: Navigating Climate
Change in the Anthropocene,” Taylor & Francis eBooks, 2019), https://www-taylorfrancis-
com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/books/mono/10.4324/9780203733394/gaia-psyche-deep-ecology-
andrew-fellows // ECL
Others, who I will label ‘ techno-optimists’ , can and do envisage , such healing aside, a transformative
continuation of human progress through what they call ‘exponential technologies’ —primarily
(for now) artificial intelligence, augmented and virtual reality, data science, digital biology and
biotech, medicine, nanotech and digital fabrication, networks and computing systems, robotics,
and autonomous vehicles. Unsurprisingly, the origin and epicentre of this flavour of futurist thinking
is Silicon Valley, and perhaps its most prominent advocate is Ray Kurzweil, who is currently
employed by Google in his seventies after many decades of brilliant technological innovation
and entrepreneurship. Kurzweil achieved widespread fame and influence through his non-fiction best-selling book The
Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (Kurzweil, 2006). The concept of a technological singularity can be traced back
to the mathematician and computer pioneer John von Neumann in the mid-20th Century. Kurzweil
predicts that machine
intelligence will become infinitely more powerful than all human intelligence combined,
irreversibly transforming human life and transcending the biological limitations of our brains and
bodies through ‘transhumanism’, ultimately merging machine and human intelligence. I confess to
having had the book in my ‘to read’ stack for many years, but note, for what it’s worth, that the word ‘soul’ does not appear in its
50-page index, whereas ‘exponential’ and its sub-entries gets almost half a page. If systems theory has taught us
anything, it is to be wary of anything ‘exponential’ . Kurzweil is also co-founder and Chancellor of the Singularity
University (https://su.org), founded in 2008, which attracted some 1,600 people from 64 countries to its 2018 Global Summit. The
university is clearly inspiring a significant number of influential people and corporations— major ‘founding and current’ sponsors
(Deloitte, Google, Genentech and 17 others) and many more sponsors of its 2018 Summit (including Boeing, Microsoft, Merrill Lynch,
AIG, MIT, Red Bull, UBS, Shell, Goldman Sachs and Intel)—as much as it is terrifying me. Perhaps the
ultimate example of
transhumanistic hubris is the non-profit religious corporation founded in 2017 by Anthony
Levandowski, another Silicon Valley wunderkind who has worked for both Google and Uber. His
‘Way of the Future’ (WOTF) aims to create a godhead based on artificial intelligence to smooth
our transition through the singularity. Personally, I favour deleting the ‘O’.
Transhumanism appears to extrapolate our separation from Gaia and exacerbate our
disenchantment to a degree I could never have imagined, and as far as I can tell altogether
ignores the other-than-human-or-machine world , not to mention the vast majority of
humanity who cannot have, or do not want, such a future. I hope it can be dismissed as Silicon Valley’s very
own ‘thought bubble’. While it undoubtedly amounts to a form of denial through hubris from the perspective of my analysis, its
implications for the natural world are unclear as that, including the Anthropocene, doesn’t seem even to be on its map. However,
another variant of ‘techno-optimism’ has much more explicit goals for our relationship with the
environment. I am again indebted to Clive Hamilton’s excellent Defiant Earth: The Fate of Humans in the Anthropocene for
showing me that there are individuals and organisations for whom the Anthropocene is not a cause
for denial, or even shame and concern, but a triumph to be embraced and exploited. The
umbrella for this so-called ‘ecomodernist’ movement appears to be the non-profit Breakthrough
Institute, whose website (https://thebreakthrough.org) links to An Ecomodernist Manifesto which sets out their stall and is well
worth reading. As Hamilton observes:
Humankind is now confronted with a momentous decision: to attempt to exert more control
so as to subdue the Earth with greater technological power —the express purpose of some
forms of geoengineering— or to draw back and practice meekness, with all of the social
consequences that would follow. (Hamilton, 2017: 9)
This really is the crux of the matter, with the ecomodernists

explicitly advocating the former path, asserting
in their manifesto that wisely applied knowledge and technology could permit ‘green growth’
without the need to harmonise with nature since Earth has become a human planet, resulting in
a ‘good, or even great’ Anthropocene. Green growth, so beloved of political fantasists, is of
course a ‘have your cake and eat it’ oxymoron. The manifesto rejects the limits to growth that
systems theorists such as Donella H. Meadows and her colleagues warned of (Meadows et al.,
1972/1974, 2004), arguing that any physical boundaries to human consumption are so theoretical as
to be ‘functionally irrelevant’. I’m not sure what that breezy dismissal is intended to convey, but surely any such
boundary is theoretical until it is reached, and then it will become ‘functionally relevant’ with a
vengeance. It should by now be clear that Hamilton, I and the deep ecology movement disagree profoundly
with this central conceit of ecomodernism and advocate the latter path, to ‘draw back and
practice meekness’. The choice is perhaps not quite as black and white as the above citations suggest, and none of us
advocates throwing out the baby with the bath water. For example, we should make increasing use of technologies
such as renewable energy (which, in fairness, ecomodernists also advocate) that work in harmony with nature
to replace those that don’t. Nonetheless, I concur more with Hamilton’s assessment of ecomodernism than I do with his
proposed alternative ‘new anthropocentrism’. While this may to some extent be because we are approaching the issue from
different perspectives, and Hamilton stresses that by ‘anthropocentrism’ he means the scientific fact of human dominance rather
than any normative claim thereto, our ways eventually part. However, returning to his critique, which echoes my own concerns
expressed above:
For the ecomodernists, instead of final proof of the dangers of hubris, the new epoch is
greeted as a sign of humankind’s ability to renovate and control nature. … in this eco-
Promethean view, the Anthropocene is not evidence of human short-sightedness or foolishness,
nor of global capitalism’s rapaciousness, but presents an opportunity for humans finally to come
into their own. Several years ago they began to speak of the good Anthropocene: there are no
planetary boundaries that limit continued growth in human populations and economic advance
because ‘human systems’ can adapt and indeed prosper in a warming world. (Hamilton, 2017: 23)
If only it were true! The Breakthrough Institute’s Directors and Senior Fellows include many capable and influential
individuals, such as lifelong techno-utopian Stewart Brand, Erle C. Ellis—curiously author of The Anthropocene: A Very Short
Introduction (Ellis, 2018) in the highly respected Oxford University Press series—and at least one Nobel laureate. Brand’s Whole
Earth Catalog was something of a counter-culture icon during my student days, so I am especially intrigued by his allegiance. Have I
succumbed to curmudgeonly pessimism (branded ‘environmentalist miserablism’ in at least one ecomodernist article) in contrast to
his and his colleagues’ continued optimism? Even from outside ecomodernism, the influential Jungian analyst Andrew Samuels
argued in his book The Political Psyche that the environmental movement ‘will fail unless it becomes more conscious of the
authoritarianism and depression within it, and the idealization of nature is somehow moderated’ (Samuels, 1993: 103). I hope that
the alternatives offered in the remainder of this book will convince otherwise, as does my personal experience. Irrespective of what I
think of ecomodernism, its advocates are, above all, well connected and should not be under-estimated. However, although they
include many scientists (especially nuclear scientists), they do not, to my knowledge, include any Earth system scientists, including
any of those whose work I have referenced—draw your own conclusions. Later, Hamilton’s critique begins in earnest:
Although the ecomoderns7 write as humanists, they construe the new epoch in a way that is
structurally a theodicy, that is, a theological argument that aims to prove the ultimate
benevolence of God. … Whereas in Leibniz’s theodicy God’s will ensures all is for the good, for the ecomoderns it is Progress
driven by human creativity and urge to betterment that ensures good will prevail. So in place of a theodicy they instate
an anthropodicy in which human-directed Progress takes the place of God. (Hamilton, 2017: 68–69)
This is perhaps not as hard to swallow as a machine taking the place of God, but therefore more dangerous—the last seven words of
extraordinary hubris that underpins ecomodernism . Nonetheless, its
this extract suffice to highlight the
message is seductive—it is what people, especially scientifically illiterate politicians utterly
bereft of new ideas, want to hear. This means it has to be acknowledged and rebutted before it
gains enough traction to steer us down the path of control and power. I would add to Hamilton’s critique
that, while appearing to be futuristic, ecomodernism is essentially deeply nostalgic for a golden
age of unprecedented technological progress and affluence unfettered by environmental
concerns—in other words, to continue the Great Acceleration forever.
In contrast to my analyses of inertia and nostalgia, I view the protagonists of hubris as misguided rather than malevolent, but that
makes them no less dangerous. The Singularity University and the Breakthrough Institute clearly attract brilliant, creative and,
presumably, well-intentioned and even idealistic people; but perhaps their optimism
about the future should be
tempered by the humbling realities of the past . Consider, for example, this passage from Edward Gibbon’s late
18th-Century 12-volume classic, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire:
The rise of a city, which swelled into an empire, may deserve, as a singular prodigy, the reflection of a philosophic mind. But the
decline of Rome was the natural and inevitable effect of immoderate greatness. Prosperity ripened
the principle of decay; the causes of destruction multiplied with the extent of conquest; and as soon as time or accident had
removed the artificial supports, the stupendous fabric yielded to the pressure of its own weight. The story of its ruin is
simple and obvious; and instead of inquiring why the Roman empire was destroyed, we
should rather be surprised that it had subsisted so long. (Gibbon, 1782/Rev.1845/2008)
William Ophuls, an independent scholar who is well acquainted with Jungian psychology, translates this into the
present with commendable succinctness and clarity in his book titled, in acknowledgement to Gibbon, Immoderate Greatness:
Why Civilizations Fail, which is best summarised by the cover notes:
A civilization’s very magnitude conspires against it to cause downfall. Civilizations are hard-
wired for self-destruction. They travel an arc from initial success to terminal decay and ultimate
collapse due to intrinsic biophysical limits combined with an inexorable trend toward moral
decay and practical failure. Because our own civilization is global, its collapse will also be
global, as well as uniquely devastating owing to the immensity of its population, complexity
and consumption. To avoid the common fate of all past civilizations will require a radical
change in our ethos—to wit, the deliberate renunciation of greatness—lest we precipitate a
dark age in which the arts and adornments of civilization are partially or completely lost.
(Ophuls, 2012)
Just as in the individual psyche at mid-life, the collective tension between adherents to one or more of our collective means of
denial, and those who accept the necessity of our ‘deliberate renunciation of greatness’, is rising. The sheer diversity of agents and
beliefs within the former category, and the countless reinforcing feedback loops between them, constitute the ‘perfect storm’ of
Section 6.2. The
factual evidence that we cannot keep rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic,
but have to change course altogether, is indisputable. The era of heroic development is over,
whether we like it or not. The time for growing bigger and cleverer is over; it is time for us to
grow up.
We must engage in frugal individuation in the face of climate change – only

long-range deep ecology is sufficient to avert global collapse
Examining our three modes of denial—inertia, nostalgia and hubris—can result in a sense of
helplessness, grief, despair and even trauma, and conversely we often resort to them because of
such feelings. Emotional and psychological states like these in the face of climate change are
widespread according to Jeffrey Kiehl, who is both a leading climate scientist and a Jungian analyst. Kiehl, a good friend and
gentle soul, has lectured widely about climate change, and makes a point of asking his audiences how they feel. We have
corresponded and occasionally met since our first encounter at the 2007 Pacifica ‘Nature and Human Nature’ conference, and I
recommend his book Facing Climate Change: An Integrated Path to the Future (Kiehl, 2016) for an
alternative approach
using analytical psychology but, unlike mine, also Buddhist philosophy. However, going back to Figure 6.1, it showed four
possible responses to our present dilemma, and so far I have explored only three of them. This chapter explores the
fourth, which is to continue along the ‘arc of life’ in a process I have called ‘ frugal
individuation ’. This appears at first sight to be a hard sell, and indeed it may be. However, I use
the word ‘frugal’ in the sense carefully elaborated by William Ophuls in Plato’s Revenge: Politics
in the Age of Ecology:
Frugality is not the same as stinginess or asceticism. To be frugal means to be sparing in the
use of resources —that is, thrifty without being pinchpenny. Frugality is the art of making as
little as possible go as far as possible . The etymology of frugal is revealing: it comes from frugalior, which is derived
from the Latin word for fruit and denotes ‘useful’ or ‘worthy’ . It therefore fits perfectly with the essential
principle of ecological economics—usufruct, which is the use and enjoyment of property or
resources without damaging or depleting their worth so that they remain permanently useful.
(Ophuls, 2011: 186)
Although Ophuls may not publicly label himself as a deep ecologist, his perceptive and uncompromising writing is extremely
relevant. To cite him one last time, I contend that the only ‘fundamental change in the ethos of civilization—
to wit, the deliberate renunciation of greatness in favor of simplicity, frugality and fraternity’
(Ophuls, 2012: 69 ) sufficient to ameliorate global collapse is that of the ‘long-range deep ecology
movement’ which arose in the 1970s. Its original proponent was the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss (1912–2009), whose
influences included Spinoza (see ‘Spinoza and Ecology’, Næss, 1977), William James, Mahatma Gandhi, Erich Fromm and Zen
Buddhism—but not, as far as I know, Jung. He was especially inspired by Rachel Carson, whose Silent Spring profoundly challenged
our anthropocentric assumptions. Other philosophical antecedents of deep ecology have been ascribed to the Americans Henry
David Thoreau (1817–1862) and Robinson Jeffers (1887–1962), the Scottish-American John Muir (1838–1914) and the English writers
D.H. Lawrence (1885–1930) and Aldous Huxley (1894–1963) (Sessions, 1995b: ix). I would add to that list the Americans George
Catlin (1796–1872), who in 1832 raised the first ever proposal for a National Park to preserve the American wilderness and its
inhabitants, and Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882), who was Muir’s mentor. Thoreau and Emerson were among the originators of
(American) Transcendentalism, which posited the unity of God, man and nature. However, its roots are much older, and already
familiar, as Bill Devall and George Sessions, two key figures in the parallel development of deep ecology in North America,
summarise:
Deep ecology is radically conservative in that it articulates a long-established minority stream of

religion and philosophy in Western Europe, North America and the Orient. It also has strong parallels
and shared insights with many religious and philosophical positions of primal peoples … In a certain sense it can be
interpreted as remembering wisdom which men once knew. (Devall & Sessions, 1985: 80)
Paul Shepard, another influential pioneer, gives examples of where and when this wisdom has manifested, and of how we can
reconnect with it via a surprisingly diverse and predominantly non-rational range of approaches:
That wisdom can be approached mathematically, chemically, or it can be danced or told as a

myth. It has been embodied in widely scattered economically different cultures. It is manifest,
for example, among pre-Classical Greeks, in Navajo religion and social orientation, in Romantic
poetry of the 18th and 19th centuries, in Chinese landscape painting of the 11th century , in current
Whiteheadian philosophy, in Zen Buddhism, in the world view of the cult of the Cretan Great Mother, in the ceremonials of
Bushman hunters, and in the medieval Christian metaphysics of light. What is common among
all of them is a deep sense of engagement with the landscape, with profound connections to
surroundings and to natural processes central to all life. (Shepard, 1969: 5)
Ecology expansion homogenizes regions and cultures, destroying ecological

diversity.
McBrien ’16 (Justin, Ph.D. candidate in modern American environmental and political history
@ University of Virginia, "Accumulating extinction." Anthropocene or capitalocene (2016): 116-
137, MX)
Exploiting the demographic catastrophe, capitalism created a novel “tropical” ecology in the
slave plantation. Tropical zones—as much created as discovered—became a homogenized
equatorial region whose native diversity was destroyed and replaced by a few staple crops
such as sugar, tobacco, and coffee. This climatic-geographic differentiation allowed for the
ecological othering of colonial subjects , justifying capitalist expansion by creating zones of law
and exclusion (Benton 2010). This geographical othering was a self-fulfilling prophecy: the more
the plantation system grew, the more the ecological transformations it wrought allowed for
malaria and yellow fever to thrive to new epidemic proportions , the more Europeans viewed
these places as unsuitable for “civilization,” and inhospitable to settlement by “civilized”
peoples. The myth that the demand for West African slaves was due to their immunity to the
Caribbean disease environment is backward. First, indigenous populations collapsed, propelled
by the imperial reorganization of natures. Then, African slaves were imported well before the
flourishing of malaria and yellow fever, which had not existed in the New World prior to the
European invasion (Packard 2011; Webb 2009).
Extractive development - whether conventional or green - leads to the 6th mass

extinction.
Dunlap ‘21 (Alexander, postdoctoral research fellow at the Centre for Development and the
Environment, "The politics of ecocide, genocide and megaprojects: interrogating natural
resource extraction, identity and the normalization of erasure." Journal of Genocide Research
23.2 (2021): 212-235, MX)
The roots of the structure of conquest are deep, adaptive, strategic and continuous.
Assimilation practices are dependent on eliminating alternative knowledges and healthy socio-
ecological practices, which necessitate the opposite (strengthening soil quality, social
relationships, air and water vitality). While people have inherited the existent, they enjoy the
enchantment of computational devices and continue participating in energy intensive
infrastructures and apparatuses. Now, more than ever, is the time to recognize these inherently
destructive politico-economic processes and stop the systematic loss in so-called human and
biodiversity .
Conclusion
This article revisits and expands on the theory of The Genocide Machine, by reflecting on three
cases studies of natural resource extraction and the social conflicts that arose in these regions.
The article examines these case studies of progressive ecological destruction, in order to argue
that genocide studies needs to further challenge megaproject development while questioning
its own Eurocentric heritage, anthropocentrism and identity essentialism. Recognizing these
blind spots within genocide studies, this article recommends challenging anthropocentrism ,
which disregards and devalues nonhuman life (hence the term dehumanization); the infectious
reality of internalizing and self-managing colonial/statist systems; and their ties to identity
categories and construction.
Recognizing these issues – and the timeless difficulty of the analysis of identity within genocide
studies – allows us to understand these three, relatively standard, extractive development case
studies as subtle and creeping contributor to a slow industrial genocide. Extractive
development – conventional or green – are cumulatively leading to planetary impacts : species
extinction and a potential 6th Extinction if industrial humans do not change their habits,
behaviours and political structures. Genocide studies, with some notable exceptions from the
post-liberal camp, remains unprepared to position itself in the face of ecological extinction and
climate catastrophe. Combining this with confronting the anthropocentrism within genocide
studies, the viral psychosocial effects of colonial/ statist systems and complications of identity
will not only begin a more accurate conversation about the techno-capitalist elephant in the
room, but also initiate a serious advocacy against faulty climate change mitigation programmes
in different disciplinary arenas. It is time to recognize the validity of the Genocide Machine
perspective and position post-liberal genocide scholarship as the mainstream within genocide
studies.
Human civilization will collapse with Climate Change

Spratt and Dunlop 19 (David, Research Director for Breakthrough and co-author of Climate
Code Red: The case for emergency action; Ian, enior member of the Breakthrough Advisory
Board, formerly an international oil, gas and coal industry executive, chair of the Australian Coal
Association and CEO of the Australian Institute of Company Directors, “Existential climate-
related security risk: A scenario approach,” BT Policy Paper, 2019)
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/148cb0_b2c0c79dc4344b279bcf2365336ff23b.pdf
With the commitments by nations to the 2015 Paris Agreement, the current path of warming is
3°C or more by 2100 . But this figure does not include “long-term” carbon-cycle feedbacks,
which are materially relevant now and in the near future due to the unprecedented rate at
which human activity is perturbing the climate system. Taking these into account, the Paris path
would lead to around 5°C of warming by 2100.
Scientists warn that warming of 4°C is incompatible with an organised global community, is
devastating to the majority of ecosystems, and has a high probability of not being stable. The
World Bank says it may be “ beyond adaptation ”. But an existential threat mayalso exist for
many peoples and regions at a significantly lower level of warming. In 2017, 3°C of warming was
categorised as “catastrophic” with a warning that, on a path of unchecked emissions, low-
probability, high-impact warming could be catastrophic by 2050.
The Emeritus Director of the Potsdam Institute, Prof. Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, warns that
“climate change is now reaching the end-game, where very soon humanity must choose
between taking unprecedented action, or accepting that it has been left too late and bear the
consequences.” He saysthat if we continue down the present path “there is a very big risk that
we will just end our civilisation . The human species will survive somehow but we will destroy
almost everything we have built up over the last two thousand years.” Unfortunately,
conventional risk and probability analysis becomes useless in these circumstances because it
excludes the full implications of outlier events and possibilities lurking at the fringes. 12 Prudent
risk-management means a tough, objective look at the real risks to which we are exposed,
especially at those “fat-tail” events, which may have consequences that are damaging beyond
quantification, and threaten the survival of human civilisation. Global warming projections
display a “fat-tailed” distribution with a greater likelihood of warming that is well in excess of
the average amount of warming predicted by climate models, and are of a higher probability
than would be expected under typical statistical assumptions. More importantly, the risk lies
disproportionately in the “fat-tail” outcomes, as illustrated in Figure 1
This is a particular concern with potential climate tipping-points — passing critical thresholds
which result in step changes in the climate system that will be irreversible on human timescales
— such as the polar ice sheets (and hence sea levels), permafrost and other carbon stores,
where the impacts of global warming are non-linear and difficult to model with current scientific
knowledge. Recently, attention has been given to a “hothouse Earth” scenario, in which system
feedbacks and their mutual interaction could drive the Earth System climate to a point of no
return, whereby further warming would become self-sustaining. This “hothouse Earth”
planetary threshold could exist at a temperature rise as low as 2°C, possibly even lower.
Current path to climate change detriments billions by 2050

2020–2030: Policy-makers fail to act on evidence that the current Paris Agreement path — in
which global human-caused greenhouse emissions do not peak until 2030 — will lock in at least
3°C of warming. The case for a global, climate-emergency mobilisation of labour and resources
to build a zero-emission economy and carbon drawdown in order to have a realistic chance of
keeping warming well below 2°C is politely ignored. As projected by Xu and Ramanathan, by
2030 carbon dioxide levels have reached 437 parts per million — which is unprecedented in the
last 20 million years — and warming reaches 1.6°C .
18 2030–2050: Emissions peak in 2030, and start to fall consistent with an 80 percent reduction
in fossil-fuel energy intensity by 2100 compared to 2010 energy intensity. This leads to warming
of 2.4°C by 2050, consistent with the Xu and Ramanathan “baseline-fast” scenario. However,
another 0.6°C of warming occurs taking the total to 3°C by 2050 — due to the activation of a
number of carbon-cycle feedbacks and higher levels of ice albedo and cloud feedbacks than
current models assume.
[It should be noted that this is far from an extreme scenario: the low-probability, high-impact
warming (five percent probability) can exceed 3.5–4°C by 2050 in the Xu and Ramanathan
scheme.]
2050: By 2050, there is broad scientific acceptance that system tipping-points for the West
Antarctic Ice Sheet and a sea-ice-free Arctic summer were passed well before 1.5°C of warming,
for the Greenland Ice Sheet well before 2°C, and for widespread permafrost loss and large-scale
Amazon drought and dieback by 2.5°C. The “hothouse Earth” scenario has been realised, and
Earth is headed for another degree or more of warming, especially since human greenhouse
emissions are still significant.
While sea levels have risen 0.5 metres by 2050, the increase may be 2–3 metres by 2100, and it
is understood from historical analogues that seas may eventually rise by more than 25 metres.
Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and 55 percent of the global population, are subject
to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions , beyond the threshold of human
survivability.
The destabilisation of the Jet Stream has very significantly affected the intensity and
geographical distribution of the Asian and West African monsoons and, together with the
further slowing of the Gulf Stream, is impinging on life support systems in Europe. North
America suffers from devastating weather extremes including wildfires, heatwaves, drought and
inundation. The summer monsoons in China have failed, and water flows into the great rivers of
Asia are severely reduced by the loss of more than one-third of the Himalayan ice sheet. Glacial
loss reaches 70 percent in the Andes, and rainfall in Mexico and central America falls by half.
Semi-permanent El Nino conditions prevail.
Aridification emerges over more than 30 percent of the world’s land surface. Desertification is
severe in southern Africa, the southern Mediterranean, west Asia, the Middle East, inland
Australia and across the south-western United States.
Impacts: A number of ecosystems collapse , including coral reef systems, the Amazon rainforest
and in the Arctic. Some poorer nations and regions, which lack capacity to provide artificially-
cooled environments for their populations, become unviable . Deadly heat conditions persist for
more than 100 days per year in West Africa, tropical South America, the Middle East and South-
East Asia, contributing to more than a billion people being displaced from the tropical zone.
Wat er availability decreases sharply in the most affected regions at lower latitudes (dry tropics
and subtropics), affecting about two billion people worldwide. Agriculture becomes nonviable
in the dry subtropics.
Most regions in the world see a significant drop in food production and increasing numbers of
extreme weather events , including heat waves, floods and storms. Food production is
inadequate to feed the global population and food prices skyrocket, as a consequence of a one-
fifth decline in crop yields, a decline in the nutrition content of food crops, a catastrophic decline
in insect populations, desertification, monsoon failure and chronic water shortages, and
conditions too hot for human habitation in significant food-growing regions.
The lower reaches of the agriculturally-important river deltas such as the Mekong, Ganges and
Nile are inundated, and significant sectors of some of the world’s most populous cities —
including Chennai, Mumbai, Jakarta, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Hong Kong, Ho Chi Minh City,
Shanghai, Lagos, Bangkok and Manila — are abandoned. Some small islands become
uninhabitable. Ten percent of Bangladesh is inundated, displacing 15 million people.
Even for 2°C of warming , more than a billion people may need to be r elocated and In high-end
scenarios, the scale of destruction is beyond our capacity to model, with a high likelihood of
human civilisation coming to an end.
Humans face severe health risks as climate change crumbles the environment
Introcaso, 18 (David, Ph.D, worked at NIH/NINR, Evaluation Officer of Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality, Public Health Analyst in the Assistant Secretary of Planning and
Evaluation, “Climate Change Is The Greatest Threat To Human Health In History,” Health Affairs,
2018) https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20181218.278288/full/
Studies show the current reality is for CO2 emissions to continue climb through 2040. This is
due largely to China, Russia and Canada's current energy policies that, if unchanged, will drive
global warming above 5°C before the end of this century. At 4°C, for example, 44 percent of
ve rtebrates lose half their geographic range, plants and insects over two-thirds , global grain
yields fall dramatically, the world's economy contracts by 30 percent and excess hyperthemia
deaths in the US increase by over 700 percent.
As dire as anthropocene warming projections are, they have yet to fully account for feedback
loops, or the fact warming temperatures become the cause of new sources of greenhouse gas
emissions. After a certain point, one that may be less than two decades away, we will have
irreversibly tipped toward self-perpetuating or runaway global warming or what a recent and
widely discussed Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences essay termed "Hothouse
Earth.” For example, a decline in the Albedo effect, where less and less sunlight is reflected by
the diminishing ice cover causes still more absorption of solar radiation or higher surface
temperatures and a wide range of subsequent threats: warming sea beds and melting
permafrost allows trapped methane, an extremely potent greenhouse gas, to escape into the
atmosphere; increased rainfalls reduce soil absorption of greenhouse gasses; and reductions in
Greenland ice can alter Gulf Stream ocean currents that in turn accelerates ice melt in the
southern hemisphere.
The October IPCC report concluded that if the current rate of greenhouse gas emissions
continue, temperatures will rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels by 2040. In order to avoid,
this the IPCC found greenhouse pollution must be reduced by 45 percent from 2010 levels by
2030 and completely, that is, by 100 percent, by 2050. Coal use, currently accounting for 40
percent of electrical production, would have to drop to nearly one percent. Renewable energy
sources, currently supplying 20 percent of electrical production, would have to more than triple.
The effort required to transform the world's economy, the report stated, would be so great
“there is no documented historical precedent.”
Human civilization will collapse with Climate Change

With the commitments by nations to the 2015 Paris Agreement, the current path of warming is
3°C or more by 2100 . But this figure does not include “long-term” carbon-cycle feedbacks,
which are materially relevant now and in the near future due to the unprecedented rate at
which human activity is perturbing the climate system. Taking these into account, the Paris path
would lead to around 5°C of warming by 2100.
Scientists warn that warming of 4°C is incompatible with an organised global community, is
devastating to the majority of ecosystems, and has a high probability of not being stable. The
World Bank says it may be “ beyond adaptation ”. But an existential threat mayalso exist for
many peoples and regions at a significantly lower level of warming. In 2017, 3°C of warming was
categorised as “catastrophic” with a warning that, on a path of unchecked emissions, low-
probability, high-impact warming could be catastrophic by 2050.
The Emeritus Director of the Potsdam Institute, Prof. Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, warns that
“climate change is now reaching the end-game, where very soon humanity must choose
between taking unprecedented action, or accepting that it has been left too late and bear the
consequences.” He saysthat if we continue down the present path “there is a very big risk that
we will just end our civilisation . The human species will survive somehow but we will destroy
almost everything we have built up over the last two thousand years.” Unfortunately,
conventional risk and probability analysis becomes useless in these circumstances because it
excludes the full implications of outlier events and possibilities lurking at the fringes. 12 Prudent
risk-management means a tough, objective look at the real risks to which we are exposed,
especially at those “fat-tail” events, which may have consequences that are damaging beyond
quantification, and threaten the survival of human civilisation. Global warming projections
display a “fat-tailed” distribution with a greater likelihood of warming that is well in excess of
the average amount of warming predicted by climate models, and are of a higher probability
than would be expected under typical statistical assumptions. More importantly, the risk lies
disproportionately in the “fat-tail” outcomes, as illustrated in Figure 1
This is a particular concern with potential climate tipping-points — passing critical thresholds
which result in step changes in the climate system that will be irreversible on human timescales
— such as the polar ice sheets (and hence sea levels), permafrost and other carbon stores,
where the impacts of global warming are non-linear and difficult to model with current scientific
knowledge. Recently, attention has been given to a “hothouse Earth” scenario, in which system
feedbacks and their mutual interaction could drive the Earth System climate to a point of no
return, whereby further warming would become self-sustaining. This “hothouse Earth”
planetary threshold could exist at a temperature rise as low as 2°C, possibly even lower.
Structural Violence
Assumption of human superiority utilizes the same logic of domination as
slavery and colonialism – shifts our morality toward one of ownership rather
than harmony
Muradian and Gómez-Baggethum 21 (Roldan Muradian, PhD, Adjunct Professor at
Empathy is the basis of morality, and it depends on psychological proximity. The social and self control for causing annihilation of the other or pain on the other are based on
identification mechanisms and the capacity to experience empathy (Mentovich et al., 2016; Czap et al., 2018b). Psychological proximity is related to the perception of shared
characteristics, and in particular of core characteristics that we associate with the human condition (such as agency, sentience and intelligence). This holds for both human-
The longer the psychological distance between

human and human-nature relations (Wildermuth et al., 2017; Miralles et al., 2019).
humans and nature, the more likely that nature is taken out from the moral community, and
therefore the more likely that an exploitative and utilitarian relationship is developed. Private
property rights on natural ecosystems (including the right to clear them up) is built up on the
notion that humans are not only different but also superior beings to other living entities. The same notion applied to
slavery, whose justification required scientific theories and social conventions assuming racial differentiation and superiority of some races over others (Edmonson, 1976).
The “deshumanization”
Mbembe (2017: 179) argues that the “birth of the racial subject, and therefore of Blackness, is linked to the history of capitalism”.
of the black subject, for its utilitarian appropriation, has the same underlying social and
psychological mechanisms as the creation of the society/nature divide. In a speech given in 1962, L´evi-
Strauss (1993) stated that a key to understand the Western man is to look at the separation between men and animals he has created. He argued that this
cultural feature opened the door to an infinity of abuses, based on the self-proclaimed right to
restrict the human condition to a privileged minority (initially of white European men). Structural
racism and a destructive relationship with nature have the same cultural foundations . The colonial
expansion of capitalism between the 16th and 19th centuries was built on two Western civilizatory pillars justified
by racism and the society/nature divide: natural wealth extraction and the forced work of
subjugated groups (Mbembe, 2019).
The history of slavery of indigenous populations and Africans in European colonies (and its abolition) are examples
of how the prevalent ideology sets the boundaries of moral communities and consequently
establish the community of justice. During the 16th century, there were theological debates about whether indigenous inhabitants of the Americas
were human beings, and about whether they were naturally inferior and deserved to be subjugated (Byung, 2011). During the colonial period, slaves were part of the community
of justice, but in a very constrained way. Masters had almost full sovereignty over judgment and punishment of slaves, and in the French Antilles for instance, if a slave
committed a severe offense and was condemned to death, the owner received a financial compensation from the state (Marquese, 2004). Only in 1811 a planter in the British
colonies, called Arthur Hodge, was for the first time tried and hanged for the murder of one of his slaves (called Prosper). This event constituted a landmark in the history of the
allocation of rights between slaves and planters (Andrew, 2000). It is revealing that planters, and not the slaves, were often compensated for the abolition of slavery in the XIX
century (Draper, 2013).
The
In the U.S., it took a long period of time after abolition for black citizens to be acknowledged by the state as equal members of the community of justice.
abolitionist and civil rights movements were social mobilizations to induce moral changes, and
consequently the allocation of rights between social groups. We think that the environmental movement should have essentially
the same profile: to aim to change the allocation of rights, including property rights, and the
composition of the community of justice. To achieve that goal requires profound ideological changes, as it was the case of the abolitionist
cause.
Adopting a utilitarian abolitionist perspective, Adam Smith argued that freeing slaves would
increase productivity (Smith, 1978). His expectations however were proven wrong, at least during the aftermath of abolition in England. Nevertheless, the
British abolitionist movement kept its claims about the immorality of slavery even after the decline of planters' profits and lost of competitiveness of the West Indies as
compared to the Spanish and Portuguese colonies where slavery was still legal (Anderson, 2014). This take persists among present movements against racial violence, which (by
contrast with utilitarian environmentalism) do not ground their demands on appeals to the contributions of black people to society, but on the categorical moral stance that
‘black lives matter’. Social struggles for changes in moral consciousness usually challenge power
structures, including production systems and prevailing allocation of rights. We argue that the environmental movement should vindicate changes in moral
consciousness. Morality and utility rarely go hand-in-hand, because morality has to do with a set of
rules for controlling power, while the pursue of utility (the maximization of it), on the contrary, requires the
expression of power.
Again, a revealing example about the conflict between morality and utility can be found in the history of slavery. Du Tertre (1667) reports that Dutch and English protestant
planters in the Antilles in the XVII century, contrary to catholic colonists, refused to baptize their slaves, because they assumed that it was not morally right to own Christian
slaves. Nonetheless, if a slave was close to die due to a disease, some planters felt the obligation to baptize the person, and at the same time to free him or her, with the risk of
the slave becoming a free person if (s)he succeeded to recover from the disease. This case shows, on the one hand, the relationship between psychological proximity and the
frontier of the moral community (baptism brought slaves psychologically closer to their masters, and therefore their acquisition of rights was more justified). On the other hand,
it also shows the common conflict between morality and utility. The maximization of utility (trade and exploitation of enslaved work force) needed the flexibilization and
adaptation of moral rules (obligation of baptism for all humans), as well as the application of such rules (obligation to baptize dying persons) implied the risk of losing economic
assets (liberation of the slave). Morality is often about restraining utility, and therefore setting the limits of commodities and markets.
Anthropocentrism has been challenged within Western environmental philosophy and law (Stone, 1972; Naess, 1973, Naess, 1993; Norton, 1984; Schweitzer, 1987; Chapron et
dominant moral philosophy in the Western culture has

al., 2019; Leopold, 2020). These exceptions notwithstanding,
considered almost exclusively human beings as moral persons for about two thousand years. Nonetheless, the criteria for
identifying moral boundaries and for defining the community of justice vary significantly throughout time and across cultural backgrounds (Stumpf et al., 2016). These criteria
might include the capacity to feel pain, to have sentience, intelligence or consciousness, holding interest or having the capacity to set contractual relations, among others
(Baxter, 2005).
Anthropocentric moral delineations are not universal, and actually they do not characterize
Amerindian cultures (Viveiros de Castro, 1992; Escobar, 2011). Forest people from the Americas do not see humans as superior or special beings, neither they
are assumed to be entitled to ownership and annihilation at will of other forest entities. Humans are seen as part of a complex and
delicate web relations in the forest. David Kopenawa, a Yanomami leader and shaman, states that for the Yanomami culture,
the Amazon forest is full, populated, among other things, by innumerous Xapiri (forest entities, invisible most
of the time), while for white people the forest is an idle space , from which minerals and other
resources must be extracted (Kopenawa and Albert, 2013). For the Yanomami, humans are just one of the multiple entities that inhabit the forest, while
for many white people the forest is an empty and “unproductive” space to be conquered, waiting to be exploited economically.
The observation made by Kopenawa reveals not only the anthropocentric character of capitalism expansion (tightly intertwined with the expansion of Western culture and
Utilitarianism, as adopted in economic science, reflects a particular

urbanization) but also its extreme utilitarianism.
conception of morality, in which the pursuit of self-interest, the limitless desire for commodities,
and the unlimited appropriation of capital are seen not only as rational, but also as morally right, since the maximization
of individual utility is conceived and the guiding principle of social organization, as a source of social order (Abercrombie et al., 1980). From this conception of morality, self-
restrain makes sense only if it pays off later on. An example of the utilitarian morality can be found in the following quote from the treaty written by André João Antonil, a Jesuit
priest, published by the first time in Lisbon in 1711 and that contained recommendations about how to treat the slaves in Brazil. He recommended never “...to hit with a stick on
the slaves, because in rage the blows are not measured and can hurt the head of a useful slave, that is worth a lot of money, and loss him…” (Antonil, 2011: 98). Here self-
The same type of argument is put forward by utilitarian

restrain is seen then as the wise expression of self-interest.
environmentalism: self-restrain of forces for environmental destruction are seen as the

expression of wise self-interest.
Colonialism is a main cause of climate change. Rethinking our modes of thought

can help challenge these dominant ideologies.
Cole and Malone ’19 (David R., Australian researcher in the fields of literacies, globalization,
critical thinking, employed @ University of Western Sydney, and Karen, Professor of
Sustainability at the Centre for Educational Research @ University of Western Sydney,
"Environmental education and philosophy in the Anthropocene." Australian Journal of
Environmental Education 35.3 (2019): 157-162, MX)
Critical theory enables and encourages investigation into the mechanisms of the Anthropocene ;
for example, economics . One of these mechanisms is connected to the history of
colonialisation and how Indigenous peoples around the world have been dominated, exploited,
exterminated and marginalised in the very countries that they have occupied for many
thousands of years before the European invaders. It is being increasingly recognised that
Indigenous peoples hold knowledge , understanding and practices that are closely aligned to
the needs of the countries where they have lived for millennia, and that mainstream society
should take note of and utilise, especially in times of environmental catastrophe (e.g., Davis &
Todd, 2017). Education as a system and discipline can be slow to react to such changes and
imperatives, and Indigenous knowledges and practices are frequently sidelined to the
periphery in curricula dominated by mainstream Western concerns such as numeracy and
literacy. The two articles included in this special edition by Stein and Thornton, Graham & Burgh
argue that Indigenous knowledges should be included as part of mainstream education to
encourage new ways to look at and act on climate change.
Stein argues that colonialism is the active cause of climate change. She believes that nothing
will change unless this fact is admitted and acted upon, and that the establishment of the
institutional sustainability response to climate change is part of the denial mechanisms of
colonialism and the inability to break with the habits of mind that are constituted by
colonialism. Stein looks to the processes of decolonial thought to help us navigate out of the
colonial trap, and specifically applies decolonial thought to university practices. Stein’s argument
is a passionate plea to think otherwise in the current situation of the Anthropocene, and to
allow for and encourage different types of knowledges and thinking practices into the frame, to
help pull us away from inevitable environmental disaster based on, for example, the logic and
domination of capitalist economics . Thornton similarly argues against mainstream colonial
education, and looks to enable a new decolonial discourse for the Anthropocene in Australia by
putting to work feminism, environmentalism and philosophy. Thornton suggests that in
Australia, the knowledges, experiences and practices of Aboriginal Australians is an invaluable
resource that should be mobilised in times of climate crisis called the Anthropocene. For
example, the ways that Aboriginal peoples have deliberately worked with fire in the
environment have a subtlety and specificity that could be very helpful in the current scenario of
drought and rising temperatures due to global warming. Thornton suggests that white settlers in
Australia have initiated and maintained a mode of thought and practice that is seen, for
example, in the education system, which acts as an exclusionary device wherein Aboriginality is
pushed to the outside. Challenging this mode of thought and acting otherwise is an imperative
made all the more real by the impending environmental disaster looming for Australia in the
Anthropocene and its causes, such as the burning of fossil fuels.
Environmental degradation disproportionately impacts vulnerable communities

and the global South while those in power reap the benefits
Gonzalez 15, (Carmen G. Gonzalez is a world-renowned expert in international environmental law,
human rights and the environment, environmental justice, and food security and is a Morris I. Leibman
Professor of Law at Loyola University Chicago School of Law, “Environmental Justice, Human Rights, and
the Global South,” 4/2/2015, Santa Clara Journal of International Law,
https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1183&context=scujil // ECL)
The adverse impacts of global environmental degradation are borne disproportionately by the
planet’s most vulnerable human beings , including the rural and urban poor, racial and ethnic
minorities, women, and indigenous peoples.13 In both the North and the South, the communities most
burdened by crushing poverty, ill health, political disempowerment, and social exclusion are the
ones most exposed to air and water pollution and most affected by climate change and other
global environmental problems.14
In the United States, the concentration of environmental hazards in low-income communities

and communities of color sparked a vibrant environmental justice movement dedicated to the defense of
disparately impacted communities.15 Environmental justice activists have been at the forefront of struggles over the siting
of hazardous industries in low-income communities of color; access to parks and open space;
farmworker exposure to pesticides; inequities in disaster preparedness and emergency
response; workplace health and safety; access to healthy and affordable food; and the
enhancement of tribal regulatory authority over indigenous lands .16
Environmental justice scholars and advocates identified four

distinct aspects of environmental injustice
experienced by historically marginalized communities. They alleged (1) distributive injustice arising
from disproportionate exposure to environmental hazards and limited access to
environmental amenities , (2) procedural unfairness caused by exclusion from environmental
decision-making, (3) corrective injustice due to inadequate enforcement of environmental
legislation, and (4) social injustice because environmental degradation is inextricably
intertwined with deeper structural ills, such as poverty and racism .17
Environmental justice struggles are taking place in both the global North and global South. 18
Among the most prominent are the struggles of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic and of the Pacific
Islands for climate justice,19 the resistance of local and indigenous communities against
environmentally devastating oil drilling ,20 and the challenge by transnational agrarian movements (such as La Vía
Campesina) to the corporate-dominated free trade policies that undermine rural livelihoods,
exacerbate poverty and hunger, and degrade the environment .21
Many scholars and legal practitioners have framed the demands of the environmental justice movements nationally and globally in
the language of human rights.22 Although most human rights treaties do not explicitly recognize the right to a healthy environment,
global and regional human rights tribunals have determined that inadequate environmental protection may violate the rights to life,
health, food, water, property, privacy, and the collective rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and resources.23
Human rights violations caused by environmental degradation have been found to infringe the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; and the American Convention on Human Rights despite the absence of explicit
environmental provisions in these treaties.24 In addition, three regional human rights treaties (the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, the San Salvador Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Arab Charter on Human Rights)
and one human rights declaration (the ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights) include the substantive right to a healthy
environment.25 Furthermore, the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters recognizes procedural environmental rights.26 For purposes of this article, the term
environmental human rights refers collectively to the right to a healthy environment, procedural environmental rights, and the
broad range of substantive human rights that may be violated by the failure to protect the environment.27
The protection of environmental human rights by regional and international human rights institutions has prompted the
incorporation of environmental human rights in national constitutions, legislation, and judicial decisions.28 Currently, at least 147
national constitutions explicitly reference environmental rights and/or environmental responsibilities.29 Clearly, human rights law
has been and continues to be an important weapon in the struggle for environmental justice.
While environmental law scholars and practitioners have harnessed the power of human rights law to advocate for the individuals
and communities that have been harmed by environmental degradation, North-South economic and political disparities pose
significant challenges to the achievement of environmental justice within and between nations.30 North-South
environmental inequities, like their domestic counterparts, manifest themselves in the form of
distributive, procedural, corrective, and social injustice. Although the North has contributed
disproportionately to global environmental degradation and has reaped the associated
economic benefits, the South experiences distributive injustice in the form of disparate
exposure to environmental hazards. This disparity is due to the vulnerable geographic locations and
limited regulatory capabilities of many Southern nations, the ongoing unsustainable extraction
of the South’s natural resources to satisfy Northern consumers, and the transfer of polluting
industry and hazardous wastes from the North to the South. 31 North-South relations are also
plagued by procedural injustice because the North dominates decision-making in the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and even in
multilateral environmental and human rights treaty negotiations due to its greater economic
and political influence.32 Corrective injustice is perhaps most evident in the inability of small island
nations to obtain redress for the imminent annihilation of their lands due to climate-change-
induced sea level rise.33 Finally, North-South environmental conflicts are inextricably intertwined
with colonialism and with post-colonial trade, aid, finance, and investment policies that
impoverished Southern nations and enabled the North to exploit the South’s resources while
externalizing the social and environmental costs .34
An additionalchallenge to the achievement of environmental justice is the imperial legacy of

international law. From the colonial period to the present, international law has generated a series of
doctrines that justified Northern political, economic, and military interventions in the South in
order to achieve “civilization” or “development” in accordance with supposedly universal
European norms.35 Human rights law is part of this tradition. Human rights law is based on the natural law notion that human
beings possess certain inalienable, permanent, and fundamental rights by virtue of their humanity, and that these universal rights
“obtain in all places and at all times regardless of what the positive law provides.”36 Southern scholars have questioned the
universal aspirations of human rights law in a multicultural world and have pointed out that international
law has
historically been used by the North to justify the conquest and dispossession of Southern
peoples.37 Most recently, international law has been deployed to legitimize military intervention and
economic reconstruction in places as diverse as Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan in
furtherance of Northern economic and political interests .38 In the words of Makau Mutua,
“[i]nternational human rights fall within the historical continuum of the European colonial
project in which whites pose as the saviors of a benighted and savage non-European world.”39
Current environmental crises have their roots in colonialism, as the global

North’s exploitation of peoples and resources enabled overconsumption while
the South bore the brunt of environmental degradation
Gonzalez 15, (Carmen G. Gonzalez is a world-renowned expert in international environmental law,
human rights and the environment, environmental justice, and food security and is a Morris I. Leibman
Professor of Law at Loyola University Chicago School of Law, “Environmental Justice, Human Rights, and
the Global South,” 4/2/2015, Santa Clara Journal of International Law,
https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1183&context=scujil // ECL)
II. The Colonial and Post-Colonial Origins of Environmental Injustice
The roots of contemporary environmental injustice lie in colonialism. The European

colonization of Asia, Africa, and the Americas devastated indigenous societies and wreaked
havoc on the flora and fauna of the colonized territories through logging, mining, and plantation
agriculture.40 European colonization transformed self-sufficient subsistence economies into
economic outposts of Europe that produced agricultural commodities, minerals and timber, and
purchased manufactured goods.41 It also paved the way for contemporary social and economic
inequality by dispossessing indigenous farmers, uprooting and enslaving millions of Africans, and
importing indentured workers to provide cheap labor for their colonial overlords .42
The colonial enterprise was justified by notions of European cultural and racial superiority that
persist, in one form or another, to the present day. Europeans regarded the native populations
as inferior and asserted a moral obligation to “civilize” the “savages” by compelling them to abandon their
local cultures and assimilate to European ways.43 In the post-colonial period, Southern elites, deeply influenced by
Eurocentric ideologies, subjugated their own indigenous and minority populations in order to
“modernize” and “develop” them.44 Despite the end of formal colonialism, the dismantling of apartheid, and the
adoption of treaties prohibiting racial discrimination, racial hierarchies remain deeply entrenched in both the
global North and the global South, as evidenced by , inter alia, widespread ethnic conflicts (including the
genocide in Rwanda), the social and economic legacy of apartheid in South Africa, hate crimes against
people of color and immigrants in Europe and the United States, and the subordination of Afro-descendant and
indigenous populations in the Americas.45
The achievement of political independence by the Latin American colonies in the 19th century and by the African and
Asian colonies in the middle of the 20th century did
not significantly alter the South’s crippling dependence
on a world economy dominated by Europe and the United States .46 Because the terms of trade
consistently favored manufactured goods over primary commodities , the nations of the global South
found themselves on an economic treadmill that prevented them from obtaining the capital to
diversify or industrialize their economies.47 Efforts to boost national earnings by increasing the
production of minerals, timber, and agricultural commodities generally created a glut of primary
commodities on global markets that depressed prices, reduced Southern export earnings, and only reinforced
Southern economic vulnerability.48 The South’s economic dependency enabled the North to
exploit Southern resources at prices that did not reflect the social and environmental
consequences of export production.49 As historian Clive Ponting observes:
Political and economic control of a large part of the world’s resources enabled the
industrialized world to live beyond the constraints of its immediate resource base. Raw
materials were readily available for industrial development, food could be imported to supply a rapidly
rising population and a vast increase in consumption formed the basis for the highest material
standard of living ever achieved in the world. Much of the price of that achievement was paid by the
population of the Third World in the form of exploitation, poverty, and human suffering .50
In the decades after the Second World War, the nations of the global South formed coalitions to reform the international economic
system by passing resolutions at the United Nations General Assembly, where they held a numerical majority.51 They sought to
assert control over their economic destinies by advancing the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the
right to nationalize the Northern companies exploiting these resources.52 They mobilized to secure a New International Economic
Order (NIEO) that would enhance Southern participation in global governance and provide debt forgiveness, special trade
preferences, and the stabilization of export prices for primary commodities.53
The debt crisis of the 1980s hastened the demise of the NIEO and facilitated the rise of the free market economic model known as
the Washington Consensus.54 In
order to secure debt repayment assistance from the IMF and the World
Bank, debtor nations in the global South were required to adopt a one-size-fits-all model of
economic development that included deregulation, privatization, trade liberalization, slashing
social safety nets, and the intensification of export production to service the foreign debt. 55
These policies increased poverty and inequality; reinforced the South’s economically
disadvantageous dependence on the export of raw materials; bankrupted small farmers by
putting them in direct competition with highly subsidized transnational agribusiness; sharply
accelerated rural-to-urban migration; and enabled transnational corporations to dominate many
of the newly privatized economic sectors. 56
The export-driven economic reforms mandated by the IMF and the World Bank accelerated the
North’s overconsumption of the planet’s resources by increasing the supply and driving down
the price of agricultural products, minerals, and timber. 57 Indebted, impoverished, and desperate for foreign
capital, Southern nations also became a convenient dumping ground for hazardous wastes from
the global North and a magnet for polluting industry, including the mining and petroleum
extraction industries that had exploited the South’s resources for generations .58 Indeed, former World
Bank chief economist Lawrence Summers wrote an infamous memorandum advocating the relocation of polluting industries from
the North to the South.59
Having industrialized by appropriating the South’s resources without regard to the

environmental and social costs (including the release of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere),
the North maintains an ecological footprint that dwarfs that of the South and has brought the
planet’s ecosystems to the brink of collapse. 60 A country’s ecological footprint is the area of land and water
required to produce the resources it consumes and to assimilate the wastes it generates.61 While the average global per
capita ecological footprint is 2.8 hectares, residents of the global North have an average per
capita ecological footprint of 5 to 10 hectares .62 By contrast, the South’s average per capita
ecological footprint is less than one hectare, and even China has a per capita ecological footprint
of only 1.2 hectares.63 Although the planet possesses approximately 12 billion productive hectares, the human population’s
total ecological footprint is almost 17 billion hectares.64 This means that we are exceeding the planet’s ecological
carrying capacity, confirming that it is biophysically impossible for everyone in the world to
enjoy the North’s consumption-driven lifestyle. If we are to achieve sustainability and ensure
an adequate standard of living for the world’s poor, it is essential for the North to scale back its
overconsumption of the planet’s resources.65
Scholars and activists have argued that the global North owes an ecological debt to the countries and
peoples of the global South for centuries of economic exploitation, decades of ill-advised
“development” programs, and consumption patterns that have devastated the planet’s
ecosystems.66 The North incurred this debt through “resource plundering, unfair trade,
environmental damage and the free occupation of environmental space to deposit waste” 67 and
through the displacement of Southern peoples and the destruction of their “natural heritage,
culture and sources of sustenance.”68 Indeed, this ecological debt is one of the key
manifestations of North-South environmental injustice. Before examining the role of environmental human
rights in addressing these inequities, it is essential to discuss the complicity of international law in the perpetuation of North-South
inequality.
The impact is the endless expansion of the Human-Nature dualism and

otherization responsible for capitalist and patriarchal dominant worldviews
Melinkoff 12 – (Alexander, Environment and Community Researcher/Graduate Student from
Humboldt State University. “Los Angeles Urban Agriculture: A Deep Ecology and Ecopsychology
Perspective on Environmentalism”, Humboldt State University, 2012)
https://scholarworks.calstate.edu/downloads/12579v50k, sj
Deep Ecology presents an alternative approach to resolving ecological problems to those offered in mainstream
environmentalism. The founder of the movement, Arne Naess, says that the goal of Deep Ecology is “ a substantial
reorientation of our whole civilization ” (1989, pp 45). Its fundamental theoretical framework is that the
ecological crises of our times are cultural, spiritual, and psychological in nature , according to the late
Humboldt State University professor Bill Devall (1993). Advocates of Deep Ecology argue that there needs to be a
comprehensive change in the paradigm of how people relate to Nature. Devall defines paradigm as
“the construct of reality that dominates our consciousness and perception ” (1988). He and George
Sessions describe what they see as the current prevailing dominant paradigm of Human-Nature
relationships. In Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered, they argue that this dominant worldview has four major
components (1985). The first is the belief that humans are fundamentally different from all other
species and life systems, and that this difference is hierarchical – meaning that humans are intrinsically more
valuable and therefore rightfully dominant to other living things. Second, humans are masters of their
destiny , capable of accomplishing any goal they wish to and overcoming any obstacles in their way. Third, the world is so large
that there are unlimited possibilities for the potential of human accomplishments . Lastly,
progress is the nature of the human species and no problems are without solutions, thus progress need never
stop. Similar yet varying descriptions of the dominant paradigm have been expressed by other Deep Ecologists. The prevailing
theme among them all is that of the dualistic and hierarchical dynamic that has resulted in the
domination of Nature by humans. This dualism involves perceiving everything that is not “me”
as being “ other ”, and when the other is a forest, an ecosystem, or a species it becomes a thing which can be used by and
destroyed for the purposes of humans. This otherizing facilitates the hierarchical structure which leads to
justified exploitation of other living beings and systems (Devall, 1988). Sessions and Devall argue that this
dominant worldview is primarily a phenomenon of Western civilization , and exemplified in the United
States. The causes that led to the development of this paradigm have been attributed to many historical
circumstances including, but not limited to, Judeo-Christian religions , economic/ capitalist forces , and male-
dominated patriarchal societies . A significant aspect of the dominant paradigm is the alienation from Nature that has
become embedded into our culture. In Living Richly in an Age of Limits, Devall 10 discusses how contact with Nature has been
reduced in recent history as humans have become increasingly urbanized. He says: “ We literally lost touch with nature .
Most Americans were now urban dwellers who did not till the soil. Wild nature was found only in remote areas of the continent.
Predatorcontrol programs supported by the
federal government helped eliminate the howl of the wolf, the
yap of the coyote, the sight of eagles in the sky, and the paw print of the mountain lion on the
mountain trail. If we wanted to see wild animals we went to the zoo. If we wanted green vegetables
we went to the supermarket” (Devall, 1993: pp. 28). This separation between human lifestyles and
the rest of Nature has led to the flawed and problematic conception of a Human-Nature
dualism . Seeing ourselves as different from Nature has had two major repercussions. Let it be known that the use of terms such
as “us” and “we” are used loosely to refer to members of a modern culture who enjoy the fruits of natural resource extraction.
There are varying degrees to which people reap such benefits, as well as different degrees of culpability. Without fully dissecting
these dynamics here, the terminology is employed to refer to general cultural themes and not meant to imply that all individuals
share the same responsibility.
As long as anthropocentric worldviews exist, the same structures of dominance

that prop up racism, sexism, classism, and imperialism will persist.
Anthropocentrism is not about all humans being above nature, but rather only
humans with the desire to dominate.
Ruuska 20 – (Toni Ruuska and Pasi Heikkurinen, Department of Economics and Management
@ University of Helsinki. Kristoffer Wilén, Department of Marketing @ Hanken School of
Economics. “Domination, Power, Supremacy: Confronting Anthropolitics with Ecological
Realism”, 26 March 2020) DOI:10.3390/su12072617, sj
In the political debates and discussions on the Anthropocene epoch [19,41,42], nature is seen primarily as a standing
reserve or a resource pool to serve a wide variety of human technological and economic
endeavors [9,17,43]. This kind of instrumentalism, a utility-based relation to nature, does not seem
problematic from the dominant anthropocentric worldview [44] as nature is assumed to exist for
humanity’s sake [14]. However, this kind of human supremacist standpoint has been claimed to result in
existential problems, such as climate change and the sixth mass extinction event [11,14,32,45–47]. An
instrumental take on nature [9,43] has developed and intensified over the course of past centuries, which means that it originates
from somewhere. Some events, historical developments, and culture-specific factors have influenced the human condition in such a
human beings have been seen as separate and supremacist
way that, especially in Western cultures,
creatures from the rest of nature [45,48]. Even though it is difficult to differentiate these events and cultures
specifically, that is, to argue from where exactly the instrumental perception of nature originates or “takes over,” it is possible to
locate it, at least to some extent, to humanist thinking and philosophy. Charles Taylor describes, in his book A Secular Age [48,49], a
historical and cultural turn that he believes has led to the current human-centered and humanist culture. This turn took place in the
beginning of the modern era, during the 17th and 18th centuries. According to Taylor, there was a shift in human thinking and self-
understanding in relation to God and nature to what he calls Providential Deism: God’s kingdom was not considered “ready”
anymore, but unfinished and it was up to humans to make it whole again. In addition, there was a shift in focus and objectives, as
the focus from divine and transcendent turned towards the mundane and ordinary: God’s will was now considered to be in human
flourishing. This turn, for Taylor [48] (p. 18) paved the way to secularism or exclusive humanism as he calls it, i.e., ‘humanism
accepting no final goals beyond human flourishing, nor any allegiance to anything else beyond this flourishing’. This entailed that
humans began to perceive themselves increasingly as creators alongside God, or as continuators of God’s creation, which arguably
led to supremacist and separationist view of nature. Industrial
and scientific revolutions then continued and
amplified these developments by giving humans powerful resources and instruments to dominate
and control each other and their extra-human nature [45]. Humanism, as a tradition, has been criticized extensively by
some of the leading Western scholars [50–53]. Instead of discussing this critique, we want to emphasize the anthropocentric nature-
relation in the humanist tradition. A common notion to both Lynn White Jr. [45] and Charles Taylor [48,49] is their attempt to explain
why particularly in the Western civilization humans and nature have been seen as separate entities. In addition to this, they have
sought to characterize nature-relation in Western cultures through instrumentality, domination and “economic value”. In addition to
these important contributions, anthropocentric perception of nature has been argued to be part of the
Western philosophical tradition as well, for instance in Plato’s Timaios dialogue, or in Descartes’ body/mind dualism
[40,54], and especially manifested in Bacon’s instrumentalism [49] (pp. 230–232), [7] (pp. 209–210). Famously, White Jr. [45] was
among the first to link the root cause of the ecological crisis to anthropocentrism, which he saw deeply rooted in the Judeo-Christian
theology and its underlying tradition of domination and supremacy. Devall
and Sessions [44] took on their behalf White’s
ideas further as they identified anthropocentrism as the dominant worldview of industrialized
societies. They [44] (pp. 65–66) wrote that “For thousands of years, Western culture has become increasingly
obsessed with the idea of dominance ; with dominance of humans over nonhuman
Nature, masculine over feminine, wealthy and powerful over the poor , with the
dominance of the West over non-West ern cultures.” Krebber [55] (pp. 328–329) claims that, as productive
forces developed, the alienation of humans from nature increased: ‘ The distance between culture and nature,
mind and matter, subject and object, human and animal, grew until humans arrogated
themselves the right to be above nature and finally broke the bond .’ In his book Eclipse of Reason,
Horkheimer [56] (p. 169) describes this development in history as reason infested by a disease pointing to instrumental reason
seeking to manipulate and dominate nature. According to Horkheimer, instrumental reason has opted to adjust nature to meet
human needs and aims, instead of seeking conformity with it, as it did in the past. Bacon [57] (p. 197) has famously crystallized this
sea change in 17th century in following way: ‘Let the human race only be given the chance to regain its God-given authority over
nature, then indeed will right reason and true religion govern the way we exert it,’ while later adding that nature should serve
‘human affairs and interests’ [57] (p. 329). Furthermore, Horkheimer and Adorno [58] (p. 1) wrote in Dialectic of Enlightenment that
enlightened reason has ‘aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters.’ This “reason” seemingly stems
from the notion that nature is perceived as hostile to human life, which is then to be conquered, controlled and dominated in order,
and paradoxically, to sustain humans [55] (p. 334).Domination and modification of nature have extended
vastly in their scope since the days of Bacon as even the weather system is now targeted for manipulation [55] (p. 331). Indeed,
the instrumental perception of nature has been intensified by productivist economics and
growth-based politics, as well as with the wide-range utilization of fossil fuel infrastructure, which require extensive and
expansive use of natural resources [23,40,59]. In Krebber’s reading [55], Horkheimer and Adorno describe the modern era in
Dialectic of Enlightenment as continuous struggle for the mastery of nature, in which thinking and reason function as primary means
to achieve this goal. Compared to pre-capitalist and pre-modern domination, along with European Enlightenment and scientific
revolution, a change in technique occurred that laid the ground for an expansion in massive scale in human’s ability to control and
manipulate nature. Whereas control of nature was previously approached through imitation (mimesis),
nature was increasingly reduced to mere material reserve for satisfying human desires and
needs [55]. Not even Marxism—probably the most prominent strand in humanist though in criticizing capitalism—has offered
systematic critique, not to mention change of agenda, to anthropocentric domination of nature, as Marxist theory, research and
politics have largely been in favor of industrialization and modernization committed to the ethos of progress and technological
development [60–63]. It is important to remark, however, that not all humans are dominators equally. A more accurate way to put
this would be to discuss of degrees of domination. Anthropocentrism should thus be seen to represent the
human will or tendency to dominate [64] (p. 10), and its enactment: the domination. This tendency might be
understood theoretically and psychologically as a trait that all humans may share—with different degrees in it— whenever
humans see or find themselves as “better”, “superior”, “above”, or “separate ” from others
(humans or non-humans) for whatever reason [14] (p. 309). The enactment of domination has often been based on
supremacist reasoning and justification. To be sure, other factors have influenced the relations of oppression as well, that is, slave
trade might have been justified with supremacist arguments, but the primary reason for it was, arguably, monetary gain. Another
point to consider is the fact that domination does not need to be justified in every case, especially when
relations of oppression have been institutionalized (e.g., legislation concerning slavery , racial
segregation , or gender discrimination ). However, what domination always requires is power, that is,
the will or tendency to dominate, as such, does not do anything if it is not coupled with power over something or someone. If
humans do have the will or tendency, it is only, in fact, the power over something and/or someone
that provides humans the ability and possibility to dominate . This power can be, for instance, political,
technological, or muscular. In the Anthropocene humans dominate each other by means of wealth, military force, and with various
political arrangements, and the non-human world especially by utilizing fossil-fuel-powered technology [15,23,27,28]. If we
conceptualize anthropocentrism in this way, it is clear that we
cannot dismiss inter-human concerns from it. This is
because anthropocentrism is clearly a rationale , which some humans or interest groups adopt
anthropocentrism ‘does not put human
for their purposes [14] (p. 313) and thus,
beings at the center of the universe but only certain humans : those who, for
one reason or another, choose to dominate others .’ In more elaborate terms, de Jonge [14] (pp. 310–311)
explains that Whatever class of social actors one identifies as being most responsible for social domination and ecological
destruction (e.g., men, capitalists, whites, Westerners ), one tends at the most fundamental level to find a common
kind of legitimization for the alleged superiority of these classes over others and hence, for the assumed rightfulness of their
domination of these others. Specifically, these classes of social agents have not sought to legitimate their position on the grounds
that they are, for example, men, capitalists, white, or Western per se, but Sustainability 2020, 12, 2617 6 of 20 rather on the grounds
that they have most exemplified whatever it is that has been taken to constitute the essence of humanness (e.g., being favored by
God or possessing rationality).
Anthropocentric worldviews will continue to view nature as a resource to be

commodified, while infiltrating its branches of dominances into other aspects of
social life, unless the human desire to control is stopped.
Ruuska 20 – (Toni Ruuska and Pasi Heikkurinen, Department of Economics and Management
@ University of Helsinki. Kristoffer Wilén, Department of Marketing @ Hanken School of
Economics. “Domination, Power, Supremacy: Confronting Anthropolitics with Ecological
Realism”, 26 March 2020) DOI:10.3390/su12072617, sj
More generally, unequal

power relations, for instance concerning indigenous livelihoods, the ownership of the
means of production and allocation of surplus value, have produced recurring conflicts in which the
people in power have attempted to dominate others [5]. Colonialism, imperialism, and neoliberal
capitalism , for instance, could all be considered as manifestations of a dog-eat-dog world, in which
the process and the outcome have been similar through ages—that is, conquest, domination, and exploitation of others. Also, the
legitimation and justification of domination has remained quite the same, although it has had historical variations. Supremacist
arguments regarding the conquest, domination, and exploitation of indigenous peoples have
altered from “civilizing mission” to “progress” and “development ,” the exploitation of the non-humans
has shifted from conquest and colonization to utility. In short, for humans, modern civilization has meant
exploitation and homogenization in the name of civilization and progress, and for non-humans,
it has mean instrumentality, commodification, and destruction due to alleged human
superiority . Below, we illustrate anthropolitics the modern era by highlighting on what grounds people, nations, and dominant
classes have claimed their superiority and exploitation. This analysis is by no means comprehensive, but rather, it is an illustration of
anthropocentrism, its reasoning, and its justification and legitimation. The Spanish colonization of the Americas in the 16th and 17th
centuries gave rise to a theological, political and ethical debate concerning the use of military force to acquire control over foreign
lands [73]. This debate occurred in the framework of religious discourse that sought to legitimate the conquest with arguments of
conversion and “salvation” of indigenous peoples. The British colonizers later used similar civilizing mission argument in the 19th
century, for instance, in India. In the Americas, the Spanish conquistadores explicitly legitimated their actions in terms of religious
missions, by bringing Christianity to the native peoples (cf. epistemic, moral, and agential anthropocentrism). Innocent IV, among
others, argued that the use of force was legitimate if the indigenous peoples Sustainability 2020, 12, 2617 8 of 20 violated the so-
called natural law, which led the Spanish to conclude that the habits of the natives, from nakedness and unwillingness to labor, were
demonstrations of this inability [73]. In contrast to many influential philosophers, Diderot was one of the most vigorous critics of
European colonization. For one, he challenged the common view that indigenous people benefitted from European civilization, and
did not consider non-Westerners as primitive, nor more complex forms of social organization as superior. He also claimed that
traders and explorers had no right to access fully inhabited lands—“the right to commerce” was commonly used as a justification by
Spanish thinkers in the 16th and 17th century [73] (cf. spatial anthropocentrism). In contrast to Diderot, several influential
philosophers, for instance in France and England in the 18th and 19th centuries took entirely opposite view and assimilated some
version of the so-called developmental approach from the Scottish Enlightenment. According to it, all societies naturally transformed
from hunting, to herding, to farming, to commerce; or from “savagery” to “barbarism” and to civilization, where the term civilization
marked the highest point of (moral) progress [74] (cf. moral and temporal anthropocentrism). The language of civilization, savagery
and barbarism is common to many 18th and 19th century thinkers, including Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill. Mill thought that
“savages” did not have the capacity for self-government (cf. epistemic and agential anthropocentrism). He thought that only
commercial society could offer individuals a possibility to realize their potential for freedom and self-government, thus leading to a
conclusion that colonizing states are acting in the interest of the less-developed peoples by governing them [73] (cf. moral and
agential anthropocentrism). Marx also had similar ideas to civilizing mission thinking, so typical for Western Enlightenment and
Eurocentric viewpoints, as Traverso [75] (p. 156) writes. Marx considered the colonial world as the periphery of the West, and
opined that the West would determine its evolution, because of its own political orientation was “regressive” and “immature” [75]
(p. 157). In articles written in the 1850s, Marx deals with the British imperial conquest in India and China, where he stigmatizes the
violence of colonialism but does not put into question the legitimacy of British conquest in the name of a “superior civilization” (cf.
epistemic, agential and temporal anthropocentrism). Marx writes that the British Empire acted as ‘an unconscious tool of history’ in
India, and its mission was at the same time destructive and regenerative [75] (pp. 158–159). Similarly, Kohn and Reddy [73] note
that Marx’s thinking of British colonialist domination reflects the same ambivalence that he and Engels have in The Communist
Manifesto toward capitalism: ‘Marx recognizes the immense suffering brought about during the transition from feudal to bourgeois
society while insisting that the transition is both necessary and ultimately progressive.’ From Tocqueville’s thinking can be found
more direct and exclusive political reasoning regarding domination, as he asserted that French colonies in Algeria would increase
France’s status in relation to its rivals. Unlike the proponents of the civilizing mission, Tocqueville noted that the brutal military
occupation did not introduce good government or advanced civilization, but quite the opposite. Instead, he saw the French national
interests as paramount and moral considerations subordinate to political goals [73]. Tocqueville’s line of thought can also be
considered to reflect the modern geopolitical power relations, where different nation states, economic organizations and other
agents of capital are seeking to further their economic and political interests often at the expense of others [2,76 ].
From the
late 19th century, anthropolitics and its underlying domination shifts from supremacist
reasoning towards economic and political utility, as imperialism and colonialism change form
due to capitalist and nationalist competition. In Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism [77], Lenin famously
reinterpreted the term imperialism to refer to the age of concentrated capital and competition between nation states and their
corporations. As Foster [78] explains, this new imperialist stage, beginning in the late 19th century was seen by Lenin as an outcome
of growth of gigantic capitalist firms, which often had monopoly power, and the close connection they had to nations states from
which they originated. This development resulted to the nationalist struggle to control and utilize the human and non-human beings
and natural resources at the global scale, leading to inter-capitalist and nationalist competition and eventually to two world wars
[78]. In general, Marxist scholars are quite unanimous on the notion that imperialism is inevitable result of capitalism [28,77,79].
This is because expansive capital accumulation is found to lead in constant search for new markets and opportunities for further
accumulation, as already Marx and Engels foresaw in The Communist Manifesto [79]. As Moore [27] (p. 87) writes, capitalism
repeatedly ‘exhausts its sources of nourishment,’ pertaining that capital accumulation depends upon finding new frontiers for
appropriation. Hence, capitalist relations of appropriation eventually extend their grasp to novel territories by bringing
industrialization and imperialism alongside with them [27] (p. 101). In the 21st century , after many centuries of
colonialism, imperialism, and capitalist appropriation in the name of progress , development,
Christ, civilization, and affluence, the ecological impacts of humans’ unequal affluence are
indeed shocking. As a consequence of the “great acceleration” [80], every major ecosystem on Earth is in
decline [9] (p. 46). A focal problem for ecological sustainability is that nature is perceived, in this era and in
capitalism, not only as a limitless external entity, but also as barrier among others to be
transcended, but above all as a resource to be exploited [27] (p. 95). Moreover, a reason why, for example,
many of the citizens in affluent industrial societies are not able to see the full human dependence and
embeddedness in nature, seems to be linked to their overall consumerist lifestyle, and capitalist economics and politics, which
give the accumulation of wealth (or economic growth) the first priority in societal goal setting [9] (see ontological, epistemic and
agential anthropocentrism). Indeed, as Krebber [55] (p. 333) aptly puts it: “the very idea of being in tune with
nature in Western, capitalistic thought, is self-evidently equal to the subjugation of nature.”
The metabolic rift of capitalism causes the genocide of indigenous peoples.

Crook, Short, and South ‘18 (Martin, associate lecturer of International Relations and
Criminology @ University of Roehampton, Damien, Co-Director of the Human Rights
Consortium, and Nigel, PhD in the field of criminology @ Middlese, "Ecocide, genocide,
capitalism and colonialism: Consequences for indigenous peoples and glocal ecosystems
environments." Theoretical Criminology 22.3 (2018): 298-317, MX)
To give one modern example of a metabolic rift that is driving ecologically-induced genocide of
indigenous peoples, consider the process of ‘extreme energy’, whereby energy extraction
methods grow more intense , unconventional and riskier over time as the easier to extract
conventional sources are depleted (Short, 2016: 52)—all of which is associated with the
insatiable demand for fossil fuels on the global markets, rooted in a system of ‘fossil
capitalism’ (Angus, 2016; Malm, 2016). The Athabasca ‘tar sands’ in Alberta, Canada, noted
above, can be viewed as an acute example of the extreme energy process. In this case, there has
been an artificial division and fragmentation of the local ecosystem in order to extract oil,
regardless of the anti-ecological effects that the resultant unnatural throughput and transfer of
energy and materials has on the local environment and, critically, on the local indigenous
population . The environmental externalities, for instance in the local waterways, have had a
crippling impact on both the physical and cultural well-being of the local indigenous population
(Huseman and Short, 2012) and have been associated with significant levels of colon cancer,
leukaemia and lymphoma (Peterson, 2007). The struggle against industrial mining is de facto a
struggle for survival. As George Poitras, a Mikisew Cree First Nation member in Fort Chipewyan,
has observed: ‘If we don’t have land and we don’t have anywhere to carry out our traditional
lifestyle, we lose who we are as a people. So if there’s no land, then it’s equivalent in our
estimation to genocide of a people’(Short, 2016: 181) [emphasis added]. To indigenous and
place-based peoples, ‘ Land is life’ (Wolfe, 2006: 387).
War
Wars, economic inequality, and resource plundering are magnified through the
integration of the military into the transnational capitalist class.
Hrubec and Uhde ‘19 (Marek, Director of the Centre of Global Studies in the Institute of
Philosophy at the Czech Academy of Sciences, and Zuzana, Ph.D. Sociology and Gender, “Global
Conflicts and Local Interactions: Contradictions of Global Capitalism and Civil Society.” Critical
Sociology, vol. 45, no. 6, Sept. 2019, pp. 777–783, doi:10.1177/0896920518798880, MX)
First, militarized escalation by means of current global repressive tendencies is linked to the
transformation of the police and war. While the global order as a whole develops step by step in
specific local and national conditions, at the same time the militarization of local and national
places is closely interlinked to macro-regional involvement in the webs of transnational and
global war conflicts (Robinson, 2018). A locally created problem in the main global superpower,
the USA, can easily spread globally . Even if the USA is declining power, its leading economic and
political groups, in collaboration with other, transnational capital groups have still played a
leading role in the domination of the world via militarily channels on the global level. The
militarization of the economy and society is rooted particularly in the events of 11 September
2001, and has led to global interactions that connect the military and security complex with
industrial and political trends in a specific dangerous way (Hristov, 2014; Paley, 2014). These
repressive tendencies have led to the establishment of a global police state.
Because of the new political and economic trends in the USA and their intense conflictual
integration within global capitalism , there are high risks of military escalation, with dangerous
lethal consequences for societies (Hrubec, 2016). The current impulses for the nuclear threat
and related problems are formulated in new strategic documents of the US administration,
particularly in the National Security Strategy and the Nuclear Posture Review. Political
statements based on these and other documents open up the possibility of the real use of
nuclear weapons in a limited nuclear war. Highly advanced electronic systems, containing
transnational communication with big data, developed high-precise weapon systems and other
tools, also allow for the application of nuclear weapons on a very specific territorial scale. On the
basis of new technologies, political and economic actors have revitalized the possibility of
nuclear war, and the establishment of Donald Trump in the White House has opened a real
threat of “thinking the unthinkable”, i.e. a real nuclear conflict.
Even if the hypothesis for nuclear war cannot be proven before the war breaks out, the highly
dangerous military, economic, and political tendencies potentially leading to this kind of war are
sufficient reason to pay attention to this serious problem. In the long history of human
civilization, people have always misused the most developed technological innovations in
wars. There is a serious probability that we are not at the end of history, when the people would
stop doing that. This is why it is important to help to contain this kind of threat by analyzing it
(Lodgaard, 2010).
Second, the thematic area of global conflicts and local interactions places a spotlight on the
transnationalization of social and other processes and relations. While these intertwined
aspects of the contradictions of global capitalism are often examined separately, their analyses
require research into complex interconnections and the common causes of local and global
problems, which is also a necessary first step in articulating potential remedies and normative
requirements for global justice. The analytical lens of global interactions also sheds light on the
changing role of the nation state, and problematizes the commonly accepted premise equating
society with the political unit of a nation state. The gap between the global interconnectedness
of social processes, on the one hand, and efforts to address arising social conflicts at the level of
nation states and internationally organized political institutions, on the other hand, is prevalent
not only in real politics, but also in the current social sciences (Beck, 2016). Asking fundamental
contemporary questions thus calls for a different methodological approach, which is linked to
transnational inquiry.
The main focuses are on the transnational intertwinement of social and environmental
contradictions that are manifested in various conjunctions in global crises, risks, and conflicts,
and on transnational migration, which is an exemplary case of interdependent problems, be
they economic, social, political, cultural, or environmental. The profit-oriented global system
creates social and environmental risks that are unequally distributed. Nevertheless, they pose a
challenge for everybody on the planet. While from a short-term perspective the transnational
ruling groups benefit from the planetary plundering of natural resources, labor precarisation,
exploitation and expulsion, and sharpening social and economic inequalities , their adaptation
to these social conflicts and crises induces the further multiplication and cumulation of
destructive consequences to a point that poses a threat to the current system and even to the
sustainability of human life on the planet (Sassen, 2014). These are the fundamental limits of
the current system.
The domination paradigm stemming from the anthropocentrist attitude

justifies interventions and war – allows certain humans to be valued more than
others when making military choices – Afghanistan proves.
Where moral superiority is heralded as a reason for conflict, anthropocentrists should take
note . As early as 2001, the US govern - ment heralded the invasion of Afghanistan as a victory
even though Hamid Karzai, the US sanctioned leader, had failed to establish effec - tive control
over the country . 9 This led reporters, led by the Independent’s Patrick Cockburn, to argue that
the insurgence had given rise to ‘a mood of extraordinary imperial arrogance’ that more recent
effects and United Nations statistics verify . 10 While there has been condemnation and outrage
over the death of US and UK soldiers in the Western press, there have been limited reports of
civilian deaths or environmental catastrophe, due to the US government spending millions of
dollars buying up ‘civilian satel - lite imagery of the effect of the bombardment, so as to limit its
dissemination’ . 11 As Hill states: ‘the absence of imagery of the destruc - tion produced by the
assault can be seen to have created a blind spot in Western perceptions of Afghanistan, at once
serving to cover up the destruction wrought by the assault, and the scale of the recon - struction
effort needed’ . 12 While it may seem inconsistent to focus on the insurgencies of the west
while ignoring the treacheries of the Taliban, it is predominantly the US / UK governments that
have made the case for the moral high ground . Since many deep ecologists insist that the root
cause of anthropocentrism is the Judaeo-Christian tradition, with its accep - tance that God
commanded the human race to have dominion over all the earth, it is somewhat ironic that both
George W . Bush and Tony Blair, both instrumental in the attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan, have
declared God’s influence in their decisions . 13 If we take the anthropocentrist attitude as
indicative of human dominance, it is clear that the environment and human lives have suffered
equally in Afghanistan un der dominating sources , with the only case made against the invasion
by mainstream Western media being the relatively small casualties—in comparison to the
civilian population—of Western soldiers . Though arguments are posed for remaining in
Afghanistan, the destruction of the landscape, the use of depleted uranium, the destruction of
Afghan villages and village life rarely makes the UK papers. To reject anthropocentrism as
human centredness is thus less important than recognising the tendency to place a set of given
moral attitudes and beliefs at the centre of concern. Although it is difficult to drop the idea that
human life takes precedence, where genocide is prevalent and human beings continue to be
tortured, imprisoned, raped and murdered by more powerful groups, there is a huge difference
between the geo-politics carried out by the war in Afghanistan (with its creepy resemblance to
George Orwell’s ‘War in Eurasia’ as depicted in the novel 1984) justified in the name of
‘liberation’, and the reasons given for destruction of the environment that are, predictably, only
considered when it poses a threat to human life. Anthropocentrism is much more than some
generalised attribute; it must, by necessity, be a strategy that some humans adopt for their
own purposes : an intersubjective egoism which many, but not all, humans possess.Yet again,
however, this view of anthropocentrism does not put human beings at the centre of the
universe but only certain humans : those who, for one reason or another, choose to dominate
others. But is anthropocentrism a competition? If I can reason better than a child with Down’s
Syndrome but the child can love more, which of us wins in the superiority stakes? Without an
ingrained metaphysics which seeks to define the actual essence of human beings, the
alternative to anthropocentrism is doomed to failure, on the grounds that a dismissal of
anthropocentrism often includes elements of human nature that play into the
anthropocentrists’ court. For instance, Gary Steiner regards as deeply prejudicial those
philosophers who maintain that humans (as opposed to the non-human world) are the only
beings who can perfect their nature. 14 A philosophy that hopes to argue against an attitude of
domination by getting rid of traits and values that most of us consider to be quintessentially
human is deeply problematic.
Turn all their impacts--Famines, epidemics, and research shortages exacerbated
by environmental issues disintegrate the control of nature and lead to conflict
with a disproportionately harmful effect on the most vulnerable people.
Ehrlich, 13 (Paul Ehrlic, Professor of Biology and President of the Center for Conservation
Biology at Stanford University, and Adjunct Professor at the University of Technology, Sydney,
Anne Ehrlich, Senior Research Scientist in Biology at Stanford, “Can a collapse of global
civilization be avoided?”, Royal Society, March 7, 2013)
https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2012.2845//ac
But today, for the first time, humanity's global civilization—the worldwide, increasingly
interconnected, highly technological society in which we all are to one degree or another,
embedded—is threatened with collapse by an array of environmental problems. Humankind
finds itself engaged in what Prince Charles described as ‘an act of suicide on a grand scale’ [4],
facing what the UK's Chief Scientific Advisor John Beddington called a ‘perfect storm’ of
environmental problems [5]. The most serious of these problems show signs of rapidly
escalating severity , especially climate disruption. But other elements could potentially also
contribute to a collapse: an accelerating extinction of animal and plant populations and species,
which could lead to a loss of ecosystem services essential for human survival; land degradation
and land-use change; a pole-to-pole spread of toxic compounds; ocean acidification and
eutrophication (dead zones); worsening of some aspects of the epidemiological environment
(factors that make human populations susceptible to infectious diseases) ; depletion of
increasingly scarce resources [6,7], including especially groundwater , which is being
overexploited in many key agricultural areas [8]; and resource wars [9]. These are not separate
problems; rather they interact in two gigantic complex adaptive systems: the biosphere system
and the human socio-economic system. The negative manifestations of these interactions are
often referred to as ‘the human predicament’ [10], and determining how to prevent it from
generating a global collapse is perhaps the foremost challenge confronting humanity. The
human predicament is driven by overpopulation, overconsumption of natural resources and
the use of unnecessarily environmentally damaging technologies and socio-economic-political
arrangements to service Homo sapiens’ aggregate consumption [11–17]. How far the human
population size now is above the planet's long-term carrying capacity is suggested
(conservatively) by ecological footprint analysis [18–20]. It shows that to support today's
population of seven billion sustainably (i.e. with business as usual, including current
technologies and standards of living) would require roughly half an additional planet; to do so, if
all citizens of Earth consumed resources at the US level would take four to five more Earths.
Adding the projected 2.5 billion more people by 2050 would make the human assault on
civilization's life-support systems disproportionately worse, because almost everywhere people
face systems with nonlinear responses [11,21–23], in which environmental damage increases at
a rate that becomes faster with each additional person. Of course, the claim is often made that
humanity will expand Earth's carrying capacity dramatically with technological innovation [24],
but it is widely recognized that technologies can both add and subtract from carrying capacity.
The plough evidently first expanded it and now appears to be reducing it [3]. Overall, careful
analysis of the prospects does not provide much confidence that technology will save us [25] or
that gross domestic product can be disengaged from resource use [26]. What is the likelihood of
this set of interconnected predicaments [27] leading to a global collapse in this century? There
have been many definitions and much discussion of past ‘collapses’ [1,3,28–31], but a future
global collapse does not require a careful definition. It could be triggered by anything from a
‘small’ nuclear war, whose ecological effects could quickly end civilization [32], to a more
gradual breakdown because famines, epidemics and resource shortages cause a disintegration
of central control within nations, in concert with disruptions of trade and conflicts over
increasingly scarce necessities . In either case, regardless of survivors or replacement societies,
the world familiar to anyone reading this study and the well-being of the vast majority of people
would disappear. How likely is such a collapse to occur? No civilization can avoid collapse if it
fails to feed its population. The world's success so far, and the prospective ability to feed future
generations at least as well, has been under relatively intensive discussion for half a century
[33–40]. Agriculture made civilization possible, and over the last 80 years or so, an industrial
agricultural revolution has created a technology-dependent global food system. That system,
humanity's single biggest industry, has generated miracles of food production. But it has also
created serious long-run vulnerabilities , especially in its dependence on stable climates, crop
monocultures, industrially produced fertilizers and pesticides, petroleum, antibiotic feed
supplements and rapid, efficient transportation. Despite those food production miracles, today
at least two billion people are hungry or poorly nourished. The Food and Agriculture
Organization estimates that increasing food production by some 70 per cent would be required
to feed a 35 per cent bigger and still growing human population adequately by 2050 [41]. What
are the prospects that H. sapiens can produce and distribute sufficient food? To do so, it
probably will be necessary to accomplish many or all of the following tasks: severely limit
climate disruption; restrict expansion of land area for agriculture (to preserve ecosystem
services); raise yields where possible; put much more effort into soil conservation [3]; increase
efficiency in the use of fertilizers, water and energy; become more vegetarian; grow more food
for people (not fuel for vehicles); reduce food wastage; stop degradation of the oceans and
better regulate aquaculture; significantly increase investment in sustainable agricultural and
aquacultural research; and move increasing equity and feeding everyone to the very top of the
policy agenda. Most of these long-recommended tasks require changes in human behaviour
thus far elusive. The problem of food wastage and the need for more and better agricultural
research have been discussed for decades. So have ‘technology will save us’ schemes such as
building ‘nuclear agro-industrial complexes’ [42], where energy would be so cheap that it could
support a new kind of desert agriculture in ‘food factories’, where crops would be grown on
desalinated water and precisely machine fertilized. Unhappily, sufficiently cheap energy has
never been produced by nuclear power to enable large-scale agriculture to move in that
direction. Nor has agriculture moved towards feeding people protein extracted from leaves or
bacteria grown on petroleum [43, pp. 95–112]. None of these schemes has even resulted in a
coordinated development effort. Meanwhile, growing numbers of newly well-off people have
increased demand for meat [44], thereby raising global demand for feedgrains . Perhaps even
more critical, climate disruption may pose insurmountable biophysical barriers to increasing
crop yields . Indeed, if humanity is very unlucky with the climate, there may be reductions in
yields of major crops [45], although near-term this may be unlikely to affect harvests globally
[46]. Nonetheless, rising temperatures already seem to be slowing previous trends of increasing
yields of basic grains [45,47], and unless greenhouse gas emissions are dramatically reduced,
dangerous anthropogenic climate change [48] could ravage agriculture. Also, in addition to
falling yields from many oceanic fish stocks because of widespread overfishing [49], warming
and acidification of the oceans threaten the protein supply of some of the most nutritionally
vulnerable people [50], especially those who cannot afford to purchase farmed fish.
The impact is global collapse from nuclear war. Competition over resources,
especially agricultural water, and the need for access to food supplies trigger a
regional-scale nuclear war that leads to global collapse from the widespread
climate consequences.
Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 13 (Paul Ehrlic, Professor of Biology and President of the Center for
Conservation Biology at Stanford University, and Adjunct Professor at the University of
Technology, Sydney, Anne Ehrlich, Senior Research Scientist in Biology at Stanford, “Can a
collapse of global civilization be avoided?”, Royal Society, March 7, 2013)
https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2012.2845//ac
Another possible threat to the continuation of civilization is global toxification . Adverse
symptoms of exposure to synthetic chemicals are making some scientists increasingly nervous
about effects on the human population [77–79]. Should a global threat materialize, however, no
planned mitigating responses (analogous to the ecologically and politically risky
‘geoengineering’ projects often proposed to ameliorate climate disruption [80]) are waiting in
the wings ready for deployment. Much the same can be said about aspects of the
epidemiological environment and the prospect of epidemics being enhanced by rapid
population growth in immune-weakened societies, increased contact with animal reservoirs,
high-speed transport and the misuse of antibiotics [81]. Nobel laureate Joshua Lederberg had
great concern for the epidemic problem, famously stating, ‘The survival of the human species is
not a preordained evolutionary program’ [82, p. 40]. Some precautionary steps that should be
considered include forbidding the use of antibiotics as growth stimulators for livestock, building
emergency stocks of key vaccines and drugs (such as Tamiflu), improving disease surveillance,
expanding mothballed emergency medical facilities, preparing institutions for imposing
quarantines and, of course, moving as rapidly as possible to humanely reduce the human
population size. It has become increasingly clear that security has many dimensions beyond
military security [83,84] and that breaches of environmental security could risk the end of
global civilization . But much uncertainty about the human ability to avoid a collapse still hinges
on military security, especially whether some elements of the human predicament might trigger
a nuclear war. Recent research indicates that even a regional-scale nuclear conflict , as is quite
possible between India and Pakistan, could lead to a global collapse through widespread climatic
consequences [32]. Triggers to conflict beyond political and religious strife easily could include
cross-border epidemics, a need to gain access to food supplies and farmland, and competition
over other resources, especially agricultural water and (if the world does not come to its
energy senses) oil. Finding ways to eliminate nuclear weapons and other instruments of mass
destruction must move even higher on civilization's agenda [85], because nuclear war would be
the quickest and surest route to a collapse [86]. In thinking about the probability of collapse,
one must obviously consider the social disruptions associated with elements of the
predicament. Perhaps at the top of the list should be that of environmental refugees [87].
Recent predictions are that environmental refugees could number 50 million by 2020 [88].
Severe droughts, floods, famines and epidemics could greatly swell that number. If current
‘official’ predictions of sea-level rise are low (as many believe they are), coastal inundations
alone could generate massive human movements; a 1 m rise would directly affect some 100
million people, whereas a 6 m rise would displace more than 400 million [89]. Developing a
more comprehensive system of international governance with institutions planning to
ameliorate the impacts of such catastrophes would be a major way to reduce the odds of
collapse.
Alternative
Interbeing
The Gaia hypothesis and Deep Ecology are the same. Recognizing interbeing.
Humans as one part of a whole is the only way to resolve the environmental
crisis
Henning, 02 (Daniel H Henning, PhD, Professor Emeritus of Environmental Affairs, “A Manual for Buddhism and Deep
Ecology,” 2002) http://tinhtonghochoi.vn/uploads/kinh-sach/deep-ecology.pdf //cb **Comments and Questions sidebar omitted**
IDEAS: The basic idea of Deep Ecology is that we are part of the earth and not apart or separate
from it. This idea is in contrast with the dominant individualistic thought of our culture in which we see
ourselves as separate from the world, which makes it too easy not to be bothered by what is happening beyond our immediate self-
interests: “If I am separate from the rest of nature, what happens out there is not my problem”.
In this century, two key ideas have emerged in our scientific thought which support the view of ourselves as part of the earth:
Systems Theory and the Gaia Concept.
In Systems Theory, we see our world in terms of systems where each system is a whole that is more than the sum of its parts, but
also itself a part of the larger systems. For example, a cell is more than just a pile of molecules and itself is a part of larger systems,
e.g., an organ. An organ is on one level a whole in itself, but on another, it is part of a system at the level of an individual person. A
family and community can both be seen as systems where the parts are people. Systems Theory can also be correlated with energy
flows between the various parts of the system in terms of inter-and intra-relationships.
The Gaia hypothesis takes Systems Theory still farther and applies it to the whole planet. All of life on earth can be
seen as a whole that is more than the sum of its parts but is also itself a part of larger systems
with this whole being like a huge super-life form which we call Gaia (after the name for the ancient Greek
Goddess of the earth) with a collective intelligence . Living systems have a tendency to keep themselves
in balance but also adapt and evolve over time. Scientists have found that the earth also has these
tendencies with feedback mechanisms to keep in balance the temperatures and oxygen levels of
the atmosphere just as our bodies maintain the temperature and oxygen levels in our arteries .
Thus the Gaia hypothesis states that the earth is alive and that we are part of it . This is something that many cultures
have known for centuries. For example, Indian Chief Seattle of North America (1854) has stated, “We are part of the earth and it is
part of us”.
FEELINGS: In trying to face the scale of social and ecological crises in our world today, we can be left feeling numbed, overwhelmed,
and powerless. Yet there is often little place for such feelings in conventional politics or in our society. The dominant response is to
deny or distract ourselves from any uncomfortable feelings about the state of the world and to carry on with business as usual.
If we see ourselves as part of the world, it becomes impossible to see that such uncomfortable
feelings may serve a valuable function. Just as it hurts when we put our finger over a flame, pain for the world alerts
us to the injuries of the world and can move us to respond with compassion and action. By allowing ourselves to feel for
our world, we are also opened to a source of energy and aliveness and to a strength that comes
from connection to something more than just our narrow selves .
SPIRITUALITY: Spirituality has to do with our inner sense of connection and/or interrelationship with something larger than
ourselves and with our relationship with what we see as sacred. This can
give our lives a sense of meaning and
purpose beyond material success, and those special moments when we feel that connection more deeply can provide
an important source of strength and perspective during difficult times.
If we see ourselves as a part of the tree of life and the interconnected web of living beings we
call Gaia, then a Deep Ecological approach to spirituality might emphasize our relationship with
this larger whole. We may look at life itself as being sacred and see possibilities for the larger force of life acting through us for
earth recovery. Thus this life-saving spirituality can be an important source of inspiration to face and
respond to environmental/societal problems of our world.
ACTION: When we integrate our beliefs, values, and ideas into our behavior, we bring them alive and give them power to influence
our world. If, however, we
see ourselves as separate from the world, it is easy to dismiss our actions
as irrelevant or unlikely to make any difference . But from a Deep Ecology perspective, we are a
part of the world and every choice we make will have ripples which extend beyond us. What may seem tiny and
insignificant by itself actually adds up to a larger context. Thus every time we act for life and the earth, we put our weight and
strength behind the shift toward a life- sustaining environment and culture.
Much of Deep Ecology, in turn, asks deep questions of society and its relationships to life. Thus, in the words of professor Arne
Naess: “...in Deep Ecology we ask whether the present society fulfills basic human needs like
love and security and access to nature . We ask which society, which education is beneficial for all life on the planet as
a whole, and then ask further what we need to do in order to make the necessary changes.”
Interbeing is the best way to recognize the true damage of ecological harms by
promoting formation of an ecological consciousness
interbeing (paticca samuppada—dependent origination): Buddhadasa notes, “Dependent

(j) Interrelatedness/
origination is in the middle between the ideas of having a self and the total lack of self. It has its own
principle: Because there is this, there is that; because this is not, that is not.” (Buddhadasa, l992). It is recognized that each of the
factors of dependent origination is conditioned as well as conditioning. Consequently, they
are all relative,
interdependent and interconnected, and nothing is absolute or independent . Thus, no first cause
is accepted by Buddhism (Rahula, l990)
With interrelatedness, “the emphasis is on harmony between individuals, communities, and

nature . It involves an inner spiritual work of cultivating ecological consciousness , a process of
becoming aware of the being of rocks, trees, and rivers . . . learning how to listen with an
appreciation that everything is connected.” (Badiner, l990)
It also means recognizing that ecological elements are codependent. If damage occurs to one of
these ecological elements, then it affects the entire ecological system , i.e., one cannot do one thing
without its consequences to other things in nature . Internally, the concocting and attaching process of dependent
origination through the ego also brings about craving, aversion, and delusion in people which, in turn, affect outside relationships
and other living beings and the environment. Hence, awareness and wisdom are needed to prevent this process at the
very beginning..
Ecological wisdom stems from a spiritual awareness of our place in the cosmos
based on Buddhist teachings
Deep Ecology is also known as “ ecosophy ” which means ecologically wise actions and ecological
wisdom. Thus it refers to both a practice and a state of being. This term, along with Deep Ecology, was also
introduced by Arne Naess, the Norwegian philosopher, who used the expression, “deep and shallow ecology.” Ecosophy comes from
the Greek words, ecos, meaning “household place,” and sophia, which means “wisdom.” Thus, ecosophy
is ecological
wisdom which is manifested in actions which are ecologically harmonious . In contrast, the
assumption of shallow ecology is that we can go on with our business as usual with major
changes if we clean up our act by doing things more carefully . We can continue to increase our numbers and
technological power without questioning our world view, values, and aims. There is no need for fundamental change or redefinition
of progress or in our attempts at the unlimited control of nature. Professors Drengston and Inoue observe, So-called corporate
(shallow) environmentalism still dominates the mainstream. It advocates continuous economic
growth and environmental protection by means of technological innovation (such as catalytic
converters), “scientific resources management” (such as sustained yield forestry) and mild changes in life styles (such as
recycling). It avoids serious fundamental questions about our values and worldviews ; it does not examine
our sociocultural institutions and our personal lifestyles. This mainstream technological approach has to be clearly distinguished
from the Deep Ecology approach, which in contrast aims to achieve a fundamental ecological transformation of our sociocultural
systems, collective actions, and lifestyle. (Drengston and Inoue, 1995) Consequently ,
the Deep Ecology or Ecosophy
approach recognizes that we cannot continue with business as usual , but must face a deep
crisis in the kind of culture and character which threatens the earth , and ask ourselves how we might live
so as not to destroy the earth and all its living beings. Thus, Deep Ecology is a global movement toward a
diversity of ways for achieving ecosophic relationships with the earth . It is a radical (get at the roots)
philosophy of life wherein each kind of natural being has intrinsic worth . Ecosophy or ecological wisdom
involves deepening our ecological sensibilities and practices for ecological harmony. This involves an
awareness of one’s relationships with the processes of life that flow around, through. and
between all beings. (Drengston, n.d.) In this sense, Deep Ecology does not separate humans from the
natural environment, in contrast to “shallow” ecology which is anthropocentric . The latter considers
humans as above or outside nature, and that they are the source of value with their instrumental or utilitarian uses of natural
resources. Deep Ecology sees the world as a network of phenomena that are fundamentally
interconnected and interdependent . It views human beings as just one particular strand in the web of life. (Capra,
1995) This deep ecological awareness recognizes that nature and the self are at a “oneness” with
values inherent in all living beings, including trees and other plants, and is therefore basically a spiritual
awareness . The human spirit is concerned with finding one’s place or consciousness within the
universe so that the individual may feel connected and at one with the cosmos rather than separate and isolated. Thus ecological
awareness can be considered spiritual; Deep Ecology and Deep Spirituality are essentially one and the same. Not surprisingly, t his
sense of oneness with nature is consistent with the expression of religious feeling all over the
world, from Christian mysticism to Native American, African, and Asian spiritual traditions to the feminine spirituality of the
women’s movement. (Capra, 1995) There is beginning to be a greater recognition paid to how societies relate to the environment
and the world in general through their religious beliefs and practices. As a result, more
people are looking at the potential
for finding spiritually-based
solutions to problems which arise from ignorance, superstition and
greed. These solutions must include a paradigm shift in values and ways of thinking and
behaving—from anthropocentric (“human-centered”) to ecocentric (“total-life centered”). And perhaps the
route to this new consciousness is through a recognition of the wisdom and understanding of
nature that has been with us in lesser and greater degrees since primordial times , the buried
sense of oneness with the cosmos and all the life it contains. The “oneness” of deep spirituality and Deep
Ecology is particularly reflected in Buddhism . As the spiritual dimension of the environmental movement, the
worldview of Deep Ecology is highly compatible with Buddhist teachings and practices. The restating
and interaction of Deep Ecology with Buddhist principles and ethics greatly contributes to one’s understanding, imagination, and
reinvigoration for activism and education. Deep Ecology reflects an awareness and concern about the
intrinsic value of all living beings and the integrity of their natural home , along with a sense of the limits
of the human role in the scheme of things. This awareness, in turn, permeates Buddhism with its teachings of
impermanence, causality, non-self or emptiness, equanimity, loving kindness and compassion ,
which , in turn, reflect the doctrine of “oneness” of all living beings in Deep Ecology and deep spirituality. (Amidon and Roberts,
1996).
Self-realization acknowledges nature’s instinsic value

Tiili, 15 (Kristi, MA of Philosophy, MA of Polar Law, “Naessian deep ecology, political action and
the climate crisis,” University of Oslo, 2015)
https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/46071/1/Tiili-Master-thesis.pdf
Naess explains the first point thus: ― Instead of ‗biosphere‘ we might use the term ‗ecosphere‘ in order
to stress that we of course do not limit our concern for the life forms in a biologically narrow
sense . The term ‗life‘ is used here in a comprehensive non-technical way to refer also to things biologists may classify as non-
living: rivers (watersheds), landscapes, cultures, ecosystems, ‗the living earth‘.‖62 Though there is no further discussion of the term
‗intrinsic value‘ in the explanation to point one, this clarification of intrinsic value is given in the introduction to Ecology, Community
and Lifestyle: ―We can identify with these parts in nature precisely because they are of an equal status to us; they possess a certain
independence from us and our valuing‖.63 David Rothenberg further explains that the Norwegian word ‗egenverdi‘ is what Naess
has in mind when he speaks of intrinsic value.64 Egenverdi can roughly be translated as ‗value in and for itself‘, and what this means
for Naess is that nature has value independent of our valuation of it – not that we cannot value nature. For
readers to fully grasp his idea of nature, Naess makes the comparison between friendship and nature. Neither friends nor nature
should be used only as a means because they do have value in themselves. If we treat friends or nature as mere means we are being
superficial and such actions repeated over time will likely cause us to lose both.65
The second point of the platform naturally builds on the first, as it expands on why life as such has intrinsic value. In the elaboration
to point two, Naess states that: So-called simple, lower, or primitive species of plants and animals
contribute essentially to the richness and diversity of life . They have value in themselves and are not merely
steps towards the so-called higher or rational life forms. The second principle presupposes that life itself, as a process over
evolutionary time, implies an increase of diversity and richness … The main point is that life on Earth may be excessively interfered
with even if complete diversity is upheld.66 The last sentence means that even if we kill numerous individuals of a certain species,
and the diversity is upheld because the species is not in danger of extinction, this is not acceptable because each single life
has intrinsic value, and ‖richness has to do with the maintenance of habitats and the number
of individuals (size of populations).‖67
Throughout Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, arguments are offered that ties up the explanation for points one and two. For
example this simple maxim is presented: ―all things hang together.‖68 All parts of nature have equal right to life and their own
intrinsic value. In the same way it is generally accepted that one person has no right to harm another person or to make the other‘s
life miserable, Naess extends that general acceptance not to harm or interfere with all living and non-living parts of nature. As each
human has possibilities and rights to self-realisation, so does nature as a whole and all living creatures and non-living entities within
it.69 This possibility arises from the intrinsic value in all things and as everything is connected, one entities‘ self-realisation impacts
another‘s. According to Naess, self-realisation is pivotal for deep ecology because that is what will aid
us in reaching a level of consciousness that will make us act towards nature as if it was part of
our own body. An important part of Naess‘ self-realisation theory, is the right for every being to utilise their potential for self-
realisation, and ―everyone and everything … should develop and live without interference, as all life has value and a potential in
and for itself, and not just for others‖.70 Because all creatures are seen as equal (in a biotic sense), all have equal rights to self-
realisation, i.e. ―a right to be and to develop to their full potential‖ – and this includes the earth itself.71
The idea that one beings‘ self-realisation impacts another‘s is quite radical, and Naess does not clarify why or how he thinks that all
of nature goes through a process of self-realisation, or how our self-realisation impacts the self-realisation of animals and other
living and nonliving entities. He merely implies that the self-realisation we as individuals go through enables self-realisation in other
beings and the Earth as well.72 No kind of attempt to have this claim verified is made, or even a simple explanation as to why he
makes this connection between human self-realisation and animals‘ or nature‘s. He merely says, as we saw in chapter one, that all
beings have a right to develop to their full potential. However, does their full potential necessarily a process of self-realisation?
There are many assumptions in Naess‘ deep ecology and this is one of them. As with the other postulates, I also have a problem with
this one. I assume it takes a being with self-awareness to partake in a process of selfrealisation. For the sake of argument, let us
embrace the idea that human beings and some other types of mammals like dolphins and chimpanzees have such awareness.
Therefore, we can accept that humans and some types of mammals are self-aware enough to engage in selfrealisation. But can we
say the same for insects, stones and plants for instance? I cannot know what type of awareness such entities have, or even if they
have one at all. But because they appear not to be conscious of themselves along the line of human beings, it is hard for me to
accept that my self-realisation, if I engage in it, will affect the same process in such entities. The process of self-
realisation , as Naess speaks of it in regards to humans , is supposed to awaken our ecological selves. Through
that process we become aware of the togetherness between us and nature. Necessarily, self-realisation must mean a
transformation from some form of ignorance to a new awareness that awakens us to a
different level of consciousness . Thus, also, awareness of one‘s own process, and one‘s relationship with oneself and
nature, appears unquestionable in order for self-realisation to happen. A right to develop to its full potential for a plant seems to be
a different matter.
Self-realization is key to recognizing all value in life.

Smith and Gough 15 – Annette Gough is a Professor Emerita in the School of Education. She
has held senior appointments at RMIT and Deakin University and has been a visiting professor at
universities in Canada, South Africa and Hong Kong. Her research interests span environmental,
sustainability and science education, disaster education, research methodologies, posthuman and
gender studies and she has completed research projects for national and state governments and
worked with UNESCO, UNEP and UNESCO-UNEVOC. William Smith is also a RMIT Staff Writer (“Deep
Ecology as a framework for student eco-philosophical thinking”, Journal of Philosophy in Schools 2,
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Annette-
Gough/publication/329139474_Deep_Ecology_as_a_framework_for_student_eco-
philosophical_thinking/links/5bf770f892851ced67d0e727/Deep-Ecology-as-a-framework-for-
student-eco-philosophical-thinking.pdf) B-Bahena
The deep ecology movement developed in the early 1970s in response to concerns about the lack of connectedness,
reciprocity and simplicity in the shallow environmental worldview dominant in Western society. The founder of deep ecology,
Arne Naess (1973), outlined its main principles of connectedness to nature, biospherical egalitarianism, wilderness
preservation, population management, biodiversity, and reduction of resource use (1973). In the same article Naess argued
that shallow ecology was a narrow (anthropocentric) science that mainly addressed pollution or other environmental
problems that threatened the affluent in society, whereas lifestyles that protected the earth were deep ecology (ecocentrism).
Another more metaphysical process in deep ecology, described by Naess as ‘self-
realization’, is the deeper questioning of the relationship between the Self (the
ecological self) and nature (Fox 1990b). Sometimes this is referred to as an unfolding of the Self
outwards into the environment (Fox 1990a), and it means moving towards a oneness or
meaningful life by recognising the intrinsic value of all biological systems (Mathews 1991).
Naess did not see this as a moral position but rather saw the connectedness as deriving from a love and
respect of all life and of all nature (Fox 1990b), including the inanimate part of ecosystems such
as mountains and rivers. For Naess, selfrealisation was moving from the narrow ego to ‘as
expansive a sense of self as possible’ (Fox 1990b, p. 106). Naess was also influenced by Rachel Carson’s Silent
spring (1962) to have a deep humility towards the earth, and cites her as saying that humanity
was a ‘drop of the stream of life’ (Naess & Rothenberg 1989, p. 165).
Biocentrism
Vote negative for biocentrism – recognition of the intrinsic worth of all entities
in the ecosphere is needed to combat the justifications behind the exploitation
and destruction of nature.
Fairbanks, 10 (Sandra Jane, BA degree in philosophy from Wheaton College, M.Phil. from the
University of Edinburgh, JD from the University of Maine School of Law. PhD from the University
of Minnesota, “Environmental Goodness and the Challenge of American Culture”, Indiana
University Press, 2010) https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Environmental-Goodness-and-
the-Challenge-of-Culture-Fairbanks/62fccee87a4c9f75aad43daf736e68dd9b5f3076//ac
It should also be noted that the environmental virtues to be discussed are not intended to
provide a complete conception of environmental virtue.5 In fact the standard theories
undoubtedly include virtues not covered here; my strategy is simply to describe some virtues
that seem central to any adequate environmental philosophy, and show that American culture
threatens them. The first and perhaps most obvious virtue is respect for nature . Paul Taylor
describes respect for nature as a rational attitude similar to Kant’s respect for persons; it is not
based on love or affection, but rather on the recognition of the intrinsic worth of non-human
life , ecological wholes such as species and ecosystems, and even non-living natural objects such
as rivers or mountains (Taylor 2008). From this perspective, nature must not be viewed
instrumentally , as something to be used solely to satisfy human needs and interests.
Biocentrists such as Taylor and James Sterba argue that any thing in nature has a “good of its
own” if it can be harmed or benefited, and that if a thing has a good of its own then it is wrong
to harm it unless there is good reason to do so (Sterba 2008). Such an attitude grants moral
standing to anything in nature that has a good of its own (DesJardins 2006). Proponents of the
Land Ethic and Deep Ecology go further, recognizing the intrinsic worth not only of all living
things, but of the entire biotic community. According to Bill Devall and George Sessions, one of
Deep Ecology’s basic intuitions is that “ all organisms and entities in the ecosphere , as parts of
the interrelated whole, are equal in intrinsic worth ” (Devall and Sessions 1985, 67). The Land
Ethic expresses this same intuition of biotic equality when Aldo Leopold advocates that humans
change their role from “conqueror of the land community to plain member and citizen of it”
(Leopold 1949, 24). Therefore, the virtue of respect requires us to recognize the intrinsic good of
nonhuman living things, natural objects, and the biotic community. Respect for nature requires
the use of relevant principles in moral deliberation, for each of which there may well be a
corresponding virtue. Paul Taylor, for example, states four general principles required by an
attitude of respect for nature (Taylor 1986). The principle of nonmaleficence creates a negative
duty to refrain from harming nature except in cases where it is necessary for self-defense or to
meet some basic need; the principle of noninterference creates a negative duty not to obstruct
the freedom of organisms or ecosystems; the principle of fidelity applies to animals, and
prohibits deceiving or betraying animals through such activities as hunting, fishing, and trapping;
and the principle of restitution requires that persons who harm nature make amends for the
damage they cause. (For example, if wetlands must be destroyed for some human project then
wetlands must be promoted in another location.) Thus, the environmentally good person will
possess the virtues of nonmaleficence, noninterference, fidelity and restitutive justice.6
Environmental goodness further requires a virtue of humility with regard to our place in nature.
This virtue involves accepting the intrinsic value of nature and seeing oneself as an equal
member of an interrelated biotic community. According to Thomas Hill Jr., humility is a proper
appreciation of one’s place in the natural order, which requires knowledge of the environment,
absence of a sense of self-importance and acceptance of oneself as a natural being (Hill 2005).
Ignorance, which can lead to the destruction of nature , may contribute to a lack of humility.
Hill argues that [Ignorant persons] seem not to understand that we are a speck on the cosmic
scene, a brief stage in the evolutionary process, only one among millions of species on Earth,
and an episode in the course of human history. Of course, they know that there are stars, fossils,
insects, and ancient ruins; but do they have any idea of the complexity of the processes that led
to the natural world as we find it? Are they aware how much the forces at work within their own
bodies are like those that govern all living things and even how much they have in common with
inanimate bodies? (Hill 2005, 51) Of course, knowledge of ecology and experience of nature do
not guarantee an attitude of humility, but it does engender awareness that we are parts of a
larger whole that has value independent of its utility for us. Absence of this awareness is linked
to a person’s sense of self-importance, which is “a tendency to measure the significance of
everything by its relation to oneself and those with whom one identifies” (Hill 2005, 54). Hill
argues that to overcome self-importance one must learn to value things for their own sake. For
example, he argues that an experience of “the Alps, a storm at sea, the Grand Canyon, towering
redwoods, and the ‘starry heavens above’ move many to remark on the comparative
insignificance of our daily concerns and even of our own species” (Hill 2005, 53). If we could
cultivate this deflation of our importance in relation to nature, much less destruction would
occur . Finally, Hill argues, a lack of humility may result not so much from self-importance as
from an inability to accept oneself as a part of nature who will live, grow, decline and die just
like all other living beings. We try to escape the natural world by creating an artificial
environment that will distract us from the reality of death (Hill 2005). According to Hill, the
pretense that we are not part of nature might well express a lack of self-acceptance—though in
some cases it may not7 —which can lead to the exploitation of nature. Therefore,
environmental goodness requires relevant environmental knowledge, the defeat of self-
importance and the cultivation of self-acceptance in order to achieve humility.
Recognize biocentrism for a complete rejection of Western modernity and

domination – instead of isolated and selfish pursuit of pleasure, the alternative
recognizes the intrinsic worth of all organisms and entities in the ecosphere.
Weinberger, 18 (Jerry, Professor Emeritus of Political Science and University Distinguished
Professor at Michigan State, Chair of the Department of Political Science, B.A. from The
University of California at Berkeley, Ph.D. from Harvard University, twice been a Senior Research
Fellow of the National Endowment for the Humanities, Director of the LeFrak Forum and Co-
Director of the Symposium on Science, Reason, and Modern Democracy, “Green Madness: The
doctrine of deep ecology declares that we must keep our hands off the divine order of nature—
even if it kills us”, City Journal, Autumn 2018) https://www.city-journal.org/climate-change-
madness//ac
Deep ecology is really radical: its two fundamental principles—“self-realization” and “biocentric
equality”—amount to a complete rejection of Western modernity . According to deep
ecologists Bill Devall and George Sessions, authors of the 1985 book Deep Ecology, self-
realization is “in keeping with the spiritual traditions of many of the world’s religions,” but the
self of which they speak is quite different from the modern Western version—one based in a
notion of individual liberty and self-fulfillment. The ecological self encompasses humanity as a
whole and, even more, includes the entire nonhuman world. No one is saved, they say, until all
are saved; and the “one” includes me, all human beings, whales, grizzly bears, mountains and
rivers, and “the tiniest microbes in the soil.” That’s a big self. The principle of biocentric equality
tells us, in turn, that this “larger self-realization” views all the organisms and entities in the
ecosphere as “ parts of an interrelated whole and equal in intrinsic worth ,” with “each
possessing an equal right to live and blossom and to reach their own individual forms of
unfolding and self-realization.” Predation is a biological fact of life, Devall and Sessions
acknowledge, but that doesn’t change the fact that humans are just “plain citizens” of the
hierarchy-free biotic community. We’d better watch where we walk, in other words, lest we,
say, crush some ants; and yes, we should think even of the interests of the smallpox virus. It
would be easy to dismiss ecology this “deep” as harmless, West Coast tree-hugging. But deep-
ecology fellow traveler John Holdren served as director of the White House Office of Science and
Technology in the Obama administration—a post from which he issued, in a 2010 interview with
CNS News, a call to use the “free market economy” in a “massive campaign” to “de-develop the
United States.” Holdren was referring to work done a generation earlier, in 1977, with Paul and
Anne Ehrlich, Ecoscience: Population, Resources, Environment, a massive tome touting the
deep-ecological tenet that vastly too many human beings exist, generating such relentless
pressure on Earth’s “carrying capacity” that catastrophic shortages of food and energy were
inevitable. So great was the impending disaster, warned the authors, that preventing it would
require worldwide population control, de-development of wealthy countries, and some kind of
planetary governing institution. Three years later, Holdren advised Paul Ehrlich in his famous bet
with Julian L. Simon about the future price of a basket of raw materials—Ehrlich predicting that
it would be wildly more expensive, Simon that it would be far cheaper. Simon won the bet, of
course, and Ehrlich and Holdren were proved spectacularly wrong about environmental doom.
Yet both Ehrlich and Holdren moved on to climate change with no less certainty and moralizing
zeal. However radical and obscure it might be, what happens in the seminar room can wind up
in corporate boardrooms, and in the White House, too. To go back into the intellectual origins of
deep ecology, start with the deep-ecology “self”—or rather, with what it’s not: “the ‘modern
Western self,’ which is an isolated and selfish ego pursuing pleasure or some kind of individual
salvation in this life or the next,” in the words of Devall and Sessions. If we add to this, as the
deep ecologists surely do, that the business of that Western self is to dominate nature , we
have Western man defined in the way the intellectual founders of the modern age, for the most
part, understood him.
Embrace Deep Ecology
Critical discussions about deep ecology breed change—our model of
decision-making encourages real, accessible deliberation.
The enviroclub students reported that they contemplate the nature of their own
existence, have an acute awareness of their sense of being within the social milieu of the school, and can transcend
personal boundaries to other ecosystems and other creatures. They have a feeling of
interconnectedness that aligns well with deep ecology philosophy. Both Wolf and the enviroclub students identified strongly
with the club projects and were proud of the many environmental awards won by members of the school community
(including Wolf, the principal, and the school at state, national and international levels). This could be construed as elitism but
the responses are more aligned to an ecological wisdom as described earlier. It clearly
gave students a wider
identification with creatures all around the earth and a more highly developed sense of self,
consistent with an ecological self. The teachers and students also hold the view that
traditional landowners had a more spiritual and connected existence to land compared with
colonising peoples, and that their collective knowledge is a valuable epistemological
resource that all humans can draw upon if we are to lead an ecocentric existence.
Critical discussions in schools prove self-realization.

Our data show that respondents believe that Australian aboriginal peoples are closely
connected to the land, and that this relationship to country led to more sustainable land
management practices compared to European settlement. The study reveals that secondary
students in an environment club have an understanding of the various, complex factors at
play in our world that are affecting both the natural environment and their own
biographical trajectories. They are aware of the social norms for their age group and how
these norms influence lifestyle and consumer behavior that might negatively impact on the
limited resources of the earth. They have a distinct awareness of their unique position
within the school community, a state of mind that is generally altruistic and ego free. This was
not a result that we pre-empted in our interview questions nor selfreported by the students. The observation was derived
Environmental disasters on the opposite side
from the field notes taken in addition to the audio transcripts.
of the planet adversely affected the students and this was driven by a concern for wild
animals. The students were able to reflect upon their place within their own families, as
well as within the school community, and they used this to create their ecological selves
as well as robust eco-philosophical views. We postulate that this ontological analysis of
the data is a central feature of student lives and that this is important to the concept of
student as eco-philosopher. In this paper we developed a theoretical model for the student
as eco-philosopher, based on the findings from our research with students and teachers in a
Victorian state secondary school. Our research indicates that students in secondary schools
can embrace philosophy at abstract levels, and that this proposition is supported by
responses from students in our cohort school. We also show that, whilst Naess’s
selfrealisation is a metaphysical experience that not all scholars would agree can easily be
defined, the notion of self and the abstract sense of being are concepts that young people
can and do embrace. We conclude from our work that these students reflect upon their
existence within the ecological world and generate an environmental philosophy that is
robust, personal and well developed. In the process of developing an ecological self, the
students demonstrate attributes towards becoming the student as eco-philosopher. Schools
should be encouraged to establish environment clubs and provide opportunities for
students to engage in self-realisation that enables them to develop their ecological
selves.
Only through acts of self-realization can we begin to make the epistemological

shift from egoism to altruism
Barman 17 – (Dr. Mayuri Barman, Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy @
Pandu College. “Deep Ecology Movement for Better Environmentalism with Special Reference to
the Role of Self-realization Concept”, Journal of Energy Research and Environmental Technology,
2017, e-ISSN: 2394-157X; Volume 4, Issue 2, sj)
The current world view in today’s society is an anthropocentric perspective . This perspective
shows that humans are here to protect and control the environment to meet their own needs
and uses. Thus ecological crisis can be seen which requires a deep sense in our form of life. Deep ecology movement aims
to participate in overcoming the ecological crisis by developing a process to show the meaning
of truth in our lives. The deep ecology practice is that of an eco-centric point of view . Being
connected to one’s environment and habitat are key factors to the deep ecology perspective and having
this connection, we as humans are able to understand the complex dynamics between our
relationships with our environment. Thus, by implementing this practice of the Deep Ecology
Platform and exploring our ecological self, it is an aspect of what Arne Naess calls ‘all around maturity, of self-Realization’. The
joy and meaning of life is enhanced through increased self-realization , through the fulfillment
of each being’s potential. Naess saw the process of selfrealization as the realization that the human self is
part of the wider ecological community and this can be realized by replacing anthropocentric
forms of thinking to eco-centric forms of thinking. In order to realize our ecological self, it is
necessary to realize the self of other beings. Then only we can shift from egoism to altruism .
Once we ‘see ourselves in other’ in this broad way our natural inclination is to protect the Earth: “….. care flows naturally if the self is
widened and depend so that protecting of free nature is felt and conceived of as protection of our very selves.” Thus, Immanual kant
gave a pair of concepts live harmoniously in, for and of nature, the concept of moral act and beautiful act. Moral acts are
always motivated by moral laws and then it becomes our moral duty to perform it whether we like it or not. Sometimes
it goes against our inclination but we are bound to do it by our respect for moral law. If we do something only because
of moral law then the outcome our satisfaction decreases. And if we do what is right with our inclination and
happiness then it turns into a beautiful act. So it is clear that as Arne Naess says that people should take the
environmental affairs as a beautiful act rather than the moral acts . Until and unless, their efforts for nature
will be out of their inclination they will never give justice to their self and nature too. Then only by realization of our
true self we can derive the norm “ Self- realization “ for every being where we can increasing see
ourselves in others and others in ourselves.
Vote negative to embrace Deep Ecology and radically change our destructive
interaction with the environment – absent an intervention, human
development fuels species extinction, pollution, ecosystem degradation,
overfishing, and water degradation.
In 2015 there are many conflicts over resources in the form of oil, and it seems likely that it will
not be long before conflict will revolve around land and water, because humanity is very
destructive in its interaction . Foster (2008:4) says that the so-called human-made fingerprint of
global warming has been detected on ten different aspects of the earth’s environment: its
surface temperatures, humidity, oceanic water vapour and heat content, barometric pressure,
total precipitation, wildfires, change in species of plants and animals, water run-off, as well as
upper atmospheric temperatures. Foster goes on to argue that this will bring about a regression
of civilization and life itself beyond comprehension – an economy and ecology of destruction –
that can only be curbed by radically changing our course of action . Issues such as species
extinction, industrial pollution, forest loss, ecosystem degradation, overfishing and degraded
freshwater supplies are all a part of the drama that is in process behind the scenes of our
normal day-to-day lives. This shows that our human development is ruinous . Throughout my
discussion I frequently suggest that humankind should embrace Deep Ecology as a viable
philosophy that can holistically address and solve the issues mentioned above. As pointed out
earlier, people’s ideologies can be altered, and I will later spend some time on looking how this
may be facilitated. But what affect do different ideologies have on the environment? For
example, we may know that Mr X and Mrs Y are respectively anthropocentrically and
ecocentrically inclined in their thinking, but apart from knowing their inclinations, what do we
know of the consequences of their thinking? How do their respective modes of thinking
manifest itself in the tangible world?
The alternative forwards a reshaping of human conscience to fundamentally
alter the way we experience the world and view the self – developing stronger
connections through embracing deep ecology combats the need to control and
dominate nature for our own gain.
What does this have to do with Deep Ecology? A fundamentally different vision of the self from
that portrayed by the tripartite conception of the self is emphasised by Deep Ecology. Whatever
their qualitative differences, the desiring-impulse self, the rationalising-deciding self, and the
normative-judgmental self all refer to a narrow, atomistic or particle-like conception of the self,
whereas the transpersonal self refers to a wide, expansive, or fieldlike conception of the self.
This, says Fox (1990:69-70), has the interesting, even startling consequence of ethics (conceived
as being concerned with moral ‘oughts’) being rendered superfluous. This is because if one has a
wide, expansive, or field-like sense of the self, then (assuming that one is not self-destructive)
one will naturally protect the spontaneous unfolding of this expansive self (the ecosphere or the
cosmos) in all its aspects. Devall (1985:66) agrees that the modern Western self is defined as an
isolated ego which strives primarily for hedonistic gratification or for a narrow sense of
individual salvation. The latter is important because Deep Ecology’s perspective of self-
realisation embraces an expansive or transpersonal sense of the self, where ‘Self’ stands for
‘oneness’ or ‘organic wholeness beyond humanity to include the nonhuman world.’ The Deep
Ecological sense of the self can therefore be understood as the sense of being connected with
something greater than the individual ego. Such a self-realised individual is driven by the need
to live simply within the universe and perceive his/her external environment as sacred, holy and
precious, rather than as normal, everyday and familiar (McComb 1997:5). Davis (2011:139) went
on to explore the connection between eco-psychology and transpersonal psychology and the
cultivation of environmentally responsible lifestyles. For the most part, eco-psychology presents
two images for the relationship between humans and nature: (a) nature as home and its
inhabitants as family and (b) nature as self, in which self-identifications are broadened and
deepened to include the non-human world. These views stand in contrast to views that nature is
dangerous and needs to be controlled and dominated, or that nature is merely a useful
resource which needs to be protected, conserved, and nurtured for ourselves and future
generations. A transpersonal view of human-nature relationships can include these two images.
To conceive nature as an expanded and more inclusive self may be a necessary step in
developing a more transpersonal view of the human-nature relationship. Deep Ecology should
not be compartmentalised as a moral theory per se, even if it is classified under ecological
philosophy and environmental ethics, because Deep Ecology is more concerned with ‘how we
experience the world’ than defining its ethics or morals (Ulrey 2010:12). Devall (1984a:8) quotes
Naess in saying that if you experience the world in a particular way , then you don’t kill. If you
articulate your experience, then it can be a philosophy or religion. Deep Ecology is not an
attempt to discover intrinsic value or develop universal moral rules, but a reshaping and re-
directing of human consciousness . Therefore the concepts of self, self-realisation, and self-in-
Self-realisation (Katz 1991:84) become imperative in fully appreciating Deep Ecology. Next I will
discuss the second ‘ultimate norm’ of Deep Ecology, that is, biocentric equality.
Rapid growth and urbanization magnify the impacts and ignorance only serves
to exacerbate environmental degradation – global warming is the failure of our
current mindset and only a radical shift towards deep ecology can solve.
The issue of motivation, as discussed in Chapter 5, is an important aspect of the discussion of

our ethical and moral duties. More than two decades ago, Cobb (1994:400) pointed out that on
a hotter planet, with lost deltas and shrunken coastlines, under a more dangerous sun with less
arable land, with more people and fewer species of living things, with a legacy of poisonous
waste and much beauty irrevocably lost, there is still the possibility that our children’s children
will learn at last to live as a community among communities. Perhaps they will learn also to
forgive this generation its blind commitment to ever greater consumption. But why should we
place the responsibility on later generations? People should not put the burden on others to
locate themselves ecologically. Ecological location is an inevitable part of pro-environmental
motivation and this can only be done by way of radical paradigm shifts , by re-shaping and re-
directing human awareness. Our ignorance only contributes to environmental degradation
and such ignorance should not become the problem of future generations. Yeld (1997:12) points
out that we should not burden later generations with an ecological debt that will condemn most
of them to an even more precarious and poverty-stricken existence than that endured by tens of
millions of people today. We do indeed live in a fractured world, in which the old biotic patterns
and relationships have changed with the growth of human activities and their consequences
(Handel 2011:203). Although there are many people who are convinced that our consumptive
habits and the ideologies driving our actions are unconnected to the state of the environmental,
I am convinced that we can hardly dispute Handel’s conviction. Signs of human modifications to
ecological structures and functions are visible everywhere around us and we only need to
consult the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) website100 on Global
Climate Change – Vital Signs of the Planet, to verify this fact. Changes made to the environment
through human conduct are accelerating with the rapid growth and urbanisation of the
human population . Nowadays our travel behaviour is faster, cheaper and more frequent than
in the past. As we move about the globe and populate it, we enable the displacement and
removal of many species of plants, insects, and marine life and we tend to eliminate more
species than are being introduced. Human development is mainly destructive and we already
experience the impact of our ruinous actions as regards global warming . In this research, I have
shown how human activities have pushed essential life-support systems near or beyond critical
tipping points due to growing population and per-capita consumption as promoted and upheld
by a consumerist culture. I have argued extensively that the projected population will reach 9
billion people in 2050, according to the projected growth rate, is problematic. Weyler
(2013:192) made a very important and valid observation that social equity, consumer lifestyles
and renewable energy for 9 billion people would require about thirty times more resources than
we consume today. We have already levelled half the world’s forests; depleted major
commercial fish stocks by about 80 percent, filled the atmosphere with carbon dioxide and
drained aquifers; humanity has also turned pristine boreal lakes into black sludge pits in order to
extract the dregs of Earth’s once great stores of irreplaceable hydrocarbons. Species diversity is
now collapsing faster than at any time in the past and I wonder how many people truly realise
this. The vitality to address our behaviour for the destruction, as well as the reasons and values
for not destroying the oldest, richest, most complex and productive ecosystems on the planet
cannot be overemphasised. The environmental crisis is a pathological sign of a collective failure
of our mind-sets and, even though I am convinced that I have successfully substantiated the
factual claim regarding the planet’s environmental dilapidation as not being merely speculative,
I still wonder why there is such a common failure to make significant changes on the collective
mind-sets of people in order to bring about the required impacts on the preservation of our
planet.
Pedagogy
The alternative is ecopedagogy – we increase environmental education that
makes us aware of the environment and its problems. The way we approach
environmental problems is reframed by focusing on the rights of all living
beings instead of human desire.
Kopnina 20 [Helen is employed at The Hague University of Applied Sciences. She is a
coordinator and lecturer of Sustainable Business program, inspirational speaker, and the
(co)author of over a hundred peer-reviewed articles and sixteen books on the inter-related
subjects of environmental sustainability, circular economy, biodiversity conservation, and
environmental education.], "Ecocentric Education: Introduction to a Special Collection of
Essays", The Hague University of Applied Sciences , August 2020 ,
file:///Users/mirababa/Downloads/education-10-00217.pdf//mb
The Origins of Ecocentric Education: From Critical Theory to Ecopedagogy This Special Issue
“Ecocentric education ” contains articles focused on ecological values in environmental education (EE)
and education for sustainable development (E SD). Ecocentric education is based on a critical
theory, originating from Erich Fromm [1], Herbert Marcuse [2], and Paulo Freire [3], and on ecological pedagogy (ecopedagogy),
developed by Richard Kahn [4]. These critical theorists served as catalysts in the transformation of
education towards the recognition of the “domination” of capitalist, corporate, and/or political
power in shaping societies, challenging the broadly shared assumptions and practices [5]. Fromm [1]
and his peers believed that education makes learners internalize alienation from humanity and nature, a process which is inherent in
the industrial capitalist society. This process increases uncritical adherence to dominant values such as consumerism, downplaying
the negative side effects of technocratically defined “progress”. These theorists of critical education derived their critique from neo-
Marxist or ecological socialism perspectives, exposing both social inequalities and ecological damage created by a capitalist system
of industrial production. Ecosocialism has been especially critical of naive narratives about finitude, scarcity, and conservationism, as
David Molina-Motos [6] notes in this collection of essays. However, the Marxist critique (ecosocialism) of capitalism has its
shortcomings, as socialist or communist systems are implied to be a solution. This position fails to take into account the fact that
contemporary industrial production systems, however ideologically organized, are still predicated on the exploitation of natural
resources and on economic growth [7]. Ecosocialism criticized social and economic inequality without
challenging the very mechanism of how this wealth is created, that is, through the appropriation of natural resources [6]. At an
international political level, the realization of the negative side effects of industrial and economic development was discussed in
1972 at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and in The Limits to Growth report [8]. The
report
outlined the need to address population growth, to limit the growth economy and industrial
production in order to preserve natural resources for future generations. In 1975, responding to the
Conferences’ and report’s outcomes, these aspirations were translated into educational guidelines. Participants in the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) workshop proposed a global framework for environmental
education, referred to as the Belgrade Charter, which stated: “ The goal of environmental education is to develop
a world population that is aware of, and concerned about, the environment and its associated
problems, and which has the knowledge, skills, attitudes, motivations, and commitment to work
individually and collectively toward solutions of current problems and the prevention of new
ones” [9]. This goal of environmental education, combined with the insights of Fromm, Marcuse,
and Freire, inspired ecopedagogy, that supports an “earth democracy” and promotes the rights
of all living organisms [5]. Having in part evolved from critical pedagogy, ecopedagogy is less ideologically Educ. Sci. 2020, 10,
217; doi:10.3390/educsci10090217 www.mdpi.com/journal/education Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 217 2 of 6 leftist or Marxist and more
environment-centered [4]. What is significant in ecopedagogy is not its leftist origins, but a call for a radically different method of
addressing the excesses of industrial development and anthropocentrism. Remaining
socially critical, ecopedagogy
supports deep ecology and ecocentrism in teaching theory and learning practice [10]. Inspiring
this education, ideas addressing the human-centered (anthropocentric) treatment of the
environment have been developed by, among others, Arne Naess [10]. The ecology or
ecosysytem-centered (ecocentric) alternatives to industrial development underlined,
pragmatically, the restraint to growth, and, ethically, the importance of recognizing the intrinsic
value, rather than instrumental, value of the environment , as Haydn Washington [11], one of the contributors
to this collection of essays has underlined. As Kazuhito Nakamura, Akio Fujiwara, Hill Hiroki Kobayashi, and Kaoro Saito [12] suggest
in this Special Issue, ecocentric education does not “restrict
human well-being to economic aspects”; rather, it
makes “conventional sustainability education richer and profound” by “positioning human
beings as part of nature”. Another contributor to this collection, Reingard Spannring [13], relates ecocentric education to
ecological citizenship education, which “seeks to liberate human and nonhuman beings from predetermined behavioral results and
functions, and opens the time and space for the subjectification of human and nonhuman citizens within the complex dynamics of a
multi-species community” (p. 41). Thus, ecocentric education also includes individual care for animals, as Helena Pedersen [14], in
this collection, reflects. Pedersen relates ecocentric education to the practice for critical animal pedagogies, offering a critical theory-
based form of resistance against the conventionally framed “animal question” in education and beyond.
Ecopedagogy uses education as a vehicle for non-violent, radical social change.

It teaches students how to become advocates for the environment and better
ecological citizens.
Kopnina 20 [Helen is employed at The Hague University of Applied Sciences. She is a
coordinator and lecturer of Sustainable Business program, inspirational speaker, and the
(co)author of over a hundred peer-reviewed articles and sixteen books on the inter-related
subjects of environmental sustainability, circular economy, biodiversity conservation, and
environmental education.], "Ecocentric Education: Introduction to a Special Collection of
Essays", The Hague University of Applied Sciences , August 2020 ,
file:///Users/mirababa/Downloads/education-10-00217.pdf//mb
Ecocentric education discussed in this collection aids in understanding how complex variables
such as national and institutional context, ideology, and ethics (e.g., ecocentric orientation) and
pedagogical skills (e.g., didactic qualities) can ensure a sustainable future. Research focuses on nationally
contextualized studies on the nexus between education, environment, and sustainable future.
Contributors achieve this by examining how a wide range of educational programs have influenced students’
worldview and raised particular moral concerns in relation to the environment and our common
future. Indeed, as opposed to the dominant forms of environmental education and education for sustainable
development (ESD), ecocentric education reveals the lessons of environmentalism and engages
with the underlying power structures of society [6,13]. As Washington [11] has emphasized, sustainability and
sustainable development are different concepts, and conventional ESD tends to be highly anthropocentric. Assuming that
conventional environmental education and, particularly ESD are largely focused on social and economic issues [15,16],
ecopedagogy and ecocentric education provide a counterweight with a focus on the “planet”.
The “planet” in this case is not seen as harmoniously balanced with “people” and “profit” but as
foundational for any social and economic activity to take place [17]. In contrast to conventional education,
ecocentric education and critical pedagogy are based on “method and process for liberation”, fighting for the oppressed and
adopting a “critical methodology, and promote
education as a non-violent form of radical social change”
[18]. Presently, ecocentric education includes various aspects of ecopedogogy, ecological citizenship
education [13], conservation [19] and rewilding [20], education for deep ecology [21,22], post-humanist
Educ. Sci. 2020, 10, 217 3 of 6 education [15,23], inclusive (multispecies) pluralism [24,25], animal welfare education [26], and
critical animal pedagogy [27]. This education focuses on the unity of animal rights and welfare [28,29] on the one hand, and
environmental ethics and sustainability on the other hand [30–33]. As Alexia Barrable [34] writes in this collection of essays, one of
the central aims of ecocentric education is “the promotion of nature connectedness, benefiting both the
next generation of learners, as well as our planet”. Spannring [13] presents a fundamental critique of (animal)
consumption as a way of being in and relating to the world. In particular, her chapter addresses how objectification and
commodification of nonhumans is opposed to a duty of care within a multi-species community and how they mask speciesism
(discrimination against other species). At
the moment of writing, for example, millions of animals are used
for medical experimentation for the development of the COVID-19 vaccine, in the assumed-to-
be morally superior cause of advancing human health. Simultaneously, the root causes of
zoonotic pandemics, i.e., high human population density, consumption of meat, and wildlife
trade are subordinated to concerns about the economy and calls for a return to normal [35]. In
education, as Pedersen [14] notes, this translates into normalizing animal experimentation, as
animals are routinely incorporated in the science curriculum, with students taught to “utilize,
dominate, or control other species as dissection specimens for hands-on training of certain skills
in science classrooms”. Both Spannring [13] and Pedersen [14] argue that the hierarchical status of humans above animals is
not challenged but supported by the notion of the humane use of nonhuman animals, pertinent to welfare education, traditional
forms of environmental education, and ESD. The
aim of critical animal pedagogies, according to Pedersen
[14], is to disentangle animals from the demands we make on them. The status quo needs to be
challenged by education, as aptly argued by Pedersen, who calls for a cessation of our
narcissistic preoccupation with “animals for us”. E xploring such trajectories in ESD and beyond provides
“immanent critique and a foundation and condition for political and environmental engagement in human–animal relations” [14]. It
implies the opening of education to “multiple unthought possibilities of unlearning and re-learning our being in the world as
standing with, staying away, and stepping aside” [14]. Critical pluralism, in Pedersen’s analysis, is different from conventional
pluralism prevalent in the environmental education field, sometimes referred to as democratic, which is based on a single dominant
species’ decision-making [14]. This decision-making is also dependent on the public’s perceptions. As Nakamura and co-authors
suggest, the public’s understanding of environmental challenges often lacks complex time scales, as global issues such as climate
change “need to be understood within time spans of some hundred years or more” [12]. Public understanding of the word
“speciesism” seems lacking at the time when wokeness (awareness of social injustice) is especially prominent. During #MeToo (anti-
sexism) and #BlackLivesMatter (anti-racism) campaigns, discrimination against various human groups is rightly condemned, while
abuse of farm animals or extermination of wild animals and their habitats are not recognized as
morally abhorrent.
The alternative’s embrace of epistemic uncertainty and “common faith” allows

communities to reimagine a collaborative, interconnected climate pedagogy
Li, 20 (Huey-li, PhD, Professor of educational philosophy at the University of Akron, “Toward
Weaving a “Common Faith” in the Age of Climate Change,” ECNU Review of Education, 2020)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/2096531120905208 //cb
Toward a transformative climate pedagogy Countless concerned citizens, grassroots activists, and international
environmental organizations have made concerted and collaborative efforts to raise the public’s awareness of interconnected
ecological disasters. Still, the recurrent
waves of environmental movements seem to bow continually to
ongoing capitalist globalization. Although “Anthropocene” remains an unsettled concept in the scientific community, the
Anthropocene’s entrance into the popular lexicon indicates that the public has become more aware of the magnitude of ongoing
glocal ecological decline and the corresponding human vulnerability. The 2015 Paris Agreement within the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change signified the pursuit of intragenerational pursuit of justice by the unyielding climate
alliance across varied cultural, economic, political, and religious boundaries. The young climate activists such as Greta Thunberg
further compel the adult generation to attend to the far-reaching impact of climate change in the pursuit of intergenerational
justice. After all, one’s awareness of the temporal continuity of the human community does not mean unreflective immersion in
one’s cultural traditions. Instead, it
is critical to inquire into the historical roots of today’s ecologically
problematic cultural practices and make further efforts to redirect cultural formation . Drawing from
the above exploration of the conceptual linkages among the Buddhist doctrine of no-self, the Confucian conception of the human–
nature unity, and Deweyan “common faith,” I outline the following three interrelated thematic approaches to the
development of a climate pedagogy.
Embracing dialogical pluriversality Palmer (1994) notes that modern schooling, by removing all religious
orthodoxies, has developed “its own orthodoxy,” namely “objectivism” that “insists that we can
know the world only by distancing ourselves from it, by separating our inner lives from the
external objects we want to know” (p. 17). Compartmentalization of knowledge construction
further circumscribes one’s pigeonholed understanding of presumably “external” natural
objects. Midgley (1992) remarks the objective scientific discipline is now so narrowly scientific that “many scientists simply do not
know that there is any systematic way of thinking besides their own” (p. 44). In order to envisage an alternative
trajectory of the ongoing capitalist globalization and consequent climate change, it is essential
to demystify the split between objectivism and our inner spiritual dimension of human
existence. Jenkins (2017) notes “[P]articular religious inheritance, traditions, communities, or practices cannot be fully
understood apart from the environmental history from which they emerged and whose ecological relations they in turn influenced”
(p. 23). Transforming objectivism obliges us to engender a pedagogical praxis to retrieve, reevaluate, and reconstruct pluralistic
resources embedded in religions (Tucker & Grim, 2017). Echoing Dewey’s advocacy of “a common faith,” Callicott (2001) further
argues for an orchestral approach to achieving coherence and coordination in international
environmental policy. To Callicott, “the one globally intelligible and acceptable ecological ethic and the many culture-specific
ecological ethics may mutually reflect, validate, and correct one another—so they may exist in a reciprocal, fair, equal, and mutually
sustaining partnership” (p. 95). To a large extent, the pursuit of intra- and intergenerational justice has emerged as the globally
ecological ethic. In the meantime, hybridization of culture-specific ecological ethics heightens our awareness of the dynamic and
interactive nature of cultural formation within international communities. Consequently, one
can cultivate the Deweyan
“common faith” by demystifying universality and embracing dialogical pluriversality .
Recognizing human fallibility Transformative climate pedagogy must recognize that self-correction as the
essence of scientific inquiry does not necessarily guarantee certainty and infallibility in the process of
knowledge construction. At the same time, epistemic uncertainty concerning the causes, consequences, and solutions of
climate change should not justify inaction. Instead, epistemic uncertainty should oblige us to cultivate our
moral imagination in order to attend to how gradual, cumulative, and incremental climate
change can lead to catastrophic events. In other words, moral imagination can provide compelling
grounds for taking precautionary measures against the worst-case scenario that could originate from
unnoticeable gradual changes. Thus, Orr (1992) argues against the ongoing compartmentalization of knowledge and endorses
educational reform that fosters “a sense of connectedness , implications, and ecological citizenship,
and will provide the competence to act on such knowledge” (p. 103). To Orr, “If literacy is driven by the search for
knowledge, ecological literacy is driven by the sense of wonder, the sheer delight in being alive in a
beautiful, mysterious, bountiful world” (p. 86). Apparently, the sense of wonder embedded in moral imagination is
the key to bringing about “what if” questions (Stengers, 1997; see also Silova, 2020). In short, “what then” is a crucial question for
the lay public as well as scientists to conduct a collaborative inquiry into the interconnections between varied specialized academic
disciplines, between actions and consequences, between short-term and long-term consequences, between means and ends,
between economics and ethics, and so on. In the same vein, Jamieson (2014) identifies humility, temperance, mindfulness,
cooperativeness, respect for nature, and simplicity as a set of green virtues for living in the Anthropocene. In
line with the
Confucian ethics, the Buddhist doctrine of no-self, and the Deweyan common faith, the green
virtues, to a large extent, are in opposition to the mainstream modern values , that is, atomistic
individualism, contractual social relationship, the pursuit of progress, the quest for certainty , and
the severance between ethics and epistemology embedded in modern schooling. Hence, a transformative pedagogy,
grounded in full recognition of the coterminous coexistence of human and ecological vulnerability, must adopt an inclusive
approach to cultivate an ecologically minded citizenry with a prudent recognition of the formidability
of addressing and redressing the magnitude, ubiquity, and urgency of the ongoing glocal
ecological crisis.
Cultivating an ecological identity Modern schooling continues to play a key role in facilitating intergenerational cultural transmission
and addressing the adjustment needs of living in an interdependent global village. However, it is also evident that modern schooling
persists in developing well-adjusted yet autonomous individuals who are to survive and flourish. In recognition of the common
ground within the Buddhist doctrine of noself, the Confucian conception of the human–nature unity, and the Deweyan common
faith, it
is critical to reclaim one’s putative autonomous “self” in the web of social and ecological
interconnections and to foster inclusive and extensive ethical commitment to the flourishing of
all living beings in the universe. In line with Barad’s concept of entanglement (2007), Verlie’s conceptualization of a climate
pedagogy (2017) urges us to move us from “knowing about climate—which implies a disconnected
knower and a static world—to diverse, worldly practice climating and becoming climate” (p. 560).
More specifically, Verlie’s pedagogical delineation is based on the entangled inseparability between climate and human. It follows
that “Climate as an entanglement foregrounds how climate, climate knowledge and climate knowers coemerge through intra-
action” (p. 569; see also Taylor, 2020). Such
recognition could then engender inclusive and collaborative
efforts among policymakers, scientists, curriculum specialists, classroom teachers, and students
toward reexamination of knowledge claims, cultural values, and ethical norms with which to
implement cultural and social transformation at all levels .
Ecologizing pedagogy reinvigorates an awe with nature.

Bonnett, 20 (Michael, PhD in Philosophy (University of London), Visiting Research Fellow,
University of Bath, Member Philosophy of Education Society, Great Britain Editorial Board,
Cambridge Journal of Education, held senior teaching and research positions in the UK
universities of Cambridge, London, and Bath. Formerly he was a Visiting Professor at the
University of the Aegean, “Towards an ecologization of education”, The Journal of
Environmental Education, March 10, 2020)
https://doi.org/10.1080/00958964.2019.1687409//ac
A key theme foregrounded by previous discussion is the fact that, and the ways in which, Western style societies have become
disconnected from the natural world. In many respects in quotidian life nature has become invisible, of little account: anything
approaching open engagement with it is a purely leisure activity for some, and for many not even this. If previous argument outlined
above is accepted, this is an extremely regrettable state of affairs on at least two counts. First, our thinking is ruled by very partial
truths: we remain essentially ignorant of highly significant aspects of the natural world in which we are embedded and whose
responses to our harmful activities increasingly affect the lives of the globally most vulnerable, and ultimately threaten the physical
survival of us all. Second, our extant conscious life is seriously impoverished. Increasingly,
we become spiritually
constipated as our world appears evermore human-authored, exclusively reflecting back our
projects, projections and will. In the context of environmental education, one response to this loss of perceptiveness has
been to advocate the value of immersive experiences in nature with the intention of “taking us out of ourselves” by reconnecting us
to—and perhaps restoring a sense of our rootedness in—the natural world. Rejuvenating a sense of wonder
towards nature might be a key contributor to coming to care sufficiently for it .3 But, are such
immersive experiences either necessary or sufficient to these ends? These questions raise some important issues for further
thought. For example, while there is ample evidence to suggest that for some such experience can bring about an “awakening” that
can have a lasting influence, there remains the possibility that for others such experience might simply result in irritation at being
removed from, say, a comfortable, convenient, digitally augmented environment to one where the inconvenient exigencies of the
elemental are only too present. This suggests that perhaps some preparatory or parallel orientating experiences would help. For
example, might the study of particular myths and poetry be of value in helping students to become aware of possibilities of re-
storying their implicit understandings of nature in ways that offer compelling alternatives to the narratives upheld by the
mainstreaming of mastery?4 Indeed, might the images and sentiments evoked by such study be sufficient in themselves to provoke
a change of mind and heart? Furthermore, might useful work be undertaken in attempting to re-sensitise the senses? Might
participation in listening to music help to re-energize and refine our sensitivity to the acoustic environment and contribute to an
ability to hear and interpret the meanings that are present there? Can participation in art help to open up and sustain spaces in
which instrumentality falls away and things in nature can appear as themselves? Are there ways of rekindling our senses of touch
and smell—these perhaps having the capacity to communicate a kind of felt immediacy that sight sometimes dilutes? There again,
might “mindfulness” exercises contribute to living through the body in the here and now and hence be of value in developing an
openness to what is present in the environment? 5 These are areas in which further research needs to be (and is being) undertaken.
Each holds the potential to disrupt current mainstream quotidian ways of being in the world
that, in tandem with theoretical critiques and the emergence of re-orientating ideas , might
help to initiate the cultural change that our environmental predicament requires . By its
fundamental nature, the reign of a metaphysics is difficult to dislodge. Only vibrant counter experience and
rigorous and determined examination and critique that reveals its many threads and ways of
holding us its sway are likely to succeed . Philosophically, an important project will be adequately to elucidate and
defend ideas of nature’s integrity, normativity, intrinsic value and “voice.” In other work, and briefly above, I have attempted some
development of these ideas, but more work needs to be done regarding precisely what can be “heard” and what authority and
weight it should claim in broader environmental decision-making.6 Here I simply add a caveat: given the manifoldness of nature, it
should not be expected that it would possess simply one kind of integrity, normativity, intrinsic value, or voice. Related to this will be
the need carefully to elucidate a vocabulary for articulating our everyday experiences and relationships to things in the natural world
in ways that are not redolent with a blinding human supremacism. For example, while the term “nature” has legitimate uses in
referring in some general way to aspects of experience of the natural world, these uses do not include a wholesale homogenizing of
the myriad unique individuals that comprise the natural world. Nor must the phenomenological “otherness” of nature be allowed to
degenerate into an implicit synonym for a nondescript “inferiority.” Similarly,
and returning to the idea of an
“Anthropocene” era, we need to remain alert to the possibilities of hubristic human self-
aggrandizement implicit in this notion in the way that it foregrounds the power and significance
of human agency over those of natural agency. Indeed, there are perhaps elements of this arrogance in the
popular and seemingly benign notion of human “stewardship” of nature if this is allowed to become definitive of our role, or, again,
that somehow we can speak on behalf of nature on the basis of accumulated discursive knowledge provided, for example, by
calculative science. When we speak of, say, the need to manage wild fish stocks, we are talking of
managing human behavior towards a fish population , left alone this population is quite
capable of “managing” itself. On the other hand, we must be wary, too, of accounts that in their (otherwise laudable)
attempts to emphasize a continuity between human being and the rest of nature reduce the potentiality of both— for example,
either by stripping away the profound significance of essential elements of human
consciousness by seeking to demonstrate, for example, that there is a way in which we can
attribute cognition and experience—and therefore “consciousness”—to all forms of life (e.g.,
Affifi 2017; McDaniel 1986) with the further suggestion that to discriminate between them
expresses an unwarranted anthropocentrism, or by reducing natural phenomena to human
rationalistic constructs such as energy or information flows (e.g., Bateson 2000).7 It is clear that,
one way or another, all the foregoing indicates the need both for deep cultural change and the
development in individuals of a different frame of mind —or way of being—from the ones that
currently prevail in the West. This has radical implications for education and research. As Orr (1994)
rightly noted, environmental concern raises problems not simply in education, but of education .
Currently, in Western-style societies, education largely reflects the consumptive, perpetual
growth, economically driven society in which it is located, and that itself is an instantiation of
the aforementioned metaphysics of mastery (limitless consumption being a prime expression of
mastery). A number of important considerations follow from this situation, one of which is a need to reveal and to examine
critically key orientating elements of what is currently culturally taken for granted . Narrowing the focus to research in
the field of environmental education, this directs attention to the ways in which all research
will be informed —often tacitly—by sets of underlying assumptions, ideas and perspectives of
the kind sampled throughout this paper. Effectively, these supply its theoretical basis. In the interests of rigor and
revealing the full significance and potential of the research, it is important that this basis is made explicit, properly elucidated, and
subject to a degree of critical evaluation sufficient to demonstrate its suitability. From
the point of view of
environmental and educational philosophy, given the analysis of Western orthodoxy sketched
above, it becomes an important task to contribute to an ecologizing of education and its socio-
cultural milieu.
Vote negative for a radical paradigm shift – deep ecology is not just thinking but
culminates in action towards forging a new model of society through reshaping
human awareness.
Throughout life, every human being forms his or her own unique personal philosophy by way of
acquiring beliefs (made up of what we think is true) and belief systems, as discussed in Chapter
2. We do not usually realise this, but these beliefs constantly guide our thinking , our decision-
making and our emotions: ultimately they shape our lives. Even though thinking is a prelude to
action, it is not a prerequisite thereof because we sometimes act without thinking. Deep
Ecology, as a belief system, is a relatively new way of rethinking our relationship with the earth
and with one another and as a result it culminates in a new way of acting . Deep Ecology may
however easily be misunderstood as merely another attempt to discover intrinsic values or to
develop universal moral rules. However, the sole purpose of Deep Ecology is not to discover
intrinsic values or to develop universal moral rules. It would be more acceptable to say that
Deep Ecology is primarily concerned with reshaping and re-directing human awareness . If we
want to create a new world and model of society, then the old world and old model of society
need to be altered or radically changed . This can only happen through a radical paradigm shift
by re-shaping and re-directing human awareness. Accordingly, I believe that a new model of
society can be forged because humankind has the capacity to overcome any challenge, no
matter how big, but there is mostly a prerequisite for this: people will need to fight for such a
change. Why is it necessary that we create a new model of society? Why do we need to undergo
a shift in our paradigms? I think that we need to move away from our predominantly
instrumental inclination. Deep Ecology can instil in followers a less instrumental view of
humanity and nature, and assist in forging a new model of society which is more authentic than
the one we are living in. If we continue to go through life blind to the repercussions of our
anthropocentric thinking and resultant actions, we will not only continue to taint our present
and future cultures but also that of our planet. This is why it is necessary to forge a new model
of society; and I maintain that Deep Ecology is an adequate philosophy to embrace for this
purpose.
Critical discussion over deep ecology serves as a pedagogical tool to “go beyond
the self” and realize that everything is interrelated – recognition of biocentric
equality brings about a rethinking of societal values.
Biocentric equality refers to going beyond the ‘self’ , defined as an isolated ego striving for
sense-gratification or individual salvation. Biocentric equality is intimately related to the all-
inclusive self-realisation as discussed above — if we harm the rest of nature then we are, in fact,
harming ourselves. According to this concept, there are no boundaries and everything is
interrelated . This insight inspires us to respect all human and nonhuman individuals in their
own right as parts of the whole, without feeling the need to lay down hierarchies of species,
with humans at the top (Devall & Sessions 1985:68). According to this norm, all organisms and
entities in the ecosphere are equal in intrinsic worth. These are the central tenets of Deep
Ecology, but Deep Ecology stands for much more than these two insights. In April 1984, George
Sessions and Arne Naess summarised more than a decade of thinking on the principles of Deep
Ecology by articulating these principles in literal, neutral terms, hoping that they would be
understood and accepted by persons from different philosophical and religious positions (Devall
& Sessions 1985:69-70). This formulation is known as the Deep Ecology Platform (DEP); an eight-
point platform constituting the essential principles of Deep Ecology. Devall (2001:23) says that
this eightfold platform is a pedagogical tool that can assist people in developing their own
ecosophical statement and to stimulate dialogue between supporters and critics of the Deep
Ecological movement. The platform also helps to bring about a rethinking of societal values . My
knowledge of the eight DEP points is drawn mainly from Taylor & Zimmerman (2005:457).
However, I will elaborate on each of the eight DEP points in order to explain them in more
detail.
Degrowth
We must reframe our thinking to see nature as an entity with intrinsic value,
not a narrow resource.
Nikolova ‘19 (Antoaneta, Assoc. Prof. @ South-West University, Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria, "Deep
Ecology and East-West Dialog." Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences (2019): 151, MX)
Based on the vision of oneness, the deep ecology develops three main views: (i) the view that
everything has its intrinsic value , which “is not dependent on usefulness to human beings”; (ii)
biocentric egalitarianism, or “the view that all entities, whether a cell, an entity, or an ecosystem
such as the Amazon Basin or the planet Earth, have equal valu e”; and (iii) self realization , or
“the view that everything seeks to self-realize itself, however self-realization is understood, such
as enduring for as long as it possibly could and/or as fulfilling its own purpose ” (Guilherme,
2011: 64-65).
According to the ideas of the deep ecology these views could be supported by different
philosophical systems. Arne Naess was inspired by the monistic philosophy of Spinoza and the
ideas of Gandhi. At the core of the both philosophies there is the idea of oneness and
interpretation of reality in terms of something much higher that the narrow anthropocentric
perspective.
Actually, the view of the intrinsic value of everything stems directly from the idea of oneness.
Regarding the multiplicity of things as manifestation or modes of this oneness this idea makes
everything an aspect of the highest reality. In fact, here we could not even speak of the highest
or ultimate reality because there are no different levels, there is no rank and hierarchy
according to which to build our value system . Therefore, if this reality is the only reality and
there is nothing but it, the intrinsic value of all these modes should be equal.
For the Western mind that is used to perceive the world in terms of duality oneness seems a
little bit paradoxical.
This paradoxality is shown very well in the introducing mantra of Isha Upanishad:
OM. This is the whole. That is the whole. The whole generates [only] the whole. If from the
whole the whole is taken, again the whole remains.
This equality of the values, however, is at the same time a lack of any value, since there is no
subordination and hierarchy of being in accordance to their closeness or remoteness to the
Supreme source, as it is in Christianity and Neoplatonism, for example.
Deep ecology allows us to understand our dependency upon nature and adopt
a natural inclination to protect it.
Nikolova ‘19 (Antoaneta, Assoc. Prof. @ South-West University, Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria, "Deep
Ecology and East-West Dialog." Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences (2019): 151, MX)
According to Stefan Harding, a leading figure in the Schumacher College in England, where the
ideas of the Deep Ecology Movement are being developed and applied, “ deep experience is
often what gets a person started along a deep ecological path”. Something must happen to
make us feel “the ecosystem as a great being, dignified and valuable in itself”. This experience is
described as “a moment of tremendous liberation and expansion of consciousness, of joy and
energy – a truly spiritual or religious experience... The mind which saw nature as a dead
machine , there for human use, vanished . In its place was the pristine recognition of the vast
being of living nature , of what we now call Gaia” (Ibid.)
Such an experience would provoke a radical change in the way we perceive ourselves, the
world and our place in it:
“A key aspect of these experiences is the perception of gestalts, or networks of relationships.

We see that there are no isolated objects, but that objects are nodes in a vast web of
relationships. When such deep experience occurs, we feel a strong sense of wide identification
with what we are sensing. This identification involves a heightened sense of empathy and an
expansion of our concern with non-human life. We realise how dependent we are on the well-
being of nature for our own physical and psychological well-being . As a consequence, there
arises a natural inclination to protect non-human life. Obligation and coercion to do so become
unnecessary. We understand that other beings, ranging from microbes to multicellular life-
forms to ecosystems and watersheds, to Gaia as a whole, are engaged in the process of
unfolding their innate potentials” (Ibid.).
When we achieve the depth and breadth of our identification with nature, then the care for
nature and ecological behavior becomes quite natural and does not require rules and
prescriptions. In the words of the author of the idea of deep ecology: “Care flows naturally if the
‘self’ is widened and deepened so that protection of free Nature is felt and conceived as
protection of ourselves … Just as we do not need morals to make us breathe … so if your ‘self’ in
the wide sense embraces another being, you need no moral exhortation to show care” (Naess,
cited by Fox, 1990: 217).
Tin such a way, the deep ecology implies unity of a profound philosophical questioning about
the essence of the world, a deep mystical experience of our unity with it, and actions to
transform our way of life, both on individual and social levels.
A deep ecology approach makes a transition to degrowth possible and

understandable.
KARA and SAROĞLU ‘21 (Yunus, Altınbaş University Economics, Hacer, Minister University,
Institute of Social Sciences, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Ankara,
"Reflections of Deep Ecology Approach in the Ahimsa Doctrine." Gaziantep University Journal of
Social Sciences 20.2 (2021), MX)
Deep ecology deals with all living things as a whole. It looks after the interests of not only a
group or a species, but all living things, and evaluates events in the context of the idea of
equality and because deep ecology uses a holistic approach , it looks at ecological problems in
terms of the interest of the biosphere and living life. Deep ecology evaluates environmental
pollution not only in the context of its effects on human health, but also in terms of the living
conditions of the whole life, species and systems, fighting the deep causes of pollution. The
deep ecology movement gives intrinsic value to existing resources, taking into account the
needs of all life forms. It doesn’t look only at any object as a resource. Therefore, it critically
evaluates the production and consumption patterns, acknowleding that the extreme pressure
on life on the planet is due to the influx in the human population. According to the deep ecology
approach, the earth does not belong to humans. For example, Norway's natural landscapes,
rivers, flora and fauna, and neighboring seas are not owned by Norwegians. Likewise, oil under
the North Sea or elsewhere does not belong to a state or humanity. People only sit on land and
use resources to meet their vital needs.
The deep ecology movement offers an approach from scientific and philosophical religious
perspectives (Montano, 2006, s. 189). This movement, which offers an ecologically centered
approach, argues that simple environmental reforms are not enough. It expresses the necessity
of limiting population growth , abandoning high energy consumption and changing the use of
resources. According to the deep ecology approach, from the philosophical and religious
perspectives, the human-centered approach should evolve towards the environment centered
approach, and the relevant fields should question their own approaches and teachings. At this
point, the belief in Jainism, which takes the environment and all living things at its center, shows
the principles of the deep ecology approach and forms the basis of belief according to these
principles.
Deep ecology is not total degrowth – moderate interference is still allowed.

If all life, as suggested by deep ecology , has intrinsic value, it could be assumed that the
possibilities for action are severely limited and that there is a duty of non-interference in
natural systems. However, deep ecology arguably makes a case for moderate interference , not
abstaining from interference. As Næss (1973) suggests, in principle, there is a case to be made
for biospherical egalitarianism, which encompasses the belief that all living beings have equal
inherent moral value, thus commanding moral respect and consideration. However, Næss
states that “any realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation, and suppression” (1973,
95). This is also evident in Næss and Sessions (1984, 6) that “the slogan of ‘ noninterference’
[the fifth of the eight points] does not imply that humans should not modify some ecosystems as
do other species.… At issue is the nature and extent of such interference .” Thus, supporters of
deep ecology seek to minimize this interference “to preserve the unfolding of natural processes
in all of their rich and diverse complexity” (Katz 2000, 20).
Criticism has been levelled against the egalitarianism of deep ecology as requiring species-
ranking, despite the egalitarian motto (cf. French 1995; Katz 2000, 35). For instance, will not the
permission to forego biospherical egalitarianism in practice force a deep ecologist to determine
the nature and extent of the necessary interference by ranking the importance of species? This
assumption is correct, and explicitly advocated by Næss: “Ranking for me has primarily to do
with differences of obligation . In wintertime my cottage receives mice and men as guests, but
my obligations are enormously greater toward the human guests than toward the mice (Næss
[1999] 2005: 549). Conversely, deep ecology is often pejoratively characterized by this
biospherical egalitarianism, a claim that it constrains all possible action (cf. Ayres et al. 2001 for
a discussion on “very strong sustainability,” which is akin to a description of deep ecology). By
only allowing moderate interference, however, Næss assumedly opposes the pollution to which
a high-carbon economy contributes as well as, one could guess, the overuse of the absorptive
capacity of the atmosphere by way of GHG emissions .
The commodity and market system itself is the problem – we must shift away
from using capitalism to solve its own problems.
MX)
By drawing from and updating theoretical insights from Marxian political economy and
environmental sociology we can better understand the peculiarities, potentials, and limits of
ethical consumerism. The defetishization thesis claims alternative markets can lead to a more
honest, less mystified relationship with food production and, in turn, can strengthen civil
society. I argue that instead of defetishizing commoditie s, ethical consumerism constitutes a
‘‘third’’ layer of commodity fetishism —a distortion of reality which reifies and reproduces the
fundamental processes of capitalism by making the commodity form the solution to its own
mystifications. Very real socioecological problems with very real possibilities of dire crises are
placed upon the backs of isolated, market dependent individuals to solve through the only
means they know : consumption . With the decay of traditional political tactics—what would
and potentially still could be the path to a more socially and environmentally sound future—
individuals are forced to utilize the same unjust system to solve its own injustice. This is not
simply a ‘‘structure versus agency’’ quandary, but a predicament of a social formation that
offers its agents the means to reproduce its own structure while simultaneously feeling as
though they are toppling it.
The alternative is “practical” – conservation measures are a concrete way to

transition to low-carbon economies.
As variously seen above, deep ecology is distant from armchair philosophy as it aims toward
practical relevancy and spawning action. This is also evident in several of the deep ecology
philosophers, such as Næss and Kvaløj, who participated in acts of civil disobedience. Indeed, in
the Apron diagram, the fourth level, which is derived from the preceding three, is oriented
toward particular rules, decisions, and actions (2008, 107). It is also intended to be relevant to
policymakers (see point 6 of the eight points of deep ecology). Næss proposes several ways to
engage experts in sympathy with strong conservation measures in the public debate (Reed and
Rothenberg 1993, 81) and of including green relevance in all political decisions (Næss 1989,
135). However, he also proposes that there is an important “missed middle level” of policies
between government statements that includes ecopolitical principles and the level of action:
“[t]he more concrete policy statement which mentions specific plans for action does not
usually concur with the principles, but follows the well-travelled routes of past political
processes” (Næss 1989, 77). The diagrams, as well as the normative system analysis, could be
interpreted as a response to this missing mid-level, thus conjoining principles with action. Few
of those who discuss the need for revised normative frameworks discuss this mid-level between
normative frameworks and action. It might instead be a topic for moral psychology,
understanding moral motivation, or political science, but it points beyond merely revising
normative frameworks to instruct action. More is arguably required to fill in the mid-level
between moral convictions and practical action than provided by Næss, and to enable the
aspiration towards desirable states of affairs. But the missing middle level arguably can serve a
purpose in aligning action and fundamental values.
In sum, the deep ecology framework espoused by Næss includes not only general norms and
normative statements, combined with hypotheses, but also a clear intention to be relevant to
action . This is perhaps most clearly evident in the eight points of deep ecology (see Section 1).
Thus, it would seem that the framework offers a total system , ranging from normative
principles to action and a moderate interference with the surrounding world. As suggested in
the sixth of the eight points, “the resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the
present,” but perhaps this is what is required in terms of consumption levels, transitions to low -
carbon economies , and an increased care for our surroundings if we are to avoid dangerous
climate change.
Livingness
Vote Negative to return to livingness, and reconnect with nature.
Toncheva, 19 (Svetoslava, Assist. Prof. Svetoslava Toncheva, PhD, Department of Comparative
Fplklore Studies at the Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Studie, “REDEFINING HUMAN-
NATURE DICHOTOMY: THE VOICE OF SPIRITUAL-ECOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN
ENVIROMENTALITY DEBATE”, Anthropology-journal, 2019) http://anthropology-
journal.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/sp.-Antropologia_N_6_03.-Svetoslava-
Toncheva.pdf//ac
The history of nature conservation and environmental governance has demonstrated that the main struggles to find successful
conservation models are related to the big dilemma of humans or nature, or the idea who should gain larger benefit. Most
of
the contemporary approaches have proven unable to find a balance in the existence of people
and nature. This fact is not surprising, considering that human-nature relations have been
complex and culturally dependent throughout human history. As researchers have observed, the concept of
“nature” is “perhaps the most complex word in the language” (Williams 1983: 221, in – Fletcher 2016: 3). Anthropology does not
provide an unambiguous answer, as despite the assumptions of the structuralism of C. Lévi-Strauss (1969) that the worldview of
primitive societies relies on the nature-culture dichotomy, later anthropological research has shown that for the majority of so-
called “traditional societies” such a division does not exist. Nowadays,
the widely applied concept of the
“nature-culture dichotomy” or the divide between humans and nature is considered precisely a
“ characteristic of a Western worldview in the modern era ” (Fletcher 2016: 3). As worldwide-dominating
conservation approaches originate namely from the Western cultural perspective, the dichotomy has turned into their characteristic
marker that defines human-nature relations nowadays. As
a result, Western society is even analyzed by Louv as
suffering from a condition of a “nature-deficit disorder” (Louv 2005). The means of healing the
disorder is the “reconnection” with nature, which has turned into the “mantra of the modern
culture” (Zylstra et. al. 2014). Some researchers see the paradox in the call and its methods, as while
attempting to overcome the condition of disorder via means such as alternative conservation
approaches, ecotourism, environmental education, we have not advanced further, but reached
a state of its reinforcement (Fletcher 2016). Furthermore, in the context of development, as
analyzed by political economy, nature is constructed as a form of capital to be exploited, and
external from the human element (Escobar 1996). Escobar (1996) has demonstrated how
nature is perceived as simply raw material for economic growth, the latest form of which he
identifies as a “post-modern form of capital”, in the sustainable development discourse. This
perception has been characteristic for the “anthropocene”, or the present human-dominated
period (Ruddiman et al., 2015) and responsible for the major loss of the world’s biodiversity
that is still threatening a large number of species. It is evident, after everything said, that the issue of human-
nature relations and the construction of nature are of major importance in the domain of environmental governance. Their
“redefinition”1 (Escobar 1996) is therefore seen as a way forward which would allow to move
beyond the human focus of the so-called “anthropocene” (Ruddiman et al., 2015)
acknowledging the unity of life on Earth as one socio-ecological system (Redman et al., 2004).
Escobar (1996) calls namely for reconsideration of the dichotomy, in the context of the
poststructuralist political ecology, via alternative and ecologically sustainable strategies that he
explores among various social movements. The call is also undertaken by multiple disciplines – ethnography, with
the establishment of the so called “multispecies ethnography” that provides space for other than human actors (Hurn 2012); cultural
geography and the branch of “more-than-human geography” (Whatmore 2006); political economy and the recognition of the role of
animal agents as introduced by Barua (2016), and others. What they all share in common is namely the purpose
to return to the “livingness” or to shift the attention of the world “out there”, called
environment or nature, to the intimate corporeality of “in here ” (Whatmore 2006). Brining this
issue to the stage of global politics, B. Latour claims that “we need a completely new
cosmopolitics” (Latour 2011:80) that corresponds to the “ new relations between humans and
non-humans” (Latour 2011:80). The outlined scientific debates were brought up together not just aiming to
demonstrate the significance of human-nature relations and the construction of nature for environmental governance, but also
because they are very relevant for the cases that I am going to examine next.
The spiritual movements propose
namely redefinition of human-nature dichotomy and alternative view of nature that provide a
basis for diverse from the mainstream approaches to environmental governance. Via deeper
research on questions regarding the perception of nature , its conservation, and means of “re-
connection”, we can also better understand the ground principles of truth environmentality and
its potential contributions for a more just environmental governance for both humans and
nature. The three cases that I am going to examine are examples of new religiosity, in some cases – spirituality based on self-
determined and eclectic principles and even elements of Buddhism. Therefore I apply the broader definition of spirituality which can
encompass a broader variety of beliefs, and won’t engage in debate about their definition as this is not the primary purpose of the
article. The specific cases I discuss below are biodynamic agriculture, originating from the anthroposophy of Rudolf Steiner; the
White Brotherhood, a new religious movement, founded by the Bulgarian spiritual master Petar Deunov; and the Spiritual Rainbow
community, a spiritual movement founded by the German teacher Jurgen Hummes. The cases will be presented separately, while
later some commonalities will be outlined in the course of the analysis in the presented theoretical background.
Solvency
Deep ecology is CRITICAL for future change – despite it’s criticisms
Welker 13, (Chelsea Welker - Instructor, Political Science & International Affairs - College of
Humanities & Social Sciences), “Rethinking deep ecology: from critique to synthesis,” 2013,
Colorado State University,
https://mountainscholar.org/bitstream/handle/10217/80295/Welker_colostate_0053N_11846.
pdf?sequence=1 //SDD
My overall analysis has sought to re-envision deep ecology in ways that make it a more viable radical
ecopolitical theory, defending both its philosophical and political tenets in addition to reconciling
specific critiques concerned with its characterization (or lack thereof) of the Global South. My emphasis
on deep ecology is valuable because I argue that radical ecopolitical theory is becoming increasingly relevant
for imagining how societies can begin to combat increasingly serious environmental crises and
create pathways toward greater ecological sustainability for the benefit of human and nonhuman nature. I
began this analysis by both justifying deep ecology’s value as a radical ecopolitical theory and outlining
some of the major philosophical and political components that make deep ecology both
valuable and sometimes controversial to those who seek different avenues for radical change. Deep ecology represents an
important arm of radical ecopolitical theory for a few reasons. First of all, deep ecology makes unique
contributions to the field that project important goals related to humanity’s need for increasing
ecological sustainability and the flourishing of all life. Indeed, deep ecology incorporates the intrinsic value of a life into its
theory in addition to arguing that all biological entities possess an equal right to flourish, a unique contribution in the field of radical
ecopolitical thought that attempts to, at least in theory, convey
the value of other life forms for their own sake
(See Naess, 1986, pp. 68-9). Secondly,
deep ecology makes a cultural argument for radical change,
contending that ecocentrism should exist as the dominant cultural formulation of the human-nature
relationship as opposed to anthropocentrism (See Fox, 1985, pp. 136-9; Eckersley, 1992, p. 59; Naess, 1973, pp. 80-1). And lastly,
the emphasis on the ability of individuals to develop ecological consciousnesses through
processes of self-realization 124 is unique to deep ecology. The fact that deep ecology is fundamentally
concerned with centering politics around the vital needs of nature rather than merely incorporating
it (as other radical ecopolitical theories do) makes deep ecology unique for its desire to ensure the
flourishing of nature as much as it desires to ensure the flourishing of human beings and for its willingness to sacrifice non-
vital human needs in the process. Indeed, the emphasis on nature coupled with the emphasis on both individual and cultural
transformation toward more ecocentric relations with nature allows deep ecology to develop
strategies that spur
individual agency and also contribute to the development of ecocentric political policies that
reject the anthropocentric ethic.
The alt solves the aff – understanding deep ecology enables effective
sustainable development.
Akamani 20 Kofi [Kofi Akamani is an Associate Professor of Forest Recreation and
Conservation Social Science in the Department of Forestry at Southern Illinois University.] ,
Research Gate, "Rethinking Sustainable Development Using Deep Ecology and Adaptive
Governance of Social-Ecological Systems: Implications for Protected Areas Management",
August 2019,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334992072_Rethinking_Sustainable_Development_
Using_Deep_Ecology_and_Adaptive_Governance_of_Social-
Ecological_Systems_Implications_for_Protected_Areas_Management//mb
4. Deep Ecology, Adaptive Governance, and Sustainable Development Since the birth of the field of
environmental ethics in the 1970s, several ethical perspectives have emerged to explore human–environment interactions. Among them, deep ecology
is probably the most widely known [82]. The term deep ecology was coined by the late Norwegian philosopher, Arne Naess, in a paper titled “The
Shallow and the Deep Long Range Ecology Movements”, published in the journal Inquiry in 1973. The idea was further developed with contributions
from Bill Devall and George Sessions, among others [42]. Reference [83] made a number of distinctions between his proposed deep ecology and the
conventional approach to development and the environment, which he referred to as shallow ecology. In this section, I argue
for the
integration of deep ecology and adaptive governance, by highlighting their shared assumptions
and goals, as well as knowledge and institutional prescriptions. In doing this, I also show how these
shared attributes of deep ecology and adaptive governance differ from, and offer an alternative
to the conventional approach to sustainable development which exhibits the attributes of
shallow ecology, such as the separation of humans from nature, the emphasis on
anthropocentrism, the reliance on reductionist science and the utilization of top-down
institutional mechanisms. Although deep ecology can also be described using the eight principles of the deep ecology platform [38], the
focus on the distinction between deep ecology and shallow ecology in this section captures the central issues in the eight principles, while allowing for
ease of comparison with the adaptive governance literature. 4.1. Assumptions about Human–Nature Relationships At the metaphysical level, shallow
ecology is based on the mechanistic view of humans as separate from their environment, and the world as composed of discrete, atomistic entities
[84]. Consistent with this characterization, a major criticism of the sustainable development agenda as proposed in the Brundtland Report is its failure
to fully appreciate the complexity and uncertainties that characterize human–environment relationships. Following that report, social, economic and
ecological systems are conceptualized as separate but interconnected components, representing the three pillars of sustainable development [3,11].
This conceptualization has been critiqued for failing to recognize the diversity of societies, economies and ecosystems across scales, separating human
activities from the natural environment, and also reinforcing a static view of the relationships between humans and nature [20,85]. Sustainability 2020,
12, 5757 6 of 21 In contrast with these shallow ecological assumptions that underpin the conventional approach to sustainable development, deep
ecology is informed by a “rejection of the man-in-environment image in favor of the relational

total-field image” [86] (p. 3). The relational, total-field holism of deep ecology posits that “there is no firm ontological
divide in the field of existence. In other word, the world simply is not divided up into
independently existing subjects and objects, nor is there any bifurcation in reality between the
human and nonhuman realms” [84] (p. 157). From this perspective, humans are not separate from or above
nature, but part of a complex web of relationships in a constant state of flux [40,43,82,87]. Following from
this, deep ecology also maintains the possibility for humans to extend their self-identification to include others [43]. Such an expanded definition of the
self is necessary for achieving the state of self-realization [82]. As [43] (p. 31) succinctly noted, “If everything is part of ones’ self, and one is aiming at
self-realization (which deep ecologists argue to be the case) then the clear conclusion to be drawn is that the realization of all (living) organisms is
necessary for one’s own full self-realization”. In
line with deep ecology’s holistic and dynamic conception of
human–nature interactions, the adaptive governance approach is informed by the view of
social and ecological systems as integrated complex adaptive social-ecological systems that
shape each other in a co-evolutionary fashion across space and time [9,47]. Panarchy theory suggests that the
dynamic cross-scale interactions among adaptive cycles in social-ecological systems give rise to periods of
gradual predictable change, as well as occasional abrupt changes that are characterized by high
levels of uncertainties [49,53,88]. Adaptive governance provides the mechanisms for managing gradual and
abrupt change in such complex social-ecological systems [30,76,89]. Adaptive governance prepares
for these uncertainties by relying on adaptive management as a mechanism for building
resilience and reducing vulnerability [90]. In active adaptive management, resource management
actions are implemented as experiments to test competing policy hypotheses with the aim of
generating knowledge about the system [91–94]. However, because adaptive management has largely been implemented as a
technical resource management approach that fails to adequately recognize social and institutional considerations [74,95–97], adaptive governance
provides an appropriate institutional context for the successful implementation of adaptive management [80,94,98]. Given the reluctance of
policymakers in embracing the complexity and uncertainties that characterize human–environment interactions [94,96], combining the scientific
insights from the resilience and adaptive governance literature with the metaphysical assumptions of deep ecology could offer a more compelling
argument for a rethinking of human–nature interactions.
Solvency – Root Cause
The alternative redefines ones sense of self – positioning actions not on
sustainability of anthropocentric views – but broader interconnectedness in
nature
The mechanisms, causes, and harmful effects of climate change have been known since at least 1990 when the IPCC released its first
assessment report, which led to goals, such as the primary objective of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to “avoid
dangerous climate change.” Reaching this goal will require that global mean temperatures do not exceed a 2°C increase compared to
pre-industrial times, something that will require that concentration levels of GHGs are kept within specified limits. What exactly
those limits are depends on assumptions regarding climate sensitivity, but according to several estimates, we are well on our way
toward, and perhaps beyond, dangerous thresholds (IPCC 2014). Moreover, some claim that we will experience severe impacts at a
1.5°C increase or that climate sensitivity is greater than assumed and that we will reach a 2°C increase before the estimated
concentration levels (cf. Hansen et al. 2008). There are treaties devoted to limiting emissions of GHGs to reach the target of avoiding
dangerous interference with climatic systems, the most prominent one being the Kyoto Protocol, resultels are kept at their current
levels but also that they will decline between 2020 and 2100. But of what exactly does deep ecology suggest that we take a
longrange perspective? As a cardinal norm, Naess suggests Self-realization, more precisely, a long-range and
universal maximization of Self-realization (cf. Naess 2008, 81). It is with the insistence of Self-
realization, combined with identification and a holistic ontology , that Naess departs from other
ecocentric environmental philosophers, such as J. Baird Callicott, with a more communitarian approach (cf. Katz
2000). Self-realization in Naess’ sense is not to be understood in narrow, individualist terms; it is a
holistic Self. Indeed, Naess proposes the norm “maximize symbiosis ” as he does not fear that it will lead to the
confusion of being interpreted as entailing an “elimination of individuality in favor of collectivity ” (Naess, 1986,
29). Thus, the Self that Naess suggests that should be maximized long-term is a symbiosis with one’s surrounding, but the important
longterm perspective is an integral part of deep ecology . There is a problem here, however, as Self-realization
still seems dependent on the self’s identification with its surroundings, understood as “a spontaneous, non-rational, but not
irrational, process through which the interest or interests of another being are reacted to as our own interest or interests” (Naess
1985, 261). Nmss seems silent on the issue of posterity, but it is plausible that the identification also has a temporal, long-term
frame. b) The holistic consideration Naesss proposes a holistic view. To him, it seems as if there is a general insistence on
instrumental values in normative frameworks and an emphasis on anthropocentrism and partiality that misses the greater picture.
Expanding the sphere of consideration is an aim of sustainability . From its inception within
policies encapsulated in the Brundtland Report of 1987, an ambition of sustainability is to acknowledge the
environment, society, and economy in order to see their interconnectedness . However, the concept of
sustainability has generated criticism for being anthropocentric. One sharp criticism comes from Nasss, who considers it too
permissible: The report might consider satisfiable any actions compatible with the maximal destruction of life conditions on earth,
the maximal extinction of life-forms [...] as far as these maxima supposedly allow the satisfaction of human needs as those needs are
conceived at any definite time. (Nsess 2008, 297) More comprehensive, albeit not holistic, views have been expounded front several
strands of strong sustainability. However, Naess
wants to move away from the anthropocentrism of
sustainability to more holistic views. Thus, he wants to replace the fragmentary anthropocentric
view of sustainable development. Indeed, the holistic consideration is part of the supremacy of
ontology over ethics inherent in Nasss’ work. That everything is interdependent and that there is a
systematic relation between organisms and the environment is a descriptive assumption , which in
turn provides the foundation for conservatory norms when combined with the right to Self-
realization of all living beings.
Solvency – Intrinsic Value of Nature
The alt forwards nature as having intrinsic value – adopting a deep ecological
mindset spills over to further actions and political change separatee from the
aff’s rigid representations
c) Intrinsic values In the normative system proposed by Ntess, the inherent value of all beings is an axiom. As he suggests, An
intrinsic value is obvious to me, in the sense that it provides a clear justification for me to do something for
the living creature’s own sake, and that alone. I believe that I perceive the intrinsic value. But I call it an axiom
because I cannot find a proof. It is nothing more or less than an intuition. (Nsss [1998)2002, 65) He also considers that the
richness and diversity of life should be protected for its own sake, regardless of instrumental
values (cf. Nress 2008, 100). Intrinsic values are thus axioms from which further norms and hypotheses can be derived. Intrinsic
value is, for Na:ss, an axiom, a starting point. Indeed, he suggests that there are many ways “into” deep ecology that
lead to a commitment or agreement of the platform principles , that is, fundamental premises, such as
religious or philosophical (Spinozist, Whiteheadian, etc.) (Na;ss 2008, 105-07). Such entry points play a central role in what
he calls “the Apron diagram.” The diagram is discussed extensively in, for instance, Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle: Outline of an
Ecosophy (1989, originally published in Norwegian 1976), and offers a possible way of systematically analyzing the relation between
values and descriptive hypotheses on different levels. Cardinal
norms might concern quite general values, such
as liberty, equality, fraternity, intrinsic value, or Self-realization, from which other norms are
then derived (1989, 74). The diagram is divided into four levels: ultimate premises, world-views (Level 1), deep ecology platform
principles (Level 2), normative or factual hypotheses and policies (Level 3), and particular rules, decisions, and actions (Level 4)
(2008, 107). So can, for instance, an individual subscribing to the principles of the deep ecology movement (Level 2) have a
hypothesis that “logging
decreases richness and diversity and is not necessary to satisfy vital needs,”
and that direct action should be non-violent (Level 3), and based on these hypotheses undertake the
action of spiking as a form of non-violent resistance (Level 4) (Nsess, 2008,108). The conclusions on one level
function as the premises on the subsequent lower level (Nsess, 2008,116-17). However, despite being fundamental premises upon
which norms are derived, coupled with hypotheses, the different levels of the Apron diagram will be reconsidered as “[n]ew
information may change any hypotheses and therefore also change norms that have partly been justified on the basis of the
hypotheses being changed” (2008, 109). Norm-sentences are revisable as “actually, their main function is that of proposing tentative
guidelines” (Naess, [1977]2005, 484). What appears to be rigid and absolute is actually a quite fallibilist assumption, which is
adhered to until the point of reasonable doubt (cf. Naess [1998] 2002, 67). Intrinsic
values are not often discussed in
climate change, but they could arguably add another dimension to the all-too-often economic
sustainability discourse, which is based on anthropocentric values .
Blocks
AT Perms
Anthropocentrism and ecocentrism cannot coexist—incorporating the aff’s

immorality papers over the need to stop environmental destruction
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00664677.2016.1243515 //cb
Anthropocentrism/Ecocentrism Dichotomy
Anthropologists have often argued that the anthropocentrism versus ecocentrism (or biocentrism) dichotomy entrenches the
problematic culture-nature dualism (e.g. Ingold and Pálsson 2013; Sullivan 2014). It is argued that political ecology cannot be
properly concep- tualised unless the Nature and Culture dichotomy is dissolved (for instance, Brockington 2002). It is also
assumed that human and nature interests largely coincide , and that the so- called pragmatic
anthropocentric approach leads to positive environmental outcomes (e.g. Norton and Hargrove 1986). The
Nature/Culture dichotomy is seen as an obstacle to finding the common ground, since the two ‘camps’ (that prioritise one over the
other) tend to be rigid, exclusive, and confrontational (Flores and Clark 2001).
Yet, empirically, ecological

and human interests do not always converge . According to Katz and Hargrove (1999),
anthropocentric motivations for environmental protection can sometimes be beneficial to nature. This is, however,
only the case in the context of human- connected environments – in the case of the availability of
(clean) water, air, and soil, for example – but not in the context of species extinction . Indeed, at present,
many species go extinct as human welfare is not contingent on their survival . Therefore, moral
ecocentrism is necessary if the interests of non-humans and their habitats are to be protected
outside of utilitarian interests (Rolston 1997; Crist 2012).
In deconstructing the dichotomy between humans and non-humans , we might be simultaneously
erasing the issue of human chauvinism and speciesism . For example, if we were to reject the
dichotomy between slaves and slave owners (because they are all humans, after all), we might also be de-
politicising the necessity to critically address the institution of slavery itself . Similarly, if we reject the
distinction between the categories of men and women (again because they are all humans, after all), feminists might lose the reason
to support the gender discrimination argument.
Nobody likes dichotomies such as that between anthropocentrism and ecocentrism, or humans and nature. Yet,
practically and ethically speaking, they may be necessary, particularly where blatant
discriminations against non-humans continue. Such discriminations are evident with respect to
animal treatment in the meat industry, in medical experimentation, or in the incidence of roadkill (Thorne
1998; Crist 2012; Desmond 2013). Invoking peoples’ understanding of their moral relationships with
nature- beyond-the-human in non-anthropocentric terms is a necessary measure (Sullivan 2014).
The aff is incompatible with the K – absent a deep ecologist first approach,
West society’s domination will remain unchecked
Klammer and McNamara 19, (Cary L. Klemmer USC Suzanne Dworak-Peck School of Social
Work, University of Southern California; Kathleen A. McNamara U.S. Air Force, Nellis Air Force
Base, NV, USA) “Deep Ecology and Ecofeminism: Social Work to Address Global Environmental
Crisis,” Journal of Women and Social Work, December 13 2019,
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0886109919894650 //SDD
Conclusion: The Natural Ecology and the Science of Social Work Sooner rather than later, issues related
to the environmental crisis will move from the periphery of social concern to the issue
of social concern (Jones, 2010; Kemp et al., 2018). In order for humankind to survive this
challenge, the symbiosis between the ecology of human societies and the natural
physical environment will become an essential component of social work and all related
professions’ theorizing and interventions (Alston, 2013; Jones, 2010). Current responses to
environmental crisis based primarily in climate science are deficient in addressing complex and
intersecting social problems emerging in climate-affected spaces (Alston, 2013). Furthermore, the alarmist tone
with which climate change is discussed, while justified, may further serve to situate
humanity and nature in an adversarial relationship. With deep social justice as a guide,
however, natural ecological theorizing can facilitate a rapprochement between
humankind, the nonhuman natural world, and a changing climate. Thus, deep social justice can spur
social work interventions that fulfill the objectives of the grand challenge to address the
human impacts of the climate crisis in a meaningful and lasting way. The science of social work and its
corresponding American Academy of Social Work and Social Welfare have been created to lay claim to academic
capital and to systematize the professional conduct of the social work profession through the scientific method (Barth
et al., 2014). Ecospiritual
theorizing can ensure that these endeavors of scholarly thinking
will be holistic and nonanthropocentric (Gray & Coates, 2013). Eco-spiritual thought tells that the
natural environment is more than raw resources and that natural ecology possesses
sacred and intrinsic value outside of its utility to humankind. In sum, nature, as both the physical
environment and the natural communion in human interaction, is at risk (Besthorn & McMillen, 2002); if integrated
into a science of social work, ecofeminist and deep ecological guidance will ensure that the quest for progress and
growth does not occur in a way that is harmful and detached from nature. Without
such a consciousness,
the science of social work will perpetuate Western society’s domination over nature and
limit our opportunities to develop a sustainable relationship with the earth . Human and
nonhumankind have everything to lose.
Perm fails – weakens movements and enables anthropocentric exploitation

that turns case
The decisive difference between a shallow and a deep ecology movement hinges on the
willingness to question, and to appreciate the importance of questioning, every economic and political policy
in public. The questioning is “deep” and public. It asks why more insistently and consistently, taking nothing for granted. Deep
ecology can readily admit the practical effectiveness of anthropocentric arguments. “It is essential for conservation to
be seen as central to human interests and aspirations . At the same time, people—from heads of state to the
members of rural communities—will most readily be brought to demand conservation if they themselves recognize the contribution
of conservation to the achievement of their needs, as perceived by them, and the solution of their problems, as perceived by them”
(IUCN 1980, sec. 13). Since most policies serving the biosphere also serve humanity in the long run,
they may, at least initially, be accepted on the basis of narrow “anthropocentric” arguments .
Nevertheless, such a tactical approach has significant limitations . There are three dangers. First, some
policies based on successful anthropocentric arguments turn out to violate or compromise unduly
the objectives of deeper argumentation. Second, the strong motivation to fight for decisive change and the
willingness to serve a great cause are weakened; and, third, the complicated arguments in human-centered
conservation documents such as the World Conservation Strategy go beyond the time and
ability of many people to assimilate and understand and also tend to provoke interminable technical disagreements
among experts. Special interest groups with narrow , short-term exploitative objectives that run counter to saner
ecopolicies often exploit these disagreements and thereby stall the debate and steps toward
effective action. When arguing from deep ecological premises, one need not discuss at all most of the
complicated proposed technological fixes. The relative merits of alternative-technology proposals in industrial
societies concerned with how to increase energy production are pointless if our vital needs have already been met. The focus on
vital issues activates mental energy and strengthens motivation. The
shallow environmental approach, on the other
hand, tends
to make the human population more passi ve and less interested in environmental issues. The
deep ecology movement tries to clarify the fundamental presuppositions underlying our
economic approach in terms of value priorities, philosophy, and religion. In the shallow movement, argument comes to a halt
long before this. The deep ecology movement is therefore “the ecology movement that questions deeper.” The terms
egalitarianism, homocentrism, anthropocentrism, and human chauvinism are often used to characterize points of view on the
shallow– deep ecology spectrum. These terms, though, usually function as slogans that are open to misinterpretation. They can
imply that human beings are in some respects only “plain citizens” (Aldo Leopold) of the planet on a par with all other species, but
they are sometimes interpreted as denying that human beings have any “extraordinary” traits, or that in situations involving vital
interests, human beings have no overriding obligations toward their own kind. They have! In any social movement, rhetoric has an
essential function of keeping members fighting together under the same banner. Rhetorical formulations also serve to provoke
interest among outsiders. Of the betterknown slogans, one might mention “Nature knows best,” “Small is beautiful,” and “All things
hang together.” Clearly, all things in the universe do not hang together at the level of quantum physics or relativity theory: the
slogan only expresses a doctrine of global, not cosmic, relevance. Only a minority of deep ecology supporters are academic
philosophers such as I. Although deep ecology is not a finished philosophical system, this does not mean that movement
philosophers should not try to be as clear as possible. So a discussion of deep ecology as a derivational system may be of value.
Deep ecology constitutes a maximum self-realization that embraces all life-

forms – it increases quality of life, recognizes the unique role of humans, and is
fundamentally incompatible with reform environmentalism
1. The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman life on Earth have value in themselves
(synonyms: inherent worth; intrinsic value; inherent value). These values are independent of the usefulness of
the non-human world for human purposes.

The second sentence draws a line in the sand from the outset between deep ecology and
anthropocentric ‘human survival’ or ‘reform’ environmentalism. Historically, championed by the likes of
Ralph Nader, the latter has focussed on urban pollution problems at the expense of a wider
ecological perspective, although Al Gore has commendably expanded this to embrace the global phenomenon of climate
change, but still from his own human-dominant Christian position (as does GreenFaith with its emphasis on ‘stewardship’). This is
probably the better known, and undoubtedly a more palatable, version of environmentalism.
These differing orientations have led to allegations that deep ecology is misanthropic. Gore has
even gone so far as to suggest that Arne Næss portrays humans as being ‘an alien presence on
the earth’ (Sessions, 1995b: xiii)—not the last accusation of misanthropy we will encounter. Deep
ecologists nonetheless express their indebtedness to reform environmentalism for opening up the debate and mobilising large
numbers of people, and I personally greatly admire Gore’s integrity and efforts to influence.
Deep ecology’s advocates share a wholehearted respect for Gaia’s interrelated natural systems
and a sense of urgency about the need to make profound cultural and social changes in order to
restore and sustain the long-term health of the planet. The cultural and social ‘elephants in the
room’— patriarchy, injustice, inequality and so on— that reform environmentalism habitually
evades are therefore integral, not incidental, to their approach.
2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also
values in themselves.
This clearly echoes the systems dynamics principle of resilience.
3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs.
Our right to do as we please, whether individually or collectively, in this context passes entirely unchallenged, and is often explicitly
asserted in the Zeitgeist. By limiting this right to satisfying our vital needs, deep ecology is entirely
incompatible with economic growth beyond population growth, and thus with the
government policy of every nation on Earth with the possible exception of Bhutan. Deep ecology rejects
the ideology of economic growth and the associated reduction of all values to economic terms
for the purposes of decision-making. It seeks to replace, not reconcile, this ideology with the
practice of ecological sustainability. Thomas Berry frames this as
the ecologist standing against industrial enterprise in defense of a viable mode of human
functioning within the context of a viable planetary process. This opposition between the
industrial entrepreneur and the ecologist has been both the central human issue and the central
earth issue of this late 20th century . … the efforts of the entrepreneur to create a wonderworld
are, in fact, creating a wasteworld, a nonviable environment for the human species. The
ecologist is offering a way of moving toward a new expression of the true wonderworld of
nature as the context for a viable human situation. The current difficulty is that the industrial enterprise has such extensive
control over the planet that we must certainly be anxious about the future. (Berry, 1987/1995: 11)
Without Shepard’s ‘deep sense of engagement with the landscape, with profound connections
to surroundings and to natural processes central to all life’ this disruption of our consumption
would leave an intolerable void, hence the omnipresence of advertising to keep us addicted .
Deep ecology does not compromise our quality of life , as Næss so beautifully illustrated in a 1982 interview
with Stephen Bodian of the Los Angeles Zen Center:
I’m not for the simple life, except in the sense of a life simple in means but rich in goals and
values. I have tremendous ambition. Only the best is good enough for me. I like richness, and I feel richer than the
richest person when I’m in my cottage in the country with water I’ve carried from a certain well
and with wood that I’ve gathered. When you take a helicopter to the summit of a mountain, the view looks like a
postcard and, if there’s a restaurant on top, you might complain that the food is not properly made. But if you struggle up
from the bottom, you have this deep feeling of satisfaction, and even the sandwiches mixed with ski wax and
sand taste fantastic. (Bodian, 1982/1995: 36)
As John Muir famously said, a

day in the mountains is worth a mountain of books, and no amount of
text can convey the joy that such an attitude offers—it has to be lived and experienced in
whatever environment one finds oneself.
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of non-human life requires such a decrease.
This breaking of an almost universal taboo provokes correspondingly widespread accusations of misanthropy against deep ecology. The role of human population growth on
anthropogenic impacts is undeniable, yet we are trapped in a state of cognitive dissonance whereby a naturally decreasing population is an ecologist’s dream and an economist’s
nightmare. However, hostility to any attempt to achieve such a decrease by empowering women and encouraging couples to have fewer children extends far beyond economic
concerns. Even prominent cultural critics such as Naomi Klein and George Monbiot, who I otherwise largely agree with, fudge the issue with misapplied either/or thinking (Klein,
2014: 114n; Monbiot, 2016). The ‘progressive’ presumption is that population reduction amounts to a self-righteous and racist subjugation of the world’s poor by the wealthy,
even though the latter have vastly greater anthropogenic impacts. This is compounded by a parallel suspicion that it is also a patriarchal oppression of women’s rights. According
to the President of Population Matters, the latter arose after the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in 1994.2 Unsurprisingly its
Programme of Action frequently mentioned the need to reduce population growth, but ‘certain women’s groups’ from the U.S. manipulated peoples’ perceptions so successfully
that any talk of ‘population’ as such, or even ‘family planning’, was interpreted as a euphemism for coercive ‘population control’. It isn’t; yet this ridiculous and ultimately tragic
misperception has seriously set back thinking and action, and still crops up in ill-informed coverage of the issue.
The former ‘rich versus poor’ presumption is based on stereotyping of, in Monbiot’s case, ‘post-reproductive wealthy white men’ shifting the blame for their anthropogenic
impacts onto the growing populations of the majority world. As one who meets all these criteria (using the Chapter 1 definition of wealthy), albeit none of them through choice,
I presumably stand accused. However, I take full responsibility for my own impacts, which I try to minimise, and advocate an absolutely even-handed and voluntary global
approach to reducing human population as any other would be unethical and dangerous. I also acknowledged from the outset that the achievable per capita impact reductions
are greatest among the wealthy, and that it is vital that we are educated and act accordingly. Klein’s dismissal, relegated to a footnote in an otherwise brilliant 566-page book, of
‘population control’ (that term again, with its implied coercion) as a distraction and a moral dead end uses the same straw man argument as Monbiot—i.e., that it is instead the
excessive consumption by the rich that is the problem.3 Of course I share their outrage and disgust at such greed and selfishness, and deep ecology is both radical and
uncompromising about the limits to consumption in point 3. Moreover, I admire both Monbiot and Klein enormously; so why this persistent blind spot? Even the simplest
analysis shows that every contributing factor to anthropogenic impacts is ‘the problem’ and that they all have to be addressed concurrently; we have run out of wriggle room,
hence the need for both points 3 and 4.
One doesn’t need much imagination to see that our quality of life would improve if there were fewer of us, with more of everything to go round and less overcrowding, thereby
reducing our alienation from nature and from each other. Conversely, the consequences of endless population growth look decidedly ugly to anyone except, presumably, an
ecomodernist. The more of us there are competing for control of finite resources, the fewer of those resources will remain and the greater the risk of conflict, famine and flight.
More of us will suffer directly from anthropogenic impacts such as climate change, extreme weather events and so on. Bluntly stated, both the absolute number and proportion
of violent and agonizing human deaths, whether at the hands of another or from natural catastrophe, will inevitably increase with population. So how can voluntarily reducing
our population size through peaceful means to enhance our quality of life and reduce human suffering be construed as misanthropic?
I will return to this vexed topic, hopefully sounding less like a defence lawyer, in the following section. For now, it is worth noting that when the eight ‘deep ecology basic
principles’ were formulated, the estimated global population was under 5 billion, and has increased by well over 50% since then. The 2017 U.N. population projections to 2100
shown in Figure 7.1 show what a dramatic difference an apparently small change in global fertility rates can make.
[FIGURE OMITTED]
5. Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation is
rapidly worsening.
Indeed. The principles were formulated about half-way between the start of the Great Acceleration and the present day, and eight
years before the first Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro and adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) in 1992. Awareness of global heating outside the fossil fuel industry was minimal in 1984.
6. Policies must therefore be changed. The policies affect basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting
state of affairs will be deeply different from the present.
Indeed, which is why deep ecology upsets entrenched interests. The premise of this book is that psychology underpins all three basic
structures. Lovelock’s concept of ‘sustainable retreat’ reflects the realities of the second half of life in Jung’s model.
7. The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent
rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound
value)
awareness of the difference between big and great.
This is the vital shift of perception or attitude , which I personally hesitate to label as ‘ideology’. Without it,
and the upsides mentioned under points 3 and 4, deep ecology appears unremittingly bleak
and restrictive; with them, it can increase our quality of life. The difference between big and
great, which resembles quantity versus quality, is the essence of frugality as defined above, and
brings to mind the title of E.F. Schumacher’s ground-breaking Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered
(Schumacher, 1973/1974).
8. Those
who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to
implement the necessary changes.
Although I do indeed happen to ‘subscribe to the foregoing points’, my attempts to minimise my own impacts, engage with others
and write this book began long before I became aware of the ‘eight principles’ or even deep ecology per se. In this I am surely not
alone, for deep ecology is, like analytical psychology, decentralised and self-questioning, so its
expression through women and men from diverse cultures and disciplines is both welcomed
and constantly evolving. I suggest that the eight principles should be adopted more as a
framework for mindful living than an environmentalist equivalent of Isaac Asimov’s ‘Three
Laws of Robotics’ (with all the problems they entailed), otherwise they would become a new
ideology which, thankfully, Næss explicitly rejects. Like individuation, it is ordered by something
greater than any ego-driven will to conformity or power, finding unique conscious expression
in, for example, Dolores LaChapelle’s passion for ritual, Joanna Macy’s ‘Council of All Beings’,
David Abram’s magical prose and Gary Snyder’s poetry. The common thread is a way of being
in the world in harmony with Gaia, and hence with oneself. These characteristics appear in an important
passage from Jung that was written before deep ecology was even mooted:
Resistance to the organised mass can be effected only by the man who is as well organised in
his individuality as the mass itself. I fully realise that this proposition must sound well-nigh unintelligible to the man of
today. The helpful medieval view that man is a microcosm, a reflection of the great cosmos in miniature, has long since dropped
away from him, although the very existence of his world-embracing and world-conditioning psyche might have taught him better.
(Jung, 1957/1970: §540)
The first sentence accords with Næss’ insistence that deep ecology is not institutionalised as a religion or an
ideology, or even a philosophy in any proper academic sense (Næss, 1986: 17). The second sentence
accords with deep ecology’s psychological rather than moralistic approach to environmentalism by
expanding self beyond the boundaries of the narrow ego through the process of caring
identification with larger entities such as forests , bioregions and the planet as a whole. Echoing
Hillman’s questioning of the demarcation between ‘me’ and ‘not me’, this identification was not
just theorised but clearly experienced by Jung at the simple (it had no electricity or even running
water) stone dwelling he built at Bollingen:
At times I feel as if I am spread out over the landscape and inside things, and am myself living in
every tree, in the splashing of the waves, in the clouds and the animals that come and go, in the
processions of the seasons. (Jung, 1963/1995: 252)
Although Næss seems not to have been directly influenced by Jung’s ideas, there are intriguing parallels between the two men, not
least in the importance for them both of solitude and communion with nature. Jung built his lakeside retreat at Bollingen in
Switzerland, and Næss built a little cabin, ‘Tvergastein’, high on his favourite mountain in Arctic Norway, spending up to six months
at a time living there. Jung sailed a dinghy, Næss climbed mountains—significantly both are activities which encourage and benefit
from frugality as defined above. There are intriguing parallels between their theories too. Like Jung, Næss formulated a concept of
‘Self-realisation’ within his ‘Ecosophy T’ framework (which is, admittedly, hard going for anyone other than a professional
philosopher; apparently ‘T’ is for Tvergastein). Although his concept of the ‘ecological Self’ is somewhat different from Jung’s, they
both took inspiration from the Upanishads and clearly differentiated their respective ‘Self’ concepts from the domain of the
individual ego:
I do not use this expression in any narrow, individualistic sense . I want to give it an expanded
meaning based on the distinction between a large comprehensive Self and narrow egoistic self
as conceived of in certain Eastern traditions of atman. This large comprehensive Self …
embraces all the life forms on the planet … together with their individual selves … Viewed
systematically, not individually, maximum Self-realization implies maximizing the
manifestations of all life.
This definition by Næss indicates that his ecological concept of ‘Self’ can legitimately be regarded as a Gaian complement to the
Jungian Self, and he accords the same primacy to Self-realisation that Jung did. There is a striking similarity between the last line in
the above citation—‘Viewed systematically, not individually, maximum Self-realization implies maximizing the manifestations of all
life’—and the opening lines of Jung’s autobiography: ‘My life is a story of the self-realisation of the unconscious. Everything in the
unconscious seeks outward manifestation, and the personality too desires to evolve out of its unconscious conditions and to
experience itself as a whole’ (Jung, 1963/1995: 17). The former refers to the ‘outer’ world, the latter to the ‘inner’—they are
complementary. Moreover, just as individuation encourages wholeness, deep ecology fosters diversity
within unity , and not just biodiversity as in Gaia theory: ‘Deep cultural diversity is an analogue
on the human level to the biological richness and diversity of life-forms’ (Næss, 1986: 73). In short, both
Jungian psychology and deep ecology embrace wholeness, of which the majority is other-than-ego in the
former, and other-than-human in the latter. In other words, deep ecology is, above all, biocentric, not
anthropocentric, viewing us as just one constituency among others in the biotic community,
and recognising the intrinsic value of all. It therefore asserts that ecologically effective ethics
can only arise within the context of a cosmology of fundamental interrelatedness. This radical
practical and ethical stance is widely misinterpreted as a denial of the unique role of Homo
sapiens in Gaia—apparently the parting of the ways between deep ecology and the ‘new
anthropocentrism’ advocated by Clive Hamilton. This is because, as is so often the case, equality is
erroneously conflated with identity. Of course deep ecology recognises that humans have a
unique role , unique powers and hence unique responsibilities, and are profoundly different
from, say, trees, bacteria or fish. A more egalitarian relationship with other life forms does not
reduce everything to homogeneity; if anything, it encourages a sense of wonder at their
diversity.
The foregoing already impressive parallels between deep ecology and analytical psychology are further enriched by the structural
correlations between Homo sapiens and ego. These correlations explicitly connect the outer movement in deep ecology from our
anthropocentric Zeitgeist towards a biocentric worldview/ethos and a smaller human population with the inner movement of the
midpoint of the personality from the ego towards, and under the influence of, the Jungian Self in the individuation process. This is
summarised in Table 7.1.
This schema highlights the difference between deep ecology and anthropocentric ‘reform
environmentalism’ , which could be more plausibly compared with psychological quick fixes
such as medication, counselling or ‘pop psychology’ . Its over-dependence on technological
remedies is analogous to the widespread overuse of psycho-pharmaceuticals. While analytical
psychology as a therapeutic practice does not depend on medication, in cases of serious
disorder it may be necessary to restore sufficient psychic stability and structure, i.e., self-
regulation, for psychotherapy to be effective. In other words, medication can be a prerequisite, but not a
substitute, for Jungian psychotherapy. Unfortunately, in a healthcare industry driven by economic might, the relatively low financial
costs of medication and powerful influence of ‘big pharma’ versus the high costs of psychotherapy favour the former in the long
term too. This prejudice reflects our materialistic Zeitgeist. Technological remedies, such as renewable energy,
are essential, but cannot be long-term substitutes for adapting our lifestyles along the lines
proposed by deep ecology.
As a postscript,
it is intriguing to contrast the terms ‘deep ecology’ and ‘depth psychology’ with ‘high
technology’, ‘high society’, ‘high flier’ etc. in the context of the movement of the Western
religious perspective from Earth to heaven. Our entire notion of ‘progress’ is upward on the y-
axis of the Cartesian coordinate system. Of course, as we ‘grow up’ we become taller , and I still
remember my childhood pride in the pencil lines advancing up the wall. We forget, however, that in becoming taller
we also press more heavily downwards upon the Earth.
Adoption of the Buddhist concepts of Interbeing and impermanence enables a

shift from egocentrism to ecocentrism
Khisty, 06 (C. Jotin Khisty, PhD, Professor Emeritus of Civil Engineering, “Meditations on
Systems Thinking, Spiritual Systems, and Deep Ecology,” Systemic Practice and Action Research,
2006) https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11213-006-9019-3#citeas //cb
6. Buddhist philosophy vis-a-vis Deep Ecology
According to Buddhist philosophy, the ‘self’ is a metaphor – a metaphoric construct of identity and agency.
For a moral connectedness and interdependence , in accordance with Buddhist thinking, we have to
dismantle our ‘ego-centricity’ and embrace ‘eco-centricity’ , which is in line with the systemic view
of life. By embracing eco-centricity there will be a resurgence of non-dualistic spiritualities (Macy 1990).
To imagine one as a separate ego, a source of action and of awareness, entirely separate and independent from the rest of the
world, locked up inside a bag of skin, is in the view of the Eastern Philosophies, a kind of hallucination .
Eastern philosophies
say that we are not strangers on this Earth who have come into this world as the result of a fluke of
nature, or as spirits from somewhere outside nature altogether. We truly belong to the Earth (Watts 1995).
When the ecological movement first got started several decades ago in the Western world, the
fight was against pollution
and resource depletion. Human beings were put above nature; value was seen as residing in
human beings, with nature given only instrumental value . As mentioned before, this anthropocentric
movement was essentially Shallow Ecology in comparison with Deep Ecology which is truly
holistic, which considers human beings as an intrinsic part of nature , and merely as a special strand in
the fabric of life (Capra 1996). In many ways the Deep Ecology movement is an extension of spiritual
systems, particularly that of Buddhism, placing Deep Ecology firmly in the realm of spiritual systems.
Arne Naess proposed that environmental ethics evolves from two fundamental values – self-realization
and bio-centric equality. Self-realization can be achieved by reflection and contemplation , giving us
the ability to feel connected with something greater than our own ego. Achieving bio-centric equality gives us the
understanding that we are one with all other sentient beings, with no special rights, just because
we are human. The precepts of deep ecology can be sometimes challenging, giving us an attractive approach to examine
environmental ethics, once the basic tenets are intuitively accepted (Vesalind and Gunn 1998).
In essence, deep ecology is manifest as the intuitive heart of the spiritual traditions, particularly Buddhist
philosophy. Berry’s words add special meaning to what is included in this section. He writes, “In reality, there is a single
integral community of the Earth that includes all its component members whether human or other than
human. In this community every being has its own role to fulfill, its own dignity, its inner spontaneity . . . .
Every being enters into communion with other beings. This capacity for relatedness for presence to other beings, for spontaneity in
action, is a capacity possessed by every mode of being throughout the universe (Berry 1999, p. 4)
In summary, there
is an intimate relationship between Buddhist philosophy and the Deep Ecology
movement. The history of Buddhist thought and practice, especially the principles of nonviolence, non-injury,
and reverence for life, makes it particularly easy for those who follow Buddhist philosophy to understand and appreciate
Deep Ecology (Naess 1986).
7. Other core Buddhist concepts
It was felt that there were a few more core concepts in the Buddhist tradition that needed to be addressed to elucidate some of the
finer issues described in this paper. These are: (a) the recognition of ‘Impermanence,’ (b) the meaning of ‘Interdependent Co-Arising’
and ‘Interbeing,’ and (c) the significance of ‘Emptiness.’
Let’s consider ‘Impermanence’ first. The three marks of existence are impermanence, egolessness (or selflessness), and ‘existential
anxiety’ or suffering (Varela et al. 1991).‘Impermanence’ forms the bedrock of Buddhist thinking. All
phenomena are
impermanent, reminiscent of philosophers and scientists from Heraclitus to Heisenberg, because everything is in
transition, and it would thus be a folly to hold on to our experiences, our possessions, or our lives .
Existential anxiety (suffering) caused by our ego, selfishness, and greed is inevitable if impermanence is ignored (Nisker 1998). To put
it another way, it
is the false notion of permanence that rules our lives and contributes to our
existential anxiety.
The topic of Interdependent Co-Arising (or Dependent Origination) is taken up next. This term, as used in a Buddhist text
(Skt: Pratityasamutpada), refers to the science of cause and effect, similar to what one encounters in systems thinking. This principle
means that all
conditioned things and events in the universe come into being only as a result of the
interaction of various causes and conditions . This is significant because it precludes two possibilities: first, that
things can arise from nowhere, with no cause and conditions, and second, that things can arise on account of a transcendent
designer or creator (Dalai Lama 2002). The all-encompassing range of interdependent co-arising is best caught in the short, though
deceptively simple formulation: “When
this is, that is; this arising, that arises. When this is not, that is
not; this ceasing, that ceases.” (Smith and Novak 2003).
Another version and meaning of the term ‘Interdependent Co-arising’ is ‘Interbeing ,’ a word that is really a
portmanteau, a made-up word, coined by the Buddhist monk, Thich Nhat Hanh (1998), that includes the concepts
of interconnectedness, interdependence, and interrelatedness. In fact, everything is a part of everything else , not
only spatially but tem- porally as well. We are situated in an implicate order, and thus everything is a
microcosm of all other things. We, along with all other things, are embedded in a context, within
the universe. Hanh (2000) explains ‘interbeing’ as a fundamental reality of life where “things do
not exist separately and outside each other. In reality, things exist inside each other and with each other.” He goes
on to explain: “Consider the analogy: A cup has an inside and an outside. Yet it is one cup, not just an inside and an outside, but one
seamless whole. Using this analogy, it might be said that mind is the inside of matter and matter is the outside of mind; but even so,
there is one seamless whole” (Low 2002, p. 59). Readers may recall that in Section 3 of this paper under ‘Systems Thinking,’ Wilber
said something quite similar to this analogy, and so did Teilhard de Chardin, which demonstrates the link between Buddhist and
Systems thinking. We tend to suffer from an experience of self that exists vacuously in a realm of
separation, limitation, and discrimination . However through an understanding of the meaning of
‘interbeing,’ it is possible that one’s preoccupation with self may simply dis- solve . In its place, one
may become aware of the subtle web of interconnections shared with others, with our experience of
place and time, and ultimately with the universe . Thich Nhat Hanh qualifies this experience as follows: “Interbeing
means you cannot exist by yourself alone, you have to ‘inter-be’; this is non-self. Touching one side of reality deeply,
you also touch the other side. You can only understand the meaning of impermanence when you
have understood the meaning of non-self or interbeing ” (Hanh 2000, p. 175).
The third topic that is considered here is ‘Emptyness.’ In a most dramatic way, Churchman (1979) teases out the meaning of
‘nothingness’ reminiscent of the basic ideas of ‘zeroness’ and ‘emptyness’, described in Buddhist philosophy. In his postscript to
Chapter 10, of his book: The Systems Approach and Its Enemies, (pp. 185–186), Churchman writes: “This section considers the
worship of nothingness, which entails, of course, the worship of everything. In such an excursion, every thing
and everything, no thing and nothing are allowed to play together”. . . . Referring to Zen Buddhism, he continues:
“in every thing there is nothing nothing belongs to every thing every thing belongs to everything everything contains nothing”
and if we permit “is” to replace “belongs to” or “belongs in” we have
“nothing is everything”
“every thing is everything”
the second being reminiscent of the earlier principle “in every system are all systems.”
Churchman’s understanding corresponds closely with Buddhist philosophy as borne out in the ‘Prajnaparamita Heart
Sutra’ or ‘The Heart of Perfect Understanding’ , a text that is regarded as the essence of Buddhist teaching. This text
says that when one considers a particular object to be empty, it means it is empty of a separate,
independent existence, because everything in this world has to inter-be with everything else ,
including the mind. It is empty of a separate self; but empty of a separate self means it is full of everything (Hanh 1988).
The alt builds on current spiritual movements to build an ecocentric society free
from capitalist globalization
Khisty, 06 (C. Jotin Khisty, PhD, Professor Emeritus of Civil Engineering, “Meditations on
Systems Thinking, Spiritual Systems, and Deep Ecology,” Systemic Practice and Action Research,
2006) https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11213-006-9019-3#citeas //cb
9. Building a culture of awakening and action
There is already evidence of an emerging cultural shift, as millions of people and their leaders are stirring, as if from a trance, to
questions concerning such issues as spiritual awakening, ecological literacy, economic systems, and ethical issues. Many others are taking
to the streets by the hundreds of thousands demanding a restoration of democracy, an end to the rule of large global
corporations, and respect for the needs of all people and other sentient beings (Korten 2001). I will now
examine the areas where action is emerging in a positive way.
9.1. Spiritual systems Spiritual

awakening is one such transformation . For instance, in Zen Buddhism the
awakening of awareness in an individual, is metaphorically equivalent to the ‘opening of the
third eye.’ When such awakening occurs collectively, it naturally leads to the potential for groups of people to awaken to the need for social
awareness and social responsibility through ‘the opening of the fourth eye’ (Jones 2003). The beginnings of this collective wakening started perhaps in
the 1960s. Since then, engaged
collective awareness has matured and is currently dealing head on with a
world characterized by postmodernism, free market globalization , and global terrorism.
9.2. Ecological and environmental systems Thegreat challenge of our time is to build and nurture sustainable
communities – social, cultural, and physical. The first step in this endeavor has been to press for ‘eco-
literacy’: to understand that ecosystems evolve for sustaining the web of life. The second step has moved towards ‘eco-design’: to drive towards
such actions as organic farming, the development of industries into ecological clusters in which the waste of any one industry is a resource for another,
and the development and production of affordable non-motorized vehicles. Fortunately, some of these sustainable systems are already in place and are
being improved and refined still further. Note, that eco-literacy and eco-design require applications of systems
thinking – thinking in terms of relationships, contexts, patterns, and processes (Capra 2002). On the other
hand, our record with respect to such issues as resource efficiency, service and flow economy, energy
conservation, ecological degradation, and infrastructure expansion and design, has been rather limited and in
some cases deplorable. The reason for this poor record is that the causes of most of our present ecological and social
problems are deeply embedded in our economic systems and the current form of global
capitalism which is ecologically and socially unsustainable, and hence politically difficult to achieve in the long run (Capra 2002). In a cogent paper,
Bell and Morse (2005), have described how they “developed a holistic approach to what is essentially a timeless need for understanding, systemic
planning, and a compassionate stewardship,” in recent work that they undertook in Malta and Lebanon. Their example indicates the need to truly
understand problems connected with sustainability issues, requiring a much wider perspective to environmental problems than what is being practiced
in the developing world today.
9.3. Economic systems and consumerism According

to free market capitalism all values can be reduced to the
monetary value ascribed to them by buyers of goods and services in the competitive market. The prime movers of this
system are the transnational corporations (TNCs) whose economic powers typically surpass that of most of the world’s
sovereign states. Naturally, for TNCs to prosper and survive they must make a competitive profit, they must constantly grow, they must keep ahead of
competitors by consuming considerable resources and raw materials to satisfy consumers, and they must somehow subvert the democratic institutions
to serve their own selfish interests. The TNCs and their successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO), are able to get what they want because of their
influence in the regulation of the global market. Third World countries and the poorer sections of their populations are the worst victims of the policies
of WTO. What we find today is that one-third
of all economic activity worldwide is generated by only two
hundred corporations, which are linked to each other by strategic alliances. As David Loy puts it “ consumerism is the most
successful religion of all times, winning more converts more quickly than any previous belief system or value system in human
history” (Loy 2002). While the World Trade Organization, created in the mid-1990s, was hailed by all nations, rich and poor, as one that would produce
worldwide economic benefits, and where wealth would trickle down to everybody, it was soon apparent to a large number of environmentalists and
other grassroots organizations that the
rules established by the WTO were totally unsustainable, creating
fatal consequences such as a breakdown of democracy, rapid deterioration of the environment,
and increasing poverty and alienation. As a result, mass demonstrations have been systematically
launched against the policies of the WTO since 1998, with riots in 1999, in Seattle, WA, forcing the delegates to gather
behind highly armed police barricades. Apart from the Seattle riot, scores of large demonstrations in both developed and developing countries have
been reported, such as the in Bangalore, India, the Mexican state of Chiapas, Papua in New Guinea, Madrid, and Washington DC., and the struggle
continues unabated (Korten 2001). This living democracy movement, challenging the foundations of capitalism, aims to demonstrate that the quality of
life of everyone is of far greater importance than the aggregate consumption of the privileged few. These riots also clearly indicate
the profound political shift emerging in the US as well as in other developing countries. People have discovered that the
WTO is ill-suited to the task of building a just, sustainable, and compassionate society that can nurture sufficiency, partnership, and respect for life and
its values (Korten 2001). Naturally, a new kind of civil society, organized to counterbalance globalization, is
gradually emerging, embodied in powerful international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), such as Oxfam, Greenpeace, and the
Third World Network, plus hundreds of other smaller organizations, all of which are forging ahead as social actors in a new political environment (Capra
2002).
9.4. Ethical systems
It has been recognized by many activists devoted to peace and social justice that, beneath
all expressions of violence,
there is a spirit of coerciveness, which is pervasive in probably all cultures. To counteract this coerciveness the following
actions continue to prove successful:
Creative Nonviolence: Of the several kinds of thinking about nonviolence that are practiced, creative nonviolence, in the tradition
of Mahatma Gandhi and Buddhist ethics is well accepted and documented. In this style of nonviolence opposing parties are open to
persua- sion and are not seeking a one-sided triumph. In other words one does not declare victory over the opponent but rather
over the situation, and as a consequence learns something important from the adversary. Satyagraha is another form of time
honored creative nonviolence, made up of two elements – love and force – a dialectical spiritually inspired nonviolence, practiced
and refined by Gandhi.
Creative Culture of Peace: Again, in the tradition of Mahatma Gandhi, Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hanh, and Sulak Sivaraksa, the
Buddhist activist in Thailand, and countless other people across the world, the
principle of ‘Ahimsa,’ (the ‘Path of
Harmlessness’) has been actively put to use in stopping armed conflicts after they have broken out or has
prevented such conflicts and crises from starting. Such intervention has stopped or considerably reduced social
injustice and misery. While short-term ‘fire-fighting’ tactics of peacemaking have been used in innumerable cases, for saving
lives and for winning time, the long-term, in-depth work to develop cultures of peace has won Hindu and Buddhist activists a lot of
recognition (Jones 2003).
While the latter half of the twentieth century developed the most sophisticated technologies and organizational abilities, coupled
with enormous wealth to inflict death and suffering on others as well as on itself, the last quarter of the century has freely used
these technologies for novel forms of war, conflicts and terrorism, a free market capitalism, the deepest levels of environmental
degradation, and the exponential growth of material consumption within a finite ecosystem (Jones 2003). Faced with these
challenges, Buddhist thinking calls for a modest concept of living, embracing simplicity, frugality,
and an emphasis on what is essential, as cogently described by Schumacher in his essay on Buddhist Economics (1973).
If we accept the thesis that the pollution of nature and the pollution of the mind are the two faces of
the same coin, exploring a viable environmental psychology becomes a significant venture, as prescribed by Buddhist ethical
practice. Such practice recognizes greed, hatred, and delusion as the root causes of our problems
and suffering .
Absolute faith in innovation and technological change is a form of hubris that

alienates us from nature and ensures civilization collapse – collective healing
cannot be a top-down process.
Perhaps the surest historical predictor of the impending collapse of a civilisation is hubris , which
in our case sums up all that is most actively dysfunctional in our present attitude to the other-than-human world now that the age of
the hero (as conventionally understood) has passed. Hubris is overweening pride, superciliousness or arrogance, often resulting in
fatal retribution or nemesis, as the Old Testament explicitly warns: ‘Pride goes before destruction, a haughty spirit before a fall’
(Proverbs 16:18). In ancient Greece, hubris referred to actions which, intentionally or not, shamed and humiliated the victim, and
frequently the perpetrator as well. It was most evident in the public and private actions of the powerful and rich, which in the global
context today again means our culture. The word was also used to describe actions of those who challenged the gods or their laws,
especially in Greek tragedy, resulting in the protagonist’s downfall. Hubris was considered a crime in classical Athens. It was also
considered the greatest sin of the ancient Greek world. The parallels of all these aspects of hubris with our current collective
situation are obvious and alarming.
The most general manifestation of hubris in our culture is the unquestioning belief in the
benefits of progress . This has many consequences, the most obvious of which is the automatic
equation of newer with better. At the fundamental level of Western science, peer review and empirical testing ensure
that this is generally the case, and ‘better’ is unequivocally defined as a closer match between theory and observation. However, in
other domains, notably the ideological and material, it is far from clear what constitutes
improvement. For goods and services, newness per se without any other proven merit is not just a strong selling point, but a
lynchpin of our growth economies; likewise built-in redundancy. The rate of technological change, especially since
the Great Acceleration, and our obsession with the latest products has resulted in older wisdom
being dismissed as redundant or simply forgotten. This has societal as well as cognitive
consequences, not least in the widespread reversal of the status of older people from respected
elders and repositories of knowledge in traditional cultures to marginalised techno-illiterati in
ours.
Our faith in progress and the commensurate assumption that our civilisation will endure forever,
despite our knowledge of the decline and fall of all previous civilisations (which had presumably
all assumed likewise), goes largely unchallenged. The ideology of globalisation extends that
assumption to the acquisition and merger of every other civilisation on the planet into ours. No
statement of these erroneous assumptions has been more succinct, uncompromising and, unfortunately, influential than that of the
Stanford political scientist Francis Fukuyama in his now notorious essay, ‘The End of History?’ Amidst
all the self-righteous
gloating over the demise of the Soviet Union, Fukuyama trumpeted Western liberal democracy
—an institution that just three decades later looks increasingly precarious—as the final form of
human government (Fukuyama, 1989: 4). Flattery gets you everywhere, and Fukuyama’s triumphalist
fundamentalism has continued to mesmerise Western policymakers and petrify our social
imagination long after he repudiated it. He has nonetheless subsequently claimed to be a ‘rock star’ in recently
democratised countries such as Ukraine, Poland, Myanmar and Indonesia, and his 2014 book Political Order and Political Decay has
been privately translated, and is required reading, for the senior leadership in China (Yang, 2014).
We are unable to let go of the heroic attitude that has brought us unprecedented material
comfort and security, but now threatens us with the opposite. Nowhere is this more apparent
than in our attitude to climate change, which Rex Tillerson, addressing the U.S. Council on
Foreign Relations as CEO of ExxonMobil, reduced to an ‘ engineering problem’ (Daily, 2012; Daily,
2012). The whole ‘techno-fix’ mentality is another instance of hammers and nails , but a dangerous
one this time, and just one example of our ‘cherished convictions and principles’ beginning ‘to
harden and to grow increasingly rigid’ (Jung, 1954/1969: §773). Jung’s bleak warning that ‘ the world today
hangs by a thin thread, and that thread is the psyche of man ’ (Jung, 1957/1977: 303) is worth reiterating as
it lays such hubris bare.
Apart from the extraordinary success of our technology, which is beyond dispute and mostly a cause for celebration, I suggest that
alienation from nature is another contributing factor to our hubris . According to the United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2018 Revision of World Urbanization Prospects (DESA, 2018 ),
55% of the world’s
population lives in urban areas, a proportion that is expected to increase to 68% by 2050. The most
urbanised regions include Northern America (with 82% of its population living in urban areas in 2018) and Europe (74%). By 2030,
the world is projected to have 43 megacities with more than 10 million inhabitants, most of them in developing regions. This
matters, not least because, as Lovelock notes,
Scientists are usually condemned to lead urban lives, but I find that country people still living close to the earth often seem puzzled
that anyone should need to make a formal proposition of anything as obvious as Gaia theory. For them it is true and always has
been. (Lovelock, 1979/2000: 10)
Thanks to light pollution, many city-dwellers, especially the urban poor, may rarely, if ever, see a starry night sky. Stargazing was an
everyday experience for our ancestors, a constant source of awe and a humbling reminder of our smallness in the cosmos. Likewise,
we are largely sheltered from the elements —earth reduced to dirt, water confined to pipes,
fire controlled unseen in the internal combustion engine, power stations and central heating,
and air conditioned to a standstill in our built environment. All are rebounding dangerously in
the Anthropocene through erosion, floods, wildfires and storms respectively. However, intriguing
though that may be, my point here is that alienation from nature not only engenders an exaggerated sense
of human control, achievement and importance, but is also a major factor in our
disenchantment. If hubris were a car, then this psychological doublewhammy of ego inflation
and loss of soul would be a lethal combination of ‘pedal to the metal’ and cutting the brake
pipes. Another demographic disproportionately susceptible to this path to hubris is those at
the top of the power structure. By this I mean the people who determine many aspects of our
lives, especially leaders in business and government whose professional environments alternate between cities,
limousines, airports and aircraft cabins, with the other-than-human world limited to little more than potted
plants and perhaps an occasional round of golf. Airports in particular are like a glimpse into a
dystopian future of total isolation from nature or even fresh air and sunlight, combined with a
heavily policed and paranoid human environment of unrelated strangers in which consumption
is the only permitted activity. When such a way of life becomes normalised, it reinforces already
unhealthily strong aspirations to power and recognition in the human world to fill the void. This
form of personal hubris makes it even harder to envisage collective healing of our relationship
with Gaia being a top-down process.
AT – Alt Causes
Deep Ecology assumes alt causes – anthropocentrism is a pathway towards
GREATER ecological sustainability
A second important critique that emerges in literature concerned with the Global South involves the
formation of the anthropocentric/biocentric divide in deep ecology . Guha and Martinez-Alier
(1997) argue that deep ecology, at least implicitly, argues that the needs of the biosphere are more
important than the needs of humans. Moreover, they argue that anthropocentrism is a false cause of environmental
degradation, instead of blaming structures of power such as overconsumption and militarization in
their analysis. Deep ecology’s insistence on both ecocentrism as a solution to environmental
degradation and especially its insistence upon anthropocentrism as a root cause of degradation,
according to critics, serves to distract the focus of ecological sustainability away from these other concrete problems. These more
concrete problems also have direct environmental consequences in the Global South, unlike the shadow of anthropocentric culture
(p. 94-5). Though these critiques concerned with the anthropocentric/biocentric divide point out
issues that also cause environmental harm and relate closer to Bookchin’s social ecology 98
arguments concerning hierarchy and domination, I have already addressed the purpose and the
value that anthropocentrism has in deep ecology, arguing that it can (at the very least) serve as a
conceptual dividing line that helps in categorizing anthropocentric versus ecocentric actions .
Moreover, I have argued that anthropocentric culture reinforces more concrete problems like
those mentioned by Guha and Martinez-Alier (1997), serving to perpetuate these institutional
causes through a metanarrative that fundamentally places humans both at odds with nature
and in a position of moral superiority. While this critique is important because it points out causes that cannot be
ignored by deep ecology in its overall analysis of environmental problems, deep ecology has acknowledged that
problems beyond anthropocentrism must be addressed on the pathway toward greater
ecological sustainability (See Johns, 1990, p. 251-2).
AT – Social Eco/Bookchin
Social ecology allows for important debate that reinvigorates Deep Ecology –
similarities spur radical change
This section seeks to establish—given some important similarities between social ecology and deep ecology —
that the critiques listed above may not be as devastating to deep ecology as they first appear. Moreover, these similarities can
provide some common ground for critical engagement between these two theories , creating a space
for debate about the importance of a variety of aspects in the establishment of ecologically sustainable societies. The
differences between these two theories may not be surmountable , but the similarities can provide avenues
for discussion and debate. The recognition that each theory has a vital role to play in the formation of radical ecopolitical societies
makes the discussion of their similarities vital to the political debate surrounding the merits of
radical ecopolitical thought. For example, while social ecology provides a critique of contemporary institutions and
hierarchies that reinforce existing power structures that devastate humans and the environment, deep ecology provides a
critique of anthropocentric culture, providing an impetus for changing the belief systems that
undergird political and social institutions. Furthermore, while social ecology is able to focus on how
the 72 oppression of humans results in environmental degradation, deep ecology is able to
ensure that nature plays an equal role in political debates about how to structure radical
ecopolitical societies and is not lost in debates regarding social problems. Without deep
ecology, nature has the potential to become lost in social ecology given its intense focus on the
domination and oppression of human beings. Given these important roles that each theory can play in the transformation of
contemporary political societies, it is vital that they have common ground to stand on when engaging in debate and when
attempting to insight action. Granted, disagreement will be a part of the process of transformation given that these two theories
fundamentally disagree about the steps that need to be taken first for the formation of radical ecopolitical societies. Nevertheless,
however, they
each have important similarities that tend to reinvigorate deep ecology , and, in
particular, give
it an important role in instigating radical change. To begin with, both social ecology
and deep ecology emphasize the importance of selfrealization and liberation (Keulartz, 1998, 119). Keulartz
(1998) argues that both strains of thought are much more closely aligned on these points than most in either field might care to
acknowledge (p. 119). For Bookchin (1989), individual agency constitutes a way for humans to change problematic social institutions
in the pursuit of greater human freedom, social flourishing, and ecologically sound practices (p. 201-3). For deep ecology, by
contrast, individual agency can engender an ontologically re-formulated vision of how one relates to nature, engendering better
practices toward the environment in contemporary society (Dobson, 1995, p. 91). While social
ecology places individual
action at the locus of how individuals relate to sparking change in social institutions, deep
ecology places individuals at the center of its discussion of agency for how they can change their
individual relationships with nature, resulting 73 in cultural changes throughout anthropocentric contemporary society.
In social ecology, then, the impetus lies in individual’s ability to change institutions and reject hierarchies, while in deep ecology this
impetus lies in the individual human’s ability to change his or her mindset about humanity’s relationship to nature. This focus on the
agency of individuals in both theories can create dialogue about how individuals play a role in the formation of ecological societies,
albeit from starkly divergent viewpoints. Furthermore, this focus on an individual human’s capacity for change in deep ecology
lessens some of the critiques that social ecology formulates about the theory, namely that deep ecology promotes anti-humanism.
By arguing that a change in individual consciousness can engender societal change toward
ecocentric societies, deep ecology recognizes the power that human beings possess for creating
radical change. Where deep ecology differs from social ecology in its formation of individual agency lies in its insistence on the
force of ideas. Deep ecology projects a much more Hegelian outlook on change, implying that changes in ideas can change culture,
and subsequently, institutions. Social ecology, by contrast, contributes a more Marxist tone to the debate, implying that change in
institutions and social relations will predate widespread changes in consciousness. (It must be noted, however, that social ecology
also sees dialectics as an important component of human evolution—a particularly robust aspect of Hegelian thought—arguing that
the dialectic structure of human evolution has led to increasing human freedom throughout history). Though this particular debate is
age old, it demonstrates that there is room for both social ecology and deep ecology as part of the debate about radical ecology in
general. Both theories contribute different ideas about how change occurs, and both theories can contribute to creating change.
Deep ecology can focus on consciousness, ideas, and culture; social ecology can focus on institutions and hierarchies. Most
importantly, however, the
74 ability of humans to insight radical change in both theories contributes
to each theory’s disdain for more reformist tactics in promoting more environmentally sound
practices.
AT – Global South Turn
Deep Ecology CAN account for the global south – the kritiks mindset shift is a
step towards RECOVERING deep ecology
Although deep ecology has proven exclusionary in its characterizations of the Global South, the
solutions to these issues lie in recognition of these missteps and intentional incorporation of
these regions of the globe throughout deep ecology. The results of this inclusion 110 will allow deep
ecology to promote itself as a global political theory of radical change in pursuit of ecological
sustainability, social justice, and the flourishing of all life. 3 . Reconciling Critiques: Re-envisioning Deep Ecology
as a Globally Relevant Political Theory Deep ecology makes a number of mistakes in both the lack of attention that it pays to the
Global South and the ways that it selectively includes these populations in its theory. Moreover, deep ecology has failed to
formulate specific arguments that relate to how the Global South can be included in its theory based upon its own potential for
agency and the formation of culturally relevant ecocentric societies in particular regions. The major mistake that deep ecology
makes with regards to its insistence on wilderness preservation derives from its argument that humans must be absent from these
regions. Human interference does not always destroy ecosystems, but instead can even enhance wilderness areas when the vital
needs of both humans and ecosystems are taken into account in decision-making. Moreover, deep ecology advocates wilderness on
a global scale, failing to acknowledge that especially initially in ecocentric societies, most areas of the world will not constitute
wilderness areas including farmlands, urban areas, suburban areas, and toxic waste sites. The task of deep
ecology should,
therefore, be to develop strategies that take into account these types of areas and discover ways
that humans can assist in the flourishing of nature alongside many already developed areas of
the globe. (This does not mean that reclamation and wilderness preservation will not eventually become the major strategies for
ensuring the flourishing of wild things and humans, but instead that deep ecology must acknowledge the
necessity of interim strategies between anthropocentrism and its ecocentric ideal.) These absences
from deep ecology leave critics to believe that deep ecology promotes a neocolonial outlook when it comes to wilderness
preservation and interference in the Global South. 111 Science, according to some deep ecologists, can also play a role in
determining which areas of the globe need what resources to sustain the flourishing of both human and natural entities. For
example, Eckersley contends that wilderness preservation encapsulates a method for accounting for the inaccuracy of scientific
human endeavors while at the same time utilizing science as a flawed yet often valuable method for determining what and where to
best utilize preservationist methods (Eckersley, 1992, p. 157). Though she does not elaborate in depth on this point, it is important
to realize that deep ecology utilizes wilderness preservation as such an important method of recognizing the intrinsic value of other
beings because political decisionmakers, scientists, and political theorists have not yet devised a “better” method for ensuring the
security and flourishing of large parts of the planet without resorting to preservationist methods that (aside from some indigenous
and locally sustainable populations) at least partially guarantee these goals of deep ecology. By
determining other
methods by which humans and nature can flourish beyond wilderness preservation, scientific
endeavor can broaden this focus on wilderness preservation to include other mean s. Importantly,
however, science alone cannot solve these global environmental problems. Instead, the incorporation of local
knowledge systems coupled with soft technologies in the Global South will often trump Western
scientific methods that might be perceived as forcing solutions onto these particular regions of
the globe. Deep ecology, therefore, must acknowledge that a multiplicity of self-conceived
strategies in the Global South will be coupled with softer technologies and scientific endeavors
that are often dominated by Western interests. The number of strategies that can aid in the development of
ecocentric societies, moreover, is limitless if deep ecology emphasizes the necessity of ensuring that the
Global South can develop these unique strategies of its own accord.
AT FW
Ontological boundaries between living things are illusory.
Michael Nelson, 07-18-2008, " Michael Paul Nelson is an environmental scholar, writer,
teacher, speaker, and consultant who holds the Ruth H. Spaniol Chair in Renewable Resources
and is a Professor of environmental philosophy and ethics at Oregon State University,
Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and Philosophy”,
https://www.uky.edu/OtherOrgs/AppalFor/Readings/240%20-%20Reading%20-%20Deep
%20Ecology.pdf//WH
Deep ecology in its narrow academic sense rests on two fundaments: an axiology (The study of
the criteria of value systems in ethics) of ‘‘biocentric egalitarianism’’ and an ontology (the study
of existence) of metaphysicalholism which asserts that the biosphere does not consist of
discrete entities but rather internally related individuals that make up an ontologically unbroken
whole. Both principles are rooted in an intuitive epistemology reminiscent of Descartes’ ‘‘clear and distinct’’ criteria—once you
grasp them, their truth is beyond doubt. The first principle, biocentric egalitarianism—known also by other
phrases that combine biocentric, biospherical, and ecological with equality and egalitarianism
(Naess 1973, p. 95; Devall and Sessions 1985, pp. 67-69)—holds that biota have equal intrinsic
value; it denies differential valuation of organisms. In the words of Naess, ‘‘the equal right to live
and blossom is an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom’’ (1973, p. 96 [Naess’s emphasis]). In the words of
the sociologist Bill Devall, writing with George Sessions, ‘‘all organisms and entities in the ecosphere, as parts of
the interrelated whole, are equal in intrinsic worth’’ (1985, p. 67). Naess shrewdly preempts
invariable attacks on this idea of the equal worth of all organisms by adding the qualifier ‘‘in
principle’’ because ‘‘any realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation, and suppression’’
(1973, p. 95). This qualifier has not, however, staved off criticisms of biocentric egalitarianism. The valuing of human beings over
other life forms in the teleology of a great chain of being (Lovejoy 1936) has been a key feature of the European–North American
intellectual tradition—and, to the dismay of deep ecologists, also a feature of some prominent variants of environmental ethics
(Birch and Cobb 1981; Bookchin 1982; Rolston 1988). Biocentric egalitarianism aims directly at this target.
By denying
humans special moral consideration, Deep Ecology is not just nonanthropocentric, but anti-
anthropocentric (Watson 1983). Sessions has categorically rejected any differential axiology on the grounds that hierarchies of
value lay the groundwork for claims of moral superiority. Quoting John Rodman (1977, p. 94), Sessions cautions that any
comparative axiology merely reinstates a ‘‘pecking order in this moral barnyard’’ (Sessions 1985, p. 230). At a 1979 conference
devoted to reminding philosophers of the purpose of their discipline (namely, deep questioning), Sessions warned environmental
ethicists of the temptation of looking to a metaphysics based on intensity of sentience. ‘‘The
point is not whether
humans in fact do have the greatest degree of sentience on this planet (although dolphins and
whales might provide a counterinstance), deep ecologists argue that the degree of sentience is
irrelevant in terms of how humans relate to the rest of Nature’’ (Sessions 1985, p. 18). The
second principle is metaphysical holism. One can apprehend ontological interconnectedness
through enlightenment or ‘‘self-realization’’ (Devall and Sessions 1985, pp. 67–69; Naess 1987).
As Fox says, ‘‘It is the idea that we can make no firm ontological divide in reality betweenthe
human and the nonhuman realms. . . . [T]o the extent that we perceive boundaries, we fall short
of deep ecological consciousness’’ (Fox 1984, p. 196). Through this awakening, the ontological
boundaries of the self extend outward, incorporating more and more of the lifeworld into the
self. This insight discloses that there is in reality only one big Self, the lifeworld, a notion
developed in the article ‘‘The World Is Your Body’’ (Watts 1966). This method of self-realization
is identification: By recognizing the intrinsic worth of other living beings, one recognizes the
solidarity of all life forms. Naess, upon watching a flea immolate itself in an acid bath under a
microscope, empathized with the suffering flea, identified with it, and thereby felt deeply
connected with the entire lifeworld (1987, p. 36). Once ontological boundaries between living
beings are recognized as illusory, one realizes that biospherical interests are one’s own. Devall and
Sessions assert that ‘‘if we harm the rest of Nature then we are harming ourselves. There are no boundaries and
everything is interrelated’’ (1985, p. 68). In the words of the environmental activist John Seed, the statement ‘‘I am
protecting the rain forest’’ develops into ‘‘‘I am part of the rain forest protecting myself.’ I am that part of the rain forest recently
emerged into thinking. . . . [T]he change is a spiritual one, thinking like a mountain, sometimes referred to as ‘Deep Ecology’’’ (Devall
and Sessions 1985, p. 199). Because the rainforest is part of the activist Seed, he is inherently obliged to look after its welfare .
The
rainforest’s well-being and needs are indistinguishable from Seed’s. Naess and Sessions have
emphatically emphasized the phenomenological spirit of deep ecology and downplayed dicta;
the psychological realization of metaphysical holism makes ethics superfluous. As Naess has
said, ‘‘I’m not much interested in ethics or morals. I’m interested in how we experience the
world. . . . ’’ (Fox 1995, p. 219). In Sessions words, ‘‘The search . . . is not for environmental ethics but for ecological
consciousness’’ (Fox 1995, p. 225).
The 6th mass extinction from the impacts of the Anthropocene is upon us.
Discussing different ecological approaches is a critical question.
Cole and Malone ’19 (David R., Australian researcher in the fields of literacies, globalization,
critical thinking, employed @ University of Western Sydney, and Karen, Professor of
Sustainability at the Centre for Educational Research @ University of Western Sydney,
"Environmental education and philosophy in the Anthropocene." Australian Journal of
Environmental Education 35.3 (2019): 157-162, MX)
We stand on the cusp of a new era, called the ‘ Anthropocene’ . Some date the beginnings of the
Anthropocene back to the industrial revolution in the United Kingdom and elsewhere at the end
of the 18th century (e.g., Tsing, 2015). Others place it alongside the great acceleration that has
occurred after the end of the World War II, and 1945 (Steffen, Broadgate, Deutsch, Gaffney, &
Ludwig, 2015). Others still look to the basic drives of humans, and how humans have used their
social intelligence to understand, transform and ultimately dominate nature (Ellis, 2015). The
disruption that the naming of the Anthropocene has administered in environmental education
— and will continue to administer — has provided a massive jolt to our collective imagination.
As an unsettling ontology that disrupts a persistent ‘ humanist’ paradigm, the concept of the
Anthropocene has allowed new conversations around human-dominated global change, human
exceptionalism and the nature-culture divide. It has been employed as a heuristic device for
gaining a greater understanding of the role of human societies and the part they have played in
changing the planet. Therefore, the starting point of and for the Anthropocene is less important
to this special edition than two fundamental questions that the naming of the new era
produces: (1) What does the Anthropocene mean for the future of human civilisation (and, for
example, education)? (2) What can and should be done with respect to the Anthropocene ?
This special edition takes on one small aspect of the possible responses to these questions
entailed by ‘Environmental education and its philosophy’. It is the contention of this special
edition that the naming of the Anthropocene marks an awakening and a significant moment for
environmental education. The significance and overwhelming reality of the Anthropocene, and
its connections to, for example, the sixth great extinction event (e.g., Kolbert, 2014), making
learning about, in, and how to deal with the environment more important than ever.
Philosophy, as the fundamental mode of human speculation about life, is a fitting companion to
an expanded and centralised environmental education and acts as a basic driver for education in
the Anthropocene. Philosophy does not discriminate between subject disciplines and can work
to galvanise all the resources available to respond to the problematics of the Anthropocene if
applied evenly. Philosophically, the Anthropocene is a concept that works both for us and on us.
In its unsettlement of the entrenched binaries of modernity (human-nature, nature-culture,
objectsubject) and its provocative alienation of familiar anthropocentric scales and times opens
up possibilities for exploring new theoretical approaches such as posthumanism and new
materialism. In this special issue, many of the articles have an underlying focus on fleshing out
what it means to be human in a world where being human is being disrupted, interrogated;
exploring the precarity and promise of a human being in a constant and dynamic state of
ontological becoming as (merely) part of the material world and subject to the same physical
processes. Vital materiality, agential realism — all open up new theoretical space for exploring
these concepts as it acknowledges the aliveness of matter — active, self-creative, productive,
unpredictable. Matter as alive means we can no longer delineate the ‘human’ body as an island
but human as a species , one among many , as it becomes an assemblage of objects cellular and
historical. Guattari describes this move from a postnuclear model of embodied subjectivity
entering into a ‘viral’ or ‘parasitic’ mode as a discerning shift in paradigms, raising ontological
questions of what it means to be in the world with shared bodies through time. The world, as
used with this approach, is viewed as dynamic, in a constant process of ‘being’ and ‘becoming’
with material matter. Intra-action, as presented through the thinking of Barad (2007),
constitutes a reconfiguring of ‘things’ and ‘objects’ that are not structured with a specific space
or time but are enacted as agential entities flowing in a space-time continuum. The focus of
reality in this approach is not on the phenomena of the things (their specific properties) but how
the things are ‘in-phenomena’ — being produced through a series of entangled relational
possibilities with other objects and things.
Different epistemologies and the beliefs we hold in the world constitute the
way we interact with the environment.
KARA and SAROĞLU ‘21 (Yunus, Altınbaş University Economics, Hacer, Minister University,
Institute of Social Sciences, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Ankara,
"Reflections of Deep Ecology Approach in the Ahimsa Doctrine." Gaziantep University Journal of
Social Sciences 20.2 (2021), MX)
Ecological problems caused or will be caused by humans may be related to their ideas about
the natural world. The socio-cultural, economic, political and social conditions in which people
are born and live and the beliefs they adopt or belong to determine the ecological perspective.
The mental world that determines the attitude of the human being in the absolute interaction
between human and the environment is their [his] belief, in other words. Therefore, which
religion people belong to is one of the factors that determines the ecological deterioration they
may cause.
Religion is an important phenomenon that continues its existence in parallel to the historicity of
humanity. Religion and belief systems have been encountered in almost every period of human
history. This relationship between humanity and belief systems shows that religion and belief
are a human need. Religion is first affected by the conditions required by the society in which it
flourishes. Religion, associated with the social structure, is an effective factor in changing social
organization and social actions. Religion offers people a way of life within a certain
understanding of the world and develops people's sense of believing in certain things.
Displaying a social character in the historical process, religion has tried to give people a
mentality by means of certain values and symbols. Religion shows its presence in society by
setting rules in order to regulate the social structure and shape collective actions.
Each religious structure brings with it a different model of society, causing a change in
individuals' lives and perceptions of the world. Not only does religion affect the behavior of
people in line with the beliefs it contains, but it also affects the meanings attributed to social
events and not only does it offer a system of thinking and behavior to its members, but also it
includes some social tasks such as bringing a new mentality to the society and structuring the
society. The perception of the natural environment that religion, which is the determinant of the
social structure and undertakes important roles in many changes in the social structure, is also
the determinant of the environmental problems that may arise due to religion.
The educational process in debate is important in promoting capitalist

subjectivity – objecting to it is key.
Boxley ‘19 (Simon, Senior Lecturer in Education (Education Studies) @ University of
Winchester, "Red Biocentrism for the Anthropocene." Australian Journal of Environmental
Education 35.3 (2019): 183-197, MX)
What is the product of a Red Biocentric education? Like capitalist education, like all education, it
is subjectivity . Let us be clear, education plays a central part in the reproduction of the
conditions for the possibility of capitalism. The wage labourer’s subjective existence is
dependent upon a relation to capital established by and through educational process (Rikowski,
2002); likewise, the capitalist’s. That section of the Grundrisse wherein Marx offers his analysis
of precapitalist economic formations explains that ‘[t]he production of capitalists and
wagelabourers is a major product of the process by which capital turns itself into values’ (Marx,
1965, p. 118). This is a process of subjectification .14
The Holocene saw a revolutionary transformation in the forms of human subjectivity and
subjectification that accompanied the ‘ separation’ of labourers from the nexus of relations that
comprised their precapitalist ecology (Mezzandra, 2018). What Marx calls, rather provocatively
‘natural conditions of existence’ (Marx, 1965, p. 87) have a dual character — an objective and a
subjective aspect, an outside and an inside. For those producing within such conditions, the
‘producer occurs as part of [an ecology,] a family, a tribe, a grouping of his [sic] people ::: It is as
such a communal part that he has relation to a determined (piece of) nature (let us still call it
earth, land, soil), as his own inorganic being, the condition of his production and reproduction’
(Marx, 1965, p. 87). During the course of the late Holocene, human consciousness underwent a
process of subjective estrangement from these ‘natural conditions’ that accompanied the
emergence of the capital relation. In respect of this weirdly abstracted subjectivity, while the
biological requirements of ongoing, lived entanglement with nature is retained,
what requires explanation is not the unity of living and active human beings with the
natural, inorganic conditions of their metabolism with nature ::: What we must explain is
the separation of these inorganic conditions of human existence from this active
existence, a separation which is only fully completed in the relationship between wage-
labour and capital. (Marx, 1965, pp. 86–87)
Capital, as we know, deployed enclosure as the means of producing wage labourers , of

stripping women of their power within a gendered division of labour by devaluing the non-
monetary ‘cheap’ labour of birthing and childrearing, and of effecting this separation.
The form of education in the early geological Anthropocene will be necessitated by a

revolutionary transformation equal to that of the late Holocene. Its aim is the production of
revolutionary biocentric subjectivity, capable of extending the ecological Self across class and
species to turn identification and solidarity into realisation and flourishing. Specifically, unlike
capitalist or bureaucratic-centralist socialist education, it is not merely the production of the
subjective aspect of labour capacity.
Students in educational spaces play a critical role in the ecocentrism movement

2.9.5 Student as ecophilosopher. Ecophilosophy is viewed by some as essential to teaching and learning: At this stage in its history,
it is difficult to identify an issue of greater importance for humankind than its relationship with
its environment, nor one that is more fraught . It must be a unique phenomenon—on Earth at least—for a species
to be contemplating the possibility of its self- extinction. Yet as evidence mounts daily to confirm that human action is affecting the
environment in ways that are both unprecedented and unsustainable, the issues raised appear ever more complex and the way
ahead far from straightforward. Given that the consequences of this situation has to be faced in increasingly acute forms by the
citizens of the early twentyfirst century, clearly it would be irresponsible for education somehow to attempt to remain aloof from
the issues that this state of affairs throws up. (Bonnett, 2003, p. 551) Schools
have an essential role to play in
fulfiling these aims (Standish, 2003) and to raise the standard of EE to include controversial discussions
about the relationships that humans have to nature, and to promote deeper thought about the
consequences of our actions on the planet (Bonnett, 2003). The idea that children can be
philosophers is not new (Haynes, F., 2014; Kennedy, N. S., 2012; Tschaepe, 2012), however, there has been little, if any,
research on ecocentric philosophies in schools, and on how secondary school students view themselves using the deep ecology lens.
There is also an array of thinking skills programs, of which Lipman’s Philosophy
for Children (P4C) is possibly the best known
(Trickey & Topping, 2004), and collectively they harness skills that are consistent with the deep ecology
principles (Naess, 1973) and the Deep Ecology Platform (Naess & Sessions, 1995). There is growing evidence that philosophy
is an important component of school education, with successful programs being implemented throughout the United
Kingdom (Bartley & Worley, 2012), where primary school children as young as eight years are successfully involved in classroom
philosophy (Bartley & Worley, 2011), and in Australian schools (Federation of Australasian Philosophy in Schools Association, 2014;
Victorian Curriculum and Assessment Authority, 2014). There is also an active program in the United States for teaching philosophy
to children (Teaching Children Philosophy, 2014) and a primary school program in ethics in Australia (Primary Ethics, 2014).
Philosophy has become popular in England where it is claimed that it promotes abstract thinking, the art of discussion, and expands
students’ vocabulary (Brett, 2003). Others have called it the
holy grail of education because it creates active,
creative and democratic thinking, at the same time as increasing a sense of self-worth in
students (Cohen & Naylor, 2008). Of particular relevance to this study is Lipman’s pedagogical dimension to the
philosophy of education, the community of philosophical inquiry (Kennedy, D., 2012), which lends
itself to a similar normative discourse that can be found in deep ecology (Drengson & Devall, 2010).
Embracing deep ecology is a prerequisite to effective environmental

policymaking.
Benshirim 19 [Zeke is a Ph.D. student in Biological and Biomedical Sciences at Harvard
University. He is working in the Paola Arlotta lab in collaboration with the Jennifer Lewis lab on
bioengineering better brain organoids.], Harvard University , "Daring to Care: Deep Ecology and
Effective Popular Environmentalism ", 2019, https://green.harvard.edu/news/daring-care-deep-
ecology-and-effective-popular-environmentalism///mb
The modern environmental movement, after decades of struggle, appears further than ever from its
goal of preserving a healthy and livable planet. Millions have joined the international environmental
movement since its seminal campaigns in the 1960s against the overuse of DDT and other pesticides. However, human
impacts on the planet, from greenhouse gas emissions to deforestation, have become ever
more damaging since then, making “severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and
ecosystems” all but inevitable (IPCC). Environmentalists have long debated how best to promote beliefs conducive to treating
the environment appropriately, along with the more fundamental question of what constitutes appropriate treatment. The work of
the twentieth-century Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss addresses both questions. He distinguished two
paradigms he called “shallow” and “deep ecology, ” primarily on the basis of a fundamental division in
environmental ethics between biocentrism, the view that non-human life deserves moral
consideration, and anthropocentrism, the restriction of moral value primarily or exclusively to
humans (“Environmental Ethics”). In a 1986 paper, Næss defined “deep ecology” as a group of philosophical positions adhering to
a platform of eight fundamental principles (Næss 67). The first and most indicative of these principles is the rejection of
anthropocentrism: “The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have value in themselves […]
independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes (68).” The remaining principles hold that
biodiversity has intrinsic value; that only the “vital needs” of humans outweigh non-human value;
that human populations must be reduced; and that we have an obligation to implement radical
changes to human ideologies and economies, de-emphasizing consumerist ideals, to reduce our
excessive interference with the non-human world. Næss argues that promoting a deep ecological
ethic is advantageous even for “shallow” ecologists, writing that “conservation strategies are
more eagerly implemented by people who love what they are conserving, and are convinced
that it is intrinsically lovable” (67). Deep ecology is naturally attractive to biocentrists, but this argument extends its
appeal, at least as a tactical tool, to anthropocentric environmentalists. He [Næss] distinguished two paradigms he called “shallow”
and “deep ecology,” primarily on the basis of a fundamental division in environmental ethics between biocentrism, the view that
non-human life deserves moral consideration, and anthropocentrism, the restriction of moral value primarily or exclusively to
humans (“Environmental Ethics”). Books written
for the general public on “green” topics could be a
vehicle for proselytizing deep ecology. One of the first and most influential popular environmental
books was Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (published in 1962, over two decades before Næss’s paper), which
warned that the widespread use of toxic chemicals like DDT endangered human health and
threatened the birds and wildflowers “that most charm and fascinate all [humans] who are
aware of them” (111). Silent Spring, as Al Gore wrote in a 1994 introduction, launched the modern popular environmental
movement and succeeded in restricting the use of certain pesticides (xix). Over 40 years later, maverick climate scientist James
Lovelock published The
Revenge of Gaia (2006), describing the threats to human civilization posed by
global climate change. Lovelock—famous for arguing that the entire global ecosystem should be
considered as a single living “superorganism” called Gaia—writes that “our concern for Gaia
must come first, because the welfare of the burgeoning masses of humanity demands a
healthy planet” (1). Carson and Lovelock use different ethical frameworks: Carson usually appeals directly to
anthropocentrism, while Lovelock employs “cynical anthropocentrism,” advocating biocentrism as a means to higher-level
anthropocentric ends. These frameworks have different rhetorical strengths and weaknesses. According to Næss,
environmentalists like Carson and Lovelock cannot fully realize their goals unless they commit
to deep ecological ideas (66). I will argue that Lovelock’s criticism of Carson, on grounds similar to Næss’s, overlooks some
of her most important accomplishments in legitimizing a deep ecological ethic , while Lovelock’s own
endorsement of deep ecology would benefit from some of the strategies he overlooks.
AT – Social Eco/Misanthropy Turn
Social Ecology lacks the ability to spur political action and is INACCURATE –
deep ecology allows for more simplicity – key for radical change
First of all, I argue that deep

ecology does not promote misanthropy ; instead, deep ecology
acknowledges that humans will take care of their own vital needs prior to ensuring that the vital
needs of other species are met (Glasser, 1995, p. 380). Secondly, I argue that Bookchin’s contention that
anthropocentrism cannot be the root cause of environmental harm because it does not prevent humans
from dominating other humans is fundamentally inaccurate. Instead, the anthropocentric ethic acts as an metanarrative
or cultural undercurrent that not only promotes the instrumental use of nature by humanity but also the instrumental use of other
human beings for whatever purposes those in power see fit. Importantly, anthropocentrism in deep ecology does not necessarily
imply that humans will not dominate or exploit other humans. By contrast, the
anthropocentric ethic undergirds and
perpetuates the powerful institutional and socio-cultural structures that permit both human
domination and the exploitation of nature , centering politics on a small group of powerful
nation-states that utilize the lives and well-being of other species and other humans for their
own economic and political gains. Moreover, I argue that anthropocentrism plays another role in organizing politics and
culture. Namely, 127 anthropocentrism can act as a conceptual category that can be utilized in political decisionmaking, where
decision-makers can debate whether or not political decisions account for the vital needs of other species, ecocentrically, or do not
account for these needs, making the policy at hand anthropocentric and therefore, fundamentally at odds with ecological
sustainability. Indeed, the anthropocentric/ecocentric divide works as a conceptual tool by fostering political debate regarding vital
needs of humans and other species, how much interference should be allowed in nature, and how humans should play a role in
determining these two agendas. Indeed, I further argue that Bookchin’s critique of deep ecology’s emphasis on biocentric
egalitarianism is also unnecessary in that it misunderstands the role that this ethic can play in the lives of human beings. Instead
of denying the unique abilities of humans, biocentric egalitarianism promotes the idea that all
living beings have a vital role to play in the functioning of the biosphere and have an equal right
to flourish given these vital and unique roles , including human beings. This ethic, if applied with an understanding of
the unique abilities of different species (including humans), can serve to highlight these unique capabilities (See
Naess, qtd. in Clark, 2010, p. 24). By highlighting the unique and important qualities that individual
species, animals, and human beings bring to the maintenance of the biosphere, biocentric
egalitarianism can help to ensure that not only is the capacity to flourishing of a life ensured in these
populations, but also that these unique capabilities are fostered and highlighted for how they
contribute to the overall flourishing of nature and of human societies . Bookchin’s second major critique of
deep ecology, as mentioned, charges deep ecology with wrongly conceptualizing the human-nature relationship by both idealizing
wilderness as the ideal state of nature and arguing in favor of wider identification with nature in the human psyche (Humphrey,
2000, p. 250-3). Moreover, Bookchin argues that the formation of identification in 128 deep ecology, particularly, fails to account for
the ways that social problems directly influence and cause environmental problems (Light, 1998, p. 350). I argue, in response, that
deep ecology’s insistence on the importance of wider identification simplifies the human-nature
relationship, while Bookchin’s arguments add complexity to it. For example, deep ecology
simply points out the value of and advocates for wider identification to foster both respect for
nature and a deep connection with it in order to spur political action, thereby limiting
Bookchin’s argument that identification with nature may result in less political action in order
to protect nature (See Humphrey, 2000, p. 253). And finally, Bookchin’s argument that deep ecology tends
to idealize nature via its promotion of wilderness preservation fails to acknowledge that
wilderness, as an idealized state of nature, can provide an impetus for political action, highlighting both
the awesome destructive power that humanity has to alter nature and to assist in its
preservation. And finally, regarding the critiques from social ecology, I attempt to flesh out the similarities between deep
ecology and social ecology, arguing that these similarities not only provide common ground upon which the two theories can create
critical dialogue and debate, but also that these similarities lessen the severity of Bookchin’s conclusions
regarding deep ecology. I begin by outlining the vital role that each theory can play in the formation of ecologically
sustainable societies, arguing that deep ecology’s critique of anthropocentric culture is at least as valuable as social ecology’s
critique of social and institutional structures, being that together, these two critiques favor change in the major forces (namely,
culture and institutions) that organize human societies. Moreover, both theories argue that individual agency plays an important
role in provoking radical change, contending that individual humans have the unique ability to alter culture, institutions, and
hierarchies (Keulartz, 1998, 119). Both theories also 129 reject technocratic solutions to environmental problems, agreeing that
capitalism, technology, and many other existing social and political institutions are responsible for environmental degradation
(Tokar, 1988, p. 132). Given these similarities, I hope to promote openings in which both
theories can come together (in
spite of disagreements) to promote radical change in favor of ecological sustainability
Util
Reject classical egalitarianism in favor of biospherical egalitarianism –
preserving resources for future generations perpetuates anthropocentrism
8.3 Future humans, intrinsic value and biospherical egalitarianism The study found that the students’
anthropocentric beliefs were nearly always linked to the idea that the Earth’s resources
should be preserved for “the future”, or more appropriately for “future humans”. This was
summed up well in the aphorism from the sustainability coordinator Adam: “ We’re not using the resources
left by our ancestors, we’re stealing them from our children .” (Adam, 00:19:52). The deep
ecology/ecocentric view states that natural resources should be shared not only
between humans, animals and other forms of life in nature, but also be shared with the
nonliving parts of nature (like mountains, rivers and oceans). This is what Naess (Fox, 1990c)
meant by biospherical egalitarianism; everything in the ecosystem has intrinsic value . The
findings from the study showed that only a few participants understood or subscribed to biospherical egalitarianism,
although the love of animals for some students possibly equated to biological egalitarianism. Previous work has
shown that students can learn the intrinsic value of nature (Hargrove, 2010). The findings here
indicate the need for future research on biological egalitarianism, where humans and
animals have the same rights of access to natural resources.
AT Feminist K of Deep Eco
Deep ecology and ecofeminism are CLOSELY ALIGNED – deep ecology seeks to
PREVENT continued environmental domination
Theorists of the deep ecological and ecofeminist movements in social work have attempted to
develop and find affirmation for frameworks that integrate person and natural environment
transactions (Drolet, 2012). These frameworks view traditional ecological theory as too conservative
sociopolitically, and too detached from nature , spirituality and critiques of power relations in the systems of human
interaction (Besthorn, 2012; Besthorn & McMillen, 2002; Stephens et al., 2009). These theorists posit that the ways in which the
social work field has framed its response to the climate crisis using a traditional ecological systems approach have perpetuated a
person on the environment as opposed to a person in the environment worldview. In this way, the field supports the
conceptualization that humanity is detached from and superior to the natural environment and misses an opportunity to advocate
for the underserved and undervalued, in this case: nonhumankind 4 Affilia: Journal of Women and Social Work XX(X) (Besthorn,
2012; Besthorn & McMillen, 2002; Ungar, 2002). The main constructs of deep ecology and ecofeminism can
be used to right these missteps. Three central ideas of ecofeminist thought have been solidified by Besthorn and
McMillen (2002). The first is that there is currently an uneven and exploitative power dynamic between masculinity and femininity
that equally mirrors the split between humankind and nature. Similarly, all things demarcated by humankind fall either within nature
or that which is outside and superior to nature (Besthorn & McMillen, 2002). These demarcations are oppressive, are hierarchical,
and are presupposed and unquestioned by all institutions of modernity. From an ecofeminist lens, the “twin oppressions” (Besthorn
& McMillen, 2002, p. 224) of patriarchy and anthropocentrism are conjoined in their preponderance and could be mutually
destroyed. In other words, to
dismantle one of these hierarchical, oppressive structures would lead to
equal disability of the other: “issues of environmental degradation and concerns for a
reanimated person/nature consciousness cannot be separated from all forms of injustice , whether
toward nature or other human beings” (Besthorn & McMillen, 2002, p. 223). This critical perspective that troubles the concept of
dominant and passive sides of a coin leads logically to the question of whether such binaries can and should be eradicated entirely.
The second construct posits that all forms of domination, either of humans or of nature, are feminist concerns (Besthorn &
McMillen, 2002). Ecological
critiques are simply incomplete without an appraisal of unchecked power
and the effect of its operation in society (Stephens et al., 2009). Without social critique of power, underlying
misogyny and disdain of nature cannot be unveiled. As scholar and environmental activist Vandana Shiva (1997) put it, the rise of
globalization and industrialism has ushered in the gendered construction of nature as “passive, inert, and valueless,” not dissimilar
to the characterization of femininity (para. 38). To provide social critique and to promote positive change is one main aim of the
ecofeminist social and political movement. This objective is closely aligned with the political and social objectives of deep ecology
(Besthorn, 2012; Gray & Coates, 2013; Ungar, 2002). The third main idea of ecofeminism is that humanity has lost consciousness of
the sacred interconnectedness of all things (humankind and nonhumankind) due to the institutions of modernity (Besthorn, 2012;
Ungar, 2002). Modernity, which is encapsulated by the ideas of enlightenment thinking, seeks continued progress as ultimate good.
Here, progress is defined as the accumulation of scientific knowledge (Ferreira, 2010). This view is flawed according to ecofeminists
and deep ecologists who see the accumulation of knowledge through positivism as the continued and increasing dominion of
humankind over nature (Besthorn, 2012; Besthorn & McMillen, 2002; Stephens et al., 2009). An objective of ecofeminist thought
therefore is to reignite within social consciousness the idea that the whole of humanity is greater than the sum of its parts. Each
of these parts shares a fundamental interconnectedness, a premise that also categorizes deep ecological
thinking (Kober, 2013; Ungar, 2002). It therefore follows that commitment to political and social action is inherently spiritual,
especially in relation to climate change (Besthorn & McMillen, 2002; Gray & Coates, 2013). Deep
ecology is closely
aligned with ecofeminist theorizing and is the study of the mutual dependency found in all aspects of
an ecosystem both social and natural/environmental (Alston, 2013; Diehm, 2014; Jones, 2010; Stephens et al., 2009; Ungar, 2002).
Besthorn (2012) explains that, “rather than individual experience as separate from the environment, [in
deep ecological theory] the environment exists in individuals as they cultivate awareness of
being one with all that exists” (p. 252). Humankind, in their relationship with one another, is the embodiment of nature.
Simply stated, there is an interconnectedness of all things, and the dominant behaviors of society have an effect on all things, human
and nonhuman. According to Gray and Coates (2013), there has been a shift throughout human history from that of an ecologically
centered philosophy to that of an anthropocentric presumption. The shift from Klemmer and McNamara 5 ecocentrism to
anthropocentrism facilitates humankind to seek and legitimize dominion over nature.
The reigning dominance of
market-based systems and an overreliance on continuous scientific and economic growth have
led to the overconsumption of natural resources and the current environmental crises, especially those problems
caused by warming temperatures (Besthorn, 2012; Dominelli, 2011, 2013; Gray & Coates, 2013; Peeters, 2012 ). Both
ecofeminist and deep ecological theorists posit that we need to change widely held ideology
and political and economic structures that operate on the assumption that a valuable life is one rich in
material possession and consumption (Besthorn & McMillen, 2002; Gray & Coates, 2013; Stephens et al., 2009).
Deep ecology’s remedy to environmental crisis does not include the development of more
sustainable technologies that would allow only for continued domination of the environment (Peeters,
2012). Instead, addressing climate change will not be possible without radical social change . Deep
ecologists posit that with the interconnectedness of all things, it follows that diversity and symbiosis are in the best interest of
humankind, nonhumankind, and physical place (Alston, 2013; Ungar, 2002). The more complex and diverse an ecosystem may be,
the less likely it is that it will be destroyed. Naess shows this proposition mathematically; the arrangement of three single-digit
numbers can produce only six unique arrangements of numbers; the arrangement of four singledigit numbers can produce 24
unique arrangements (Ungar, 2002, p. 486). A deep
ecological view thus suggests that human social ecology,
when in symbiosis with a diverse natural ecology, is dually protected and strong. The political and
social crusade of deep ecology is therefore to revive a oncevital consciousness on the importance of diverse human and natural
ecosystems and to replace it with the currently reigning modern market-based principles of consumption (Alston, 2013). In sum, this
movement advocates a shift in the social work field from fitting in with modernity by way of unquestioningly embracing analytic,
scientific rationality to a more social justice–aligned approach in which environmental sustainability is viewed through an inclusive
and holistic paradigm that centers indigenous perspectives and land and community stewardship (Bhuyan et al., 2019; Billiot et al.,
2019; Ferreira, 2010
Deep ecology critiques current dualist worldviews – it utilizes feminist language

to forward both the feminist and ecological cause.
Darling [Dr. Kate Darling is a Research Specialist at the MIT Media Lab and author of THE NEW
BREED. Her interest is in how technology intersects with society.], Melbourne Journal of
International Law, "AA WEIGHT FOR WATER: AN ECOLOGICAL FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF
EMERGING NORMS AND TRENDS IN GLOBAL WATER GOVERNANCE ", June 2012,
https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/1687279/Darling.pdf//mb
Further, whilethe Report references the dependence of non-human entities on water systems,
they are positioned quite separately from human lives and aspirations, and subordinately to the
demographic, economic and social drivers. Throughout, the Report positions water next to the
qualifier ‘resource’ indicating its instrumental value and natural tendency toward
commodification. In a document that seeks redress for decades of neglect of the incorporation of water into global decision-
making, this approach is frustrating in the true sense. Evident in the valuing system presented here is a fundamental belief in the
domination of one (human) over the other (water systems). As Judith Plant explains, this understanding ‘comes from a philosophical
belief that has rationalized exploitation on such a massive scale that we
now not only have extinguished other
species but have also placed our own species on a trajectory 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid. 122 Ibid 36–7. 123 Kurian,
above n 19, 24. 2012] A Weight for Water 23 toward self-destruction’ .124 This conflicts, in essence, with the
deep ecology understanding of the present framework that anthropocentric responses are myopic and will only ever be
reformative rather than necessarily transformative. The anthropocentric design of both the issues and the
solutions as reinforced by the ubiquitous human– nature dualisms perpetuate the oppressive
frameworks that deny the membership of women and men within ecosystems . This approach leaves
as unchallenged fact that the environment exists to serve global trade. The only limit is the finite amount of given
resources and/or human innovation. In a similar vein, women as a uniform group, are
celebrated for their usefulness rather than their own inherent value. Women are earmarked for
their particular adeptness at quelling the effects of the three drivers — like a mother with an
ornery child — and achieving the solutions that the expert groups advance. For example, the Report
explains that: Women with education have fewer children, which has beneficial consequences for the health of mothers and
children and results in lower demand per family for food and water … Removing or reducing school fees could free household
income to pay for other services — including food and water or agricultural inputs that could increase water productivity.125
Women in this view are not using their education or training to design water conservation units
or lead communities to a more sustainable approach to the improvement of their wellbeing.
Their role, rather, is to discontinue contributing to the burdens of overpopulation. Further, it
should be noted that the work of the World Water Assessment Programme and the Report is dedicated to supporting water
managers, policy and decision-makers.126 As Zwarteveen has noted, however, the presumption remains that men currently occupy
these positions and women remain mere users of water.127 The consequences of this valuation go beyond Vandana Shiva’s
argument that the ways of knowing the environment differ between men and women128 and beyond Curtin’s position that ‘[r]eal
ecodevelopment cannot be sustained … unless distinctively women’s practices and ways of knowing are granted the conceptually
central places they deserve’.129 Rather, it sees as pivotal that ‘[t]he control exerted by scientists in testing involves an exercise of
power (for example, what variables are considered relevant; what form of testing happens; what interpretations ensue of resulting
information; and so on)’.130 Further, the knowledge, or epistemologies, derived 124 Judith Plant, ‘Learning to Live with Differences:
The Challenge of the Ecofeminist Community’ in Karen J Warren (ed), Ecofeminism: Women, Nature, Culture (Indiana University
Press, 1997) 120, 121. 125 World Water Development Report, above n 114, 272. 126 World Water Assessment Programme, About
WWAP, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization <http://www.unesco.org/water/wwap/description/>. 127
Zwarteveen, ‘The Politics of Gender in Water and the Gender of Water Politics’, above n 63, 190. Zwarteveen makes this observation
specifically in relation to irrigated agriculture. It is suggested that this demonstrates how an instrumental approach to water
management can pervade the implementation of development projects on the ground. 128 See Vandana Shiva, Staying Alive:
Women, Ecology and Survival in India (Kali for Women, 1988). 129 Curtin, above n 15, 82. 130 Kurian, above n 19, 26. 24 Melbourne
Journal of International Law [Vol 13 from such testing becomes an instrument of power and control over how societies are organised
in response to this knowledge.131 The particularly western tradition from which this scientific and technical knowledge come132
reduces both women (users) and the environment (resource) to an economic calculus that the rational economic actor (masculine
hegemonic form) can arrange according to what it values.
AT: Environmental Management Good
The focus on resource management is a short-sighted and shallow perspective
that allows the environment to be exploited for human benefit
Jacob 94 – (Merle, Professor in the Department of Theory of Science and Research @
University of Gothenburg. “Sustainable Development and Deep Ecology: An Analysis of
Competing Traditions”, Springer-Verlag, 1994) Environmental Management Vol. 18, No. 4, pp.
477-488, sj
Although all of the extant perspectives on the environmental crisis draw their inspiration and knowledge bases from this critique, a
close examination will reveal that they differ substantively in the interpretation they place on the content of this critique. This
difference also leads them to emphasize certain arguments at the expense of others. In order to distinguish among the different
perspectives that resulted from these interpretations, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, proposed that they be divided into
two categories, deep and shallow (Naess 1973). Shallow perspectives are characterized by an emphasis on
the need to apply ecological principles to ensure better management and control of the
environment for human benefi t. This leads to a treatment that depicts environmental
problems as isolated contradictions in the prevailing style of development. Deep ecology
perspectives, however, start from the premise that the ultimate cause of extant environmental
problems is the anthropocentric nature of Western development . They interpret
environmental problems as proof of the need for an alternative ecological worldview premised
on the idea that humans are part of the living system itself and that human interaction with the rest
of nature should be dictated by this imperative . Those familiar with contemporary environmentalism will know that
any number of environmental perspectives can fit these broad descriptions. The following sections will therefore elaborate on the
above by examining in some detail perspectives from each category of the deep/shallow ty.pology. We shall begin with deep ecology
because it is the least known.
Environmental pragmatism allows shallow ecologists to rehabilitate

anthropocentrism – only a shift to deep eco-centric motivations can counter
accelerating environmental threats
Kopnina et al 18 – (Dr. Helen, author of sixteen books on environmental sustainability,
biodiversity, and environmental education @ Hague University of Applied Sciences. Other
contributing others: Haydn Washington, Bron Taylor & John J Piccolo. “Anthropocentrism: More
than Just a Misunderstood Problem”, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 18
January 2018) https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10806-018-9711-1, sj
Third, the convergence theory (Norton 1984) supports shallow ecology or protection of nature for human sake (Naess 1973)
and is often associated with strong anthropocentrism or pragmatic environmental ethics.

Pragmatic ethics is based on the assumption that anthropocentric or ecocentric motivations
achieve the same ends, for example as in the case of fighting pollution threatening human health (e.g. Norton 1984; Weston
1985; Grey 1993). Ecocentric writers would disagree with Hayward that: “the best, if not only, reason for preserving
eco-systemic relations is precisely that they constitute the ‘life-support system’ for humans” (p. 60). While an
anthropocentric motivation can produce environmentally-positive outcomes in situations where
both humans and environment are negatively affected, anthropocentrism does not protect
nonhumans without utilitarian value (Katz 1999), nor safeguard animal welfare (Singer 1977). In fact, the loss of some
biodiversity does not affect humanity (at least not yet), as evidenced by mass extinctions (Crist 2015). Also, utilitarian approaches
presume that we know the long-term effect of disappearance of keystone species necessary for our survival—however, what
keystone species should be saved is in fact unknown and is likely to remain so (Washington 2013). What allows pragmatic
ethicists to rehabilitate anthropocentrism , as a basis of an environmental ethic, is their own
rejection of the intrinsic value of nature (Noss 1992; Katz 1999; Mathews 2016). By rejecting intrinsic value,
environmental protection is enacted only to the extent needed for human well-being, and a
human environmental right subjugates all other needs, interests and values of nature to those of
humanity (Bisgould 2008; Borràs 2016). Thus, ecocentric scholars have argue d that non-
anthropocentrism is necessary to counter the accelerating threats to environmental elements that do not
directly contribute to human welfare (e.g. Quinn et al. 2016). Anthropocentric motivation is not enough . UNGA
(1982) calls for non-wasteful use of natural resources and observes that humanity benefits from healthy
ecological processes and biological diversity. However, this, essentially, is still an anthropocentric position
that sees nature as a resource where protection extends only to the ‘critical natural capital’
(Ekins et al. 2003) needed for society—not the rest of nature. This argument, in fact, is at the root of the concept of
ecosystem services (MEA 2005), which has now become a dominant paradigm in ecology and conservation literature, and a driving
force for governmental and NGO conservation. The ecosystem services approach however remains
anthropocentric, as it focuses on only benefits for people (Norton 1984; Washington 2015). Unga (1982) also states that every
form of life warrants respect “regardless of its worth to man”, and that according such respect requires us to be “guided by a moral
code of action” (in Sykes 2016). This moral code of action is not likely to be instructed by the same thinking that produced
anthropocentrism as a dominant ideology in the first place. To recall the famous quote by Albert Einstein: “We cannot solve our
problems with the same thinking we used when we created them”. Anthropocentrism does not allow for the
possibility of radical change similar to those that have ended slavery, and led to rights for women and ethnic minorities.
While the most promising hope for maintaining significant biodiversity under our prevailing value
system has been said to be ecologically -enlightened self-interest, it holds no ground if there are risks, and when
exclusive self-interest promises a ‘bigger pay off’ (Rees 2008: 89). As Washington (2015) argues, if instead we were to shift
to ecocentric values , nature’s survival would be ensured even more effectively , along with the
ecosystem services humanity depends on.
AT – Kills People
The alt doesn’t call for the end of all human life – instead forwards a world in
which humans consume only as much as they need – known as subsistence
emissions
4. SOME POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS PERTAINING TO THE ADEQUACY OF A DEEP ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE Deep ecology has
generated significant levels of criticism from many different standpoints. It has been viewed as
misanthropic or nonsensically impractical. Both concern the same point; the demands which deep
ecology makes are so strict that it would entail the impossibility of human life since all human
life requires some form of exploitation or harm to either animals or the environment. But Nress does not claim that
the duties of biospherical egalitarianism supervene, for instance, the right to livelihood; he permits
a moderate interference with our surrounding world, and moreover ranks different species. This is not as
controversial in the context of climate change as it would seem. We know that the atmosphere’s absorptive
capacity is limited, that current emission levels and the pace of increased emissions will soon exceed this absorptive capacity, and
that severe climatic changes will follow. However, we
need to emit in order to survive since we are dependent
on the burning of fossil-fuels to fulfill our energy need s—what is often called subsistence
emissions (cf. Shue 2014). Sacrificing such emissions would be morally relevant. However,
subsistence emissions could be distinguished from “luxury emissions,” which raise the risk and
magnitude of impending impacts without fulfilling any
*Deep ecology doesn’t justify random genocide – rather forwards a new

mindset of the self and our relation to nature
Hawkins 14, (Ronnie Hawkins was a professor at the University of Central Florida in the
Department of Philosophy), “Why Deep Ecology Had to Die” The Trumpeter – Volume 30,
Number 2, 2014, http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/index.php/trumpet/article/view/1398 //SDD
Deep ecology introduced a way of perceiving ourselves within the larger whole of the biosphere,
one that makes us stand back from fixation on the travails of our human subgroupings, with all
their associated rivalries and enmities, and consider the ways that all of us as a species affect the “otherness” of nature; it might
help us break through these social taboos as well . Moreover, if the growth of human populations
everywhere is in itself a driving factor in the accelerating extinction of nonhuman life forms, this
is a relationship that we need to allow ourselves to “see,” not hide from , nor we should we try to cover
up its moral implications. “Standing back” to gain a large-scale perspective does not in itself entail the detachment and moral
disconnection of a drone operator. We
don’t need to reduce our human population “by whatever means
necessary,” such as “randomly and indiscriminately shooting [its] members, ” as Callicott describes our
culture’s commonly adopted approach to overpopulating deer (1999, 124) and the one still being taken toward certain “other”
human subgroups – and in
fact we needn’t treat nonhuman populations in this way either (see Bekoff 2013).
In choosing to think differently from the currently prevailing winds, we humans can collectively
exercise a great deal of choice over the number of children we bring into the world , as well as how
much we consume and whether we wage war; to pretend otherwise is to buy into the determinism of a
metaphysics badly out of date. Accepting responsibility for the fact that many unfortunate
actions have been carried out by groups of which we are members, including the larger, all-
encompassing “group” of our species, is not to deny that different subgroupings have
contributed in different ways; it is simply a needed step to take toward the rectification of all these wrongs. To the
extent that the “whistleblowing” of deep ecology contributes to this realization, its proponents
deserve praise for their courage in standing up to the group, not condemnation and premature
burial for their audacity
AT – Watson
Watson’s critique ignores nuanced understandings of the term “natural” – it’s
ideologically unsound
Anderson 20, (Joshua Anderson - Asian Philosophy An International Journal of the
Philosophical Traditions of the East), “The self in deep ecology: A response to Watson” Asian
Philosophy An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions of the East, 17 March 2020,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09552367.2020.1733215 //SDD
Anthropocentric’ can be construed in a number of different ways. Most crudely, anthropocentricism can be understood as the idea
that all that matters are humans. Another way ‘anthropocentric’ can be understood is that all value is derivative of human values. A
third way is the way that Watson seems to use the term. Watson claims that ‘[t]he posing of man against nature in any way is
anthropocentric’ (p. 252). Since Watson’s objection is based on understanding anthropocentric in that way, I will be using his
understanding for the purpose of this paper. As to ‘Natural,’ Watson is using it in a very strict sense .
Watson believes that human nature is natural because anything humans do cannot violate the
laws of nature. Natural understood as not violating the laws of nature is what Holmes Rolston calls ‘following nature in the
absolute sense’ (Rolston, 1988, p. 33). However, one can understand human nature as natural in an
artificial sense: ‘Humans alter the course of spontaneous nature’ (p. 34). Both Watson and the
deep ecologist believe that natural in the artificial sense is what is problematic . Curbing the human
destruction of the environment is the goal of both Watson and the deep ecologist. However , how that is to be done is
where Watson and the deep ecologist diverge . Watson believes that anthropocentric prudence pushes one toward
following nature in a relative, or artificial, sense. ‘All landscaping is artificial; on the other hand no landscaping violates the laws of
nature. Some landscaping which blends with natural contours and uses native flora or introduce[s] plants compatible with it, is
considered more natural’ (p. 35). I contend
that human nature for the deep ecologist may fit under any of
these definitions of natural. However, a more Buddhist view of the self makes possible a deep
ecological understanding of ‘human nature’ that avoids the contradiction that Watson
believes is inherent in deep ecology.
Watson’s theory IGNORES ontological perceptions of the self – deep ecology

posits the self as fictional and must be reimagined
To answer Watson’s anthropocentric objection , one must realize that at the end of the day the formal
principles of deep ecology are secondary. As was mentioned above, ‘the most urgent task of ecophilosophy is the
articulation of a new understanding of the self’ (Curtin, 1994, p. 195). While developing a new understanding of any concept or idea
has value in itself, there is a more fundamental motivation for the deep ecologist . The autonomous mental
substance of Descartes, which still permeates Western thinking, is alienated from nature. This conception encourages environmental
degradation since damage to nature does not directly affect an immaterial self. Naess therefore advocates that the
narrow, Cartesian self must be expanded to include identification with the whole of nature —
nature as Self—thus, eliminating alienation, and with it the deep causes of our mistreatment of the environment (p.
195). So, environmental degradation is bad, and most people would certainly agree that it is. But, the reason humans
mistreat the environment, at least according to deep ecology, is due to a misunderstood sense
of self. Therefore, in order to ‘fix’ how one treats the environment, one must alter one’s notion of the self. Roughly then, an
expanded view of the self is required in order to solve environmental problems . Thought of this way, it
appears that the deep ecologists are really just presupposing the conclusion in the premises—viz., that one should change one’s
view of one’s ‘self.’ Moreover, it appears that the deep ecologists are claiming that from an ‘anthropocentric’ viewpoint,
degradation of the environment is ASIAN PHILOSOPHY 33 wrong. The only way one can stop environmental degradation is to have a
more inclusive sense of self. Therefore, one should change one’s view of the self, so that environmental degradation will stop.
Further, it can be noted that the manner in which Naess explains the expanded view of self seems to have an, arguably,
anthropocentric—or perhaps anthropomorphic—tone. I think a better way of looking at the situation is as follows: The current
idea of self—as an autonomous, self-interested ego—is flawed. Therefore, one should change one’s notion of the self. As a
result, one’s relationship with nature will change. And, if the deep ecologist is correct, it will have a positive
ecological impact. Here is the idea: one can take morality as primary, explanatorily at least. What I want to suggest is that
ontology should be made primary. Thus, the contrast is does morality drive ontology—which is what I take to be
Watson’s interpretation of deep ecology—or does ontology drive morality—which is what I take to actually be the deep
ecological position. With that in mind, consider, again the ‘self.’ Walpola Rahula explains that ‘Buddhism stands unique in the history
of human thought in denying the existence of [a self].3 According to the teachings of the Buddha, the idea of self is an imaginary
false belief which has no corresponding reality’ (Rahula, 1974, p. 51). From the Buddhist perspective, besides being
false and imaginary—which I will return to below—there is a further reason for rejecting a permanent, autonomous ego. Such
a conception of the self—call this the ‘traditional understanding’—leads to suffering . The traditional
understanding of the ego, Rahula explains, ‘produces harmful thoughts of ‘me’ and ‘mine,’ selfish desire, craving, attachment,
hatred, ill-will, conceit, pride, egoism, and other defilements, impurities and problems’ (p. 51). Perhaps something less theoretical
will make this point clearer. Consider the following scenario: GROCERY STORE: You are standing in line at the grocery store. You are
in the express lane and three people in front of you all have five more items than they are supposed to. Further, two people try to
pay with checks, and the lane is cash only. They both get in huge arguments with the cashier and one ends up paying with pennies
and the other just abandons their items—which takes time to clear. In the end it takes you twenty minutes to buy a half gallon of
milk. The whole time you are in line, you are getting more and more upset, your blood pressure is rising and you just want to yell at
someone. Suppose you do yell at someone; that just makes you angrier. Thus, a quick trip to the grocery store has led to you getting
upset and ruining your whole evening because you continue to brood over the incident. Your ruined evening, the unpleasantness of
your anger, et cetera are a result of the people in front of you wasting ‘your’ time. ‘You’ had ‘important’ things to do. Your wants
and desires are so much more important than other people’s lives. ‘You’ hate these people because ‘they’ have interfered with your
television show, say. These negative results are actually the consequence of believing in the traditional notion of the self. GROCERY
STORE gets at the crux of the Buddhist position. Because there is a ‘you’—i.e. a self—you crave things. Craving leads to suffering
because you may not get those things you desire, or if you do get them, you are afraid you will lose them. In Buddhism, suffering is
called dukkha. Dukkha is often translated as suffering, but it can better be translated as instability or unsettledness. Thus, dukkha
follows directly from believing in an individual, and substantial, self. 34 J. ANDERSON Certainly, most everyone does believe in a self.
It is a deeply rooted psychological belief, but that does not make it right. However, what we call the self has an essentially empty
nature. Everything undergoes change: Dirt compresses into rock, wind and rain break down the rock and turn it into sand. The sand
is taken up and turned into glass, say a bowl. The bowl is dropped and broken. The broken glass is recycled and turned into
insulation. The insulation is put into a house. The house burns down, and the process just keeps going. The
process of
continual change has no real beginning and no real end. Nothing is lasting; everything is
impermanent, including the self—at least according to the traditional teachings of Buddhism. People are born, grow and
die. No one will deny that the molecules that make up ‘my’ body today are not the same as the molecules that made up my body
when ‘I’ was three. Further, experiences today are just memories tomorrow. Impermanence is one aspect of what is called sunyata
(emptiness) in Buddhism. Another aspect of emptiness is that speaking of what something is only makes sense in relation to what it
is not. A pencil with which I may write is only a pencil, at least in part, because it is not a pen or a crayon or a car. Further, emptiness
can be seen in what makes something up. Consider, again, the pencil. The pencil is made of wood, which came from a mill. The mill
got its wood from a logger, who chopped down a tree. The tree, in turn, came from a seed, which was nurtured by the sun and rain.
Thus, a particular pencil reflects all the things that led to the pencil’s coming to be. If any of the myriad things that led to the pencil’s
coming to be were lacking, that particular pencil would not exist. In Buddhism, because of these and other reasons it is said that the
pencil is empty and lacks an essential self—it does not exist from its own side, it dependently and radically contingently exists. It is
the same for people. One is conceived at a specific time. One eats particular food, has particular experiences, mental states, et
cetera. All of these things make up what one is. There is no thing that is one of these or separate from these that can rightly be
understood as the individual self or ego. Curtin maintains that what has just been said is exactly a point to which Zen master Dogen
continually returns. ‘Dogen makes a Humean point: careful examination does not reveal a ‘singular,’ Cartesian self, but ‘innumerable
beings’ present to multiple spheres in which beings exist in relation to other beings’ (Curtin, 1994, p. 200). Again, the conclusion that
Buddhism draws from these considerations is that one is mistaken when one postulates a unique, individual, autonomous ego. Now,
there is a real reason for the deep ecologist to articulate a new understanding of the self, which is nonquestion-begging—viz., that
the traditional notion of ‘self’ is flawed. Using more technical jargon, consider the notion of paticca samuppada, dependent
coorigination. Dependent co-origination is simply the idea that one cannot isolate a separate self. All phenomena are dependent on
other phenomena for their coming into existence and their ceasing to exist. Importantly though, for Buddhism, and I would say deep
ecology, all that has been said, thus far, has to be realized in practice. One must see that all phenomena, including one’s self, is
impermanent (anicca). One must realize that all things are empty of essential self (anatta). One must realize that by not having
understood anatta and anicca, one is in fact suffering (dukkha)—or is subject to a life of dissatisfaction and dis-ease. One must
always keep in mind that, for Buddhism and deep ecology, when it comes down to it, experience is what ultimately matters. For
now, though, I will continue with theory. Curtin emphasizes the relational notion of self in Dogen, which can be instructive for the
overall project and its relevance to deep ecology. Dogen goes beyond Naess’ expanding circles of identification. ‘Dogen challenges us
to take [the] final step toward nondualism. For Dogen, the self goes out to realize with what he calls ‘the myriad things’. But the
myriad things also come forth to realize us’ (Curtin, 1996, p. 245). Curtin calls the interaction between the self and the myriad things
co-realization with all things. The idea of the myriad things coming forth to realize us is simply an extension of dependent co-
origination. Through co-realization, or so the thought goes, not only is the self nondualistic, but it is also nonmonistic. All
phenomena are empty of essential self and impermanent, and interdependent, hence nondual. There is no sharp distinction
between this and that. However, the fact that there are various phenomena—for example ‘me’ holding a pencil—is a given. Thus,
reality is not totally monistic. Consider that a top’s spinning and a top’s standing on its tip are co-realized. They are entirely
dependent, and one cannot exist without the other— the top spinning, just is the top standing on its tip, and vice versa. At the same
time, they are in some sense distinct states of affairs.4 It is not the case that everything is one whole; it is simply that everything is
related and there is no clear distinction between phenomena. His Holiness the Dalai Lama explains that [b]ecause phenomena
possess the characteristics of existing and occurring and are dependent on other factors—causes, conditions, and so forth—they are,
therefore devoid of an independent nature. Consequently, they have the nature of being dependent. The very fact that they have
this nature of dependence—being dependent on other factors—is an indication that they lack an independent status . . . Therefore,
an understanding of emptiness does not contradict the conventional reality of phenomena (Gyatso, 1995, p. 45). What the Dalai
Lama is underscoring is an extremely important point and returns to the idea of ‘natural’ and ‘human nature.’ Phenomenal reality, as
one normally thinks about it, is not denied. A tree is still a tree; a pencil is still a pencil. The natural sciences can, and should,
continue as they have. The point of an ‘empty self’ is an ontological one and quasiethical.5 If one’s actions come from a deluded
sense of a permanent self, it can be said that one is not acting naturally—or, perhaps, authentically. The relational aspect of
phenomena is the basis on which all phenomena derive value.6 Two things should be said here. First, value here is not moral value,
per se—though it is not not moral value. The intrinsic or inherent value of all phenomena is ontological—for lack of a better term. All
phenomena are valuable simply by being; this is taken as axiomatic for deep ecology. Further, since
all phenomena are
interdependent, value is also interdependent. Second, it is not the case that value is made or created, or is, in some
sense, distinguishable from being. The ontological value of being simply is. To speak of value, independent of being is a nominal
distinction, but that is not to say there is no value. Value is part of being, or rather, being is value and value is being. It may be
objected that the way I am interpreting value is extremely vague and ‘continental’—in a derogatory sense. However, that is not my
intention. My
discussion of value can be seen as a natural outcome of the relational, and
interdependent, notion of self. If one wishes to speak of value at all and claim that human beings have inherent 36 J.
ANDERSON value, then due to the interdependence of all phenomena all phenomena must have inherent value based on the
relational aspect of being.
Deep Ecology is not inconsistent, rather it forwards the self as being

interconnected with nature – Watson misidentifies Buddhist interpretations
Watson objects to deep ecology on the grounds that it is inconsistent . Watson believes it is inconsistent
because, while claiming to be non-anthropocentric, deep ecology ‘interferes’ with human nature. By interfering with human
nature, the deep ecologist is setting human nature apart and is, thereby, anthropocentric. Drawing on
Buddhism, it has been shown that the ‘Cartesian self’ is a flawed conception , or at least not the notion of
self that the deep ecologist holds. The deep ecologist claims that the Cartesian self is flawed, and a new understanding
should be adopted. As a result of the new view of self, one’s conception of human nature is also changed. Human
nature, for the deep ecologist, is not posed against nature—as Watson claims —but instead is
interrelated with nature and cannot be pulled apart from nature . When one, through experience, realizes
the interdependence of phenomena, one will act in an ‘ethically appropriate,’ or even an ‘ethically exemplary,’ manner toward
nature. ASIAN PHILOSOPHY 37 It is not that human’s ‘natural’ tendencies are curbed because of
prudence; abuse of the environment will cease when one realizes the fundamental
interdependence of all things. Finally, in regards to formal principles and definite actions one should take, these are mind-
training devices. Normative duties and so forth help one to realize the expanded view of self and are
part of the co-realization process. Further, until one has come to an ‘enlightened’ view of nature,
one in a sense imitates the actions of those who have truly realized the expanded view of self.
Because the formal principles are mind trainings, the principles of deep ecology are not anthropocentric
either. They do not set human nature apart, but rather serve a heuristic purpose; they are used to bring one to an
expanded view of self. In conclusion, Watson’s objection to deep ecology is unsound . Deep ecology is not
anthropocentric, or need not be anthropocentric. At worst, one might claim that the deep ecologists have not
been clear. Since a fuller understanding of the self, from a deep ecological perspective, highlights the fact that there is no distinction
between human nature and Nature, deep
ecology is not inconsistent in claiming to be
nonanthropocentric. Thus, deep ecology does not have to be abandoned, as Watson claims.
Deep Eco Good
Deep ecology allows us to live in harmony with other beings and apply place-
specific ecological wisdom by examining various cultures
Drengson 12 – (Alan, emeritus professor at the University of Victoria in British Columbia,
Canada. “Some Thought on the Deep Ecology Movement”, Foundation for Deep Ecology, 2012)
http://www.deepecology.org/deepecology.htm, sj
In 1972, Naess made a presentation in Bucharest at the Third World Future Research Conference. In his talk, he discussed the
longer-range background of the ecology movement and its concern with an ethic respecting nature and the inherent worth of other
beings. As a mountaineer who had climbed all over the world, Naess had enjoyed the opportunity to observe political and social
activism in diverse cultures. Both historically and in the contemporary movement, Naess
saw two different forms of
environmentalism, not necessarily incompatible with each other. One he called the “long-range deep ecology
movement” and the other, the “shallow ecology movement .” The word “deep” in part referred to the level of
questioning of our purposes and values when arguing in environmental conflicts. The “deep” movement involves
deep questioning , right down to fundamental root causes . The short-term, shallow approach stops before
the ultimate level of fundamental change, often promoting technological fixes (e.g. recycling, increased automotive efficiency,
export-driven monocultural organic agriculture) based on the same consumption-oriented values and methods of the industrial
economy. The long-range deep approach involves redesigning our whole systems based on values
and methods that truly preserve the ecological and cultural diversity of natural systems. The
distinguishing and original characteristics of the deep ecology movement were its recognition of the inherent value of all living
beings and the use of this view in shaping environmental policies. Those who work for social changes based on this recognition are
motivated by love of nature as well as for humans. They recognize that we cannot go on with industrialism's “business as usual.”
Without changes in basic values and practices, we will destroy the diversity and beauty of the
world, and its ability to support diverse human cultures. In 1972, very few people appreciated that Naess was characterizing an
existing grassroots movement, rather than simply stating his personal philosophy. In order to establish shared objectives, Naess
proposed a set of eight principles to characterize the deep ecology movement as part of the general ecology movement. The
platform can be endorsed by people from a diversity of religious and philosophical backgrounds as well as differing political
affiliations. “Supporters
of the deep ecology movement ” (rather than being referred to as “deep ecologists”) are
united by a long-range vision of what is necessary to protect the integrity of the Earth's
ecological communities and ecocentric values. Unfortunately, some vociferous environmentalists who claim to
support the movement have said and written things that are misanthropic in tone. Supporters of the deep ecology movement are
not anti-human, as is sometimes alleged. Naess's platform principle Number 1 begins with recognizing the inherent worth of all
beings, including humans. Gandhian nonviolence is a tenet of deep ecology activism in word and deed. Supporters of the deep
ecology movement deplore anti-human statements and actions. Accepting the Deep Ecology Platform principles
entails a commitment to respecting the intrinsic values of r ichness and diversity . This, in turn,
leads one to critique industrial culture , whose development models construe the Earth only as raw materials to be
used to satisfy consumption and production—to meet not only vital needs but inflated desires whose satisfaction requires more and
more consumption. While industrial culture has represented itself as the only acceptable model for development, its monocultures
destroy cultural and biological diversity in the name of human convenience and profit. If we do not accept the industrial
development model, what then? Endorsing
the Deep Ecology Platform principles leads us to attend to the
“ecosophies” of aboriginal and indigenous people so as to learn from them values and
practices that can help us to dwell wisely in the many different places in this world. We learn
from the wisdom of our places and the many beings who inhabit them . At the same time, the
ecocentric values implied by the platform lead us to recognize that all human cultures have a mutual interest in seeing Earth and its
diversity continue for its own sake and because most of us love it. We want to flourish and realize ourselves in
harmony with other beings and cultures. Is it possible to develop common understandings that enable us to work
with civility toward harmony with other creatures and beings? The Deep Ecology Platform principles are a step in
this direction. Respect for diversity leads us to recognize the ecological wisdom that grows
specific to place and context. Thus, supporters of the deep ecology movement emphasize place-
specific, ecological wisdom , and vernacular technology practices. No one philosophy and technology is applicable to the
whole planet. As Naess has said many times, the more diversity, the better.
Deep ecology develops a philosophical worldview that embraces self-

realization and biocentric equality to render a non-dominating and ethical
approach to environmentalism
Luke 02 – (Timothy, Distinguished Professor in the Political Science Department at Virginia
Polytechnic Institute & State University. “DEEP ECOLOGY: LIVING AS IF NATURE MATTERED -
Devall and Sessions on Defending the Earth”, Sage Publications, 2002,
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/10826602015002005, sj)
As one of the most fully outlined expressions of deep ecology in this literature, Devall and Sessions (1985) elaborated in considerable
detail what they saw as the central concepts of this approach. Following Naess, they held that almost all of today’s most basic social
conflicts loop into and around conflicts in consciousness: Thus deep ecology goes beyond the so called factual
level to the level of self and earth wisdom . Deep ecology goes beyond a limited piecemeal shallow
approach to environmental problems and attempts to articulate a comprehensive religious and philosophical
worldview . The foundations of deep ecology are the basic intuitions and experiencing of ourselves and Nature which comprise
ecological consciousness. (p. 100) The central problem of the dominant worldview for Devall and Sessions was the human desire to
dominate nature: Ecological consciousness and deep ecology are in sharp contrast with the
dominant worldview of technocratic-industrial societies which regards humans as isolated and
fundamentally separate from the rest of Nature, as superior to, and in charge of, the rest of creation. But the view
of humans as separate and superior to the rest of Nature is only part of larger cultural patterns. For thousands of years, Western
culture has become increasingly obsessed with the idea of dominance : with dominance of humans over
nonhuman Nature, masculine over the feminine, wealthy and powerful over the poor, with the dominance of West over non
Western cultures. Deep ecological consciousness allows us to see through these erroneous and
dangerous illusions . (pp. 65-66) To cultivate this nondominating ecological consciousness , Devall and
Sessions adopted Naess’s two ultimate norms: self-realization and biocentric equality . First, for Devall and
Sessions, self-realization was drawn from Gary Snyder’s (1974) vision of “real work,” or striving to be a whole
person rather than an isolated ego struggling to accumulate material possessions. This practice
ties into a new ethic of “being” or “doing” rather than a credo of “experiencing” or “having .”
Self realization is regarded as spiritual growth , or the unfolding of inner essence, which begins when we
cease to understand or see ourselves as isolated and narrow competing egos and begin to identify with
other humans from our family and friends to, eventually, our species. But the deep ecology sense of self requires a
further maturity and growth, an identification which goes beyond humanity to include the
nonhuman world. (Devall & Sessions, 1985, p. 67) Second, the norm of biocentrism holds “that all things
have an equal right to live and blossom and to reach their own individual forms of unfolding
and self realization within the larger self-realization ” (p. 68). This principle does not preclude mutual predation;
instead, it stresses the larger concern of living “with minimal rather than maximal impact on other species and the earth in general”
(p. 68). They argued, “ Biocentric equality is intimately related to the all-inclusive Self realization in
the sense that if we harm the rest of Nature then we are harming ourselves. There are no
boundaries and everything is interrelated” (p. 68). This new ethical attitude, Devall and Sessions
maintained, should, in turn, motivate people to change their behaviors in accord with the precepts of “voluntary
simplicity,” or living life as “simple in means, rich in ends.”
Deep ecology provides a unique forum for self-realization and understandings

of species interconnectedness – only then can we begin to understand humans
as a small part of a much larger biosphere, rather than the center of it all
Barman 17 – (Dr. Mayuri Barman, Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy @
Pandu College. “Deep Ecology Movement for Better Environmentalism with Special Reference to
the Role of Self-realization Concept”, Journal of Energy Research and Environmental Technology,
2017) e-ISSN: 2394-157X; Volume 4, Issue 2, sj
Deep ecology movement is founded on the basic principles - one is the scientific insight into the
interrelatedness of all systems of life on earth , together with the idea that anthropocentrism – human
centeredness is a misguided way of seeing things. Deep ecologists say that an ecocentric attitude is more consistent with the truth
about the nature of life on earth. The second component of deep ecology is ‘ Selfrealization’ - the fundamental norm of
deep ecology. Arne Naess consider self – realization as a replacement of morality. Everything goes around this fundamental norm of
deep ecology. Naess is of the opinion that if we identify ourselves with the non- human world then we are in no need of morality. As
Arne Naess has said “I am not interested in ethics or morals. I am interested in how we experience the world.” Thus, people
should take the environmen tal affairs as beautiful acts rather than moral acts. It should not
be a moral duty that drives the individual to protect the environment, but rather he or she should be
naturally inclined to do so, because a defense of nature should develop from a desire for self - defense.
Self-realization is the heart of deep ecology . Realizing the true self will give the equal rights to
every species of this ecosystem to live freely in this biosphere. Naess takes ‘selfrealization’ in a comprehensive sense. He
distinguishes between the two shelves, self (with a capital ‘S’ with a meaning to the Indian atman and self (with a small‘s’), meaning
individual self. The individual self should achieve the universal self through the diminishing of ego
or through the Mayuri Barman Journal of Energy Research and Environmental Technology (JERET) p-ISSN: 2394-1561; e-ISSN: 2394-
157X; Volume 4, Issue 2; April-June, 2017 188 narrow self. In other words the maxim “everything is interrelated” is realized. Thus,
the two basic principles – the diminishing of ego and the integrity between human and the non-
human world – constitute Naess’s ultimate norm of ‘selfrealization’. By the diminishing of ego he means the gradual
reduction of our hedonistic attitude. The integrity principle says that everything in this biosphere is internally
connected all organisms are parts of an integrated whole. That is, if we harm any element in this nature, then
eventually we harm ourselves. Naess self-Realization refers to the whole of nature and all the human and non-human
individuals that it comprises, realizing itself. Naess’s self-realization involves the identification of the small
human se l f -the personal ego with ever wider wholes . This identification is grounded in a
recognition of the metaphysical fact of interconnectedness (Freye Mathew, 1995).
Deep Ecology K – Aff Answers - Neil
Perms
Deep and shallow ecology can and should work together – shallow ecology
provides immediate solutions to urgent problems, while deep ecology
formulates long-term mindset shifts
Iyer 1/15 – (Aparna, environmental researcher @ Jindal School of Environment and
Sustainability, O.P. Jindal Global University. “Deep and Shallow Ecology Must Meet in the
Middle”, Delhi Greens, 1/15/2021) https://delhigreens.com/2021/01/15/deep-and-shallow-
ecology-must-meet-in-the-middle/, sj
First articulated by Arne Naess, a Norwegian philosopher and environmentalist, these two approaches are debated and weighed
against each other in environmental decision making. Shallow Ecology focuses on tackling environmental
problems that threaten human life , like air pollution and resource depletion. It is anthropocentric and
based on the needs of human beings. In
Deep Ecology, the central objective is ecosystem restoration and
recognising that all species have the right to live . And that humans are a natural part of this all-encompassing
ecosystem or Biosphere. So, the Deep Ecology approach is more eco-centric as the objective here is to
protect the environment for all living species, which will automatically protect and improve the environment for human
beings. How Deep is Deep Ecology? Deep Ecology deliberates on certain principles regarding
environmental protection like ecological egalitarianism, diversity and symbiosis, anti-class
posture and decentralisation. Ecological egalitarianism refers to the level of crowding and loss of life resulting from it, not
only for humans, but other species as well. We can understand this through the following analogy. People feel uncomfortable when
a place is too crowded, or when their movements are restricted. Similarly, mammals and other species also require a minimum
amount of space to thrive. Deforestation, habitat loss, carrying capacity of the Earth and such issues are considered through this lens
in deep ecology. Another principle that needs to be spelled out is diversity and symbiosis. All life forms are interdependent on each
other and should peacefully coexist. Diversity among species enhances life and balances the ecosystem. The principle also applies to
different livelihoods of people and their culture – each community knows what is best for their environment and should have the
right to practice it sustainably. Anti-class posture emphasizes that one community should not be exploited for the benefit of the
other community. The aim is to achieve equality between these communities through development so that no one lives in a
degraded environment. It also extends to environment-related conflicts between developed and developing countries. When
environmental problems are approached with short term solutions like air purifiers or air coolers during heatwaves, people’s basic
rights are compromised because not everyone can afford such technology. Also, manufacturing these products consumes more
resources and generates waste, which could result in further problems. Deep Ecology also suggests local autonomy for communities
to take measures at their level. Sometimes, conservation policies or development projects are implemented at a national level,
leaving the needs of local groups unaddressed. Thus, autonomy could be given to these groups, so that they implement policies for
resource use or environmental protection according to their knowledge and requirement. It can be monitored by the government,
so that people don’t misuse this. Decentralisation helps achieve anti-class posture too, as it empowers communities to take a stand
regarding their environment. To sum it up, Deep Ecology addresses social, ethical, and environmental issues
to ensure that ecosystems are protected. It allows nature to have its own rights and intrinsic
value. Out of the two, this is considered as the better approach to environmental protection. However, Deep Ecology has
limitations too. It is difficult to adopt a global strategy because national policies sometimes do not
align with these principles. Also, there is no empirical evidence to convince policymakers that
this is the best approach, though it is evident that human health and happiness comes with living in a good environment.
With global warming and environmental degradation, people’s lives and livelihoods are at stake . We also need
to realize that some communities are more affected due to environmental damage while others cope
with it better, and take measures that will benefit everyone. Conclusion Both Deep and Shallow Ecology
are important when we think of our relationship with nature. Adapting to the changes, restoring
the environment and preventing further damage requires a combination of both strategies. It
might seem that the benefits of shallow ecology are only temporary, but it can be a stepping
stone to Deep Ecology. Shallow Ecology helps us convey the urgency or threats as it is more
practical – “we need to save the environment because it helps us live.” Deep Ecology is a little complex , but this
path will have long-term impacts and help ecosystems recover and survive . Thus, rather than
debating between Deep and Shallow Ecology, we need to allow them to complement each
other to secure a green and healthy future.
There is a middle ground between deep ecology and environmental

management. Thinking pragmatically about the effects policies have on the
environment can prevent both overcorrecting and doing nothing.
Fatemi and Moghaddam 19 [Mahsa is an Assistant Professor for the Department of
Agricultural Extension and Education at Shiraz University.Kurosh Rezaei is a Professor of
Agricultural Extension and Entrepreneurship Development, US National Library of Medicine ,
"Multi-criteria evaluation in paradigmatic perspectives of agricultural environmental
management", 2019 , https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6378352//mb
The paradigms constitute the intellectual foundation that includes the values, beliefs and norms of the individual, organization or
society. Since strategies and decisions are also rooted in the intellectual foundation, one can perceive the strategies and behaviors
of the individual or organization by reviewing their intellectual paradigm. The strategies
which are selected and
implemented by policy makers, executives and managers are also extracted from their paradigmatic viewpoints.
Frontier economics, eco-development and deep ecology are considered as the three
fundamental paradigmatic perspectives relevant to environmental management debates . Frontier
economics proponents, with emphasis on economic components, consider economic growth and high agricultural production as the
main solution to sustainable agricultural development. In contrast, radical environmentalists believe in deep ecology and consider it
as the highest priority for environmental protection under any circumstances. Finally, there
is a moderate and
intermediate perspective called eco-development, which takes into consideration economic,
social and environmental aspects in order to achieve comprehensive environmental
management. There are three different types of strategies in terms of environmental management which are matched with
different paradigmatic perspectives. Regarding complexity, these strategies are independent strategies, cooperative strategies and
strategic maneuvering, respectively. The environmental management strategies selected by each principal group of the agricultural
sector of Iran are consistent with their paradigmatic viewpoints. The
key national policy makers and executives of
agricultural extension of Iran have an economic paradigmatic perspective toward environmental
management, thus assigning priority to economic factors such as natural resources use to meet
the needs of Iranians more than the other socio-environmental elements. Removing economic
barriers, agricultural production growth and more utilization of natural resources are the most
effective factors to sustainable agricultural development based on the opinions of the
agricultural extension policy makers and executive managers. Consistent with this intellectual foundation,
selected strategies would be mostly independent, separate and sporadic. In other words, the orientation of the principal
agricultural extension policy makers of Iran supports implementation of reactive strategies after
facing the crisis. Temporary and positional reduction of environmental damage in the agricultural sector is the main objective
of this kind of strategy. The managers and policy makers of the private sector, as well as researchers of agriculture of Iran, have a
moderate paradigmatic viewpoint, so they consider socio-environmental aspects in addition to economic factors, and even give
highest priority to environmental aspects most of the time. They also have a greater tendency to support integrated and cooperative
strategies in addition to reactive independent strategies in special situations. Agricultural researchers and the policy makers of the
private sector prefer proactive strategies over reactive ones. They believe in foresight and implementation of appropriate strategies
before facing environmental degradation as a means of crisis prevention. Using proactive strategies in agriculture requires
systematic land use planning studies in order to identify the capacities of natural resources of each region for comprehensive land
and water management. Thus it could be possible to determine and cope with environmental challenges and barriers before a crisis
occurs. Environmental policy makers, superior managers and the specialists of Fars province have
a totally different perspective in comparison with the other agricultural policy maker groups of
the study. This group has perceived intensive environmental crisis as well as strong environmental concerns more than others.
They absolutely believe in prioritizing the environmental components, so they prefer far more complex strategies for comprehensive
environmental management in order to achieve sustainable agricultural development. The policy makers and experts of the central
office of environment protection argue that it is necessary to rethink, modify and redesign common strategies in order to resolve
environmental challenges and crises of Iran. Using new strategies in the agriculture sector leads to maximum consistency between
the environmental programs and challenges, as well as adjusting to the specific condition of each region. On the other hand, it is
possible to change and modify the strategies in accordance with their flexibility. Empowerment of rural farmers enables them to
confront independently future problems in terms of environmental challenges to agriculture. The paradigmatic perspectives of the
agricultural extension key policy makers of Iran suggest that the viewpoint of the main policy makers and authorities as the superior
executives of agricultural extension of the country is mainly supports agricultural production growth due to the modernization and
diffusion of agricultural innovations theory. Environmental crisis would be worsened following the continuity of this theory. In
contrast, the managers and specialists of the other organizations related to agriculture have more
moderate perspectives related to the environmental circumstances, but they do not have much
executive force to make necessary changes in the country. The paradoxes among the paradigmatic viewpoints
of different policy maker groups in agriculture sector of Iran is another challenge which reduces their effective interactions. Weak
communications among these groups of policy makers is probably rooted in the strong
differences in their perspectives and intellectual paradigms. Selecting and implementing effective strategies
for better environmental management of agriculture has not happened since there is no change in the paradigmatic perspectives of
agricultural policy makers and executives of Iran. A
paradigm shift is required from frontier economics to the
more environmental paradigm of eco-development in the age of environment called ecological
enlightenment due to the widespread environmental crisis. Thus, a fundamental change is needed in the
dominant theory of innovation diffusion focusing on economic factors to the green theories emphasizing all aspects of socio-
economic and environmental components. Emphasizing
on economic growth and agricultural production
increase through transfer of technical knowledge no longer work . It is also required to notice
biocapacity of resources, poverty alleviation, environmental sustainability, food safety and
multi-functional agriculture comprehensively to a sustainable environmental management.
Combining deep ecology with adaptive forms of governance challenges shallow

ecology. It creates a new way of viewing resources by focusing on the intrinsic
value of a resource and the knowledge that it can bring.
Akamani 20 Kofi [Kofi Akamani is an Associate Professor of Forest Recreation and
Conservation Social Science in the Department of Forestry at Southern Illinois University.] ,
Sustainability Review , "Integrating Deep Ecology and Adaptive Governance for Sustainable
Development: Implications for Protected Areas Management", 17 July 2020,
file:///Users/mirababa/Downloads/sustainability-12-05757-v4.pdf//mb
To address these governance challenges, adaptive governance of social-ecological systems

[68,73,74] has been receiving attention among researchers and policymakers as a promising
alternative to conventional resource management approaches . Adaptive governance refers to flexible

and collaborative learning-based governance mechanisms that connect individuals, organizations and
institutions across multiple scales in ecosystem-based management of land and water resources
[31,32,75]. The focus of adaptive governance regimes goes beyond the narrow emphasis on the resource
management arena toward consideration of the broader social and institutional context within
which resource management occurs [73,76,77]. In this regard, Osterblom and Folke [78] build on Dietz et al. [68] to define
adaptive governance as “a process of dealing with complexity and change under uncertain
conditions that are difficult to control, involving diverse interest, and reconciling conflict among
people and groups who differ in values, interests, perspectives, and power, and the kinds of
information they bring to situations” (p. 2). This makes adaptive governance an appropriate mechanism for
managing the wicked problems that are entailed in the implementation of adaptive
management and ecosystem management [ 49,74,79]. Adaptive governance is also seen as an effective mechanism for
promoting transformational change in social-ecological systems when existing conditions
become undesirable [58,75,80,81]. The key features of adaptive governance have received considerable attention in the resilience literature
and they include: the recognition of change and uncertainty; the integration of diverse sources of
knowledge; the promotion of integrative and adaptive management goals; and a reliance on
diverse and nested institutional structures within polycentric systems [9,49,68,74,75]. These attributes of
adaptive governance could help overcome the conceptual and implementation shortfalls associated with current
approaches to promoting sustainable development, such as the neglect of complexity, the lack of integrated goals,
the dominance of science and technology and an overreliance on top-down decision-making. In

spite of its promise, a number of knowledge gaps continue to limit the widespread adoption of adaptive governance regimes. Notable among
these knowledge gaps is the neglect of the ethical foundations for adaptive governance regimes
[33]. Reference [11] highlighted the need for embracing attitudes and worldviews that support the active
stewardship of ecosystem processes as a key component of mechanisms for realizing the

sustainable development agenda. In the next section, this article seeks to contribute to the discussion on the ethical
aspects of adaptive governance by drawing from insights on deep ecology.
Perm do both- legislation to protect the environment is in line with deep

ecology
Wevodau 4 (Fellow at The College of Arts and Sciences at Texas Tech University, )
Michael Wevodau, "THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS WATER:AN
INQUIRY INTO OUR ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS ", Citeseerx.ist.psu, August
2004, https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.932.2204&rep=rep1&type=pdf)//guyB
This paper introduced the "problems" that early settlers created through the introduction to the
thinking that the environment was something that "needed tamed" and needed "owned ." This
way of thinking was contrasted with that of the Native Americans ways of "living as a part of nature."
The Euro-American concept of "wasteful techniques for resource use" was identified . Later, this paper
introduced a brief history of environmentalism. Initially, water was thought to be primarily of "limited use ,"
such as for "navigation purposes" or "secondary to navigation ." This section of the paper continued to discuss
how the ways for considering water had changed over time to include the effects of dams for "harnessing energy." This paper also
presented how decisions were influenced through the introduction of ethics and some examples of ethical dilemmas were
considered. The similarities between environmental lawyers and environmental engineers were illustrated in the context of these
"ethical dilemmas." We have looked at environmental legislation, as influenced by the field of ethics, and seen the effects that both
have had on shaping our current public policy. The role of the EPA has been outlined and its purpose has
proved to be great in the protection of the environment . We have seen how a decrease in funding coupled
with an increase in responsibilities has severely handicapped the EPA overall. 40 The impact of legislation has been a
tremendous asset in further protection of the environment . We have seen the impact that fining polluters
has had through a reduction of environmental pollution. Environmentallyconscious actions are achieved only
with the implementation of substantial fines and penalties . Incentives to lower pollution have
thus far been working through a new program called "water quality trading." This is a new
approach to solving old problems, and new thinking, coupled with the natives way of thinking
of and treating the environment is exactly what needs implemented in order to improve our
current environment. Albert Einstein once claimed that "we cannot solve the problems we have created with the same
thinking that created them." This sentiment still rings true today! Legislation has helped to provide us with the proper perspective on
considering the environment. The legislation is but the final phase in dealing with the environment. Only
when someone is
caught do they have to answer to the rules outlined in the enforceable policy. Throughout time
economic fines have proven to be effective in raising environmental awareness . Unless these fines
are substantial though they do not serve as a total deterrent. As long as it is less expensive to pay the fines "if caught" then
individuals and corporations alike will continue to pollute. This is why it is imperative to contribute to a better future by raising our
own self-consciousness and adjusting our own personal habits toward the environment so that we may act as a catalyst for others
whom we contact on a daily basis
The perm uses flexible learning based governance mechanisms and overcomes
the shortfalls of squo sustainability efforts
Akamani 20 (Associate Professor of Forest Recreation and Conservation Social Science in the
Department of Forestry at Southern Illinois University., )
Kofi Akamani, "Integrating Deep Ecology and Adaptive Governancefor Sustainable

Development: Implications forProtected Areas Management", Department of Forestry,
Southern Illinois University, 7-16-2020, https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.932.2204&rep=rep1&type=pdf)//guyB
The growing knowledge of the uncertainties and conflicts resulting from the complex cross-scale interactions in social-ecological
systems, and the influence of external drivers of change, present a number of challenges for the design of
effective institutions for the sustainable governance of social-ecological systems [55,68,69]. One of the
major challenges is the design of institutions with the capacity to provide the knowledge and
incentives for learning and experimentation processes in adaptive ecosystem-based
management [7,58]. Additionally, in view of the increased emphasis on transformational capacity in recent years, the
design of institutions for social-ecological governance need to account for the broader
processes of social-ecological change [54,70]. Moreover, the recognition of the importance of scale,
and problems associated with scale mismatch in conventional resource management policies,
calls for the design of multi-level institutions capable of enhancing the fit between various
components of social and ecological systems across multiple scales [7,44,71]. Conventional top-down
institutions that rely on reductionist scientific knowledge to achieve narrow sectoral goals,
based on assumptions of stability and equilibrium, are ill-suited for meeting these challenges
[9,30,72]. To address these governance challenges, adaptive governance of social-ecological systems [68,73,74]
has been receiving attention among researchers and policymakers as a promising alternative
to conventional resource management approaches . Adaptive governance refers to flexible and
collaborative learning-based governance mechanisms that connect individuals, organizations
and institutions across multiple scales in ecosystem-based management of land and water
resources [31,32,75]. The focus of adaptive governance regimes goes beyond the narrow emphasis on the
resource management arena toward consideration of the broader social and institutional
context within which resource management occurs [73,76,77]. In this regard, Osterblom and Folke [78] build on
Dietz et al. [68] to define adaptive governance as “a process of dealing with complexity and change under
uncertain conditions that are difficult to control, involving diverse Sustainability 2020, 12, 5757 5 of 21 interest,
and reconciling conflict among people and groups who differ in values, interests, perspectives, and power, and the kinds of
information they bring to situations” (p. 2). This makes adaptive governance an appropriate mechanism for managing the wicked
problems that are entailed in the implementation of adaptive management and ecosystem management [49,74,79]. Adaptive
governance is also seen as an effective mechanism for promoting transformational change in social-ecological systems when existing
conditions become undesirable [58,75,80,81]. The key features of adaptive governance have received considerable attention in the
resilience literature and they include: the
recognition of change and uncertainty; the integration of diverse
sources of knowledge; the promotion of integrative and adaptive management goals; and a
reliance on diverse and nested institutional structures within polycentric systems [9,49,68,74,75].
These attributes of adaptive governance could help overcome the conceptual and implementation shortfalls
associated with current approaches to promoting sustainable development , such as the neglect of
complexity, the lack of integrated goals, the dominance of science and technology and an
overreliance on top-down decision-making . In spite of its promise, a number of knowledge gaps continue to limit the
widespread adoption of adaptive governance regimes. Notable among these knowledge gaps is the neglect of the ethical
foundations for adaptive governance regimes [33]. Reference [11] highlighted the need for embracing attitudes and worldviews that
support the active stewardship of ecosystem processes as a key component of mechanisms for realizing the sustainable
development agenda. In the next section, this article seeks to contribute to the discussion on the ethical aspects of adaptive
governance by drawing from insights on deep ecology
Deep ecology alone FAILS – absent a practical policy approach, mindsets are
meaningless – the perm solves net better
Deep ecological and ecofeminist theory and associated interventions described above provide a
critical and thorough voice; however, they are limited as they are not “evidence-based.” Alston
(2013), after elaborating on the value of ecofeminist theorizing to provide guidance on gendersensitive social work in an era of
environmental crisis concedes, “we require multiple and layered practice theories and interventions
based on sound research in order to be critical players and advocates in the environmental
and climate disaster policy and practice space” (p. 219). Deep ecology has been widely criticized
for its celebration of the spiritual, which comes, for some, at the expense of the practical (Ungar,
2002). It can be argued that deep ecology and ecofeminism are ways of thinking, not ways of
doing, which invite social workers to question the dominant paradigms 8 Affilia: Journal of Women and Social Work XX(X) with
which they have been socialized, not only in the profession but also in the society as well. Having been steeped in an
anthropocentric worldview, social workers understandably focus their skills on addressing
existential crises facing their clients, patients, and community members . Similarly, when faced with
environmental crises, we understandably tend to situate our responses from an anthropocentric stance. The American Academy of
Social Work and Social Welfare hopes to foster, highlight, and proliferate the social work profession through advancements in
science-informed programming, and to estblish the social work profession as an integrative scientific profession (Barth, Gilmore,
Flynn, Fraser, & Brekke, 2014; Brekke, 2014). To what extent can the eco-spiritual frameworks make claim that they are indeed
scientifically based and thus be centered in this movement? At this point, literature
on the deep ecological and
ecofeminist movements in social work is indeed theoretical, conceptual, and, at times, strongly
anti-positivist (Besthorn & McMillen, 2002). The deep ecological and ecofeminist movement has made
explicit a disdain for a reliance on existing methods of scientific inquiry, which are in part believed to be
the cause of current environmental crisis. Thus, it may seem that ecofeminist and deep ecological practice is
an uneasy fit with current trends to operationalize social work based in scientific evidence .
However, ecofeminist and deep ecological tenants and practices can be aligned with
traditional paradigms to broaden the impact of scientific inquiry and to develop evidence-based practices
attentive to social and ecological justice. For example, scholar Deboleena Roy (2008) offers a “feminist practice of research agenda
choice” (p. 154, emphasis in original) which does not seek to dismantle typical scientific inquiry “but rather to provide the feminist
scientist with the necessary tools to produce interruptions or positive disruptions in the processes of scientific knowledge making”
(p. 154). Thus, through
centering ecofeminist ethics as a starting point in social work research and
intervention, the ecological spiritual movement and its ideas can be applied to existing
modalities of professional practice
Prefer the perm – Political movements and deep ecology work best TOGETHER
What I advocate and argue for is this: even those who completely subsume ecological policies under
the narrow ends of human health and well-being cannot attain their more modest aims, at least not fully
and easily, without being joined by supporters of deep ecology . They need what these people have to
contribute, as this alliance will work for them more often than it works against them. Those in charge of environmental
policies, even if they are resource-oriented (and growthtolerating?) decision makers, will increasingly welcome what
deep ecology supporters have to say, if only for tactical and not fundamental reasons. Even though
the more radical ethic may seem nonsensical or untenable to them, they know that its advocates are doing in
practice conservation work that sooner or later must be done. They concur with the practice, although they
operate from diverging theories. If I am right, the time is ripe for professional followers of deep ecology to
break their silence and freely express their deepest concerns . A bolder advocacy of deep
ecology by those who are working within the shallow, resource-oriented “environmental” sphere is the
best strategy for reestablishing some of the strength of this movement among the general public and
thereby contributing, however modestly, to a turning of the tide. What do I mean by saying that even the more modest aims of
shallow environmentalism have a need for deep ecology? We can see this by considering the World Conservation Strategy prepared
by the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) with the advice, cooperation, and financial
assistance of the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). The argument in this
important publication is through and through anthropocentric in the sense that all its recommendations are justified in terms of
their effects on human health and well-being. Even the recommended environmental ethic, with its attendant environmental
education campaign, has human beings in harmony with nature for human good. “A new ethic, embracing plants and animals as well
as people, is required for human societies to live in harmony with the natural world on which they depend for survival and well-
being” (IUCN 1980, sec. 13). Such
an ethic would surely be more effective if it were acted upon by
people who believe in its validity, rather than by those who merely believe in its usefulness. This, I
think, will come to be understood more and more by those in charge of educational policies. Quite simply, it is indecent for a teacher
to proclaim an ethic only for tactical reasons. Further, this point applies to all aspects of world conservation strategy.
Conservation strategy will be more eagerly implemented by people who love what they are
conserving, and who are convinced that what they love is intrinsically lovable . Such lovers will not want
to hide their attitudes and values, but rather will increasingly give voice to them in public. They have a genuine ethics of
conservation, not merely a tactically useful instrument for social and political ends. In short, environmental education campaigns can
fortunately combine anthropocentric arguments with a practical land and sea ethic based on a deeper and more fundamental
naturalistic philosophical or religious perspective, and on a set of norms resting on intrinsic values. The
inherent strength
of this overall position will be lost, however, if those who work professionally on
environmental problems do not give public testimony to these fundamental norms . This article is
hortatory, in the positive etymological sense of that word. I seek “to urge, incite, instigate, encourage, cheer” (Latin: hortari). This
may seem unacademic in a philosophical journal, but I consider it justifiable because of an intimate relationship between hortatory
sentences and basic philosophical views, which I will formulate below.
Government policies can be contingently good- the perm harnesses political

power to materially move away from anthropocentrism
Kopnina 12 (employed at The Hague University of Applied Sciences in The Netherlands,
coordinating Sustainable Business program and conducting research within the inter-related
areas of environmental sustainability, environmental education, biological conservation, and
animal ethics., )
Helen Kopnina, "The Lorax complex: deep ecology, ecocentrism and

exclusion", Tandfondonline, 10-18-2012, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/194
3815X.2012.742914)//guyB
O’Riordan (1976) reflects that even the weaker forms of anthropocentrism such as conservationism and human welfare ecology are
not sustainable since, in the presence of human crisis, they would be sacrificed for the more humanist perspectives. Indeed, despite
evidence of heightened global problems such as climate change and biodiversity loss, ‘‘environmental considerations continue to be
subordinated to economic ones’’ (Stevenson 2006:280). While the economic capture approach to preserving biodiversity seems to
be part of the mainstream political thinking, the latter approach calls for reflection on political implications for such an approach in
the rapidly globalising system of neoliberal democracy. The question of democratic legitimacy and conservation is hotly debated by
political observers, social scientists and the media. Some authors point to the empirical
evidence demonstrating that
government policies do not need to be legitimate in order to be effective or that ecocentric
approach may require different forms of democratic representation that would be inclusive of
non-human species (Ophuls and Boyan 1992; Oates 1999). One example demonstrating that democratic legitimacy
is not necessarily related to success of conservation policies is the creation and maintenance of
East African parks by un-democratic colonial governments , as well as evidence of success of
environmentally benign dictatorships in the Dominican Republic (Holmes 2010) in pushing forward
environmental regulation. Richard E.F. Leakey, a paleontologist and an activist, became famous for his fight to preserve
wildlife in Africa. Leaky espoused the view that the parks were selfcontained ecosystems that had to be fenced in and humans kept
out. In order to address the poaching of elephants, Leakey created special, well-armed, anti-poaching units that were authorized to
shoot poachers on sight. The poaching was dramatically reduced (http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Richard_Leakey)
but Leaky was widely criticized by human rights advocates. Various authors have argued that pursuit of biodiversity conservation will
fail without addressing democratic questions of human rights to livelihoods and access to landscapes (Western 1994; Wilshusen et
al. 2002, 2003). Robyn Eckersley (2002) has dissed how political
dilemmas such as these can be framed within
two alternative approaches: ecocentric (deep green perspective approach) and environmental
pragmatism (shallow ecology), suggesting that both need to be clearly articulated in order for dialogue between different
value holders as well as solutions to biodiversity issues can be found. Chawla and Cushing (2007) note that an analysis of the world’s
most serious environmental problems suggests that the effect of private actions is limited unless it is combined with organizing for
public change through collective political action (Chawla and Cushing 2007:438). At present, however, there
are no
empirical cases showing wide popular support for that advocating deep ecology perspective
due to the dominance of anthropocentric power holders . Different forms of ecologically enlightened regimes
were suggested as an alternative to deliberative democracy, such as panels of ‘‘moral experts’’ (Hardin 1972; Heilbronner 1974;
Caldwell 1990; Foreman 1998; Terborgh 1999; Dobson 2003). Without more fully elaborated representation of ecocentric advocates,
there are no institutional guarantees that other species will be considered in decision-making
processes, than their interests will be constantly neglected or at least given low priority (Barry et
al. 2002; Eckersley 2004, 2012). The problem is that no existing political system, democratic or less so, seems
to actually employ a panel of ‘‘moral experts,’’ particularly the one representing the deep
ecological perspective or simply, representing the non-human entities (Lidskog and Elander 2010). While
historically the anthropocentric position of individuals ‘‘in power’’ did not threaten bio-
diversity due to lower population density and nonindustrial system of production, the present-
day anthropocentrism has salient implications for the well-being and even the very survival of
non-human species. While some ‘‘green’’ political parties in Europe (such as the Party for the Animals in
The Netherlands) exercise some form of political influence over animal welfare, such influence is
proportionally very small and subordinated to other political interests, such as social welfare
and economic growth. Not only are individuals or groups within non-human species not
distinguished in terms of rights, the very discussion of their basic right to survive is not to be
found (for example, domesticated pigs are slaughtered for human consumption and wild boars are subject to possible extinction
due to deforestation). Most green political parties are only interested in the welfare of animals that
humans consume or keep as pets and not in ‘‘wild’’ animals outside of human instrumental
interest (Vining 2003). To sum up, and returning to the question of limitations of ‘‘economic capture’’ approach, the ‘‘moral
expert’’ approach combining ethical elements provided by the deep green perspective might be extremely useful in targeting
biodiversity loss. Multi-level
environmental governance (Lidskog and Elander 2010) and deliberate
democracy (Dobson 2003) do provide room for integration of deep ecology advocates . However, while
the inclusion of such moral experts within existing political systems is feasible, there are no guarantees that anthropocentric
interests will not dominate, as they do now. The
type of ‘‘affirmative action’’ by governments, informed not
just by dominant anthropocentric but ecocentric ethics might thus be needed to assure that
deep ecology is integrated in political interests . Taking off the academic hat, the author wants to stress that the
underlying ethics supporting gender and racial equality, abolition of slavery, and other human
rights have been inconceivable a couple of generations ago . At present, treating human minorities
as less worthy will not be socially and politically acceptable in most western liberal circles. If
moral considerations underlying present-day social issues such as racism and sexism are to be
extended to other species, the (minority) voice of human eco-centric advocates may actually
represent the majority voice of all biospheric citizens .
Only the perm solves- interaction with mainstream politics is key

animal ethics., )

3815X.2012.742914)//guyB
6.1. The causes of marginalization of deep green perspective While the ‘‘radicals’’ might be extremely
disappointed with the lack of support from the mainstream environmental organizations and
anthropocentrically inclined individuals, the most strategic political choice may still be peaceful
collective lobbying for the ecospheric interests. On the other hand, without general public’s and governments
support, and with continuing demonization of ‘‘eco-warriors’’ the ecospheric interests are not likely to be recognized. The
solution, however naïve, thus may lie in integrating deep ecology ethic in the mainstream
political apparatus to avoid both extremism and to achieve a true planetary sustainability . While
the author realizes that such integration might not be realistic in the current sociopolitical climate, ignoring deep green
perspective as ‘‘one of many’’ (at best) visions is not likely to result in resolution of severe
environmental issues such as biodiversity loss.
We’re not severance- even if they win that we’re “shallow ecology”, combining
the palatable politics of the 1AC with the radical stance of the alt is the ONLY
way to solve
animal ethics., )

3815X.2012.742914)//guyB
An analysis of environmental problems suggests that the effect of private actions is limited unless it is
combined with organizing for public change through collective political action . It was proposed that
the failure of the current political system to address biodiversity loss stems from the fact that
ecocentric values are underrepresented in the most powerful strata of society . While private
expressions of biophilia are acceptable, the more pronounced publicly expressed deep ecology
position is discouraged as radical. At the onset of this article, we have inquired why ‘‘radical
environmentalists’’ are among the least understood of all contemporary opposition
movements, not only in tactical terms, but also ethically . Those human advocates that ‘‘speak for
nature’’ at international summits and influential political meetings often represent shallow
rather than deep ecology position. It was postulated that the present-day causes for this lack of
understanding are both structural (in terms of power holders such as political and corporate elites) as well as
contextually dependent (current – and thus not ‘‘constant’’ or universal socio-cultural factors that make such
anthropocentrism acceptable). The author does see the possibility to reduce this lack of understanding through
open articulation of the ethical foundation of deep ecology perspective, combining emotional,
cognitive and philosophical underpinnings as an alternative to the current anthropocentric
paradigm. The work of Robyn Eckersley (2002) is particularly instructive in seeing not only why ecocentric activists have
trouble ‘‘speaking the same language’’ as ‘‘environmental pragmatists’’ or moderate environmentalists
within the shallow ecology movement, but also as an indication of ways forward in regard to potential of continuing to promote such
a dialogue. It
is not impossible to reconcile deep and shallow ecology visions, as ecocentric and
anthropocentric positions are often intimately interlinked (as most mainstream proponents of any form of
environmental protection – for human as well as for intrinsic value purposes would probably agree on). Just as pet-owner’s
commitment to their cat can be an expression of both ecocentric (loving a non-human being) and anthropocentric (the cat is used as
a companion, fed cat food possibly originating from other slaughtered animal, etc.) values, so can care
for the
environment in general be hopefully combined – when both deep ecology and shallow
ecology objectives can be clearly stated.
Perm – Native Solvency
Indigenous communities already engage in principles assoicated with deep
ecology, ceding authority to these communities is an act of the alternative.
Sneed 19 – Annie Sneed is a journalist for Scientific American (“What Conservation Efforts Can
Learn from Indigenous Communities”, Scientific American,
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-conservation-efforts-can-learn-from-
indigenous-communities/, 05/29/2019) B-Bahena
A kaleidoscopic diversity of Earth’s plants and animals underpins human existence but is under
major threat from the environmental degradation wrought by human activities from mining to
agriculture. A million species face extinction —many within decades— without major changes
to the way we interact with nature , according to a United Nations–backed report released earlier this month. But
there is a bright spot: this decline is happening at a slower rate on indigenous peoples’ lands ,
according to the report, which was compiled by a panel called the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and
Ecosystem Services (IPBES).
Its authors and other conservation experts say the world should not
only draw lessons from those and other local communities’ environmental stewardship but
that scientists and policy makers need to support and partner with them in order to stem the
tide of biodiversity loss. “On average, they are doing a better job of managing natural resources and environmental
hazards like species decline and pollution,” says Pamela McElwee, one of the report’s lead authors and an associate professor of
human ecology at Rutgers University. “This is a watershed moment in acknowledging that indigenous and local communities play
really important roles in maintaining and managing biodiversity and landscapes that the rest of us can learn from.” STEWARDS
OF BIODIVERSITY The report says at least a quarter of our planet’s land is owned, used, occupied or managed by indigenous
peoples. And that includes 35 percent of terrestrial areas with very low human impacts, as well as approximately 35 percent of
lands under formal protection. The numbers would rise even higher if groups the report designates as “local communities”—
considered nonindigenous, but with strong ties to the land through livelihood and other factors—were included. “We have
always been saying that if you really look at it, indigenous peoples manage very large areas of biodiversity. But to have
governments accept that, and to make it one of the major findings of the report, is quite significant,” says Joji Carino, who is
Ibaloi-Igorot from the Philippines’ Cordilleras Highlands and a senior policy adviser of the Forest Peoples Programme. This
nonprofit human rights organization works with indigenous peoples, particularly in tropical forest countries. The report found
that indigenous and local communities contribute in many significant ways to biodiversity. By
combining wild and domestic species in gardens, for example, they have created habitats that
are much more diverse and species-rich than typical agricultural landscapes—which are often
vast fields with acre upon acre of the same crop . “In some cases, there are 300 or 500 species in a garden,”
says Zsolt Molnár, a coordinating lead author of the IPBES global assessment and an ethnoecologist at the MTA Center for
Many indigenous and local communities actively manage their lands,
Ecological Research in Hungary.
such as through traditional burning practices that promote biodiversity in places including Australia.
They also carry out ecological restoration of degraded lands, such as in the U.S. Pacific Northwest, where indigenous
communities have been involved in restoring shellfish populations and native plant species .
Indigenous peoples and
local communities also play an important role in long-term monitoring of ecosystems . This is
critical, especially because some of these groups live in remote, hard-to-reach areas, such as the Arctic or Amazon forest. “It’s
really [these communities] that are collecting the data, often through everyday experiences, so they can report back trends for
species, population numbers over time, interactions between species, noticeable declines,” McElwee says. “That monitoring role
can be really important, particularly where we don’t have a long-term scientific presence.” For example, indigenous communities
in the semipolar regions of the U.S. and Canada have collaborated with those countries on the Local Environmental Observer
scientists and
network, which collects observations on everything from temperatures to wildlife sightings. Often, though,
governments have not recognized—or have even denigrated—the contributions of indigenous
and local communities to biodiversity conservation and ecosystem health . In Hungary, for instance,
traditional herders had long allowed livestock to graze grasslands, which helped promote biodiversity by maintaining the balance
of plant species. But when the country established national parks several decades ago, government authorities often
discouraged, restricted or even outright banned traditional grazing on grasslands. “The problem was that science had no
understanding of traditional herding and its impacts,” Molnár says. It is only over the last couple decades that government
authorities and scientists have recognized herders’ crucial role in grassland management and have started reintroducing and
supporting traditional grazing in the parks. A DIFFERENT VIEW OF NATURE Indigenous and local communities tend to succeed at
conservation for a number of reasons, say experts such as Eduardo Brondízio, co-chair of the IPBES global assessment and an
anthropologist at Indiana University Bloomington . These communities have long histories with their lands, which have provided
sustenance in a very direct and intimate way. “When you understand the potential uses and the values of hundreds of species,
you see a forest differently than if you don’t recognize that,” he says. Social norms and rules can also help communities regulate
their natural resources. “It’s about [viewing] the landscape not only from the perspective of just agriculture or ranging,”
Brondízio notes. “Instead of focusing on a single management issue, they look at the function of landscapes and what is
They also
important to keep in terms of connectivity, how different habitats can be managed to complement each other.”
tend to have a deeper understanding of local ecosystems and their dynamics, and this can
help make better-informed management decisions . “Community-based institutions are often more successful
than government policies or institutions (like formal protected areas) simply because they are closer to the ground and can
respond more quickly to changes or threats,” McElwee says. In addition ,
many indigenous and local communities
tend have a reciprocal relationship with nature, rather than viewing nature as existing to
serve humans —as much of Western culture has historically regarded things. “The institutions,
the cultural values, the way of living and the way you see nature itself—as [inseparable] from
your social life and identity—that creates a different view of what to use, how to use and how
to deal with the tradeoffs of use ,” Brondízio says. As McElwee notes, “Even if we don’t acknowledge it, the water we
drink, the air we breathe, the food we produce—it all depends on healthy ecosystems. That is a lesson we can learn from
indigenous peoples and local communities who know this already, and who are actively conserving and managing lands .”
Experts say indigenous and local knowledge is—and will be—a critical part of protecting the
planet’s biodiversity and the overall health of our ecosystems . This means governments and
scientists need to be allies with these communities by amplifying their voices, including them
in scientific assessments, recognizing territorial rights and creating partnerships between
scientists and indigenous and local communities . “One of the big points is that governments really have to
respect our knowledge, values and innovations,” Carino says. “As well as recognize land tenure systems, access rights, and so
on.” At the same time, many of these communities and their lands face immense threats. They are dealing with pressures from
encroaching infrastructure, agriculture, mining, logging and other activities that also endanger biodiversity. There are internal
pressures as well, Brondízio says. “Poverty is a major issue among indigenous and local communities,” he explains, adding that
this can put pressure on their natural resources or allow outsiders to exploit communities .
Standard conservation
practices can present a threat too , experts including Molnár and Carino say . “There are many bad
examples where indigenous territories were appropriated by the government, declared a
protected area, and indigenous peoples were translocated or just simply killed, ” explains Molnár,
pointing to the example of the Ogiek, who were evicted from their homes on Mount Elgon in Kenya. “ If we want
indigenous peoples to become allies in the protection of biodiversity, then we have to respect
their rights,” he says. Carino agrees. “Really, the whole way of conservation in the future needs to be
rethought,” she says. “It has to be conservation with respect for human rights of the peoples who are living there, who are
managing these areas.”
Indigenous justice is ALIGNS better with a deep ecology perspective – key to

resist systems of oppression
Kopina and Cherniak 16, (Helen Kopina Faculty Social and Behavioural Sciences, Institute
Cultural Anthropology and Development Sociology, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands;
b Independent Researcher, Ontario, Canada; Brett Cherniak studies Deep Ecology, Animal
Rights, and Environmental Communication – corresponding author), 2016, “Neoliberalism and
justice in education for sustainable development: a call for inclusive pluralism, Environmental
Education Research”, 22:6, 827-841, DOI: 10.1080/13504622.2016.1149550 //SDD
Many of these educational paths incorporate the earth democracy (Shiva 2005) or eco-advocates who ‘speak for
nature’ (O’Neill 2006), representing the voices of more-than-human citizens (e.g. Sandell and Öhman 2010). It is the creation
of these ‘voices’ that are essential . In Spell of the Sensuous, Abram (1997) speaks of the kinds of first-hand experiences
that could enable students to attend to the more-thanhuman voices including explorations of animal tracks, the speech of stones
and the taste of the wind, felt through direct contact or storytelling. Similarly, Payne (2010b) calls for storytelling, art, illustration,
song and poetry to place learners within an ecocentric sense of self. This
sense of self comes from an appreciation
of the intrinsic value of nature, and in Abram’s words ‘through a renewed attentiveness to this perceptual dimension
that underlies all our logics, through a rejuvenation of our carnal, sensorial empathy with the living land that sustains us’ (1996, 69).
Evoking Abram, Bonnett (2015, 25) reflects that while the mutually sustaining relationship with the transcendent that lies at the
heart of human consciousness is frequently veiled and distorted by other powerful motives,
this interdependent
relationship with nature still has an essential ontological significance . In education, ‘sustainability is
not a matter of alien material to be manipulated and problems to be fixed, but of opportunities
for loving partnership and engagement – where ‘loving’ means recognition of the existence of something that is other
than ourselves and our constructions, and allowing it to stand forth in the nobility of being itself’ (ibid., 38). As Pashby and Andreotti
(forthcoming) suggest, we need to ‘worktowards intelligibility, dissent, and solidarity: making visible and
unearthing the embedded Environmental Education Research 833 assumptions at the core of systems of
oppression; resisting their enactments and reproductions; and coming together through difference’. In this process of
recognizing difference, further progress can be gained by using cross-cultural examples of Non-
Western environmental learning, as it is closer to the deep ecology perspective (Milton 2002; Black
2010). Indigenous ontologies have historically disputed a dualistic vision of human-environment
that produces separate ‘social’ and ‘environment’ categories , and demonstrated that sustainability
can only be achieved by the provision of simultaneous social and ecological justice (e.g. Shiva 2005;
Strang 2013). The environment as a natural resource in modern neo-liberal societies stands in sharp
contrast to the ecological spirituality of traditional culture s (Taylor 2008, 2010; Sponsel 2016).
The aff’s representations ALIGN with deep ecology – the permutation solves
best
The social work profession has developed deep ecological philosophy and ecofeminist ideals for
purposes of informing clinical intervention. Many in social work have used the theories of
ecofeminism and deep ecology to suggest an expanded ecological theory that is inclusive of
both the natural physical environment and also the natural being of humankind and their
interrelationships, community, and spirituality (Adger, 2000; Ferreira, 2010; Gray & Coates, 2013). These theories direct
social work to move from anthropocentrism to ecocentrism, dualism to holism, individual to
community, and progress to well-being (Gray & Coates, 2013). Deep and feminist ecology attempts to
expand the methods of social science research and clinical intervention (Dominelli, 2011; Drolet, 2012),
for example, by honoring the spiritual narratives of indigenous communities , more thoroughly defining
constructs of sustainability, and by highlighting the importance of physical place to communities (Alston,
2013). Deep ecology has been summarized into eight distinct principles. The principles adapted from Naess (1989) for social work
professionals by Ungar (2002) are all individuals have intrinsic value outside of one’s usefulness for human consumption; diversity
offers the potential for the emergence of unique solutions; structured alliances must be situated to increase diversity of resources;
service delivery systems ought to be managed by community stakeholders; these systems should be kept small; public policy must
allow communities the capacity to function on their own; that which benefits individuals and their communities is the benchmark of
development; those who align with these points have an obligation to amend their methods and organizations to achieve these
goals (p. 488). 6 Affilia: Journal of Women and Social Work XX(X) Ultimately, such a manifesto calls on practitioners to view all
entities, both human and nonhuman with a stance of equanimity, to ensure that a diversity of resources are channeled to
communities so that they may “help them help themselves” (Besthorn, 2012; Gray & Coates, 2013), and to guide human service
organizations to achieve these aims by remaining small, and seeking guidance from community stakeholders rather than boards or
bureaucracies (Ungar, 2002). Finally, in practice, social workers must advocate for policies that situate the well-being of communities
as the benchmark of social and economic developmental processes (Ungar, 2002). The many ways in which these principles have
been operationalized by social workers to meet the need of environmental crisis include educating on the issues associated with
environmental degradation, promoting sustainable energy production and consumption, and mobilizing communities to protect
their futures through local social work focusing on environmental problem-solving (Dominelli, 2011 ).
Many examples of
ecofeminist and deep ecological social work practices exist and include supporting prison
abolitionists’ fight to decriminalize Indigenous and environmental protest; supporting youth
environmental leaders globally, such as climate activist Greta Thunberg (2019); working in solidarity with undocumented farm
workers; and advocating for comprehensive immigration reform and immigrant labor rights in order to green our food systems
(Bhuyan et al., 2019, pp. 292–293). Social workers at the microlevel and mezzolevel provide psychoeducation to ensure that groups
and organizations understand environmental problems so that global-level knowledge can affect local action. Furthermore, on the
macrolevel, social workers can bring people together to defend international policy such as the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCC, 1997). As
stated by Dominelli (2011) “Social workers, with their skills in seeing the whole picture and mediating between conflicting groups,
can facilitate implementation discussions at international policy and community levels” (p. 434). In all, these interventions are led by
workers not bound within the confines of an agency but bring the decision-making process out of the bureaucratic boardroom and
into the spiritual and communal spaces of those being serviced (Ungar, 2002). Social worker Julie Drolet (2012) recounts an
ecofeminist intervention whereby communitybased participatory action research was used in British Columbia, Canada, to inform
and guide potential interventions. The community-based participatory action research process lead to identification of desired
interventions and needed policy advocacy. It was found that issues of environmental degradation and change were significant
concerns of local community research participants and that local and national government action on these issues was desired. This
intervention led to an identification of the problem as understood by the community as well as their desired changes, namely,
advocating for further development of community-managed food gardens, and more autonomy in managing and identifying the use
of natural ecological resources that were central to local economies (Drolet, 2012). Ecofeminist intervention develops agency, allows
for reflection, and promotes community action (Drolet, 2012). In another example, social worker Michael Ungar (2018) synthesized
the literature on resilience, pointing out that research in this area has traditionally been anthropocentric. He highlights the adaptive
and resilient ways in which plant and animal regimes have survived human-made disturbances and underscores the capacity-
building possibilities that present themselves in the face of adversity (Ungar, 2018). Such a perspective, which acknowledges
connections between human and nonhuman elements in a community and earnestly weighs trade-offs present in an adversity–
resiliency process, would be beneficial to the social work profession as it addresses this grand challenge. Ecofeminist and deep
ecological interventions take into account the subjectivities of those affected by climate change and create space for communities to
learn and dialogue on both environment and other social issues that are believed to be interconnected; a social problem does not
arise without equal problem in the natural ecological realm (Alston, 2013; Drolet, 2012). Jones (2010) highlights interventions of this
nature that utilize experiential learning related to issues of Klemmer and McNamara 7 environmental exploitation and destruction.
Jones recommends taking clients and students of social work to community gardens, degraded
waterways, waste management facilities, and natural ecological rejuvenation sites . These experiences
prompt intervention participants to question their potentially limited knowledge of ecological environmental issues and their
underdeveloped frameworks to question and solve problems of social and natural ecological dimension.
In concurrence
with these methods, indigenous scholars have recently provided examples of social work that
incorporates place-based teaching. Billiot and colleagues (2019) share on their work to teach social work students
through embodied learning about the sand creek massacre in the state of Colorado. In their example of this type of teaching, explicit
connection-making between historical violence perpetrated in part by important figures in the student’s academic community was
made, and a site visit was utilized to promote a deep ecological perspective for students who illustrated their interconnectedness
with their environment and its history. These scholars also give an example of mental health interventions that engage with the
natural environment: The Yappallı´ Choctaw Road to Health intervention uses a place-based, outdoor mode of communal and
individual healing for women of the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma (Billiot et al., 2019). These are but two examples on how social
work practitioners, researchers, and administrators can incorporate placebased, historically aware educational classes and health
interventions using these paradigms. Deep ecological and ecofeminist interventions promote communities’ ability to enjoy one
another and nature. Naess (1989) argues “We need types of societies and communities in which one delights in the value-creative
aspects of equilibrium rather than the glorification of value-neutral growth; in which being together with other living beings is more
important than exploiting them” (p. 24). Deep ecological and ecofeminist interventions attempt to bring individuals, families, and
communities together outside of the realm of enjoyment as demarcated by market-based economy. These interventions teach
individuals and communities to enjoy one another, to be in and revel in natural spaces, and to observe and create art and music
(Besthorn & McMillen, 2002). This occurs simultaneously in communities while advocacy ensures that socially marginalized groups
receive adequate resources to engage in these types of activities; market-based economies have disenfranchised many from
accessing these types of value-driven lifestyles (Peeters, 2012). Interventions such as those described here are supported by critical
methodologies such as educator Paulo Freire’s (2000) perspective-shifting take on the ways in which educator, student, and
environment are defined. Freire (2000) states “The oppressor consciousness tends to transform everything surrounding it into an
object of its domination. The earth, property, production, the creations of people, people themselves, time—everythingis reducedto
the status of objects atits disposal” (p. 11). Proposingto shift this framework, Freire (2000) advocates for humansto become aware
oftheir “incompletion” (p. 29) and to actively reject the process of valuation, domination, and oppression. The social work profession
would do well to similarly be aware of its “incompletion” as it works toward achieving justice for humans, all sentient creatures, and
the nonsentient material of the planet alike.
Alt
Generic – Alt Fails
The alternative fails to solve the climate crisis and relies heavily on utopic
values. Waiting for a consciousness to be developed, assuming everyone would
act the same once enlightened, and that a mindset shift would ever occur are
far-fetched and unrealistic.
Tiili 15 – (Kristin, MA Philosophy from University of Oslo and Polar Law candidate @ University
of Akureyri. “Naessian deep ecology, political action and the climate crisis”, University of Oslo,
Sprin 2015) https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/46071/Tiili-Master-thesis.pdf?
sequence=1&isAllowed=y //sj
After having read Ecology, Community and Lifestyle one is left with a feeling resembling a kind of Hobbesian pessimism towards
people due to the complete lack of faith in human beings in their current state. The only solution to the global crisis is the enormous
change we are told we have to undergo in order to solve anything of substance and become good enough persons. Though
Naess presents solutions such as change in policy and our economic structure, nothing will yield
results unless a change in consciousness is realised. Hence, his whole thesis rests on that
change. There are three problems with this idea , and I will present them one by one: ( a) We do not have
time to wait while a new consciousness is realised by enough people. b) Even if a change in
consciousness is realised, this does not automatically mean that people will act towards other
living beings and nature as Naess automatically thinks they will. This is the claim about moral intellectualism that
I will develop further later on. (c) A change in consciousness might not occur at all. Point (a) we do not
have time to wait while a new consciousness is realised by enough people, is an evident challenge that makes it difficult to
wholeheartedly embrace Naess‘ solution of a change in consciousness. The reason is that we have to act now and
we cannot wait for enough individuals to reach a different level of consciousness. 120 It somehow
feels like unreservedly embracing an idea I might have of what I would do if I won a billion pounds. Sure, I can dream and make
plans, but I would never base my everyday life on the idea of having all that money, and what I would or could do with it. Yet
somehow, this is what Naess is supposedly doing; he
is basing his whole theory on a hope that may or may
not happen sometime in the future. Though he appears to be certain that a change in
consciousness will become a reality at some point, history tells us otherwise. Humans have changed in many
ways since the dawn of man, but not all that much in terms of compassion for others, human and nonhuman, showing humility
towards nature and not exploiting what we can with the tools we have. Never before has the human race exploited so much of the
Earth as we are currently doing, and this is simply because we now have the technology to do so. For most individuals this is
progress, and then asking the majority of people to take what would feel like several steps back into some dark age, is comparable
to asking someone to live now as if they had a billion pounds when they do not – and have no idea of they will ever realise the
dream. We cannot live today merely on the hopes of what tomorrow might bring; we also have
to make decisions based on where we are today and what assets we have right now . Tomorrow will
certainly come, but it may not come in the form we hoped, and it might not bring with it what we had hoped for. Having hopes,
dreams and aspirations is of importance, but it is utopian to base one‘s entire life on those same
hopes, dreams and aspirations. The situation unfolding itself on this planet in this very moment, is one where most are not willing to
give up their standard of living in exchange for what Naess deems quality of life. This is the truth that we have to start working from
when we attempt to find solutions for the environmental crisis. One
can be optimistic about changing people‘s
attitudes towards the environment and the climate crisis, but a change in consciousness is too
unconvincing . As an opposing argument Naess could surely state that with the aid of self-realisation, we could ensure that the
future will be as we wish it to be. And by spreading the idea of selfrealisation through the deep ecology
movement, enough people might be reached and thus it would take more time than we have – in order to
remedy the climate crisis . Naess could also argue that he himself is an example of another level of consciousness being
plausible because he embraced it. Furthermore, he might argue that if a change in consciousness is realizable not too far into the
future, deep ecology offers sufficient solutions through the platform that will enable us to act also while we ‗wait‘ for enough
people to change. But, first of all, how can we rely on self-realisation and that enough people will
embrace the idea? For more than two thousand years the philosophy of Siddharta Gautama has been available to us, and not
many (compared to how many we are on this planet) have embraced his idea of enlightenment. In some ways enlightenment, as
taught by the Buddha, can be likened to Naess‘ idea of self-realisation. However, most people appear not to be interested in
embracing either philosophies, whether spread by the deep ecology movement or by H.H. the 14th Dalai Lama. Many do embrace
these ideas, but not enough. Surely, Naess himself is a good example of someone who has taken on board the ideas of Buddhism
and deep ecology, but even he cannot follow through as we saw in point 1 above. Consequently, it is easy to draw the conclusion
that for most of us, it simply is too improbable to take such ideas seriously. Though
deep ecology offers some
solutions that might be implementable now, they are too heavily intertwined with the idea of
self-realisation and a change in consciousness for them to be taken too seriously as deep
ecology now stands. Naess places great importance on political action and policymaking and he argues that the deep ecology
movement and ecological movements in general cannot evade political engagement.121 I agree with this, but on the other hand, it
seems futile to base political action and policymaking on hopes and dreams without having some sense of how things actually are at
the moment. If we were to take political action based on a level of consciousness that is not realized, it is plausible to think that not
much would get done as people would not follow or even might not understand. We cannot hope to act from a place we have yet to
reach. Politics, perhaps more than anything, has to deal with status quo and slowly aim at working toward the desired goal.122 (b)
A change in consciousness does not guarantee a change in action. Naess takes it for granted that when a
change is consciousness is realized, everyone will feel a connection with nature and treat it as it was part of our own bodies.123
However, as shown above, this
necessary link between theory and action that Naess envisions, is not
even realised by himself as we saw above. Not only because action is more difficult than theory, as seen in Naess‘ case, but
also because most people do not embrace the theory Naess passionately advocates. In Naess‘ own words, the ―change of
consciousness […] of a transition to a more egalitarian attitude to life and the unfolding of life on Earth‖ 124 is the way forward.
However, this is Naess‘ assumption, but it does not necessarily follow that it would actually be as he envisions, even if enough
people experienced a change in consciousness. Though
Naess fails in his own love in action some times , this
does not mean that he fails at all times, and his consciousness towards nature is likely unlike that of most people. If
the
majority came to think and act like Naess, it is credible to conclude that more nature would be
left untouched. However, it is uncertain whether most people would act and think as Naess even if
they did have a sort of awakening. It is also possible to spend hours on end in nature without
becoming ecocentric and/or see nature in a more spiritual light. Timber workers for example, spend hours on end in the
forest, but they see the forest as a kind of store where they can get their timber. Most of them probably have great respect for
nature, but that does not necessarily mean that they will want to leave the trees and not utilise them for building houses for
instance. Spending time in nature does not necessarily lead to the same result for all the
individuals . Hence, we cannot simply assume that everyone who spends much time outdoors will
come to the same conclusions as Naess does. Consequently, deep ecology makes a great error relying on a change in
consciousness to be part of the solution to the global crisis. Having the ideals seem good for end goals, but perhaps dividing the end
goal into smaller bits that are a little more fathomable for the general individual might be a good idea. And in regards to Naess, I
think he would have benefitted from smaller and more approachable goals, because it would have made deep ecology more
applicable as it would have been more practical and tangible for the average person. Going from being an average person to
transforming oneself into a self-realised person of perfection who lives in togetherness with nature, might be a little daunting unless
there are stages one can go through that makes it appear more reachable. That is, if one has any interest in starting the process at
all. If not, any amount of smaller goals might not do the trick. Furthermore,
in our western society today, most
people spend the majority of their time indoors or within the limits of cities, and not in nature (this is a
prerequisite for change in deep ecology as we saw earlier). At the most some people spend the occasional hour in a park located
within the city boarders or by a river running through it. How
we are supposed to get people to spend time in
nature is not discussed in Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. And frankly, it does not seem plausible to
pass laws and create policies that force persons to spend a certain amount of their time in nature each
day or each week. It is difficult to even imagine a sort of government who would spend time on such issues. Perhaps Naess
envisions, along the lines with his ideal ecophilosopher, that society will be like the utopian civilization depicted in William Morris‘
novel News from Nowhere. 125 In this utopian story there is no more democracy, money or any difference in status between
anyone. It is a true egalitarian society where everyone has their tasks and everything is shared among everyone. In the novel this
change comes about after a major disaster in the world that destroys nearly everything and everyone. The remaining people build a
new and better society.126 Whether such a society is possible at all is difficult to say, but I think we can conclude that it is not
possible currently. Naess places tremendous faith in the deep ecological movement, and that a sufficient amount of supporters with
an ecocentric worldview will be part of it. From the 2007 IPCC report to the 2013 report they (scientists) found things to have
become worryingly more severe during those six years than was expected.127 Since
the situation keeps worsening at
such a rate, we do not have time to allow sub-organisations of deep ecology to spread the
information in order for enough people to change their view of nature . As we know, for Naess a change
in consciousness is essential, and he claims that without a ―change in consciousness, the ecological movement is experienced as a
never-ending list of reminders.‖128 The apparent lack of consciousness a la Naess, is plausibly part of the reason why deep ecology
in some ways do come across as a never-ending list of reminders. (c) A change in consciousness might not occur
at all. This is a problem because if an entire theory relies on a change in consciousness to happen, then
what if that change does not take place ? It seems in that case the thesis will crumble and fall to the ground. With
the assumption that a change in consciousness will take place in a foreseeable future, Naess supposes that when that
change has occurred, everyone will awaken‘ and experience togetherness with nature. However,
this is quite unlikely. The way in which people view and thus act towards nature, have generally been divided into four types:
stewardship, imperialism, romanticism and utilitarianism.129 Those who see themselves as stewards of nature generally hold a
perspective of human privilege in the hierarchy of nature. It is our responsibility to take care of nature as the stewards of the Earth.
The imperialist view is a view much like the stewardship, but they have a stronger connection with the Christian and Jewish
traditions for human superiority on this planet. Human beings have a God-given right to control all living beings and ecosystems as
we please, because we are at the top. Though a romantic might view nature in an anthropocentric way like the stewards and
imperialists, they see nature as most beautiful in its untouched, pure state. The final view, the utilitarian, regards the most
important thing in life to be happiness.130 Naess is clearly a romantic in regards to nature and his relationship with it. And he
appears to assume that everyone will wake up with a romantic view towards nature when they have gone through their awakening
change in consciousness . By maintaining that the solution is a change in consciousness , deep
ecology removes itself from being part of the solution to the crisis . What we need is
proposed resolutions we can make use of today, and not something that might occur if the
change in consciousness happens to take place . Naess argues that currently, humans are too anthropocentric
and need to go through a change in consciousness that will take us from a human-centred focus to a nature-centred focus. He
argues that changes in the system of our way of life are futile without the change in consciousness, and therefore that has to be
taken seriously. We do need direct action in the form appeals, humanitarianism and information in addition, but without a change in
consciousness Naess does not think sufficient change can be made in order to rectify the crisis.131 Thus, short-term goals are useful
only when a change is consciousness is taken into consideration and worked towards through self-realisation.
The alt’s mindset shift is TOO VAGUE – leaving room for anarchism
Honnacker 20, (Ana Honnacker professor in philosophy Hannover,
Germany), “Environmentalism and Democracy”, European Journal of Pragmatism and American
Philosophy [Online], XII-2 | 2020, Online since 14 December 2020, connection on 15 July
2021. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/2132; DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.2132 //SDD
A first potentially anti-democratic feature may be found on the level of the mode of political action. Generally, radical
forms of
environmentalist thinking tend to have sympathies for anarchism (Barry 2014: 158) and to be politically
revolutionary instead of relying on reforms. “Fixing” environmental problems while going on the way we used to
seems a “shallow” solution – which means it is no solution at all. From this perspective, we need a thoroughgoing social and cultural
transformation. The crucial question is how this demand for change is realized, and how far-reaching
it is. 17 Deep ecology, for example, clearly advocates a radical re-orientation with regard to our
lifestyle. Though this implies fundamental political, economic and social changes, deep ecologists remain rather
vague about how these are to implement and focus on the importance of an alternative
philosophy. The revolution is intended to happen on the metaphysical level : ontology first, politics
second. “The advocates of deep ecology claim that the most important task is to understand the world in the right way [my italics];
given the correct understanding, the ethical choices will be obvious.” (Katz, Light & Rothengerg 2000: xiv).7 This openness
leaves room for anti-democratic political action yet it does not explicitly support it, the more so as it is conceded
that the Environmentalism and Democracy European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-2 | 2020 4 necessary deep
change may be performed in small steps, and is only revolutionary “in direction” (Naess 1989: 156). 18 The
problematic
dimension of revolutionary demands become obvious when not only the free market and global
capitalism are identified as part of a system that is ecologically disastrous but also the existing
institutional and political structures, including democracy . In contrast to reformist environmentalism, the
criticism of “the system” is totalized, hence the necessity of a system-change is claime d (Westra
1993: 126). 19 The radical movement of anarcho-primitivism is probably the most significant manifestation of that kind of criticism.
According to its proponents, civilization itself is the root of our social and environmental problems, since it has alienated us from
ourselves and the environment. Apart from mediation and technology, what deprived humans from “what’s real” and valuable is the
“ideology of civilization,” which raised false and perverted desires and must be fought in order to be authentic again. This ideology is
“based upon deep rooted notions of ‘progress,’ the value of consumption and work, domestication and order, and the underlying
desires created by industrial society” (Humphrey 2007: 34). State, capital, organised religion, technology, in short: civilization, is said
to facilitate oppression, alienation, domestication and exploitation. In consequence, it has to be abandoned respectively destroyed.
Furthermore, primitivism rejects politics in all but anarchic forms and advocates the absence of political authority (Humphrey 2007:
31-9; Aaltola 2010: 164-6). The revolutionary impetus of anarcho-primitivism thus is not only anti-civilizatory, but anti-democratic
and finally anti-political at its core.
Deep Ecology criticisms are useless—no concrete plan of action or coherent

vision for the alt
Hastings, 18 (Taylor, MA candidate, “Missed Opportunity: The Strategic and Rhetorical
Miscalculations of Deep Ecology,” Masters thesis submitted to the University of Montana, 2018)
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/11171/ //cb
Another Perspective
Twelve years after Deep Ecology was formally introduced to ecocritical thinkers, Jack
Turner, in his book: The Abstract Wild,
moved beyond any sort of philosophical charge against Deep Ecology, and engaged how
ineffective the theory is in practice: “Effective protests are grounded in an alternative vision. Unfortunately, we have
no coherent vision of an alternative to our present maladies. Deep ecology does not , as yet, offer
a coherent vision ” (23). Deep Ecology presented an alternative vision, but the vision is so vague
and ambiguous that it offered nothing to create effective protest or action . Deep Ecology is a
“hodgepodge of lists, principles, declarations, quotations , clippings from every conceivable tradition, and
tidbits of New Age kitsch” (23). The reason there is no clear message from Deep Ecology is because there are no clear
proposals for change. Naess had many opportunities to propose tangible solutions, or utilize the solutions presented by
other Deep Ecologists to catalyze the movement towards environmental change, but Naess only wanted to argue
validity of his philosophical framework.
The philosophical landscape was filled with many Deep Ecological writers and thinkers proposing
unauthorized solutions, and the result was an ineffective and fractured movement : “The authors do not clearly
say what they mean, they do not forcefully argue for what they believe, they do not create anything new” (Turner 23-4). Without a
figure to properly exemplify Deep Ecology, the numerous ideas did little to spur change: “ Presented
as revolutionary
tracts aimed at subverting Western civilization, these writings on deep ecology should
embarrass us with their intellectual timidity ” (Turner 24). The theory is toothless without real
proposals moving Deep Ecology towards real change.
Turner’s final thought on Deep Ecology is the most damning to Naess’ development and engagement in fostering the theory:
“Deep ecology is suspicious. It lacks passion , an absence that is acutely disturbing given our
current state of affairs” (24). To empower a population to make difficult decisions, and truly make the changes
necessary to transition to an ecocentric world, is impossible without a concrete strategy for change , and
thirty-four years after the introduction of Deep Ecology, due to issues with climate and population growth, making difficult decisions
more important than ever. Deep Ecology’s philosophical framework is in no danger of being disturbed or degraded because of
Naess, but what
good is a theory proposing a dramatic reorientation of fundamental values if it
doesn’t prompt one to action?
As I have demonstrated throughout Naess’ philosophy, there

are two major reasons why Deep Ecology has been
largely ineffective as a social movement. Naess’ rhetorical failure is the first issue inhibiting Deep Ecology. Rhetorical theory
going back to Cicero established three offices of oratory. James Burnette Eskridge describes Cicero’s three offices as (1) to instruct [docere]; (2) to
please [delectare]; (3) to move [movere]; and their natural and legitimate spheres of action are in the regions, (1) of the intellect; (2) of the sensibilities;
(3) of the will, respectively. To instruct is of the intellect, to arouse or soothe the emotions, to move the will is the orator’s part of the program in
dealing with humanity. (16) Naess didn’t create Deep Ecology to simply add to an academic philosophical dialogue; Naess wanted to move humans to
fundamentally change the way they engaged with the more-thanhuman world. Naess’
creation of Deep Ecology, and his philosophical
framework gave a logical and
instructive path for Deep Ecologists to follow on their own journey towards a
more ecocentric existence, but any philosophy needs to be more than just instructive if the goal
is to become a forceful social movement.
The second reason Deep Ecology failed to coalesce as a social movement was because Naess’ tenets were
incompatible in critical places. Respecting a pure intrinsic value theory in a system that also privileges a human’s right to
satisfy vital needs, or the implementation of intrinsic value without explicitly dismantling human
hierarchical social systems would be impossible. Warwick Fox was one of the major proponents of Deep Ecology
who worked to remove complications and incompatibilities of the theory in his book Toward a Transpersonal Ecology. Fox’s purpose
in examining and dissecting the faults of Deep Ecology was to create a new ecophilosophy devoid of Deep Ecology’s rhetorical issues.
Fox described Naess as “the bearer of so many perspectives that it would simply be impossible for him to be able to maintain them all at the same time
without cutting the odd logical corner or engaging in a bit of plain bluffing” (89). Not only did Naess cut logical corners, but
Fox also addressed potential practical incompatibilities with implementing Deep Ecological tenets since the
“abundance of evidence to suggest that people do in fact draw upon basic philosophical and
religious assumptions [level 1] to justify both ecocentric and anthropocentric views” (142). Naess wanted to
be inclusive of a variety of viewpoints, but his strategy was not logically (or ecocentrically) coherent. It is impossible for a follower of
Deep Ecology to fully respect intrinsic value and still prioritize “vital needs” in a fully compatible
fashion. If a follower of Deep Ecology holds the ultimate religious premise to obey God, then the connotation, through interpretation of biblical
text, would lead to that person privileging his/her own existence over other entities in the biosphere1 . One of Fox’s rhetorical proposals was to change
from the dichotomy of shallow and deep ecology movements in favor of the “anthropocentric ecology movement and the ecocentric ecology
movement” (144). Utilizing more explicit appeals to encourage the development of an ecocentric viewpoint is only one of the many issues Fox
addressed in Transpersonal Ecology. Fox diagnosed, and logically worked through, many of Deep Ecology’s other issues in his book, but he was mainly
interested in discussing philosophy and not the efficacy of Naess’ rhetoric in establishing a social movement towards change. A person who adheres to
Deep Ecology cannot do so faithfully to all the tenets which leaves writers, theorists, and activists, conflicted since they are only able to exhibit some
Deep Ecological tendencies in their work.
Prefer pragmatism – the alt spurs VIOLENT backlash – over 70% of the
population is dependent on environmental “commons”
Fakur and Mookerjee 6/21, (Mohammad Ali Fakur is Freelance Researcher and Human
Rights Activist from Afghanistan. He completed his Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) from Gawharshad
University, Kabul, Afghanistan and Master of Laws (LL.M) in Human Rights from the National
Law School of India University; Ujal Kumar Mookherjee is an Assistant Professor of Law at
Indian Institute of Legal Studies, Siliguri, India. He completed his Bachelor of Laws (B.A, LL.B)
from Department of Law of the University of Calcutta (Hazra Campus) and Master of Laws (LL.M)
in Human Rights from the National Law School of India University), June 21 st 2021, BiLD Law
Journal, “An Ecofeminist and Third World Critique of Deep Ecology,”
http://bildbd.com/index.php/blj/article/view/21 //SDD
To better deal with environmental crises, it would be absolutely essential to understand not only
the root causes of environmental degradation, but also dependency of a large population on
natural resources. Deep ecology has precisely identified such philosophical causes, but its
prescription for uprooting those challenges has failed to address the complexity of human
societies. While, deep caring for nature, especially wilderness preservation is appreciated, deep understanding of such
complexity is more appreciated. Since deep ecologists refer to human beings as an active organ of Mother Nature, caring for
environment cannot and should not involve any advocacy for cutting one part to heal the
problem of the whole body. Over 70% of population around the world, especially in Asia and
Africa depend on national and international commons as their primary source of survival. Failure to deep
understanding such intricacy, will result in more environmental deterioration because the
indigenous people will not voluntary cut out their relations and dependency on nature unless
a better and sustainable alternative for survival is replaced. Protection of parks, wilderness areas and
endangered for the sake of environment can only take place in countries where people have other
alternatives of consumption, whereas in developing countries such advocacies are not practicable at least in the short-
term. Deep ecology has also been charged as purely western ideology , but cannot be the mere base to
invalidate it. Instead, to what extent such ideologies can be dangerous for both human being and the environment can be the heart
of the problem. The
consequences of implementing deep ecology theories into practice may result in
amplifying environmental deterioration . People in developing countries are dealing with poverty
and debt, wilderness areas provide their shelter, food, sanitation and basic minimum needs of their everyday live.
Furthermore, the world today is facing greater challenges which stem from inaccurate models
and unjust behaviours and policies. The issues of overconsumption can be an illustration. Deep ecology can also
criticised from this point of view that did not fully address unjust behaviours of small number An Ecofeminist and Third World
Critique of Deep Ecology 107 of countries which result in looting other countries . Overpopulation only can be an issue
if everyone has access to the same level of natural resources and environmental deterioration .
Whereas the developed countries reap the benefits of environmental degradation, the burdens
are borne by developed countries . Deep ecology to a large extent was able to identify the challenges, the prescription is
unbiased and lacks fairness and inclusivity. Lastly, since deep ecology tried to establish a new moral and philosophical ideology, the
proposal for human population reduction is totally immoral . As exponents of deep ecology publicly
expressed, they only care for environment and do not care about the immorality of such proposals. Therefore, it is very much
needed for the complex world to reach a consensus to incorporate the tenets and provisions of every useful ideologies which result
in both addressing the concerns of both humans as well as the environment. The idea that the nature functions as a complex
adaptive system, and elimination
of one section of the population may end up harming the balance of
nature has been something that the deep ecologists have failed to contemplate. Rather what is
required is to reduce non-linear changes so that the natural balance may be maintained. While the significance of deep ecology as
movement in environmental ethics and its contribution to the later philosophical developments is absolutely undeniable, it has
failed to answer the aforesaid criticisms with satisfaction.
A shift to nonanthropocentrism is itself anthropocentric – prefer the aff’s
flexible approach to the rigidity of the alt
Afifi, 20 (Ramsey, PhD, Biology and Environmental Philosophy lecturer at the University of
Edinburgh, founder of the Sai Nyai Eco School, “Anthropocentrism’s fluid binary,” Environmental
Research Education, 2020) https://doi.org/10.1080/13504622.2019.1707484 //cb
The question of where a given conception leads relates directly to another point already suggested in the introduction. Many
attempts at nonanthropocentrism are not actually possible to live . For example, the idea that we treat all
living organisms as equal centres of value (for example, Taylor’s ’biospheric egalitarianism’ (Taylor 1986) or Lupinacci and Harpel-
Parkin’s “nonanthropocentrism” (Lupinacci and Happel-Parkins 2016) can
really only be briefly entertained
conceptually and affectively. Within hours, the would-be egalitarian will value themselves over
some other to acquire nutrients and calories . Indeed, they will need these calories to fuel their arguments, implicitly
valuing the ends they hope their arguments will achieve over the particular life forms sacrificed to produce them. But this does not
necessarily mean that ’impossible nonanthropocentrisms’ are without value. They may still serve to guide action, to push people to
be ever more compassionate or sensitive to their local and systemic impacts on the world. Let’s call them strategic
nonanthropocentrisms (in the vein of Spivak’s (1990) ’strategic essentialism’ and Bennett’s (2009) ’strategic anthropomorphism’). In
other words, nonanthropocentrisms may still function as ideals regulating action (the pragmatic notion of a
regulative ideal comes from Kant’s third critique (Kant 1790)). Of course, in keeping with the observations of this paper, holding
such an ideal -or ’end in view’ to use Dewey’s (1922) term- as a way of directing action is itself a very
human thing to do and valuing this particular way of teleologically investing behaviour with a
future is therefore another form of anthropocentrism .
Similarly, some attempts at nonanthropocentrism are at best experienced or practiced only

sometimes. As such, it is crucial that educators consider critically whether they actually have the potential to carry over into
people’s otherwise anthropocentric lives. For example, the experience of ‘self realisation’ characterised by
deep ecology can be an aesthetic oneness or a deep universal empathy, but these states are not sustained. Educating
for sustainability does not suggest we make some fleeting ontological experience universal but
that we move beyond the tendency to search for a particular ’ism’ that, if adopted, would carry us to
salvation (for this reason, the important critiques of Kopnina (2012) are incomplete). It is an empirical question (to be
settled through self-reflection and through observing others), whether deep ecology or any other ecstatic and temporary
experience has the capacity to modify actions when people are back to their nondeep daily
encounters, and if so whether it does so any better than some alternate conception or experience. It is my suspicion that we
need to move towards a more flexible and pluralistic notion of what frameworks, experiences,
and emotions are ’needed,’ and to develop the general capacity to become more aware of when and how our various
ways of looking at the world are motivating or demotivating to us and to others. Sustainability education might be a contemplative
practice (see Eaton, Hughes, and MacGregor 2017) before it is a set of (metaphysical, ethical, or scientific) propositions to be
accepted and transformed into action.
And still, I suspect some apparent nonanthropocentrisms are best taken in the smallest of dosages , if
at all.
That ‘taking action’ is itself obviously anthropocentric (Taylor 2017), grounded as it is on the idea that
we transform the world according to our own values, reveals another variation of the theme suffusing this
article. Recognising anthropocentrism’s fluid binary does not imply we put anthropocentrism and
attempts to transcend it on equal footing (Wals and Jickling 2002). Anthropocentrism is an urgent
problem. But nonanthropocentrism is an insufficiently ecological solution . We can take action to seek
(non)anthropocentric values committed to biotic flourishing. This, to me, is the crucial issue. How do we help learners become more
versatile at abandoning and restructuring the stock of approaches they deploy when their repertoire does not actually participate in
the flourishing of people and the earth? Rather than seek to overcome anthropocentrism itself, we can inspire students in the arts
of contemplation, guiding them in better observing, listening, reflecting upon, and experimenting with their various
(non)anthropocen- trisms in theory, in feeling, and in practice.
This foray into anthropocentrism’s fluid binary is intended to illustrate the importance of philosophy for environmental education. I
hope the reader will see this potency even if (or especially when) my particular arguments fail. It is easy to lock into beliefs
that we think are ’part of the solution’, and it is a normal to be less critical of those beliefs than those which contradict
them. In a complex and ever-evolving world, sustainability would seem to require the capacity to unsustain habitual patterns of
thought that are no longer helpful for understanding or engaging (sustain/unsustain: another fluid binary?). It is not sufficient to
merely develop ’critical thinking’ skills, as these often merely sharpen one’s saber blade while keeping it pointed at illusory ene-
mies. The exciting sense of wonder that comes through breaking down one’s own cherished assumptions is an experience few
people know how to embrace. Uncertainty is insecurity. These are fears the typical classroom culture is committed to continue
quietly stoking. A flexible and responsive attention to any complex theoretical/material sustainability
issue will require a completely reimagined pedagogy, one that delights in baffling journeys and
the humility such journeys may bring. Revealing the instability and paradoxes inherent in (non)human
reasoning is a part of this project.
AT Biocentrism
Attempts to endorse deep ecology replicates the same dualism that it critiques.
Human intention cannot be generalized because there is no ideology behind
humanity – we do things because it helps us survive, not because we assign
ourselves more value.
Watson 89 David Watson [Watson published How Deep is Deep Ecology under the
pseudonym George Bradford. a veteran contributor to the radical social and ecological milieus
himself (and author of an excellent, earlier critique, How Deep Is Deep Ecology] , "How Deep is
Deep Ecology?", The Anarchist Library ,1989 , http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/george-
bradford-how-deep-is-deep-ecology.pdf//mb
But deep ecology’s “intuition… that all things in this biosphere have an equal right to live and
blossom” is the same projection of human social-political categories onto nature — a legalistic
and bourgeois-humanist anthropocentrism itself. Ecology confirms the animist vision of
interrelatedness, but when expressed in the ideological terms of this society, it denatures and
colonizes animism, reducing it to a kind of economics or juridical, legal formalism. Neither animals nor primal
peoples recognized or conferred abstract legal rights, but lived in harmony and mutualism,
including a mutualism of predation of other species to fulfill their needs and desires . Human
subsistence was bound up with natural cycles and not in opposition to them; people did not en9 vision an alienated
“humanity versus nature” dualism (which, whether one takes “nature’s side” or “humanity’s,” is
an ideology of this civilization), but rather “humanized” nature by interacting mythically and
symbolically with it. When ecological “antihumanism” (justly) rejects technocratic resource management, it does so for the
wrong reasons. The dualism of its formulation takes the technocratic reduction of nature to resources for an undifferentiated
species activity based on supposed biological need. While human beings and institutions that actively engage
in the destruction of nature must be stopped by any means necessary and as soon as possible,
it should not automatically be assumed that they are acting out the biological destiny of the
species; that would be to take at face value the corporate and state rationalizations for exploitation (“we do it all for you”). The
human social context that produces this aberrant destructiveness is not readily explained by ecological analysis. Deep ecologists err
when they see the pathological operationalism of industrial civilization as a species-generated problem rather than as one generated
by social phenomena that must be studied in their own right. Concealing socially generated conflicts behind an ideology of “natural
law,” they contradictorily insist on and deny a unique position for human beings while neglecting the centrality of the social in
environmental devastation. Consequently,
they have no really “deep” critique of the state, empire,
technology, or capital, reducing the complex web of human relations to a simplistic, abstract,
scientistic caricature. Thus humanity as a species, or a voracious human self-interest acting
through “humanism,” is blamed for ecological degradation by most (if not necessarily all) deep ecologists,
particularly the American adherents close to Earth First!. This formulation, shared by many people in the U.S. conservation
movement, tends tooverlook the fact that preservation of wilderness and defense of natural
integrity and diversity is essential to human survival also. There is no isolated “intrinsic worth”
but an interrelated dependency that includes us all.
AT Do Nothing
Letting nature run its course leads to twice as much human suffering – it
justifies not intervening in environmental catastrophes like food shortages.
Doing nothing is being complicit in murder.
A Deep Ecologist Who Advocates Genocide Among his following are many of the eco-activists
and deep ecologists of Earth First!, including their apparent leader, Dave Foreman, who in an
interview with Bill Devall in the Australian magazine Simply Living said, regarding starvation in
Ethiopia, that “the best thing would be to This argument repelled me personally, for I have
spent much time in the islands and have seen with my own eyes what the private property so
hallowed in Hardin’s view has done. It is not an abstract population question there; it is the runaway tourism
development and the agro-industrial contamination that are Hawaii’s problems. Hardin’s article is “Lifeboat Ethics: The Case
Against Helping the Poor,” in Psychology Today, September 1974. 23 just let nature seek its own balance,
to let the people there just starve…” Giving aid would of course only spur the Malthusian
cycle, thus “what’s going to happen in ten years time is that twice as many people will suffer
and die.” Notice how Malthusian brutality is couched in the terms of humanitarian concern. “Likewise,” he said, “letting the
USA be an overflow valve for problems in Latin America is not solving a thing. It’s just putting
more pressure on the resources we have in the USA… and it isn’t helping the problems in Latin
America.” Notice here how rapidly the “anti-anthropocentrist” reverts to a nationalist resource
manager. But his entire formulation, like those of Abbey and Hardin, reverses social reality and conceals the real sources of
hunger, resource pressures, and refugees. Central America is being devastated by U.S. corporate
exploitation and a genocidal war to make sure the plunder continues. One horrible example is the U.S.-
caused war in El Salvador, defending a death-squad government that would likely collapse in weeks without U.S. backing. The war
has forced one quarter of the Salvadoran population to become refugees , and a halfmillion of them have
fled to the U.S. Comments like Foreman’s might not be quite so obscene if there were consistent coverage in his newspaper of U.S.
exploitation in Central America (apart from the occasional material on rainforests, usually in a Rainforest Action Network
supplement) and denunciations of the U.S. annihilation of the Salvadoran people, cultures, and lands, but there is no antiwar
component in the paper and little about these interrelated problems in Central America. Foreman,
too, ought to be
utterly ashamed, but Foreman, too, has a following. When Devall asked Foreman why the mainstream environmental
movement had not addressed the population issue, the reply was, “you can’t get any reaction.” Foreman appeared to be implying
that no serious dialogue could be generated on it, but if so, he was being less than candid. In the summer of 1986 I sent a friendly
but critical letter to Earth First! which criticized contemporary Malthusianism and warned them to “not make the mistake of
advocating the genocide that the industrial system is already carrying out.” It was never printed, nor did it receive any response,
though in subsequent issues Foreman stressed the need for an exchange of ideas and diverse points of view, describing the paper as
“a forum of the deep ecology/ Earth First! movement.”8 8 Actually, a tiny slice of my friendly cover letter was printed, where I took
issue with Foreman’s offhand comment in a previous issue that social ecologist Murray Bookchin “would do well to get out of his
stuffy libraries and encounter the wilderness,” calling it an irrelevant and unjust personal attack. Foreman printed this one remark,
responding that his comment was “a fundamental critique of Bookchin and anyone else who relies excessively on scholarship instead
of direct wilderness experience for wisdom.” He added that “in virtually every area where I disagree with him, his lack of direct
wilderness experience is the key. I do not believe that anyone, no matter how learned or thoughtful, can fully understand human
society or the relationship of humans to the natural world without regularly encountering the wilderness and finding instruction
there.” This, of course, is nothing but mystical demagogy. Foreman didn’t get his ideas on Ethiopia, Latin America, deep ecology, or
anything else directly from the wilderness, but from reading books and articles like everyone else — particularly, for one example,
from Paul Shephard’s strange and technocratic book, The Tender Carnivore and the Sacred Game, and for another, from David
Ehrenfeld’s The Arrogance of Humanism, which are both beyond the scope of this essay to review. It is demagogy as well because
Foreman doesn’t know about Bookchin’s experience and because it implies that it is his own (presumably correct) wilderness
“instruction” that tells him exactly where Bookchin’s ideas go wrong. Foremanis claiming a special relationship
with nature and using it to pontificate on political questions ( like letting others starve). Whether
any wilderness experience, even that of primal people, can be called “direct” is questionable.
But the wilderness experience of anyone grown up in industrial civilization is always mediated
by ideology and culture. “Direct wilderness experience” is also a middleclass fad, with an enormous industry in nylon and
aluminum and plastic products to make it all possible. Foreman, after all, is no primal person coming from a
culture embedded in the natural world; he is a frontiersman, a settler, who forgets that being in
nature physically does not in and of itself promise any insight. As Hegel said of nomads, they 24 I sent
another letter questioning why mine was never printed, pointing out the problems with Foreman’s comments on immigration and
Ethiopia, and warning Earth First! to avoid becoming “vanguardist” by suppressing the diverse views it claims to want and which
undoubtedly exist within the deep-ecology current. I finally received a note from Foreman himself, groaning, “Gawd, I’m bored with
left-wing humanist rhetoric.” In answer to my question about open discussion on the population issue, he replied, “My
honest
feeling is that the vast majority of those who consider themselves Earth First!ers agree with my
position. … I am all for cooperation with other groups where it fits, but we have a particular
point of view which we are trying to articulate. Call it fascist if you like, but I am more interested
in bears, rain-forests, and whales than in people.” Well, its certainly Foreman’s business to print, or not print,
whatever he likes. And since I have access to publications myself, I gave up attempting an open and egalitarian
discussion with him and decided to research deep ecology and the hunger question further . It was
later that his comments on Ethiopia and related issues came to my attention, but they heightened my sense of unease with the
direct-action environmental group that had previously earned my respect and praise in the Fifth Estate. While Foreman’s
presumptuousness about speaking for the “vast majority” of Earth First! (and by extension, deep ecologists and even other species)
is only manipulation, his acceptance of the fascist label is telling. There is a definite connection between fascism and his perception
of world corporate genocide as nature taking its course. It is also fascistic to call for an end to immigration and the closing of
borders, especially to exclude those who are fleeing a war waged by one’s own country. (Perhaps Earth First! will volunteer to help
round up those courageous people in the Sanctuary movement who, in the best tradition of the antislavery underground railroad,
are aiding the refugees. Or
they can help the KKK apprehend Guatemalan Indians, an animist, land-
based people, fleeing a holocaust perpetrated with the active involvement of the U.S.) And,
finally, smearing all anticapitalism or critiques of global corporate empire as “an ossified leftist
worldview that blames everything on the corporations” (as Foreman does in the March 1987
Earth First!) is reminiscent of the anticommunist pseudoradicalism of the Nazis themselves. Certainly,
“capitalists are not the only problem” (Foreman, in the June 1987 Earth First!). But Foreman should realize that the problem won’t
be resolved as long as capital exists. To
deny the connection between chopping down trees and chopping
down peasants is to show willful ignorance and to act in silent complicity with murderers.9
AT Population Control
Trying to control human population growth is akin to genocide. It has
empirically been used to prevent marginalized communities from growing and
makes women the target of violence.
Population Control as Genocide The genocidal character of population control is dizzying .

Sterilization has been focused on India’s tribal minorities, though they are numerically small. In
South Africa, population control is for blacks, while whites are rewarded for having children. The
only free medical service for [black people] blacks is birth control. There, the argument is used
widely that black “overpopulation” is putting pressure on the ecology of the region. In Puerto Rico, a
U.S. colony ecologically devastated by U.S. corporate exploitation (and where mainland U.S. environmental laws do not apply), one
third of the women were sterilized by 1968. Inside the U.S., Native
American women have been the target of
forced sterilization. China, which has recently been going through economic transformations
along a Western development model, has implemented draconian antipopulation measures,
with forced abortions and sterilizations to impose a one-child-family policy. As new incentive programs
along private capitalist lines have been implemented, Malthus has slipped in with them. Nevertheless, interestingly, China’s greatest
strides in stabilizing population came before the onechild policy was instituted, according to Hartmann, and there has even been a
slight population trend upward since the new policy, along with the privatization of lands, was implemented. It should come as no
surprise that this “profoundly technocratic exercise” should aggravate the problem and backfire. The notion that top-down
techniques and “rational” education of the poor, administered by authoritarian, privileged elites over the peasants who are their
subjects, without reference to the social context of land ownership, social power, and health, is a scientistic and mechanistic fantasy.
But it is the strategy followed by most Third World states and Western population and family-planning agencies. Kenya
is
considered one of the worst failures of such policy, yet it was the first African nation south of
the Sahara to implement an official population control program, in 1967. Because it ignored
social and economic conditions, and focused on population control rather than family planning
and health, it was resisted by the people, and now Kenya has one of the highest birth rates in
the world. None of the sources of high fertility — high infant mortality, landlessness, lack of
power, patriarchal domination — was addressed. One of the largest causes of high dropout rates in family
planning was contraceptive side effects, yet riskier high-tech methods were favored, and local custom and health devalued, so
women did not respond. The
“machine model of family planning,” based on efficiency models,
incentives, and “target orientation,” ends in outright coercion. In Indonesia, which is ruled by a
right- wing dictatorship, “women are dragooned toward contraception as, once, they were
doomed to uncontrolled fertility.” Choice is actually limited to the worst techniques, and traditional methods
and low-tech methods demanding women’s empowerment and participation as well as a focus
on their health, are actively discriminated against. Even the military authorities have been directly involved,
forcing IUD’s on villagers at gunpoint. “The top-down approach toward birth- control means it is not popularly perceived as a tool of
reproductive choice,” writes Hartmann almost euphemistically, “but as a means of social control.” One can see this process
backfiring as it did in Kenya and may be starting to do in China. Yet, startlingly, “Indonesia has become the family planning showcase
of the Third World.” Ironically, the women of the world want birth-control. Hartmann discusses several studies, including a survey
done in 27 Third World countries, that found that “almost half the married women questioned wanted no more children, and that
younger women especially tended to desire 42 a smaller family size.” Women actually lack access to birth control and information.
The 30 to 50 million induced abortions a year — one half of them illegal — also suggest that women want birth control. (In Latin
America, up to one half of all maternal deaths are due to illegal abortions.)
Scholars compare the rhetoric of deep ecologists to the Nazis. Calls for
population reduction removes free will and justifies eugenics. Populations
deemed lesser than others will be the first to get culled.
Gardiner 08 [Anne Barbeau is professor emerita of English at John Jay. College of Criminal
Justice, C.U.N.Y. ], First Things JOURNAL OF RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE, "Deep Ecology and the
Culture of Death", 2008, http://www.uffl.org/vol17/GARDINER07.pdf//mb
DEEP ECOLOGY AND POPULATION CONTROL In the platform co-authored by Arne Naess and George Sessions, we
find the following, startling statement related to population control: The flourishing of human life and cultures is
compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of non-human
life requires such a decrease. 12 Note the chilling phrase a substantial decrease of the human population. The term
substantial means to a large degree. Does this imply half, or even two-thirds of the world’s
population? Note the next statement as well, that non-human life today requires such an ample decrease in human numbers.
The word requires implies that the speedy culling of our mammalian species is a matter beyond
dispute. These two sentences alone expose the dark heart of deep ecology. The goal of the movement
is not just zero population growth, but a serious decline in the number of people on the planet. That this point was left in the public
platform when other controversial principles were taken out for the sake of consensus reveals how non-controversial among certain
classes is the desire to see the world’s population plummet. How can such a substantial decrease be accomplished? Deep ecologists
intend to bring it about, Eric Katz explains, by a profound change in “economics, technology and science, politics, education,
philosophy, and religion.” All these facets of life “must be reoriented so that they can exist in harmony with the developing
processes and life- Anne Barbeau Gardiner 183 “Against the Inevitability,” Beneath the Surface, p. 21. 13 “Deep Ecology and Desire:
On Naess and the Problem of Consumption” in 14 Beneath the Surface, p. 225. forms of the natural world.” What they hope for,
then, is a wholesale 13 revolution. If they ever come to power, they hope to alter the very foundations of society for the sake of the
ecosystem. Humans are to be reeducated and circumscribed by laws so as to give intrinsic value, not to their children first–for
perhaps, by then, such a preference will be condemned as the crime of anthropocentrism–but to rivers, watersheds, landscapes, and
ecosystems. According to Jonathan Maskit, an expert on deep ecology, Naess taught that the present environmental crisis is chiefly
one of “population and economics.” It is, therefore, “a political problem.” Since the main principle of deep ecology (though it is
missing from the platform) is that the ego-self is only a part of the world-Self, and since most people in the West do not believe this,
deep ecologists have a big job ahead of them of persuading people to think like them and enacting laws to change their behavior.
And this is where politics becomes “the real heart of Naess’s deep ecology.” Maskit explains that Naess wanted both “personal
change and 14 political change” to occur at the same time, because persuading people to think in ecocentric terms does not
necessarily change their behavior: “Policy changes are therefore needed to force even those who ‘know
better’ to behave in a way commensurate with their beliefs.” Note the words force and even
those in the last sentence. All people are to be forced to behave as if they believed they were
merely part of nature, even those who already accept ecocentrism but whose behavior has not caught up with their
conviction. Government “policies” are to serve as an “externalized will” in place of “the will that we
don’t have,” and thus to “force us to act as we would if we were fully realized beings.” Again, note
the use of the word force in this last sentence: Maskit says that policies can force everyone to conform,
regardless of their interior views. What room will be left for free will? Virtually none. The belief that
we are just part of nature, this scholar concludes, “can help motivate people to fight for policies they might not otherwise support.
And those policies can 184 Life and Learning XVII Ibid., pp. 225-26. 15 Ibid., p. 227. 16 Moral Menagerie, p. 162. 17 Gary Snyder,
Turtle Island (New York NY: New Directions, 1974). 18 function, at least in part, to change behaviors in ways that we can support.”
This is hardly democracy in action. 15 Humans are to be simultaneously coaxed and compelled, then, to do what
nature requires–namely, bring about a substantial decrease in their own numbers. Even so, deep ecologists worry that a large
population decrease might cause some self-congratulation and backsliding: “We
can well imagine human population
dropping, levels of consumption doing likewise, and so on, and this leading to an inability to
continue seeing environmental problems as serious.” So, when will populations fall so 16 low
that deep ecologists will finally consider the environment safe from depredation and breathe a
sigh of relief? It seems that they will not be perfectly happy till our numbers reach the level of
the Neolithic or upper-Paleolithic age, a time when the world was overrun with wild animals. Little wonder they are
accused of “misanthropy.” Mark Fellenz remarks that deep
ecologists remind him “of Nietzsche’s famous
diagnosis of man as a disease on the earth’s skin .”17 Indeed, they not only condemn the use of animals for food
and science, but even question the domestication of animals, without which very few people on earth could be fed. Deep ecologist
Paul Shepard idealizes the late Pleistocene, when small bands of humans roamed the earth as hunter-gatherers. The summons “Back
to the Pleistocene!” was first heard in Gary Snyder’s Turtle Island, but while Snyder remains to this day a critic of modern 18
agriculture, he has since accepted small-scale, indigenous farming. Marc Fellenz likewise glorifies the Paleolithic hunter ancient and
modern by pointing to the “metamorphic ecstasis” that occurs in the sun-dance of the Oglala of North America as they “cut and
impale themselves while dressed as various animals.” Such transformations into “animality,” he says, beautifully collapse the
boundaries between culture and nature. It is commonplace among deep ecologists to “trace the primordial fall from a Anne Barbeau
Gardiner 185 Fellenz, Moral Menagerie, pp. 16-17. 19 Michael E. Zimmerman, “Possible Political Problems of Earth-Based 20
Religiosity” in Beneath the Surface, pp. 170-72; and Zimmerman, “Ken Wilber’s Critique of Ecological Spirituality” in Deep Ecology, p.
246. Two other important works dealing with this topic are Robert Pois, National Socialism and the Religion of Nature (London UK:
Croom Helm, 1986), and Michael E. Zimmerman, “Ecofascism: A Threat to American Environmentalism?” in The Ecological
Community, ed. Roger Gottlieb (New York NY: Routledge, 1996), pp. 229-54. Roger Gottlieb, “Spiritual Deep Ecology” in Deep
Ecology, pp. 25-26; Jackson, 21 “Gender, Nature” in Sacred Custodians, p. 26. foraging paradise to agriculture,” or to blame the loss
of biological diversity on the domestications of the Neolithic age. One may well ask, 19 how many humans could survive on this
planet if the only source of food were from hunting or from small-scale, indigenous farming? What would happen to urban
populations? Michael
Zimmerman has argued persuasively that deep ecology resembles German
National Socialism of the 1930s, which was also a “neo-pagan revival and a radical ‘green’
movement.” The Nazis, too, castigated Christianity as “nature-hating, life-despising, and
otherworldly,” embraced a “perverted religion of nature,” and rejected the “progressive political
ideologies” of socialism and liberalism for carrying on, albeit in secular form, the Christian view
of a divine purpose unfolding itself in history. The Nazis made the same claim that humans were
merely part of “the great web of life,” and their slogan “Blood and Soil” was a forerunner the
deep ecologists’ bioregionalism. Zimmerman observes that even if they used modern technology, the Nazis were
“premodern” in their “social and cultural orientation.”20 Other scholars, too, mention the Nazis’ “green dimension,” their embrace
of mystical neo-paganism, and their draconian laws to protect wildlife. Hitler, a vegetarian, believed in the intrinsic value of the
natural world, castigated the destruction of nature wrought by industry, and wanted to protect the German wilderness.21 When
to this eerie similarity to the Nazis we add the deep ecologists’ plan to bring about a
substantial decrease in human population, it becomes clear that this radical movement is in
the vanguard of the culture 186 Life and Learning XVII John B. Cobb Jr., “Protestant Theology and Deep Ecology” in Deep
Ecology, 22 p. 226.He adds that, “Interest in the ‘humane’ treatment of domesticated animals seems to many deep ecologists to be
sentimental.” Fellenz, Moral Menagerie, p. 164. 23 Deane Curtin, “A State of Mind Like Water: Ecosophy T and the Buddhist 24
Traditions,” Beneath the Surface, p. 264. Katz, Against the Inevitability,” Beneath the Surface, pp. 26-27. 25 Ibid., p. 38. 26 of
death. As John Cobb observes, deep ecologists “for the most part do not attend to the question of individual animal suffering.
Their concern for the health of the biosystem leads them to accept animal suffering as the natural course of things.... Their concern
is directed chiefly to the wild and to how human beings rightly fit into the order of the wild.” Marc Fellenz 22 adds that for deep
ecologists “the enormous mortality which removes the majority of the newborn every year from nearly every species” is simply one
of the “value-neutral inevitabilities in the natural world.” Suffering is of no importance from their impartial ecosystem-favoring
viewpoint.23
AT – Movements – No energy
Movement energy has long dissipated – with the majority of environmentalists
running away from deep ecology
Hawkins 14, (Ronnie Hawkins was a professor at the University of Central Florida in the
Department of Philosophy), “Why Deep Ecology Had to Die” The Trumpeter – Volume 30,
Number 2, 2014, http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/index.php/trumpet/article/view/1398 //SDD
I was sickened by the invective and deeply

disappointed at the effect his outpouring seemed to have on
the infant Green movement, fracturing the activist community and staving off the development
of a biocentric consciousness – an awareness in no way demeaning to the human species, only displacing it as the sole
center of value. Moreover, instead of recognizing the nature of exponential growth – enormous The Trumpeter ISSN: 0832-6193
Volume 30, Number 2 (2014) Ronnie Hawkins 208 numbers developing rapidly toward the end – and hence the
urgency of putting on the brakes, Bookchin overlooked the increasingly destructive ecological
effects of a surging human population, pronouncing “the so-called ‘population debate’" “a debate that has raged for
over two hundred years” (ibid, 12) and charging that deep ecology’s main proponents were “splashing
around in the cesspool of Malthusianism” (ibid, 14) by drawing attention to the issue. Bookchin reportedly played a
major role in articulating the “Ten Key Values” adopted by the first national green organization at its founding meeting in 1984,
three months after the bioregional congress at which Haenke had spoken. Biocentrism was nowhere to be found, although
“ecological wisdom” topped the list; however by 2000 this too had been demoted, moving down into third place (Feinstein 2014).
Green political organizations have since made some headway at state and national levels , a
development I applaud, but it seems that the heady enthusiasm of the “movement” has long since
dissipated, and I have often wondered what might have happened if Bookchin had not lashed out in such a vicious and
frightening manner so soon after its birth. Whatever hopes I had for the initial fervor ushering in a new
perception and a rapid change of attitudes and actions were dashed , as good people ran from the
Malthusian label, fearful of getting spattered with “the muck of deep ecology” (Bookchin 1987, 10).
AT Ecopedagogy
Environmental education fails because solving ecological crisis depends on the
morals and drive of the students to catalyze change. Ecopedagogical
approaches cannot motivate students to catalyze change, at best it just gives
them new information
Nijhuis 11 [Michelle is the author of the book Beloved Beasts: Fighting for Life in an Age of
Extinction. She is a project editor for The Atlantic and a longtime contributing editor for High
Country News, and her reporting has appeared in publications including National Geographic
and the New York Times Magazine.] , "Green Failure: What's Wrong With Environmental
Education" Yale School of the Environment , 2011,
https://e360.yale.edu/features/green_failure_whats_wrong_with_environmental_education//
mb
Environmental education has failed because it’s not keeping pace with environmental
degradation.” Saylan: When we talk about failure, we’re being very pragmatic about it. We believe that environmental
education has failed because it’s not keeping pace with environmental degradation, with human
impacts on the environment. I also think that it’s failed to provoke action. We have this idea that
environmental education should provide us with the tools we need to make informed decisions, but I don’t believe we’re
making informed decisions as a society commensurate with the pace of our consumption of the
environment, our destruction of the environment . So if one looks at environmental education from the
standpoint of getting bang for the buck spent, so to speak — and we think that bang for the buck should be measured in tangible
impacts such as reduction of greenhouse-gas emissions — it’s just not happening. e360: Was there a moment when you
realized that environmental education was failing in this sense? Saylan: At the Ocean Conservation Society, we’ve done a lot of
environmental outreach. And because we’re located in an affluent area, in west Los Angeles, we work with a lot of private schools.
We also work with the city of Santa Monica, which is kind of the poster child for sustainable municipalities. In our book. we talk a lot
about public education and how the standards on which public education is based don’t include environmental education. In private
schools, especially these private schools, there’s a heavy emphasis on environmental education, and it’s a significant and strong part
of the curriculum. And
we didn’t see a lot of motivation in these kids. They knew the material and
said what was expected of them, but we didn’t really see a change in behavior or a willingness
to give something up for the benefit of the environment. Environmental education, typically, is
based on this idea that if we make people aware, they’ll do the right thing. We were working with a
highly aware community that wasn’t doing the right thing. I started to question whether awareness translates to action at all.
Alternative Turns
Generic
Deep Ecology is corrupted by western ideology – encouraging neo-colonialist
actions in the Global South that take away self determination
Some deep ecologists have also noted that changes must take place in the North prior to the wider expectation that the
South should pursue equally radical changes, but have also emphasized, problematically, that the South also
currently has an obligation to endure hardships in pursuit of ecocentric relations . These hardships
could include starvation and disease and lack of resources due to the incompatibility of the
existence of flourishing ecosystems alongside currently large human populations (Foreman, 2011, p.
44-6). Characterizations like these that place burdens on the Global South are inaccurate at best, and, at worst, dangerous in
that they promote a sharing of responsibility that should, at least initially, fall on the North because it
107 retains responsibility for most of the environmental degradation that has occurred on a
global scale in human history. Moreover, by focusing mostly (aside from the above example from Foreman) on the
changes that must occur in the West, particularly the structures of power that reinforce anthropocentrism, deep ecology
lacks a plan of action for ensuring that the most vulnerable regions of the world are both able to
support themselves and their environments once the North has made the necessary changes
toward the formation of ecocentric societies. In addition, deep ecology lacks an explicit focus on the
ways in which the South can reject current anthropocentric practices and make changes now
toward the formation of ecocentric societies through a wider identification with natur e. Just
because the changes that must take place prior to the envisioning of global ecocentric arrangements must be sought by the North
and developed in opposition to current anthropocentric mindsets does not imply that it is not equally important to focus on how
ecocentric ways of being can arise organically and ethically in the Global South. This unintentional exclusion of the Global
South in deep ecology, moreover, results in a variety of negative effects on how the Global South is viewed in the theory
overall. These exclusionary moments have appeared in deep ecology, and serve to further limit deep ecology as a
global perspective. Exclusion occurs in a variety of ways in deep ecology, often through simplistic statements made by deep
ecologists that characterize “what needs to happen” in the Global South for the formation of ecocentric societies. For example ,
Naess (1991) argues that, But it is now clear that, in areas of the world where pollution and other environmental problems
are still minimal, the influential and powerful people in these areas tend to favor the kinds of development that people in more
polluted areas increasingly resist. In
order to save what can still be saved of areas contributing only moderately to the
ecological crisis,political institutions in larger areas must pressure the smaller, less polluted and damaged
areas to adopt restrictions on ecological damaging practices (p. 144). 108 Naess goes on to argue that some of these
particular regions of the world may require justified coercion to sway them away from the path of
development. Moreover, “forced limitation on their self-determination ” would also be justified
under these specific conditions of below average levels of unsustainability (Naess, 1991, p. 144-5). These classifications of certain
regions of the world are not only vague but result in their potential exclusion from consideration as decisionmakers in political
processes and place conceptual limits on agency and participation. Importantly, Naess directly argues that it is vital to limit these
regions of the world in order to prevent them from ever reaching catastrophic levels of unsustainability, such as many areas in the
North have already reached (Naess, 1991, p. 145). While Naess does not specifically discuss the Global South in this particular
characterization, it can be assumed that many regions in the South would be included in these areas that have not yet reached
extremely high levels of unsustainability. These statements by Naess typify how deep ecology often characterizes how governance
would work in the transition to ecocentric societies. Naess’ arguments, however, are neither valid nor necessary in pursuit of
ecological sustainability. Indeed, deep
ecology possesses very little trust in the abilities of the Global
South to sustainably re-develop humanity’s relationships to nature in these regions . At the same
time, deep ecology fails to acknowledge or contend that the peoples in these regions have the
ability to change their own path dependencies that have been set in place by the neocolonialist
policies of industries in the West, conceptually denying their potential for revolutionary agency and,
in turn, potentially excluding them from active participation both in the fate of their own bioregions, communities, and nation-states
but also in the fate of the global path toward ecological sustainability. Not
only is the Global South theoretically
barred from attaining agency in some 109 parts of deep ecology, but in many parts of the theory, these
regions of the globe are absent altogether. Moreover, deep ecology tends to overcompensate for
its own emphasis on nature, resulting in a lack of emphasis on ensuring that both humanity and
nonhuman nature in the Global South have the best chance to pursue ecocentric livelihoods in the
context of culturally relevant traditions and customs. For example, in order to ensure that the environment gets top priority in
economic and political decision-making, deep ecologist George Sessions has called for the establishment of a United Nations
Environment Council (similar to the Security Council) that prioritizes population issues, economic issues in the Global South, and
protection of wildlife. He goes on to note that many nation-states in the Global South have begun to follow unsustainable economic
practices mimicking capitalist practices that have been long established in the North (Zimmerman, 1994, pp. 28-9). The
willingness with which Sessions suggests using an international body that participates at least
partially in the practices of neocolonialism in order to promote environmental sustainability
suggests that Sessions is not necessarily concerned with promoting the flourishing of humans in
the Global South or promoting the inclusion of these populations in decision-making at the international level. Indeed, in this
argument, Sessions seems more concerned with promoting the environmental goals of deep
ecology than worrying about how to ethically bring about these goals in relation to the Global
South, failing to radically rethink how anthropocentrism favors certain populations of humans
over others in addition to favoring humans over nature.
The alt is exclusionary – perpetuating EXISTING power structures in the Global

South AND appropriating Eastern Culture
Inclusivity is a vital component of any political theory because it serves to make political theories
more applicable beyond the contexts in which they are formulated. Moreover, inclusion results in
recognition of both the agency and rights to participation that exist within humanity’s capacity
for action. By only mentioning the Global South in passing, deep ecology not only does a disservice to the multiple roles that
people and communities in these regions can play in the formation of ecocentric societies, but it also dismisses the abilities and the
capacity for agency that these populations possess due solely to their status as humans occupying the planet. In this regard, deep
ecology’s lack of attention to how ecocentrism can flourish in the Global South has left its theory
devoid of strategies regarding how humans in these regions can participate fully in decision-
making that affects the planet and become agents in their communities who promote ecocentric
ways of being. Moreover, exclusion on the part of deep ecology denies the intrinsic value of people
and ecosystems in these regions of the world and, in turn, perpetuates existing power structures
that have historically dominated both nature and certain populations of human beings in these regions. Exclusion in
deep ecology, briefly, acts in two important ways: First,
it denies the unique role that the Global South can play
in the formation of ecocentric societies along with the unique risk that both humans and
animals in these regions bear in relation to ecological degradation. Second, it stifles agency and participation in
these regions of the world by the lack of attention paid to the Global South in its overall theory.
Fundamentally, deep ecology has proclaimed that it is a globally applicable theory of how nature and humans relate, and these
claims of global applicability make inclusivity a vital element in deep ecology overall. Deep ecology alludes to its global perspective in
a variety of ways. For example, Naess argues that global movements in deep ecology have yet to have much 104 of an impact on the
Global South partially because the goals of the movement in the Global South will differ vastly from policies that need to be
implemented in the North for many reasons, including the fact that cultures around the world differ and that the strategies of
already industrialized nation-states must deal with differing problems than people in the Global South regarding nature (Naess,
1995, p. 285-6). In terms of the global reach of deep ecology, Naess proclaims that, “ Ecological
sustainability…will be
achieved only when policies on a global scale protect the full richness and diversity of life forms
on the planet” (Naess, 1995, p. 286). Given that deep ecology perceives itself both as a global theory of
environmental sustainability and a global movement toward the formation of ecocentric
societies, the inclusion of the Global South in any analysis of deep ecology must be a priority ,
especially given the unique vulnerabilities of these regions. Since the Global South is faced with inherently
higher risks in the face of ecological problems like climate change, pollution, water scarcity, and
biodiversity loss, the importance of guarding these regions against increasing vulnerabilities is
paramount. Importantly, issues such as poverty, lack of food, and lack of clean water relate directly to climate change, which is
predicted in certain areas to create even higher levels of starvation, drought, and in some areas, devastating flooding, affecting the
ability of humans and animals to survive in these regions. With
the capacity for flourishing threatened at such
high levels, deep ecology needs to prioritize the inclusion of the Global South in its theory . This
prioritization of the most vulnerable ecological areas, however, has not proven significant enough to spur action under current
anthropocentric economic, social, and political arrangements, and deep ecology has argued that the anthropocentric paradigm must
first be changed to ensure the greatest amount of flourishing for both humans and ecological entities (McLaughlin, 1993, p. 14-
5)Although deep ecology cannot, by itself, invoke global cultural change away from the anthropocentric ethic, it can, at the very
least, engender change by promoting its theory as one of inclusivity and concern for both the flourishing of nature and the poorest,
most destitute populations around the globe. Although
deep ecology has mostly failed in its task at the
latter, it has argued that this exclusion is justified for a variety of reasons . For one, some deep
ecologists have appropriated Eastern traditions in order that these traditions serve as a contrast
to Western civilizations which are fundamentally alienated from nature and entrenched in the
anthropocentric ethic. Although these characterizations, as mentioned, only serve to portray the Global South inaccurately
and to other these populations, the disdain that deep ecology has for the West and all its environmentally degrading practices
emerges in much of the literature in relation to these characterizations of the Global South. The result of these statements by deep
ecology is a profound distrust in Western traditions in addition to problematic exclusions of the Global South in the theory overall.
Examples in deep ecology abound of this type of “East is good, West is bad” characterization . For
example, Taylor (2000) argues that deep ecology views “Western” religions as inherently anthropocentric and opposed to the moral
consideration of other living creatures besides humans. Moreover, deep ecology finds non-Western religions
more capable of emphasizing identification with nature, instilling a proper view of how man
relates to the natural world (p. 270-1). Deep ecology claims that Western cultures are mostly to
blame for the contemporary environmental crisis, and should therefore be rejected on these
grounds. In regards to this bias against Western culture, deep ecology both implicitly and explicitly promotes a return of Western
culture to these more “primal” or “primitive” cultures and religious institutions that supposedly promote more ethical relations
between humans and nature (Taylor, 2000, p. 106 271). This perception by deep ecology explains why they continually refer to non-
Western traditions and religions as inherently more ethical than the counterparts in the West.
Global South
Deep Ecology IGNORES struggles in the Global South – appropriating Eastern
culture that leads to colonialist representations
The fact remains that wilderness

preservation in the South will not become a goal until all people in
those regions of the world attain some consistent level of sustenance and flourishing . Even deep
ecology knows that humans will take care of their own vital needs prior to ensuring that the vital
needs of other species and the broader ecology are met (See Naess, 1988, pp. 68-9). Some critics might argue that the above
formulation about vital needs and the necessity of attaining some level of flourishing in the Global South returns deep ecology to a
fundamental argument in social ecology, namely that social problems must be solved before and will result in the resolution of
ecological problems. On the contrary, however, this is not my main argument. Instead, I argue that deep
ecology must
account for and emphasize that while human populations around the world are starving, dying
of curable diseases in great numbers, and don’t have access to the basic necessities of life , that
putting nature above human needs is unlikely in particular regions. Given these conditions, however,
deep ecology can emphasize that ecocentrism is a path to overall flourishing even when conditions of hardship typify the realities of
much of the Global South. The
role of the North to dramatically change its current development path is
well established in deep ecology, but in order to avoid the charges of neocolonialism, deep
ecology cannot argue that wilderness preservation in the American or Canadian sense can be or
needs to be globally applicable. Instead, deep ecology needs to contend that ecocentric ways of relating to nature that
put the vital needs of other species in the context of the non-vital needs of humans are contentious issues that vary cross-culturally
and globally based on a variety of factors such as climate, vegetation, and other ecological factors as well as human vital needs in
relation to these climatic and ecological factors in addition to cultural factors. Wilderness preservation, therefore,
must take a back seat in deep ecology (at least in its discussion of the Global South) in favor of 113 an emphasis on the
above aspects of deep ecology that are more easily contested based on the variance of vital needs. Moreover, deep ecology
cannot promote types of policies that it deems will “best fit” particular regions in the Global
South because these assertions will be based upon incomplete knowledge of cultures in these regions and will also imply an
imperialist outlook. With regards to the appropriation of other cultures in deep ecology , the
characterizations from deep ecologists like Sessions of the West and the Global North are accurate and serve to ensure deep
ecology’s place as a radical ecopolitical theory. The problem, however, liesin deep ecology’s discussion of solutions
to these problems of Western hegemony . Though both Sessions (1991) and Glendinning (1995) speak about
the degradation of the West and the promises that Eastern traditions , earth-based cultures, and
indigenous knowledge can provide, they do not recognize an important element of “recovery” from
Western alienation—the fact that humans in the West and those that have been corrupted by the
West cannot “go back to nature” and go back to these past ways of being in the world (some of which are still currently
practiced) that perhaps relate to nature in more ethically sound and deeper ways. Deep ecology utilizes so-called
Eastern traditions and tactics of appropriation in order to justify their arguments that these other
ways of relating to nature are both more ethical and reminiscent of past cultures and societies that deep ecology perceives were
much less harmful to nature in general. Instead of going back, however, deep ecology must recognize that going forward is the only
possible solution to the present ecological crisis. Recovering humanity’s deep identification with nature will not be a process
(particularly for the majority of the population in the West) that relies on old indigenous knowledge systems or so-called “Eastern”
religions and traditions (though these may be utilized by peoples who identify deeply with some of these elements). By and large,
however, the West must renounce the degradation that has been caused by 114 neocolonialism
around the world and forge a new way of envisioning deeper, identification based relationships with nature that recognize
intrinsic value. Despite the use of these nonWestern elements throughout much of deep ecology, however, it still
promotes a Western-biased format for both change and the formation of ecological societies on
a global scale that fails to account for differences across cultures, different climates, and
differences in the practices of those who live in certain regions of the world
Deep Ecology is NOT globally applicable – ignores struggles in the Global South
and forwards a western-based ideology
My analysis adds to the overall discussion about deep ecology and the Global South by pointing out the specific ways that deep
ecology has failed to become a theory of global inclusivity that accounts for difference in its
discussion of the universality of its theory and the policies that it espouses. Moreover, my analysis points out the specific points in
the literature that cause the most problems for deep ecology in addition to analyzing how these aspects of the theory implicitly
discourage participation and agency on the part of the Global South. I also attempt to reconcile these critiques by pointing out the
specific moments in deep ecology that 120 need revision and the ways that these parts can be revised in pursuit of both greater
inclusivity and more nuanced ways of discussing things like wilderness preservation.
Deep ecology—as particularly seen in the
above passage regarding how the South should fundamentally “trust” the North from Naess (1991)—directly calls into
question the capacity for agency in the Global South. Furthermore, the call for coercive action
directly denies participation on the part of local populations in these areas , implying that these
populations are incapable or unwilling to participate in and succeed at establishing ecocentric
societies. Instead of conceptually excluding these regions of the world from participation, deep ecology must instead
acknowledge that neither Western academics nor activists can spur political action in these regions without first exciting change in
industrialized nation-states and fundamentally altering the path dependencies that push these nation-states toward greater
unsustainability, unyielding economic growth, and increasing levels of consumption and industrial development. Though the roles of
oppressors and oppressed have sometimes switched throughout human history, the
capacity of the North to
dominate and create a desirable trajectory for economies, nonhuman nature, and structures of
power in the South has not diminished in contemporary political society . Unfortunately, therefore, it
will be necessary for the North to back off and halt its oppressive practices (in addition to helping in
whatever ways the South deems fit and necessary) on the path to global ecological sustainability . The North,
moreover, should directly assist the South only in ways that the South insists are necessary and vital to its overall
flourishing. Anything more in terms of interference in the South on the part of the North invokes
neocolonial tendencies. Importantly, deep ecology has utilized a variety of tactics in defending its
commitment to ecocentrism, namely exclusion, appropriation, and insistence upon Western-
centric modes of 121 political action on a global scale . Many of these mistakes are reconcilable with more
specific and nuanced forms of theoretical justification for the choices that deep ecology has made. Acknowledging the importance of
inclusion, agency, and participation in the Global South to the overall vision of global ecological sustainability is vital for any radical
ecopolitical theory, especially deep ecology since it has traditionally focused heavily on nature and not human social problems.
Moreover, appropriationthat results in the othering and the belittling of the Global South is
unnecessary and unjust throughout much of deep ecology . Critical engagement with people in
the Global South is necessary in order that these regions of the globe are ensured participation,
recognition, and assistance in meeting their vital needs on the path to ecocentrism . No longer
can deep ecology claim that its policies are globally applicable in ways that conceptually exclude or other
the Global South. Instead, the theory needs to acknowledge that difference in both needs and cultures around the world will play a
vital role in determining the structure of ecocentric societies and policies. Lastly and in relation to the Global South, deep ecology
should ask deeper questions rather than promoting a universalistic conception of identity as the main path toward the formation of
ecocentric societies. These questions should recognize differences among cultures and attempt to be as inclusive as possible,
recognizing that actual political actions that point toward the formation of ecocentric societies will differ at least in the initial phases
of transition if not beyond. Questions that ask what kind of societies humans want to be a part of are essential. For example, does
the Global South want to continue down the road of development, degrading its environment and causing
suffering to its human populations? If not, then how can the North provide technologies, critical
resources, and act as an example in promoting more ecocentric ways of being without excluding
populations from participation and without guiding these 122 populations in paternalistic and neocolonialist ways? The
North must recognize that the ecocentric ways of being that develop in the Global South will
and must be self-determined, but at the same time, the acknowledgement that these regions may need help due to
hundreds of years of oppression and domination must also be present within deep ecology. These essential changes in deep ecology
are both necessary and ethically sound ways of fostering a broader radical ecopolitical theory of both ecocentric inclusivity (including
nonhuman nature) and ecological justice on a global scale.
Cultural Apropriation
The alt is cultural appropriation – theorized to justify neo-colonialist actions in
the Global South
After discussing social ecology’s role in critiquing deep ecology, I then move to the second body of critiques at deep ecology. I
examine critiques that emerge from people concerned with the plight of the Global South—regions of the world that have been
damaged both environmentally and at the level of human flourishing by a variety of imperialist and neocolonial influences from the
West in addition to often possessing colonial histories. People concerned with these regions of the world critique deep ecology for
three important reasons. First, they criticize
deep ecology’s focus on wilderness preservation, arguing that
wilderness preservation is an attempt by deep ecology to map Western-centric solutions onto
the Global South and impose “green imperialist” tactics on these regions . Additionally, concerns arise
regarding preservation based upon the fact that other “more pressing” environmental problems need to be addressed first in the
Global South, and that poverty stricken populations may be displaced and lose their livelihoods if
preservationist policies prevail (See Guha and Martinez-Alier, 1997, all; Guha, 1998, pp. 271-9). These critiques also argue
against the blame that deep ecology places on ecocentrism, arguing instead that deep ecology should focus on more
concrete causes of environmental harm such as militarization and overconsumption . Moreover,
critics attempting to account for the Global South argue that deep ecology reinforces its neocolonial tendencies
by appropriating so-called “Eastern traditions,” indigenous cultures, and other cultural elements in 130
the Global South in order to legitimize its arguments in favor of ecocentrism (See Guha and Martinez-
Alier, 1997, all). In addition to the critiques that have been made by people concerned with the Global South, I also structure an
additional critique of deep ecology based on its failure to become a theory of inclusivity that accounts for difference in the Global
South, arguing that deep ecology makes a number of statements and omissions that leave it open to this particular critique. Indeed,
by either excluding or selectively including populations in the Global South in its theory, deep
ecology conceptually denies both agency and participation to these groups and individuals in the South,
further falling prey to neocolonial tendencies that fail to acknowledge the contributions that historically oppressed
populations can contribute to the formation of ecocentric societies. With regard to wilderness preservation, I argue that deep
ecology has sometimes failed to account for and often failed to emphasize that wilderness preservation is both an
idealized state of nature and a state that is unattainable in many areas of the world given
contemporary forces that keep many populations of humans in the Global South in poverty. Also, deep ecology fails to
account for interim strategies that will be necessary in the process of transforming areas toward
lower levels of human interference, ignoring the presence of farmlands, suburban housing,
vast urban areas, and toxic waste areas or areas with high pollution levels that are present globally in its theory.
In addition, deep ecology does not adequately focus on other environmental problems that must be
solved prior to establishing vast wilderness areas, such as pollution and climate change. Indeed, the
Global South must forge its own pathways toward preservation , accounting for its own vital
needs and the vital needs of other species in the process based on significant cultural, climatic, and social factors in a
given region. The North cannot 131 coerce the South, therefore, to adopt preservationist policies, given that this
would be an imperialist and, ultimately, a reformist strategy for the attainment of ecological sustainability Moreover, the failure to
address how the Global South can participate fully in decisionmaking processes regarding how to form ecocentric societies precludes
deep ecology from fully developing a major point in its theory, namely, that the
flourishing of the Global South
currently depends on the ability of the North to dramatically decrease levels of consumption and
degrading environmental practices immediately (See Naess, 1995, p. 289-91). Though deep ecology makes this point in its theory,
this focus does not excuse the absence of inclusion of the Global South in most of its theory. Likewise, this
point by deep ecology also does not justify the selective inclusion of “Eastern traditions ,” indigenous
perspectives, or anything else from the Global South in order to provide evidence for how the North should
pursue the ecocentric ethic. I argue that the appropriation allowed by deep ecology is neither justified nor necessary for
the purposes of furthering this ecocentric ethic. Indeed, deep ecology cannot “go back” to past societies and cultures (or
contemporary ones in the Global South) to justify its theory. Given the context of contemporary environmental issues, deep ecology
needs to develop new ways of fostering wider identification with nature, particularly in already developed nation-states.
Furthermore, I argue that both
the appropriation of other cultures and the focus on wilderness
preservation in deep ecology promotes “othering” of populations in the Global South ; I contend
that by othering these populations, deep ecology has fueled colonial discourses and failed to radically account for the potential
agency of these populations for the formation of ecocentric societies. Moreover this
othering of other cultures is a
failed attempt to universalize a vision for ecocentric societies that deep ecology finds desirable ,
promoting an essentialized and Western-centric characterization of these cultures in the process. Indeed
these formulations about 132 how humans fundamentally relate to nature have not been developed by deep ecology in ways that
account for the multiplicity of different identities that define an individual (Plumwood, 2000, p. 67-8). Lastly, I argue that
exclusion in deep ecology is never justified even if the theory does attempt to focus on changes
that must take place in the Global North prior to any radical changes taking hold in the South . I
argue that this exclusion has limited deep ecology in the value of its ethical arguments by conceptually denying
the intrinsic value of excluded populations. Consequently, this denial has greatly limited deep ecology in its
ability to serve as a globally applicable theory of radical ecocentrism promoting cultural change away from the
anthropocentric ethic. In order to be globally applicable, deep ecology must not only acknowledge the Global South but account for
and analyze the differences that exist between these poverty-stricken regions and much of the North, contending that both cultural
and historical differences will ensure that ecological sustainability develops in very different ways in these regions, especially in the
initial phases of radical change. And finally, deep ecology must emphasize that it is the task of the North not only to radically change,
but to provide any assistance that is vitally necessary to the Global South for flourishing of both human and nonhuman nature, at
least until these regions no longer ask for assistance in these areas.
The alt utilizes cultural appropriation to JUSTIFY neo-colonialist actions in the

Global South – AND exclude them from participation
Over half of the world’s human population lives in regions of the world referred to as the
“Global South.” These regions of the world are often marked by a variety of negative
socioeconomic issues including poverty and rampant environmental problems , and these regions
often lack both the resources and the historical contexts that would enable them to flourish as nationstates,
communities, and ecological spaces that reject the neocolonial forces that often contribute to and
perpetuate these devastating outcomes. A second important body of critiques directly related to these issues that
causes problems for deep ecology emerges from individuals concerned with the Global South and the contributions that these
regions of the world can make in pursuit of the formation of ecologically sustainable societies. My concern about deep ecology and
these critiques emerges from my assertion that theseparts of the world do indeed have a significant
knowledge base that can both play a role in creating ecological societies and in creating new softer
technologies for the formation of ecocentric livelihoods. Moreover, by all but completely ignoring an entire
section of the globe in its theory, deep ecology creates an overly contentious political space for discussion
that fails to acknowledge the greater risk that is posed to both natural spaces and human
populations in the Global South from the threats of climate change, pollution, and water
scarcity, among other things. The Global South, then, provides insights into caring for and relating to the Earth that are
both valuable and necessary for the formation of ecocentric societies in these regions of the globe. These insights may also provide
avenues for the formation of ecocentric societies in parts 82 of the North. For these reasons it is both vital and necessary to include
the Global South in any analysis that focuses on radical ecopolitical thought and ecological sustainability. Deep ecology draws
negative attention from theorists concerned with the Global South for a variety of reasons. First of all, deep
ecology engages
in colonialist discourses when it discusses the global applicability of issues like wilderness
preservation and population control, conceptually perpetuating neocolonialism and oppression
as a result. Secondly, critiques emerge about deep ecology’s insistence upon the
anthropocentric/biocentric divide, drawing criticism that contends that this dualistic formulation
places blame on the false cause of anthropocentrism , when in reality, environmental degradation is
intimately related to other more concrete issues such as overconsumption and militarization .
And thirdly, what little mention of the Global South that deep ecology does attempt to incorporate into its theory results in misuse
of indigenous perspectives and appropriation of systems of knowledge solely for the purposes of perpetuating deep ecology in the
West (See Guha & Martinez-Alier, 1997, pp. 94-7). This appropriation of other cultures, practices, and religions
in the Global South fails to acknowledge that Western philosophers and political theorists can never
truly appreciate and correctly characterize the perspectives and customs of cultures other than
their own. Indeed, some may see this third critique as a charge that only touches the surface of deep ecology and its goals as a
radical ecopolitical theory. In fact, however, appropriation belittles and others the Global South by misusing
information while conceptually excluding the humans that live in these regions from meaningful
participation in the discussion about and construction of radical ecopolitical societies. These missteps in deep ecology only
serve to promote a specific and bounded version of ecocentric politics that deep ecology finds palatable. Most importantly,
this othering of the 83 Global South and focus on specific policies in deep ecology results in the
promotion of Westerncentric policies that reflect the imperialistic and neocolonialist tendencies
that have plagued Western political thought for centuries. The last critique that emerges regarding deep
ecology does not appear frequently in the literature, however, but is a critique that I feel must be dealt with adequately in my
analysis. I argue that deep ecology fails to include the Global South in most of its theory as a viable region of the globe that has a role
to play in the formation of ecocentric societies. While these omissions may not always be intentional in deep ecology, this
exclusionary outlook prevents deep ecology (and its adherents) from viewing those in the Global South as agents of change and as
full participants in decision-making that will greatly affect their communities, their livelihoods, and their overall flourishing. I argue
that these omissions are not necessarily meant to harm the Global South, but instead emerge because deep ecology primarily
focuses on policies and philosophical tenets that might “work better” for the formation of ecocentric societies in the North.
Nevertheless, this exclusion still proves problematic for deep ecology overall. While
deep ecology has attempted to
incorporate some basic insights and issues related to the Global South in its theory, it does so in piecemeal
ways that fail to formulate either a unified perspective or a specific position on how the Global
South can both contribute to and fully participate in the formation of ecocentric political
societies. Deep ecology, by failing to formulate a specific standpoint about humans and the broader ecology in the Global South,
has not only opened itself up to the above critiques but has also missed an opportunity to place these often excluded populations at
the level of equally relevant partners in changing the way humans relate to nature. Of course, I do not imply that the West should
guide the Global South, but 84 instead begin to open itself up as a theory of inclusivity that will be ready to support these regions of
the world in uplifting themselves in pursuit of ecocentric political societies.
Deep Ecology perpetuates neo-colonialist power structures that PREVENTS the

Global South from accessing self determination
Overall, the first three critiques fundamentally relate to neocolonialism, and how neocolonialism
reinforces oppressive
contemporary structures of power, resulting in environmental degradation and suffering of
populations in the Global South. These charges levied at deep ecology from perspectives concerned with the Global
South also mirror charges often levied at dominant Western political, social, and economic institutions, including claims that
implicate these powerful institutions for perpetuating destructive economic forces that promote moving extractive and
environmentally harmful industries to areas in the Global South that have often have lower labor costs and fewer environmental
regulations. In turn, these
neocolonial practices of industry, reinforced by governments and
international organizations in the North perpetuate colonialism by oppressing local populations
by keeping them in poverty and at the same time destroying surrounding nature . Moreover, there
is a history of both exploitation and oppression of both humans and nonhuman nature in the
Global South. For example, some deep ecologists have commented briefly on this neocolonialism in their arguments (although
neocolonialist discourses are often still perpetuated in many of these same arguments). Taylor (2000) summarizes how
neocolonialism relates to environmental degradation in the minds of many in the South by paraphrasing how these populations feel,
saying, The land has been stolen and abused by outsiders—either by multinational commercial interests, or more commonly, by
national and commercial elites—who are interested in quick profits rather than ecologically sustainable land use [author’s italics] (p.
278). Moreover, he argues that, “Grassroots activists often trace the beginning of this process to the
arrival of colonial armies, the theft of their mineral resources, and the fast-following commercial
85 enterprises, including cash-crop monocultures ” (Taylor, 2000, p. 278). Both neocolonialism— now
mostly perpetuated by industries rather than directly by nation-states— and imperialism— now perpetuated through the
insistence by many nation-states in the West that outsiders adopt democratic and capitalist mechanisms in the name of progress—
are devastating tactics that result in both environmental degradation and the suffering of
human populations around the world in the Global South . These systems of power, moreover,
serve to keep populations in the Global South from acting against these forces , preventing most people
in these regions from becoming agents in their own nation-states’ and communities’ self-chosen paths toward flourishing and
sustainability. Despite the fact that the North has consistently denied the South the ability and the agency to equally participate in
the determination of its own fate, the
fact remains that only the North (as the oppressors) can “allow”
the Global South to uplift itself and regain its rightful role in world politics on the path toward
ecocentrism. Importantly, all of the above critiques will be addressed with the intention of directing deep ecology toward more
varied perspectives on the formation of ecocentric societies and with the intention of making deep ecology a viable theory that does
not promote Western-centric notions of ecological sustainability. All of these critiques in some way focus on the importance of
inclusion or the acknowledgement of difference. As it currently stands, deep
ecology either excludes the Global
South from its theory altogether or includes only the Global South’s “ecological wisdom ” that
promotes its overall philosophical tenets and political goals. Neither the exclusion of the Global South nor its selective inclusion
promotes a radical change toward ecocentric political societies, especially given deep ecology’s conviction that all beings on the
planet have an equal right to live and flourish. Furthermore, while
some deep ecologists (David M. Johns, Robyn Eckersley,
and Arne Naess) have attempted to address these critiques regarding 86 the Global South, their
answers are insufficient and do not adequately acknowledge or address the presence of
othering or exclusion in deep ecology.
The alt is cultural appropriation that seeks to LEGITIMIZE OPPRESSIVE Western

power structures
The third important critique concerning the Global South involves the appropriation of other
cultures in deep ecology, especially religious and cultural traditions emerging from the Global
South and indigenous perspectives. Deep ecology has utilized a variety of tactics in order to
promote its ecocentric outlook and justify its positions regarding tenets such as intrinsic value and biocentric
equality. It has attempted to globalize its perspective by discussing unrelated collections of
religious, cultural, and political traditions that have historically emerged from the Global South and
indigenous peoples worldwide. Given this usage of unrelated and random perspectives from different cultures to uphold
the theory of deep ecology, it is not surprising that it has received criticism regarding this appropriation and misuse of other cultures
in its theory. This critique is important for two reasons. First of all, deep ecology does not really need these “examples” of historically
ecocentric societies and cultures in order to justify its ethical and political claims .
If deep ecology did need these
tactical appropriations, then it would fail to stand alone as a viable radical ecopolitical theory .
Secondly, these tactics not only serve to limit deep 99 ecology’s global appeal but also fail to
account for the contemporary systems of knowledge present in the Global South , instead
characterizing certain regions based upon historical, sociocultural, or religious institutions,
leading to an idealized “othering” of people and cultures in the South . For example, Guha and Martinez-
Alier (1997) argue that deep ecology uses appropriation to “construct an authentic lineage …and present
deep ecology as a universalistic philosophy” (p. 97). Deep ecology relies on these historical narratives
to justify its own position in favor of ecocentrism. By retelling these histories in a piecemeal way,
deep ecology is able to pick and choose which historical and indigenous perspectives support
ecocentrism and focus on these “exemplars” of humanity’s real relationship to nature in its theory. Moreover, by utilizing
examples from around the globe, deep ecology attempts to universalize its theory and construct a utopian vision of the
past, one that paints an inaccurate and essentialized vision of human history and limits its
overall argument in favor cultural change , which will vary significantly across the globe, even in the pursuit of
ecocentric relations with nature. These idealized versions of the past serve to undermine deep ecology because they cast a
shadow over deep ecology’s real argument: ecocentric political societies based upon wider identification with
nature will result in better environmental practices and clearer pathways toward the overall flourishing of all human and ecological
entities on the planet. It is therefore unnecessary for deep ecology to back up its main arguments through
the misuse of indigenous knowledge and cultural contributions to ecological sustainability from
the Global South. Importantly, deep ecology has incorrectly characterized the bases for past
societies that seemingly had ecocentric relationships with the natural world . This characterization,
according to Guha and Martinez-Alier (1997), demonstrates that deep ecology has idealized these contexts 100 in
which many Eastern and traditional societies operated and interacted with the natural world in
order to justify its own positions regarding ecocentrism (p. 97-8). Indicative of Guha and Martinez-Alier’s
characterization of deep ecology, Sessions (1991) contends that, …the cultures of most primal (hunter/gathering) societies
throughout the world were permeated with Nature-oriented religions that expressed the ecocentric perspective. These cosmologies,
involving a sacred sense of the Earth and all its inhabitants, helped order their lives and determine their values (p. 158). Sessions
elaborates on this point by saying that most cultures gradually lost their ecocentric perspectives with the beginning of agricultural
societies, implying that a return to more simple ways of living is needed to establish ecocentric political societies (Sessions, 1991, p.
158-0). Relatedly, however, I will argue that deep ecology does not necessarily require a priori a return to the past that embraces a
more “primitive” state of humanity in order to establish ecocentric societies. Related to these more general comments about
historically ecocentric societies, other more specific characterizations emerge and serve to misuse information and pick and choose
which cultures are focused upon in the deep ecology literature as exemplars of ecocentric societies both historical and
contemporary. For example, Devall and Sessions (1985) argue that, “Eastern traditions express organic unity, address what we have
called the minority tradition, and express acceptance of biocentric equality in some traditions. Furthermore, these sources relate to
the process of becoming more mature, awakening from illusion and delusion” (p. 100). They go on to name a few activists,
philosophers, and writers who embrace deep ecology and have drawn wisdom from these so-called “Eastern” traditions, including
Emerson, Thoreau, and Gary Snyder. They also specifically mention the Tao Te Ching and the influence of Buddhism on these cultural
transmissions from East to West (Devall and Sessions, 1985, pp. 100-1). 101 Even
the simplicity that deep ecology
projects onto these “Eastern” and ecocentric traditions is highly problematic . For example, Guha and
Martinez-Alier (1997) argue that
these characterizations may well reinforce age old stereotypes that
the West has often projected upon indigenous cultures and other lifestyles in the Global South
(p. 97). They reflect comments made by Ronald Inden (1986) regarding orientalism saying that, This romantic and essentially positive
view of the East is a mirror image of the scientific and essentially pejorative view normally held by Western scholars of the Orient. In
either case, theEast constitutes the Other, a body wholly separate and alien from the West ; it is
defined by a uniquely spiritual and non-rational ‘essence,’ even if this essence is valorized quite
differently by the two different schools (Guha & MartinezAlier, 1997, p. 97). According to these statements, then,
deep ecology not only essentializes these traditions, cultures, and religious practices but also
“others” those who partake in these customs . By idealizing the Global South so much so that peoples in these
regions become “others” that should be mimicked by the West, deep ecology alienates these regions and
reinforces existing power structures that have historically exploited these parts of the planet
and the populations that reside within them . The concept of “othering” first appeared in the work of Edward Said2
(1997), and has farreaching negative consequences for these so-called “others.” For example, Guha and MartinezAlier (1997) argue
that othering in deep ecology characterizes and delegitimizes people in the “East” in certain important ways. First of all, by
utilizing these Eastern traditions as exemplars, deep ecology is presenting the Global South as
dependent upon nature. Although deep ecology argues that all humans are ultimately dependent upon nature, the ways
that deep ecology talks about these traditions and cultures only serves to further their own dependency upon both nature 2 Said
(1977) coined the phrase “Orientalism,” detailing how indigenous and Eastern culture s (the “Orient,”
traditionally) have been othered by the Western imagination for much of historical Western memory, especially since the onset of
colonial history (pp. 169-171). 102 and the will of Western observers. Secondly, these portrayals of the Global South deny that these
populations have agency and also deny that they are capable of reasoning in ways that will ultimately lead to their own ecological
sustainability. And lastly, this
method of othering the Global South merely places the Global South at
the will of the West in addition to denying that these regions are anything but a “vehicle” for the
purposes of furthering ecocentrism in the West (Guha and Martinez-Alier, 1997, p. 97-8). Othering, importantly,
as a consequence of appropriation in deep ecology, results in a return to a colonial discourse
that has historically othered these populations in the Global South for the purposes of furthering some
goal in the West, ultimately perpetuating oppression and the attitude that the West still dominates world politics and relations.
AT – Mindset Alt
Deep Ecologies erasure of identity leads to REJECTION of political unity –
perpetuates colonialism
In relation to the concept of othering, ecofeminist Val Plumwood (2000) argues that deep ecology has an
issue with the way it conceptualizes identity in relation to its emphasis on deep identification of
the self with nature. For Plumwood, the problem lies in deep ecology’s insistence on identifying with
nature rather than a focus on solidarity —a political concept of unity that does not require the
loss of difference in the process of identification (p. 66). Moreover, the emphasis on unity in deep ecology
further promotes the othering of people in the Global South by denying difference and
reflecting colonialist tendencies . By insisting upon unity 116 in the process of identification with nature, deep
ecology implicitly promotes the colonial destruction of cultural diversity in oppressed
populations across the globe (Plumwood, 2000, p. 66-7). In this regard, Plumwood argues that deep ecology fails to
acknowledge that its emphasis on unity makes the theory particularly susceptible to hegemonic and
authoritarian interpretations that deny difference , insist upon universality in the theory, and promote othering of
populations (even if this othering and projection of the merits of “Eastern traditions” often appears to be interpreted in a positive
light in deep ecology) (Plumwood, 2000, p. 67-8).
Identification, moreover, does not consist in one identity that
fundamentally defines an individual and guides action (Plumwood, 2000, p. 60-6). Deep ecology should
therefore emphasize that identification with nature will only be one among many identities that define and shape individuals within
the context of ecocentric communities in addition to placing a greater emphasis on solidarity. Yet, irrespective of this critique, I
argue that the way deep ecology discusses identity is valuable in that it promotes the formation of new constitutive identities in
individuals that will spur action. Nevertheless, the goal of deep ecology is to reinvigorate what it perceives as an identity that has
largely faded from the human condition in contemporary society, contending that this re-invigoration of an essential identity will
result in better overall flourishing for human and nonhuman nature. By recognizing the multiplicity of identities that make up
individual humans, deep ecology can also promote itself alongside other radical ecopolitical theories that deal with issues like
patriarchy, hierarchy, and other systems of power that fundamentally damage the identities of individuals and alienate people from
nonhuman nature. By emphasizing unity and singular identification, moreover, deep ecology fails to
acknowledge differences between humans and nature and between humans in general. 117
Plumwood (2000) argues that this failure to distinguish results in the other becoming a subordinate
object that exists solely for the purposes of reinforcing the role that individuals play in relation
to the whole of ecology/human culture (p. 60-7). Deep ecologist Johns (1990), however, argues that, “Any system of
values that does not transcend nature-as-other cannot limit destruction of the biosphere as effectively as one that embraces
nonhuman life as intrinsically valuable” (p. 250). How does deep ecology reconcile these two very different viewpoints? On the one
hand, critics argue that deep ecology fails to recognize difference, and in turn, this failure results in the theory utilizing other cultures
for instrumental purposes. On the other hand, however, deep
ecology emphasizes the notion that unity and
self-realization of one’s place in the broader ecology in addition to the recognition of the
intrinsic value of all life forms is a necessary and vital step for the purposes of sustainability . I
argue that these two different perspectives highlight how deep ecology has failed to develop a
nuanced sense of what it means to be human in the context of nature . Recognizing difference is not
necessarily incompatible with an emphasis on unity (or solidarity, as Plumwood refers to the sense of the self’s role in the broader
ecology). Importantly, deep
ecology has failed to acknowledge that a human can both deeply identify
with nature and at the same time celebrate the diversity of cultures, social institutions, and
religions that inhabit the globe. Unity in deep ecology does not necessarily constitute an embracing of similarity or an
erasure of difference; instead, it constitutes a way that humans can better envision how diversity and difference plays a vital role in
the maintenance of a functioning biosphere and of flourishing human populations. Without diversity, the ability of humans to
construct new ways of relating to nature and ecocentric ways of acting would be severely limited. Deep
ecology has yet to
develop a robust theory that acknowledges these results of its theoretical assumptions , but must,
especially given 118 the vital importance that the recognition of intrinsic value will play in the overall radical transition of
contemporary society to a world marked by ecocentrism and an absence of all forms of oppression and domination.
Green Imperialism
The alt instates Green Imperialism that is NET WORSE – resulting in permanent
displacement
Deep ecology has occasionally engaged in debate over issues related to the Global South and the critiques that have been made of it
in relation to these regions of the globe. The major players in this debate have been Ramachandra Guha and Juan Martinez-Alier,
arguing out of concern for the Global South, and David M. Johns and Arne Naess, arguing on behalf of deep ecology. This debate has
centered on a few important issues that serve to highlight the problem of neocolonialism in deep ecology, in addition to specific
ethical and policy issues like the anthropocentric ethic and wilderness preservation. The first major critique that arises from
perspectives concerned with the Global South relates to deep ecology’s focus on wilderness preservation as a
globally applicable policy standpoint. To varying degrees, deep ecology has heralded a commitment to
the preservation of wild spaces on a global scale . It has emphasized the importance of this policy
position in keeping 87 with its promotion of the intrinsic value of all species and ecosystems and the
concept of biocentric egalitarianism (Guha & Martinez-Alier, 1997, p. 94). These critiques are concerned with an inherently
Western bias in deep ecology that puts the theory in danger of promoting neocolonial and
imperial policies that negatively affect the Global South and do not account for difference in these regions of
the globe. Regarding this focus on wilderness preservation, Guha and Martinez-Alier (1997) argue that deep ecology not
only emphasizes wilderness preservation, but obsesses about the necessity of preserving
pristine wild areas and restoring damaged areas to near-pristine condition (p. 95). Moreover, they
contend that the focus on wilderness preservation in deep ecology upholds imperialist and
reformist environmental practices that have occurred throughout the Global South for decades ,
such as setting aside lands for tiger reserves which has resulted in the taking of land from poverty stricken and peasant populations.
Additionally, deep ecology’s focus on wilderness preservation promotes a culture of
professionalization where biologists become the number one source regarding which wild
spaces need preservation, regardless of local needs and local input on these preservationist policies (Guha &
Martinez-Alier, p. 95-6). This “West knows best” attitude that permeates from this emphasis on wilderness preservation
in deep ecology fails to acknowledge the abilities and the capacity for action that local populations have for preserving
ecological integrity in a particular region of the South as well as fails to acknowledge the diversity of needs and perspectives in
these regions. Factoring in local needs as they relate to nature and preservationist policies, human ecologist James D. Nations (1988)
also argues against deep
ecology, contending that it is impractical in its wish to push these types of policies
toward adoption in the developing world without resorting to anthropocentric arguments (p. 78-9). He argues that
deep ecology does not 88 factor in the differences that exist between the North and developing
or underdeveloped nationstates in the South. For example, many people depend on slash and burn
agriculture in the developing world to sustain their vital needs and generally survive, but deep ecology
would try to convince these farmers that preservation benefits their endeavors and preserves the
biological diversity in the region. Farmers in many of these regions, Nations argues, must have a direct incentive that benefits
themselves and their families to start conserving and preserving the lands around them upon which their lives depend (Nations,
1988, pp. 78-81). Ultimately, Nations
points out that deep ecology fails to recognize the extent to which
ecological sustainability is not currently possible in regions of the world still made destitute by
problems such as poverty and a lack of vital resources to sustain human life. Related to subsistence
agricultural and the general survival of populations in the Global South, Guha and Martinez-Alier (1997) also argue that deep
ecology’s focus on wilderness preservation takes attention away from much more pressing ecological problems in these regions.
Moreover, the insistence on taking a mostly American inspired conservation movement and mirroring it in the Global South will
result in social suffering and uprooting (p. 96). In this regard, the consequences that arise from what Guha (1998) refers to as
“green imperialism” implicit in deep ecology are far more dangerous for populations in the
Global South than either traditional economic or religious imperialism. For example, he argues that green
imperialism will not simply encourage a culture of consumerism in the Global South (the insistence implicit in economic
imperialism). Moreover, green imperialism will not simply convert populations to another religion that can be rejected at any time
by its converts. Green
imperialism (and wilderness preservation, specifically), instead, poses the threat of
permanently displacing people in the name of preservation of wildlife and landscapes . This often
permanent displacement under 89 the guise of preservation, instead of promoting wilderness areas compatible with populations of
humans that already live in these regions, asks these often poverty stricken populations to make sacrifices in the name of preserving
wildlife (p. 276-7). In essence, Guha argues that these
populations should not have to shoulder a burden in
the name of preservation, when they have already suffered so much given the results of
colonialism and economic imperialism. More than the emphasis on wilderness preservation alone, Guha (1998, 1997),
MartinezAlier (1997), and Nations (1988) are criticizing the lack of nuance in deep ecology’s policy angle regarding wilderness,
arguing that deep ecology lacks a focus on differences that emerge given the contexts of environmental problems in the Global
South and the differences amongst cultures generally. Importantly, some deep ecologists have acknowledged that wilderness
preservation is neither practical nor desirable in all reaches of the globe, due to factors such as urbanization, subsistence lifestyles,
and the importance of decentralization and bioregionalism in human management of local environments. These responsesto
those who critique the wilderness aspects of deep ecology have been important, but not sufficient for
addressing all the concerns that revolve around this policy recommendation. In addition, other deep ecologists have also
directly responded to Guha and Martinez-Alier (1997), contending that wilderness preservation is still a valuable and necessary
globally applicable policy standpoint. For example, Eckersley (1992) comments on wilderness preservation by acknowledging how it
can benefit ecocentric political societies, rather than responding directly to charges of imperialism or neocolonialism. She has stated
that wilderness preservation can provide a “litmus test” that distinguishes between anthropocentric and ecocentric viewpoints. In
this regard, wilderness preservation can act as a way for determining whether or not theorists and policymakers are adequately and
ecocentrically accounting for the vital interests of nonhuman 90 entities in their decision-making processes (p. 130). Wilderness
preservation, for Eckersley, marks a valuable way in which humans can gauge if they are truly reflecting ecocentric values by placing
the vital needs of other species prior to their own non-vital needs in decision-making. Moreover, Eckersley briefly contends that
wilderness preservation can also assist in preserving indigenous cultures (p. 158). Eckersley does not go more into depth on these
topics, however, leaving
a more critical engagement with the merits and downfalls of deep ecology’s
insistence on wilderness preservation absent from her analysis . Her insights, however, may prove valuable in
the long run, when ecological sustainability becomes a truly global goal and is able to be practiced in regions currently stricken by
immediate and devastating social concerns and more pressing environmental problems. Moreover, deep ecology has not really
emphasized that wilderness preservation is an idealized state of human protection of nature. Very few actual wilderness areas still
exist, and many populations of humans around the world who wish to live off of the land will disrupt this idealized vision of nature.
The vital needs of many of these populations will depend upon this “invasion” of particular areas
of nature that are more unspoiled than others . As mentioned previously, Naess (1984) has contended that the
levels of interference in nature will be contested concepts in ecocentric societies. Moreover, the variability of needs across cultures
will determine acceptable levels of interference based on needs of both humans and animals in these regions (p. 169-170). Though
Naess makes this admission about difference, he still vigorously defends the necessity of preservation in many of his works (See
Naess, 1995; Naess, 1986). Also defending the value of preservation, deep ecologist David M. Johns (1990) has directly responded to
Guha’s and others’ critiques of deep ecology’s focus on wilderness preservation, though his response still does not sufficiently
address all the issues raised in this 91 analysis. He argues that human civilization is really not compatible with sustainability and that
almost all human actions in some way disrupt or destroy the functioning of ecosystems. In this sense wilderness preservation is
absolutely necessary for the flourishing of nature on a global scale (p. 235). Moreover, he argues that the mere existence of human
communities in many parts of the globe poses a threat to the flourishing of ecosystems because in many of these areas humans
compete with animals for habitat (Johns, 1990, p. 238). Though Johns defends the insistence on wilderness preservation in deep
ecology, he also acknowledges that preservation has often been implemented imperialistically in the Global South in contemporary
society by Western interests, arguing that deep ecology must recognize and account for the fact that imperialism has been a
problem in this policy arena. Additionally, deep ecology must argue that wilderness preservation will differ and might not constitute
imperialism in a system based on ecocentrism rather than the current anthropocentric one (Johns, 1990, p. 238-9). Though
Johns makes some important points, he too fails to acknowledge the diversity of needs that will
play a role in determining how wilderness areas are constructed and if these areas can be
occupied by humans that do not unduly degrade the environment, at the same time failing to
acknowledge the intense destruction of wilderness that has made the transition to such
preservationist models extremely difficult in contemporary society.
Even if the alt focuses on the “north” first – it doesn’t excise neocolonialist
foundations that mold Deep Ecology
Indeed, Naess(1995) has also somewhat contradicted his above statements that point toward a
colonial discourse by arguing that deep ecology does not necessarily promote or intend to
promote tactics that force wilderness preservation or population control on populations in the
Global South, arguing instead that deep ecology recognizes that poverty stricken populations will most likely be concerned with
their own overall well-being prior to concerning themselves with ecological problems (p. 284). Moreover, Naess argues that deep
ecology does not seek to map solutions like wilderness preservation onto the Global South, thereby further diminishing the capacity
for flourishing of humans in poverty in these regions. The problem with these arguments from Naess is that
they do not propose solutions for how to directly deal with the conflicts that arise between
preservation, population, and poverty in the Global South , instead arguing that preservation
and population control are good ideas that eventually must take hold in these regions, albeit in
ways that account for specific contexts (Naess, 1995, p. 282). Indeed, Naess doesn’t really provide
evidence from deep ecology that promotes a radical rethinking of how both wilderness and
population control can be dealt with solely by the inhabitants of these regions without guidance or neocolonial
interference on the part of the Western interests. At best, Naess’ statements regarding wilderness seem
contradictory, and at worst, they bring to mind 95 colonial discourses that only serve to
perpetuate existing contemporary Western domination of the Global South. Related to the neocolonial
and imperialist assumptions in deep ecology, Guha (1998) also contends that Naess and deep ecology in general
promotes “green imperialist” tendencies throughout the theory (p. 276-7). For example, he quotes Naess
(1989) saying, “the deep ecology movement is ‘from the point of view of many people all over the world, the most precious gift from
the North American continent in our time’” (p. 276). Guha goes on to argue that deep
ecology must recognize that
wilderness preservation (presumably part of what Naess is referring to in this passage) is a particularly Western
ideal of environmental sustainability and that humility in making claims about wilderness
preservation is also necessary (p. 277). Beyond Guha’s critique, this passage from Naess (1989) implicitly shifts the
burden of responsibility about ecological sustainability to those in the South by implying that “deep ecology will save the world” and
that “the whole world will be thankful for this theory.” The
burden of responsibility is now placed on the South
to follow the path of deep ecology, right or wrong and in the process to unquestioningly accept
policies such as wilderness preservation and population control for its own good. This attitude in
deep ecology can be seen as both imperialistic and paternalistic because it attempts to map
culturally-constructed solutions from the West onto the Global South , foregoing more nuanced arguments
about the merits of deep ecology that focus on the importance of intrinsic value, biocentric equality, and radically contested cultural
change toward ecocentrism, instead promoting essentialized versions of policy “truths” for consumption in the Global South.
Despite these problematic statements that cannot be excused, Naess (1989) also argues that deep ecology has focused on the
Global North because it requires the most substantial 96 economic and social changes to become ecocentric and because the North
requires resources from the South and in turn, oppresses these regions while destroying nature (pp. 284-6). Before the South can
become ecocentric, the North must change, argues deep ecology. Relatedly, Naess understands that due to overconsumption and
industrialism in the Global North, the South has little say in and little opportunity to discuss and participate in solving ecological
problems. These overzealous economic endeavors backed by anthropocentrism by the North, in turn, cause great harm to come to
the environmental, economic, and social justice causes in the South (Naess, 1995, p. 289-91). The focus on solutions in
the North in deep ecology, however, does not excuse the above neocolonialist statements
from Naess that deep ecology is a “gift” to the Global South or that the South must “trust” the
North to help it in its progress toward greater sustainability . Related to the focus in deep ecology on the
North, deep ecologist Chellis Glendinning (1995) argues that humans need to “recover” from Western
civilization (p. 37). She argues that the West, particularly, has removed itself from its relationship with nature and from natural
cycles, resulting in the loss of humanity’s sense of place and environmental crises of epic proportions. This removal from nature
resulted from an addiction to technological progress and technology in general and from mechanistic ways of viewing nature
(Glendinning, 1995, p. 37- 9). Relatedly, the solution to this loss of self and alienation from nature seems to lie, for some theorists of
deep ecology, in what Glendinning refers to as recovery—which encompasses recovering from alienation, from “Techno-Addiction,”
and from mechanistic world-views (Glendinning, 1995, p. 39-40). The
solution to recovering lies in the re-
discovering and inventing new and old philosophies based upon both new knowledge and old
“earth-based, ecological, and indigenous” cultures (Glendinning, 1995, p. 40). Recovery in the West, for deep
ecology, 97 involves a re-envisioning both of the self’s place in the broader ecology and a radical questioning of contemporary
society’s view of nature and the results that derive from this ontology.
Deep Eco Is Bad
Deep Ecology is elitist and justifies the elimination of third world countries
Deep ecology has been attacked by different thinkers and activists of various schools of thought
like social ecology, liberal democracy and ecofeminism . Murray Bookchin, a social ecologist for instance,
accused deep ecology and Earth First! (a vanguard activist) of being incoherent intellectually, ignorant of
the socio-economic factors that contribute to environmental crises . He also criticized the founder to
‗Earth First!‘ for recommending that mass starvation a solution to the crisis of human population
and environmental deterioration .39 One of the voices that had been less represented, hence, less heard of comes from
outside the Western world.40 Apart from the labels attributed to deep ecologists such as sexist, misanthropists, fascists and racists,
the critics of third-world countries accused deep ecology of being ‗elitists ‘ – for they attempt to
preserve wilderness only to be used by certain sections of economically and socio-politically
well-off people. Further, these critics have accused deep ecology of mainstreaming western cultural
imperialism which aims to secure its own variety of conservation , which may not be suitable for
countries outside the Western world. Ramachandra Guha, in his own words, offers a view of a ‗sympathetic outsider‘
and his critique of deep ecology is historical and sociological, rather than philosophical in nature.41 His perception towards deep
ecology is very much linked to issues raised by cultural relativists. He contends that deep ecology is uniquely American –
a country which Guha regards to be similar to India in terms of ecological diversity, but significantly dissimilar in cultural and social
history and its social and political goals are not quite the same as in countries like West Germany and India. Further, the
consequences of putting deep ecology in practice worldwide could be very grave .42 The focus
of the deep ecologists on the wilderness area approach to prevent environmental degradation,
Guha argues, is ‗positively harmful‘ when applied to the Third World . Drawing the Indian example Guha
points out that India has been home to a vast agrarian population who have, historically maintained, a fine balance in human
relationship with nature. It
has however been the influx of western ideas that tends to alienate these
people from their homelands in order to protect wilderness, that have caused the direct transfer of
resources from the poor to the rich.43 He later on discusses that the focus on preservation of wilderness and restoration of
degraded areas, excludes the other important issues associated with environmental issues. Hecriticizes the efforts of
certain deep ecologists using Eastern traditions to found an authentic lineage for their
philosophy. He regards the same as an exaggerated effort to keep the deep ecological theories
universal. He concludes by regarding deep ecology as nothing but a radical trend within the wilderness preservation
movement.44 This criticism is of particular significance in light of the recent judgment of the Indian Supreme
Court wherein the question of which sort of conservation – the western model of human exclusion, or the
rather Indianized version, which Guha argues for– should be preferred in the Indian context, became a part of
academic discourse came to the forefront once again .45
Deep ecological rhetoric results in human erasure that turns the kritik and
sparks political backlash – it makes environmental action impossible unless
centered around self-annihilation
DiCaglio 15, (Joshua DiCaglio joined the English department in Fall 2016 after completing a
Ph.D in English at Penn State. His work studies the intersection of rhetoric, science, and
mysticism as intersecting modes of attempting to make sense of our modernized, globalized
world), Ironic Ecology, ISLE: Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment, Volume 22,
Issue 3, Summer 2015, Pages 447–465, https://doi.org/10.1093/isle/isu106 //SDD
The need for a doubled ecological irony originates within historically situated critiques of
anthropocentrism and calls for ecocentrism . These critiques originated in the attempt to deepen the conceptual
implications of the early environmental and animal rights activism of the 1960s and 1970s. This movement became what
is known as “deep ecology.” Often citing the spiritual resonance of writers like Aldo Leopold and Rachel Carson,10 deep
ecologists used the term ecocentrism (or biocentrism) to describe the transformative nature of ecological thinking. Originally,
however, deep ecologists used the terms to emphasize both the displacement and dispersal of the human. The critiques of
anthropocentrism sought to undo visions of humans as “the crown of creation , the source of all value,
the measure of all things” (Seed 243). At the same time, deep ecologists frequently warned against the
concept of a contained self: “the deep ecology sense of self requires . . . an identification which goes beyond humanity to
include the nonhuman world” (Devall and Sessions 67). Hence their emphasis on “ecological consciousness”
designated the full realization of displacement and dispersal of the human . It resulted in an ethical
sensibility informed by an ecological consciousness as we realize that “no one is saved until we are all saved” (Devall
and Sessions 67). In subsequent years, however, deep ecology's rhetoric resulted in a skewed view of its
project. This confusion created the need for the new layer of critique found in Gessner's irony. By the turn of the new century, the
spiritual resonances of deep ecology became associated with the overly somber, jeremiad tone that Gessner is responding to. At the
same time, thecore critiques of deep ecology became associated only with a strictly displacing
critique of anthropocentrism; the conceptually more difficult implication of a dispersal of the
human was ignored. Hence, in Michael Bennett's assessment, “the primary gospel of Deep Ecology is that
we must abandon andocentric11 planning and develop a biocentric understanding of the
environment, an understanding which is to be gained by existing in harmony with unspoiled
nature” (32, emphasis mine). Bennett uses this characterization to suggest that deep ecologists ignore the reality of
human life, as emblemized by their lack of focus on city-life. Indeed, deep ecology's emphasis on
preserving “wilderness” areas rhetorically emphasizes the separation between humans and
nature.12 Thus, between the original manifestos of deep ecology (of the 1970s and 1980s) and Bennett's formulation (published
in 2001), deep ecology's emphasis on personal transformation within these wilderness areas conceptually subsumed 452 ISLE
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isle/article/22/3/447/2357529 by guest on 14 July 2021 the larger social and political
implications originally implied by their critique of human self-containment.13 The
rhetoric of deep ecology further
invites this misinterpretation through its use of spatialized language . Both anthropocentrism and
ecocentrism—as well as the process of decentering that moves from one to the other—imagines a conceptual space where the
entity called “human” becomes situated in a new relation to the entity called “nature.” Although
deep ecologists do not
view these entities as separate self-contained wholes (humans are part of nature), this nuance gets lost in
the terminology. The language of anthropocentrism and ecocentrism frequently uses the terms
“human” and “nature” in a way that seems to place them in opposition . In other words, in articulating
ecocentrism deep ecologists seemed to posit, as in the definition cited above, a “nature rather than human” as
if the two are diametrically opposed to each other . Combined with the emphasis on wilderness
as a literally separate place, these spatialized metaphors appear as wholly negative spatial
displacements. The desire for ecocentrism becomes the conceptual analog to the desire for wilderness: ecocentrism becomes a
place minimally tainted by humans.14 Alarmed by the growing effects of pollution and the destruction of wildlife areas,
environmental rhetoric has fixated on this displacement of the human . To adopt an ecocentric view came
to mean adopting a degree of misanthropy, lamenting the hubris of humankind, and attempting to erase its
impact. Critiques of anthropocentrism became a process of removing the human wherever it was found.15 Thus, deep
ecology's attempt to create a unifying vision of ecology became fixed in a rhetoric of erasure.
Unfortunately, the rhetoric of erasure has served as a source of political resistance to
environmental action. For example, Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger, whose work provides the context for
Gessner's Manifesto, call for the “death of environmentalism” for this form of rhetoric: “Environmentalism has saddled us with the
albatross we call the politics of limits, which seeks to constrain human ambition, aspiration, and power rather than unleash and
direct them. In focusing attention so exclusively on the nonhuman worlds that have been lost rather than the astonishing human
world that has been created, environmentalists have felt more resentment than gratitude for the efforts of those who came before
us” (17). Within
environmental politics—as well as how these politics translate into personal, local action (via recycling,
conservation, etc.)—the
decentering critiques thus leave no place for people to act from . When we
erase what is perceived as a unified category “human,” then all environmental action must
come through some form of self-annihilation.
Deep ecologists attempt to erase the human – rather then coming up with
strategies to live with nature
DiCaglio 15, (Joshua DiCaglio joined the English department in Fall 2016 after completing a
Ph.D in English at Penn State. His work studies the intersection of rhetoric, science, and
mysticism as intersecting modes of attempting to make sense of our modernized, globalized
world), Ironic Ecology, ISLE: Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment, Volume 22,
Issue 3, Summer 2015, Pages 447–465, https://doi.org/10.1093/isle/isu106 //SDD
Unfortunately, while many of these recent critics were attempting to rearticulate the human-
dispersing implications of ecology into the conversation , they were viewed as attacks on deep
ecology. This is best represented by Gary Snyder's harsh response to Cronon. Rather than recognizing mutual
resonances between himself and Cronon, Snyder attacked Cronon. “I'm getting grumpy ,” he begins,
“about the slippery arguments being put forth by high-paid intellectuals trying to knock nature and knock
the people who value nature and still come out smelling smart and progressive” (195). In the end, both Snyder and Cronon were
struggling with the same problem:
how do we overcome the resistance people develop toward
ecological thinking. However, Snyder's alienating response, as well as his role as a key figure for
deep ecologists, set deep ecology in opposition to these critics .19 By the turn of the century, this divide
seems implicit in the history of ecocriticism; crucially, Michael Bennett names this new wave of critics Social Ecologists and opposes
them to Deep Ecologists (32). He argues that Deep
Ecology provides the foundation for ecocriticism,
specifically through its emphasis on the distant wilderness , which Social Ecology questions through the
reintegration of human concerns. Thus, Bennett's account can easily fall into the opposition already
entailed by the “nature rather than man” formulation described above: Deep Ecologists attempt to
erase the human, while Social Ecologists attempt to reintegrate it by writing about recognizably human
objects and places (34–35).
Deep Ecology fails to consider the ecofeminist perspective, making biological
egalitarianism unachievable and exacerbating its human chauvinist ontology
Tresca 20 – (Anthony, Political Science Research Assistant @ Trinity University. “Getting Deep
About Deep Ecology”, David Publishing, February 2020)
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/99f1/0baf4afb0eb8b42b207ddf56f2923adfa15c.pdf, DOI:
10.17265/2328-2134/2020.02.003, sj
Dr. Ariel Kay Salleh poses radically different qualms with Deep Ecology than Ferry by critiquing the
philosophy from an ecofeminist perspective . Salleh takes grievance with Deep Ecology on both a logical ground
and challenges their tacit methodological approach. Deep Ecology claims to want to move away from
anthropocentrism and toward biological egalitarianism; thus, removing man’s desire to dominate nature.
However, “the master-slave role which marks man's relation with nature is replicated in man’s
relation with woman. A self-consistent biological egalitarianism cannot be arrived at unless
men become open to both facets of this same urge to dominate and use ” (Salleh, 1984, p. 340). Salleh
argues that if we continue to ignore the sexism that still currently exists within humans, it will be
impossible to achieve true equality for all beings. Though Deep Ecology claims to advocate for
diversity—they even include diversity in their basic principles (Devall, 1985)—they will be only partially successful
“if the ecologist continues to ignore the cultural inventiveness of that other half of the human race ,
women” (Salleh, 1984, p. 341). Salleh calls out the hypocritical nature of the philosophy; while it rejects the exploitation of some by
others (such as nature by man), “sexual
oppression and the social differentiation that this produces is not
mentioned by Naess” (Salleh, 1984, p. 341). Women have once again been lumped in with everything else; by ignoring
the specific problems of women, the philosophy shows that it is not truly interested in
achieving biocentric equality for all—namely, for women. Similarly, by keeping women and their issues out of the
philosophy, Salleh argues that Deep Ecology’s definition of “pollution” is not fully representative of the problem. The objectivist
attitude that is present throughout ecological writings —as well as the tacit mind-body dualism which shapes this
—means that the philosophy’s comprehension of “pollution” is framed exclusively in external
material terms. While ecofeminists acknowledge that pollution in terms of its material sense is a
pressing problem, the female consciousness is equally concerned with eradicating “ideological
pollution, which centuries of patriarchal conditioning have subjected us all to” (Salleh, 1984, p. 342). Women
are more motivated to change this system and address ideological pollution because, unlike men, women do not
receive an ego gratification from the patriarchal hegemony that is still present. Finally, Salleh questions the purpose and
effectiveness of Deep Ecology. Deep Ecologists’ proposals are centered around theories of complexity, not complication principle;
for example, just because urban life is more complicated than that of nature does not make it more complex holistically (Devall,
1985). Deep Ecology favors a more complex economy that is supported by division (Devall, 1985). Salleh argues that there are
serious problems of implementation attached to this overly idealistic worldview. The philosophy’s references to
expanding “soft future research , the implementation of policies ”, and increasing the
“ exponential growth of technicalskill and intervention”, collapse the movement into the “ shallow”
ecology paradigm and its human chauvinist ontology (Salleh, 1984, p. 342). Salleh accuses Deep
Ecology of falling prey to the masculine sense of sense-worth that has become deeply entrenched in the
scientific community that makes it “very hard for men to argue persuasively without recourse to [vague] terms like these for
validation” (Salleh, 1984, p. 342). The inflated sense of self-worth that Deep Ecologists’ possess has led
eco-feminists to dismiss Deep Ecology as being more of a “self-congratulatory” reformist movement
rather than one that has any chance of getting anything done (Salleh, 1984, p. 344)
Deep ecology is rooted in internal contradictions, racial securitization, and a
refusal of concrete science
Hawkins 14 (Ronnie, Trumpeter, 2014)
http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/index.php/trumpet/article/view/1398)
While not without its critics, deep ecology continued to hold its own alongside other approaches to environmental philosophy into
the dawning of the new millennium. But any tensions that existed within the subdiscipline, or in any other field for that matter, were
tempests in teapots compared to the panic that engulfed just about the entire population of the United States of America on
September 11, 2001, when the Trade Center towers went down in a massive cloud of pyroclastic dust, marking an event that is still
yet to be thoroughly and honestly analyzed by the academic community. It was my experience that, during the immediate post-9/11
years, a fear-laden atmosphere developed within academia, such that anyone hesitant to wave the flag and “circle the wagons”
against any and all possible threats to “our group” risked being suspected of disloyalty, leading to a blanket of self-censorship
descending over the university community. And
while “the face of the enemy” (Keen 1986) was being
painted by some zealots upon all Muslims, Afghanis, Iraqis, and just about anyone else not in the
mold of the clean-cut American patriot, the longtime foes of animal rights and environmental
activists were quick to use this in-group paranoia for tarring the most outspoken as similarly
threatening acts of “terror” against the status quo, in this case branding them “eco-terrorists.”
Deep ecology, in addition to inspiring some self-identified “ecowarriors,” was itself already a
kind of heresy insofar as it put “the group” in question – in this case the species itself as seen
“from the outside,” in terms of effects beyond its boundaries. It seems to me no coincidence that the
stampede away from admitted association with deep ecology emerged out of this post-9/11 context – a social milieu that, it must be
said, also generated policies of military
aggression and publicly admitted torture that have yet to be
clearly disavowed by the majority of Anglo-American academics . I believe a social dynamic has been at play
that has led to all sorts of unfortunate occurrences – a dynamic that, should we become reflexive enough to understand its
workings, we might be able to defuse, or at least redirect into more appropriate collective activities in light of our species’ “whole”
situation. The first clear-cut evidence that came to my attention of a move to “kill off” deep ecology, however, was the banishment
of the entire “Deep Ecology” section from the fourth edition of Zimmerman’s anthology (Zimmerman et al., 2005, 2001, 1998, 1993),
the earlier editions of which I had used year after year in my teaching. In his preface to The Trumpeter ISSN: 0832-6193 Volume 30,
Number 2 (2014) Ronnie Hawkins 213 the new edition, Zimmerman himself refrained from any comment on this surgical excision of
deep ecology other than to say that it resulted from his decision to include a new section, “Environmental Continental Philosophy,”
which “required” the expurgation, and that this had been “the most difficult decision” that he had had to make as the anthology’s
general editor (vii). It was left to Callicott, perhaps still smarting from his own social censure, to explicitly state that “after September
11, 2001, responsible
environmental philosophers wish to distance themselves from militant
ideologies associated with groups that have used illegal and even violent means to achieve their
ends,” singling out animal rights as an “increasingly militant movement” but also calling deep
ecology “vaguely anti-intellectual” and noting that its platform had been adopted by “members
of the radical green movement, including its covert operatives, the ‘ecowarriors ’ of Earth First! in the
1980s” (Callicott 2005, 6). Deep ecology was said to have been “integrated into the ecofeminism section” of the volume, but I
searched in vain for a positive explication of the position. The inclusion of continental and phenomenological approaches could have
been a welcome addition to the Zimmerman et al. volume. However, the complete erasure of deep ecology felt
like a slap in the face, with its implication that even the historical existence of this once-inspiring
movement ought to be expunged from our memories. Moreover, the lead essay of the new
section, “Nature as Origin and Difference,” by Steven Vogel, seemed almost to have been chosen with the intention of kicking
sand in the eyes of as many “true believers” in deep ecology as possible, since its take-home message was basically that what they
care so deeply about, and are sometimes willing to fight for, simply does not exist. In addition, especially given Callicott’s put-down
the seeming rejection by Vogel of the validity of a scientifically
of deep ecology as “anti-intellectual,”
informed perspective was deeply disappointing, at least to this philosopher struggling to inform
students about the basics of our grim “environmental” situation today
Deep Ecologies are vague and its movements have empirically failed
Hawkins 14 (Ronnie, Trumpeter, 2014)
http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/index.php/trumpet/article/view/1398)
The First National Green Gathering was held in Amherst, Massachusetts, in July of 1987. I would have attended had I not been
abroad studying tropical agroecology while going for a PhD in (environmental) philosophy. It was probably fortunate that I only
became aware of Murray Bookchin’s infamous tirade against deep ecology after the fact, though its sting was hardly diminished in
written form. Published as “Social Ecology versus Deep Ecology,” Bookchin spews venom at a “ vague, formless, often self-
contradictory, and invertebrate thing called deep ecology ” (Bookchin 1987, 2), “a black hole of halfdigested, ill-
formed, and half-baked ideas” (ibid, 4), with followers who indulged in “orgies about ‘biocentrism’” (7). In contrast, social ecology,
the school of thought he claimed for his own, was upheld as rejecting “a ‘biocentrism’ that essentially denies or degrades the
uniqueness of human beings, human subjectivity, rationality, aesthetic sensibility, and the ethical potentiality of this extraordinary
species” (16); the
aggressive anthropocentrism was breathtaking. I was sickened by the invective
and deeply disappointed at the effect his outpouring seemed to have on the infant Green
movement, fracturing the activist community and staving off the development of a biocentric
consciousness – an awareness in no way demeaning to the human species, only displacing it as the sole center of value.
Moreover, instead of recognizing the nature of exponential growth – enormous The Trumpeter ISSN: 0832-6193 Volume 30, Number
2 (2014) Ronnie Hawkins 208 numbers developing rapidly toward the end – and hence the urgency of putting on the brakes,
Bookchin overlooked the increasingly destructive ecological effects of a surging human population, pronouncing “the so-
called ‘population debate’" “a debate that has raged for over two hundred years” (ibid, 12) and
charging that deep ecology’s main proponents were “splashing around in the cesspool of
Malthusianism” (ibid, 14) by drawing attention to the issue. Bookchin reportedly played a major role in articulating the “Ten
Key Values” adopted by the first national green organization at its founding meeting in 1984, three months after the bioregional
congress at which Haenke had spoken. Biocentrism was nowhere to be found, although “ecological
wisdom” topped the list; however by 2000 this too had been demoted, moving down into third place (Feinstein 2014). Green
political organizations have since made some headway at state and national levels, a development I applaud, but it seems that
the heady enthusiasm of the “movement” has long since dissipated, and I have often wondered
what might have happened if Bookchin had not lashed out in such a vicious and frightening
manner so soon after its birth. Whatever hopes I had for the initial fervor ushering in a new perception and a rapid
change of attitudes and actions were dashed, as good people ran from the Malthusian label, fearful of getting spattered with “the
muck of deep ecology” (Bookchin 1987, 10).
Eco Fem K of Deep Eco
Deep ecology subsumes the experiences of women while fundamentally
misunderstanding that man’s relationship with nature is the same exploitative
process of man’s relationship with woman.
Salleh 84 – (Ariel, Australian sociologist who writes on humanity-nature relations, political
ecology, social change movements, and ecofeminism. “Deeper than Deep Ecology: The Eco-
Feminist Connection”, Environmental Ethics, 1984)
http://www.profcohen.net/reli151/uploads/texts/salleh1.pdf, sj
The first feature of the deep ecology paradigm introduced by Naess is replacement of the Man/Nature
dualism with a relational total-field image, where man is not simply "in" his environment, but essentially
"of' it. The deep ecologists do not appear to recognize the primal source of this destructive dualism,
however, or the deeply ingrained motivational complexes which grow out of it. 3 Their formulation uses the generic
term Man in a case where use of a general term is not applicable. Women's monthly fertility cycle, the tiring symbiosis of
pregnancy, the wrench of childbirth and the pleasure of suckling an infant, these things already ground women's
consciousness in the knowledge of being coterminous with Nature. However tacit or unconscious this
identity may be for many women, bruised by derogatory patriarchal attitudes to motherhood, including modern male-
identified feminist ones, it is nevertheless "a fact of life." The deep eco logy movement, by using the generic
term Man, simultaneously presupposes the difference between the sexes in an uncritical way, and
yet overlooks the significance of this difference . It overlooks the point that if women's lived
experience were recognized as meaningful and were given legitimation in our culture, it could provide an
immediate "living" social basis for the alternative consciousness which the deep ecologist is trying
to formulate and introduce as an abstract ethical construct. Women already, to borrow Devall's turn of phrase, "flow
with the system of nature." The second deep ecology premise , according to Naess is a move away
from anthropocentrism, a move toward biological egalitarianism among all living species. This assumption, however, is
already cancelled in part by the implicit contradiction contained in Naess' first premise. The master-slave role which
marks man's relation with nature is replicated in man's relation with woman . A self-consistent
biological egalitarianism cannot be arrived at unless men become open to both facets of this same
urge to dominate and use. As Naess rightly, though still somewhat anthropocentrically, points out, the denial of
dependence on Mother/Nature and the compensatory drive to mastery which sterns from it, have only served to
alienate man from his true self. Yet the means by which Naess would realize this goal of species equality is through
artificial limitation of the human population . Now putting the merits of Naess' "ends" aside for the moment, as a
"means" this kind of intervention in life processes is supremely rationalist and technicist, and quite at odds
with the restoration of life-affirming values that is so fundamental to the ethic of deep ecology . It is also a
solution that interestingly enough cuts right back into the nub of male dependence on women as mothers and
creators of life-another grab at women's special potency, inadvertent though it may be. The third domain
assumption of deep ecology is the principle diversity and symbiosis: an attitude of live and let live , a
beneficial mutual coexistence among living forms. For humans the principle favors cultural pluralism ,
an appreciation of the rich traditions emerging from Africa, China, the Australian Aboriginal way, and so on. These departures
from anthropocentrism , and from ethnocentrism, are only partial , however, if the ecologist continues
to ignore the cultural inventiveness of that other half of the human race , women; or if the ecologist unwittingly
concurs in those practices which impede women's full participation in his own culture. The annihilation of seals and whales, the
military and commercial genocide of tribaI peoples, are unforgivable human acts, but the
annihilation of women's
identity and creativity by patriarchal culture continues as a fact of daily existence. The embrace of progressive
attitudes toward nature does little in itself to change this. Deep ecology is an anti-class posture ; it
rejects the exploitation of some by others, of nature by man, and of man by man, this being destructive to the realization of human
potentials. However, sexual oppression and the social differentiation that this produces is not
mentioned by Naess. Women again appear to be subsumed by the general category. Obviously the feminist
ecological analysis is not "in principle" incompatible with the anti-class posture of deep ecology. Its reservation is that in
bypassing the parallel between the original exploitation of nature as object-and-commodity resource and
of nurturant woman as object-and-commodity resource , the ecologist's anti-class stance
remains only superficially descriptive , politically and historically static. It loses its genuinely deep structural critical
edge. On the question of political praxis though, there is certainly no quarrel between the two positions. Devall's advocacy of loose
activist networks, his tactics of nonviolent contestation, are cases in point. 4 Deep ecology and feminism see change as gradual and
piecemeal; the violence of revolution imposed by those who claim "to know" upon those who "do not know" is an anathema to
both.
Deep Ecology and Ecofeminism work hand in hand – empirics prove social work
resistance is successful
*can also be alt solves evidence
The social work profession has developed deep ecological philosophy and ecofeminist ideals for
purposes of informing clinical intervention. Many in social work have used the theories of
ecofeminism and deep ecology to suggest an expanded ecological theory that is inclusive of
both the natural physical environment and also the natural being of humankind and their
interrelationships, community, and spirituality (Adger, 2000; Ferreira, 2010; Gray & Coates, 2013). These theories direct
social work to move from anthropocentrism to ecocentrism, dualism to holism, individual to
community, and progress to well-being (Gray & Coates, 2013). Deep and feminist ecology attempts to
expand the methods of social science research and clinical intervention (Dominelli, 2011; Drolet, 2012),
for example, by honoring the spiritual narratives of indigenous communities, more thoroughly defining constructs of sustainability,
and by highlighting the importance of physical place to communities (Alston, 2013). Deep ecology has been
summarized into eight distinct principles. The principles adapted from Naess (1989) for social work professionals by Ungar (2002) are
all individuals have intrinsic value outside of one’s usefulness for human consumption; diversity offers the potential for the
emergence of unique solutions; structured alliances must be situated to increase diversity of resources; service delivery systems
ought to be managed by community stakeholders; these systems should be kept small; public policy must allow communities the
capacity to function on their own; that which benefits individuals and their communities is the benchmark of development; those
who align with these points have an obligation to amend their methods and organizations to achieve these goals (p. 488). 6 Affilia:
Journal of Women and Social Work XX(X) Ultimately, such a manifesto calls on practitioners to view all entities, both human and
nonhuman with a stance of equanimity, to ensure that a diversity of resources are channeled to communities so that they may “help
them help themselves” (Besthorn, 2012; Gray & Coates, 2013), and to guide human service organizations to achieve these aims by
remaining small, and seeking guidance from community stakeholders rather than boards or bureaucracies (Ungar, 2002). Finally, in
practice, social workers must advocate for policies that situate the well-being of communities as
the benchmark of social and economic developmental processes (Ungar, 2002). The many ways in which
these principles have been operationalized by social workers to meet the need of environmental crisis include educating on the
issues associated with environmental degradation, promoting sustainable energy production and consumption, and mobilizing
communities to protect their futures
through local social work focusing on environmental problem-
solving (Dominelli, 2011). Many examples of ecofeminist and deep ecological social work
practices exist and include supporting prison abolitionists’ fight to decriminalize Indigenous and
environmental protest; supporting youth environmental leaders globally, such as climate activist Greta
Thunberg (2019); working in solidarity with undocumented farm workers; and advocating for comprehensive immigration reform
and immigrant labor rights in order to green our food systems (Bhuyan et al., 2019, pp. 292–293). Social workers at the microlevel
and mezzolevel provide psychoeducation to ensure that groups and organizations understand environmental problems so that
global-level knowledge can affect local action. Furthermore,
on the macrolevel, social workers can bring
people together to defend international policy such as the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCC, 1997). As stated by
Dominelli (2011) “Social workers, with their skills in seeing the whole picture and mediating between conflicting groups, can
these interventions are
facilitate implementation discussions at international policy and community levels” (p. 434). In all,
led by workers not bound within the confines of an agency but bring the decision-making
process out of the bureaucratic boardroom and into the spiritual and communal spaces of those
being serviced (Ungar, 2002). Social worker Julie Drolet (2012) recounts an ecofeminist intervention whereby communitybased
participatory action research was used in British Columbia, Canada, to inform and guide potential interventions. The
community-based participatory action research process lead to identification of desired
interventions and needed policy advocacy . It was found that issues of environmental degradation and change were
significant concerns of local community research participants and that local and national government action on these issues was
desired. This intervention led to an identification of the problem as understood by the community as well as their desired changes,
namely, advocating for further development of community-managed food gardens, and more autonomy in managing and identifying
the use of natural ecological resources that were central to local economies (Drolet, 2012). Ecofeminist intervention develops
agency, allows for reflection, and promotes community action (Drolet, 2012). In another example, social
worker Michael
Ungar (2018) synthesized the literature on resilience, pointing out that research in this area has
traditionally been anthropocentric. He highlights the adaptive and resilient ways in which plant and animal regimes
have survived human-made disturbances and underscores the capacity-building possibilities that present themselves in the face of
adversity (Ungar, 2018). Such a perspective, which acknowledges connections between human and nonhuman elements in a
community and earnestly weighs trade-offs present in an adversity–resiliency process, would be beneficial to the social work
profession as it addresses this grand challenge.
Ecofeminist and deep ecological interventions take into
account the subjectivities of those affected by climate change and create space for communities
to learn and dialogue on both environment and other social issues that are believed to be
interconnected; a social problem does not arise without equal problem in the natural ecological realm (Alston, 2013; Drolet,
2012). Jones (2010) highlights interventions of this nature that utilize experiential learning related to issues of Klemmer and
McNamara 7 environmental exploitation and destruction. Jones recommends taking clients and students of social work to
community gardens, degraded waterways, waste management facilities, and natural ecological rejuvenation sites. These
experiences prompt intervention participants to question their potentially limited knowledge of ecological environmental issues and
their underdeveloped frameworks to question and solve problems of social and natural ecological dimension. In concurrence with
these methods, indigenous scholars
have recently provided examples of social work that
incorporates place-based teaching. Billiot and colleagues (2019) share on their work to teach social work students
through embodied learning about the sand creek massacre in the state of Colorado. In their example of this type of teaching, explicit
connection-making between historical violence perpetrated in part by important figures in the student’s academic community was
made, and a site visit was utilized to promote a deep ecological perspective for students who illustrated their interconnectedness
with their environment and its history. These scholars also give an example of mental health interventions that engage with the
natural environment: The Yappallı´ Choctaw Road to Health intervention uses a place-based, outdoor mode of communal and
individual healing for women of the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma (Billiot et al., 2019). These are but two examples on how social
work practitioners, researchers, and administrators can incorporate placebased, historically aware educational classes and health
interventions using these paradigms.
Deep ecological and ecofeminist interventions promote
communities’ ability to enjoy one another and nature. Naess (1989) argues “We need types of
societies and communities in which one delights in the value-creative aspects of equilibrium
rather than the glorification of value-neutral growth ; in which being together with other living beings is more
important than exploiting them” (p. 24). Deep ecological and ecofeminist interventions attempt to bring individuals, families, and
communities together outside of the realm of enjoyment as demarcated by market-based economy. These interventions teach
individuals and communities to enjoy one another, to be in and revel in natural spaces, and to observe and create art and music
(Besthorn & McMillen, 2002). This occurs simultaneously in communities while advocacy ensures that socially marginalized groups
receive adequate resources to engage in these types of activities; market-based economies have disenfranchised many from
accessing these types of value-driven lifestyles (Peeters, 2012). Interventions such as those described here are supported by critical
methodologies such as educator Paulo Freire’s (2000) perspective-shifting take on the ways in which educator, student, and
environment are defined. Freire (2000) states “The oppressor consciousness tends to transform everything surrounding it into an
object of its domination. The earth, property, production, the creations of people, people themselves, time—everythingis reducedto
the status of objects atits disposal” (p. 11). Proposingto shift this framework, Freire (2000) advocates for humansto become aware
oftheir “incompletion” (p. 29) and to actively reject the process of valuation, domination, and oppression. The social work profession
would do well to similarly be aware of its “incompletion” as it works toward achieving justice for humans, all sentient creatures, and
the nonsentient material of the planet alike.
Ecofeminism and deep ecology are directly compatible. Patriarchal structures is

the result of otherization and discrimination – deep ecology resolves those
inequalities by viewing everything and everyone as equal and intrinsically
valuable.
Darling [Dr. Kate Darling is a Research Specialist at the MIT Media Lab and author of THE NEW
BREED. Her interest is in how technology intersects with society.], Melbourne Journal of
International Law, "AA WEIGHT FOR WATER: AN ECOLOGICAL FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF
EMERGING NORMS AND TRENDS IN GLOBAL WATER GOVERNANCE ", June 2012,
https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/1687279/Darling.pdf//mb
First, the
ecological feminism presented here espouses the central principles of the philosophy of
deep ecology.10 Like all philosophies, deep ecology provides a system of values that assists its
adherents in organising their 5 See the seminal text: Françoise d’Eaubonne, Le Féminsme ou la mort (Pierre Horay, 1974). 6
Karen Warren and Ynestra King represent the thinking in this subset. For a fuller insight, see Karen J Warren, ‘Feminism and Ecology:
Making Connections’ (1987) 9 Environmental Ethics 3; Ynestra King, ‘The Ecology of Feminism and the Feminism of Ecology’ in
Ynestra King (ed), Healing the Wounds: The Promise of Ecofeminism (New Society, 1989) 18. Warren posits from a socialist paradigm
that an ‘ecofeminist perspective is … structurally pluralistic, inclusivist and contextualist, emphasizing through concrete example the
crucial role that context plays in understanding sexist naturist practice’: Karen J Warren, ‘Toward an Ecofeminist Ethic’ [1988]
(December) Studies in the Humanities 140, 151. 7 Chris J Cuomo, Feminism and Ecological Communities: An Ethic of Flourishing
(Routledge, 1998) 6. Cuomo distinguishes
ecological feminism from other forms of ecofeminism in its
focus on the various forms and functions of oppressive systems rather than on the objects of
oppression, which can result in the essentialisation of humans and environments. 8 Karin van Marle
and Elsje Bonthuys, ‘Feminist Theories and Concepts’ in Elsje Bonthuys and Catherine Albertyn (eds), Gender, Law and Justice (Juta,
2007) 15, 17. 9 Brenda Cossman, ‘Turning the Gaze Back on Itself: Comparative Law, Feminist Legal Studies and the Postcolonial
Project’ [1997] Utah Law Review 525, 539. 10 See the seminal text by Arne Naess in which he coined the term ‘deep ecology’: Arne
Naess, ‘The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary’ (1973) 16 Inquiry 95. 4 Melbourne Journal of
International Law [Vol 13 worldview.11 The
worldview of deep ecology recognises the non-instrumental or
intrinsic value of all humans and of the non-human world.12 This stands in contrast to the
conservationist view that natural entities are only valuable insofar as they are useful to humans.
As will be seen, this latter view frequently appears in the description of non-human systems —
such as watercourses — as ‘resources’. The present version of ecological feminism, like deep
ecology, views humans as an inextricable part of nature and therefore promotes an egalitarian
(as between human and non-human entities), non-anthropocentric bias.13 Secondly, the
framework relies on a diverse understanding of both women and nature. A critique of ‘nature’
and ‘spiritual’ ecological feminisms is that they have a tendency to essentialise all ‘women’ and
‘nature’ in an effort to celebrate the metaphysical interconnectedness between the t wo.14 In
contrast, the present framework aligns with Deane Curtin’s view that women are no closer to
nature than are men and that nature is no more feminine than it is masculine .15 The association
of women’s practices with lesser-valued nature is the result of a patriarchal value system rather
than anything innate to women or nature or the inherent capacity of either.16 Such a view risks neglecting men as
‘natural beings’ and women as dominators and oppressors . Further, by ascribing attributes and ahistorical
functions in this way, gender essentialism limits the potential for change and necessary social reorganisation.17 Rather than
focusing on the object of oppression — the woman, who stands for all women and the natural world, which is immutable
— the present version of ecological feminism focuses upon the ‘patterns among the treatment of oppressed,
exploited or undervalued beings and entities … and [the] common ethical and ontological bases
for maltreatment’.18 11 See Bill Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology (Gibbs Smith, 1985). This social/political
movement commenced in 1984 with the adoption of the Deep Ecology Platform. For the purpose of constructing an
ecological feminist framework, the philosophy of deep ecology must be distinguished from the
deep ecology movement. The tenets of this movement promote a non-anthropocentric bias. However, they go on to
prescribe decreases in the human population and a relinquishing of the pursuit of higher standards of living. Warren argues
that such proclamations are presented neutrally, failing to confront the ‘important connections
[that] exist between the treatment of women, people of color and the underclass on one hand
and the treatment of non-human nature on the other’, thus making the ethic ‘grossly
inadequate’ in this form: Karen J Warren, ‘Taking Empirical Data Seriously: An Ecofeminist Philosophical Perspective’ in Karen J
Warren (ed), Ecofeminism: Women, Culture, Nature (Indiana University Press, 1997) 3, 3. 12 See d’Eaubonne, above n 5. 13 Eccy de
Jonge, Spinoza and Deep Ecology: Challenging Traditional Approaches to Environmentalism (Ashgate, 2004) 1. 14 See generally
Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution (Harper & Row, 1980). 15 Deane Curtin,
‘Women’s Knowledge as Expert Knowledge: Indian Women and Ecodevelopment’ in Karen J Warren (ed), Ecofeminism: Women,
Culture, Nature (Indiana University Press, 1997) 82, 87. 16 Ibid 87. 17 Ratna Kapur, ‘The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric:
Resurrecting the “Native” Subject in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal Politics’ (2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 1, 7.
18 Cuomo, above n 7, 7. 2012] A Weight for Water 5 Thirdly,
the framework houses the belief that ‘woman’
does not constitute a unified category.19 Rather, as a term denoting a particular gender, it is
socially constructed in an infinitely complex context. It seeks to explain the differences between
women, men and others residing along the gender spectrum as well as ideas about ‘femininity’
and ‘masculinity’.20 Any focus on gender or concepts relating to femininity or masculinity
requires an acknowledgement, as far as possible, of the social, cultural and historical context
in which those terms are used. This framework remains alive to Chandra Mohanty’s observation that ‘women are
constituted as women through the complex interaction between class, culture, religion and other ideological institutions and
frameworks’.21 The fear is that generalisations concerning the concept of women ‘efface the problems, perspectives, and political
concerns of women marginalized because of their class, race, religion, ethnicity, and/or sexual orientation’.22 On the other hand, an
understanding that recognises social complexities and contingencies helps sensitise the analysis, particularly in a discussion about
global governance. Fourthly,
the present variation of ecological feminism presumes that dualistic
thinking reinforces interacting oppressions, which serve to devalue the environment and ideas
associated with femininity. Anthropocentric biases result in the prioritisation of human needs
over those of non-human entities. Further, the androcentrism that pervades the laws,
institutions, organisations and principles governing the composition of society tend to value
notions associated with masculinity over others. As Hilary Charlesworth notes, ‘[o]ne technique for identifying and
decoding the silences in international law is [through] paying attention to the way that various [gendered] dichotomies are used in
its structure’.23 This technique shall be employed here.
The aff is in line with the thesis of the kritik---holds non-human species
as intrinsically valuable.
Sandler 12 – Ronald Sandler is an Associate Professor of Philosophy, Northeastern
University (Intrinsic Value, Ecology, and Conservation, The nature education – knowledge
project, https://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/intrinsic-value-ecology-and-
conservation-25815400/) B-Bahena
Proponents of intrinsic value — both subjective and objective — believe that it is crucial to
the justification for, and practice of, conservation biology. Policies and practices aim to
accomplish goals. These goals need to be justified, particularly when there are costs
involved in pursuing them and alternatives to them. This applies to the goals of
conservation biology and ecosystem management. There are costs associated with
preserving species and effectively managing ecological systems, and there are alternative
uses for managed spaces and management funds. Goals are justified by appeal to values. If
restricting certain activities in an area or allocating resources to preserve species is
justified, the justification must make appeal to the value of the species or the ecosystem.
Sometimes, the justifying value is instrumental, as is the case with fisheries (natural resource value), watersheds (ecosystem
services) and ecotourism (economic value). However, many species are quite low on instrumental value (Maclaurin & Sterelny
2008), and in some cases instrumental value (particularly economic and resource values) will favor development and use
rather than conservation and preservation. In these situations ,
preservation, conservation, and assisted
recovery goals are justified only if the organisms, species, or systems involved possess non-
instrumental (i.e., intrinsic) value. Moreover, instrumental value is substitutable, replaceable, and compensatable.
If something is instrumentally valuable as a means to an end, it is possible to compare it to other potential means to the same
end. If a means is lost, but some other equally adequate means exists, then there is no net value loss. Therefore, if non-human
organisms, species, and ecosystems possess only instrumental value, their value-and by extension the conservation and
management goals they justify-are highly contingent, defeasible, and unstable. They can and should be treated as comparable
intrinsic value is not substitutable or
to, and substitutable by, other instrumental values. In contrast,
replaceable (Callicott 2006). If non-human organisms, species, or ecosystems have
(subjective or objective) intrinsic value, their value is not dependent upon whether
alternative means come available (e.g., economic or medicinal), and they cannot be traded
or substituted for without loss. For this reason, proponents of intrinsic value argue that it is
more stable and robust than is instrumental value with respect to justifying conservation
goals. They also believe intrinsic value is relevant to developing particular
conservation and management plans, strategies, and methods, since these need to
reflect the values at stake. For example, natural-historical value, because it is contrary to human impacts and control,
typically favors less intensive design and management — and if individual animals have inherent worth, ecosystem
management practices (e.g., methods of population management and translocation) need to respect their worth as individuals.
Not all environmental ethicists agree that intrinsic value is crucial to justifying conservation goals and developing
management plans and methods. Environmental pragmatists, in particular, have been critical of the instrumental
value/intrinsic value distinction (Weston 1985), as well as the cogency of the concept of intrinsic value more generally
(Norton 1995). Pragmatists typically argue that management goals and plans are justified procedurally (i.e., in virtue of their
being developed in adequately open, informed, collaborative, and inclusive ways) rather than by process-independent (e.g.,
Some environmental pragmatists advocate retaining the language
intrinsic) values (Thompson 1996).
of intrinsic value, because it can be useful in discourse or procedural contexts (Minteer
2001). However, the pragmatic conception of intrinsic value does not have the normative features (i.e., the distinctive
stability and robustness) associated with more standard conceptions of intrinsic value.
Viewing all of nature as intrinsically valuable causes irradical decision-
making.
Maguire and Justus ’08 – Lynn A. Maguire is a professor of the practice of
environmental decision analysis at Duke University's Nicholas School of the Environment in
Durham, North Carolina. James Justus is an assistant professor at Florida State University
and a postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Sydney in
Australia. (“Why Intrinsic Value Is a Poor Basis for Conservation Decisions”, Oxford
Academic – BioScience, https://academic.oup.com/bioscience/article/58/10/910/245722,
11/01/2008) B-Bahena
The idea that species and ecosystems have intrinsic value inspires many conservationists, perhaps drawing on deep-seated
emotional connections to the nonhuman environment. However, although intrinsic value may get conservationists out of bed
in the morning and into the field or up to the bargaining table, it does not serve them well once they get there.
Conservation requires decisionmaking, and here intrinsic value falls short.
Decisionmaking requires tradeoffs: competition among conservation projects for
limited funds and personnel, compromises between preservation of biota and other
human uses, and even conflicts between conservation goals (e.g., predation by endangered
peregrine falcons threatening recovery of also endangered California least terns). Trade-offs require
comparative evaluation of competing claims, whether this evaluation is done
explicitly (e.g., by eliciting preferences, as in multicriteria decision analysis, or by monetizing
value, as in contingent valuation [[Chee 2004]]) or implicitly, by taking a particular
decision (e.g., approving a development proposal for a land parcel that harbors a threatened ecosystem, such as longleaf-
pine savannah). Proponents of intrinsic value as a basis for conservation action hope that
it will take precedence over competing claims and guarantee conservation. This
rarely happens, even for decisions relatively insulated from the pressures of
competing demands. For example, any species that is threatened or endangered is eligible for
protection under the US Endangered Species Act (ESA). In principle, intrinsic value should give any
kind of species equal access to ESA listing. In practice, however, limited funds and personnel
to administer the ESA, and political and legal pressures to list particular species (or not),
have forced agencies responsible for listing decisions to assign priorities to species on the
basis of “scientific” characteristics, such as taxonomic distinctiveness and geographic
distribution, and “visceral” characteristics, such as large size and charismatic appeal (Metrick
and Weitzman 1996). Intrinsic value may get a proposed listing to the table, but it does not
muster the attention needed to get it off the table and into action. When protection
of species and ecosystems conflicts with economic development or with immediate
human needs, intrinsic value is even less likely to be an effective basis for
conservation. Although proponents of intrinsic value hope that it will take priority
over competing socioeconomic demands, it is more likely that conservation goals
will be cast aside in favor of those more easily computed in familiar metrics such as
dollars. This is not unique to conservation decisionmaking. Many assert that human life has intrinsic value and object to
evaluating the preservation or extension of a life in relation to profit, convenience, or other desired ends. Yet decisions about
health and safety regulations, such as setting highway speed limits or permissable levels of pesticide residues in food, require
at least implicit calculation of what human life is “worth.” Sometimes that calculation is made explicitly, and extension of life or
Characteristics such as those
prevention of illness is expressed in quantitative, perhaps monetary, terms.
used to assign priorities among species proposed for ESA listing show that some
people attribute greater conservation value to some species than to others. These
characteristics depend upon instrumental values, which express values species have
in relation to other desired ends (e.g., preservation of genetic diversity or
evolutionary processes, or aesthetically desirable ecosystems) rather than in terms
of the value intrinsic to the species itself. This is a comparative concept of value
rather than the incommensurate, priceless, or perhaps infinite value that some claim
for intrinsic value; this comparative value is exactly what conservation decision
making requires. Proponents of intrinsic value have objected to the use of
instrumental value as a basis for conservation on several grounds. One is that
valuing nonhuman biota in relation to some further end is morally objectionable. In
this view, species and ecosystems are regarded as having “sacred” value, in the sense used by Hanselmann and Tanner (2008),
trade-offs
who characterized trade-offs involving sacred values as “taboo,” distressing those facing such choices. But such
must be made, and methods of measuring conservation values against competing
demands are therefore required. Some objections to instrumental value as a basis for conservation stem from
too narrow a view of instrumental value, in particular, one that puts too much emphasis on market-based and monetary
expressions of instrumental value. For example ,
McCauley (2006) criticized the use of ecosystem-
services markets to motivate conservation as “selling out on nature,” arguing that
only rarely will conservation of biota provide the services that humans need more
cheaply than engineered solutions. But this neglects other types of instrumental value that might contribute
to the value of species and ecosystems: aesthetic, spiritual, educational, scientific, and even “existence” value—satisfaction
humans derive from knowing that species and ecosystems remain, even if they are not experienced directly (Chee 2004).
This broader view of instrumental value captures much that proponents ascribe to
intrinsic value, but in a form that can be evaluated comparatively and used in
conservation decisionmaking. There are qualitative and quantitative methods for
eliciting different kinds of instrumental value for use in formal and informal
decision frameworks (e.g., Chee 2004). Some, such as contingent valuation through willingness-to-pay or
willingness-to-accept survey protocols, express various kinds of instrumental value and trade-offs between costs and benefits
in monetary terms. Others, such as utility or preference elicitation protocols from decision analysis, express value in terms of
relative preference of decisionmakers or stakeholders among possible levels for particular instrumental values, such as
aesthetic value. These methods articulate tradeoffs among competing goals by showing how much of one instrumental value
(e.g., aesthetics) a stakeholder or decision-maker would be willing to exchange for another (e.g., an ecosystem service such as
clean water). These protocols represent relative value in numerical, but nonmonetary, terms. Monetary
expressions
of instrumental value can be used in cost-benefit analyses, and both monetary and
nonmonetary expressions can be used in cost-effectiveness analyses and in
multicriteria decision frameworks, such as multiattribute utility analysis, the
analytic hierarchy process, or outranking procedures (e.g., Chee 2004). Cost-benefit
analyses and multi-criteria decision frameworks can aid stakeholder negotiations
convened to adjudicate controversies about conservation actions (e.g., Gregory and Wellman
2001). Undoubtedly, arguing that instrumental value is more useful for conservation decisions than intrinsic value will not
satisfy everyone. The
essential tension between the emotional appeal of intrinsic value
and the trade-offs required by conservation decisions is probably irreconcilable.
Using instrumental value to bring aesthetic, spiritual, and cultural values of biota
into conservation decisionmaking will not satisfy deep ecologists and others who
find weighing one form of value against another abhorrent. But those defending
conservation against competing uses and allocating scarce resources among
conservation actions are better served by building their decisions on a strong
foundation of instrumental value rather than on the weak concept of intrinsic value.
Deep Eco = Patriarchal
Deep Ecology embodies hetero-patriarchal structures that are elitist and violent
Despite deployment of environmental protection laws and policies, and initiating global
movements, the earth not only continues to suffer from environmental crises, but also
experiences even greater challenges. Cleanup of air and water pollution, protecting the endangered species, slowing
down the global warming, addressing the issue of resource depletion, and so on simultaneously have become the primary issues for
the world today. For many environmentalists during the dawn of environmental ethics in 1970s, the
core issue with
environmental crises was not the failing legislations, or institutions, or individuals‘ day-to-day
behaviour, but the very ethical thinking towards nature and non-human beings. Environmental ethics,
in contradistinction to other ethics like business ethics and professional ethics, advocated for extending moral standing to non-
human entities as well, in relation to humans. Deep
Ecology, in particular, as a new approach, is one of such endeavours, that
advocated for recognition of some sort of ‗intrinsic value‘ of ‗Mother Nature‘. Besides, its proponents
have suggested pogroms like human population reduction by active means to protect the environment. The deep ecologists
have faced scathing criticism for their ideas. They have been regarded to be proponents of a
patriarchal program by ecofeminists. Drawing parallels between the sufferings of women and
nature, they have criticized the deep ecological philosophies . Third World critics like
Ramachandra Guha have regarded them as ‗elitists‘ and their theory as essentially western . This
paper seeks to analyse the nuances of the arguments forwarded by the deep ecologists and also the ecofeminists and the third
world thinkers, articulate the debate between them and critically evaluate the contribution of deep ecology as a movement in
environmental ethics. This paper limits itself to the criticisms forwarded by the ecofeminists and the so-called ‗Third World‘ critics
only, as they have been the staunchest critics of the movement.
Deep Ecology forwards a militaristic mindset that justifies genocide

Environmental ethics, in contradistinction to medical ethics or bio ethics, emerged as an expansionist project,
seeking to expand the classes of moral patients .3 It sought to extend moral standing to entities other than
humans, in relation to human beings.4 One of the movements towards that direction is ‗Deep Ecology‘. Deep Ecology, also
known as ‗New Ecology‘5 was initially developed by Norwegian philosopher, Arne Næss , who was
advocating for recognizing inherent value for nature and other living beings. This worldview considers human being as part of the
whole ecosystem and denies instrumental and materialistic utility of nature for the sake of good and well-being of humans.
Rather, it calls for recognition of some sort of inherent value of nature, which is independent of
any what value it holds to humans. It resulted in a paradigm shift in natural movements and posed profound challenges
to traditional world-view (anthropocentrism, as a dominant, yet destructive world-view) by: first, questioning the established moral
superiority of human beings to other species and then, investigating the possibility of rational arguments for assigning intrinsic value
to natural environment and other nonhuman species. Following
framing this world-view, the proponents
attempted to restructure the modern human societies in accordance with this brand of ideology.
Deep Ecology contends that the natural world is a settled balance of complex interrelations in which the existence of one living being
is dependent on other living beings. By distinguishing between shallow ecology (a humancentric and economic approach to study
the ecosystem) and deep ecology, the latter‘s proponents have raised deeper questions and have sought for a deeper paradigm shift
in human‘s thinking and understanding the natural environment. This
world-view that aimed at relieving ‗Mother
Earth‘ from the grave crises that it is faced with along with its proponents, were widely criticized
too. Its more militant proponents went to the level of advocating measures like active human
population reduction. It has faced staunch opposition from humanists, feminists and has also
been regarded to be anti-industrial capitalist civilization in particular . Deep ecology as well as the
activists in the ‗Earth First!‘ (a radical environmentalist group adhering to the deep ecological arguments) have been
labelled as sexists, misanthropists, fascists, elitists, and racists who are trying to modernize
Malthusianism and publicly advocating for genocide.6 Feminists allege that the predominantly
male proponents of the theory have completely ignored the fact of oppression of women and
the question of general domination by some humans by others. Extending this analysis, ecofeminists draw
parallels between oppression of nature and oppression of women. The critics from the so-called third world have called out the
elitist nature of the theories, designed to preserve wilderness experiences only for the economically better off classes. To acquit
these charges, the later exponents of deep ecology argue that these critics are biased and have failed to thoroughly comprehend the
true meaning of deep ecology or its ‗real work‘, which includes its rituals, bioregionalism, defending ecosystem, and restoring
human damaged ecosystem.
Deep Ecology is founded on patriarchal linguistics – encourages domination and

an exclusionary perception of “self”
Since its coinage and delineation in 1972, deep

ecology has been severely criticized by scholars and thinkers
representing from different schools of thoughts including social ecology, liberal democracy and
ecofeminism. There is much to discuss and explore the debates on deep ecology and its relation to and the subsequent debates
with social liberalism, social ecology, ecofeminism and cultural relativism. The focus in this article is, however, confined to the
debates of deep ecologist and the ecofeminism and the cultural relativist contentions against the propositions of the deep
ecologists. The reason for focusing on the aforesaid two streams of criticism is the simple fact that the
most scathing attack
against the philosophy of deep ecology has been led by thinkers belonging to these two schools. Deep
Ecology and Ecofeminism Many deep ecologists call their perspective alternatively ‗eco-centrism‘ or ‗biocentrism‘. The
intention is to convey an idea of ecosystem-centric or lifecentered value systems. All the same, the activists of deep
ecology consider themselves as anarchist, non-believers in hierarchy, non-bureaucratic, and
decentralized. These perceptions held and the activities initiated by the exponents of deep-ecology, have given rise to
the critiques of ecofeminism. Despite similarities between the two, they hold different positions in regard
to these issues. 30 Koenraads (n 27). 31 ibid An Ecofeminist and Third World Critique of Deep Ecology 103 To start off,
ecofeminists point out to the fact that a vast majority of the exponents of deep ecology are all
men. They regard their language, unified program and usage of the logical style as opposed to the intuitive style often accorded to
women to be revealing of the masculinist nature of the movement. Having said this, ecofeminism is not unified and unanimous in its
theorization and has within its ambit, plethora of diversity.32 Hence, uniformization of the ecofeminist analysis is a difficult task.
Now, for the purpose of understanding the ecofeminist critique of deep ecology, some basic tenets with which a bulk of
ecofeminists tend to adhere to needs to be identified. Karen Warren, for example, believes that ecofeminism
contains the following:  a critique of the dominant ‗patriarchal conceptual framework‘; and 
offers an alternative feminist framework that is ‗grounded in familiar ecological principles.33 Ecofeminist thinkers tend to
agree on one point, i.e. that androcentrism– by which men took the domination of women as
well as the nature– is the core problem . They believe that domination of women and nature are very
much connected and hence, environmental activism is needed to emancipate both. 34 They also
criticize the ‗Patriarchal Dualism‘, through which the world is ordered by dividing into two opposite parts: mind vs body, reason vs
intuition and culture vs nature, also, popularly known as the ‗Cartesian Dualism‘. According to this world-view the dominated
‗other‘ is always undervalued and discriminated against. It is also expanded and applied to the case of women, people of colour,
minorities and so on, where one group of people seek domination and oppression on other groups. As per ecofeminism, the
oppressed groups, in particular women and people of colour, are often associated with body, rather than the mind, thus, may be
considered as intuitive, but overemotional. This
dualism creates a hierarchy of values where reason is
considered superior to intuition (a value more popularly associated with women according to the predominant gender
role narrative) and a strange dichotomy is created between culture and nature, which, to thinkers like Ynestra King, is one of the
main causes of subjugation of women.35 One of the major points of the deep ecology-ecofeminism debate is how deep
ecologists critique anthropocentrism . Another criticism of deep ecology stems from what the
philosophers have meant by ‗self‘, described in deep ecology ‘s 32 Sessions (n 25). 33 ibid 34 ibid 35 ibid 104
BiLD Law Journal 4(2) basic principle of self-realization. It has been critically analysed by Val Plumwood in her work ‗Nature, Self and
Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy, and the Critique of Rationalism‘. 36 In accordance with ecofeminists,
roots of anthropocentrism lies in several challenging value dualisms, such as ‗culture vs. nature‘
dualism. They say that the criticism of anthropocentrism forwarded by deep ecologists, fails to see that patriarchal
underpinnings of anthropocentric assumptions. In terms of the second problematic feature of deep ecology (self-
realization), that contends human self is actualized only when it is merged with cosmos , they say that this
theory of the expanded self is, in effect, nothing but a misguided form of human colonialism , that fails to
treat nature as a genuine ‗other‘, which is independent of human interest and purposes. Patriarchy, as a form of social
organization and a form of dominance is the focus of the feminists .37 This principle is false, Plumwood
argues, because of ‗the discontinuity of thesis‘, which is a clear ontological divide between human and nature, remains intact.38

Deep Ecology K - DDI 2021

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Deep Ecology K - DDI 2021

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

K - Deep Ecology- 2021 DDI

These five features provide the basis for hegemonic

NCP=Nature’s Contributions to People

Second, social conventions (expressed in metaphors) shape mental representations inferring

An anthropocentric worldview abdicates us of our moral responsibility to

The aff upholds shallow ecology – it perpetuates the dismissal of ecocentric

Human consciousness is another intricacy of nature – it should not be turned a

It is not a debate between humans and other species – it’s a reconciliation of

Ethically, shallow ecology is informed by an anthropocentric or human-centered perspective that views

In contrast, deep ecology is non-anthropocentric in its orientation, as it recognizes the intrinsic

Agents and their motives The main

The fairyland of neoclassical microeconomics in which economic rationalist argument for

Environmental utilitarianism” necessitates a view of nature as an economic

(ii). Anthropocentrism. The society/nature division is a prerequisite for a worldview that

Economic agendas for sustainability ignore the intricacies of biodiversity

Attempts at a green capitalist approach is only meant to contain awareness of

Rather than concede the fundamental irrationality of industrialized provisioning, the

Centering financial logic around biosecurity has recreated the problems of

Green capitalism/policy solutions amplifies commodity fetishism by destroying

Consumer blindness to the true ecological costs of their consumption

A political-economic theory of relevance offers a neglected, yet critical, perspective in

The aff is a form of consumption constantly demanding “safer commodities.”

Capitalism is a mode of production that reproduces itself through intensification, geographical

Decoupling is commonly measured by dividing GDP by domestic material consumption16 (DMC),

International law was created to TRASFORM commons into capital – separating

If we can assume that technology

Global institutions allow for moral corruption – enabling inaction towards

Science strives to better the human condition at the expense of the

Human innovation, advancement are the root cause of environmental

Technoscientific capitalism has transformed human and environmental

On the one hand, contemporary capitalism is constituted and defined by technoscientific

Innovation drives us into the new age of assetization instead of

Technological “solutions” only drive private surveillance to make a profit, not

Technological solutions are counterintuitive under capitalism – they only help

Relying on technological solutions to climate change represents a convenient and widely

Giagnocavo & Goldstein 90 – (Dr. Cynthia Giagnocavo, Universidad de Almería,

Population increase for short-sighted economic, military, and other purposes

Modeling upholds a management paradigm that perpetuates human

Ethically, shallow ecology is informed by an anthropocentric or human-centered perspective

Western ideology structures a destructive relationship with nature – in the face

POPULATION Shallowapproach: The threat of (human) overpopulation is seen mainly as a problem

The Yellowstone model of conservation is based on flawed ecological

Deep ecology acknowledges human essential needs – oil companies go beyond

saw as the predominant trend in environmentalism, as the anthropocentric practice of protecting

The aff’s attempt to solve pollution through technology is a form of shallow

The aff’s evaluation of the effects of pollution are rooted in anthropocentrism –

Focus on pollution in industrialized nations is a form of shallow ecology that

The aff’s focus on minor reforms to remedy pollution is a form of shallow

Western domination reflects an anthropocentric attitude towards the

Industrial agriculture is rooted in a paradigm of domination and exploitation

The industrial, mechanized paradigm of food production wages war on the

Industrial agriculture is primarily a fossil-fuel-driven agriculture. Replacing people with fossil

Paradoxically, whilethis ecological destruction of natural capital is justified in terms of “feeding

Techno-optimists are wrong – growth is terminally unsustainable and exerting

This really is the crux of the matter, with the ecomodernists

We must engage in frugal individuation in the face of climate change – only

Deep ecology is radically conservative in that it articulates a long-established minority stream of

That wisdom can be approached mathematically, chemically, or it can be danced or told as a

Ecology expansion homogenizes regions and cultures, destroying ecological

Extractive development - whether conventional or green - leads to the 6th mass

Human civilization will collapse with Climate Change

Current path to climate change detriments billions by 2050

Human civilization will collapse with Climate Change