Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1980 Bookmatter SpeechActTheoryAndPragmatics
1980 Bookmatter SpeechActTheoryAndPragmatics
JOHN R. SEARLE
University of California, Berkeley, U.S.A.
FERENC KIEFER
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, and La Sorbonne Nouvelle, Paris
and
MANFRED BIERWISCH
Academy of Sciences of the G.D.R., Berlin
INTRODUCTION vii
leave the room", "You will leave the room", and "Will you leave the room?"
the same proposition, that you will leave the room, is expressed in the per-
formance of three different illocutionary acts, one a request, one a prediction,
and one a question. This last distinction between the illocutionary act and the
propositional act has suggested to most theorists who write about speech acts
that there is a typical logical form of the illocutionary act whereby it has a
propositional content (P) and that propositional content is presented with a
certain illocutionary force F, giving the total act the structure F(P). Finally,
in the theory of speech acts there is a customary distinction between direct
speech acts, where the speaker says what he means, and indirect speech acts
where he means something more than what he says. For example in a standard
dinner table situation when a speaker says "Can you pass the salt?" he per-
forms the direct speech act of asking whether the hearer can pass the salt but
normally also the indirect speech act of requesting the hearer to pass the salt.
Most of the standard authors on the subject of speech acts would accept
something like the above distinctions, but when it comes to the notion of
pragmatics, the situation is much more confused. "Pragmatics" is one of
those words ("societal" and "cognitive" are others) that give the impression
that something quite specific and technical is being talked about, when often
in fact it has no clear meaning. The motivation for introducing this term,
which was done by Charles Morris and later Rudolf Carnap, was to distinguish
pragmatics from syntax [or "syntactics"] and semantics. According to
Morris's earliest formulation of this distinction (1938), syntactics studies
"the formal relations of signs to one another". Semantics studies "the rela-
tions of signs to the objects to which the signs are applicable." And pragmatics
studies "the relations of signs to interpreters". But this distinction between
pragmatics and semantics is very unsatisfactory. For example, taken strictly,
the above defmitions would have the consequence that pragmatics is a branch
of semantics, since signs are clearly "applicable" to interpreters. Morris later
modified this defmition, and redefmed pragmatics as "that branch of semiotics
which studies the origins, the uses, and the effects of signs" (1946). Camap
(1942), following Morris's earlier position, gave the following defmition,
which has proved influential to subsequent authors:
If, in an investigation, explicit reference is made to the speaker, or to put it in more gen-
eral terms, to the user of the language, then we assign it to the field of pragmatics ... If
we abstract from the user of the language and analyze only the expressions and their de-
signata, we are in the field of semantics. And if, finally, we abstract from the designata also
and analyze only the relations between the expressions, we are in [logical] syntax. The
whole science of language, consisting of the three parts mentioned, is called "semiotics".
INTRODUCTION ix
According to this use, speech act theory, together with the study of index-
ical expressions, make up most, or perhaps all, of the domain of pragmatics.
Contrasting with these views, the second tradition assumes sense rather
than denotation to be the core notion of semantics. According to this concep-
tion, the meaning of an expression is determined by the sense relations (such
as synonymy, antonymy, entailment, etc.) that it bears to other expressions
within the system. On this account, the sense of an expression can be distin-
guished as its context-free, literal meaning from the context-<iependent,
actual meaning of an utterance of that expression. The utterance meaning,
although determined by the sense of the sentence uttered, differs from it in
various ways, just as the acoustic realization of an utterance differs from the
phonological structure of the sentence uttered. Thus, semantics, according to
x INTRODUCTION
this tradition, studies all aspects of the literal meaning of sentences and other
expressions, while pragmatics is concerned with the conditions according to
which speakers and hearers determine the context- and use-dependent utter-
ance meanings. A typical expression of this view is in Katz (1977): "Prag-
matics is performance theory at the semantic level." According to this
position, the analysis of both indexical expressions and speech acts belongs in
part to semantics, in part to pragmatics. As to indexical expressions, semantics
is basically concerned with conditions of coreference, leaving the determina-
tion of actual reference to pragmatics. Thus the rules - according to which
"he" and "his" in "He hurt his hand" mayor may not be coreferential, while
"he" and "her" in "He hurt her hand" cannot have the same referent - are
part of semantics, whereas the determination of the actual referents of "he",
"his", and "her" in a given context follows from rules of pragmatics. A similar
partition applies to speech acts. Insofar as the illocutionary potential of a
sentence is determined by its context-free, literal meaning, then it is part of
its semantic structure, and its study is in the domain of semantics. Insofar as
its illocutionary potential depends on the context of utterance, including the
intentions of the speaker, its study belongs to the domain of pragmatics. A
typical example of the distinction would arise in the study of indirect speech
acts. In an indirect speech act, the speaker says one thing, means what he
says, but he also means something more. A speaker might, for example, say
to a hearer, "You are standing on my foot." And he might mean "You are
standing on my foot", but in most contexts, he would likely mean something
more, such as "Please get off my fOOL" In such an utterance, the direct speech
act expressed by the literal meaning of the sentence lies in the domain of
semantics. The indirect speech act, expressed in the speaker's utterance mean-
ing insofar as it differs from the literal meaning of the sentence, lies within
the domain of pragmatics.
It is perhaps an ironic feature of the use of the expression "pragmatics" in
the current philosophical and linguistic literature that many of the authors
who are most commonly described as working within the area of pragmatics
do not use this expression at all, for example, Austin, Grice, and Searle. In
this third tradition, which derives in part from the late Wittgenstein, the core
notion in the explanation of meaning is the use of the expressions of a given
language. This is in turn explained in terms of the intentions speakers conven-
tionally have in using these expressions. Although there is a fairly clear dis-
tinction between the speaker's (actual) meaning and the conventionalized
sentence meaning, there is on this account no way of sorting out the context-
free meaning of a linguistic expression, since even the strictly conventionalized
INTRODUCTION xi
THE EDITORS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Morris, Charles: 1946, Signs, Language and Behavior, New York, Prentice Hall.
Stalnaker, R. C.: 1972, 'Pragmatics,' in Davidson and Harman (eds.), Semantics of
Natural Language, Dordrecht, D. Reidel.