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TOPIC
THE IDEA OF SUBSTANCE THAT ALLOWS MOST OF OUR INTUITIONS
SUBMITTED BY
Charles Irumba
LECTURER
COURSE
Seminar on modern philosophy (Locke, inquiry on human understanding)-PHS 235
23rd SEPTEMBER,2021
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Table of Contents
Introduction....................................................................................................................................3
4.0 Intuition.............................................................................................................................8
Conclusion......................................................................................................................................8
References.......................................................................................................................................9
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Introduction
In this chapter, Locke begins his discussion of the complex ideas. The first modes he
examines are those related to space, which is itself regarded as a simple idea under Locke's
rubric. Locke also uses this chapter to launch into a complaint against the unclear and poorly
defined terms used by many European philosophers. In particular, he criticizes two longstanding
while accidents are outward or inessential characteristics. Such terms, he concludes, are "of little
use in philosophy" because they are circularly defined, substance is merely a term for "that
which supports accidents." In Locke's view, the substance or accident confusion is illustrative of
a wider problem with language. People have essentially the same simple ideas, but they "perplex
themselves" by using different words for the same concept, or by using the same word in
different senses. This paper will discuss the idea of substance that allows most of our intuitions.
According to John Locke, Ideas, come from two sources. Sensation, meaning our sensory
experience of the outside world, is one source. Reflection our mind's awareness of its own
operations is the other. Locke says that a sign to the ongoing, empirical nature of idea formation
may be found by observing how people think at different stages of life. Children have ideas that
reflect their own limited experience of life, while adults tend to have more varied and complex
Locke also considers a related question: are we always thinking? He answers no,
dismissing the idea that a person could think and not be conscious of it. For example, “If a
sleeping man thinks without knowing it," he says, "the sleeping and waking man are two
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persons." In other words, our thoughts are not really our own if we have no way of consciously
accessing or remembering them. Locke's discussion of this issue and his refutation of the idea
that "the soul always thinks" are entangled with his treatment of sensation and reflection.1
There are ideas that the mind receives passively, namely the simple ones that come to it
from sensation and reflection. The mind can’t make any such simple idea for itself, and can’t
have any idea that doesn’t wholly consist of them. But while the mind is wholly passive in the
reception of all its simple ideas, it acts in various ways to construct other ideas out of its simple
ones, which are the materials and foundations of all the rest. The acts in which the mind exerts its
power over its simple ideas are mainly these three; The first is combining several simple ideas
into one compound one; that is how all complex ideas are made. Secondly, bringing together two
ideas, whether simple or complex, setting them side by side so as to see them both at once,
without uniting them into one; this is how the mind gets all its ideas of relations. Lastly, by
separating them from all other ideas that accompany them in their real existence; this is called
abstraction, and it is how all the mind’s general ideas are made. This shows that the power a man
has, and his exercise of it, are pretty much the same in the intellectual world as in the material
one. In neither realm has he any power to make or destroy any raw materials; all he can do is
either to unite them together or set them side by side, or wholly separate them. For example, he
cannot make or destroy rocks, but he can assemble them to make a wall, or dismantle a wall that
has been made from them· Let us begin with uniting, and then, we shall come to the other two in
due course.2
1
John Locke: an essay concerning human understanding; Pennsylvania state university,1690,287
2
Ibid, 279
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As simple ideas are observed to exist in various combinations united together, so the
mind has a power to consider several of them united together as one idea; not only in
combinations that exist in external objects, but also in ones the mind makes up. Ideas thus made
up of several simple ones which become complex. Examples are the ideas of beauty and
gratitude. These are all complex ideas made up of simple ones, but the mind can, if it wishes
treat each of them by itself as one unified thing, signified by one name. By being able to repeat
and join together its ideas, the mind has great power to vary and multiply the objects of its
thoughts, infinitely beyond what sensation or reflection provides it with. The basic raw materials
of all its compositions are simple ideas received from those two sources, the mind has no other
way of getting any but once it has acquired these simple ideas it can by its own power put
together the ideas it has, making new complex ones that it never received united in that way.
Complex ideas, however combined, are infinitely numerous and endlessly various. Still,
one can think that they can all be brought under three headings; modes, substances and relations.
First, modes are complex ideas that don’t contain within them the supposition of existing by
themselves, but are considered as dependences on or states of substances. Examples are the ideas
signified by the words like, triangle, gratitude etc. These words stand for dependences on
occurs that is because someone is grateful. Here we are using the word ‘mode’ in a different
sense from its ordinary one. Two sorts of modes deserve to be considered separately. Some are
only variations or different combinations of the same simple idea, not mixed in with any other.
For example, the ideas of dozen and score are nothing but the ideas of so many distinct units
added together. These are called simple modes, because they are contained within the bounds of
one simple idea. Other complex ideas are made up of simple ideas of different kinds, put together
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to make one complex one. Examples are beauty a certain composition of colour and figure,
causing delight to the beholder, and theft the concealed change of the possession of something
without its owner’s consent, which obviously combines several ideas of different kinds. Call
Secondly, the ideas of substances are combinations of simple ideas that are taken to
represent distinct particular things existing by themselves. In such combinations the supposed or
confused idea of substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief. Thus, if to the idea of
substance, we join the simple idea of a certain dull whitish colour, and ideas of certain degrees of
weight and hardness, we have the idea of lead; and a combination of the ideas of a certain shape
with mobility, thought, and reasoning, joined to substance, makes the ordinary idea of a man.
Ideas of substances also fall into two sorts; ideas of single substances as they exist separately, for
example the idea of a man or of a sheep; and ideas of several of those put together, such as the
idea of an army of men, or of a flock of sheep. An idea of the latter collective kind of an idea,
that is, of several substances put together is as much one single idea as the idea of a man.
Thirdly, the last sort of complex idea is the one we call relation, which consists in considering
According to Locke, an idea is ‘the object of the understanding when a man thinks’
where thinking includes all cognitive activities. Ideas form the materials of knowledge. The
3
John Locke: an essay concerning human understanding; Pennsylvania state university,1690,281
4
John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, An analysis of Mr. Locke's Doctrine of ideas; S marks
publisher,1825,195
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2) Signs or representations of the world of things.
4) Caused by experience.
Our ideas are derived from two sources, the first is sensation and the second is reflection or
perception of the operation of our own mind which may be called internal sense. Our senses
convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things. This is what is called sensation. This
is a process through which the mind receives ideas from external objects. By means of inner
sense or introspection the mind gets the ideas not from the existing objects but by reflecting on
its own operations within itself. This is the process of thinking, doubting, believing, willing, etc.
The mind has powers of analyzing and reassembling the raw materials received.
Locke makes a distinction between simple ideas and complex ideas. Sensory experiences of the
uniform character are called simple ideas. Color smell, sound, numbers, extension, etc. are
simple ideas. They are the contents of actual experience. Locke says that the mind uses some
kind of liberty in forming those complex ideas, in contrast with simple ideas where the mind is
passive. The simples, Locke insisted can never be created nor destroyed by the mind. The mind
has power to repeat, compare, and unite simples thereby creating new complex ideas. But the
mind cannot invent simple ideas that it has not experienced. Simples in Lockian theory of
knowledge are building blocks from which all of our complex and compounded ideas can be
According to Locke, Substances are, first, just objects in the world, things; but substances are,
second, the underpinning and support of the sensible qualities we perceive. Ideas of substance
depend upon our sensory modalities; our ideas of substance don’t represent substances as they
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really are; they present us with the picture we need in order to get around in the world.
4.0 Intuition
original, independent source of knowledge, since it is designed to account for those kinds of
knowledge that other sources do not provide. Knowledge of necessary truths and of moral
principles is sometimes explained in this way. Some necessary truths for example, statements of
Intuitive knowledge involves direct and immediate recognition of the agreement or disagreement
of two ideas. Intuitive knowledge is that which we get by the mere consideration of the ideas
themselves. This knowledge is self-evident. If we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we
shall find that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas
immediately by themselves without the intervention of any other, and this is philosophically
referred to as intuitive knowledge. This is perceived by the mind just as the eye doth light. In this
Conclusion
According to John Locke, all our ideas of the various sorts of substances are nothing but
collections of simple ideas, together with a supposition of something to which they belong and in
which they exist, though we have no clear distinct idea at all of this supposed something. All the
5
John Locke: an essay concerning human understanding; Pennsylvania state university,1690,280
6
John Locke, James Augustus St. John: The Works of John Locke: Philosophical Works, with a Preliminary Essay
and Notes by J. A. St. John, Volume 2; Henry G. Bohn publisher, 1854,134
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simple ideas which, when thus united in one common substratum, make up our complex ideas of
various sorts of substances are received from sensation or reflection. Even those ideas must be
constructed out of the simple ideas that we originally received from sensation or reflection. Most
of the simple ideas that make up our complex ideas of substances. These complex ideas of
substances also lead to most of our intuitions because intuitive knowledge involves immediate
recognition of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas of substances which affect most of
our intuitions.
References
John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, An analysis of Mr. Locke's Doctrine
Locke J, James Augustus St. John: The Works of John Locke: Philosophical Works, with a
Preliminary Essay and Notes by J. A. St. John, Volume 2; Henry G. Bohn publisher, 1854,134