HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY

1. Introductory remarks

The word Mediaeval is derived from two Latin words notably: “medium”and“aevum”.
Medium simply means “Middle” and aevum simply means Age. When put together this would
read as “Middle - Ages” Hence alternatively, the word Mediaeval would simply mean “Middle
- Ages". In effect, the Middle - Ages is a period between antiquity and Renaissance (Nasci =
to be born) often considered to be between the end of the Roman Empire in the 5th century and
the early 15th century.

In the history of this discipline, Saint Augustine, though strictly speaking not belonging to the
Middle - Ages, is however generally considered to be the point of departure. He constitutes a
reservoir of knowledge that have had a positive impact and hence improved the works of this
period that we can technically call “the mediaeval era.”

In fact, this discipline will aim at allowing the student to effectively assimilate and have
knowledge of the major text of this longest period in the history of philosophy running from the
5th century right up to 15th. This is periodically speaking the longest discipline aging about 1000
years in the history of philosophy

2. Misconceptions about Mediaeval Philosophy

There was a time when mediaeval philosophy was considered as unworthy of serious study,
when it was taken for granted that the philosophy of the Middle Ages was subservient to
theology that it was practically indistinguishable therefrom and that, in so far as it was
distinguishable, it amounted to little more than a barren logic-chopping and word-play. In
other words, it was taken for granted that the European philosophy contained two main
periods notable: the Ancient period, which to all intents and purposes meant the philosophies
of Plato and Aristotle and on the other hand the Modern period, when the speculative reason
once more began to enjoy freedom after the dark night of the Middle Ages when
ecclesiastical authority reigned supreme and the human reason, chained by heavy fetters,
was compelled to confine itself to the useless and fanciful study of theology, until a thinker
like Rene Descartes at length broke the chains and gave philosophy its freedom. Thus, in the
Ancient and Modern period philosophy may be considered a free man, whereas in the
Mediaeval period it was a slave.
Apart from the fact that mediaeval philosophy naturally shared in the disesteem with which the
Middle Ages in general were commonly regarded, one factor which was partly responsible for
the attitude adopted towards mediaeval thinkers was doubtless the language used concerning
Scholasticism by men like Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes. What we are saying is that just
as Aristotelians are prone to evaluate Platonism in terms of Aristotle’s criticism, so admirers of
the movement apparently initiated by Bacon and Descartes were prone to look on mediaeval
philosophy through their eyes, unaware of the fact that much of what Francis Bacon, for
instance, has to say against the Scholastics could not legitimately be applied to the great figures
of mediaeval thought. In effect, looking on mediaeval philosophy from the very start, great
figures who criticized this discipline could perhaps scarcely be expected to seek a closer and
first-hand acquaintance with it. This means that they condemned it unseen and unheard,
without knowledge either of the rich variety of mediaeval thought or of its profundity.

Additionally, it is worth noting that even if mediaeval philosophy was in fact richer and more
varied than has been sometimes supposed, ``is it not true to say that it stood in such a close
relation to theology that it is practically indistinguishable therefrom? It is not, for example, a
fact that great majority of mediaeval philosophers were priests and theologians, pursuing
philosophic studies in the spirit of a theologian or even an apologist? It is indeed necessary to
point out that the relation of theology to philosophy was itself an important theme of mediaeval
thought and that different thinkers adopted different attitudes in regard to this question.

3. The scope of mediaeval philosophy

Having argued that there really was such a thing as mediaeval philosophy or at any rate that
there could be such a thing, even if the great majority of mediaeval philosophers were
Christians and most of them theologians, we want to finally say something about the aim of this
discipline.

We certainly do not intend to attempt the task of narrating all the known opinions of all
mediaeval philosophers. In other words it is not our intention to constitute an encyclopaedia
of mediaeval philosophy and on the other hand it is not our intention to give a simply a
sketch or series of impressions of mediaeval philosophy. We shall endeavor to give an
intelligible and coherent account of the development of mediaeval philosophy and of the
phases through which it passed, omitting many names altogether and choosing out for
consideration those thinkers who are of special importance and interest for the content of
their thought. To certain of these thinkers, we shall devote a considerable amount of space,
discussing their opinions at some length.
To place in clear relief the main lines of connection and development and at the same time to
develop at some length the ideas of selected philosophers is certainly not an easy task, and it
would be foolish to suppose that our inclusions and omissions or proportional allotment of
space will be acceptable to everyone.

The general plan of this discipline is thus as follows. First of all we shall treat briefly of those
selected Christian thinkers who had a real influence on the Middle Ages: St. Augustine, St
Gregory of Nyssa, Boethius, John Scotus Eriugena, Anselm of Canterbury and Peter Abailard.
We shall call this group the group of Early Mediaeval Christian.

The second phase of our exposition will focus on Islamic Philosophy. The prevailing number of
the selections in the section on Islamic philosophy is taken from the major Aristotelians and
these include: Alfarabi, Avicenna , Averroes while Agazali will exemplify the reaction to this
movement. Here it is important to note that Islamic Aristotelianism reached its climax in Spain
with IbnRushd commonly known as Averroes. He was the great commentator of Aristotle.
Much of the continuation of Islamic philosophy must be seen in terms of its influence in the
Jewish tradition. The latter will be thus our third scope of mediaeval investigation.

As already stated, our third phase of our reflection will be based on the Jewish Philosophy. This
phase will be marked with at least five philosophers. But to our own interest, we shall focus on
great figures like Solomon IbnGabirol commonly known as Avicebrol and Moses Maimonides
who is the greatest of the entire Jewish philosopher.

The last phase will be marked by two selected Latin philosopher starting with St.Bonaventure
Giovani Fidanza and St. Thomas Aquinas.

Throughout our investigation and this with the aid of the great mediaevalist mentioned above,
we shall focus on special topic such the question of God, Free will, the question of Evil, the
problem of universals, the theory of knowledge, the question of faith and reason, metaphysic
etc.

4. Early mediaeval Christian philosophy

i. Mediaeval influence

It is true that men like St. Gregory of Nyssa and St. Augustine belonged to the period of Roman
Empire, that their philosophic affiliation were with Platonism, understood in the widest sense,
and that they were Christian thinkers and exercised a great influence on the Middle Ages. In
effect, one could hardly understand St. Anselm or St. Bonaventure without knowing
something of St. Augustine, nor could one understand the thought of John Scotus Eriugena
without something of the thought of St. Gregory of Nyssa and of Pseudo-Dionysius. For this
reason, there is scarcely any need then to apologize for beginning a history of mediaeval
philosophy with a consideration of the thinkers who belong, so far as chronology is
concerned, to the period of the Roman Empire.

a. St. Gregory of Nyssa A.D 335 - 395

One of the most learned of the Greek fathers and one of the most interesting from the
philosophical standpoint was the brother of St. Basil, St. Gregory of Nyssa who was born in
Caesarea (in Cappadocia, not Palestine) about A.D 335 and, after having been a teacher of
rhetoric, bishop of Nyssa, dying about the year 395

i. The relation between Faith and Reason according to Gregory

For Gregory of Nyssa, the data of revelation are accepted on faith and are not the result of
logical reasoning. This implies for him that the mysteries of faith are not philosophical or
scientific conclusion. He argues that if the mysteries were explained by reason, then
supernatural faith, as exercised by Christians, and Hellenic philosophizing would be
indistinguishable.

On the other hand, Gregory argues that Faith has a rational basis, in that, logically speaking,
the acceptance of mysteries on authority presupposes the ascertainability by natural
reasoning of certain preliminary truths, especially the existence of God, which are capable of
philosophic demonstration.

Additionally, Gregory maintained the superiority of faith but he argued that it is only right to
invoke the aid of philosophy. To this end, he stated that Ethics, natural philosophy, logic,
mathematics are not only ornaments in the temple of truth but may also contribute to the life of
wisdom and virtue: they are therefore, not to be despised or rejected, though divine revelation
must be accepted as a touchstone and criterion of truth. This is because human reason must
be judged by word of God, not the word of God by human reasoning. Furthermore, he argued
that it is right to employ human speculation and human reasoning regarding the dogma; but the
conclusion will not be valid unless they agree with the scriptures.

ii. Gregory’s Platonism vis a vis the universals

Gregory’s Platonism in regard to universal comes out clearly in his De hominis opificio, where
he speaks of the universal as the ideal man or the heavenly man. He distinguishes the heavenly
man or the ideal man or the universal, from earthly man or the object of experience.
According to Gregory, the former, the ideal man or the ideal human being, exists only in the
divine idea and is without sexual determination, being neither male nor female. The latter,
the human being of experience, is an expression of the ideal and is sexually determined.
Gregory argues that the ideal being as it were, ‘splintered’ (to break something into thin
sharp fragments) or partially expressed in many single individuals. It should be noted that
the understanding of ideal man or God’s idea of man as sexually undetermined is
eschatological. This is because at the last day there will be neither male nor female, since in
heaven there will be no marriage.

iii. Creation of the world.

God created the world out of an abundance of goodness and love. This was in order that there
might be creatures who could participate in the divine goodness. Secondly he did not create
the world from necessity but he created it freely. As a result there is a share in this freedom
God has given to man and God respects this freedom. With this freedom, man is free to chose
evil if he so wills. Evil is the result of man’s free choice, God is not responsible. Gregory
argues that it is true that God foresaw evil, but in spite of this foreknowledge He created man,
for He knew also that He would in the end bring all men to Himself. For Gregory, this means
that there will be restoration of all things. To this end he asserted that every human being,
even Satan and the fallen angels, will at length turn to God, at least through the purifying
sufferings of the hereafter. Thus for Gregory every human being will at length return to the
“Idea” and be therein contained, though Gregory certainly accepted individual immortality.
It should be noted that this notion of the return of all things to God, to the Principle from
whom they sprang, and of the attainment of a state in which God is “all in all ”, was also
borrowed by John Scotus.

iv. The soul and the body

According to Gregory, the soul which is not confined to any one portion of the body, is “a
created essence, a living essence, intellectual, an essence that has the power of giving life
and perceiving sensible objects, so long as the bodily instruments endure.” As simple and
uncompounded, the soul has the power of surviving the body with which, however, it will in
the end be reunited. The soul is thus spiritual and incorporeal. But the question is: how is the
soul different from the body when the latter as a concrete material object, is composed,
according to Gregory, of qualities which in themselves are incorporeal? In his De hominis
opificio, he argues that the union of qualities like color, solidity, quantity, weight results in
body, whereas their dissolution spells the perishing of the body. Thus Gregory, to tackle this
matter, he proposed a dilemma which goes as follows:
 Either material things proceed from God, in which case God, as their
Source, would contain matter in Himself, would be material, or, if
God is not material, then material things do not proceed from Him
and matter is eternal.

Gregory however rejects both the materiality and dualism of God and the conclusion of this
would be that the qualities of which bodily things are composed are not material. However,
paradoxically he asserts the creation ex nihilo which is the creation from nothing. But he
argues that we cannot comprehend how God creates the qualities out of nothing; but it is
reasonable to suppose that in his eyes the qualities which form body are not themselves bodies.
This is so in that there is no concrete body at all except in and through their union.

The second preoccupation is that if the qualities are not material, how then are they not
spiritual? And if they are spiritual, how does soul differ essentially from the body? To this
interrogation Gregory argues that though the qualities unite to form body and cannot,
considered in abstraction, be called “bodies”, yet they have an essential relation to matter, since
it is their function to form matter. We should recapture here the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine
of matter and form. Prime matter is not in itself body, but it is one of the principles of body.
Gregory argues in the same manner as St. Thomas would put it that the prime matter never
exists by itself alone and that it has an exigency for quantity, an essential ordination to concrete
body.

Additionally Gregory talks about the ascension of the soul. His scheme of the soul’s ascent is
certainly christocentric. To this end he argues that the advance of the soul is the work of the
Divine logos, Christ. However, the rising of the soul does not come in solitary union with God,
but rather of a realization of the Pleroma of Christ. The latter means that the advance of the
soul brings grace and blessing to the body and the dwelling of God in the individual affects
the whole body. Additionally, this mysticism according to Gregory is also thoroughly
sacramental in character. To this end he argues that the soul is restored by Baptism, union
with God is fostered by Eucharist. According to Gregory, this advance of the soul goes
through different stages of knowledge and love up to the mystical life and the Beatific Vision.

b. St. Augustine Aurelius of Hippo

i. Introductory note

The reflection on St. Augustine’s works cannot be under estimated. This is because
“Augustinism” is for us the one of point of departure of mediaeval philosophy. In this first part
of our reflection we will first give a brief biography of Saint Aurelius Augustine. Conscience of
St. Augustine vast works, we will try to limit our reflection. To this end the scope of our
reflection on St. Augustine will trace the major theses like:Theory of Knowledge, Eternal Law
which has its roots in his Neo-platonic philosophical tradition, and his understanding of his
moral philosophy. Additionally, explore the following theses: Free creation, on the Soul and
body.

ii. Biographical note

St. Augustine was born at Tagaste, in Numidia on 13th November 354. He came from a pagan
father, Patricius, and a Christian mother Monica.At the age of 19 in 365 he went to the town of
Madaura where he laid the foundation of his knowledge in Latin literature and grammar and
later became a Manichee. Thus, he embraced the dualistic Manichean theory which postulate
there are two ultimate principle, a good principle, that of light, God and the evil principle, that
of darkness.

Later after learning the concept of Manichaeism, he returned to Tagaste in 373 where he taught
grammar and Latin literature for a year, after which he opened where he became a lecturer of
rhetoric at Carthage a in 373.

St. Augustine latter when to Rome to teach rhetoric and under the platonic and Neo platonic he
published two bouquets which he called De beata vita and De ordine. St. Augustine later
became the professor of Eloquence at Milan. It was here where he met Ambrose, the bishop of
Milan who later baptized him at the age of 33 on Easter 25 th April 387. Whilst at Milan, he
wrote so main bouquets such as De immortalitate animae, De musica etc.

St. Augustine departed for Africa where he met Valerius, the bishop of Hippo who later
ordained him Priest. Whilst at Hippo, Augustine wrote the following articles: De libero
arbitrio, De magistro, De vera religion, De utilitate credendi etc.

Later on in 395, St. Augustine ordained bishop-coadjutor at Hippo after which he succeeded St.
Ambrose in 396/7. During his time he published many works such as De Doctrina Chritiana,
Confessionum XII, etc.

Later in 410, there was a council at Carthage. Present at this council were Pelagius, Coelestius,
Julianus amongst others. Certain issues were tackled. But the most pronounced one it that of
Pelagian controversy. It was during this period that St. Augustine wrote on the concept of
Nature and Grace and published the book entitled De Natura et Gratia. This work has the
positive impact at a time and it led to condemnation of Pelagianism by African Synod which
took place from 416 to 418. Other works of his time were: De spirituetLittera, Contra duas
epistolas Pelagianorum, De Trinitate, De civitate Dei etc.

St. Augustine died in 430 at the age of 76 on 28th August.

iii. The theory of Knowledge

1. Knowledge as a view to Beatitude.

Spinoza developed the philosophy of God or Substance because it is only the contemplation
of an infinite and eternal Object which can fully satisfy mind and heart and bring happiness
to the soul. Analogically, St. Augustine emphasizes that the knowledge of truth is to be
sought not for purely academic purposes, but as bringing true happiness, true beatitude. To
justify this position, Augustine argues that Man feels his insufficiency and he reaches out to
an object greater than himself, an object which can bring peace and happiness. The
knowledge of that object is an essential condition of its attainment. For this reason, Augustine
asserts that only the wise man can be happy because wisdom postulates knowledge of the
truth. In De Beata Vita, Augustine furthers his argument as he says; no one is happy who does
not possess what he strives to posses. Hence, the man who is seeking for truth but has not yet
found it, cannot be said to be truly happy

However, for Augustine, in an attempt to attain peace and happiness, truth should be known
with certainty. Augustine is hence, preoccupied with the problem of certainty. The question is:
How does the finite, changing human mind attain certain knowledge of eternal truth, truth
which rule and govern the mind and so transcends it? In contra Academicos Augustine
shows that we indubitably do attain certainty of some facts. His reading of platonic works
suggested to him that we are able not only to know with certainty eternal and necessary
truth, but also to know them as eternal and necessary truths. And Plato explained this by the
theory of Reminiscence. (The Platonic doctrine that anything we encounter is an imperfect
recollection of an idea that our souls have encountered in a previous disembodied existence)

Augustine is going to conclude that the knowledge of eternal truth should thus bring the soul,
by reflection on that knowledge, to the knowledge of God Himself and God’s activity.
Consequently, bringing the soul (us) to true happiness, to salvation, to beatitude.
 2. St. Augustine and Scepticism.

First of all to understand Augustine’s position on skepticism, we need to define who a skeptic
is. The latter actually refers to somebody who doubts something is true: A doubter of accepted
beliefs or theories.

What is Augustine’s position then about skepticism? For Augustine if one is deceived in
thinking that appearance and reality always correspond, one at least is certain of his subjective
impression. He argues that no one has a complaint to make of his senses, for it is unjust to
demand of them more than they can give. Whatever the eyes can see they see truly. The issue
is we should not give the assent to more appearance, to more than what the eyes can offer
and we will not be deceived. To defend his position, Augustine in his Contra Academicos,
argues that he does not see a skeptic who refuses if the man says in his expression that , “I
know that this object seems white to me, I know that this sound gives me pleasure, I know
this smell is pleasant to me, I know that this tastes sweet to me, I know that this feels cold to
my touch”

Explanation: St. Augustine refers in this citation to the Epicureans.

Epicureans are those who are devoted to sensual pleasures. Of course these
are disciples of a certain medievalist by the name of Epicurus.

- However, what Augustine means is that the senses as such never lie or
deceive us even if we may deceive ourselves in judging that things exist
objectively in the same way that they appear.

- Hence if one comes out of hot a room and put his hand in tepid water, it
may seem to him cold, but as long as he merely say “ This water seems
cold to me, he is saying something the truth of what he is certain of, and
no skeptic can refute him.

To accentuate his position that truth exists, Augustine postulates that everyone who doubts
about the truth, knows that he is doubting, and the fact that he knows that he is doubting, he
is certain of this truth at least. So the capacity of someone to doubt should convince him that
there is such a thing as truth. Moreover, Augustine says we are also certain of mathematical
truth. Thus when one says seven and three make ten, he does not say that they ought to make
ten, but knows that they make ten.
 3. Experiential knowledge

Augustine refers to Experiential Knowledge as Sense-knowledge. This is according to him the

lowest level of knowledge. In effect, experiential knowledge is dependent on sensation.
However, Augustine considers this sensation from the standpoint of platonic psychology.

Explanation: According to platonic psychology, sensation is an act of the soul

using the organs of sense as its instruments. To express this clearly
Augustine says: Sentire non est corporis sed animae per corpus [We do not
sense through our body but through the animated body]. The soul animates the
whole body, but when it increases or intensifies its activity in a particular part,
i.e. in a particular sense-organ, it exercises the power of sensation.

From this theory it would seem to follow that any deficiency in sense-knowledge [empirical
knowledge] must proceed from the mutability both of the instrument of sensation, the sense-
organ, and of the object of sensation. However, Augustine states that rational soul exercise
true knowledge and attains true certainty when it contemplates eternal truths in and through
itself. But when it turns towards the material world and uses corporeal instruments it cannot
attain true knowledge. So, experiential knowledge per se is not true knowledge because it is
knowledge of changing objects. Thus Augustine asserts with Plato that: the object of true
knowledge are unchanging, from which it necessarily follows that knowledge of changing
objects is not true knowledge.

Moreover, man is able make rational judgments concerning corporeal things and to perceive
them as approximations to eternal standards. This is to say an individual is able to judge that
one object is more beautiful than another. And by this his comparative judgment involves the
implication of a reference to an eternal standard of beauty.

4. The doctrine of illumination

According to this doctrine, St. Augustine argues that we cannot perceive the immutable truth
of things unless they are illuminated as by a sun. This divine light which illumines the mind,
comes from God, who is the intelligible light in whom and by whom and through whom all
those things which are luminous to the intellect become luminous. The illumination in
question is a spiritual illumination which performs the same function for the objects of the
mind as the sun’s light performs for the objects of the eye. In other words, as the sunlight
makes corporeal things visible to the eye, so the divine illumination makes the eternal truths
visible to the mind. From this it would appear to follow that it is not the illumination itself
which is seen by the mind, nor the intelligible sun or God, but that the characteristics of
necessity and eternity in the necessary and eternal truths are made visible to the mind by the
activity of God. The light which comes from God to human mind enables the mind to see the
characteristics of changelessness and necessity in the eternal truths. This is what Augustine
terms ideogenetic function

St. Augustine argues that we need a divine illumination in order to enable us to transcend our
minds for no creature, how so ever rational and intellectual is lighted of itself but is lighted by
participation of eternal Truth. It follows then that by illumination theory, God conserves and
creates the human intellect and that the natural light of the intellect is a participated light.
Simply put, by illumination, we participate in the divine ideas, or light or truths of God.

1. The theory of Eternal order and Eternal Law.

a. Eternal order.

In this reflection we shall focus on St. Augustine understanding of Eternal Order and Eternal
Law. In fact, the Neo-platonic background of St. Augustine philosophy cannot be under
estimated in his understanding of created order. In his books of confessions he quotes the
Platonic books as the place where he read about the created order (Confessions VII.9, pp. 144 –
149). Thus, Augustine adopted the Neo-platonic metaphysic on eternal order which says:

“In the platonic account this world was animated through and through by the
upward aspiration toward its origin, which was also the goal of all its
movement, its last end. Man’s place in this world fits into this “great chain of
being”. The soul exiled from its real home by being embodied, need only turn
from the relative worthlessness of material things to the pursuit of its real
goal, the pursuit of primal Beauty and Goodness. Animated by this desire it
ascends through the stages of its original descent until it comes to rest again
in an ecstatic union with God”.

Explanation: St. Augustine took over this metaphysical structure as his own, and made the
ordered universe the basic model by which he operated.

a. The world is well ordered. Some things are more perfect than others. And
others more perfect than the latter. This chain of perfections gives an
account of a structured universe, each being occupying its position
according to its degree of perfection with the Supreme Being occupying
the highest position and the highest perfection. All the Beings are
oriented toward the latter.
 b. The quotation also gives an account on the order of the universe which
includes the order within each individual human being. Human beings
are chained or ordered in their respective positions, with their respective
degree of perfections towards the perfect of all perfections, Supreme
Being.

c. Additionally, in this ordered universe, God, according to St. Augustine,

stands as the supreme or superior being who orders the composition of a
human being. To justify this position, he says in De Musica“the soul is
ruled by the superior which later rules the inferior. But God alone is
superior to it and only body is inferior to it.”To further this argument
Augustine argues again that“ God, therefore supreme and true, by an
inviolable and unchanging law by which He rules all creation, subjects
the body to the soul, the soul to Himself, and so everything to
Himself.”From this quotation, the Author is demonstrating the order which
is found specifically in living beings.

However, we should not forget that this order demonstrated in living beings finds its place or
inserts itself within the order of whole universe. This is due to the fact that human beings are
“micro-cosmos” of the “macro-cosmos” which is itself a “cosmos” that we call “ univers”.
This simply means we are part and parcel of the cosmos and by that virtue we are part and
parcel of that eternal order.

But the question still stands, what commands or creates this eternal order?

a. Eternal Law

The eternal order of all things in the hierarchy is created by an eternal law. St. Augustine
defines eternal law as God’s highest reason which reigns over all things. By this law it is just
that all things should be most ordered. Things are the way they are, and they must be that way.
Hence eternal order and eternal law are woven in the fabric of reality, and cannot be
changed or overridden.

Explanation: eternal law and eternal order are embedded in any exiting formal
or physical reality. Every reality posses its position, attributes and status
simply because the eternal law commands it to be so. Moreover, any action or
event or situation emanating from any reality will follow the command of the
eternal law already woven in that reality. Consequently, no event, reality,
situation etc escapes the dictates of this eternal law.
 2. The moral philosophy of St. Augustine

a. De Beata Vita et Deus [Happiness and God]

The goal of life in this world as pointed out in De Beata Vita is happy life. St. Augustine
defines happy life as the possession of one’s greatest good. From what preceding statement, we
can affirm that St. Augustine’s ethic has something in common with what one might call the
typical Greek ethic. This means that Augustine’s ethic is Eudemonistic in character. Simply
put, Augustine theory of morality proposes an end for human conduct which is happiness. But
this happiness is to be found only in God. Augustine argues here against the Epicureans who
place man’s supreme good in the body, who place their hope in themselves. He asserts that
the rational creature has been so made that it cannot itself be the good by which it is made
happy. This is because the human being is mutable and insufficient to itself and it can only
find its happiness only in the possession of what is more than itself, in the possession of an
immutable object.To this end, Augustine is trying to put across the idea according to which
only God is the custodian of happiness. Hence, we must strive after God as a sign of desire
for beatitude. Augustine puts this clearly in De moribus that “to strive after God is to desire
happiness; to reach God is happiness itself. We strive after Him by loving him; we reach
Him, not by becoming altogether what He is, but by coming close to Him, touching him in a
wonderfully spiritual way, and being illuminated and pervaded utterly by His truth and
Holiness.” Thus, we should strive; we should not rest until we reach him. My soul shall not
rest until the time when I shall see him whole in all.

In deed the attainment of God is beatitude itself. God is the greatest good. It is in God alone
that we can find perfect happiness. This can only be achieved by our soul turning from that
which is less than God, returning to the natural order in which God is love above all else. This
Augustinian position is justified in De musica as he says “when the soul is turned from its
God to its servant [ i.e., the body it is supposed to rule], it is necessarily deficient; but, when it
is turned from its servant to its God, it necessary progresses and furnishes its servant [the
body]a very easy life and therefore least laborious and full of business…”.

Additionally, we can arguably assert that the Ethic of Augustine is primarily an Ethic of love.
He argues this in the following way: “it is by the will that man reaches out towards God and
finally takes possession of and enjoys Him. When therefore the will, which is the
intermediate good, cleaves to the immutable good, man finds therein the blessed life, for if
God is man’s supreme good it clearly follows, [since to seek the supreme good is to live well],
that to live well is nothing else but to love God with all the heart, with all the soul, with all
the mind”. Indeed, the ethics of Augustine centers on the participation in the immutable good
and this is not possible for man unless he be aided by grace, unless he receives the gratuitous
mercy of the Creator.

b. De philosophilia et mores

However, the question still stands: what “means” can one use to turn to God to possess the
greatest good, thus possessing happy life? According to Augustine, Philosophy is the way to
this beatitude. In effect, the turning to God is accomplished by reasoning. Reason is the
power of the rational soul to begin to understand the order of things, and to find in that
order and beauty, the rationality of the creation, and the power behind the creation. (we need
to appreciate the beauty of the universe). In fact, once the eternal order is apprehended by a
person then it is that very order which will lead one to the true knowledge of God. The power
behind every order and creation is the eternal law, which as stated earlier is God’s highest
reason. This highest Reason can only be attained by human reason which posses the same
qualities as the highest reason though at a lower degree. Hence the slogan: “Quid quid
recipitur ad modus recipitientis est recipitur” Thus conclusively, we can hold that philosophy
or reason moves toward God by discovering through philosophical thinking, discussion and
contemplating that which is at the center of the universe which are God’s order and Law.
Having discovered this order, one is brought to the happy life by pursuing it. This order is
not the creation of minds, but the way things actually are. To support this assertion we can
quote Augustine who says in De Vera Religione that “reason does not create truth but
discovers it. Before it is discovered it abides in itself and when it is discovered it renews us”.

c. Libero arbiterio (Free will)

The preoccupation is how does Augustine treat the question of the freedom of the will in
his theory moral philosophy.

Augustine defines free will as the ability of human beings by which they have chosen to love
that which is less worthy of their love, and by which they are able to choose to love God.

After defining free will as such, St. Augustine argues that Free will is then the cause of Evil. In
effect Augustine did not agree with Plato that that the cause of evil is simply ignorance.
Certainly, he agrees that there are can be some circumstances under which a person does not
know the ultimate good, that is when the person does not know God. But Augustine still argues
that “even the ungodly” have the capacity to “blame and rightly praise many things in the
conduct of men.” The overriding fact is that in daily conduct people understand praise and
blame only because they already understand that they have an obligation to do what is
praiseworthy and to abstain from what blameworthy. Under these circumstances, people’s
predicament is not that they are ignorant but that they stand in the presence of alternative.
People are able to choose to turn towards God or turn away from God. They are in short free.
Whichever way a person chooses, it is with the hope of finding happiness. According to
Augustine people are capable of directing their affections exclusively toward finite things,
persons, or themselves and away from God. Augustine says that this turning away and turning
to are not forced but voluntary acts. Evil, or sin, is a product of the will. It is not, however as
Plato said, the result of Ignorance nor as the Manichaeans said that Evil is as the result of the
work of the principle of darkness permeating the body.

Augustine argues that in spite of the fact of original sin, all humanity still possesses the
freedom of the will. This freedom ( liberum) of the will is not, however, the same as the
spiritual freedom (libertas), for true spiritual liberty is no longer possible in its fullness in this
life. A person now uses free will to choose wrongly; but even when people choose rightly,
they do not possess the spiritual power to do the good they have chosen. To realize the latter
choice, the person must have the help of God’s grace. The latter makes an individual develop
perfect virtue. Hence, we can reasonate with Augustine that whereas evil is caused by an act of
free will, virtue, on the other hand, is the product not of people’s will but of God’s grace.

From the preceding arguments, Augustine further argues that the moral law tells people what
they must do, but in the end it really shows them what they can’t do. Hence, for Augustine the
conclusion is that “ the law was given that grace might be sought and in turn grace given that
the law might be fulfilled.

d. The concept of Evil

It can be argued that if moral perfection consists in loving God, in directing the will to God and
bringing all other powers, e.g. the senses, into harmony with this direction, evil will consist in
turning the will away from God. But the question is what is Evil in itself and moral Evil in
particular?

Augustine defines moral evil as the privation of good. He also argues that the cause of this
moral evil is not the Creator but the created will. For him, the cause of good things is the
divine goodness, whereas the cause of evil is the created will which turns away from the
immutable Good. Thus Augustine is going to define Evil as a turning away of the created will
from immutable and infinite good.

Additionally evil according to Augustine cannot be termed a “thing”, since this word implies a
positive reality, and if moral evil were a positive reality, it would have to be ascribed to the
Creator, unless one were willing to attribute to the creature the power of positive creation out of
nothing. Evil then is that which falls away from essence and tends to non-being. It tends to
make that which is ceased to be.

Additionally, Augustine argues that everything in which there is order is ascribed to God, but in
the will which turns away from God there is disorder. The will itself is good, but the absence of
the right order or the privation of right order, for which the human agent is responsible, is Evil.
On this note, Augustine is going to define moral evil as the privation of right order in the
created will.

The theory of Creation

I: Creatio Ex Nihilo: Augustine argues that God created all things ex nihilo, out of nothing. By
his theory about the creation of the world, Augustine departed from two different theories. First
he was in contrast with to Plato’s account of the world which was not “created” but was the
Demiurge’s combining of the Forms and the receptacle which always existed independently.
Secondly he departed from the Neo-platonic theory of Plotinus which explained the world as an
emanation from God. Plotinus had said that there was a natural necessity in God to overflow,
since the Good must necessarily diffuse itself. And this theory held that there was a continuity
between God and the world, that the world is merely an extension of God

Against all the above notions, Augustine stressed that the world is the product of God’s free act,
where by He brings into being, out of nothing, all the things that make up the world. In this case
then, all things owe their existence to God. Thus Augustine speaks of God as bringing into
being what did not exist before. He could not have created out of an existing matter because
matter would already be something. Actually everything including matter is according to
Augustine a product of God’s creative act. Additionally, the fact that matter was created by
God meant for Augustine was essentially good because nothing evil is created by God.

II:Rationes Seminale: In his elaboration about the creation of the world, Augustine was
additionally struck by the fact that the various species in nature never produce new species.
Horses produce horses and flowers produce flowers. In fact what fascinated Augustine about all
this was its relevance to the general question of causality. He held that it is true that parents and
the cause of Children and flowers are the cause of new flowers but none of those things is able
to introduce new forms into nature. According to Augustine, there is no original causal power
in things capable of fashioning new forms and yet new forms of nature are emerging. The
question is “ where do they come from? To answer this preoccupation, Augustine propounded
on the concept of “ RationesSeminale” which means Seminal Reason. Augustine defines this
concept as the reason or principle of the germs of those things which were to develop in course
of time. To put it clearly, Ratio Seminalis are simply germs of things or invisible powers or
potentialities, created by God in the beginning in the humid element and developing into the
objects of various species by their temporal unfolding. So God had implanted this Seminal
principles into matter, thereby setting into nature the potentiality for all species to emerge.
Meaning that according to Augustine all species bear the invisible, potential powerto become
what they are not yet at present time. When species begin to exist, their Seminal principle, that
is their potentiality is fulfilled, and subsequentely actual seeds transmit the continuation of the
fixed species from potentiality to actuality.

However, it should be noted that St. Augustine developed this theory to solve the exegetic
problem and not a scientific problem. The problem is that, according to the book of
Ecclesiasticus: “He that liveth forever created all things together”, while on the other hand
according to the book of Genesis it is said that God created the world in six days. Meaning that
God should have to create step by step, the fishes and birds, for instance, appeared only on the
fifth “day” of creation, while the cattle and beast of the earth appeared only on the sixth day.
Additionally, there was some question too, about what is meant here by six days, especially that
the sun was not created until the fourth day. Meaning that there was no notion of time right up
to the fourth day and why the fourth day if third day did not exist. It was the doctrine of
RationesSeminales that enable Augustine to solve this problem. He postulated that God had
created all things at once, meaning by this that he had implanted the seminal principle of all
things at once, meaning that he had implanted the seminal principles of all species
simultaneously. But since these germs are principles of potentiality, they are the bearers of
things that are to be but that have not yet “flowered.” Accordingly, though all species were
created at once, they did not all exist fully formed simultaneously. They each fulfilled their
potentiality in a sequence of points in time.

v. Philosophy in the Dark Ages

The fall of the Roman Empire in 476 ushered in a period of intellectual darkness. The
Babarians who destroyed the political might of Rome also shattered the institutions of culture in
Western Europe. Learning came to a halt. Virtually the whole body of ancient literature was
lost. For the next five or six centuries, philosophy was kept alive by Christian scholars who
became the channels through which the works of the ancient Greeks were transmitted to the
west

a. Manlius AniciusSeverinus Boethius : 480 – 524

Boethius has been described as both Roman thinker and the first medieval schoolman. He was
born on 480 into a prominent senatorial family in Italy, which was then under the rule of the
Goths. He became a consul in 510 and was executed in 524. Realizing that the Roman world
was possibly nearing its end, he attempted to revive and to sum up the philosophical learning of
antiquity. His mediaeval successors were deeply influenced by his partial achievement.
Mediaeval thinkers owed to Boethius nearly all knowledge that they possessed of the ancient
logic as well as some of their knowledge of ancient mathematics and musical theory. They
knew too of his efforts to apply philosophical concepts to problems of Christian theology and
they found in his book on The Consolation of Philosophy a masterpiece of reflection.

i. Boethius and Aristotle

Boethius was a Christian. He was deeply learned and knew no less about the philosophical and
literary achievements of Greece. According to Boethius, earlier Christian thinkers had tended to
avoid Aristotle’s philosophy. He argued that when the Christian thinkers turned to Greek
thought it was likely to be to Plato or to the Stoic. The reason for this was according to
Boethius that Aristotle, who was to have taught that the world was eternal and to have denied
the divine providence as well as the immortality of the soul, seemed too much of a pagan. So
very few were interest in the philosophy of Aristotle. Among these were the non-Christians
thinker likely Plotinus was studied Aristotle and his pupil Porphyry, who wrote some ten
commentaries on Aristotle’s work. With just the few who read Aristotle, Boethius lamenated
the decline of classical culture in the Roman world and was fearful that Greek legacy of thought
might be lost forever.

i. Boethius on Categories

Among his greatest work were the commentaries he made on the Categories of Aristotle.
According to Boethius, the Categories presents the ten categories into which things are
classified: first the substance and then the nine accidents notably: quantity, quality, relation,
active, passive, when, where, having and position. Boethius like other commentators before
him, saw that there was a problem in knowing whether to treat the categories as the kinds of
being or simply as concepts representing them

ii. Boethius et De interpretationes

On interpretation,i.e De Interpretationes, Boethius exposes the study of modal sentences which

are sentences which state the possibility and necessity. Sentences or propositions of facts or
necessity include statement as “ fire heats” and “mankind possesses rationality”. While
sentences or proposition of possibilities refer to future contingent events of the kind that are as
likely to happen as not to happen. The examination of future contingent events leads Boethius
into some discussion of determinism and free will. he argues that a proposition predicting the
future for example: “there will be a sea battle tomorrow”, is either true or false, even if we way
reflect that there is not enough evidence to be certain now whether it is true or false. He argue
that God know this and other future contingent events, although, being outside time, he does
not foreknow them

iii. Boethius on Porphyry’s introduction to Aristotle

Porphyry’s introduction to Aristotles’s logical work is called Isagoge. The later became the
standard mediaeval textbook. Boethius asserts that in this text, Porphyry deals with the five
predicables, that is the five kinds of object which can be predicated of the a subject in a
proposition such as: “X is Y”. In this statement it should be noted that x is the subject and Y is
the predicate. Thus, thepredicables in questions are genius, species, specific difference,
proprium, and accidents. Thus in a statement such as:

“ the horse is an animal”

The predicable chosen is a genius. Again in the sentence like:

“ the horse is small”

The predicable in this statement is an accident. However, Porphyry in his introduction states
but does not seek to pursue the question whether these predicables exist in human
understanding only or also in reality or whether also they are incorporeal or corporeal, and
whether they apart from sensible objects or only with them.

iv. Boethius and the problem of universals

Boethius with regards to the problem of the universals inclines to an Aristotelian rather than a
Platonic view, although he does not reach a final decision about the universals. He thus, argues
that universals are concepts and as such they cannot be substances. The substance is one and
unique whilst the universal as a concept is common to many. For instance, the genius of the
species which belong to it. In this case the genius in question is the term animal to which
different species of animals belong. Thus, Boethius is going to argue that what is common to
many (e.g animal) as the universal, cannot be individual, one and unique. Additionally, he
argues that these general concepts or universals are not simply in the mind because they are
thoughts of things and they correspond to physical realities. To this end, he further argues
that the human can extract universal ideas of things and think of these ideas separately
although they do not exist separately.

v. The treatise of Boethius

Boethius’ efforts to apply philosophical concepts to theology are largely contained in the five
treatises known as the Opuscula Sacra. Which survived in the middle ages. The treatise deal
largely with Christian doctrinal disputes which where current in Boethius’ time and which
concerned: the definition of and the distinction between person and nature, God and man, in
Christ. Bascally, boethius’ aim in his treatise was to resolve disagreements between Christian
schools of thought by the application of philosophical clarity. For our scope of study, we shall
we shall concentrate on the third treatise called the Hebdomand, which literally means the
“group of seven”. In this third treatise, Boethius is going to expose his metaphysics. Thus
Boethius is going to demonstrate: “How substances can be good in virtue of their existence
without being absolute goods”. To defend this metaphysical thesis, Boethius is going first to
expose as series of fundamental arguments which he will later use to justify the above thesis.
The following are the fundamental arguments:

a. If equals are taken from equals the remainders are equal.

b. Being (esse) and the thing that is (id quod est) are different. Simple being awaits
manifestation, but a thing is and exists as soon as it has received the form which is;
but it is something after it has acquired Being.

c. A thing that exists can participate in something else; but absolute Being can in no wise
participate in anything. For participation is effected when a thing already is; but it is
something after it has acquired Being.

d. That which exists can posses something besides itself. But absolute Being has no
admixture of aught besides itself.

e. Everything that is participates in absolute Being through the fact that it exists. In order
to be something it participates in something else. Hence that which exists participate in
absolute Being through the fact that it exists, but it exists in order to participate in
something else.

f. Every simple thing possesses as a unity its absolute and its particular Being.

g. In every composite thing absolute and individual Being are not one and the same

h. Diversity repels; likeness attracts. That which seeks something outside itself is
demonstrably of same nature as that which it seeks.

With these metaphysical statements, we can explain the above thesis of Beothius. The
explanation is that things which are, are good. However we need to inquire how they are good.
Is it by participation or by substance? If by participation, they are in no wise good in
themselves; for a thing which is white by participation in whiteness is not white in itself by
virtue of absolute Being.

c. Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite: 500 AD

i. Introductory note

During the Middle Ages the writings which were then ascribed to St. Paul’s Athenian convert,
Dionysius the Areopagite, enjoyed high esteem, not only among mystics and authors of works
on mystical theology, but also among professional theologians and philosophers, such as St.
Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas. The reverence and respect paid to these writings
were, of course, in great part due to the mistaken notion as to their authorship, a mistake which
originated in the author’s use of a pseudonym. To put it differently, it was believed the name of
Dionysius Areoropagita was the writer’s pseudonym which was scarcely ever suspected before
the fifteenth century.

In 533 the patriarch of Antioch, Severus, appealed to the works of Dionysius in

support of his Monophysite doctrine. The latter doctrine talks about somebody who
believes that Jesus Christ has a single inseparable nature that is both human and divine.
So the fact that such doctrine could be elaborated with reference to Dionysius’s
writings is prima facie the evidence that his writings possessed some authority.
Additionally, Dionysius owed most of his inspiration as a speculative thinker to
earlier Christian Platonists, especially Gregory of Nyssa and also Proclus, whose
concept of emanation Denis largely adapted to a Christian context.
ii. About God
According to Dionysius there are two ways of approaching God, the center of all
speculations. There is a positive way known as Cataphatike and the negative way
known as Apophatike.
A. In the positive way or method the mind begins with the most universal
statements, and through intermediate terms proceeds to particular titles, thus beginning
with the highest category. According to the author, this method is theaffirmative
method which shows how names such as Goodness, Life, Wisdom, are applicable to
God in a transcendental manner and how they apply to creature only in the virtue of
their derivation from and their varying degrees of participation in those qualities which
are found in God not as inhering qualities but in substantial unity. To put it differently,
Dionysius begins with the idea or name of Goodness, which is the most universal name,
inasmuch as all things, existent or possible, share in goodness to some degree, but
which at the same time expresses the Nature of God. God as the Good, is the
overflowing source of creation and its final goal, and from the Good comes the light
which is an image of Goodness, so that the Good is described by the name of light. In
brief, the affirmative method means ascribing to God the perfection found in creatures,
that is, the perfections which are compatible with the spiritual Nature of God, though
not existing in Him in the same manner as they exist in creatures, since in God they
exist without imperfection. This affirmative way was elaborated by Dionysius in his
book called Divine Names and in his Symbolic theology and outlines of Divinity
B. In his Mystical Theology, Dionysius is going to propound on the negative way
which consists in the exclusion from God of the imperfections of creatures. In this
method, according to the author, the mind begin by denying of God those things which
are farthest removed from him, e.g. drunkenness of fury and proceeds upwards
progressively denying of God the attributes and qualities of creatures, until it reaches
“the super-essential Darkness”. Dionysius argues that God is utterly transcendent,
we praise Him best by denying or removing all things that are bad, just like who,
carving a statue out of marble, remove all the impediments that hinder the clear
perception of the latent image and by this mere removal display he hidden statue
itself in its hidden beauty. Additionally, the author argues that human being is inclined
to form anthropomorphic conceptions of the Deity, and it is so necessary to strip away
these human, all-too-human conceptions. However, we need to note that Dionysius
does not mean that from this process there results a clear view of what God is in
himself. To this end he argues that when the mind has stripped away from God the
human modes of thought and inadequate conceptions of the Deity, it enters upon the
“Darkness of Unknowing” wherein, it renounces all the apprehension of the
understanding and wrapped in that which is wholly intangible and invisible united to
Him that is wholly unknowable. Dionysius says this is the province of Mysticism. This
Darkenness of Unknowing is not due to the unintelligibility of the Object considered in
itself, but to the finiteness of the human mind, which is blinded by excess of light
iii. The creation of the world and God
According to Pseudo-Dionysius, the relation of the world to God is based on the
concept of emanation also known as πρόοδος(proodos) of God into the universe of
things. However, he is going to combine the neo-platonic emanation theory with the
Christian doctrine of creation. To this end, he propounds that since God bestows
existence on all things that are, He is said to become manifold through bringing forth
existent things from Himself; yet at the same time God remains One even in the act of
“self-multiplication” and without differentiation even in the process of emanation.
Here, Dionysius resonates in the same order of idea as Proclus who said that God or the
first principle does not change or become less through the process of emanation.
Pseudo-Dionysius is going to argue at length that God exist indivisibly and without
multiplication of Himself in all individual, separate and multiple things, and, though
they participate in the goodness which springs from Him and though they may in a
certain sense be thought of as an “extention” of God, God Himself is not involved in
their multiplication. The world in short, is an out flowing of the divine goodness, but it
is not God Himself.
From this argument, Pseudo-Dionysius is establishing the transcendent and the
immanent character of God. That God is transcendent; Pseudo-Dionysius affirms that
God created the world through the exemplary or archetypalideas, the “Pre-ordination”
also known as the προορίσμοί (proorismoi) which exists in Him. In addition, God is the
final cause all things, drawing all things to Himself as the Good. He is therefore the
beginning and the end of all things: He is the beginning as their cause and He is the end
as their Purpose. There is then an out going from God and a return to God, a process of
multiplication and a process of intercommunion and return.

d. John ScotusEriugena: 810 – 877

One of the most remarkable phenomena of the ninth century is the philosophical system of John
Scotus which stands out like a lofty rock in the midst of a plain. However, it should be noted
that John relied largely on the former speculation of St. Gregory of Nyssa and particularly on
the on the work of Pseudo-Dionysius. Indeed, John formulated a metaphysical system in which
he sought to fuse Christian and neoplatonic teachings. His writings appear to have been read in
his own time and he had some influence on later thinkers, but there is a sense in which he was
outside the main stream of mediaeval Christian thought. The interpretation of John’s teaching is
not an easy task. On the one hand, he cites Scripture and the writings of the Greek and Latin
Fathers and expresses himself in the language of orthodox Christian thought. On the other hand,
many passages in his work have a pantheistic ring. That is why he is sometime considered to be
a pantheist in Christian guise.

1.On division of Nature

The work for which John Scotus is celebrated is the De DivisioneNaturaewhere he propounds
on the question of nature.

“Nature” is the fundamental concept of John’s thought. Identifying nature with being and
reality, he defines it as the totality of those things which are and those which are not. This most
general description of nature includes even God, though it does not seem to follow that
Eriugena considered God as part of nature or that, for him, God and nature are identical.

Distinguishing between creating and created beings, and using these terms and their negations
in all possible combinations, John divides nature into four species. There is first of all nature
which creates, but is not created. Secondly, there is nature which is created and creates. Thirdly,
there is nature which is created, but does not create. Finally, there is nature which neither
creates nor is created. Having made this logical distinction, Eriugena is going to proceed to
interpret them ontologically.

a. Nature which creates but is not created: According to Eriugena, this nature is
identical with God who is the uncaused cause who created all things out of
nothing.Viewed in this manner God is said to be transcendent as described in
Scripture. At this same time God is said to be the essence of all things, their
beginning, middle and end, and a being appearing in all things. According to this
description God is immanent. God is thus, the first principle, since all creatures
proceed from him, the middle (medium). It is in him and through Him that
creatures subsist and move and the end, the final cause since he is the return of the
creature’s movement of self-development and perfection.

b. Nature which is created and creates: From God, who is uncreated but creates,
proceeds that nature which is created and creates. Eriugena identifies this nature
with the primordial causes, Ideas, predestination, or prototypes. The primordial
causes are the exemplary causes of all things and they were implanted by God, the
Father, within the Divine Word, the son.

c. Nature which is created but does not create: From the primordial causes flows
that nature which is created but does not create. This is the world of angels, men,
and bodies. It is here that Eriugena is going to describe the creation of the world by
using the variety of metaphors or analogies for emanation. For example, the world
is said to come from God a water from a fountain. Then again, the world is said to
be related to God as the radii of a circle to its center. In still another way, Eriugena
describes creation as the self-manifestation or revelation of God (theophany). In
line with this description, he affirms that God, in making the world, makes
Himself.

d. Nature which neither creates nor is created:this fourth division refers to God as
the final cause to which all things will return. The final cause which is not create
and does not create.

2.Creatures as “participation”
John speaks of Natura quae creaturet non creat which consists of creatures, exterior to God,
forming the world of nature in the narrow sense, which was made by God out of nothing. John
Scotus calls these creatures “ Participations”, and asserts that they participate in the primordial
causes, as the latter participate immediately in God. The primordial causes, therefore, look
upwards the ultimate Prinicple and downwards towards their multiple effects, a doctrine which
obviously smacks of the neo-platonic emanation theory. “Participation” means, however,
derivation from, and, interpreting Greek μετοχή or μετουσία as meaning μεταέχυσία or
μεταουσία which simply means post-essentia or secunda essential in Latin, John says that
participation is nothing else than derivation of the second essence from a higher essence. To
this end, John is going to argue analogically that just like water rises in a fountain and is poured
out into the river-bed, so the divine goodness, essence, life etc., which are in the Fount of all
things, flow out first of all into the primordial causes and causes them to be, and then proceed
through the primordial causes into their effect. To this end, John is going to assert that God is
everything, He makes all things and is made in all things. He argues that the divine goodness is
progressively diffused through the universe of creation, in such a way that it “makes all things,
and is made in all things, and is all things.

3. Creatures as theophanies

John argues that creatures constitute, not only a “ participation” of the divine goodness, but
also the divine self-manifestation or theophany. To qualify his argument, John explains that all
objects of intellection or sensation are “the appearance of the non-appearing, the manifestation
of the hidden, the comprehension of the incomprehensible, the speaking of the ineffable, the
approach of the unapproachable, the understanding of the unintelligible, the body of the
incorporeal, the essence of the super-essential. Just as the human mind, itself invisible becomes
visible or manifest in words and writing and gesture, so the invisible God reveals Himself in
nature, which is therefore, a true theophany.

4. The doctrine of Man

John Scotus, states that we can say of man that he is an animal, while we can also say that he is
not an animal. This is because according John in as far as man shares with the animals the
functions of nutrition, sensation etc., he is an animal. However in as far as he has also the
faculty of reason, which is peculiar to him and which elevates him above all the animals, he is
said not to be just an animal but a rational animal. However, he argues that there are not two
souls in man, an animal soul and a rational soul. There is a rational soul which is simple and is
wholly present in every part of the body, performing its various functions. Hence, John Scotus,
defines man as animal rationale, understanding by animal the genus and by rationale the
specific difference. Additionally, he argues that human soul is made in the image of God. To
this end, he states that this soul’s likeness to God expresses the true substance and essence of
man. Hence, as the soul exists in any actual man it is an effect and as it exists in God it is a
primordial cause, though these are but two ways of looking the same thing: soul. To this end
man from one point of view is definable and from one point of view is undefinable since the
mind or reason of man is made in the image of God and the image, like God himself, exceeds
our power of understanding.

Additionally, John Scotus tells us that man is the microcosm of the creation since he
sums up in himself the material world and the spiritual world, sharing with the plants the
power of growth and nutrition, with the animals the power understanding. Indeed man is called
the δέσμος or the bond, the link between the material and spiritual, the visible and invisible
creation.

e. Anselm of Canterbury :1033 – 1109

Anselm was born at Aosta, in the Italian Alps, in 1033. Like most saints, he is said to have
given early evidence of religious vocation; and again like many, he met with opposition from
his father. He took up the life of a wandering scholar and eventually settled at Norman
monastery of Bec. Anselm became a Monk in 1060. By 1063 he became a Prior and in 1078 he
was elevated to the office of an Abbot. Hence from 1063 to 1093 he was thus an administrator
and teacher of one of the model abbeys. It is worth noting Anselm was an unusually humane
mediaeval teacher, who objected to the popular assumption that frequent beatings have
pedagogical values

During these days, he wrote his celebrated works dealing with the existence of God, the
MonologiumandProslogium; the semantical work on literature called De grammatico; on the
the truth called De veritate; and on the freedom of choice called Le libertatearbitri. In 1093 he
was literally dragged into the office of Archbishop of Canterbury, in which role he engaged in
the investiture controversy with Kings William II and Henry I of England. Anselm additionally
maintained the position that on clerical matters he must obey the Pope. In spite of pastoral
duties, journeys and exiles, he wrote the Cur dues homo (why God became Man) and a number
of theological treatises which were left unfinished notably: De postetateetimpotentia,
possibilitateetimpossibilitate, necessitate etlibertate. Indeed the character of Anselm can be seen
in his reply to the report that he would soon die and this is what he had to say: “If it is His will
I shall gladly obey, but if He should prefer me to stay with you just long enough to solve the
question of the origin of the soul which I have been turning over in my mind, I would
gratefully accept the chance, for I doubt whether anybody else will solve it when I am gone”
Anselm was canonized in 1494.
 1.Proof of God’s existence

a. Proof in the monologium by degree of perfection

Here, St. Anselm develops the proof of God’s existence from the degree of perfections which
are found in creatures. He applies the argument to goodness and greatness. He argues that such
qualities are found in varying degrees in the objects of experience. Thus, this argument
proceeds from the empirical observation of degree of, for example, goodness. As such this
argument is called an a posteriori argument. To put it different, Anselm says that the argument
is a posteriori argument in that it does not proceed from the idea of absolute goodness to the
existence of absolute goodness but from observed degree of goodness to the existence of
absolute goodness and from the degree of wisdom to the existence absolute wisdom, the
absolute goodness and absolute wisdom being then identified as God. Accordingly, St. Anselm
is going to further his argument that by saying that, judgment about the degree of perfection is
objectively grounded in that it implies a reference to a standard of perfection. By reference to
the standard of perfection, we simply mean that things, for example, participate objectively in
absolute goodness, to which they approximate more or less nearly.

b. Proof in the monologium by causality

Whatever exists, exists either through something or through nothing. However, Anselm is
going to dispel the latter supposition as qualifies is as absurd. So he asserts that whatever then
exists, must exist through something this means that all existing things exist either through one
another or through themselves or through one cause of existence. Additionally, to this
argument, Anselm is going to add a Platonic element when he argues that if there is a plurality
of existent things which have being of themselves, i.e. are self-dependent and uncaused, there is
a form of being-of-itself in which all participate. The implication is that when several beings
possess the same form, there must be unitary being external to them which is that form. There
can, therefore, be but one self-existent or ultimate Being, and this must be the best and highest
and greatest of all that is.

c. Proof of God in the Proslogium by the Ontological argument.

In the proslogium St. Anselm develops the so-called “Ontological argument” which proceeds
from the idea of God to God as a reality, as existent. This argument has been developed in a
syllogistic form and it runs as follows:
 1.God is that than which no greater can be thought.

2.But that than which no greater can be thought must exist, not only mentally, in idea, but
also extramentally.

3.Therefore God exists, not only in idea, mentally, but also extramentally.

In this syllogism point one is a major premiss which simply gives the idea of God, the idea a
man has of God, even if he denies His existence. Whilst point two is the minor premiss which
clarifies that, if that than which no greater can be thought existed only in the mind, it would not
be that than which no greater can be thought.

In effect, this proof starts from the idea of God as that than which no greater can be conceived
i.e. as absolutely perfect. It follows that the idea of God as absolute perfection is necessarily the
idea of an existent Being, and St. Anselm argues that in this sense no one can at the same time
have the idea of God and yet deny His existence.

d. Gaunilo versus St. Anselm

The ontological argument given by St. Anselm in the Proslogium was attacked by the monk
Gaunilo. The later observed that the idea we have of a thing is no guarantee of its extramental
existence and that St. Anselm was guilty of an illicit transition from the logical to the real
order. Additionally Gaunilo argued that wemight as well say that the most beautiful islands
which are possible must exist somewhere because we conceive them.

In reaction to this above assertion by Gaunilo, St. Anselm denied that Gaunilo’s argument is
not at parity. To this end he said that since the idea of God is the of an all-perfect Being and if
absolute perfection involves existence, this idea is the idea of an existent, and necessarily
existent Being, whereas the idea of even the most possible beautiful islands is not the idea of
something which must exist. To this end St. Anselm declares that his argument and that of
Gaunilo, even in the purely logical order the two ideas are not at par.

b. Faith and reason

 f. Peter Abelard: 1079 – 1142

Peter Abelard was one of the outstanding figure of era of dialectic and theology and indeed the
one who is credited with giving “ theology” its modern sense. He was called “the Socrates of
Gaul” and like Socrates his greatest contribution is found less in any doctrine than in the rigor
of his method and in his raising the standards of philosophy. To judge from recent estimates of
his work he was a gifted logician. Thus the so-called “Terminist logic” of later centuries owed
much to him. In theology, he is known for systematic theology.

We need to note Abelard’s life was spectacular, and ended in a sort of Socratic martyrdom. He
was born in 1079 at Le pallet in Brittany and gave up the life of a knight to follow the tourney-
ground of dialectic. He is said to have studied under many masters namely: William of
Champeaux, Roscelin the Nomalist etc but he is also said to have attacked and abandoned his
teachers. He is also said to have directed a cathedral school in Paris where he became famous.

Abelard who was said to have married Heloise broke up in 1118. Their son was sent to
Abelard’s sister. Heloise went to the convent whereas Abelard had become a monk at the royal
abbey of St. Denys. Abelard is said to have written and taught a lot. He was described as a
genius versatile, subtle, and sharp. In exploring Abelard, we shall limit our study to his moral
mindset.

The Ethics of Abelard

a. The defect of the mind bearing upon action and sin

Abelard argues that certain defects or merits have no connection with morals. Meaning that
they (defects), do not make human life a matter of praise or blame. He argues that such feature
such as dull wits or quick insight; a good or bad memory; ignorance or knowledge, each of
these features is found in bad and good alike. He says they have nothing to do with the system
of morals, nor with making life base or honorable.

Abelard further argues that the defect of this mental kind is not the same thing as sin. Sin too is
not the same as a bad action. For example, to be irascible, that is, prone or easily roused to the
agitation of anger is a defect and moves the mind to unpleasantly impetuous and irrational
action. This defect, however, is in the mind so that the mind is liable to wrath, even when it is
not actually roused to it. Similarly, lameness, by reason of which a man is said to be lame, is in
the man himself even when he does not walk and reveal his lameness. This is because the
defect is there though action maybe missing. By the defects that we do not sin.
 b. Definition of “defect” and of sin

Defect is that whereby we are disposed to sin. We are inclined to consent to what we ought not
to do, or to leave undone what we ought to do. The consent of this kind we rightly call it sin.
Sin is the reproach of the soul that merits damnation or being declared guilty by God. In a
sense, Sin is contempt of God. It is the consent to despise God and to violate his Laws. To sin is
to despise the creator, contempt of the Creator. That is not to do for Him what we believe we
should do for Him or not to renounce what we think should be renounced on His behalf.

We need to not that we have defined sin negatively by say that it means not doing or not
renouncing what we ought to do or renounce. By this definition we have clearly shown that that
sin is not a reality. It is in the state of not being than in the state of being.

For Peter, he argues further that there is a need to strive and not tocircum to the power of defect
in order to avoid sinning. To this end he is going to qualify the martyrdom as a moral act. To
defend this position, he picks on an example of a furious master who draws his sword with the
intent to kill a servant. But the servant who with all possible solutions flies and avoids death
could not but forcibly and unwillingly eventually kills the master to survive death. In this case,
the servant is said to have posed an evil will and to have sinned. The will is evil because he
consented to the defect which is in him and which he could have fought and possibly avoid
killing. No one gave him the sword he took it and killed the master and so he sinned. To this
end peter argues that martyrs have died morally because they fought and strived to the end by
not consenting to the defect. It is in this sense that biblical texts from 2 Timothy II, 2 says “ No
one shall be crowned who has not truly striven”. This striving means standing less against men
than against myself, so that defects may not lure me into base consent.

c. Recompense of action and God’s Justice

Peter argues that some recompense should be made for good and bad deeds. Rewards are meant
for good actions or are meant so that we may be stirred too good actions. Punishments are
meant for bad actions or so that we may be deterred from executing bad actions.

In as far as Justice is concerned, Peter argues that God assigns the penalty of each crime
according to the measure of guilt. He argue that the degree of contempt displayed by men to
God is afterwards proportionately punished, whatever be their condition or calling. To this end
he argues that a Monk and a lay-brother who both fornicate, deserve the same penalty.
Peter applies the same notion where one man , sinning openly, offends many, and corrupts them
by his example; while another man sins in secret, and injures only himself. He states that the
secret sinner’s intention and contempt of God are identical with those of the open sinner and so
they both merit the same penalty. He argues that the man who does not restrain himself out of
respect for God would hardly refrain, for the same reason from public crime. Peter argues that
in the recompense of God or Evil, God notes the soul, not its external effects, and counts what
comes from our guilt or good will. it is the soul in its scheme of intention, not in the outward
result of its action, that God assesses.

d. The good Action and Good Intention

Peter argues that there are actions which are common to saint and sinners, all of them
indifferent and only to be called bad or good according to the intention of the agent. Such
actions are so described because they a performed either with bad intention or good intention.
The clear cut line according to Peter is that only good intention harbors good actions and bad
intention bad actions. He resonates with St. Augustine who says that only from good intention
springs good action. Explaining this standpoint Peter says we call the intention good which is
right in itself, but the action is good, not because it contains within it some good, but because it
issues from a good intention. He adds that the same act may be done by the same man at
different times. According to the diversity of his intention, however, this act may be at one time
good and at another time bad.

5. Islamic Philosophy

To come upon a chapter on the philosophy of the Arabs in a work devoted to mediaeval
thought, in the sense of the thought of mediaeval Christendom, might astonish a reader who
was making his first acquaintance with the philosophy of the Middle Ages. But the influence,
positive and negative of Islamic philosophy on that of Christendom is now a matter of common
knowledge among historians, and one can scarcely avoid saying something on the subject. As
already stated above, The Arabian philosophy was one of the principal channels whereby the
complete Aristotle was introduced to the West. However, the great philosopher of mediaeval
Islam notably Avicenna and Averroes, were more than mere transmitters. They changed and
developed the philosophy of Aristotle more or less according to the spirit of neo-Platonism, and
several of them interpreted Aristotle on important points in a sense which was incompatible
with the Christian theology and faith. Aristotle therefore when he appeared to mediaeval
Christian thinkers in the shape given him by Averroes, for example, naturally appeared as an
enemy of Christian wisdom. This explains to a large extent the opposition offered to
Aristotelianism in the thirteenth century by many upholders of the Christian tradition. Moslem
philosophers are divided into two groupsnotably the Eastern group and the Western group. For
our interest we shall tackle three thinkers belonging to the Eastern group.

a. Abu Nasr Al-farabi: 870 – 950

Alfarabi belonged to the school of Baghdad and died in about 950. Alfarabi was a major
representative of Aristotelianism. He is said to be the “second teacher” with Aristotle being the
first teacher. Alfarabi commented on many of Aristotle’s works, wrote expositions of Platonic
and Aristotelian doctrine and in addition he composed a number of independent works. His
political theories became perhaps his most distinctive contribution to Muslim and Jewish
thought. Among his Muslim successors there was hardly anyone who was not influenced by his
teachings and several Jewish thinkers, Maimonides in particular, held him in high esteem. The
Christian world knew him through Latin translations of some of his works, but he was
overshadowed by Avicenna and Averroes.

b. The two metaphysical doctrines of Abu Nasr Al-farabi

The first of his metaphysical doctrines is his distinction between possible and necessary
existence. He argues that when the mind reflects upon existing things, it finds that there are
some which can exist or not exist, while there are others which necessarily must exist. From
this reflection it becomes clear that all existing things are divisible into those which are
possible and those which are necessary. To which it should be added that the series of
necessary things comes to an end with a being necessary through itself and this is God. The
second of his metaphysical doctrines bows down on an examination that existent things reveal
that the mind can think their essence without concomitantly thinking that these things exit.
Hence according to Alfarabi, existence is different from and supperadded to essence, and
essence and existence are ontologically distinct.

c. On God and the Creation of the world

God, according to Alfarabi, is identical with neoplatonic One and at the same time with
Aristotle’s divine thought thinking itself. Besides being one, God is knowing, true and living.
Additionally, Alfarabi argues that in God all these attributes are identical with His essence. God
is incorporeal, pure intellect and the creator of everything that exists.

To explain the origin of the world, Alfarabi turns to the neoplatonic doctrine of emanation.
God, according to Alfarabi, contemplates Himself and from this contemplation there issues
fourth from Him an intellect which is the first emanation. From intellect there emanates
successively nine further intellects, the last of which is so-called Agent Intellect. To each
intellect belongs a celestial sphere, though the intellect exists in separation from its sphere.
Invoking neoplatonic cosmological doctrines, Alfarabi identifies each of the first nine sphere
with a celestial body. In descending order the spheres are: The first all-encompasing sphere, the
sphere of the fixed stars, Saturn, Jupter, Mars, Sun, Venus, Mercury and the moon. The Agent
Intellect governs the sublunar sphere which is the sphere of generation and corruption. Within
the sublunar sphere, intellectual, animate, and natural powers are at work, and everything
within it is composed of matter and form.

d. The doctrine of the intellect

Alfarabi follows closely Aristotle who in the De Anima divides the intellect according to the
four senses notably: Intellect in Potentiality, Intellect in actuality, Acquired intellect and Agent
intellect.

The intellect which is in potentiality is some soul, or part of a soul, or one of the faculties of the
soul, or something whose essence is ready and prepared to abstract the quiddities of all existing
things and their forms from their matters, so that it makes all of them a form for itself or forms
for itself. And those forms which are abstracted from their matters do not become abstracted
from their matters in which their existence is unless they become forms for this essence [the
intellect in potentiality]. Those forms abstracted from their matters which become forms in this
essence are intelligible, and this name [intelligible] is derived for them from the name of that
essence which abstracts the forms of existing things, so that they become forms for it. The
essence is like matter in which forms. To this end, Alfarabi follows closely Aristotle and argues
that “ if you imagine some corporeal matter, for example, a piece of wax on which an
impression is stamped, and that impression and that form comes to be in its surface and its
depth and that form gets possession of all matter so that the matter in its complete totality
becomes that form because the form is spread out in it, then your imagination is close to
picturing the manner in which the forms of things come to be in that essence which is like
matter and substractum for that form.

In accordance with this example, one should imagine the coming to be of the forms of existing
things in that essence which Aristotle in the De Anima calls intellect in potentiality. Hence as
long as there is not within it any of the forms of existing things, it is intellect in potentiality.
However, when there come to be in it the forms of existing things, then that essence becomes
intellect in actuality. And when there come to be in it the intelligible which it abstracts from the
matters, then those intelligible become intelligible in actuality. Before they were abstract from
their matters they were intelligible in potentiality, but when they were abstracted, they became
intelligible in actuality, because they became forms for that essence. But they are intelligible in
actuality and the intellect is an intellect in actuality that is the very same thing.

Additionally, we can argue with Alfarabi that the intelligible which are intelligible in
potentiality are, before they become intelligible in actuality, forms in matter outside the soul.
But when they become intelligible in actuality, then their existence insofar as they are
intelligible in actuality, is not the same as their existence insofar as they are forms in matters.
And their existence in themselves [ as forms in matters] is not the same as their existence
insofar as they are intelligible in actuality.

Accordingly, alfarabi argues that the existence of the forms in themselves, of the forms in the
matters follows the rest of that which is joined to them namely: the place, time, position,
quantity, corporeal quality, action. Many of these categories are removed from them, so that
their existence becomes another existence different from the existence of forms in themselves.

Alfarabi pushes his reflection further to say when the intelligible become intelligible in
actuality, they become then one of the things existing in the world, and they are counted,
insofar as they are intelligible, among the totality of existing things. In this case, intelligible
insofar as they are intelligible in actuality, are now thought. And that which is thought is then
nothing but that which is intellect in actuality.

In as far as Acquired intellect is concerned, Al-farabi argues that if there are existing things
which are forms not in matters and which never were forms in matter, then those forms
become, when they are thought, an existing thing, namely an intelligible, possessing the same
kind of existence which the forms had before they were thought. However, we need to note
here, as already stipulated above that when something is first thought it means that the forms
which exist in matters are abstracted from their matters and there comes to them some other
existence, different from their first existence. But we need to note here that if there exist things
which are forms which have no matter, it is not at all necessary that this essence i.e the intellect
in potentiality abstracts them from matter, but it encounters them as abstracted and thinks them
just as it encounters itself or its essence (insofar as it is an intellect in actuality), as intelligible
which are not in their matters and thinks them. And its existence, insofar as it is an intelligible,
becomes a second intellect and this is the same existence which belonged to it before it was
thought by this intellect. Thus when the intellect in actuality thinks these intelligible, insofar as
they are intelligibles in actuality, then the intellect in actuality becomes now the acquired
intellect.

As for the Agent intellect, which Aristotle mentioned in the third treatise of De Anima, is a
separated form of which never neither existed in matter nor ever will exist in it, and it is in a
certain manner an intellect in actuality close in likeness to acquired intellect. However, the
agent intellect in that principle which makes that essence which was an intellect in potentiality,
an intellect in actuality and which makes the intelligible which are intelligible in potentiality,
intelligible in actuality.

e. IbnSina (Avicenna): 980 – 1037

1.Biographical note

The greatest of Moslem philosopher of the eastern group is without doubt Avicenna or Ibn
Sina. He is the real creator of the Scholastic system in the Islamic world. A Persian by birth,
born near Borkhana, he received his education in the Arabic tongue and most of his works,
which were extremely numerous, were written in Arabic. A precocious boy, he learnt in
succession the Koran, Arabic literature, geometry, jurisprudence, logic. Outstripping his
instructors, he studied by himself theology, physics, mathematics and medicine, and at sixteen
years of age he was already practicing as a doctor. He then devoted a year and half to the study
of philosophy and logic, but it was only when he chanced upon a commentary by Al-farabi that
he was able to understand to his satisfaction the metaphysics of Aristotle which he had read
forty times without being able to understand it. The rest of his life was adventurous and busy as
he spent most of his time practicing medicine. He also devoted most of his time writing even in
prison. He died at Hamadan at the age of fifty-seven, after performing his ablutions, repenting
of his sins, distributing abundant alms and freeing his slaves. His principle was is AS SIFA,
known as SUFFICIENTIAE, which comprised logic, mathematics, psychology and
metaphysics. The NAJAT was a collection of texts, taken from the first work and arraged in a
different order.

2.Metaphysics of Avicenna

Avicenna argues that things which are included in existence can be divided in the mind into two
kinds. One of these is that which, when it is considered in itself, does not have its existence by
necessity. However, it is also clear that its existence is also not impossible, for if its existence
were impossible, it would not be included in existence. This thing is in the domain of
possibility argues Avicenna. The other of these is that which, when it is considered in itself, has
its existence by necessity. Avicenna argues that, that whose existence is necessary through
itself does not have a cause while that whose existence is necessary through itself does have a
cause. Further, that whose existence is necessary through itself is necessary in respect to
existence in all of its aspect. He again argues that it is not possible that the existence of that
whose existence is necessary is co-equal with another existence so that each of them is equal
with the other in respect to the necessity of existence and so that both necessarily accompany
each other. Moreover, it is not possible that the existence of that whose existence is necessary
be composed of a multitude at all. Finally, it is not possible that the true nature which that
whose existence is necessary possesses is shared in any way whatsoever. It follows then that
according to Avicenna that that whose existence is necessary is not relative, not changeable, not
multiple, not sharing in respect to the existence which is peculiar to it.

Indeed, Avicenna deciphers that everything whose existence is through some other thing does
not have existence by necessity when it is considered in itself apart from that other. And
everything which does not have existence by necessity when it is considered in itself apart from
the other, is not necessary in respect to existence through itself. Hence it is evident that if that
whose existence is necessary through itself were to have a cause, it would not be something
whose existence is necessary through itself. It is clear then that that whose existence is
necessary does not have a cause. From that it is also clear that it is not possible that something
in necessary in respect to the existence through itself and simultaneously necessary in respect to
existence to existence through another. For if its existence is necessary through another, it
cannot exist without that other. And whenever something cannot exist without another, it is
impossible that its existence is necessary through itself. For if it where necessary through itself,
it would already exist.

Furthermore, Avicenna argues that everything whose existence is possible has, when it is
considered in respect to itself, both its existence and its non-existence from a cause. For if it
exists, existence as distinguished from non-existence has come to it, and if it does not exist,
non-existence as distinguished from existence has come to it. The attribute of existence comes
from a cause which is an existing cause, while the attribute of non-existence comes from a
cause which is the absence of a cause for the attribute of existence.

3.The question of Unity in Necessary Existence and the idea of Particulization

Avicenna argues that that whose existence is necessary must be necessary be one essence. For
if it were not, it would be a multitude each one of whose parts would be something whose
existence is necessary. It would follow then that each one of these parts would not at all differ
from another in regard to the notion which is its true nature. This is because the notion of
essence which exists in the different parts is not differentiated in so far as it is an essence, but
insofar as there is adjoined to it something through which it comes to be this particular part or
in this particular part, or insofar as there is adjoined to it the determination that it is this
particular part through something within itself. And that which is adjoined to the essence in one
part is not adjoined to it in other part, but that through which the other part becomes that other
or the determination that the other part is that other part. This adjoined notion is a principle of
particulization which is adjoined to this notion that is, the essence and through it the two parts
are differentiated.

4. The division of Causes and their disposition.

Avicenna argues that there are four kinds of causes which are Formal cause, Elemental cause,
Agent cause and Purpose cause. By formal cause we have in mind the cause which is part of the
subsistence of something, through which the thing is what it is in actuality. By elemental cause
we have in mind the cause which is part of the subsistence of something, through which the
thing is what it is in potentiality and in which there rests the potentiality of its existence. By the
Agent we have in mind the cause which bestows existence separate from itself, that is, its
essence is not, according to the first intention, an underlying subject for that which receives
from it the existence of something which is formed by it, so that it is in itself the potentiality of
its existence that is, the existence which it bestows only accidentally.

Additionally, Avicenna argues that the cause of something must either enter its subsistence and
be part of its existence, or it must not. If however, the cause is not part of its existence, then it is
either that for the sake of which it exists. now if it is that for the sake of which the thing exists
then it is the purpose.

5. About the Temporal Origin of the Soul

It is argued and proved that the soul come into existence whenever a body does so fit to be
used. The body which thus comes into being is the kingdom and instrument of the soul.
Avicenna argues that in the very disposition of the substance of the soul which comes into
existence together with certain body, there is a natural yearning to occupy itself with that body,
to use it, control it, and be attracted by it. This yearning binds the soul specially to this body,
and turns it away from other bodies different from it in nature so that the soul does not contact
them except through it ( ie the body). Thus when the principle of its individuation, namely, its
peculiar dispositions, occur to it, it becomes an individual. These disposition determine its
attachment to that particular body and form the relationship of their mutual suitability, although
this relationship and conditions may be obscure to us.

Additionally, Avicenna argues that the soul achieves its first entelechy through the body; its
subsequent development however does not depend on the body but on its own nature. He later
asserts that, after their separation from their bodies the souls remain individual owing to the
different matters in which they had been, and owing to the times of their birth and their
different dispositions due to their bodies which necessarily differ because of their peculiar
conditions.
 f. Ibn Rushd (Averroes): 1126 – 1198

6. Jewish Philosophy

The most important Jewish Neo-Platonist was Solomon IbnGabirol who was known as
Avicebrol in Latin. It is with him that Jewish philosophy was introduced in Spain in the Islamic
west. However, the Jewish Aristotelianismreached its climax with Moses Maimonides who
became the overpowering figure of mediaeval Jewish thought. In this section, IbnGabirol stands
for the Neo-Platonist whilst Maimonides exemplifies a king of Aristotelianism.

a. Solomon IbinGabirol: 1022 – 1070

b. Moses Maimonides: 1135 – 1204

7. The problem of the Universal