G.R. No.

L-630            November 15, 1947 constitutional question may never come up again before this court, because both vendors and vendees
will have no interest but to uphold the validity of their transactions, and very unlikely will the register of
deeds venture to disobey the orders of their superior. Thus, the possibility for this court to voice its
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,
conviction in a future case may be remote, with the result that our indifference of today might signify a
vs.
permanent offense to the Constitution.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.

All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number of days and
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant.
the legal result of the last vote was a denial of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We are thus
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for respondent-appellee.
confronted, at this stage of the proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question becomes
Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies.
unavoidable. We shall then proceed to decide that question.

MORAN, C.J.:
Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:

Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of
1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said
registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he
cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court
of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the
refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.
There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under our
Constitution may acquire residential land.
It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw the
appeal which should have been granted outright, and reference is made to the ruling laid down by this
Court in another case to the effect that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question if its
judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds. There is, we believe, a confusion of ideas in this
reasoning. It cannot be denied that the constitutional question is unavoidable if we choose to decide this
case upon the merits. Our judgment cannot to be made to rest upon other grounds if we have to render
any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment simply because we have to avoid a constitutional
question. We cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the appeal only because we wish to
evade the constitutional; issue. Whether the motion should be, or should not be, granted, is a question
involving different considerations now to be stated.
According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court to grant a
withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been presented. At the time the motion for withdrawal was
filed in this case, not only had the briefs been prensented, but the case had already been voted and the
majority decision was being prepared. The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever, and the
Solicitor General was agreeable to it. While the motion was pending in this Court, came the new circular
of the Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of
residential lots to aliens. The herein respondent-appellee was naturally one of the registers of deeds to
obey the new circular, as against his own stand in this case which had been maintained by the trial court
and firmly defended in this Court by the Solicitor General. If we grant the withdrawal, the the result
would be that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court,
but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice, issued while this case was pending before
this Court. Whether or not this is the reason why appellant seeks the withdrawal of his appeal and why
the Solicitor General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now immaterial. What is material and indeed
very important, is whether or not we should allow interference with the regular and complete exercise
by this Court of its constitutional functions, and whether or not after having held long deliberations and
after having reached a clear and positive conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is, we may still
allow our conviction to be silenced, and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or misconceived, with
all the harmful consequences that might be brought upon the national patromony. For it is but natural
that the new circular be taken full advantage of by many, with the circumstance that perhaps the
Article XIII. — Conservation and utilization of natural resources.
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject
to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inaguration of the
Government established uunder this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no licence, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water "power" in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the
limit of the grant.
The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all lands of
any kind of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the
conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this provision, with
reference to lands of the public domain, makes mention of only agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it
means that all lands of the public domain are classified into said three groups, namely, agricultural,
timber and mineral. And this classification finds corroboration in the circumstance that at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic classification existing in the public laws and judicial
decisions in the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural lands" under said classification had then
acquired a technical meaning that was well-known to the members of the Constitutional Convention
who were mostly members of the legal profession.
As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said that the
phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to
be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those public lands acquired from
Spain which are neither mineral for timber lands." This definition has been followed in long line of
decisions of this Court. (See Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular
Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39
Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) And with respect to residential lands,
it has been held that since they are neither mineral nor timber lands, of necessity they must be classified
as agricultural. In Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said:
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted
into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining

1
 or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural
land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was
originally agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act
of Congress contains only three classification, and makes no special provision with respect to
building lots or urban lands that have ceased to be agricultural land.
In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not
only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural purposes.
But whatever the test might be, the fact remains that at the time the Constitution was adopted, lands of
the public domain were classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber,
and that the term "public agricultural lands" was construed as referring to those lands that were not
timber or mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely be presumed, therefore, that what the
members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-
known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing.
Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and where
such words have been in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its
framers and the people who ratified it have used such expressions in accordance with their
technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. 683.) Also Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1 Law.
ed., 648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.)
It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall be
given the meaning which had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at the time of
the framing and adoption of the instrument. If a word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning
in legal and constitutional history, it will be presumed to have been employed in that sense in
a written Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303; L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.)
Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to
have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain
meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires
that the words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they
have been so previously used, although the sense may vary from strict literal meaning of the
words. (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.)
Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution
must be construed as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a legislative interpretation
given after the adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that "where the Legislature has
revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such a revision is to be regarded as a legislative
construction that the statute so revised conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon after the
Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed
Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof permit the sale of residential lots to
Filipino citizens or to associations or corporations controlled by such citizens, which is equivalent to a
solemn declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution,
only agricultural lands may be alienated.
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public lands"
which are the same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural,
residential, commercial, industrial and for other puposes. This simply means that the term "public
agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as
used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is
particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for
purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly agricultural or actually devoted to
cultivation for agricultural puposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or lands for other
purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141,
in favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands under
said statute and under the Constitution.
It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act
No. 2874, aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes, but
after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire
such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation.
And, again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, land of the public
domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but after the
Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not
sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the purposes referred
to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation, and
this again is another legislative construction that the term "public agricultural land" includes land for
residence purposes.
Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive
Department of the Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in answer to a
query as to "whether or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII (now XIII) of
the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential, commercial, and industrial lands for purposes
of their disposition," rendered the following short, sharp and crystal-clear opinion:
Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the
Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since
the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time
of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands' and,
therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the
phrase 'agricultural public lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain which are
neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in
many subsequent case. . . .
Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be
included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of
necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.
Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are
agricultural or not, the character of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524;
Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the
land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods which determines
whether it is agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).
Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land, which
may be sold to a person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends
to use it as a site for his home.
This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later became the
Chief Justice of this Court, but also because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the late
President Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision under
consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And the opinion of the Quezon
2
administration was reiterated by the Secretary of Justice under the Osmeña administration, and it was
firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both administrations.
It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government — judicial, legislative and executive
— have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and
timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots.
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is
limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands
of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their
agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article
XIII, and it reads as follows:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred
or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may
leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to
aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the
hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to insure the policy of
nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the
same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the
prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the subject matter of both sections is
the same, namely, the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since "agricultural land" under
section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning should be attached to "agricultural land
under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a word or phrase repeated in a statute will
bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears." (II Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between "agricultural land" under section 5, is that
the former is public and the latter private. But such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of
land. The lands are the same in both sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony, what
is important is the nature or class of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its
citizens.
Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then
Secretary of Justice, to the effect that residential lands of the public domain may be considered as
agricultural lands, whereas residential lands of private ownership cannot be so considered. No reason
whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no valid reason can be adduced for such a
discriminatory view, particularly having in mind that the purpose of the constitutional provision is the
conservation of the national patrimony, and private residential lands are as much an integral part of the
national patrimony as the residential lands of the public domain. Specially is this so where, as indicated
above, the prohibition as to the alienable of public residential lots would become superflous if the same
prohibition is not equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to private
residential lands will eventually become more important, for time will come when, in view of the
constant disposition of public lands in favor of private individuals, almost all, if not all, the residential
lands of the public domain shall have become private residential lands.
It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership" were used
and later changed into "no agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into "no private agricultural
land" and from these changes it is argued that the word "agricultural" introduced in the second and final
drafts was intended to limit the meaning of the word "land" to land actually used for agricultural
purposes. The implication is not accurate. The wording of the first draft was amended for no other
purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. The words "no land" of the first draft,
unqualified by the word "agricultural," may be mistaken to include timber and mineral lands, and since
under section 1, this kind of lands can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the same would be
superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had to be drafted in harmony with section 1 to which it is
supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be
private, and the only lands that may become private are agricultural lands, the words "no land of private
ownership" of the first draft can have no other meaning than "private agricultural land." And thus the
change in the final draft is merely one of words in order to make its subject matter more specific with a
view to avoiding the possible confusion of ideas that could have arisen from the first draft.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not
strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential
lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may
validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants,
fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields,
and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor
General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond
question.
One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and which
was embodied in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other
Natural Resources of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural
resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be preserved
for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the
Filipino Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural
Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered in connection with the national
policy on agricultural lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens from the privilege of acquiring public
agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the Philippines
to keep pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines for the Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.) And, of the
same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete nationalization of our
lands and natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given birthright should be one hundred
per cent in Filipino hands . . .. Lands and natural resources are immovables and as such can be compared
to the vital organs of a person's body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the
shortening of life. If we do not completely antionalize these two of our most important belongings, I am
afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will
be just a mockery, for what kind of independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in
our hands but in those of foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego says that since the opening
days of the Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and dominating objectives was the conservation
and nationalization of the natural resources of the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the members of the Constitutional Convention who are now
members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, and Mr. Justice Hontiveros.
And, indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even operate a small
jitney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own a pieace of land.
This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the National
Assembly passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are referring again to Commonwealth
Act No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121
which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity. Said section reads as follows:
SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred,
3
 except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the
public domain under this Act; to corporations organized in the Philippine Islands authorized
therefor by their charters, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to
citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right
to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or permanent improvements
thereon, or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, only in the manner and to the extent
specified in such laws, and while the same are in force but not thereafter.
SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public
Land Act or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of
law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y
realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the
public domain or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on
such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or
associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act; to corporate bodies
organized in the Philippine Islands whose charters may authorize them to do so, and, upon
express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of the countries the laws of
which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease,
encumber, dispose of, or alienate land or pemanent improvements thereon or any interest
therein, as to their own citizens, and only in the manner and to the extent specified in such
laws, and while the same are in force, but not thereafter: Provided, however, That this
prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary
succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts, nor to lands and
improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used for such
purposes: Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and
improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred
by judicial decree to persons,corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire
the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall be
obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise
period of five years, under the penalty of such property reverting to the Government in the
contrary case." (Public Land Act, No. 2874.)
It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private lands, whether
strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been
acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in
these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon
express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to
acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the
right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came the Constitution and
Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as follows:
SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred,
except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the
public domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized
thereof by their charters.
SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act,
ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the
Philippines with regard to public lands terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or
in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered,
alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land
of the public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose
charters authorize them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be
applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly
acknowledged and legalized by competent courts: Provided, further, That in the event of the
ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding
section being transferred by judicial decree to persons, corporations or associations not
legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons,
corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others
so capacitated within the precise period of five years; otherwise, such property shall revert to
the Government.
These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only
difference being that in the new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is completely
stricken out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy contained in section 5 of Article XIII
of the Constitution which, in prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural lands to aliens, grants them
no right of reciprocity. This legislative construction carries exceptional weight, for prominent members of
the National Assembly who approved the new Act had been members of the Constitutional Convention.
It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, there being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of the means
provided in said provisions. We are not, however, diciding the instant case under the provisions of the
Public Land Act, which have to refer to land that had been formerly of the public domain, otherwise their
constitutionality may be doubtful. We are deciding the instant case under section 5 of Article XIII of the
Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it prohibits the transfer
to alien of any private agricultural land including residential land whatever its origin might have been.
And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of
"private real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly
prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a consequence of the mortgage.
This prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that are strictly agricultural and private
lands that are residental or commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in
favor of aliens, which is again a clear implementation and a legislative interpretation of the constitutional
prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that private residential lands may be sold to aliens under
the Constitution, no legislative measure would have been found necessary to authorize mortgage which
would have been deemed also permissible under the Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the
Congress that such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it was such opinion that prompted the
legislative measure intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the constitutional prohibition.
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the
Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to
preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their
homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even
in the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely excluded by the
Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is
temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the
Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino
citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public
agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.
4

G.R. No. 113539. March 12, 1998
CELSO R. HALILI and ARTHUR R. HALILI, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HELEN MEYERS GUZMAN,
DAVID REY GUZMAN and EMILIANO CATANIAG, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The factual findings of a trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, may no longer be reviewed
and reversed by this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The transfer of an
interest in a piece of land to an alien may no longer be assailed on constitutional grounds after the entire
parcel has been sold to a qualified citizen.
The Case
These familiar and long-settled doctrines are applied by this Court in denying this petition under Rule 45
to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-GR CV No. 37829 promulgated on
September 14, 1993, the dispositive portion of which states:[3]
WHEREFORE, and upon all the foregoing, the Decision of the court below dated March 10, 1992
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit is AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs.
The Facts
The factual antecedents, as narrated by Respondent Court, are not disputed by the parties. We
reproduce them in part, as follows:
Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real properties in the
Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, defendant appellee [herein private respondent] Helen
Meyers Guzman, and his son, defendant appellee [also herein private respondent] David Rey Guzman,
both of whom are also American citizens. On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim (Annex
A-Complaint), assigning[,] transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests in
and over six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from Simeon.
Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation, x x x situated in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan,
containing an area of 6,695 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-170514 of the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan. The quitclaim having been registered, TCT No. T-170514 was cancelled and
TCT No. T-120259 was issued in the name of appellee David Rey Guzman.
On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to defendant-appellee [also herein
private respondent] Emiliano Cataniag, upon which TCT No. T-120259 was cancelled and TCT No. T-
130721(M) was issued in the latters name.[4]
Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, questioning the constitutionality and validity of the two conveyances -- between Helen
Guzman and David Rey Guzman, and between the latter and Emiliano Cataniag -- and claiming ownership
thereto based on their right of legal redemption under Art. 1621[5]of the Civil Code.
In its decision[6] dated March 10, 1992,[7] the trial court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that Helen
Guzmans waiver of her inheritance in favor of her son was not contrary to the constitutional prohibition
against the sale of land to an alien, since the purpose of the waiver was simply to authorize David Rey
Guzman to dispose of their properties in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the
Philippines, and not to subvert them. On the second issue, it held that the subject land was urban;
hence, petitioners had no reason to invoke their right of redemption under Art. 1621 of the Civil Code.
The Halilis sought a reversal from the Court of Appeals which, however, denied their appeal. Respondent
Court affirmed the factual finding of the trial court that the subject land was urban. Citing Tejido vs.
Zamacoma[8] and Yap vs. Grageda,[9] it further held that, although the transfer of the land to David Rey
may have been invalid for being contrary to the Constitution, there was no more point in allowing herein
petitioners to recover the property, since it has passed on to and was thus already owned by a qualified
person.
Hence, this petition.[10]
Issues
The petition submits the following assignment of errors:
x x x the Honorable Court of Appeals -
1. Erred in affirming the conclusion of the trial court that the land in question is urban, not rural
2. Erred in denying petitioners right of redemption under Art. 1621 of the Civil Code
3. Having considered the conveyance from Helen Meyers Guzman to her son David Rey Guzman illegal,
erred in not declaring the same null and void[.][11]
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
First Issue: The Land Is Urban;
Thus, No Right of Redemption
The first two errors assigned by petitioners being interrelated -- the determination of the first being a
prerequisite to the resolution of the second -- shall be discussed together.
Subject Land Is Urban
Whether the land in dispute is rural or urban is a factual question which, as a rule, is not reviewable by
this Court.[12] Basic and long-settled is the doctrine that findings of fact of a trial judge, when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme Court. This admits of only a few exceptions, such
as when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; when an inference
made by the appellate court from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; when
there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; when the findings of the appellate court go
beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case or fail to notice
certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; when there is a
misappreciation of facts; when the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific
evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence or are contradicted by
evidence on record.[13]
5
The instant case does not fall within any of the aforecited exceptions. In fact, the conclusion of the trial
court -- that the subject property is urban land -- is based on clear and convincing evidence, as shown in
its decision which disposed thus:
x x x As observed by the court, almost all the roadsides along the national ghighway [sic] of Bagbaguin,
Sta. Maria, Bulacan, are lined up with residential, commercial or industrial establishments. Lined up
along the Bagbaguin Road are factories of feeds, woodcrafts [sic] and garments, commercial stores for
tires, upholstery materials, feeds supply and spare parts. Located therein likewise were the Pepsi-Cola
Warehouse, the Cruz Hospital, three gasoline stations, apartment buildings for commercial purposes and
construction firms. There is no doubt, therefore, that the community is a commercial area thriving in
business activities. Only a short portion of said road [is] vacant. It is to be noted that in the Tax
Declaration in the name of Helen Meyers Guzman[,] the subject land is termed agricultural[,] while in the
letter addressed to defendant Emiliano Cataniag, dated October 3, 1991, the Land Regulatory Board
attested that the subject property is commercial and the trend of development along the road is
commercial. The Boards classification is based on the present condition of the property and the
community thereat. Said classification is far more later [sic] than the tax declaration.[14]
No Ground to Invoke Right of Redemption
In view of the finding that the subject land is urban in character, petitioners have indeed no right to
invoke Art. 1621 of the Civil Code, which presupposes that the land sought to be redeemed is rural. The
provision is clearly worded and admits of no ambiguity in construction:
ART. 1621. The owners of adjoining lands shall also have the right of redemption when a piece of rural
land, the area of which does not exceed one hectare, is alienated, unless the grantee does not own any
rural land.
xxx xxx xxx
Under this article, both lands -- that sought to be redeemed and the adjacent lot belonging to the person
exercising the right of redemption -- must be rural. If one or both are urban, the right cannot be invoked.
[15] The purpose of this provision which is limited in scope to rural lands not exceeding one hectare, is to
favor agricultural development.[16] The subject land not being rural and, therefore, not agricultural, this
purpose would not be served if petitioners are granted the right of redemption under Art. 1621. Plainly,
under the circumstances, they cannot invoke it.
Second Issue: Sale to Cataniag Valid
Neither do we find any reversible error in the appellate courts holding that the sale of the subject land to
Private Respondent Cataniag renders moot any question on the constitutionality of the prior transfer
made by Helen Guzman to her son David Rey.
True, Helen Guzmans deed of quitclaim -- in which she assigned, transferred and conveyed to David Rey
all her rights, titles and interests over the property she had inherited from her husband -- collided with
the Constitution, Article XII, Section 7 of which provides:
SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
The landmark case of Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds[17] settled the issue as to who are qualified (and
disqualified) to own public as well as private lands in the Philippines. Following a long discourse
maintaining that the public agricultural lands mentioned in Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution, include residential, commercial and industrial lands, the Court then stated:
Under section 1 of Article XIII [now Sec. 2, Art. XII] of the Constitution, natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and with respect to public agricultural lands,
their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural
resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who
may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is
included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain
in the Philippines.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may
leak into aliens hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to
aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the
hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 [now Sec. 7] is intended to insure
the policy of nationalization contained in section 1 [now Sec. 2]. Both sections must, therefore, be read
together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the
persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 [now Sec. 7] are the very same persons
who under section 1 [now Sec. 2] are disqualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines. And the subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the non transferability of
agricultural land to aliens. x x x[18]
The Krivenko rule was recently reiterated in Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals,[19] which involves a sale
of land to a Chinese citizen. The Court said:
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to
acquire lands of the public domain (II Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines 439-440 [1988 ed.]).
The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the disposition, exploitation, development and
utilization of all lands of the public domain and other natural resources of the Philippines for Filipino
citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they
have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.[20]
In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except
only by way of legal succession.[21]
But what is the effect of a subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a qualified Filipino citizen?
This is not a novel question. Jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien
who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.[22]
Thus, in United Church Board of World Ministries vs. Sebastian,[23] in which an alien resident who
owned properties in the Philippines devised to an American non-stock corporation part of his shares of
stock in a Filipino corporation that owned a tract of land in Davao del Norte, the Court sustained the
invalidity of such legacy. However, upon proof that ownership of the American corporation has passed
on to a 100 percent Filipino corporation, the Court ruled that the defect in the will was rectified by the
subsequent transfer of the property.
The present case is similar to De Castro vs. Tan.[24] In that case, a residential lot was sold to a Chinese.
Upon his death, his widow and children executed an extrajudicial settlement, whereby said lot was
allotted to one of his sons who became a naturalized Filipino. The Court did not allow the original vendor
6
to have the sale annulled and to recover the property, for the reason that the land has since become the
property of a naturalized Filipino citizen who is constitutionally qualified to own land.
Likewise, in the cases of Sarsosa vs. Cuenco,[25] Godinez vs. Pak Luen,[26] Vasquez vs. Li Seng Giap[27]
and Herrera vs. Luy Kim Guan,[28] which similarly involved the sale of land to an alien who thereafter
sold the same to a Filipino citizen, the Court again applied the rule that the subsequent sale can no
longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer.
The rationale of this principle was explained in Vasquez vs. Li Seng Giap thus:
x x x [I]f the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by this
Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nations lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or
purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens
who became Filipino citizens by naturalization.[29]
Accordingly, since the disputed land is now owned by Private Respondent Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, the
prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. The objective of the constitutional provision -- to keep
our land in Filipino hands -- has been served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The challenged Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132964 February 18, 2000
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
DAVID REY GUZMAN, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, LOLITA G. ABELA, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF BULACAN, MEYCAUAYAN BRANCH, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES seeks the nullification of the 5 March 1998 Decision of the Court of
Appeals1 which affirmed the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court, Br. 77, Malolos, Bulacan, of the
petition for escheat filed by the Government.2
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses Simeon Guzman,3 a
naturalized American citizen, and Helen Meyers Guzman, an American citizen. In 1968 Simeon died
leaving to his sole heirs Helen and David an estate consisting of several parcels of land located in
Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-146837 (M), T-146839 (M), T-146840 (M), T-
146841 (M), T-146842 (M), T-120254 (M) and T-120257 (M).
On 29 December 1970 Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of
Simeon Guzman dividing and adjudicating to themselves all the property belonging to the estate of
Simeon. The document of extrajudicial settlement was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds
on 8 December 1971. The taxes due thereon were paid through their attorneys-in-fact, Attys. Juan L.
Austria and Lolita G. Abela, and the parcels of land were accordingly registered in the name of Helen
Meyers Guzman and David Rey Guzman in undivided equal shares.
On 10 December 1981 Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed assigning, transferring and conveying to her son
David her undivided one-half (1/2) interest on all the parcels of land subject matter of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman. Since the document appeared not to have
been registered, upon advice of Atty. Lolita G. Abela, Helen executed another document, a Deed of
Quitclaim, on 9 August 1989 confirming the earlier deed of quitclaim as well as modifying the document
to encompass all her other property in the Philippines.4
On 18 October 1989 David executed a Special Power of Attorney where he acknowledged that he
became the owner of the parcels of land subject of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen on 9 August
1989 and empowering Atty. Lolita G. Abela to sell or otherwise dispose of the lots. On 1 February 1990
Atty. Lolita G. Abela, upon instruction of Helen, paid donor's taxes to facilitate the registry of the parcels
of land in the name of David.
On 16 March 1994 a certain Atty. Mario A. Batongbacal wrote the Office of the Solicitor General and
furnished it with documents showing that David's ownership of the one-half (1/2) of the estate of
Simeon Guzman was defective. On the basis thereof, the Government filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos Bulacan a Petition for Escheat praying that one-half (1/2) of David's interest in each of
the subject parcels of land be forfeited in its favor. On 9 August 1994 David Rey Guzman responded with
a prayer that the petition be dismissed.
On 11 July 1995 the trial court dismissed the petition holding that the two (2) deeds of quitclaim
executed by Helen Meyers Guzman had no legal force and effect so that the ownership of the property
subject thereof remained with her.5
The Government appealed6 the dismissal of the petition but the appellate court affirmed the court a
quo.
Petitioner anchors its argument on Art. XII of the Constitution which provides —
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations
provided by law.
Thus as a rule, only a Filipino citizen can acquire private lands in the Philippines. The only instances when
a foreigner can acquire private lands in the Philippines are by hereditary succession and if he was
formerly a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship. Petitioner therefore contends
that the acquisition of the parcels of land by David does not fall under any of these exceptions. It asserts
that David being an American citizen could not validly acquire one-half (1/2) interest in each of the
subject parcels of land by way of the two (2) deeds of quitclaim as they are in reality donations inter
vivos. It also reasons out that the elements of donation are present in the conveyance made by Helen in
favor of David: first, Helen consented to the execution of the documents; second, the dispositions were
made in public documents; third, David manifested his acceptance of the donation in the Special Power
of Attorney he executed in favor of Atty. Lolita G. Abela; fourth, the deeds were executed with the
intention of benefiting David; and lastly, there was a resultant decrease in the assets or patrimony of
Helen, being the donor. Petitioner further argues that the payment of donor's taxes on the property
proved that Helen intended the transfer to be a gift or donation inter vivos.
David maintains, on the other hand, that he acquired the property by right of accretion and not by way
of donation, with the deeds of quitclaim merely declaring Helen's intention to renounce her share in the
property and not an intention to donate. He further argues that, assuming there was indeed a donation,
7
it never took effect since the Special Power of Attorney he executed does not indicate acceptance of the
alleged donation.
There are three (3) essential elements of a donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b)
the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus
donandi. When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that the
donation be made in a public document and that there should be an acceptance thereof made in the
same deed of donation or in a separate public document.7 In cases where the acceptance is made in a
separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor should be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be
noted in both instruments.8
Not all the elements of a donation of an immovable property are present in the instant case. The transfer
of the property by virtue of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen resulted in the reduction of her
patrimony as donor and the consequent increase in the patrimony of David as donee. However, Helen's
intention to perform an act of liberality in favor of David was not sufficiently established. A perusal of the
two (2) deeds of quitclaim reveals that Helen intended to convey to her son David certain parcels of land
located in the Philippines, and to re-affirm the quitclaim she executed in 1981 which likewise declared a
waiver and renunciation of her rights over the parcels of land. The language of the deed of quitclaim is
clear that Helen merely contemplated a waiver of her rights, title and interest over the lands in favor of
David, and not a donation. That a donation was far from Helen's mind is further supported by her
deposition which indicated that she was aware that a donation of the parcels of land was not possible
since Philippine law does not allow such an arrangement.9 She reasoned that if she really intended to
donate something to David it would have been more convenient if she sold the property and gave him
the proceeds therefrom.10 It appears that foremost in Helen's mind was the preservation of the Bulacan
realty within the bloodline of Simeon from where they originated, over and above the benefit that would
accrue to David by reason of her renunciation.11 The element of animus donandi therefore was missing.
Likewise, the two (2) deeds of quitclaim executed by Helen may have been in the nature of a public
document but they lack the essential element of acceptance in the proper form required by law to make
the donation valid. We find no merit in petitioner's argument that the Special Power of Attorney
executed by David in favor of Atty. Lolita G. Abela manifests his implied acceptance of his mother's
alleged donation as a scrutiny of the document clearly evinces the absence thereof. The Special Power of
Attorney merely acknowledges that David owns the property referred to and that he authorizes Atty.
Abela to sell the same in his name. There is no intimation, expressly or impliedly, that David's acquisition
of the parcels of land is by virtue of Helen's possible donation to him and we cannot look beyond the
language of the document to make a contrary construction as this would be inconsistent with the parol
evidence rule.12
Moreover, it is mandated that if an acceptance is made in a separate public writing the notice of the
acceptance must be noted not only in the document containing the acceptance but also in the deed of
donation. Commenting on Art. 633 of the Civil Code from whence Art. 74913 came Manresa said: "If the
acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Solemn words are not
necessary; it is sufficient if it shows the intention to accept . . . . it is necessary that formal notice thereof
be given to the donor, and the fact that due notice has been given must be noted in both instruments.
Then and only then is the donation perfected.14
Thus, in Santos v. Robledo we emphasized that when the deed of donation is recorded in the registry of
property the document that evidences the acceptance — if this has not been made in the deed of gift —
should also be recorded. And in one or both documents, as the case may be, the notification of the
acceptance as formally made to the donor or donors should be duly set forth.15 Where the deed of
donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance made in a separate
instrument is either not given to the donor or else noted in the deed of donation, and in the separate
acceptance, the donation is null and void.16
These requisites, definitely prescribed by law, have not been complied with, and no proof of compliance
appears in the record. The two (2) quitclaim deeds set out the conveyance of the parcels of land by
Helen in favor of David but its acceptance by David does not appear in the deeds, nor in the Special
Power of Attorney. Further, the records reveal no other instrument that evidences such acceptance and
notice thereof to the donor in an authentic manner. It is well-settled that if the notification and notation
are not complied with, the donation is void. Therefore, the provisions of the law not having been
complied with, there was no effective conveyance of the parcels of land by way of donation inter
vivos.17
However, the inexistence of a donation does not render the repudiation made by Helen in favor of David
valid. There is no valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already accepted her share of the
inheritance when she, together with David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of
Simeon Guzman on 29 December 1970 dividing and adjudicating between the two (2) of them all the
property in Simeon's estate. By virtue of such extrajudicial settlement the parcels of land were registered
in her and her son's name in undivided equal share and for eleven (11) years they possessed the lands in
the concept of owner. Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides —
The acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance, once made is irrevocable and cannot be impugned,
except when it was made through any of the causes that vitiate consent or when an unknown will
appears.
Nothing on record shows that Helen's acceptance of her inheritance from Simeon was made through any
of the causes which vitiated her consent nor is there any proof of the existence of an unknown will
executed by Simeon. Thus, pursuant to Art. 1056, Helen cannot belatedly execute an instrument which
has the effect of revoking or impugning her previous acceptance of her one-half (1/2) share of the
subject property from Simeon's estate. Hence, the two (2) quitclaim deeds which she executed eleven
(11) years after she had accepted the inheritance have no legal force and effect.
Nevertheless, the nullity of the repudiation does not ipso facto operate to convert the parcels of land
into res nullius18 to be escheated in favor of the Government. The repudiation being of no effect
whatsoever the parcels of land should revert to their private owner, Helen, who, although being an
American citizen, is qualified by hereditary succession to own the property subject of the
litigation.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals which sustained the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, dismissing the petition for escheat is AFFIRMED. No costs.
G.R. No. 91189 November 27, 1992
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
SAMUEL BUYCO and EDGAR BUYCO, represented by their attorney-in-fact, RIEVEN H. BUYCO and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In its Decision of 5 February 1985, 1 Branch 82 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Odiongan, Romblon
granted the application of the private respondents, who are American citizens, to bring within the
operation of the Land Registration Act a parcel of land with an area of 3,194,788 square meters
8
(319.4788 hectares) which spreads across the barangays of Canduyong, Anahao and Ferrol in the
municipality of Odiongan, Province of Romblon, and to confirm their title thereto.
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals; he alleged therein that the trial court erred (a)
in not declaring the private respondents barred by the Constitution from applying for registration
because they are American citizens and are thus disqualified from acquiring lands in the Philippines, (b)
in holding that private respondents had established proprietary rights over the land even before
acquiring American citizenship through naturalization, and (c) independently of the issue of alienage, in
not dismissing the application for registration on the basis of the private respondents failure to
overthrow, by conclusive or well-nigh incontrovertible proof, the presumption that the land applied for is
public land belonging to the State. 2
In its Decision of 21 November 1989 in CA-G.R. CV No. 05824, 3 public respondent dismissed the appeal
"for lack of merit."4
Petitioner consequently filed this petition on 11 January 1990 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Reiterating the issues he raised before the respondent Court, he seeks a review and reversal of the
latter's decision. 5
In the Resolution of 11 July 1990, this Court gave due course to the petition after the filing by the private
respondents of their Comment to the same and by the petitioner of his reply thereto. 6 On 17 April 1991,
the parties were required to file their respective Memoranda. 7
The records disclose the following material operative facts and procedural antecedents:
A certain Charles Hankins, an American who was married to Laura Crescini and who resided in
Canduyong, Odiongan, Romblon, died on 31 May 1937 leaving a will (Exhibit "N"). He was survived by his
widow; his son Alexander and William; and his grandchildren Ismael Samuel and Edgar, all surnamed
Buyco, who are the legitimate issues of his deceased daughter Lilia and her husband Marcelino Buyco.
The will was submitted for probate before the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Romblon. Charles Hankins' son Alexander was appointed administrator of the estate in Special
Proceedings No. 796.
Laura Crescini died on 22 December 1941.
It appears that in a Project of Partition dated 25 June 1947 (Exhibit "O") and submitted to the probate
court in the aforesaid Special Proceedings No. 796, one of the properties of Charles Hankins described as
"a parcel of pastureland, riceland and coconut land containing an area of about 250 hectares, 21 ares
and 63 untares . . . assessed at for P6,950.00 as per Tax Declaration No. 15853," was partitioned among
his heirs as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
TO LAURA C. HANKINS, . . .
(a) 157 acres . . . comprised in what is known as Carabao Pastureland and Milk-
Cow Pasture. (This land is a portion of the land described in tax declaration N0.
15853 . . .)
xxx xxx xxx
TO ALEXANDER HANKINS, . . .
(a) 80 acres of land (pasture) which is a portion of the land described in Tax
declaration No. 15853 . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
TO LILIA HANKINS, . . .
(a) 100 acres of pastureland situated in the barrio of Canduyong and which is a
portion of the entire parcel described in tax declaration No. 15853 . . . .
(b) 25 acres of pasture land situated in the barrio of Canduyong and which is a
portion of the entire parcel described in tax declaration No. 15853.
xxx xxx xxx
TO WILLIAM B. HANKINS, . . .
(a) 100 acres of pastureland situated in the barrio of Canduyong and which is a
portion of the entire parcel described in tax declaration No. 15853 . . . .
(b) 25 acres of pasture land situated in barrio Anajao and which is a portion of the
entire parcel described in tax declaration No. 15853 . . . . 8
The total area so adjudicated is 487 acres, or 197.086 hectares (1 hectare = 2.471 acres)
On 30 July 1948, Laura's share in the estate of her husband Charles was partitioned among her children.
Alexander and William, and her grandchildren, Ismael, Samuel and Edgar who were represented by their
father Marcelino Buyco (Exhibit "P"). Thereafter, on the same date, William sold his hereditary shares in
the estate of his parents to Marcelino Buyco (Exhibit "R").
On 20 August 1962, Marcelino Buyco donated to his children the property acquired from William
together with other properties (Exhibit "S").
On 8 September 1970, the Buyco brothers partitioned among themselves the properties acquired by
inheritance from their grandparents and by donation from their father (Exhibit "T"). However, Ismael
waived his right to his share therein in favor of Samuel, one of the private respondents in this case.
Edgar and Samuel Buyco became naturalized American citizens on 29 January 1972 and 12 September
1975, respectively.
On 14 October 1967, Edgar and Samuel, through their attorney-in-fact, Rieven H. Buyco, filed before the
then Court of First Instance of Romblon an application for the registration of a parcel of land, described
as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot I, under surveyed for the heirs of Lilia Hankins situated in the
barrios of Canduyong, Anahao and Ferrol, Municipality of Odiongan, province of
9
 Romblon, Tablas Island under PSU 127238) LRC Record No. ________: Bounded on
the North by properties of the heirs of Rita Fiedacan and Alexander Hankins; on
the Northeast, by Canduyong River and property of Alexander Hankins; on the
East, by properties of Andres Cuasay, Escolastica Feruelo, Candido Mendoza,
Raymundo Goray, Pedro Goray, Manuel Yap, Feliza Fedri and Silverio Mierculecio;
on the Southeast, by properties of Candido Mendoza, the Heirs of Benita
Formilleza Silverio Mierculecio, Zosimo Llorca, Lot 2, and properties of Beatrice
Hankins and Zosimo Llorca; on the West, by properties of Maria Llorca and Miguel
Llorca; and on the Northwest, by property of Catalino Fabio. Point "I" is S. 33 deg.
24"., 4075.50 m. from B.L.L.M. 1, Odiongan, Romblon. Area THREE MILLION ONE
HUNDRED NINETY FOUR THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT (3,194,788)
SQUARE METERS, more or less as Exhibit "C". 9
which they claim to own in fee simple as they acquired the same by inheritance and donation inter vivos.
However, they allege in paragraph 9 of the application that should the Land Registration Act be
inapplicable, the benefits provided for under C.A. No. 141, as amended, be made to extend to them since
both they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession thereof since time immemorial.
The application was docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-48 LRC Record No. N-51706.
The above description is based on a survey plan prepared by private land surveyor Santiago Español in
1950 (Exhibit "C") and subsequently approved by the Director of Lands. While in their application, private
respondents invoked the provisions of the Land Registration Act, 10 they eventually sought for a
confirmation of imperfect title pursuant to paragraph (b), Section 48 of the Public Land Act 11, as further
amended by P.D. No. 1073.
While only the herein petitioner filed an opposition thereto, the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP) manifested that the portion of the property pertaining to Samuel Buyco is covered by a mortgage
in its favor. After the jurisdictional facts had been established during the initial hearing and a general
order of default entered against all other parties, the lower court designated the Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Odiongan as commissioner to receive the evidence for the parties. Samuel Buyco, William
Hankins, Manuel Firmalo and Jacinta Gomez Gabay (who was 83 years old when she took the witness
stand in October 1979) testified for the applicants. The first two (2) recounted the history of the tract of
land up to the time of the abovementioned partitions and the alleged possession of the entire area by
the applicants (private respondents herein).
On 5 February 1985, the land registration court handed down a Decision 12 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court hereby orders the registration of title to the
parcel of land designated as Lot No. 1 Psu-127238 and its technical description
together with all the improvements thereon, in the name of the herein applicants,
recognizing the interest of the Development Bank of the Philippines to be
annotated on the certificate of title to be issued as mortgagee for the amount of
P200,000.00 with respect to the share of applicants (sic) Samuel H. Buyco.
Upon the decision become (sic) final let the corresponding decree and certificate
of title be issued accordingly.
The favorable decision is based on the court's conclusion that:
The oral and documentary evidence indubitably show applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest — their grandparents Charles Hankins and Laura Crescini,
to their uncle Alexander Hankins, to them thru their administrators Gregorio
Gabay and later Manuel Firmalo — have possessed the property herein sought to
be registered in the concept of owners thereof, and such possession has been
continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, open and public for a period of more than
eighty years. And their right over the property is duly recognized by the adjoining
owners in their individual affidavits marked as Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-21",
inclusive. Moreover, none of the adjoining owners filed any opposition to the
herein land registration case, thereby indubitably showing their recognition of the
correctness of the boundary (sic) between their individual lots and that of
applicants land subject of this registration.
The late Charles Hankins declared said land for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 15853 (please see description of lot in Exh. "N") and thereafter in
the name of applicants and/or their father Marcelino Buyco since 1949 up to the
present time (Exhs. "W", "W-1" to "W-19").
Applicants have also paid the real estate taxes thereon since 1948 up to the
present time (Exhs. "X", "X-1" to "X-194").
In 1950, the land of applicants was surveyed by Private Surveyor Santiago Español
and its exact metes and bounds were determined with accuracy in his survey plan
PSU-127238 (Exh. "C"). This survey corrected the impreciseness of the land area as
mentioned in the several instruments –– the will, project of partition, deed of
partition, deed of sale (Exhs. "N", "O", "P", and "R") — under which applicants
acquired the land in question. The correctness of this survey is further shown by
the fact that none of the other heirs, like Alexander Hankins nor (sic) the adjoining
owners ever made a claim over any portion of the lot shown in said Psu-127238.
The land in question has been primarily devoted to cattle grazing (sic) and to the
cultivation of rice and coconut and it was (sic) the applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest have (sic) been reaping the fruits thereof.
The evidence further show (sic) that applicants can rightfully and did validly
acquire title and ownership over the land in question because they were then
Filipino citizens, their father Marcelino Buyco being a Filipino citizen himself
(please see personal circumstances of Marcelino Buyco in Exhs. "P" and "R") and
their modes of acquisition — by inheritance, intestate succession, and donation
inter-vivos — are all legally recognized modes to transfer ownership to them from
their predecessors-in-interest.
Since time immemorial, applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have
exercised all the attributes of dominion and absolute ownership over the land in
question, and have therefore established their vested proprietary rights and
registrable (sic) title over the land in question, rights which they have acquired
long before they became citizens of the United States (Edgar Buyco became a U.S.
citizen only on January 29, 1972; while Samuel H. Buyco, only on September 12,
1975. As a matter of fact, applicant Samuel H. Buyco mortgaged in favor of the
Development Bank of the Philippines (Exhs. "U", "U-1" and "U-2") the portion
belonging to him in Lot 1, Psu-127238.
10
 From the foregoing evidence it has been satisfactorily established that the at present the owners in possession of the property subject of this registration
applicants have acquired an imperfect and incomplete title over the parcel of land proceedings are applicants Samuel Buyco and Edgar Buyco; that the said land is
subject of this registration proceedings in their own right as citizens of the devoted to cattle grazing and planted with coconuts and rice.
Philippines so as to entitle them to a confirmation and registration of said lot in
their names. Consequently Section II, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution does not
xxx xxx xxx
apply to this case, neither (sic) does this case fall under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 713. 13
Jacinta Gomez Gabay, 83 years (as of October, 1979) . . . testified that she knew
the spouses Charles Hankins and Laura Crescini because since the time she can
More specifically, the conclusion regarding possession is based on the testimonies of Manuel Firmalo,
remember, she stayed with said spouses up to the (sic) their death (sic); that
William Hankins and Jacinta Gomez Gabay which, as summarized by the court, are as follows:
having stayed with the Hankins couple, she knew of their properties because she
lived with them in Canduyong where the property was situated; that the property
xxx xxx xxx is a big tract of land; . . . that when she was living with the Hankins spouses, said
spouses already owned and were in possession of this big tract of land, and this
land was fenced off with barbed wires, and that said big tract of land has been
Witness Manuel Firmalo testified that from 1970 to 1978 he was the
used for grazing purposes since she reached the age of reason up to the present
administrator, of the property of applicants; that the said property is located in the
time; that during all the time that she has been with said Hankins spouses, nobody
Barrios of Anahao, Canduyong, and Tubigon (now forming part of the municipality
ever claimed any portion thereof; that this property extended from barrio
of Ferrol) and the same is shown in the survey may marked as Exh. "C" (Psu-
Canduyong up to barrio Anahao; that after Charles Hankins died, his property was
127238); that said lot is separated from the adjacent properties by concrete
divided among his children Alexander Hankins, William Hankins and Lilia Hankins
monuments, big tress and some barb (sic) wire fence (sic); that previous to his
and the latter's share was received by her children named Ismael, Samuel and
administration thereof, the same property was administered by his father-in-law,
Edgar all surnamed Buyco; that before Charles Hankins' estate was partitioned it
Gregorio Gabay; . . . that during his administration, a large part of the land was
was placed under the administration of Alexander Hankins (one of the heirs); that
devoted to cattle grazing and a little portion, to coconut (sic) which are now fruit
after the partition, the portion (sic) that went to the Buyco children (as heirs of
bearing; that when he took over the administration of the ranch, there was a total
Lilia Hankins) were administered by her husband Gregorio Gabay; that her
of 120 heads of cattle and at the time of termination of his administration there
husband's administration over said property started 3 or 4 years after the war
were 300 heads; that from time to time, some cattle in the ranch were sold by him
which (sic) lasted 25 years or until Gregorio Gabay died; that his son-in-law Manuel
and he rendered an accounting to the applicants, the owners of the ranch; that he
Firmalo took over the administration of applicants' property; that the land she was
employed cowhands to help him ran (sic) the ranch of applicants and the salaries
referring to is utilized as a pasture land and it has been a pasture since the time it
of said cowhands were paid out of the funds of applicant Samuel Buyco from the
was it was owned by spouses Charles Hankins and Laura Crescini up to the present
sale of the cattle; that the proceeds of the coconuts harvested, the money was
time; that Edgar, Samuel and Ismael, all surnamed Buyco have been receiving the
(sic) deposited with the bank and a portion was used for the payment of the real
fruits of the portion that went to Lilia Hankins; that Charles Hankins' possession of
estate taxes on the land; that during his administration no third person ever
that big tract of land was in the concept of owner, continuous, adverse, open and
claimed ownership over applicants land; that he was the one who procured the
public; that a portion of this big tract of land went to Edgar H. Buyco, Samuel H.
execution of the affidavits of adjoining owners (Exhs. "V", "V-1" to "V-21") which
Buyco and Ismael H. Buyco as the heirs of Lilia Hankins; that the possession of the
were used to support the real estate mortgage with the DBP over said land; that
said heirs of the late Lilia Hankins over the portion that went to them was in the
from the proceeds of the sale of the copra harvested from the land of applicants,.
concept of owner, continuous, adverse, open and public up to the present time;
he paid the real estate taxes thereon specifically the taxes covered by Exhs. "X-83"
that as far as she can remember the Hankins family possessed said property for
to "X-144"; . . . that his administration over said land was adverse, open
more than eighty (80) years. 14
continuous and public.

The land registration court also summarized the testimony of private respondent Samuel H. Buyco as to
William Hankins, then 72 years old and resident (sic) of Odiongan, Romblon,
possession in this wise:
testified . . .; that ever since he was still a small kid, he know (sic) that the big tract
of land subject of their partition was already owned by his father (Charles
Hankins); that the possession of his father was in the concept of owner, Applicant Samuel H. Buyco testified that he was 51 years of age, . . .; that prior to
continuous, adverse, public, and open, up to his (Charles Hankins) death; that after the death of his grandfather Charles Hankins, that big parcel of pastureland was
receiving his hereditary share from the estates of his father and mother, he sold about 500 to 550 hectares, the boundaries of which were marked off by concrete
his said shares to Marcelino Buyco, father of applicants by executing a Deed of monuments, some big trees, some big stones until it was partitioned in 1948, and
Sale (Exh. "R") dated July 30, 1948; that during the lifetime of Charles Hankins; the to fix the actual boundaries, the land was surveyed by private surveyor Español
big tract of land was devoted primarily to cattle grazing and to coconut and rice; (Exh. "D"); that during the lifetime of their grandfather Charles Hankins this big
that after he sold his hereditary share of (sic) Marcelino Buyco, the latter took land was primarily used as a ranch and it was fenced off by barb (sic) wires to
possession of his said portion; that after Marcelino Buyco died, the property of prevent the cattle from getting out; that after the death of his grandfather Charles
Marcelino Buyco (including his share (sic) hereditary share sold under Ex. (sic) "R") Hankins, the property was administered by his uncle Alexander Hankins, and such
was transmitted to his children, namely: Edgar H. Buyco, Ismael Buyco and Samuel administration was terminated when there was a partition in 1948 in accordance
H. Buyco (Samuel and Edgar Buyco, the (sic) applicants herein); that he known that with the will of his grandfather; that during the administration of the property by

11
 Alexander Hankins, this property was used as a cattle ranch, even during the
Japanese time; that after receiving their share form the partition of the estate,
they initially planted rice and coconut and later on they reverted to cattle ranch
operation (sic); that after he and his brother Edgar became the possessor (sic) of
said land, they were the one (sic) who have been harvesting the fruits of the land;
that they did not personally managed (sic) the land but hired in 1949 the services
of Mr. Gregorio Gabay to administer the estate for them until 1970 when the latter
died, and Manuel Firmalo was hired to take over the administration until 1977
when applicant took over active management of the property because he obtained
a loan of P200,000.00 from the Development Bank of the Philippines; . . . that the
land was declared in their name (sic) for taxation purposes by their administrator
Gregorio Gabay in 1949 (Exhs. "W", "W-1" to "W-19", inclusive) and that the taxes
thereon were paid out of their own money since 1948 up to the present (Exhs. "X",
"X-1" to "X-194", inclusive); that applicants' possession in the concept of owner
over the property sought to be registered has been open, continuous,
uninterrupted, adverse and
public. 15
As earlier adverted to petitioner's appeal from the said decision was dismissed by the public respondent
for lack of merit. As to the private respondents' title to the land subject of the application, public
respondent makes the following findings:
Undisputably, applicant-appellees anchored their title to the land in question by
means of hereditary succession as well as donation from their own father,
Marcelino Buyco, who purchased the entire hereditary share of William Hankins
(Exhs. "R"). Subsequently, applicants-appellees and their brother, Ismael,
partitioned their hereditary share from their grandparents, the spouses Hankins,
including the property donated by their father, Marcelino Buyco, in an instrument
dated September 8, 1970 (Exh. "T"). In this partition, the share of Ismael H. Buyco
went to applicant-appellee Samuel H. Buyco (Exh. "T-1").
From the records extant in this case, it is Our considered view that from almost
(sic) time immemorial or a period of eighty (80) years, applicant-appellees through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, continuous, and peaceful
possession of the property in question so that the inescapable conclusion is that all
along it is private land and had been segregated from the dominion (sic) of the
State. Thus, We sustain the conclusion reached by the court a quo that the latter
(applicants-appellees) thru their predecessors-in-interest have acquired title by
acquisitive prescription over the same. . . . 16
As to the issue of the private respondents citizenship, public respondent held that:
. . . it is beyond per adventure (sic) of doubt that applicants-appellees were still
Filipinos when they acquired their title thereto. From the death of their
grandfather Charles Hankins on May 31, 1937, applicants-appellees right of
succession was already vested. Moreover, as early as the year 1962, their father
Marcelino Buyco transferred his title thereto by donation inter-vivos so that on
September 8, 1970, when the Buyco brothers partitioned the property in question,
among themselves, they could validly register the same as they already possess
the necessary qualifications to have their title perfected under the Torrens system
of registration. 17
The petition is meritorious.
As could be gleaned from the evidence adduce, the private respondents do not rely on fee
simple ownership base on a Spanish grant or possessory information title under Section 19 of the Land
Registration Act; the private respondents did not present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-
interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or royal; (b) the "concession
especial" or special grant; (c) the "composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (d) the "titulo de
compra" or title of purchase; and (e) the "informacion posesoria" or possessory information title, which
could become a "titulo gratuito" or gratuitous title.18 The primary basis of their claim is possession, by
themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial. The land registration court and
the public respondent are of the opinion, and so held, that the private respondents had this in their
favor. Thus, both courts declared that the land applied for had been segregated from the public domain
and had become private land.
If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in possession since time immemorial,
the rulings of both courts could be upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands; 19
. . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land
that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in
interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption
that the land had never been part of the public domain even before the Spanish
conquest. (Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. ed., 594.)20 The
applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot
by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.
This exception was reiterated in Susi vs. Razon, 21 where the first possessor was in possession was in
possession for an undetermined period of time prior to 1880. We stated therein:
. . . In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de
jure established, in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, 22 amending Act
No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were
complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and
through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly,
continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. . . . If
by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the
State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private
property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
Director of Lands.
Although this additional pronouncement was rippled by the ruling Manila Electric Co. vs. Castro-
Bartolome 23, to the effect that land would cease to be public only upon the issuance of a certificate of
title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, 24 and that a piece of
land over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed remains public, this Court, speaking through
then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, in Director of Lands vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court,  25 reiterated the Cariño and Susi doctrine, thus:
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the
majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be
binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already
referred to, 26 is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or
12
 through his predecessor-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is
covered to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso
jure.
It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public
land and (b) his possession, in the concept abovestated, must be either since time immemorial, as ruled
in both Cariño and Susi, or for the period prescribe in the Public Land Act. As to the latter, this Court,
in Gutierrez Hermanos vs. Court of Appeals, 27 adopted the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals, per
then Associate Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., now a distinguished member of this Court, that an applicant
for registration under Section 48 of the Public Land Act must secure a certification from the Government
that the lands which he claims to have possessed as owner for more than thirty (30) years are alienable
and disposable. It is the burden of the applicant to prove its positive averments.
land registration court and the public respondent, is patently baseless. There is an evident failure to
comprehend the meaning and import of the term immemorial. As defined, immemorial simply means
beyond the reach of memory, 33 beyond human memory, or time out of mind. 34 When referring to
possession, specifically "immemorial possession," it means possession of which no man living has seen
the beginning, and the existence of which he has learned form his elders. 35 Such possession was never
present in the case of the private respondents. The trial court and the public respondent based the
finding of the more than eighty (80) years of possession by the private respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest on the sole testimony of Mrs. Gabay who was eighty-three (83) years old when
she testified in October of 1979. Thus, she must have been born in 1896. If the asserted possession
lasted for a period of more than eighty (80) years at the time she testified the same must have
commenced sometime in 1899, or at the time that she was barely three (3) years old. It is quite
impossible that she could fully grasp, before coming to the age of reason, the concept of possession of
such a big tract of land and testify on the same some eight (8) decades later. In short, therefore, she
cannot be relied upon to prove the possession by Charles Hankins of the said property from 1899.

In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove that the property subject of
Charles Hankins was an American citizen. There is no evidence to show the date of his birth, his arrival in
the application is an alienable and disposable parcel of land of the public domain. On the contrary, based
the Philippines — particularly in Odiongan, Romblon — or his acquisition of the big tract of land; neither
on their own evidence, the entire property which is alleged to have originally belonged to Charles
is there any evidence to prove the manner of his acquisition thereof. Thus, there does not even exist a
Hankins was pasture land. According to witness Jacinta Gomez Gabay, this land has been pasture land,
reasonable basis for the finding that the private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest
utilized for grazing purposes, since the time it was "owned" by the spouses Charles Hankins and Laura
possessed the land for more than eighty (80) years, much less since time immemorial. In Oh Cho
Crescini up to the present time (i.e., up to the date she testified). In Director of Lands vs. Rivas, 28 this
vs. Director of Lands, 36 possession which began in 1880 was not considered as possession "since time
Court ruled:
immemorial."

Grazing lands and timber lands are not alienable under section 1, Article XIII of the
There is as well, no evidence on record to show that Charles Hankins cultivated, had control over or used
1935 Constitution and sections 8, 10 and 11 of Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.
the whole or even a greater portion of the big tract of land for grazing purposes. None of the witnesses
Section 10 distinguishes strictly agricultural lands (disposable) from grazing lands
testified as to the number of heads of cattle which were bought by Charles into the land. There is
(inalienable).
likewise no competent proof that he declared the land in his name for taxation purposes or that he had
paid the taxes thereon. Although his will (Exhibit "N") made mention of Tax Declaration No. 15853,
The instant application was filed, heard and decided under the regime of the 1973 Constitution. neither the said declaration nor any tax receipt was presented in evidence. Because of such non-
production, it cannot be determined when Charles initially declared his alleged land for taxation purpose
As to the second matter to be proved, the applicant must present evidence of an imperfect title such as and what exactly were its natural boundaries, if any. It is clear that the non-production of this tax
those derived from the old Spanish grants. He may also show that he has been in continuous, open and declaration accounted for the obvious inability of the witnesses to testify with certainty as to the extent
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of the area of the property. As correctly observed by the petitioner, none of the private respondents'
of acquisition of ownership and for the period prescribed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land witnesses could give the court a definite idea thereon. Thus, Samuel Buyco declared:
Act. 29 Simply put, a person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of
possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and convincing I really don't know the exact area, but it is between 500 to 550 hectares. 37
evidence; he should not rely on the weakness of the evidence of the
oppositors. 30 This rule is certainly not new. In the 1913 case of Maloles vs. Director of Lands,  31 this Court
while William Hankins admitted:
already held that in order that a petitioner may be entitled to have a parcel of land registered under the
Torrens system, he has to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple, of the said land;
moreover, it is the duty of the court, even in the absence of any oppositor, to require the petitioner to I cannot exactly tell because that is a very big estate. 38
show, by a preponderance of the evidence and by positive and absolute proof, so far as it is possible,
that he is the owner in fee simple of the land in question.
On the other hand, witness Jacinta Gomez Gabay averred:

In Santiago vs. de los Santos, 32 this rule was to find anchorage in policy considerations based no less on
I could not exactly tell but I have heard that it was a big tract of land because we
one of the fundamental objectives of the Constitution, namely the conservation and utilization of our
were staying there. 39
natural resources. We held in the said case that there would be a failure to abide by its command if the
judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate. This Court then
set the quantum of evidence needed to be established by the applicant, to wit: well-nigh incontrovertible In any event, even if Charles had indeed declared the property for taxation purposes and actually paid
evidence. taxes, such facts are still insufficient to justify possession thereof, much less a claim of ownership
thereon. This Court has repeatedly held that the declaration of ownership for purposes of assessment on
the payment of the tax is not sufficient to prove ownership. 40
In the instant case, private respondents evidence miserably failed to establish their imperfect title to the
property in question. Their allegation of possession since time immemorial, which was conceded by the

13
To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that Charles Hankins had possessed the
property — allegedly covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject of both his last will
and testament and the project of partition of his estate among his heirs — in such a manner as to
remove the same from the public domain under the Cariño and Susi doctrines. Thus, when he died on 31
May 1937, he transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect to the said property, to his heirs. This being
the case, his possession cannot be tacked to that of the private respondents for the latter's benefit
pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their application.
It would have been entirely different if the possession of Charles was open, continuous, exclusive,
notorious and under a bona fide claim of ownership as provided under Section 48 of the Public Land Act.
Even if he were an American citizen at that time, he would have had the same civil rights as Filipino
citizens pursuant to the original ordinance appended to the 1935 Constitution. the pertinent portion of
said ordinance reads:
(17) Citizens and corporations of the United States shall enjoy in the
Commonwealth of the Philippines all the civil rights of the citizens and
corporations, respectively, thereof.
The import of said paragraph (17) was confirmed and reinforced the originally by Section 44 of Act No.
2874 and Section 127 of C.A. No. 141 (The Public Land Act of 1936); the latter provided that:
Sec. 127. During the existence and continuance of the Commonwealth and before
the Republic of the Philippines is established, citizens and corporations of the
United States shall enjoy the same rights granted to citizens and corporations of
the Philippines under this Act.
This right, however, vanished with the advent of the Philippine Republic on 4 July 1946. 41
Verily, private respondents had to rely exclusively on their own possession. under the applicable law at
the time, it was incumbent upon them to prove that they had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural land of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the applications
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. 42
By their own evidence, private respondents admitted that they were never in actual possession of the
property prior to the filing of their application. During the pendency of Special Proceedings No. 796, the
estate of Charles Hankins appeared to have been administered by his son Alexander. This administration
was terminated in 1948 upon the execution of the Project of Partition. Private respondents and their
brother Ismael did not take possession of the share which pertained to their mother, Lilia; instead; they
allegedly hired Gregorio Gabay to administer the same. There is, however, no competent evidence to
show the extent of such administration. Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that Gregorio had the
property declared for taxation purposes, the correct area and boundaries of the same have not been
proven. As evidenced by the Project of Partition, the share of Lilia was only 125 acres or 50.59 hectares,
which is clearly not the portion applied for. The area applied for consists of 319.4788 hectares of land
based on a survey plan prepared by private land surveyor Español on the basis of a survey conducted in
1950. Obviously, therefore, the plan was not prepared to determine Lilia's share alone for, as admitted
by the private respondents themselves, this plan includes William Hankins' share which was sold to
Marcelino Buyco, private respondents father, and the other properties which the latter donated to the
private respondents and Ismael Buyco on 20 August 1962 (Exhibit "S"). However, there is no competent
evidence as to the respective boundaries and areas of the properties constituting the said share of
William Hankins; neither are there reliable descriptions of the other alleged properties belonging to
Marcelino Buyco. Be that as it may, when the survey was conducted by Español, private respondents and
their brother Ismael did not immediately acquire the portion originating from William Hankins and the
other alleged properties of Marcelino Buyco; hence, there was no valid basis for the inclusion of said
properties in the survey. And even if both William's share and Marcelino Buyco's properties were
included there would still be nothing to support the application for the entire 319,4788 hectares
considering that as per the Project of Partition, the share pertaining to William consisted only of 50.59
hectares. There was, moreover, no evidence to show the extent of the alleged "other properties" of
Marcelino Buyco. Given such circumstances, it would be reasonable to presume that what was surveyed
in 1950 was the entire pasture land alleged to form part of the estate of Charles Hankins, covered by Tax
Declaration No. 15853, and which necessarily included the share of Alexander Hankins. Significantly, per
Exhibit "O" the latter's share is specified as part of the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853.
The inclusion then of Alexander's share in the survey and the plan may provide the clue to this unusual
increase in the area covered by the survey plan.
Nevertheless, even if We are to assume for argument's sake that there was nothing irregular in the
inclusion in the survey plan of the share of William Hankins and the other properties of Marcelino Buyco,
the fact remains that the "ownership" thereof could have been acquired by the private respondents and
Ismael Buyco only on 20 August 1962 upon the execution of the deed of donation in their favor. To be
thus benefited by the possession of William or Marcelino for purposes of Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act, there should be proof that said predecessors had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation thereof. Unfortunately, no such proof was offered.
It is palpably obvious then that at the time Land Registration Case No. N-48 was filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Romblon on 14 October 1976, private respondents did not have in their favor an imperfect title
over that which they claimed to have inherited, by representation, from the estate of Charles Hankins.
With greater force does this conclusion likewise apply with respect to the properties donated to them in
1962 by their father Marcelino Buyco. This is because they were not able to prove open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application, 43 or from 12
June 1945. 44
Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before such filing, it goes without
saying that they had acquired no vested right, consisting of an imperfect title over to property before
they lost their Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of the public respondent of 21
November 1989 in CA-G.R. CV No. 05824 is hereby SET ASIDE and the Decision of 5 February 1985 of
Branch 82 of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon in Land Registration Case No. N-48, LRC Record No. N-
51706 is REVERSED.
G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE VEGA, respondents.
Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
14
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase
while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements for
registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to nullify the decision of the
appellate court which affirmed the judgment of the court a quo in granting the application of respondent
spouses for registration over the lots in question.
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a
total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the
time of the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of
land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no
longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their respective evidence,
the court a quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents' title to the lots in question, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby approves the said application and confirms the
title and possession of herein applicants over Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-003755 in the names of spouses
Mario B. Lapiña and Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino citizens by birth but now Canadian citizens by
naturalization and residing at 14 A. Mabini Street, San Pablo City and/or 201-1170-124 Street,
Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued. In the
certificate of title to be issued, there shall be annotated an easement of .265 meters road right-of-way.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on the following ratiocination:
In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino citizens when they bought the
land in controversy from its former owner. For this reason, the prohibition against the acquisition of
private lands by aliens could not apply. In justice and equity, they are the rightful owners of the subject
realty considering also that they had paid for it quite a large sum of money. Their purpose in initiating
the instant action is merely to confirm their title over the land, for, as has been passed upon, they had
been the owners of the same since 1978. It ought to be pointed out that registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to
private land. It is intended merely to confirm and register the title which one may already have
(Municipality of Victorias vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31189, March 31, 1987). With particular
reference to the main issue at bar, the High Court has ruled that title and ownership over lands within
the meaning and for the purposes of the constitutional prohibition dates back to the time of their
purchase, not later. The fact that the applicants-appellees are not Filipino citizens now cannot be taken
against them for they were not disqualified from acquiring the land in question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su,
G.R. No. L-29442, November 11, 1987). (Rollo, pp. 27-28)
Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's approval, hence this present
recourse, which was belatedly filed.
Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been filed out of time had it not
been for the constitutional issue presented therein.
At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over the
subject properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the
registration thereof in their favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are
presumed to be public lands under the principle that lands of whatever classification belong to the State
under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in
the jurisdical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State. Petitioner further argued
that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the
land become privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land,
depending on the evidence.
As found by the trial court:
The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves and their predecessors-in-
interest, had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the two adjacent parcels of land applied for registration of title under a bona-fide claim of
ownership long before June 12, 1945. Such being the case, it is conclusively presumed that all the
conditions essential to the confirmation of their title over the two adjacent parcels of land are sought to
be registered have been complied with thereby entitling them to the issuance of the corresponding
certificate of title pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree. (Rollo, p. 26)
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:
The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the alienable and disposable zone
established by the Bureau of Forest Development (Exhibit "P"). The investigation conducted by the
Bureau of Lands, Natural Resources District (IV-2) reveals that the disputed realty had been occupied by
the applicants "whose house of strong materials stands thereon"; that it had been declared for taxation
purposes in the name of applicants-spouses since 1979; that they acquired the same by means of a
public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" duly executed by the vendor, Cristeta Dazo
Belen, on June 17, 1978 (Exhibits "I" and "J"); and that applicants and their predecessors in interest had
been in possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for
registration. But what is of great significance in the instant case is the circumstance that at the time the
applicants purchased the subject lot in 1978, both of them were Filipino citizens such that when they
filed their application for registration in 1987, ownership over the land in dispute had already passed to
them. (Rollo, p., 27)
The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of possession and argues:
17. The Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of
respondent spouses only since 1979. However, tax declarations or reality tax payments of property are
not conclusive evidence of ownership. (citing cases)
18. Then again, the appellate court found that "applicants (respondents) and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application
for registration." This is not, however, the same as saying that respondents have been in possession
"since June 12, 1945." (PD No. 1073, amending Sec. 48 [b], CA NO. 141; sec. also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529).
So there is a void in respondents' possession. They fall short of the required possession since June 12,
1945 or prior thereto. And, even if they needed only to prove thirty (30) years possession prior to the
filing of their application (on February 5, 1987), they would still be short of the required possession if the
starting point is 1979 when, according to the Court of Appeals, the land was declared for taxation
purposes in their name. (Rollo, pp. 14-15)
15
The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of petitioner, any transferee is thus
foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the
transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive possession thereof
for thirty (30) years or more. This is not, however, what the law provides.
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) reads:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by wars or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
As amended by PD 1073:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945.
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or through his
predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in possession of
the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of
title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession. In
the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937.
Petitioner does not deny this except that respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of
the land sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the required length of time. As
aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were acquired by private respondents through their
predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, have been in open and continued possession thereof since 1937.
Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof,
acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.
At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves scant
consideration. There, it was held that before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in
the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has already been abandoned in the
1986 case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in Director
of Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the Court, through then Associate Justice, now
Chief Justice Narvasa, declared that:
(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for
the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes
private property. . . .
Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
. . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's
proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his
predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the
mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent . . .
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied
with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the
public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would
be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land
which is of the character and duration prescribed by the statute as the equivalent of an express grant
from the State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that the possessor(s) ". . . shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title ..." No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption,
confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the required character and length of time; and
registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession
became complete. As was so well put in Cariño, ". . .(There are indications that registration was expected
from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The
effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open, continuous and exclusive
possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to private property
(Director of Lands v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602 [1990]). This means that
occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, vest
title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public and (National Power
Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]).
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and
(b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When the conditions
set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued (National Power
Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the land ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond
the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.
16
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private
land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer
ownership. As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were able to establish
the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was offered to prove that their
predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject land and introduced improvements thereon
(Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified true copy of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo and her sister
Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the subject parcels of land were inherited by vendor
Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G").
Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in evidence together with a letter from the
Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the questioned lots were part of the alienable and
disposable zone of the government and that no forestry interest was affected (CA GR No. 28953,
Records, p. 33).
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for registration of title on the ground of
foreign nationality. Accordingly, the ruling in Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's
thesis.
We disagree.
In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were natural-born Filipino citizens at
the time of their supposed acquisition of the property. But this is where the similarity ends. The
applicants in Buyco sought to register a large tract of land under the provisions of the Land Registration
Act, and in the alternative, under the provisions of the Public Land Act. The land registration court
decided in favor of the applicants and was affirmed by the appellate court on appeal. The Director of
Lands brought the matter before us on review and we reversed.
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:
As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private respondents do not rely on fee simple
ownership based on a Spanish grant or possessory information title under Section 19 of the Land
Registration Act; the private respondents did not present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-
interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or royal grant (b) the
"concession especial" or especial grant; (c) the "composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (d)
the "titulo de compra" or title by purchase; and (e) the "informacion posesoria" or possessory
information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a gratuitous title (Director of Forestry v.
Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]). The primary basis of their claim is possession, by themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial.
If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in possession since time immemorial,
the rulings of both courts could be upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil.
890 [1946]):
. . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify
the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that if had been a private
property even before the Spanish conquest (Cariño v. Insular Government, 41 Phil 935 [1909]; 212 U.S.
449; 53 Law. Ed., 594) The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of
the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.
. . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
(Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra)
It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public
land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial, as ruled
in both Cariño and Susi, or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. As to the latter, this Court, in
Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 37 [1989]), adopted the rule enunciated by the Court
of Appeals, per then Associate Justice Hugo R. Gutierrez, Jr., . . ., that an applicant for registration under
Section 48 of the Public Land Act must secure a certification from the Government that the lands which
he claims to have possessed as owner for more than thirty (30) years are alienable and disposable. It is
the burden of the applicant to prove its positive averments.
In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove that the property subject of
the application is an alienable and disposable land. On the contrary, the entire property . . . was pasture
land (and therefore inalienable under the then 1973 Constitution).
. . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to establish their imperfect title to the property in
question. Their allegation of possession since time immemorial, . . ., is patently baseless. . . . When
referring to possession, specifically "immemorial possession," it means possession of which no man living
has seen the beginning, and the existence of which he has learned from his elders (Susi v. Razon, supra).
Such possession was never present in the case of private respondents. . . .
. . ., there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the private respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest possessed the land for more than eighty (80) years, . . .
xxx xxx xxx
To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that (their predecessor-in-interest) had
possessed the property allegedly covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject of both his
last will and testament and the project of partition of his estate among his heirs — in such manner as to
remove the same from the public domain under the Cariño and Susi doctrines. Thus, (when the
predecessor-in-interest) died on 31 May 1937, he transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect to the
said property, to his heirs. This being the case, his possession cannot be tacked to that of the private
respondents for the latter's benefit pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the alternative
ground relied upon in their application . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before such filing, it goes without
saying that they had acquired no vested right, consisting of an imperfect title, over the property before
they lost their Philippine citizenship. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely because they were
American citizens at the time of their application therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove
possession of their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or possession in such a manner that
the property has been segregated from public domain; such that at the time of their application, as
American citizens, they have acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land.
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the
acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the
process, the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their
predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have constructed a
house of strong materials on the contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapiñas mother.
17
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows
private respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII
of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations
provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the
then 1973 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his
residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which
provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the
legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a
maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of
rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of
the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall
not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be entitled
to be a transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to
those already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed by the
legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-
born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of
the properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already private lands; consequently,
there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what the
Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public
domain. They are already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership
prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000
sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of the
Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not
significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or
registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for
registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that
private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of possession of their
predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be
approved.
The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185, must also be complied with by
private respondents. Specifically, it refers to Section 6, which provides:
Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements provided for in other laws for the registration of titles to lands, no
private land shall be transferred under this Act, unless the transferee shall submit to the register of
deeds of the province or city where the property is located a sworn statement showing the date and
place of his birth; the names and addresses of his parents, of his spouse and children, if any; the area,
the location and the mode of acquisition of his landholdings in the Philippines, if any; his intention to
reside permanently in the Philippines; the date he lost his Philippine citizenship and the country of which
he is presently a citizen; and such other information as may be required under Section 8 of this Act.
The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the instant case since
said requirements are primarily directed to the register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is
to be submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the requirements must
likewise be submitted before the land registration court prior to the approval of an application for
registration of title. An application for registration of title before a land registration court should not be
confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is only when the judgment
of the land registration court approving the application for registration has become final that a decree of
registration is issued. And that is the time when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register
of deeds should be complied with by the applicants. This decree of registration is the one that is
submitted to the office of the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the
applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the register of deeds has no participation in
the approval of the application for registration of title as the decree of registration is yet to be issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 195670               December 3, 2012
WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner,
vs.
AVELINA AMORES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of CoLlli assailing the
October 8, 2009 Decision2 and January 24, 2011 Resolution3 of the court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 01940, which affirmed the February 28, 2007 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros
Oriental, Branch 34 in Civil Case No. I 2884. The foregoing rulings dissolved the conjugal partnership of
gains of Willem Beumer (petitioner) and Avelina Amores (respondent) and distributed the properties
forming part of the said property regime.
The Factual Antecedents
18
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. After several years, properties, consisting of drills, a welding machine, grinders, clamps, etc. She alleged that these tools and
the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 32, declared the nullity of their marriage in the Decision 5 dated equipment have a total cost of P500,000.00.15
November 10, 2000 on the basis of the former’s psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of
the Family Code.
The RTC Ruling

Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership6 dated December 14,
2000 praying for the distribution of the following described properties claimed to have been acquired
during the subsistence of their marriage, to wit:
By Purchase:
a. Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 22846, containing an area of 252 square
meters (sq.m.), including a residential house constructed thereon.
b. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21974, containing an area of 806
sq.m., including a residential house constructed thereon.
On February 28, 2007, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 34 rendered its Decision, dissolving the
parties’ conjugal partnership, awarding all the parcels of land to respondent as her paraphernal
properties; the tools and equipment in favor of petitioner as his exclusive properties; the two (2) houses
standing on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties, the dispositive of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
between petitioner Willem Beumer and respondent Avelina Amores considering the fact that their
marriage was previously annulled by Branch 32 of this Court. The parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Titles Nos. 22846, 21974, 21306, 21307, 23567 and 23575 are hereby declared paraphernal
properties of respondent Avelina Amores due to the fact that while these real properties were acquired
by onerous title during their marital union, Willem Beumer, being a foreigner, is not allowed by law to
acquire any private land in the Philippines, except through inheritance.

The personal properties, i.e., tools and equipment mentioned in the complaint which were brought out
c. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21306, containing an area of 756
by Willem from the conjugal dwelling are hereby declared to be exclusively owned by the petitioner.
sq.m.

d. Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre,
covered by TCT No. 21307, containing an area of 45 sq.m.
By way of inheritance:
The two houses standing on the lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 21974 and 22846 are
hereby declared to be co-owned by the petitioner and the respondent since these were acquired during
their marital union and since there is no prohibition on foreigners from owning buildings and residential
units. Petitioner and respondent are, thereby, directed to subject this court for approval their project of
partition on the two houses aforementioned.

e. 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 23567, containing an
area of 2,635 sq.m. (the area that appertains to the conjugal partnership is 376.45 sq.m.).
f. 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 23575, containing an
area of 360 sq.m. (the area that appertains to the conjugal partnership is 24 sq.m.).7
The Court finds no sufficient justification to award the counterclaim of respondent for attorney’s fees
considering the well settled doctrine that there should be no premium on the right to litigate. The prayer
for moral damages are likewise denied for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.

In defense,8 respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1 and SO ORDERED.16
2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being
that she used her own personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds
It ruled that, regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4, petitioner
and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way of inheritance. 9 She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and
could not have acquired any right whatsoever over these properties as petitioner still attempted to
petitioner attesting to the fact that she purchased Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon using her
acquire them notwithstanding his knowledge of the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership
own money.10 Accordingly, respondent sought the dismissal of the petition for dissolution as well as
of private lands.17 This was made evident by the sworn statements petitioner executed purporting to
payment for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.11
show that the subject parcels of land were purchased from the exclusive funds of his wife, the herein
respondent.18 Petitioner’s plea for reimbursement for the amount he had paid to purchase the foregoing
During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of properties on the basis of equity was likewise denied for not having come to court with clean hands.
respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as
his disability benefit12 since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He also
The CA Ruling
claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was
contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid.13
Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA, contesting only the RTC’s award of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 in
favor of respondent. He insisted that the money used to purchase the foregoing properties came from
For her part, respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the lots came exclusively
his own capital funds and that they were registered in the name of his former wife only because of the
from her personal funds, in particular, her earnings from selling jewelry as well as products from Avon,
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership. Thus, he prayed for reimbursement of one-half
Triumph and Tupperware.14 She further asserted that after she filed for annulment of their marriage in
1996, petitioner transferred to their second house and brought along with him certain personal

19
(1/2) of the value of what he had paid in the purchase of the said properties, waiving the other half in
favor of his estranged ex-wife.19
On October 8, 2009, the CA promulgated a Decision 20 affirming in toto the judgment rendered by the RTC
of Negros Oriental, Branch 34. The CA stressed the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the
constitutional prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines." 21 Hence, he cannot invoke equity
to support his claim for reimbursement.
Consequently, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision due
to the following error:
UNDER THE FACTS ESTABLISHED, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE PETITIONER’S ATTEMPT AT
SUBSEQUENTLY ASSERTING OR CLAIMING A RIGHT OF HALF OR WHOLE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE USED
IN THE PURCHASE OF THE REAL PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.22 (Emphasis supplied)
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena
Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller23 the Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the
value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former
Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on
the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the
prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land24 enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the
1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutional
prohibition"25 and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the
subject properties in the latter’s name.26 Clearly, petitioner’s actuations showed his palpable intent to
skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no reason why it
should not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioner’s claim for reimbursement.
As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and
he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity
shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that
his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.27
In this case, petitioner’s statements regarding the real source of the funds used to purchase the subject
parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to have previously executed a joint
affidavit that respondent’s personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1,28 he likewise claimed that his
personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his
untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded
from seeking any equitable refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given
that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional
purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be
done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. 29 Surely, a contract that violates
the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no
legal effect at all.30 Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, 31 petitioner cannot have the
subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase
thereof. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where
it finds them.32 Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly
entered into.
Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. 33 As
held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money
spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is
proscribed by the Constitution, to wit:
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return
the same to him.1âwphi1
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No
person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has
been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not
apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari
delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over
the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord
Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The objection that a contract is immoral or
illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the
defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general
principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between
him and the plaintiff."34 (Citations omitted)
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship.35 Precisely, it is
the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land.
To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not
to the improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were
properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the purpose of
the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony 36 and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound
to protect.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed October 8, 2009 Decision and
January 24, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01940 are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-29663 August 20, 1990
GREGORIO LLANTINO and BELINDA LLANTINO assisted by husband Napoleon Barba, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
CO LIONG CHONG alias JUAN MOLINA, defendant-appellee.
20
Delfin de Vera for plaintiffs-appellants. 1961 and that his name is no longer Co Liong Chong but Juan Molina (Rollo, p. 12; Record on Appeal, p.
15).
Antonio G. Sosito for defendant-appellee.
On May 17, 1968, the trial court rendered a Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the contract
of lease entered into between the plaintiffs and the defendant on October 5, 1954,
PARAS, J.:
valid and in accordance with law and the complaint is dismissed with costs against
the plaintiffs.
This is an appeal perfected before the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, from the decision * of the Court
of First Instance of Catanduanes in Civil Case No. 611, to quiet title with damages, entitled Gregorio
The Court, however, feels that there is no sufficient ground to award moral
Llantino, et al. vs. Cong Liong Chong alias Juan Molina, dismissing the complaint and declaring that the
damages or attorney's fees as claimed by the defendant because the Court is fairly
contract of lease entered into between the plaintiffs and the defendant valid and in accordance with law.
convinced that the institution of the suit sprung from an honest conviction on the
part of the plaintiffs that on account of the period fixed in the contract of lease
The facts of the case as summarized by the trial court are as follows: and the fact that the defendant was a Chinese national at the time of its
celebration constituted valid grounds for annulment.
Plaintiffs (petitioners herein) aver that they are the owners of a commercial-residential land situated in
the municipality of Virac, Catanduanes, described in paragraph 2 of the complaint, which sometime in SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 12; Record on Appeal, p. 24).
1954 they leased to the defendant (private respondent) who was then a Chinese national and went by
the name of Co Liong Chong for a period of thirteen (13) years for the sum of P6,150.00 for the whole
From this judgment, plaintiffs appealed directly to this Court on a pure question of law (Rollo, p. 12;
period. The defendant was placed in possession of the property but knowing that the period of the least
Record on Appeal, pp. 24-25).
would end with the year 1967, petitioners requested private respondent for a conference but the latter
did not honor the request and instead he informed the petitioners that he had already constructed a
commercial building on the land worth P50,000.00; that the lease contract was for a period of sixty (60) The plaintiffs-appellants filed their brief on May 26, 1969 (Rollo, p. 48). The defendant-appellee filed his
years, counted from 1954; and that he is already a Filipino citizen. The claim of Chong came as a surprise corresponding brief on July 22, 1969 (Rollo, p. 59).
to the Llantinos because they did not remember having agreed to a sixty-year lease agreement as that
would virtually make Chong the owner of the realty which, as a Chinese national, he had no right to own
The appellants raised the following assignment of errors:
and neither could he have acquired such ownership after naturalization subsequent to 1954. On
December 16, 1967, in order to avoid a court litigation the Llantinos once more invited Chong to a
conference about the matter but again Chong ignored the invitation. (Rollo, p. 48; Appellant's Brief, p. I
12)
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN THE
Hence, on January 10, 1968, the Llantinos filed their complaint to quiet title with damages before the APPELLANTS AND THE DEFENDANTS ON OCTOBER 5, 1954 VALID.
Court of First Instance of Catanduanes (Rollo, p. 12; Record on Appeal, pp. 1-4).
II
After Chong has filed an answer to the complaint and the Llantinos their reply, (Rollo, p. 12; Record on
Appeal, pp. 9-10) the trial court set the case for pre-trial and trial for April 2, 1968 (Rollo, p. 12; Record THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DECLARE THAT CONTRACT NOT A LEASE.
on Appeal, pp. 10-11).

At the pre-trial, both parties agreed upon the identity of the land as described in the complaint. It was
mutually admitted that the defendants original name was Co Liong Chong who was then a Chinese
national in 1954, when he approached the plaintiffs and offered to lease the land in question. It was also
admitted by the counsel for the defendant that prior to the filing of the case, the plaintiffs have in fact
invited the defendant to a conference about the matter (Rollo, p. 12; Record on Appeal; p. 14).
Chong's counsel produced the carbon original of the contract of lease entered into between Chong and
the Llantinos and the existence of the contract of lease as a public instrument was admitted (Rollo, p. 12;
Record on Appeal, pp. 14-15).
It was also admitted that Chong had in fact constructed a building of strong materials on the land worth
P40,000.00 (Rollo, p. 12; Record on Appeal, p. 15); that Chong has become a naturalized Filipino citizen in
Stripping the case of irrelevant allegations, the pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the contract of
lease entered into by and between the petitioners including Virgilio Llantino now deceased and private
respondent on October 5, 1954 for a period of sixty (60) years is valid.
Petitioners contend that when the contract which is sought to be declared void was entered into by and
between the parties, private respondent was still a Chinese national (Rollo, p. 48; Appellants' Brief, p. 2).
However, petitioners also stated that they do not dispute the right of private respondent to hold the
landholding in dispute under a contract of lease but they cannot fathom how Congress could have
thought of a lease contract which shall be for an indefinite period and yet say that the period to be valid
should not exceed 99 years (Rollo, p. 48; Appellant's Brief, p. 4; Article 1643 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines).

21
On the other hand, private respondent argued that even though he was still an alien when he entered
into the contract of lease (on October 5, 1954), he was not prohibited by law to do so. In fact, prior to his The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
becoming a naturalized Filipino citizen in 1961, the appellants did not question his right to enter into that
contract so that the parties are in pari delicto. He constructed a building on the property worth The Facts
P40,000.00 and prays that he be awarded P30,000.00 for moral damages and P2,000.00 for Attorney's
fees. (Rollo, p. 48; Appellant's Brief, p. 2).
The facts of the case are narrated by the CA as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
The position of private respondent is well taken.
"A complaint for ejectment was filed by [Petitioner Ten Forty Realty and Development Corporation]
against . . . [Respondent Marina Cruz] before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Olongapo City,
The lower court correctly ruled that the defendant-appellee Chong had at the time of the execution of docketed as Civil Case 4269, which alleged that: petitioner is the true and absolute owner of a parcel of
the contract, the right to hold by lease the property involved in the case although at the time of the lot and residential house situated in #71 18th Street, E.B.B. Olongapo City, particularly described
execution of the contract, he was still a Chinese national (Rollo, p. 59; Appellee's Brief, pp. 10-11). as:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In the present case, it has been established that there is only one contract and there is no option to buy
the leased property in favor of Chong. There is nothing in the record, either in the lease contract or in
the complaint itself, to indicate any scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition. On the
contrary, the Llantinos themselves admit openly that right from the start and before entering into the
contract, Chong had merely asked them for a lease of the premises to which they agreed. Admittedly
under the terms of the contract there is nothing to prevent the Llantinos from disposing of their title to
the land to any qualified party but subject to the rights of the lessee Chong. Neither is there under the
terms of the said contract to indicate that the ownership of the Llantinos of the leased premises has
been virtually transferred to the lessee (Rollo, p. 59; Appellee's Brief, p. 14). [G.R. No. 151212.
September 10, 2003.]
TEN FORTY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., Represented by its President, VERONICA G.
LORENZANA, Petitioner, v. MARINA CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In an ejectment suit, the question of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of
determining who is entitled to possession de facto. In the present case, both parties base their alleged
right to possess on their right to own. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in passing upon the
question of ownership to be able to decide who was entitled to physical possession of the disputed
land.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the August 31,
2001 Decision 2 and December 19, 2001 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
64861. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Decision dated May 4,
2001 is hereby AFFIRMED." 4
‘A parcel of residential house and lot situated in the above-mentioned address containing an area of 324
square meters more or less bounded on the Northeast by 041 (Lot 255, Ts-308); on the Southeast by 044
(Lot 255, Ts-308); on the Southwest by 043 (Lot 226-A & 18th street) and on the Northwest by 045 (Lot
227, Ts-308) and declared for taxation purposes in the name of [petitioner] under T.D. No. 002-4595-R
and 002-4596.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
having acquired the same on December 5, 1996 from Barbara Galino by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale; the sale was acknowledged by said Barbara Galino through a ‘Katunayan’; payment of the capital
gains tax for the transfer of the property was evidenced by a Certification Authorizing Registration issued
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; petitioner came to know that Barbara Galino sold the same property
on April 24, 1998 to Cruz, who immediately occupied the property and which occupation was merely
tolerated by petitioner; on October 16, 1998, a complaint for ejectment was filed with the Barangay East
Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City but for failure to arrive at an amicable settlement, a Certificate to File Action
was issued; on April 12, 1999 a demand letter was sent to [respondent] to vacate and pay reasonable
amount for the use and occupation of the same, but was ignored by the latter; and due to the refusal of
[respondent] to vacate the premises, petitioner was constrained to secure the services of a counsel for
an agreed fee of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fee and P500.00 as appearance fee and incurred an expense of
P5,000.00 for litigation.
"In respondent’s Answer with Counterclaim, it was alleged that: petitioner is not qualified to own the
residential lot in dispute, being a public land; according to Barbara Galino, she did not sell her house and
lot to petitioner but merely obtained a loan from Veronica Lorenzana; the payment of the capital gains
tax does not necessarily show that the Deed of Absolute Sale was at that time already in existence; the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter because the complaint was filed beyond the one (1)
year period after the alleged unlawful deprivation of possession; there is no allegation that petitioner
had been in prior possession of the premises and the same was lost thru force, stealth or violence;
evidence will show that it was Barbara Galino who was in possession at the time of the sale and vacated
the property in favor of respondent; never was there an occasion when petitioner occupied a portion of
the premises, before respondent occupied the lot in April 1998, she caused the cancellation of the tax
declaration in the name of Barbara Galino and a new one issued in respondent’s name; petitioner
obtained its tax declaration over the same property on November 3, 1998, seven (7) months [after] the
respondent [obtained hers]; at the time the house and lot [were] bought by respondent, the house was
not habitable, the power and water connections were disconnected; being a public land, respondent
filed a miscellaneous sales application with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office in
Olongapo City; and the action for ejectment cannot succeed where it appears that respondent had been
in possession of the property prior to the petitioner." 5
In a Decision 6 dated October 30, 2000, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) ordered respondent to
vacate the property and surrender to petitioner possession thereof. It also directed her to pay, as
damages for its continued unlawful use, P500 a month from April 24, 1999 until the property was
vacated, P5,000 as attorney’s fees, and the costs of the suit.

22
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court 7 (RTC) of Olongapo City (Branch 72) reversed the MTCC. The RTC
ruled as follows: 1) respondents entry into the property was not by mere tolerance of petitioner, but by
virtue of a Waiver and Transfer of Possessory Rights and Deed of Sale in her favor; 2) the execution of
the Deed of Sale without actual transfer of the physical possession did not have the effect of making
petitioner the owner of the property, because there was no delivery of the object of the sale as provided
for in Article 1438 of the Civil Code; and 3) being a corporation, petitioner was disqualified from
acquiring the property, which was public land.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On the basis of the facts found by the CA and the RTC, we find that petitioner failed to substantiate its
case for unlawful detainer. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. Not shown
either was the corporation’s alleged tolerance of respondent’s possession.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
While possession by tolerance may initially be lawful, it ceases to be so upon the owner’s demand that
the possessor by tolerance vacate the property. 11 To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the
permission or tolerance must have been present at the beginning of the possession. 12 Otherwise, if the
possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.
Sarona v. Villegas 13 elucidates thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Sustaining the RTC, the CA held that petitioner had failed to make a case for unlawful detainer, because
no contract — express or implied — had been entered into by the parties with regard to possession of
the property. It ruled that the action should have been for forcible entry, in which prior physical
possession was indispensable — a circumstance petitioner had not shown either.
The appellate court also held that petitioner had challenged the RTC’s ruling on the question of
ownership for the purpose of compensating for the latter’s failure to counter such ruling. The RTC had
held that, as a corporation, petitioner had no right to acquire the property which was alienable public
land.
Hence, this Petition. 8
Issues
"A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word ‘tolerance’ confirms our view heretofore
expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered,
to categorize a cause of as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise
would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons. First. Forcible entry into the land is an open
challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress — in the
inferior court — provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before
suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right
to seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after
the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action for forcible entry can really
prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a
demand, bring suit in the inferior court — upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in —
and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in
mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and
that the one year time bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action." 14

In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any, averment of fact that would
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
substantiate the claim of petitioner that it permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by
Respondent Cruz. The Complaint contains only bare allegations that 1) respondent immediately occupied
"1. The Honorable Court of Appeals had clearly erred in not holding that [r]espondent’s occupation or
the subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner; 15 and 2) her allegedly
possession of the property in question was merely through the tolerance or permission of the herein
illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance. 16
[p]etitioner;
These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioner’s theory that its cause of action is for
" [2.] The Honorable Court of Appeals had likewise erred in holding that the ejectment case should have
unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that respondent’s occupation of the property
been a forcible entry case where prior physical possession is indispensable; and
was unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the essential requirement in unlawful detainer cases
that petitioner’s supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be present right from the start of a
" [3.] The Honorable Court of Appeals had also erred when it ruled that the herein [r]espondent’s
possession that is later sought to be recovered. 17
possession or occupation of the said property is in the nature of an exercise of ownership which should
put the herein [p]etitioner on guard." 9
As the bare allegation of petitioner’s tolerance of respondent’s occupation of the premises has not been
proven, the possession should be deemed illegal from the beginning. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that
The Court’s Ruling the ejectment case should have been for forcible entry — an action that had already prescribed,
however, when the Complaint was filed on May 12, 1999. The prescriptive period of one year for forcible
entry cases is reckoned from the date of respondent’s actual entry into the land, which in this case was
The Petition has no merit. on April 24, 1998.

First Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Second Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Alleged Occupation by Tolerance Nature of the Case

Petitioner faults the CA for not holding that the former merely tolerated respondent’s occupation of the
subject property. By raising this issue, petitioner is in effect asking this Court to reassess factual findings.
As a general rule, this kind of reassessment cannot be done through a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, because this Court is not a trier of facts; it reviews only
questions of law. 10 Petitioner has not given us ample reasons to depart from the general rule.
Much of the difficulty in the present controversy stems from the legal characterization of the ejectment
Complaint filed by petitioner. Specifically, was it for unlawful detainer or for forcible entry?
The answer is given in Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which we reproduce as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

23
 Alleged Acts of Ownership
"SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, Petitioner next questions the CA’s pronouncement that respondent’s occupation of the property was an
threat, strategy, or stealth, or a vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any exercise of a right flowing from a claim of ownership. It submits that the appellate court should not have
land or building is unlawfully withheld after expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by passed upon the issue of ownership, because the only question for resolution in an ejectment suit is that
virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, of possession de facto.
vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or Clearly, each of the parties claimed the right to possess the disputed property because of alleged
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under ownership of it. Hence, no error could have been imputed to the appellate court when it passed upon
them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.’’ the issue of ownership only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession de facto. 30 The CA’s
holding is moreover in accord with jurisprudence and the law.
While both causes of action deal only with the sole issue of physical or de facto possession, 18 the two
cases are really separate and distinct, as explained below:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Execution of a Deed of Sale Not Sufficient as Delivery

". . . . In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, In a contract of sale, the buyer acquires the thing sold only upon its delivery "in any of the ways specified
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession in Articles 1497 to 1501, or any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred
thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or from the vendor to the vendee." 31 With respect to incorporeal property, Article 1498 lays down the
implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on general rule: the execution of a public instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing that is
who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but the object of the contract if, from the deed, the contrary does not appear or cannot be clearly
became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful inferred.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of
action is the termination of the defendant’s right to continue in possession. However, ownership is transferred not by contract but by tradition or delivery. 32 Nowhere in the Civil
Code is it provided that the execution of a Deed of Sale is a conclusive presumption of delivery of
"What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land. If the entry is possession of a piece of real estate. 33
illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible
entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is This Court has held that the execution of a public instrument gives rises only to a prima facie
one of unlawful detainer which must be filed within one year from the date of the last demand." 19 presumption of delivery. Such presumption is destroyed when the delivery is not effected because of a
legal impediment. 34 Pasagui v. Villablanca 35 had earlier ruled that such constructive or symbolic
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it delivery, being merely presumptive, was deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual
are the allegations in the complaint 20 and the character of the relief sought. 21 possession of the land sold.

In its Complaint, petitioner alleged that, having acquired the subject property from Barbara Galino on It is undisputed that petitioner did not occupy the property from the time it was allegedly sold to it on
December 5 1996, 22 it was the true and absolute owner 23 thereof; that Galino had sold the property December 5, 1996 or at any time thereafter. Nonetheless, it maintains that Galino’s continued stay in the
to Respondent Cruz on April 24, 1998; 24 that after the sale, the latter immediately occupied the premises from the time of the sale up to the time respondent’s occupation of the same on April 24,
property, an action that was merely tolerated by petitioner; 25 and that, in a letter given to respondent 1998, was possessions held on its behalf and had the effect of delivery under the law. 36
on April 12, 1999, 26 petitioner had demanded that the former vacate the property, but that she refused
to do so. 27 Petitioner thereupon prayed for judgment ordering her to vacate the property and to pay Both the RTC and the CA disagreed. According to the RTC, petitioner did not gain control and possession
reasonable rentals for the use of the premises, attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit. 28 of the property, because Galino had continued to exercise ownership rights over the realty. That is, she
had remained in possession, continued to declare it as her property for tax purposes and sold it to
The above allegations appeared to show the elements of unlawful detainer. They also conferred respondent in 1998.
initiatory jurisdiction on the MTCC, because the case was filed a month after the last demand to vacate
— hence, within the one-year prescriptive period. For its part, the CA found it highly unbelievable that petitioner — which claims to be the owner of the
disputed property — would tolerate possession of the property by respondent from April 24, 1998 up to
However, what was actually proven by petitioner was that possession by respondent had been illegal October 16, 1998. How could it have been so tolerant despite its knowledge that the property had been
from the beginning. While the Complaint was crafted to be an unlawful detainer suit, petitioner’s real sold to her, and that it was by virtue of that sale that she had undertaken major repairs and
cause of action was for forcible entry, which had already prescribed. Consequently, the MTCC had no improvements on it?
more jurisdiction over the action.
Petitioner should have likewise been put on guard by respondent’s declaration of the property for tax
The appellate court, therefore, did not err when it ruled that petitioner’s Complaint for unlawful detainer purposes on April 23, 1998, 37 as annotated in the tax certificate filed seven months later. 38 Verily, the
was a mere subterfuge or a disguised substitute action for forcible entry, which had already prescribed. tax declaration represented an adverse claim over the unregistered property and was inimical to the
To repeat, to maintain a viable action for forcible entry, plaintiff must have been in prior physical right of petitioner.
possession of the property; this is an essential element of the suit. 29
Indeed, the above circumstances derogated its claim of control and possession of the property.
Third Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Order of Preference in Double Sale of Immovable Property

24
 While corporations cannot acquire land of the public domain, they can however acquire private land. 46
The ownership of immovable property sold to two different buyers at different times is governed by Hence, the next issue that needs to be resolved is the determination of whether the disputed property is
Article 1544 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph private land or of the public domain.

"Article 1544. . . . According to the certification by the City Planning and Development Office of Olongapo City, the
contested property in this case is alienable and disposable public land. 47 It was for this reason that
"Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good respondent filed a miscellaneous sales application to acquire it. 48
faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
On the other hand, petitioner has not presented proof that, at the time it purchased the property from
"Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in Galino, the property had ceased to be of the public domain and was already private land. The established
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is rule is that alienable and disposable land of the public domain held and occupied by a possessor —
good faith."cralaw virtua1aw library personally or through predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously, and exclusively for 30 years — is
ipso jure converted to private property by the mere lapse of time. 49
Galino allegedly sold the property in question to petitioner on December 5, 1996 and, subsequently, to
respondent on April 24, 1998. Petitioner thus argues that being the first buyer, it has a better right to In view of the foregoing, we affirm the appellate court’s ruling that respondent is entitled to possession
own the realty. However, it has not been able to establish that its Deed of Sale was recorded in the de facto. This determination, however, is only provisional in nature. 50 Well-settled is the rule that an
Registry of Deeds of Olongapo City. 39 Its claim of an unattested and unverified notation on its Deed of award of possession de facto over a piece of property does not constitute res judicata as to the issue of
Absolute Sale 40 is not equivalent to registration. It admits that, indeed, the sale has not been recorded its ownership. 51
in the Registry of Deeds. 41
WHEREFORE, this Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
In the absence of the required inscription, the law gives preferential right to the buyer who in good faith petitioner.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
is first in possession. In determining the question of who is first in possession, certain basic parameters
have been established by jurisprudence.
Under the circumstances, a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an
First, the possession mentioned in Article 1544 includes not only material but also symbolic possession.
alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship. Aliens are not
42 Second, possessors in good faith are those who are not aware of any flaw in their title or mode of
completely excluded by the Constitution from use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence
acquisition. 43 Third, buyers of real property that is in the possession of persons other than the seller
in the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is
must be wary — they must investigate the rights of the possessors. 44 Fourth, good faith is always
not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortune and
presumed; upon those who allege bad faith on the part of the possessors rests the burden of proof. 45
misfortune, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire (Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She,
21 SCRA 52 [1967], citing Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 [1947]).
Earlier, we ruled that the subject property had not been delivered to petitioner; hence, it did not acquire
possession either materially or symbolically. As between the two buyers, therefore, respondent was first
in actual possession of the property. The only instance where a contract of lease may be considered invalid is, if there are circumstances
attendant to its execution, which are used as a scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition.
Petitioner has not proven that respondent was aware that her mode of acquiring the property was
defective at the time she acquired it from Galino. At the time, the property — which was public land — If an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the
had not been registered in the name of Galino; thus, respondent relied on the tax declarations thereon. Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes
As shown, the former’s name appeared on the tax declarations for the property until its sale to the latter clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages
in 1998. Galino was in fact occupying the realty when respondent took over possession. Thus, there was not only of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi, and jus abutendi) — rights,
no circumstance that could have placed the latter upon inquiry or required her to further investigate the sum of which make up ownership. It is just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow the
petitioner’s right of ownership. use, the next day the disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up
are consolidated in an alien (Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52 [1967]).
Disqualification from Ownership of Alienable Public Land

Private corporations are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain, as provided under
Section 3 of Article XII of the Constitution, which we quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the
uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.
Citizens of the Philippines may not lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than
twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant. . . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
Coming back to the case at bar, even assuming, arguendo, that the subject contract is prohibited, the
same can no longer be questioned presently upon the acquisition by the private respondent of Filipino
citizenship. It was held that sale of a residential land to an alien which is now in the hands of a
naturalized Filipino citizen is valid (De Castro vs. Tan, 129 SCRA 85 [1984]).
A contract is the law between the contracting parties, and when there is nothing in it which is contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order, the validity of the contract must be sustained
(Marimperio Compania Naviera, S.A. vs. Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 358 [1987]).

25
The issue of the nature of the contract in the case at bar was never raised in the basic pleadings or in the
pre-trial (Rollo, p. 59-1; Appellee's Brief, p. 22).
It is too late to raise an issue on appeal in the Supreme Court when it has not been raised in the lower
court (Espadera vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 364 [1988]).
Moreover, contracts which are not ambiguous are to be interpreted according to their literal meaning
and should not be interpreted beyond their obvious intendment (Plastic Town Center Corporation vs.
NLRC, 172 SCRA 580 [1989]; Herrera vs. Petrophil Corp., 146 SCRA 385 [1986]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against the plaintiffs-
appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration
in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters,
more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No.
141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial
court in said proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation
duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real
properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the
provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both
members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale
took place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the
ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation
until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous,
adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who
were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the
possession is already considered from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes
on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable
public land or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five
Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the
Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September 18,
1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was
duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have
negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this
negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite
of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by
the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on
November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935
Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have
been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the
26
latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations
or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000
hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme
purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of
Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or
not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights
granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which
were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this
Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on
October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through
their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the
required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48
of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as
the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands
under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had
transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in
1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against
private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the
registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in
the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition
against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where
a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than
60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from
the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their
predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On
December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for
confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the
application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for registration
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply
for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court
upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of
the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still
public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration
under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between
(on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an
imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an
occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or
qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may
be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the
land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in
1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the
doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes
private property. That said dissent expressed what is the better — and, indeed, the correct, view-
becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25,
1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It
was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove'
possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may
prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated
to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in
danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in
view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any
litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language, in Susi:
27
 .... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual
and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of
the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a
right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So
that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired,
by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned
by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act
No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the
State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at
least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands.
Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed
of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void
and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina
vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra,
by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held
to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation
for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over
the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public
land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision
are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a
grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The
land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of
Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does
not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens
title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land
which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from
the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation
proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether
the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder
would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would
not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already
affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As
was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if
not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally
sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must
also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the
1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect
later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession
of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate
proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the
land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to
prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had
already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant
was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024
hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the
aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain
cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then
perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution
cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales
application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to
the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution.
Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public
agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner'
prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair
vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a
municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate
exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the
right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established
and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had
the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to
obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without
due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).<äre||anº•1àw>  15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be
regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural
28
and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in
said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in
the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have
had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would
deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no
constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling
in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as
enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis
of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was
acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no
prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical
person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the
Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for
confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court
actions. Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed the application for
registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is
conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive
effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end
result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of
ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their
favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all
such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the
Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for
confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original
persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title
that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and
who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations
duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of
title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from
themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their
names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas
the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal
application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it
breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which
has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting
that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad
Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was
disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential
limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as
essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.
G.R. No. L-6776             May 21, 1955
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
UNG SIU SI TEMPLE, respondent-appellant.
Alejo F. Candido for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Querube C. Makalintal and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for record a deed of donation executed
in due form on January 22, 1953, by Jesus Dy, a Filipino citizen, conveying a parcel of residential land, in
Caloocan, Rizal, known as lot No. 2, block 48-D, PSD-4212, G.L.R.O. Record No. 11267, in favor of the
unregistered religious organization "Ung Siu Si Temple", operating through three trustees all of Chinese
nationality. The donation was duly accepted by Yu Juan, of Chinese nationality, founder and deaconess
of the Temple, acting in representation and in behalf of the latter and its trustees.
The refusal of the Registrar was elevated en Consultato the IVth Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. On March 14, 1953, the Court upheld the action of the Rizal Register of Deeds, saying:
The question raised by the Register of Deeds in the above transcribed consulta is whether a
deed of donation of a parcel of land executed in favor of a religious organization whose
founder, trustees and administrator are Chinese citizens should be registered or not.
It appearing from the record of the Consulta that UNG SIU SI TEMPLE is a religious
organization whose deaconess, founder, trustees and administrator are all Chinese citizens,
this Court is of the opinion and so hold that in view of the provisions of the sections 1 and 5 of
Article XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines limiting the acquisition of land in the
Philippines to its citizens, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital stock of which is owned by such citizens adopted after the enactment of said Act No.
271, and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krivenko vs. the Register of Deeds
of Manila, the deed of donation in question should not be admitted for admitted for
registration. (Printed Rec. App. pp 17-18).
Not satisfied with the ruling of the Court of First Instance, counsel for the donee Uy Siu Si Temple has
appealed to this Court, claiming: (1) that the acquisition of the land in question, for religious purposes, is
authorized and permitted by Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission, providing as follows:
SECTION 1. It shall be lawful for all religious associations, of whatever sort or denomination,
whether incorporated in the Philippine Islands or in the name of other country, or not
29
 incorporated at all, to hold land in the Philippine Islands upon which to build churches,
parsonages, or educational or charitable institutions.
SEC. 2. Such religious institutions, if not incorporated, shall hold the land in the name of three
Trustees for the use of such associations; . . .. (Printed Rec. App. p. 5.)
and (2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates the freedom of religion clause of our
Constitution [Art. III, Sec. 1(7)].
We are of the opinion that the Court below has correctly held that in view of the absolute terms of
section 5, Title XIII, of the Constitution, the provisions of Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission
must be deemed repealed since the Constitution was enacted, in so far as incompatible therewith. In
providing that, —
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain in the Philippines,
the Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious associations. Neither is there any such saving
found in sections 1 and 2 of Article XIII, restricting the acquisition of public agricultural lands and other
natural resources to "corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens" (of the Philippines).
The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not suffice to escape the
Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its members are of foreign nationality. The purpose of
the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that corporations or associations allowed to
acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural resources shall be controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of
the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should be
composed of Filipino citizens.
To permit religious associations controlled by non-Filipinos to acquire agricultural lands would be to
drive the opening wedge to revive alien religious land holdings in this country. We can not ignore the
historical fact that complaints against land holdings of that kind were among the factors that sparked the
revolution of 1896.
As to the complaint that the disqualification under article XIII is violative of the freedom of religion
guaranteed by Article III of the Constitution, we are by no means convinced (nor has it been shown) that
land tenure is indispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession or worship; or
that one may not worship the Deity according to the dictates of his own conscience unless upon land
held in fee simple.
The resolution appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Pablo, Acting C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-8451        December 20, 1957
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY, respondents.
Teodoro Padilla, for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Troadio
T. Quianzon, Jr., for respondents.
FELIX, J.:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao seeking
the reversal of a resolution by the Land Registration Commissioner in L.R.C. Consulta No. 14. The facts of
the case are as follows:
On October 4, 1954, Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City of Davao, executed a deed
of sale of a parcel of land located in the same city covered by Transfer Certificate No. 2263, in favor of
the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc., s corporation sole organized and existing in
accordance with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent.
When the deed of sale was presented to Register of Deeds of Davao for registration, the latter.
having in mind a previous resolution of the Fourth Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila wherein the Carmelite Nuns of Davao were made to prepare an affidavit to the effect
that 60 per cent of the members of their corporation were Filipino citizens when they sought
to register in favor of their congregation of deed of donation of a parcel of land—
required said corporation sole to submit a similar affidavit declaring that 60 per cent of the members
thereof were Filipino citizens.
The vendee in the letter dated June 28, 1954, expressed willingness to submit an affidavit, both not in
the same tenor as that made the Progress of the Carmelite Nuns because the two cases were not similar,
for whereas the congregation of the Carmelite Nuns had five incorporators, the corporation sole has only
one; that according to their articles of incorporation, the organization of the Carmelite Nuns became the
owner of properties donated to it, whereas the case at bar, the totality of the Catholic population of
Davao would become the owner of the property bought to be registered.
As the Register of Deeds entertained some doubts as to the registerability if the document, the matter
was referred to the Land Registration Commissioner en consulta for resolution in accordance with
section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151. Proper hearing on the matter was conducted by the Commissioner
and after the petitioner corporation had filed its memorandum, a resolution was rendered on September
21, 1954, holding that in view of the provisions of Section 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine
Constitution, the vendee was not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence of
proof that at least 60 per centum of the capital, property, or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao, Inc., was actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens, there being no
question that the present incumbent of the corporation sole was a Canadian citizen. It was also the
opinion of the Land Registration Commissioner that section 159 of the corporation Law relied upon by
the vendee was rendered operative by the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution with respect to
real estate, unless the precise condition set therein — that at least 60 per cent of its capital is owned by
Filipino citizens — be present, and, therefore, ordered the Registered Deeds of Davao to deny
registration of the deed of sale in the absence of proof of compliance with such condition.
30
After the motion to reconsider said resolution was denied, an action for mandamus was instituted with
this Court by said corporation sole, alleging that under the Corporation Law as well as the settled
jurisprudence on the matter, the deed of sale executed by Mateo L. Rodis in favor of petitioner is actually
a deed of sale in favor of the Catholic Church which is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands for
the establishment and maintenance of places of worship, and prayed that judgment be rendered
reserving and setting aside the resolution of the Land Registration Commissioner in question. In its
resolution of November 15, 1954, this Court gave due course to this petition providing that the
procedure prescribed for appeals from the Public Service Commission of the Securities and Exchange
Commissions (Rule 43), be followed.
Section 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution reads as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred
or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
Section 1 of the same Article also provides the following:
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to cititzens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, SUBJECT TO ANY EXISTING RIGHT, grant, lease, or concession
AT THE TIME OF THE INAUGURATION OF THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED UNDER CONSTITUTION.
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or leases for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases other than the development and limit of the grant.
In virtue of the foregoing mandates of the Constitution, who are considered "qualified" to acquire and
hold agricultural lands in the Philippines? What is the effect of these constitutional prohibition of the
right of a religious corporation recognized by our Corporation Law and registered as a corporation sole,
to possess, acquire and register real estates in its name when the Head, Manager, Administrator or
actual incumbent is an alien?
Petitioner consistently maintained that a corporation sole, irrespective of the citizenship of its
incumbent, is not prohibited or disqualified to acquire and hold real properties. The Corporation Law and
the Canon Law are explicit in their provisions that a corporation sole or "ordinary" is not the owner of
the of the properties that he may acquire but merely the administrator thereof. The Canon Law also
specified that church temporalities are owned by the Catholic Church as a "moral person" or by the
diocess as minor "moral persons" with the ordinary or bishop as administrator.
And elaborating on the composition of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, petitioner explained that
as a religious society or organization, it is made up of 2 elements or divisions — the clergy or religious
members and the faithful or lay members. The 1948 figures of the Bureau of Census showed that there
were 277,551 Catholics in Davao and aliens residing therein numbered 3,465. Ever granting that all these
foreigners are Catholics, petitioner contends that Filipino citizens form more than 80 per cent of the
entire Catholics population of that area. As to its clergy and religious composition, counsel for petitioner
presented the Catholic Directory of the Philippines for 1954 (Annex A) which revealed that as of that
year, Filipino clergy and women novices comprise already 60.5 per cent of the group. It was, therefore,
allowed that the constitutional requirement was fully met and satisfied.
Respondents, on the other hand, averred that although it might be true that petitioner is not the owner
of the land purchased, yet he has control over the same, with full power to administer, take possession
of, alienate, transfer, encumber, sell or dispose of any or all lands and their improvements registered in
the name of the corporation sole and can collect, receive, demand or sue for all money or values of any
kind that may be kind that may become due or owing to said corporation, and vested with authority to
enter into agreements with any persons, concerns or entities in connection with said real properties, or
in other words, actually exercising all rights of ownership over the properties. It was their stand that the
theory that properties registered in the name of the corporation sole are held in true for the benefit of
the Catholic population of a place, as of Davao in the case at bar should be sustained because a
conglomeration of persons cannot just be pointed out as the cestui que trust or recipient of the benefits
from the property allegedly administered in their behalf. Neither can it be said that the mass of people
referred to as such beneficiary exercise ant right of ownership over the same. This set-up, respondents
argued, falls short of a trust. The respondents instead tried to prove that in reality, the beneficiary of
ecclesiastical properties are not members or faithful of the church but someone else, by quoting a
portion a portion of the ought of fidelity subscribed by a bishop upon his elevation to the episcopacy
wherein he promises to render to the Pontificial Father or his successors an account of his pastoral office
and of all things appertaining to the state of this church.
Respondents likewise advanced the opinion that in construing the constitutional provision calling for 60
per cent of Filipino citizenship, the criterion of the properties or assets thereof.
In solving the problem thus submitted to our consideration, We can say the following: A corporation sole
is a special form of corporation usually associated with the clergy. Conceived and introduced into the
common law by sheer necessity, this legal creation which was referred to as "that unhappy freak of
English law" was designed to facilitate the exercise of the functions of ownership carried on by the clerics
for and on behalf of the church which was regarded as the property owner (See I Couvier's Law
Dictionary, p. 682-683).
A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at a time), in
some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities and
advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have had. In
this sense, the king is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or dens, distinct from their several chapters (Reid
vs. Barry, 93 Fla. 849, 112 So. 846).
The provisions of our Corporation law on religious corporations are illuminating and sustain the stand of
petitioner. Section 154 thereof provides:
SEC. 154. — For the administration of the temporalities of any religious denomination, society
or church and the management of the estates and the properties thereof, it shall be lawful for
the bishop, chief priest, or presiding either of any such religious denomination, society or
church to become a corporation sole, unless inconsistent wit the rules, regulations or
discipline of his religious denomination, society or church or forbidden by competent
authority thereof.
See also the pertinent provisions of the succeeding sections of the same Corporation Law copied
hereunder:
SEC. 155. In order to become a corporation sole the bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder of
any religious denomination, society or church must file with the Securities and Exchange
Commissioner articles of incorporation setting forth the following facts:
31
xxx xxx xxx. to his successor in said office. If the ownership or title to the properties do not pass to the
administrators, who are the owners of church properties?.
(3) That as such bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder he is charged with the
administration of the temporalities and the management of the estates and properties of his Bouscaren and Elis, S.J., authorities on cannon law, on their treatise comment:
religious denomination, society, or church within its territorial jurisdiction, describing it;
In matters regarding property belonging to the Universal Church and to the Apostolic See, the
xxx xxx xxx. Supreme Pontiff exercises his office of supreme administrator through the Roman Curia; in
matters regarding other church property, through the administrators of the individual moral
persons in the Church according to that norms, laid down in the Code of Cannon Law. This
(As amended by Commonwealth Act No. 287).
does not mean, however, that the Roman Pontiff is the owner of all the church property; but
merely that he is the supreme guardian (Bouscaren and Ellis, Cannon Law, A Text and
SEC. 157. From and after the filing with the Securities and Exchange Commissioner of the said Commentary, p. 764).
articles of incorporation, which verified by affidavit or affirmation as aforesaid and
accompanied by the copy of the commission, certificate of election, or letters of appointment
and this Court, citing Campes y Pulido, Legislacion y Jurisprudencia Canonica, ruled in the case of
of the bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder, duly certified as prescribed in the section
Trinidad vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 63 Phil. 881, that:
immediately preceding such the bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder, as the case may be,
shall become a corporation sole and all temporalities, estates, and properties the religious
denomination, society, or church therefore administered or managed by him as such bishop, The second question to be decided is in whom the ownership of the properties constituting
chief priest, or presiding elder, shall be held in trust by him as a corporation sole, for the use, the endowment of the ecclesiastical or collative chaplaincies is vested.
purpose, behalf, and sole benefit of his religious denomination, society, or church, including
hospitals, schools, colleges, orphan, asylums, parsonages, and cemeteries thereof. For the
Canonists entertain different opinions as to the persons in whom the ownership of the
filing of such articles of incorporation, the Securities and Exchange Commissioner shall collect
ecclesiastical properties is vested, with respect to which we shall, for our purpose, confine
twenty-five pesos. (As amended by Commonwealth Act. No. 287); and.
ourselves to stating with Donoso that, while many doctors cited by Fagnano believe that it
resides in the Roman Pontiff as Head of the Universal Church, it is more probable that
SEC. 163. The right to administer all temporalities and all property held or owned by a ownership, strictly speaking, does not reside in the latter, and, consequently, ecclesiastical
religious order or society, or by the diocese, synod, or district organization of any religious properties are owned by the churches, institutions and canonically established private
denomination or church shall, on its incorporation, pass to the corporation and shall be held corporations to which said properties have been donated.
in trust for the use, purpose behalf, and benefit of the religious society, or order so
incorporated or of the church of which the diocese, or district organization is an organized
Considering that nowhere can We find any provision conferring ownership of church properties on the
and constituent part.
Pope although he appears to be the supreme administrator or guardian of his flock, nor on the
corporation sole or heads of dioceses as they are admittedly mere administrators of said properties,
The Cannon Law contains similar provisions regarding the duties of the corporation sole or ordinary as ownership of these temporalities logically fall and develop upon the church, diocese or congregation
administrator of the church properties, as follows: acquiring the same. Although this question of ownership of ecclesiastical properties has off and on been
mentioned in several decisions of the Court yet in no instance was the subject of citizenship of this
religious society been passed upon.
Al Ordinario local pertenence vigilar diligentemente sobre la administracion de todos los
bienes eclesiasticos que se hallan en su territorio y no estuvieren sustraidos de su jurisdiccion,
salvs las prescriciones legitimas que le concedan mas aamplios derechos. We are not unaware of the opinion expressed by the late Justice Perfecto in his dissent in the case of
Agustines vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, 80 Phil. 565, to the effect that "the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila is only a branch of a universal church by the Pope, with permanent residence in
Teniendo en cuenta los derechos y las legitimas costumbres y circunstancias, procuraran los
Rome, Italy". There is no question that the Roman Catholic Church existing in the Philippines is a
Ordinarios regular todo lo concerniente a la administracion de los bienes eclesciasticos,
tributary and part of the international religious organization, for the word "Roman" clearly expresses its
dando las oportunas instucciones particularles dentro del narco del derecho comun. (Title
unity with and recognizes the authority of the Pope in Rome. However, lest We become hasty in drawing
XXVIII, Codigo de Derecho Canonico, Lib. III, Canon 1519).1
conclusions, We have to analyze and take note of the nature of the government established in the
Vatican City, of which it was said:
That leaves no room for doubt that the bishops or archbishops, as the case may be, as corporation's sole
are merely administrators of the church properties that come to their possession, in which they hold in
GOVERNMENT. In the Roman Catholic Church supreme authority and jurisdiction over clergy
trust for the church. It can also be said that while it is true that church properties could be administered
and laity alike as held by the pope who (since the Middle Ages) is elected by the cardinals
by a natural persons, problems regarding succession to said properties can not be avoided to rise upon
assembled in conclave, and holds office until his death or legitimate abdication. . . While the
his death. Through this legal fiction, however, church properties acquired by the incumbent of a
pope is obviously independent of the laws made, and the officials appointed, by himself or his
corporation sole pass, by operation of law, upon his death not his personal heirs but to his successor in
predecessors, he usually exercises his administrative authority according to the code of canon
office. It could be seen, therefore, that a corporation sole is created not only to administer the
law and through the congregations, tribunals and offices of the Curia Romana. In their
temporalities of the church or religious society where he belongs but also to hold and transmit the same
respective territories (called generally dioceses) and over their respective subjects, the

32
 patriarchs, metropolitans or archbishops and bishops exercise a jurisdiction which is called
ordinary (as attached by law to an office given to a person. . . (Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 17,
p. 93).
While it is true and We have to concede that in the profession of their faith, the Roman Pontiff is the
supreme head; that in the religious matters, in the exercise of their belief, the Catholic congregation of
the faithful throughout the world seeks the guidance and direction of their Spiritual Father in the
Vatican, yet it cannot be said that there is a merger of personalities resultant therein. Neither can it be
said that the political and civil rights of the faithful, inherent or acquired under the laws of their country,
are affected by that relationship with the Pope. The fact that the Roman Catholic Church in almost every
country springs from that society that saw its beginning in Europe and the fact that the clergy of this
faith derive their authorities and receive orders from the Holy See do not give or bestow the citizenship
of the Pope upon these branches. Citizenship is a political right which cannot be acquired by a sort of
"radiation". We have to realize that although there is a fraternity among all the catholic countries and
the dioceses therein all over the globe, the universality that the word "catholic" implies, merely
characterize their faith, a uniformity in the practice and the interpretation of their dogma and in the
exercise of their belief, but certainly they are separate and independent from one another in jurisdiction,
governed by different laws under which they are incorporated, and entirely independent on the others in
the management and ownership of their temporalities. To allow theory that the Roman Catholic
Churches all over the world follow the citizenship of their Supreme Head, the Pontifical Father, would
lead to the absurdity of finding the citizens of a country who embrace the Catholic faith and become
members of that religious society, likewise citizens of the Vatican or of Italy. And this is more so if We
consider that the Pope himself may be an Italian or national of any other country of the world. The same
thing be said with regard to the nationality or citizenship of the corporation sole created under the laws
of the Philippines, which is not altered by the change of citizenship of the incumbent bishops or head of
said corporation sole.
We must therefore, declare that although a branch of the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church,
every Roman Catholic Church in different countries, if it exercises its mission and is lawfully incorporated
in accordance with the laws of the country where it is located, is considered an entity or person with all
the rights and privileges granted to such artificial being under the laws of that country, separate and
distinct from the personality of the Roman Pontiff or the Holy See, without prejudice to its religious
relations with the latter which are governed by the Canon Law or their rules and regulations.
We certainly are conscious of the fact that whatever conclusion We may draw on this matter will have a
far reaching influence, nor can We overlook the pages of history that arouse indignation and criticisms
against church landholdings. This nurtured feeling that snowbailed into a strong nationalistic sentiment
manifested itself when the provisions on natural to be embodied in the Philippine Constitution were
framed, but all that has been said on this regard referred more particularly to landholdings of religious
corporations known as "Friar Estates" which have already bee acquired by our government, and not to
properties held by corporations sole which, We repeat, are properties held in trust for the benefit of the
faithful residing within its territorial jurisdiction. Though that same feeling probably precipitated and
influenced to a large extent the doctrine laid down in the celebrated Krivenco decision, We have to take
this matter in the light of legal provisions and jurisprudence actually obtaining, irrespective of
sentiments.
The question now left for our determination is whether the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church
in the Philippines, or better still, the corporation sole named the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator
of Davao, Inc., is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands in the Philippines pursuant to the
provisions of Article XIII of the Constitution.
We see from sections 1 and 5 of said Article quoted before, that only persons or corporations qualified to
acquire hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines may acquire or be assigned and hold private
agricultural lands. Consequently, the decisive factor in the present controversy hinges on the proposition
or whether or not the petitioner in this case can acquire agricultural lands of the public domain.
From the data secured from the Securities and Exchange Commission, We find that the Roman Catholic
Bishop of Zamboanga was incorporated (as a corporation sole) in September, 1912, principally to
administer its temporalities and manage its properties. Probably due to the ravages of the last war, its
articles of incorporation were reconstructed in the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 8, 1948.
At first, this corporation sole administered all the temporalities of the church existing or located in the
island of Mindanao. Later on, however, new dioceses were formed and new corporations sole were
created to correspond with the territorial jurisdiction of the new dioceses, one of them being petitioner
herein, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., which was registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on September 12, 1950, and succeeded in the administrative for all
the "temporalities" of the Roman Catholic Church existing in Davao.
According to our Corporation Law, Public Act No. 1549, approved April 1, 1906, a corporation sole.
is organized and composed of a single individual, the head of any religious society or church,
for the ADMINISTRATION of the temporalities of such society or church. By "temporalities" is
meant estate and properties not used exclusively for religious worship. The successor in office
of such religious head or chief priest incorporated as a corporation sole shall become the
corporation sole on ascension to office, and shall be permitted to transact business as such on
filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission a copy of his commission, certificate of
election or letter of appointment duly certified by any notary public or clerk of court of record
(Guevara's The Philippine Corporation Law, p. 223).
The Corporation Law also contains the following provisions:
SECTION 159. Any corporation sole may purchase and hold real estate and personal; property
for its church, charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, and may receive bequests or
gifts of such purposes. Such corporation may mortgage or sell real property held by it upon
obtaining an order for that purpose from the Court of First Instance of the province in which
the property is situated; but before making the order proof must be made to the satisfaction
of the Court that notice of the application for leave to mortgage or sell has been given by
publication or otherwise in such manner and for such time as said Court or the Judge thereof
may have directed, and that it is to the interest of the corporation that leave to mortgage or
sell must be made by petition, duly verified by the bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder
acting as corporation sole, and may be opposed by any member of the religious
denomination, society or church represented by the corporation sole: Provided, however,
That in cases where the rules, regulations, and discipline of the religious denomination,
society or church concerned represented by such corporation sole regulate the methods of
acquiring, holding, selling and mortgaging real estate and personal property, such rules,
regulations, and discipline shall control and the intervention of the Courts shall not be
necessary.
It can, therefore, be noticed that the power of a corporation sole to purchase real property, like the
power exercised in the case at bar, it is not restricted although the power to sell or mortgage sometimes
is, depending upon the rules, regulations, and discipline of the church concerned represented by said
corporation sole. If corporations sole can purchase and sell real estate for its church, charitable,
benevolent, or educational purposes, can they register said real properties? As provided by law, lands
held in trust for specific purposes me be subject of registration (section 69, Act 496), and the capacity of
a corporation sole, like petitioner herein, to register lands belonging to it is acknowledged, and title
thereto may be issued in its name (Bishop of Nueva Segovia vs. Insular Government, 26 Phil. 300-1913).
33
Indeed it is absurd that while the corporations sole that might be in need of acquiring lands for the
erection of temples where the faithful can pray, or schools and cemeteries which they are expressly
authorized by law to acquire in connection with the propagation of the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith or
in furtherance of their freedom of religion they could not register said properties in their name. As
professor Javier J. Nepomuceno very well says "Man in his search for the immortal and imponderable,
has, even before the dawn of recorded history, erected temples to the Unknown God, and there is no
doubt that he will continue to do so for all time to come, as long as he continues 'imploring the aid of
Divine Providence'" (Nepomuceno's Corporation Sole, VI Ateneo Law Journal, No. 1, p. 41, September,
1956). Under the circumstances of this case, We might safely state that even before the establishment of
the Philippine Commonwealth and of the Republic of the Philippines every corporation sole then
organized and registered had by express provision of law the necessary power and qualification to
purchase in its name private lands located in the territory in which it exercised its functions or ministry
and for which it was created, independently of the nationality of its incumbent unique and single
member and head, the bishop of the dioceses. It can be also maintained without fear of being gainsaid
that the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines has no nationality and that the framers of
the Constitution, as will be hereunder explained, did not have in mind the religious corporations sole
when they provided that 60 per centum of the capital thereof be owned by Filipino citizens.
There could be no controversy as to the fact that a duly registered corporation sole is an artificial being
having the right of succession and the power, attributes, and properties expressly authorized by law or
incident to its existence (section 1, Corporation Law). In outlining the general powers of a corporation.
Public Act. No. 1459 provides among others:
SEC. 13. Every corporation has the power:
(5) To purchase, hold, convey, sell, lease, lot, mortgage, encumber, and otherwise deal with
such real and personal property as the purpose for which the corporation was formed may
permit, and the transaction of the lawful business of the corporation may reasonably and
necessarily require, unless otherwise prescribed in this Act: . . .
In implementation of the same and specially made applicable to a form of corporation recognized by the
same law, Section 159 aforequoted expressly allowed the corporation sole to purchase and hold real as
well as personal properties necessary for the promotion of the objects for which said corporation sole is
created. Respondent Land Registration Commissioner, however, maintained that since the Philippine
Constitution is a later enactment than public Act No. 1459, the provisions of Section 159 in amplification
of Section 13 thereof, as regard real properties, should be considered repealed by the former.
There is a reason to believe that when the specific provision of the Constitution invoked by respondent
Commissioner was under consideration, the framers of the same did not have in mind or overlooked this
particular form of corporation. It is undeniable that the naturalization and conservation of our national
resources was one of the dominating objectives of the Convention and in drafting the present Article XII
of the Constitution, the delegates were goaded by the desire (1) to insure their conservation for Filipino
posterity; (2) to serve as an instrument of national defense, helping prevent the extension into the
country of foreign control through peaceful economic penetration; and (3) to prevent making the
Philippines a source of international conflicts with the consequent danger to its internal security and
independence (See The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Professor Jose M. Aruego, a Delegate
to the Constitutional Convention, Vol. II. P. 592-604). In the same book Delegate Aruego, explaining the
reason behind the first consideration, wrote:
At the time of the framing of Philippine Constitution, Filipino capital had been to be rather
shy. Filipinos hesitated s a general rule to invest a considerable sum of their capital for the
development, exploitation and utilization of the natural resources of the country. They had
not as yet been so used to corporate as the peoples of the west. This general apathy, the
delegates knew, would mean the retardation of the development of the natural resources,
unless foreign capital would be encouraged to come and help in that development. They
knew that the naturalization of the natural resources would certainly not encourage
the INVESTMENT OF FOREIGN CAPITAL into them. But there was a general feeling in the
Convention that it was better to have such a development retarded or even postpone
together until such time when the Filipinos would be ready and willing to undertake it rather
than permit the natural resources to be placed under the ownership or control of foreigners
in order that they might be immediately be developed, with the Filipinos of the future serving
not as owners but utmost as tenants or workers under foreign masters. By all means, the
delegates believed, the natural resources should be conserved for Filipino posterity.
It could be distilled from the foregoing that the farmers of the Constitution intended said provisions as
barrier for foreigners or corporations financed by such foreigners to acquire, exploit and develop our
natural resources, saving these undeveloped wealth for our people to clear and enrich when they are
already prepared and capable of doing so. But that is not the case of corporations sole in the Philippines,
for, We repeat, they are mere administrators of the "temporalities" or properties titled in their name
and for the benefit of the members of their respective religion composed of an overwhelming majority
of Filipinos. No mention nor allusion whatsoever is made in the Constitution as to the prohibition against
or the liability of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines to acquire and hold agricultural lands.
Although there were some discussions on landholdings, they were mostly confined in the inclusion of the
provision allowing the Government to break big landed estates to put an end to absentee landlordism.
But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the above referred to inhibitory clause of Section 1 of
Article XIII of the constitution does have bearing on the petitioner's case; even so the clause requiring
that at least 60 per centum of the capital of the corporation be owned by Filipinos is subordinated to the
petitioner's aforesaid right already existing at the time of the inauguration of the Commonwealth and
the Republic of the Philippines. In the language of Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel (a delegate to the
Constitutional Convention), in his concurring opinion of the case of Gold Creek mining Corporation,
petitioner vs. Eulogio Rodriguez, Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director
of the Bureau of Mines, respondent, 66 Phil. 259:
The saving clause in the section involved of the Constitution was originally embodied in the
report submitted by the Committee on Naturalization and Preservation of Land and Other
Natural Resources to the Constitutional Convention on September 17, 1954. It was later
inserted in the first draft of the Constitution as section 13 of Article XIII thereof, and finally
incorporated as we find it now. Slight have been the changes undergone by the proviso from
the time when it comes out of the committee until it was finally adopted. When first
submitted and as inserted to the first draft of the Constitution it reads: 'subject to any right,
grant, lease, or concession existing in respect thereto on the date of the adoption of the
Constitution'. As finally adopted, the proviso reads: 'subject to any existing right, grant, lease,
or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution'. This recognition is not mere graciousness but springs form the just character of
the government established. The framers of the Constitution were not obscured by the
rhetoric of democracy or swayed to hostility by an intense spirit of nationalism. They well
knew that conservation of our natural resources did not mean destruction or annihilation of
acquired property rights. Withal, they erected a government neither episodic nor stationary
but well-nigh conservative in the protection of property rights. This notwithstanding
nationalistic and socialistic traits discoverable upon even a sudden dip into a variety of the
provisions embodied in the instrument.
The writer of this decision wishes to state at this juncture that during the deliberation of this case he
submitted to the consideration of the Court the question that may be termed the "vested right saving
34
clause" contained in Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution, but some of the members of this Court
either did not agree with the theory of the writer, or were not ready to take a definite stand on the
particular point I am now to discuss deferring our ruling on such debatable question for a better
occasion, inasmuch as the determination thereof is not absolutely necessary for the solution of the
problem involved in this case. In his desire to face the issues squarely, the writer will endeavor, at least
as a disgression, to explain and develop his theory, not as a lucubration of the Court, but of his own, for
he deems it better and convenient to go over the cycle of reasons that are linked to one another and
that step by step lead Us to conclude as We do in the dispositive part of this decision.
It will be noticed that Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides, among other things, that "all
agricultural lands of the public domain and their disposition shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines
or to corporations at least 60 per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, SUBJECT TO
ANY EXISTING RIGHT AT THE TIME OF THE INAUGURATION OF THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED UNDER
THIS CONSTITUTION."
As recounted by Mr. Justice Laurel in the aforementioned case of Gold Creek Mining Corporation vs.
Rodriguez et al., 66 Phil. 259, "this recognition (in the clause already quoted), is not mere
graciousness but springs from the just character of the government established. The farmers of the
Constitution were not obscured by the rhetoric of democracy or swayed to hostility by an intense spirit of
nationalism. They well knew that conservation of our natural resources did not mean destruction or
annihilation of ACQUIRED PROPERTY RIGHTS".
But respondents' counsel may argue that the preexisting right of acquisition of public or private lands by
a corporation which does not fulfill this 60 per cent requisite, refers to purchases of the Constitution and
not to later transactions. This argument would imply that even assuming that petitioner had at the time
of the enactment of the Constitution the right to purchase real property or right could not be exercised
after the effectivity of our Constitution, because said power or right of corporations sole, like the herein
petitioner, conferred in virtue of the aforequoted provisions of the Corporation Law, could no longer be
exercised in view of the requisite therein prescribed that at least 60 per centum of the capital of the
corporation had to be Filipino. It has been shown before that: (1) the corporation sole, unlike the
ordinary corporations which are formed by no less than 5 incorporators, is composed of only one
persons, usually the head or bishop of the diocese, a unit which is not subject to expansion for the
purpose of determining any percentage whatsoever; (2) the corporation sole is only
the administrator and not the owner of the temporalities located in the territory comprised by said
corporation sole; (3) such temporalities are administered for and on behalf of the faithful residing in the
diocese or territory of the corporation sole; and (4) the latter, as such, has no nationality and the
citizenship of the incumbent Ordinary has nothing to do with the operation, management or
administration of the corporation sole, nor effects the citizenship of the faithful connected with their
respective dioceses or corporation sole.
In view of these peculiarities of the corporation sole, it would seem obvious that when the specific
provision of the Constitution invoked by respondent Commissioner (section 1, Art. XIII), was under
consideration, the framers of the same did not have in mind or overlooked this particular form of
corporation. If this were so, as the facts and circumstances already indicated tend to prove it to be so,
then the inescapable conclusion would be that this requirement of at least 60 per cent of Filipino capital
was never intended to apply to corporations sole, and the existence or not a vested right becomes
unquestionably immaterial.
But let us assumed that the questioned proviso is material. yet We might say that a reading of said
Section 1 will show that it does not refer to any actual acquisition of land up to the right, qualification or
power to acquire and hold private real property. The population of the Philippines, Catholic to a high
percentage, is ever increasing. In the practice of religion of their faithful the corporation sole may be in
need of more temples where to pray, more schools where the children of the congregation could be
taught in the principles of their religion, more hospitals where their sick could be treated, more hallow or
consecrated grounds or cemeteries where Catholics could be buried, many more than those actually
existing at the time of the enactment of our Constitution. This being the case, could it be logically
maintained that because the corporation sole which, by express provision of law, has the power to hold
and acquire real estate and personal property of its churches, charitable benevolent, or educational
purposes (section 159, Corporation Law) it has to stop its growth and restrain its necessities just because
the corporation sole is a non-stock corporation composed of only one person who in his unity does not
admit of any percentage, especially when that person is not the owner but merely an administrator of
the temporalities of the corporation sole? The writer leaves the answer to whoever may read and
consider this portion of the decision.
Anyway, as stated before, this question is not a decisive factor in disposing the case, for even if We were
to disregard such saving clause of the Constitution, which reads: subject to any existing right, grant, etc.,
at the same time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution , yet We
would have, under the evidence on record, sufficient grounds to uphold petitioner's contention on this
matter.
In this case of the Register of Deeds of Rizal vs. Ung Sui Si Temple,  2 G.R. No. L-6776, promulgated May
21, 1955, wherein this question was considered from a different angle, this Court through Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, said:
The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not suffice to
escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its members are of foreign
nationality. The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that
corporation or associations allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural resources
shall be controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of the Constitution demands that in the absence
of capital stock, the controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens.
In that case respondent-appellant Ung Siu Si Temple was not a corporation sole but a corporation
aggregate, i.e., an unregistered organization operating through 3 trustees, all of Chinese nationality, and
that is why this Court laid down the doctrine just quoted. With regard to petitioner, which likewise is a
non-stock corporation, the case is different, because it is a registered corporation sole, evidently of no
nationality and registered mainly to administer the temporalities and manage the properties belonging
to the faithful of said church residing in Davao. But even if we were to go over the record to inquire into
the composing membership to determine whether the citizenship requirement is satisfied or not, we
would find undeniable proof that the members of the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith within the territory
of Davao are predominantly Filipino citizens. As indicated before, petitioner has presented evidence to
establish that the clergy and lay members of this religion fully covers the percentage of Filipino citizens
required by the Constitution. These facts are not controverted by respondents and our conclusion in this
point is sensibly obvious.
Dissenting Opinion—Discussed. — After having developed our theory in the case and arrived at the
findings and conclusions already expressed in this decision. We now deem it proper to analyze and delve
into the basic foundation on which the dissenting opinion stands up. Being aware of the transcendental
and far-reaching effects that Our ruling on the matter might have, this case was thoroughly considered
from all points of view, the Court sparing no effort to solve the delicate problems involved herein.
At the deliberations had to attain this end, two ways were open to a prompt dispatch of the case: (1) the
reversal of the doctrine We laid down in the celebrated Krivenko case by excluding urban lots and
properties from the group of the term "private agricultural lands" use in this section 5, Article XIII of the
Constitution; and (2) by driving Our reasons to a point that might indirectly cause the appointment of
Filipino bishops or Ordinary to head the corporations sole created to administer the temporalities of the
35
Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines. With regard to the first way, a great majority of the members
of this Court were not yet prepared nor agreeable to follow that course, for reasons that are obvious. As
to the second way, it seems to be misleading because the nationality of the head of a diocese
constituted as a corporation sole has no material bearing on the functions of the latter, which are limited
to the administration of the temporalities of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines.
Upon going over the grounds on which the dissenting opinion is based, it may be noticed that its author
lingered on the outskirts of the issues, thus throwing the main points in controversy out of focus. Of
course We fully agree, as stated by Professor Aruego, that the framers of our Constitution had at heart to
insure the conservation of the natural resources of Our motherland of Filipino posterity; to serve them as
an instrument of national defense, helping prevent the extension into the country of foreign
control through peaceful economic penetration; and to prevent making the Philippines a source of
international conflicts with the consequent danger to its internal security and independence. But all
these precautions adopted by the Delegates to Our Constitutional Assembly could have not been
intended for or directed against cases like the one at bar. The emphasis and wonderings on the
statement that once the capacity of a corporation sole to acquire private agricultural lands is admitted
there will be no limit to the areas that it may hold and that this will pave the way for the "revival or
revitalization of religious landholdings that proved so troublesome in our past", cannot even furnish the
"penumbra" of a threat to the future of the Filipino people. In the first place, the right of Filipino citizens,
including those of foreign extraction, and Philippine corporations, to acquire private lands is not subject
to any restriction or limit as to quantity or area, and We certainly do not see any wrong in that. The right
of Filipino citizens and corporations to acquire public agricultural lands is already limited by law. In the
second place, corporations sole cannot be considered as aliens because they have no nationality at all.
Corporations sole are, under the law, mere administrators of the temporalities of the Roman Catholic
Church in the Philippines. In the third place, every corporation, be it aggregate or sole, is only entitled to
purchase, convey, sell, lease, let, mortgage, encumber and otherwise deal with real properties when it is
pursuant to or in consonance with the purposes for which the corporation was formed, and when the
transactions of the lawful business of the corporation reasonably and necessarily require such dealing —
section 13-(5) of the Corporation Law, Public Act No. 1459 — and considering these provisions in
conjunction with Section 159 of the same law which provides that a corporation sole may only "purchase
and hold real estate and personal properties for its church, charitable, benevolent or educational
purposes", the above mentioned fear of revitalization of religious landholdings in the Philippines is
absolutely dispelled. The fact that the law thus expressly authorizes the corporations sole to receive
bequests or gifts of real properties (which were the main source that the friars had to acquire their big
haciendas during the Spanish regime), is a clear indication that the requisite that bequests or gifts of real
estate be for charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, was, in the opinion of the legislators,
considered sufficient and adequate protection against the revitalization of religious landholdings.
Finally, and as previously stated, We have reason to believe that when the Delegates to the
Constitutional Convention drafted and approved Article XIII of the Constitution they do not have in mind
the corporation sole. We come to this finding because the Constitutional Assembly, composed as it was
by a great number of eminent lawyers and jurists, was like any other legislative body empowered to
enact either the Constitution of the country or any public statute, presumed to know the conditions
existing as to particular subject matter when it enacted a statute (Board of Commerce of Orange Country
vs. Bain, 92 S.E. 176; N. C. 377).
Immemorial customs are presumed to have been always in the mind of the Legislature in
enacting legislation. (In re Kruger's Estate, 121 A. 109; 277 P. 326).
The Legislative is presumed to have a knowledge of the state of the law on the subjects upon
which it legislates. (Clover Valley Land and Stock Co. vs. Lamb et al., 187, p. 723,726.)
The Court in construing a statute, will assume that the legislature acted with full knowledge of
the prior legislation on the subject and its construction by the courts. (Johns vs. Town of
Sheridan, 89 N. E. 899, 44 Ind. App. 620.).
The Legislature is presumed to have been familiar with the subject with which it was
dealing . . . . (Landers vs. Commonwealth, 101 S. E. 778, 781.).
The Legislature is presumed to know principles of statutory construction. (People vs. Lowell,
230 N. W. 202, 250 Mich. 349, followed in P. vs. Woodworth, 230 N.W. 211, 250 Mich. 436.).
It is not to be presumed that a provision was inserted in a constitution or statute without
reason, or that a result was intended inconsistent with the judgment of men of common
sense guided by reason" (Mitchell vs. Lawden, 123 N.E. 566, 288 Ill. 326.) See City of Decatur
vs. German, 142 N. E. 252, 310 Ill. 591, and may other authorities that can be cited in support
hereof.
Consequently, the Constitutional Assembly must have known:
1. That a corporation sole is organized by and composed of a single individual, the head of any
religious society or church operating within the zone, area or jurisdiction covered by said
corporation sole (Article 155, Public Act No. 1459);
2. That a corporation sole is a non-stock corporation;
3. That the Ordinary ( the corporation sole proper) does not own the temporalities which he
merely administers;
4. That under the law the nationality of said Ordinary or of any administrator has absolutely
no bearing on the nationality of the person desiring to acquire real property in the Philippines
by purchase or other lawful means other than by hereditary succession, who according to the
Constitution must be a Filipino (sections 1 and 5, Article XIII).
5. That section 159 of the Corporation Law expressly authorized the corporation sole to
purchase and hold real estate for its church, charitable, benevolent or educational purposes,
and to receive bequests or gifts for such purposes;
6. That in approving our Magna Carta the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention, almost
all of whom were Roman Catholics, could not have intended to curtail the propagation of the
Roman Catholic faith or the expansion of the activities of their church, knowing pretty well
that with the growth of our population more places of worship, more schools where our
youth could be taught and trained; more hallow grounds where to bury our dead would be
needed in the course of time.
Long before the enactment of our Constitution the law authorized the corporations sole even to receive
bequests or gifts of real estates and this Court could not, without any clear and specific provision of the
Constitution, declare that any real property donated, let as say this year, could no longer be registered in
the name of the corporation sole to which it was conveyed. That would be an absurdity that should not
receive our sanction on the pretext that corporations sole which have no nationality and are non-stock
corporations composed of only one person in the capacity of administrator, have to establish first that at
least sixty per centum of their capital belong to Filipino citizens. The new Civil Code even provides:
36
 ART. 10. — In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that
the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
Moreover, under the laws of the Philippines, the administrator of the properties of a Filipino can
acquire, in the name of the latter, private lands without any limitation whatsoever, and that is so
because the properties thus acquired are not for and would not belong to the administrator but to the
Filipino whom he represents. But the dissenting Justice inquires: If the Ordinary is only the administrator,
for whom does he administer? And who can alter or overrule his acts? We will forthwith proceed to
answer these questions. The corporations sole by reason of their peculiar constitution and form of
operation have no designed owner of its temporalities, although by the terms of the law it can be safely
implied that the Ordinary holds them in trust for the benefit of the Roman Catholic faithful to their
respective locality or diocese. Borrowing the very words of the law, We may say that the temporalities of
every corporation sole are held in trust for the use, purpose, behalf and benefit of the religious society,
or order so incorporated or of the church to which the diocese, synod, or district organization is an
organized and constituent part (section 163 of the Corporation Law).
In connection with the powers of the Ordinary over the temporalities of the corporation sole, let us see
now what is the meaning and scope of the word "control". According to the Merriam-Webster's New
International Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 580, on of the acceptations of the word "control" is:
4. To exercise restraining or directing influence over; to dominate; regulate; hence, to hold
from action; to curb; subject; also, Obs. — to overpower.
SYN: restrain, rule, govern, guide, direct; check, subdue.
It is true that under section 159 of the Corporation Law, the intervention of the courts is not necessary,
to mortgage or sell real property held by the corporation sole where the rules, regulations and discipline
of the religious denomination, society or church concerned presented by such corporation sole regulates
the methods of acquiring, holding, selling and mortgaging real estate, and that the Roman Catholic
faithful residing in the jurisdiction of the corporation sole has no say either in the manner of acquiring or
of selling real property. It may be also admitted that the faithful of the diocese cannot govern or overrule
the acts of the Ordinary, but all this does not mean that the latter can administer the temporalities of the
corporation sole without check or restraint. We must not forget that when a corporation sole is
incorporated under Philippine laws, the head and only member thereof subjects himself to the
jurisdiction of the Philippine courts of justice and these tribunals can thus entertain grievances arising
out of or with respect to the temporalities of the church which came into the possession of the
corporation sole as administrator. It may be alleged that the courts cannot intervene as to the matters of
doctrine or teachings of the Roman Catholic Church. That is correct, but the courts may step in, at the
instance of the faithful for whom the temporalities are being held in trust, to check undue exercise by
the corporation sole of its power as administrator to insure that they are used for the purpose or
purposes for which the corporation sole was created.
American authorities have these to say:
It has been held that the courts have jurisdiction over an action brought by persons claiming
to be members of a church, who allege a wrongful and fraudulent diversion of the church
property to uses foreign to the purposes of the church, since no ecclesiastical question is
involved and equity will protect from wrongful diversion of the property  (Hendryx vs. Peoples
United Church, 42 Wash. 336, 4 L.R.A. — n.s. — 1154).
The courts of the State have no general jurisdiction and control over the officers of such
corporations in respect to the performance of their official duties; but as in respect to the
property which they hold for the corporation, they stand in position of TRUSTEES and the
courts may exercise the same supervision as in other cases of trust (Ramsey vs. Hicks, 174 Ind.
428, 91 N.E. 344, 92 N.E. 164, 30 L.R.A. — n.s. — 665; Hendryx vs. Peoples United
Church, supra.).
Courts of the state do not interfere with the administration of church rules or discipline unless
civil rights become involved and which must be protected (Morris St., Baptist Church vs. Dart,
67 S.C. 338, 45 S.E. 753, and others). (All cited in Vol. II, Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p.
960-964.).
If the Constitutional Assembly was aware of all the facts above enumerated and of the provisions of law
relative to existing conditions as to management and operation of corporations sole in the Philippines,
and if, on the other hand, almost all of the Delegates thereto embraced the Roman Catholic faith, can it
be imagined even for an instant that when Article XIII of the Constitution was approved the framers
thereof intended to prevent or curtail from then on the acquisition sole, either by purchase or donation,
of real properties that they might need for the propagation of the faith and for there religious and
Christian activities such as the moral education of the youth, the care, attention and treatment of the
sick and the burial of the dead of the Roman Catholic faithful residing in the jurisdiction of the respective
corporations sole? The mere indulgence in said thought would impress upon Us a feeling of
apprehension and absurdity. And that is precisely the leit motiv that permeates the whole fabric of the
dissenting opinion.
It seems from the foregoing that the main problem We are confronted with in this appeal, hinges around
the necessity of a proper and adequate interpretation of sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the
Constitution. Let Us then be guided by the principles of statutory construction laid down by the
authorities on the matter:
The most important single factor in determining the intention of the people from whom the
constitution emanated is the language in which it is expressed. The words employed are to be
taken in their natural sense, except that legal or technical terms are to be given their
technical meaning. The imperfections of language as a vehicle for conveying meanings result
in ambiguities that must be resolved by result to extraneous aids for discovering the intent of
the framers. Among the more important of these are a consideration of the history of the
times when the provision was adopted and of the purposes aimed at in its adoption. The
debates of constitutional convention, contemporaneous construction, and practical
construction by the legislative and executive departments, especially if long continued, may
be resorted to resolve, but not to create, ambiguities. . . . Consideration of the consequences
flowing from alternative constructions of doubtful provisions constitutes an important
interpretative device. . . . The purposes of many of the broadly phrased constitutional
limitations were the promotion of policies that do not lend themselves to definite and specific
formulation. The courts have had to define those policies and have often drawn on natural
law and natural rights theories in doing so. The interpretation of constitutions tends to
respond to changing conceptions of political and social values. The extent to which these
extraneous aids affect the judicial construction of constitutions cannot be formulated in
precise rules, but their influence cannot be ignored in describing the essentials of the process
(Rottschaeffer on Constitutional Law, 1939 ed., p. 18-19).
There are times that when even the literal expression of legislation may be inconsistent with
the general objectives of policy behind it, and on the basis of equity or spirit of the statute the
courts rationalize a restricted meaning of the latter. A restricted interpretation is usually
applied where the effect of literal interpretation will make for injustice and absurdity or, in
37
 the words of one court, the language must be so unreasonable 'as to shock general common
sense'. (Vol. 3, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., 150.).
A constitution is not intended to be a limitation on the development of a country nor an
obstruction to its progress and foreign relations (Moscow Fire Ins. Co. of Moscow, Russia vs.
Bank of New York and Trust Co., 294 N. Y. S.648; 56 N.E. 2d. 745, 293 N.Y. 749).
Although the meaning or principles of a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the
time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as if intended to stand for a great
length of time, and it is progressive and not static. Accordingly, it should not receive too
narrow or literal an interpretation but rather the meaning given it should be applied in such
manner as to meet new or changed conditions as they arise (U.S. vs. Lassic, 313 U.S. 299, 85 L.
Ed., 1368).
Effect should be given to the purpose indicated by a fair interpretation of the language used
and that construction which effectuates, rather than that which destroys a plain intent or
purpose of a constitutional provision, is not only favored but will be adopted (State ex rel.
Randolph Country vs. Walden, 206 S.W. 2d 979).
It is quite generally held that in arriving at the intent and purpose the construction should be
broad or liberal or equitable, as the better method of ascertaining that intent, rather than
technical (Great Southern Life Ins. Co. vs. City of Austin, 243 S.W. 778).
All these authorities uphold our conviction that the framers of the Constitution had not in mind the
corporations sole, nor intended to apply them the provisions of section 1 and 5 of said Article XIII when
they passed and approved the same. And if it were so as We think it is, herein petitioner, the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., could not be deprived of the right to acquire by purchase
or donation real properties for charitable, benevolent and educational purposes, nor of the right to
register the same in its name with the Register of Deeds of Davao, an indispensable requisite prescribed
by the Land Registration Act for lands covered by the Torrens system.
We leave as the last theme for discussion the much debated question above referred to as "the vested
right saving clause" contained in section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution. The dissenting Justice hurls
upon the personal opinion expressed on the matter by the writer of the decision the most pointed darts
of his severe criticism. We think, however, that this strong dissent should have been spared, because as
clearly indicated before, some members of this Court either did not agree with the theory of the writer
or were not ready to take a definite stand on that particular point, so that there being no majority
opinion thereon there was no need of any dissension therefrom. But as the criticism has been made the
writer deems it necessary to say a few words of explanation.
The writer fully agrees with the dissenting Justice that ordinarily "a capacity to acquire (property) in
futuro, is not in itself a vested or existing property right that the Constitution protects from impairment.
For a property right to be vested (or acquired) there must be a transition from the potential or
contingent to the actual, and the proprietary interest must have attached to a thing; it must have
become 'fixed and established'" (Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498). But the case at bar has to be
considered as an exception to the rule because among the rights granted by section 159 of the
Corporation Law was the right to receive bequests or gifts of real properties for charitable, benevolent
and educational purposes. And this right to receive such bequests or gifts (which implies donations in
futuro), is not a mere potentiality that could be impaired without any specific provision in the
Constitution to that effect, especially when the impairment would disturbingly affect the propagation of
the religious faith of the immense majority of the Filipino people and the curtailment of the activities of
their Church. That is why the writer gave us a basis of his contention what Professor Aruego said in his
book "The Framing of the Philippine Constitution" and the enlightening opinion of Mr. Justice Jose P.
Laurel, another Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in his concurring opinion in the case of
Goldcreek Mining Co. vs. Eulogio Rodriguez et al., 66 Phil. 259. Anyway the majority of the Court did not
deem necessary to pass upon said "vested right saving clause" for the final determination of this case.
JUDGMENT
Wherefore, the resolution of the respondent Land Registration Commission of September 21, 1954,
holding that in view of the provisions of sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution the
vendee (petitioner) is not qualified to acquire lands in the Philippines in the absence of proof that at
least 60 per centum of the capital, properties or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of
Davao, Inc. is actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens, and denying the registration of the deed
of sale in the absence of proof of compliance with such requisite, is hereby reversed. Consequently, the
respondent Register of Deeds of the City of Davao is ordered to register the deed of sale executed by
Mateo L. Rodis in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., which is the subject
of the present litigation. No pronouncement is made as to costs. It is so ordered.
Bautista Angelo and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Paras, C.J., and Bengzon, J., concur in the result.
G.R. No. L-31956 April 30, 1984
FILOMENA GERONA DE CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
JOAQUIN TENG QUEEN TAN, TAN TENG BIO, DOLORES TAN, ROSARIO TAN HUA ING, and TO O.
HIAP, respondents.
Pascual G. Mier for petitioner.
Eddie Tamondong for respondent Joaquin Teng Queen Tan.
Carlos Buenviaje for respondent Tan Teng Bio.
Arnulfo L. Perete for respondent Ong Shi (To O. Hiap).
PLANA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Review on certiorari of the order of the former Court of First Instance of Sorsogon dismissing petitioner's
action for annulment of contract with damages.
In 1938, petitioner Filomena Gerona de Castro sold a 1,258 sq. m. residential lot in Bulan, Sorsogon to
Tan Tai, a Chinese. In 1956, Tan Tai died leaving herein respondents — his widow, To O. Hiap, and
children Joaquin Teng Queen Tan, Tan Teng Bio, Dolores Tan and Rosario Tan Hua Ing.
Before the death of Tan Tai or on August 11, 1956, one of his sons, Joaquin, became a naturalized
Filipino. Six years after Tan Tai's death, or on November 18, 1962, his heirs executed an extra-judicial
settlement of estate with sale, whereby the disputed lot in its entirety was alloted to Joaquin.
38
On July 15, 1968, petitioner commenced suit against the heirs of Tan Tai for annulment of the sale for
alleged violation of the 1935 Constitution prohibiting the sale of land to aliens.
Except for respondent Tan Teng Bio who filed an answer to the complaint, respondents moved to dismiss
the complaint on the grounds of (a) lack of cause of action, the plaintiff being in pari delicto with the
vendee, and the land being already owned by a Philippine citizen; (b) laches; and (c) acquisitive
prescription.
Over the opposition of petitioner, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, sustaining the first two
grounds invoked by the movants. It is this order of dismissal that is now the subject of this review.
The assailed order must be sustained.
Independently of the doctrine of pari delicto, the petitioner cannot have the sale annulled and recover
the lot she herself has sold. While the vendee was an alien at the time of the sale, the land has since
become the property, of respondent Joaquin Teng, a naturalized Philippine citizen, who is
constitutionally qualified to own land.têñ.£îhqwâ£
... The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer
owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was
constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more
public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is
already in the hands of a qualified person. Applying by analogy the ruling of this
Court in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons:têñ.£îhqwâ£
... if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural
but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the
Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's lands for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be
thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of
real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by
naturalization. (Sarsosa Vda. de Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113
SCRA 547, at 553.)
Laches also militates against petitioner's cause. She sold the disputed lot in 1938. She instituted the
action to annul the sale only on July 15, 1968. What the Court said in the cited Sarsosa case applies with
equal force to the petitioner.têñ.£îhqwâ£
... it is likewise inescapable that petitioner Epifania had slept on her rights for 26
years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction of inexcusable neglect, she should
be held barred from asserting her claim to the litigated property (Sotto vs. Teves,
86 SCRA 157 [1978]).têñ.£îhqwâ£
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. (Tijam, et al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., No.
L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29, 35). (cited in Sotto vs.
Teves, 86 SCRA 154 [1978]).
Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner of the property.
(p. 553.)
WHEREFORE, the appealed order is affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
G.R. No. 74170 July 18, 1989
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, GUILLERMO GONZALVES,** respondents.
Amando Fabio Jr. for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
The chief question presented in the appeal at bar concerns the validity of a conveyance of residential
land to an alien prior to his acquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization.
The Trial Court's description of the factual background is largely undisputed. The case principally
concerns Chua Kim @ Uy Teng Be, who became a naturalized Filipino citizen, taking his oath as such, on
January 7,1977. 1 He was the adopted son of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un.
The case involved three (3) parcels of land, which were among those included in Land Registration Cases
Numbered 405 and 14817 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province: Lots Numbered 1 and 2,
plan Psu-57676, 2 and Lot No. 549 of plan AP-7521-identical to Plan Psu-54565. 3 These were respectively
adjudicated in said land registration cases to two persons, as follows:
1) Lots 1 and 2, Psu-57676, to the Spouses Benigno Mañosca and Julia Daguison (in
Opposition No. 51 ); 4 and
2) Lot 549, AP-7521 (Psu-54565), to Gaspar Marquez, married to Marcela
Masaganda (in opposition No. 155). 5 However, no decree of confirmation and
registration was entered at the time.
Lots 1 and 2, Psu-57676, were sold by the owners, the Mañosca Spouses, to Gregorio Reyes Uy Un on
Dec. 30, 1934. 6 Lot 549, Psu-54565, was also sold by the Marquez Spouses to Gregorio Reyes Uy Un on
December 27, 1934. 7
Subsequently, Gregorio Reyes Uy Un died, and his adopted son, Chua Kim @ Uy Teng, took possession of
the property.
39
The three (3) parcels of land above mentioned, together with several others, later became subject of a 2) Chua Kim has not proven his qualification to own private agricultural land at the
compromise agreement in a litigation in the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province, docketed as Civil time of the alleged acquisition of the property in question.
Case No. C-385. 8 The compromise agreement was executed not only by the parties in the case (plaintiffs
Domingo Reyes and Lourdes Abustan, and the defendants, So Pick, et al.) — respectively described as
The Republic's theory is that the conveyances to Chua Kim were made while he was still an alien, i.e.,
"First Parties" and "Second Parties"-but also Chua Kim @ Ting Be Uy, designated therein as "Third
prior to his taking oath as a naturalized Philippine citizen on January 7, 1977, at a time when he was
Party," although he had not been impleaded as a party to the case. In the agreement, in consideration of
disqualified to acquire ownership of land in the Philippines (ART XIII, SEC. 5, 1935 Constitution; ART. XIV,
Chua Kim's renunciation (a) of "any right or claim of whatever nature in .. (certain specifically identified)
Sec. 14, 1973 Constitution); hence, his asserted titles are null and void. 14 It is also its contention that
parcels of land" and (b) of any other claim against the First Parties and Second Parties, both the latter, in
reliance on the decision and amendatory order in Civil Case No. C-385 of the CFI, Rizal15 is unavailing,
turn waived "any claim of ownership or other right in or to the parcels of land, or the improvements
since neither document declares that the property in question was adjudicated to Chua Kim as his
thereon, in Buenavista, Quezon covered by OCT Nos. 3697, 3696, 3439 and 4382 of the Registry of Deeds
inheritance from his adoptive father, Gregorio Reyes Uy Un. 16
of Quezon," in the name of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un, Chua Kim's adoptive father, and that they (the First
and Second Parties) "will not oppose the transfer, by means not contrary to law, of the ownership
thereof to the Third Party," said Chua Kim. The compromise agreement was afterwards submitted to the The conclusions of fact of the Intermediate Appellate Court, sustaining those of the Land Registration
Court 9 which rendered judgment on July 29,1970 (amended by Order dated July 31, 1970), approving Court, reached after analysis and assessment of the evidence presented at a formal hearing by the
the same. 10 parties, are by firmly entrenched rule binding on and may not be reviewed by this Court. 17 Those facts
thus found to exist, and the legal principles subsumed in them, impel rejection of the Republic's appeal.
Chua Kim then filed a petition for issuance of decree of confirmation and registration in Land Registration
Case No. 405 (LRC Rec. No. 14817) of the Court of First Instance of Quezon Province.11 It is a fact that the lands in dispute were properly and formally adjudicated by a competent Court to the
Spouses Gaspar and to the Spouses Marquez in fee simple, and that the latter had afterwards conveyed
said lands to Gregorio Reyes Uy Un, Chua Kim's adopting parent, by deeds executed in due form on
After due proceedings, and on the basis of the foregoing facts found to have been duly proven by the
December 27, 1934 and December 30, 1934, respectively. Plainly, the conveyances were made before
evidence, the Court of First Instance of Quezon 12 promulgated on January 14, 1982 the following Order,
the 1935 Constitution went into effect, i.e., at a time when there was no prohibition against acquisition
to wit:
of private agricultural lands by aliens. 18 Gregorio Reyes Uy Un therefore acquired good title to the lands
thus purchased by him, and his ownership was not at all affected either (1) by the principle subsequently
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that herein petitioner Chua enunciated in the 1935 Constitution that aliens were incapacitated to acquire lands in the country, since
Kim alias Uy Teng Be has duly established his registerable title over the properties that constitutional principle has no retrospective application,19 or (2) by his and his successor's omission
in question in this land registration case in so far as Oppositions Nos. 51 and 155 to procure the registration of the property prior to the coming into effect of the Constitution. 20
are concerned, and hereby GRANTS his petition. The decision rendered on January
14, 1933 in so far as Opposition Nos. 51 and 155 are concerned, is hereby
It is a fact, furthermore, that since the death of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un in San Narciso, Quezon, in 1946,
amended adjudicating the said properties, better known now as Lots 1 and 2 of
Chua Kim @ Uy Teng Be had been in continuous possession of the lands in concept of owner, as the
plan Psu-57676 in Opposition No. 51 and as Lot.549 of plan Ap-7521, which is
putative heir of his adoptive father, said Gregorio Reyes; 21 this, without protest whatever from any
Identical to plan Psu-54565 in Opposition No. 155, to herein petitioner Chua Kim
person. It was indeed Chua Kim's being in possession of the property in concept of owner, and his status
alias Uy Teng Be. Upon this order becoming final, let the corresponding decrees of
as adopted son of Gregorio Reyes, that were the factors that caused his involvement in Civil Case No. C-
confirmation and registration be entered and thereafter upon payment of the fees
385 of the CFI at Calauag, Quezon, at the instance of the original parties thereto, 22 and his participation
required by law, let the corresponding certificate of titles be issued in the name of
in the Compromise Agreement later executed by all parties. As already mentioned, that compromise
petitioner, Chua Kim alias Uy Teng Be, married to Amelia Tan, of legal age, a
agreement, approved by judgment rendered on July 29, 1970, 23 implicity recognized Chua Kim's title to
naturalized Filipino citizen, and a resident of the Municipality of Buenavista,
the lands in question.
Province of Quezon, as his own exclusive properties, free from all liens and
encumbrances.
Be this as it may, the acquisition by Chua Kim of Philippine citizenship should foreclose any further
debate regarding the title to the property in controversy, in line with this Court's rulings relative to
SO ORDERED.
persons similarly situated. 24 In Sarsosa Vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547, for instance, the ruling
was as follows:
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, challenged the correctness of the Order
and appealed it to the Court of Appeals. That Court, however, affirmed the Order "in all respects," in a
... The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a
decision promulgated on March 25,1986. 13
disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the
subject property. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to
Still not satisfied, the Republic has come to this Court on appeal by certiorari, in a final attempt to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person. Applying by analogy the ruling of this
prevent the adjudication of the property in question to Chua Kim. The Solicitor General argues that — Court in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons (96 Phil. 447 [1955]),

1) the deeds and instruments presented by Chua Kim to prove the conveyance to ... if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural
him of the lands in question by the successor-in- interest of the original but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the
adjudicates are inadequate for the purpose; and Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's land for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be

40
 thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of
real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by
naturalization.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, and the judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court subject
thereof AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164584 June 22, 2009
PHILIP MATTHEWS, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN A. TAYLOR and JOSELYN C. TAYLOR, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Court of Appeals (CA) December 19, 2003
Decision1 and July 14, 2004 Resolution2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59573. The assailed decision affirmed and
upheld the June 30, 1997 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case
No. 4632 for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages.
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor
(Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina.4 On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought
from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay
Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of ₱129,000.00.5 The sale was allegedly financed by
Benjamin.6 Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latter’s funds, constructed improvements thereon and
eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn.7
All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna
Celestino, Joselyn’s sister.8
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8,
1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to
maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to
their Boracay property.9
On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement
of Lease10 (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of
₱12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner
thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort.1avvphi1
Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his
(Benjamin’s) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with
Damages11 against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the
acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyn’s
husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent.
No Answer was filed, hence, the RTC declared Joselyn and the petitioner in defeault. On March 14, 1994,
the RTC rendered judgment by default declaring the Agreement null and void.12 The decision was,
however, set aside by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 34054.13 The CA also ordered the RTC to allow the
petitioner to file his Answer, and to conduct further proceedings.
In his Answer,14 petitioner claimed good faith in transacting with Joselyn. Since Joselyn appeared to be
the owner of the Boracay property, he found it unnecessary to obtain the consent of Benjamin.
Moreover, as appearing in the Agreement, Benjamin signed as a witness to the contract, indicating his
knowledge of the transaction and, impliedly, his conformity to the agreement entered into by his wife.
Benjamin was, therefore, estopped from questioning the validity of the Agreement.
There being no amicable settlement during the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
On June 30, 1997, the RTC disposed of the case in this manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants as follows:
1. The Agreement of Lease dated July 20, 1992 consisting of eight (8) pages (Exhibits "T", "T-1", "T-2", "T-
3", "T-4", "T-5", "T-6" and "T-7") entered into by and between Joselyn C. Taylor and Philip Matthews
before Notary Public Lenito T. Serrano under Doc. No. 390, Page 79, Book I, Series of 1992 is hereby
declared NULL and VOID;
2. Defendants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of SIXTEEN THOUSAND
(₱16,000.00) PESOS as damages representing unrealized income for the residential building and cottages
computed monthly from July 1992 up to the time the property in question is restored to plaintiff; and
3. Defendants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND
(₱20,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, for attorney’s fees and other incidental expenses.
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC considered the Boracay property as community property of Benjamin and Joselyn; thus, the
consent of the spouses was necessary to validate any contract involving the property. Benjamin’s right
over the Boracay property was bolstered by the court’s findings that the property was purchased and
improved through funds provided by Benjamin. Although the Agreement was evidenced by a public
document, the trial court refused to consider the alleged participation of Benjamin in the questioned
transaction primarily because his signature appeared only on the last page of the document and not on
every page thereof.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner still failed to obtain a favorable decision. In its December 19, 2003
Decision,16 the CA affirmed the conclusions made by the RTC. The appellate court was of the view that
if, indeed, Benjamin was a willing participant in the questioned transaction, the parties to the Agreement
should have used the phrase "with my consent" instead of "signed in the presence of." The CA noted
that Joselyn already prepared an SPA in favor of Benjamin involving the Boracay property; it was
therefore unnecessary for Joselyn to participate in the execution of the Agreement. Taken together,
these circumstances yielded the inevitable conclusion that the contract was null and void having been
entered into by Joselyn without the consent of Benjamin.
Aggrieved, petitioner now comes before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari based on the
following grounds:
4.1. THE MARITAL CONSENT OF RESPONDENT BENJAMIN TAYLOR IS NOT REQUIRED IN THE AGREEMENT
OF LEASE DATED 20 JULY 1992. GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT HIS CONSENT IS REQUIRED, BENJAMIN
TAYLOR IS DEEMED TO HAVE GIVEN HIS CONSENT WHEN HE AFFIXED HIS SIGNATURE IN THE
41
AGREEMENT OF LEASE AS WITNESS IN THE LIGHT OF THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE
OF SPOUSES PELAYO VS. MELKI PEREZ, G.R. NO. 141323, JUNE 8, 2005.
4.2. THE PARCEL OF LAND SUBJECT OF THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE IS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF
JOCELYN C. TAYLOR, A FILIPINO CITIZEN, IN THE LIGHT OF CHEESMAN VS. IAC, G.R. NO. 74833, JANUARY
21, 1991.
4.3. THE COURTS A QUO ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED ARTICLE 96 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHICH IS A PROVISION REFERRING TO THE ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY. THE PROPERTY
REGIME GOVERNING THE PROPERTY RELATIONS OF BENJAMIN TAYLOR AND JOSELYN TAYLOR IS THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS BECAUSE THEY WERE MARRIED ON 30 JUNE 1988 WHICH IS PRIOR
TO THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE. ARTICLE 96 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES FINDS
NO APPLICATION IN THIS CASE.
4.4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE
EXECUTION OF NOTARIAL DOCUMENTS.
4.5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO PASS UPON THE COUNTERCLAIM OF PETITIONER
DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS NOT CONTESTED AND DESPITE THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
ESTABLISHING SAID CLAIM.17
The petition is impressed with merit.
In fine, we are called upon to determine the validity of an Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered
into by a Filipino wife without the consent of her British husband. In addressing the matter before us, we
are confronted not only with civil law or conflicts of law issues, but more importantly, with a
constitutional question.
It is undisputed that Joselyn acquired the Boracay property in 1989. Said acquisition was evidenced by a
Deed of Sale with Joselyn as the vendee. The property was also declared for taxation purposes under her
name. When Joselyn leased the property to petitioner, Benjamin sought the nullification of the contract
on two grounds: first, that he was the actual owner of the property since he provided the funds used in
purchasing the same; and second, that Joselyn could not enter into a valid contract involving the subject
property without his consent.
The trial and appellate courts both focused on the property relations of petitioner and respondent in
light of the Civil Code and Family Code provisions. They, however, failed to observe the applicable
constitutional principles, which, in fact, are the more decisive.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:18
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.1avvphi1
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision, they are also disqualified from
acquiring private lands.19 The primary purpose of this constitutional provision is the conservation of the
national patrimony.20 Our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the
public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of
which is owned by Filipinos.21
In Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,22 cited in Muller v. Muller,23 we had the occasion to explain the
constitutional prohibition:
Under Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is
limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands
of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their
agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that Section 5 is included in Article
XIII, and it reads as follows:
"Section 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines."
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may
leak into alien’s hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to
aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the
hands of Filipino citizens. x x x
xxxx
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not
strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential
lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may
validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants,
fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields,
and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant’s words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor
General’s Brief, p. 6) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond
question.24
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the
Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions.25 There is no rule more settled than this
constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own
lands through another. In a long line of cases, we have settled issues that directly or indirectly involve the
above constitutional provision. We had cases where aliens wanted that a particular property be declared
as part of their father’s estate;26 that they be reimbursed the funds used in purchasing a property titled
in the name of another;27 that an implied trust be declared in their (aliens’) favor;28 and that a contract
of sale be nullified for their lack of consent.29
In Ting Ho, Jr. v. Teng Gui,30 Felix Ting Ho, a Chinese citizen, acquired a parcel of land, together with the
improvements thereon. Upon his death, his heirs (the petitioners therein) claimed the properties as part
of the estate of their deceased father, and sought the partition of said properties among themselves.
We, however, excluded the land and improvements thereon from the estate of Felix Ting Ho, precisely
because he never became the owner thereof in light of the above-mentioned constitutional prohibition.
In Muller v. Muller,31 petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were
married in Germany. During the subsistence of their marriage, respondent purchased a parcel of land in
Antipolo City and constructed a house thereon. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of the
petitioner. They eventually separated, prompting the respondent to file a petition for separation of
property. Specifically, respondent prayed for reimbursement of the funds he paid for the acquisition of
said property. In deciding the case in favor of the petitioner, the Court held that respondent was aware
that as an alien, he was prohibited from owning a parcel of land situated in the Philippines. He had, in
fact, declared that when the spouses acquired the Antipolo property, he had it titled in the name of the
petitioner because of said prohibition. Hence, we denied his attempt at subsequently asserting a right to
the said property in the form of a claim for reimbursement. Neither did the Court declare that an implied
42
trust was created by operation of law in view of petitioner’s marriage to respondent. We said that to rule
otherwise would permit circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
In Frenzel v. Catito,32 petitioner, an Australian citizen, was married to Teresita Santos; while respondent,
a Filipina, was married to Klaus Muller. Petitioner and respondent met and later cohabited in a common-
law relationship, during which petitioner acquired real properties; and since he was disqualified from
owning lands in the Philippines, respondent’s name appeared as the vendee in the deeds of sale. When
their relationship turned sour, petitioner filed an action for the recovery of the real properties registered
in the name of respondent, claiming that he was the real owner. Again, as in the other cases, the Court
refused to declare petitioner as the owner mainly because of the constitutional prohibition. The Court
added that being a party to an illegal contract, he could not come to court and ask to have his illegal
objective carried out. One who loses his money or property by knowingly engaging in an illegal contract
may not maintain an action for his losses.
Finally, in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court,33 petitioner (an American citizen) and Criselda
Cheesman acquired a parcel of land that was later registered in the latter’s name. Criselda subsequently
sold the land to a third person without the knowledge of the petitioner. The petitioner then sought the
nullification of the sale as he did not give his consent thereto. The Court held that assuming that it was
his (petitioner’s) intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right
whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in
land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; thus, the sale as to him was
null and void.
In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we find and so hold that Benjamin has no right to nullify the
Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited
from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the
designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is
true even if we sustain Benjamin’s claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into
such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for
his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the
conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to
question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was
merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory
would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be
declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as
he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution
does not permit him to have.34
In fine, the Agreement of Lease entered into between Joselyn and petitioner cannot be nullified on the
grounds advanced by Benjamin. Thus, we uphold its validity.
With the foregoing disquisition, we find it unnecessary to address the other issues raised by the
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the December 19, 2003 Decision and July 14, 2004 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59573, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered
DISMISSING the complaint against petitioner Philip Matthews.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1411             September 29, 1953
DIONISIO RELLOSA, petitioner,
vs.
GAW CHEE HUN, respondent.
Macapagal & Eusebio and Conrado Manalansan for petitioner.
Alafriz & Alafriz for respondent. Quisumbing, Sycip & Quisumbing as amici curiae.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals holding that the sale in question is valid
and, even if it were invalid, plaintiff cannot maintain the action under the principle of pari delicto.
On February 2, 1944, Dionisio Rellosa sold to Gaw Chee Hun a parcel of land, together with the house
erected thereon, situated in the City of Manila, Philippines, for the sum of P25,000. The vendor remained
in possession of the property under a contract of lease entered into on the same date between the same
parties. Alleging that the sale was executed subject to the condition that the vendee. being a Chinese
citizen, would obtain the approval of the Japanese Military Administration in accordance with (seirei) No.
6 issued on April 2, 1943, by the Japanese authorities, and said approval has not been obtained, and that,
even if said requirement were met, the sale would at all events be void under article XIII, section 5, of
our Constitution, the vendor instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Manila seeking
the annulment of the sale as well as the lease covering the land and the house above mentioned, and
praying that, once the sale and the lease are declared null and void, the vendee be ordered to return to
vendor the duplicate of the title covering the property, and be restrained from in any way dispossessing
the latter of said property.
Defendant answered the complaint setting up as special defense that the sale referred to in the
complaint was absolute and unconditional and was in every respect valid and binding between the
parties, it being not contrary to law, morals and public order, and that plaintiff is guilty of estoppel in
that, by having executed a deed of lease over the property, he thereby recognized the title of defendant
to that property.
Issues having been joined, and the requisite evidence presented by both parties, the court declared both
the sale and the lease valid and binding and dismissed the complaint. The court likewise ordered plaintiff
to turn over the property to defendant and to pay a rental of P50 a month from August 1, 1945 until the
property has been actually delivered. As this decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals,
plaintiff sued out the present petition for review.
One of the issues raised by petitioner refers to the validity of Seirei No. 6 issued on April 2, 1943 by the
Japanese authorities which prohibits an alien from acquiring any private land not agricultural in nature
during the occupation unless the necessary approval is obtained from the Director General of the
Japanese Military Administration. Petitioner contends that the sale in question cannot have any validity
under the above military directive in view of the failure of respondent to obtain the requisite approval
and it was error for the Court of Appeals to declare said directive without any binding effect because the
occupation government could not have issued it under article 43 of the Hague Regulations which
command that laws that are municipal in character of an occupied territory should be respected and
cannot be ignored unless prevented by military necessity.
We do not believe it necessary to consider now the question relative to the validity of Seirei No. 6 of the
Japanese Military Administration for the simple reason that in our opinion the law that should govern
the particular transaction is not the above directive but the Constitution adopted by the then Republic of
the Philippines on September 4, 1943, it appearing that the aforesaid transaction was executed on
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February 2, 1944. Said Constitution, in its article VIII, section 5, provides that "no private agricultural land
shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines", which provisions are similar to those contained in our
present Constitution. As to whether the phrase "private agricultural land" employed in said Constitution
includes residential lands, as the one involved herein, there can be no doubt because said phrase has
already been interpreted in the affirmative sense by this court in the recent case of Krivenko vs. Register
of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461, wherein this court held that "under the Constitution aliens may not acquire
private or public agricultural lands, including residential lands." This matter has been once more
submitted to the court for deliberation, but the ruling was reaffirmed. This ruling fully disposes of the
question touching on the validity of the sale of the property herein involved.
The sale in question having been entered into a violation of the Constitution, the next question to be
determined is, can petition have the sale declared null and void and recover the property considering the
effect of the law governing rescission of contracts? Our answer must of necessity be in the negative
following the doctrine laid down in the case of Trinidad Gonzaga de Cabauatan, et al. vs. Uy Hoo, et al.,
88 Phil., 103, wherein we made the following pronouncement: "We can, therefore, say that even if the
plaintiffs can still invoke the Constitution, or the doctrine in the Krivenko Case, to set aside the sale in
question, they are now prevented from doing so if their purpose is to recover the lands that they have
voluntarily parted with, because of their guilty knowledge that what they were doing was in violation of
the Constitution. They cannot escape this conclusion because they are presumed to know the law. As
this court well said: 'A party to an illegal contract cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his
illegal objects carried out. The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement; it leaves the parties
where it finds them.' The rule is expressed in the maxims: 'Ex dolo malo non oritur actio,' and 'In pari
delicto potior est conditio defendentis' (Bough and Bough vs. Cantiveros and Hanopol, 40 Phil., 210,
216.)".
The doctrine above adverted to is the one known as In Pari Delicto. This is well known not only in this
jurisdiction but also in the United States where common law prevails. In the latter jurisdiction, the
doctrine is state thus: "The propsosition is universal that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an
illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the property agreed
to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation. The rule has
sometimes been laid down as though it were equally universal, that where the parties are in pari delicto,
no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the other." (Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence,
Vol. 3, 5th ed., p. 728.).
It is true that this doctrine is subject to one important limitation, namely, "whenever public policy is
considered as advanced by allowing either party to use for relief against the transaction" (idem, p. 733).
But not all contracts which are illegal because opposed to public policy come under this limitation. The
cases in which this limitation may apply only "include the class of contracts which
are intrinsically contrary to public policy, — contracts in which the illegality itself consists in their
opposition to public policy, and any other species of illegal contracts in which, from their particular
circumstances, incidental and collateral motives of public policy require relief." Examples of this class of
contracts are usurious contracts, marriage-brokerage contracts and gambling contracts. (Idem. pp. 735-
737.).
In our opinion, the contract in question does not come under this exception because it is not intrinsically
contrary to public policy, nor one where the illegality itself consist in its opposition to public policy. It is
illegal not because it is against public policy but because it is against the Constitution. Nor may it be
contended that to apply the doctrine of pari delicto would be tantamount to contravening the
fundamental policy embodied in the constitutional prohibition in that it would allow an alien to remain in
the illegal possession of the land, because in this case the remedy is lodged elsewhere. To adopt the
contrary view would be merely to benefit petitioner and not to enhance public interest.
The danger foreseen by counsel in the application of the doctrine above adverted to is more apparent
than real. If we go deeper in the analysis of our situation we would not fail to see that the best policy
would be for Congress to approve a law laying down the policy and the procedure to be followed in
connection with transactions affected by our doctrine in the Krivenko case. We hope that this should be
done without much delay. And even if this legislation be not forthcoming in the near future, we do not
believe that public interest would suffer thereby if only our executive department would follow a more
militant policy in the conservation of our natural resources as ordained by our Constitution. And we say
so because there are at present two ways by which this situation may be remedied, to wit, (1) action for
reversion, and (2) escheat to the state. An action for reversion is slightly different from escheat
proceeding, but in its effects they are the same. They only differ in procedure. Escheat proceedings may
be instituted as a consequence of a violation of article XIII, section 5 of our Constitution, which prohibits
transfers of private agricultural lands to aliens, whereas an action for reversion is expressly authorized by
the Public Land Act (sections 122, 123, and 124 of Commonwealth Act No. 141).
In the United States, as almost everywhere else, the doctrine which imputes to the sovereign or to the
government the ownership of all lands and makes such sovereign or government the original source of
private titles, is well recognized (42 Am. Jur., 785). This doctrine, which was expressly affirmed
in Lawrence vs. Garduno, G. R. No. 16542, and which underlies all titles in the Philippines, (See Ventura,
Land Registration and Mortgages, 2nd ed., pp. 2-3) has been enshrined in our Constitution (Article XIII).
The doctrine regarding the course of all titles being the same here as in the United States, it would seem
that if escheat lies against aliens holding lands in those states of the Union where common law prevails
or where similar constitutional or statutory prohibitions exists, no cogent reason is perceived why similar
proceedings may not be instituted in this jurisdiction.
Escheat is an incident or attribute of sovereignty, and rests on the principle of the ultimate
ownership by the state of all property within its jurisdiction. (30 C.J.S., 1164.)1âwphïl.nêt
... In American escheats belongs universally to the state or some corporation thereof as the
ultimate proprietor of land within its Jurisdiction. (19 Am. Jur., 382.)
An escheat is nothing more or less than the reversion of property to the state, which takes
place when the title fails. (Delany vs. State, 42 N. D., 630, 174 N.W., 290, quoted in footnote
6, 19 Am. Jur., 381.)
As applied to the right of the state to lands purchased by an alien, it would more properly be
termed a "forfeiture" at common law. (19 Am. Jur., 381.)
In modern law escheat denotes a falling of the estate into the general property of the state
because the tenant is an alien or because he has died intestate without lawful heirs to take
his estate by successions, or because of some other disability to take or hold property
imposed by law. (19 Am. Jur., 381.)
With regard to an action for reversion, the following sections of commonwealth Act No. 141 are
pertinent:
Sec. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred,
except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the
public domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized
therefor by their charters.
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 Sec. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act,
ordinance, royal decree, royal order, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the
Philippines with regards to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in
any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered,
alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporation or associations who may acquire land
of the public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose
charters authorize them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be
applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason or hereditary succession duly
acknowledged and legalized by competent courts; Provided, further, That in the event of the
ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding
section being transferred by judicial decree to persons, corporations or associations not
legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons,
corporation, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others
so capacitated within the precise period of five years; otherwise, such property shall revert to
the Government.

Sec. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or
executed in violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen, one
hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one
hundred and twenty-three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution
and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit
originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion
of the property and its improvements to the State.

Note that the last quoted provision declared any prohibited conveyance not only unlawful but null and
void ab initio. More important yet, it expressly provided that such conveyances will produce "the effect
of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit, originally issued, recognized of confirmed,
actually or presumptively", and of causing "the reversion of the property and its improvements to the
State." The reversion would seems to be but a consequence of the annulment and cancellation of the
original grant or title, and this is so for in the event of such annulment or cancellation no one else could
legitimately claim the property except its original owner or grantor — the state.

We repeat. There are two ways now open to our government whereby it could implement the doctrine
of this Court in the Krivenko case thereby putting in force and carrying to its logical conclusion the
mandate of our Constitution. By following either of these remedies, or by approving an implementary
law as above suggested, we can enforce the fundamental policy of our Constitution regarding our natural
resources without doing violence to the principle of pari delicto. With these remedies open to us, we see
no justifiable reason for pursuing the extreme unusual remedy now vehemently urged by the amici
curiae.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the sale in question is null and void, but plaintiff is barred from
taking the present action under the principle of pari delicto.

45