J Bus Ethics (2016) 138:79–90
DOI 10.1007/s10551-015-2592-6
A Role for Ethics Theory in Speculative Business Ethics Teaching
Mick Fryer
Received: 10 October 2014 / Accepted: 25 February 2015 / Published online: 5 March 2015
 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
Abstract The paper discusses the role that ethics theory
might play in business ethics teaching. It is noted that little
attention is devoted to the explanation and application of
ethics theory in business ethics textbooks, which suggests
that ethics theory is held in low esteem by business ethics
educators. This relative disregard has been justified by
some critics on the basis of the limited usefulness of ethics
theory to business ethics pedagogy. Notwithstanding these
criticisms, the paper argues that ethics theory can play an
important role in business ethics teaching which conforms
to a speculative agenda. A speculative agenda is described,
and a contribution that ethics theory can make to it is ex-
plained. This constitutes a form of immanent critique,
which enables putative statements of business ethicality to
be subjected to critique against the cultural values upon
which their credibility rests. Ethics theory is offered as a
mediating resource to facilitate such critique. Some criteria
that the presentation of ethics theory needs to meet if it is to
fulfill this speculative agenda are also outlined.
Keywords Business ethics teaching
Ethics theory

Speculative method
Immanent critique
Introduction
If the amount of space devoted explicitly to ethics theory in
recent business ethics textbooks is anything to go by, ethics
theory is accorded a low profile in the teaching of business
ethics. Those textbooks that do discuss ethics theory usu-
ally provide little more than a brief overview of some of
M. Fryer (&)
Bryndolau, Abergwesyn, Powys LD54TP, UK
e-mail: mick.fryer@outlook.com
the most well-known perspectives in an early chapter,
perhaps referring briefly back to them in later chapters. For
example Crane and Matten’s (2010) 556-page Business
Ethics covers what the authors call ‘‘normative ethical
theories’’ in only 45 pages; Griseri and Sepalla’s (2010)
Business Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility de-
votes no more than 31 of its 462 pages to ‘‘theories of
ethics’’ (although these authors also provide 43 additional
pages on ‘‘environmental ethics’’); and, in Mellahi et al.
(2010) 245-page The Ethical Business, only 17 pages dis-
cuss ‘‘different philosophical approaches to business eth-
ics’’. Most surprisingly, given its title, only 22 out of nearly
700 pages in Beauchamp and Bowie’s (2004) Ethical
Theory and Business are specifically dedicated to the ex-
plication and elaboration of ethics theory. Meanwhile,
some business ethics textbooks seem to overlook ethics
theory altogether. For instance, Treviño and Nelson’s
(2004) Managing Business Ethics: Straight Talk About
How To Do It Right includes no explicit explanation and
elaboration of ethics theory.
Of course the limited amount of space devoted to direct,
explicit elaborations of ethics theory need not stop it from
creeping unannounced into textbooks. Although some au-
thors steer clear of systematic explication of underpinning
theoretical rationales, they are nevertheless apt to draw on
notions such as the general good, duty, virtue, and rights, or
perhaps to highlight the cultural relativity of morality, in
their discussions of ethically charged business topics. Just
because theoretical ethical concepts are not presented in
philosophical language, then, does not mean that they do
not inform discussions in business ethics textbooks. Nev-
ertheless, despite the presence of implicit and indirect al-
lusions to it, ethics theory is rarely presented as the main
event. At most, it tends to be offered as a prelude; perhaps
no more than a genuflection to the expectation that a
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subject with ‘ethics’ in its title should include some
philosophical content. As such, it is usually only intro-
duced summarily and mentioned infrequently thereafter,
thus freeing up space for what seem to be considered by
authors to be more important topics.
This state of affairs may be partly due to doubts about
the usefulness of ethics theory to business ethics teaching.
Indeed, it has been suggested that ethics theory, along with
philosophy in general, has a problematic relationship with
the study of business ethics. Kaler (1999), for instance, has
highlighted the difficulty of making ethics theory intelli-
gible to students who are unfamiliar with philosophical
concepts. Kaler also questions its practical worth, sug-
gesting that ethics theory is more likely to be co-opted to
support intuitive ethical convictions, and suitably amended
on those occasions where it is at variance with them, than it
is to tell right from wrong. Kaler therefore asks whether
including ethics theory in an already crowded business
school curriculum merits the effort, and his response to this
question is a resounding ‘‘no’’.
Kaler is not alone in disputing the usefulness of ethics
theory. Rorty (2006) highlights a further concern in his
discussion of the relevance of philosophy to applied ethics.
As far as Rorty is concerned, business ethics teaching
should be about generating new possibilities so as to fa-
cilitate moral progress. This, he suggests, involves ex-
panding what Patricia Werhane calls the ‘‘moral
imagination’’ (cited in Rorty 2006, p. 376). Rorty takes the
view that, since ethics theory tends to concern itself mainly
with the revelation of so-called moral truth, it is of little use
in this respect. He proposes that, rather than seeking uni-
versally legitimate solutions to ethical conundrums, busi-
ness ethics should be about engaging with other people’s
perspectives, putting ourselves in other people’s shoes and
seeing things from their points of view. This, Rorty sug-
gests, is better facilitated by narrative than by the appli-
cation of abstract philosophical principles. He therefore
proposes that ‘‘the business ethics community…does not
need people with a thorough knowledge of moral theory as
much as it needs people who have a journalist’s nose for a
good story, and a novelist’s talent at spinning it’’ (Rorty
2006, p. 378).
At the heart of critiques such as these is what might be
called a normative impasse; that is, the apparent impossi-
bility of an approach to business ethics education that
would facilitate an understanding of what ethical truth
consists of.1 As Kaler and Rorty make clear, roads towards
1
A normative impasse of this nature has been theorized in a broader
philosophical context in various ways. For instance, Habermas (1974/
1963, 1987/1968) has referred to the apparent unfeasibility of a
critical-emancipatory social theory in an intellectual climate in which
positivist and hermeneutic forms of knowledge seem to occupy all the
available space. Meanwhile, MacIntyre (1985/1981) refers to as the
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this normative impasse can be traced in both ethical ab-
solutist and ethical relativist thought. Kaler highlights the
ethical absolutist road when he describes how the various
theories that have been put forward to help us make secure
ethical judgements often lead to conflicting conclusions.
Those conflicting outcomes, along with the apparent ab-
sence of any means arbitrating between them, seem to
undermine any normative programme that draws on ethics
theory. Meanwhile, the ethical relativism that characterizes
what Martin Parker has called a postmodern ‘‘intellectual
attitude or style which is radically sceptical about foun-
dational versions of truth’’ (Parker 1998a, p. S28) seems to
have problematized the very notion of secure moral foun-
dations for business ethics teaching. Faced with such a
normative impasse, it would be unsurprising if business
ethics educators forsook any normative aspiration and fo-
cused their pedagogic efforts instead on descriptively,
prescriptively, or instrumentally oriented teaching, or on
what Rorty has called a narrative approach, which stimu-
lates students’ ethical sympathies without offering con-
ceptual frameworks within which those sympathies can be
organized.
In this paper, I will propose a pathway out of this nor-
mative impasse; one which comprises a form of immanent
critique. That is, I propose an approach to business ethics
teaching which corresponds to Craig Calhoun’s definition
of immanent critique as ‘‘a critique that work[s] from
within the categories of existing thought, radical-
ize[s] them, and show[s] in varying degrees both their
problems and their unrecognized possibilities’’ (Calhoun
1995, p. 23). I will call this approach a speculative ap-
proach. This speculative approach aims to help students to
develop their own ethical understanding of business prac-
tice by exposing ethical statements to critique against the
underpinning cultural values to which those statements
appeal. Moreover, I will propose that ethics theory can play
an important role in mediating this speculative process. To
apply such an approach to teaching is not to presuppose
apodictic moral truths against which enhancements to
students’ ethical understanding can be measured. Rather, it
Footnote 1 continued
‘‘Failure of the Enlightenment Project’’ to secure apodictic ethical
truth, and a consequent belief that a relativistic ‘‘emotivism’’ offers
the only way to think about ethics. Whilst emphasizing the sig-
nificance of the normative impasses, though, these philosophers also
offer responses to it. For both Habermas and MacIntyre’s, the ap-
propriate response lies in a form of immanent critique. Habermas
(1984/1981, 1987/1981, 1990/1983) thus envisages a processual
model of normative legitimization, in which discourse amongst
communicatively motivated actors permits the ethical commitments
that circulate within a shared ‘‘lifeworld’’ to be interrogated and ne-
gotiated. Meanwhile, part of MacIntyre’s (1985/1981; 1988) resolu-
tion to the normative impasse involves teasing out, through processes
of imaginative engagement, shared values that infuse a particular
tradition.
Speculative Business Ethics Teaching
is to suppose that processes of immanent critique that are
intrinsic to speculative teaching will assist students to
move not to an absolute appreciation of ethicality, but to a
better one than that with which they began.
The rest of this paper will elaborate on this proposition. I
will begin by explaining what I mean by a speculative
approach to the teaching of business ethics, and how this
constitutes a form of immanent critique. I will do this
mainly with reference to the speculative method of G.W.F.
Hegel, which Hegel regarded as indispensable to a pro-
gressive, immanent critique of modern thought. The second
section of the paper will prepare the ground for suggesting
a role that ethics theory can play with regard to this
speculative agenda. This exercise in ground preparation
will involve outlining some postulates upon which the
viability of this role depends. The third section of the paper
will describe how this speculative agenda might be put into
practice. A specific example will be offered to illustrate
how ethics theory might be harnessed to a speculative
agenda. Lastly, the fourth part of the paper will dwell on
some criteria that the presentation of ethics theory may
need to meet if it is to offer a productive resource for
speculative business ethics teaching.
Part One: Speculative Business Ethics Teaching
To refer to business ethics teaching as ‘‘speculative’’ is not
to suggest that it relies upon conjecture or that it is a par-
ticularly risky undertaking. Rather, I am using the word
‘‘speculative’’ in a broadly Hegelian sense. In brief, I un-
derstand a speculative approach to business ethics teaching
as one which encourages students to critique ideas about
what is right and wrong in relation to business, with the
aim of developing their capacity to make informed
judgements about such matters. Importantly, a speculative
approach does not seek to inculcate presupposed notions of
ethical rightness. Rather, its objective is to help students to
develop their own ideas about what is right and wrong in
relation to business.
At this point, it may help to offer a few observations
concerning the speculative method of philosophical en-
quiry advocated by G.W.F. Hegel. I do this partly to ex-
plain my choice of the word ‘‘speculative’’ to describe this
particular approach to business ethics education; partly to
elaborate some characteristics of Hegel’s speculative
method and therefore to provide a better understanding of
what a speculative approach to business ethics teaching
might look like.
A key characteristic of Hegel’s speculative method is
that it is presuppositionless (Houlgate 2013). As Hegel put
it, speculative enquiry should be ‘‘preceded by universal
doubt, or a total absence of presupposition’’ (Hegel 1975/
81
1830, p. 112/78). Hegel was especially wary of basing
philosophical exploration on dogma that is apparently re-
vealed by ‘‘sound common sense, [which] offers at its very
best only a rhetoric of trivial truths’’ (Hegel 1977/1807,
p. 42/69). However, although he cautioned against taken-
for-granted presuppositions, especially those apparently
revealed by common sense, Hegel was not advocating the
imposition of a completely new basis of evaluation derived
from some external authority. This was partly because he
recognized the difficulty of stepping outside of one’s own
cultural mindset in order to engage in philosophical en-
quiry. As Hegel saw it,
Each individual is in any case a child of his time, thus
philosophy, too, is its own time comprehended in
thoughts. It is just as foolish to imagine that any
philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as
that an individual can overleap his own time or leap
over Rhodes. (Hegel 1991/1821, pp. 21–22)
Although Hegel advocated critical exploration of prevail-
ing views on a topic, then, he was clear that such
exploration could not be conducted from some neutral,
detached standpoint. It had to draw on ideas that are
contained within our own cultural perspective. Thus, in his
Logic, Hegel describes a speculative enquiry as one which
‘‘contains all previous Logic and Metaphysics: it preserves
the same forms of thought, the same laws and objects—
while at the same time remodelling and expanding them
with wider categories’’ (Hegel 1975/1830, p. 13/9).
Similarly, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, he defines
speculative method as that ‘‘which consists partly in not
being separate from the content, and partly in sponta-
neously determining the rhythm of its movement’’ (Hegel
1977/1807, p. 35/57).
A speculative approach can therefore be described as an
immanent approach. Although it does not begin with pre-
suppositions—indeed it is inherently skeptical of presup-
positions—it seeks to use given understandings of a topic as
a platform from which to develop an enhanced awareness of
that topic. In the words of John Burbidge: ‘‘the reflective
synthesis of the different descriptions that makes possible a
new beginning is the work of speculative reason’’ (Burbidge
2006, p. 93). A speculative approach to business ethics
teaching, then, would not be one that honors prevailing
notions of ethicality in relation to business. Rather, it would
be one that exposes them to critique with the aim of pro-
gressing beyond them. Nevertheless, to be true to Hegelian
method, those engaged in such an undertaking must come to
terms with cultural embeddedness; with the notion that
specific aspects of a culture, of which various views about
business ethics are a part, can only be critiqued from within
the cultural constraints that constitute the facticity of those
who are conducting such critique.
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Hegel’s speculative method proceeds by embracing the
progressive potential that is immanent in any given un-
derstanding, as well as uncovering ‘‘the contradictions
that are present therein’’ (Hegel 1977/1807, p. 70/117).
He believed that a synthesis of the progressive and the
contradictory would permit movement to an enhanced
perspective. To apply this approach to the teaching of
business ethics is therefore to encourage identification of
the progressive potential immanent in specific ways of
thinking about the topic, as well as the contradictions and
tensions contained within those modes of thought. The
aspiration of such an approach is that students will thus
be able to progress to an enhanced understanding of
business ethics; one which moves beyond those given
perspectives.
Part Two: Three Postulates
Having described what I mean by a speculative agenda for
business ethics education, I will suggest some ways in
which ethics theory might contribute to this agenda. Before
doing so, though, I will outline some postulates upon which
the viability of this speculative undertaking is based. These
postulates concern the relationship between, firstly, the
ethical values that resonate within a culture; secondly,
ethics theory; and, thirdly, putative statements of business
ethicality. This relationship will be elaborated by dwelling
on the connections between each of these three constituent
elements. First, though, I will, for the purpose of clarity,
explain what I mean by each of these elements. When I
speak of the ethical values that resonate within a culture, I
have in mind those deep-seated, often pre-theoretical
convictions that tend to inform intuitive judgements about
ethical right and wrong. Jürgen Habermas might describe
these as the norms, attitudes, and commitments that cir-
culate within a ‘‘sociocultural’’ (Habermas 1975/1973,
1979/1976) realm, in which the legitimation of political
and economic systems is rooted. The question of how these
values are inculcated, dispersed, and sustained is not one
that will be considered here. Suffice to say that they exist
and, as I will propose below, they have a crucial connection
to ethics theory and to putative statements of business
ethicality.
My understanding of ethics theory embraces more than
the deontological and utilitarian theories at which Kaler’s
(1999) critique of its usefulness is aimed. It also goes be-
yond those theories that aspire to the revelation of absolute,
objective, universal moral truths, which comprise the focus
of Rorty’s (2006) denunciation. For the purposes of this
discussion, ethics theory should be thought of as any
conceptual framework which offers a basis for considering
questions of ethical or meta-ethical significance. For sure,
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M. Fryer
the deontological and utilitarian ‘‘reductionist’’ theories
envisaged by Kaler, and the ethical absolutist theories de-
picted by Rorty fall into this category. But so do other
perspectives. The fourth section of this paper will discuss
in more detail the desirability of embracing a plurality of
perspectives under the rubric of ethics theory.
By putative statements of business ethicality, I mean
views about what ethical business practice consists of.
Such statements might articulate general views about what
businesses and business people ought and ought not to do,
or they may express opinions on the ethicality of specific
scenarios. Within a teaching context, they may articulate a
student’s views on such topics, or they may express a
conviction that is widely held within a particular con-
stituency or within a particular society. They may comprise
guiding principles that inform the decisions of business
people, or they might include rationales upon which ethical
denunciation of those same decisions is based. In short, a
putative statement of business ethicality could be any
statement which offers a view on the ethicality or otherwise
of business practice.
The Connection Between Ethics Theory and the Ethical
Values that Resonate Within a Culture
My first postulate is that the relationship between ethics
theory and the ethical values that resonate within a culture
is a reciprocal one, in which each side influences and, at the
same time, is influenced by the other. Ethics theory
therefore performs a dual role of, on the one hand, cap-
turing in conceptual form currents of ethical understanding
that circulate within a culture and, on the other hand, in-
forming their ongoing evolution.
John Kaler alludes to the first side of this relationship
when he observes that ‘‘there has to be some sort of prior
knowledge of the nature of morality’’ (Kaler 1999, p. 210),
which precedes ethical theories and against which their
usefulness in resolving ethical conundrums tends to be
assessed. Kaler’s observation implies that ethics theory is not
the outcome of detached, rational cogitation, which takes
place in the mind of a philosopher at a remove from any
cultural context. Rather, it offers theoretical explication to
currents of ethical thought that are already present within a
culture in pre-theoretical form. Andrew Gustafson makes a
similar point when he describes ethics theories as ‘‘narratives
by which we describe our values, the ways our values will
affect our practices, how the world is and how we should plan
to respond to it’’ (Gustafson 2010, p. 142). Gustafson’s de-
piction of ethical theorists such as Mill and Kant as ‘‘poets of
obligation’’ (2010, p. 149) might seem to impute to them an
artistic quality that conceals the extent to which the theories
they offer provide systematic, conceptual exposition to
Speculative Business Ethics Teaching
pre-theoretical cultural values. Nevertheless, his discussion
of the relationship between those narratives and the experi-
ences of obligation that they articulate is consistent with the
connection envisaged here.
In this manner, it seems reasonable to suppose that
specific fields of Western ethics theory have provided
theoretical exposition to specific, pre-theoretical ethical
commitments that occupy a privileged place in Western
culture. Examples might include the intuitive ethical al-
lure of the common good, which is captured in concep-
tual form by utilitarianism; the ethical significance of
people’s intentions, which finds theoretical expression in
Kantian theory; the significance accorded to certain fun-
damental entitlements, which is given conceptual ar-
ticulation by rights theory; various intuitive notions of
fair distribution, which are theorized in theories of jus-
tice; ideas about the subjectivity of ethical understanding,
which find conceptual expression in relativist ethics the-
ories; and the ethical worth that is conferred by discur-
sively achieved consensus, the theoretical underpinnings
of which have been worked through by discourse ethics
theorists.
I suggest, moreover, that this relationship between the
ethical values that resonate within a culture and ethics
theory should not be regarded as flowing only in one di-
rection. Instead, it should be seen as one in which, by
providing conceptual elaboration to pre-theoretical cultural
values, ethics theory also contributes to the ongoing evo-
lution of those values. Having captured in conceptual
form—or, as Gustafson (2010) would have it, in ‘‘narra-
tive’’ form—the pre-theoretical values and experienced
obligations that pervade a culture, ethics theories do not
gather dust on academic bookshelves. Rather, they are
absorbed back into the cultural potpourri from which they
emanated, influencing the scents that it emits into the fu-
ture. Thus, the way in which ethically charged notions such
as the common good, fundamental entitlements, good in-
tentions etc. have been conceptually elaborated by
philosophers has shaped, and continues to shape, their
ongoing cultural evolution.
Now, Kaler (1999) proposes that the need for ethics
theories to gel with pre-theoretical notions of ethical
rightness undermines the former’s usefulness in resolving
ethical conundrums. He suggests that this dependency re-
lationship provides a good reason to dispense with ethics
theory and rely, instead, on those pre-theoretical notions to
tell us right from wrong. I suggest, conversely, that by
providing theoretical elaboration to pre-theoretical con-
victions that operate at a deeper, cultural level, ethics
theory can provide conceptual tools which, as I will explain
shortly, offer a resource for immanent critique of putative
statements of business ethicality that also feed on those
same pre-theoretical cultural values.
83
The Connection Between the Ethical Values
that Resonate Within a Culture and Putative Statements
of Business Ethicality
The second postulate offered here concerns the relationship
between putative statements of business ethicality and the
ethical values that resonate within a culture. It proposes
that the former, in order to maintain any degree of cred-
ibility, must connect in a positive manner with the latter.
Richard Rorty points toward this postulate when he ob-
serves, in relation to views about business ethicality, that
‘‘what counts as justification, either of actions or beliefs, is
always relative to the antecedent beliefs of those whom one
is seeking to convince’’ (Rorty 2006, p. 371). Here, Rorty
is proposing that statements about the ethical legitimacy of
business arrangements should not seek validation with
reference to ethics theories which claim to reveal some sort
of universal, objective truth. Rather, they can only find
validation in notions of ethicality that are already accepted
amongst those to whom they are directed.
For Rorty, the unavoidably subjective quality that this
gives to statements of business ethicality undermines the
usefulness of ethics theories, which, according to his de-
piction, aspire to the revelation of unattainable absolute
truths. Given the absolutist meta-ethical presupposition that
he ascribes to ethics theories, Rorty considers them to be of
little use in deciding between what are essentially subjec-
tive ethical views. Like Kaler, then, Rorty’s argument
would set absolutist, objective-truth-seeking ethics theory
against common ethical intuitions as competing sources of
legitimacy for putative statements of business ethicality.
And, like Kaler, Rorty proposes that commonly held ethi-
cal intuitions must win out in this contest for credibility.
My contention, conversely, is that so long as we suspend
the quest for absolute legitimacy that Rorty associates with
ethics theory, and so long as we open out the gamut of
ethics theory beyond the absolutist theories that he has in
mind, ethics theory can offer a platform for immanent
critique by which statements of business ethicality can be
evaluated. This involves casting ethics theory and ethical
values that resonate within a culture not as opposing
sources of ethical legitimation but as complementary
sources. And this complementariness means that ethics
theory need not be regarded as a less-vital, inferior basis of
legitimation for ideas about business ethicality; rather it
can be viewed as a conceptual platform from which im-
manent critique of those ideas can be launched.
The Connection Between Ethics Theory and Putative
Statements of Business Ethicality
I will now draw on the two postulates already advanced to
propose a third; this time, concerning the connection
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between ethics theory and putative statements of business
ethicality. This third postulate is that the connections that
both ethics theory and putative statements of business
ethicality have with the values that resonate deep within a
culture entail that ethics theory can be used as a basis for
immanent critique of putative statements of business
ethicality.
Another way of putting this is that, because ethics the-
ories offer conceptual, theoretical elaborations of prevail-
ing cultural values, and because statements of business
ethicality draw their credibility from those same cultural
underpinnings, we can use ethics theory as a conceptual
platform from which to carry out immanent critique of
putative statements of business ethicality. Since both ethics
theory and putative statements of ethicality connect with
cultural values in the manner already postulated, those
cultural values provide a medium through which ethics
theory might be used to critique putative statements of
ethicality. The manner in which this process of immanent
exploration might be carried out is elaborated in the next
section.
Part Three: Using Ethics Theory as a Resource
for Speculative Business Ethics Teaching
In this section, I will explain in more detail how this
speculative process of immanent exploration might pro-
ceed in a teaching context. Broadly speaking, it involves
introducing students to a range of ethics theories, high-
lighting cultural values to which those theories provide
conceptual elaboration, and demonstrating how they might
be used to critique putative statements of business ethi-
cality. In this manner, students can be encouraged to
evaluate putative statements of business ethicality against
the standards of ethical legitimation to which those state-
ments appeal; a form of immanent critique that makes
explicit the standards upon which each statement’s ethical
credibility depends, and which then evaluates it against
those standards. This process is carried out with the ob-
jective of identifying the progressive potentials offered by
each statement, along with any immanent contradictions
that are thus revealed. Equipped with this awareness, stu-
dents will be able to progress to an enhanced appreciation
of the ethical merits of those statements, and to an en-
hanced understanding of the ethical ramifications of those
practical scenarios to which they relate.
In its simplest format, this process would involve cri-
tiquing one particular statement, with reference to one par-
ticular cultural value, using a branch of ethics theory that
provides conceptual elaboration of that cultural value. In
this case, implementation would involve identifying a
specific statement, drawing students’ attention to the
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M. Fryer
cultural underpinning to which it appeals, helping students
to familiarize themselves with the specific branch of ethics
theory that provides conceptual elaboration to that cultural
underpinning, and encouraging them to use that branch of
ethics theory as a resource for critiquing the statement.
However, putative statements of business ethicality can
often be validated with reference to more than one cultural
value, each of which finds conceptual elaboration in a
separate branch of ethics theory. Comprehensive critique of
such statements could therefore draw on each of those
separate branches of ethics theory. Those theories might
thus be conceived as a number of separate lenses through
which the statement under consideration can be viewed. As
the statement is examined through each lens, both the le-
gitimizing force and the deficits in legitimization associ-
ated with that lens, in relation to that particular statement,
will be illuminated. Evaluation of the statement through
these various lenses would thus permit a multi-directional
and nuanced appraisal of its merits and demerits. An ex-
ample of how this process might be applied to one such
putative statement of business ethicality is supplied next.
I have already mentioned that the putative statements of
business ethicality explored in a teaching context might
include statements that express the views of a student,
statements that express the views of a particular commu-
nity, or statements that articulate views about business
ethics that are widely held within society. One statement
that is likely to figure to a greater or a lesser extent on each
of these dimensions is the notion that business managers
have an obligation to look after the best interests of their
businesses, that this obligation overrides many other ethical
considerations, and that it might justify actions that, in
other respects, are ethically troubling. For the purposes of
this discussion, I will adopt the term principle of corporate
maximization as shorthand to refer to this particular puta-
tive statement of business ethicality.
The principle of corporate maximization might be, and
has been, legitimated with reference to a number of cultural
values. For instance, part of Milton Friedman’s influential
article, ‘‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase
its Profits’’ (Friedman 1970), draws on a value that is firmly
embedded in Western culture—that property ownership
carries fundamental entitlements—to justify the notion that
business managers should put the interests of shareholders
above all other considerations. And since Friedman equates
the interests of shareholders with corporate maximization, it
is to the latter that managers should devote their efforts.
Similarly, Elaine Sternberg has adopted a teleological ra-
tionale to argue that the defining purpose of business is
‘‘maximising owner value over the long term by selling
goods or services’’ (Sternberg, 2000, p. 32). Further justifi-
cation for the principle of corporate maximization can be
drawn from the notion, which finds currency amongst many
Speculative Business Ethics Teaching
business managers (Legge 1998; Parker 2002; Fryer 2011),
that maximizing the prosperity of their organizations is
justified because this will promote the interests of many
people, such as employees, shareholders, suppliers, and local
communities, who depend on it. In this case, then, the
principle of corporate maximization is justified by its
propensity to promote the common good.
The principle of corporate maximization can thus draw
ethical legitimacy from its alignment with a number of
values that hold a great deal of intuitive appeal in Wes-
tern culture; namely, the desirability of respecting fun-
damental entitlements, of acting in a manner which
enables an institution to fulfill its essential purpose, and of
promoting the common good. Resources for exposing
each of these rationales to immanent critique should
therefore be sought in those ethics theories which provide
conceptual elaboration to these specific values. In this
case, the branches of ethics theory that seem best suited
to the task are, respectively, rights theory, virtue theory,
and utilitarianism.
A comprehensive awareness of the ethical merits of the
principle of corporate maximization would therefore re-
quire, at the very least, critique against the broader con-
ceptual framework supplied by each of these branches of
ethics theory in turn. For instance, consideration against the
conceptual framework supplied by rights theory would
expose the limitations of taking into account only the rights
of shareholders. It would draw attention to the desirability
of considering other tacit and explicit rights associated with
business activity, along with any negative and positive
obligations that those rights entail.
Similarly, Aristotle’s (2009/circa 323BC) ideas linking
purpose to community and human fulfillment provide re-
sources for a broader understanding of business purpose
than is suggested by Sternberg’s teleological rationale.
Resources for critiquing Sternberg’s stance could also be
found in Solomon’s (1992) distinction between purposes
and goals, and in MacIntyre’s (1985/1981) virtue-influ-
enced discussion of the need for institutions to ensure that
the practices that they supervise deliver an appropriate
balance on internal and external goods.
And as far as the utilitarian justification of corporate
maximization is concerned, deeper analysis would un-
cover a possible contradiction between the principle of
corporate maximization and utilitarianism’s intrinsic
commitment to universalism. In other words, it would
reveal the principle of corporate maximization as a rule-
utilitarian guide to action that, if generally followed, may
secure the interests of all those who have a dependency
relationship with a business. However, it would also re-
veal that that principle takes little or no account of those
who have no such dependency relationship but who are
nevertheless affected by corporate activity. Given the
85
magnitude of the effect of corporate activity, this is a
significant oversight. Fundamental tension is thus exposed
between the principle of corporate maximization’s utili-
tarian underpinning and the latter’s presumption that all
people2 should be taken into when estimating the general
good.
But immanent critique of the principle of corporate
maximization need not draw solely on the resources of-
fered by conventional, Anglo-American staples such as
rights theory, virtue theory, and utilitarianism. Cultural
legitimization for this particular putative statement of
business ethicality could also be drawn from the notion that
everyone has their own views about ethics, that these views
often conflict, so any form of ethical rationalization is a
meaningless exercise and managers may as well just get on
with doing what they are hired to do, which is to drive
commercial performance. Legitimization for the principle
of corporate maximization is thus found in a form of cor-
porate nihilism. Theoretical elaboration of such a per-
spective can be found in Nietzsche’s (2006/1886, 2003/
1887) repudiation of morality and his depiction of will to
power as an inevitable and ubiquitous human motivator.
However, as well as providing an ethical relativist
source of legitimization for the principle of corporate
maximization, the writings of Nietzche and other existen-
tialist philosophers also offer resources for its critique. For
instance, Nietzsche’s denunciation of morality can equally
well be read as a celebration of individual moral
sovereignty (White 1994/1988); a celebration that is ar-
ticulated more explicitly through the Sartrean notions of
bad faith and authenticity (Sartre 2003/1943). Ideas such as
these, rather than validating ethical indifference, alert
business managers to the desirability of coming to terms
with their own moral sovereignty, and of following their
moral convictions regardless of their congruence with ex-
pectations and imperatives that prevail in the corporate
environment.
In this example, then, at least four separate branches of
ethics theory might be used as resources to subject a par-
ticular putative statement of business ethicality—the prin-
ciple of corporate maximization—to immanent critique. In
each case, interrogating the statement against the theory
that provides conceptual elaboration to a separate, under-
pinning cultural value is likely to enhance students’ ap-
preciation of the progressive potentialities offered by that
statement as well as any contradictions that it entails. It is
important to stress that to draw on relevant ethics theories
in this manner to expose putative statements of business
2
It has even been suggested (Singer 1995) that utilitarians have no
grounds for restricting evaluation to humans and that animals should
also be included in a utilitarian’s constituency of ethical relevance.
123
86
ethicality to critique is not to say that the latter should be
cast aside if they do not match up to this critique in every
respect. It is, however, to suggest that such critique can
point the way towards a more comprehensive awareness of
the ethical merits of those statements. And that awareness
is likely to be built upon awareness of both the progressive
potentiality that lies within each statement and any con-
tradictions that are thus uncovered.
To summarize, it should now be clear that the pedagogic
role for ethics theory proposed here involves searching
within a range of theories for conceptual resources that will
facilitate immanent critique of putative statements of
business ethicality. This approach could be applied to a
specific statement that holds currency in the ethical un-
derstanding of a student, of a community, or of society at
large. The example offered above focuses on one such
statement. Equally, this process can be applied to a range of
possible statements that relate to a particular, ethically
charged scenario. In the latter case, not only are the merits
and limitations of those respective statements likely to be
illuminated; this process of immanent critique will also
enable students to develop a comprehensive, nuanced ap-
preciation of the ethical ramifications of the specific sce-
nario under consideration.
Part Four: Some Criteria that the Presentation
of Ethics Theory Needs to Meet in Order to Fulfill
a Speculative Role
So far, this paper has defined a speculative approach to
business ethics teaching as one which encourages students
to develop their own ideas about business ethics by ex-
posing putative statements of business ethicality to imma-
nent critique. Moreover, it has proposed that ethics theory
provides a productive resource for facilitating such an
agenda. This last section will draw further on accounts of
Hegelian method, on discussions of immanent critique, and
on discussions of business ethics teaching, to make some
general suggestions concerning the implementation of this
speculative agenda.
Clearly, teaching business ethics in the speculative
manner discussed in this paper involves explaining a range
of ethics theories to students. Moreover, this explanation
should be delivered in a manner that highlights intuitively
appealing cultural values to which those theories provide
conceptual elaboration. Additionally, a speculative appli-
cation of ethics theory calls for clear illustration of how
theory might be applied to evaluate putative statements of
business ethicality and the practical business scenarios to
which they relate. However, several other criteria also
seem apposite to a speculative agenda. In particular, it
seems desirable to give some thought to the scope of ethics
123
M. Fryer
theory that is embraced, the spirit in which that theory is
applied, the nature of ethical understanding that it is ex-
pected to deliver, and the nature of pedagogic intervention
that is best suited to it. This last section will therefore offer
some observations concerning each of these four criteria. I
will also explain how the speculative aspiration outlined
here, while drawing upon Hegelian method, departs in one
important way from Hegel’s own expectations of
speculative philosophy.
Concerning the Scope of Ethics Theory: Broadening
the Conceptual Resources
Some writers who have expressed reservations about the
usefulness of ethics theory to business ethics have assumed
a fairly narrow definition of ethics theory. For instance,
John Kaler’s criticism is aimed at what he calls ‘‘reduc-
tionist’’ ethics theories; that is to say, at ‘‘the kind of highly
specific accounts of the nature of morality offered most
notably (but not only) by the apparently polar opposites of
deontology and utilitarianism’’ (Kaler 1999, p. 209).
Similarly, Richard Rorty’s challenge to the relevance of
philosophy to business ethics is aimed at ethics theories
which invoke ‘‘notions such as ‘absoluteness’ and ‘objec-
tivity’’’ (Rorty 2006, p. 371), ‘‘unchanging essences’’ (ibid,
p. 372), and ‘‘the commands of reason’’ (ibid, p. 374). In
other words, the ethics theories that these critics have in
mind are those which are usually referred to as ethical
absolutist theories.
The preoccupation of these critiques with ethical abso-
lutist theory may be explained by the fact that, until fairly
recently, those writers of business ethics textbooks who
have drawn on ethics theory have tended to confine
themselves to introducing rights theory, utilitarianism,
deontology, and more recently, a little virtue theory.
Although discussions of so-called ‘‘continental’’ theories
have begun to appear in some recent texts,3 critics such as
Kaler and Rorty can be excused for honing in on the An-
glo-American, absolutist tradition when they speak of
ethics theory. However, two observations seem pertinent to
this issue. The first is that ethical absolutist theories can
make a valuable contribution to speculative business ethics
teaching in the manner described above. Indeed, even
Rorty’s critical discussion alludes to this potential when he
allows that ‘‘The principles formulated by thinkers like
Kant, Mill, and Rawls provide handy little summaries of
various subsets of our moral intuitions’’ (Rorty 2006,
p. 376).
3
Painter-Morland and ten Bos’s (2011) Business Ethics and Conti-
nental Philosophy offer a refreshing departure from this traditional,
Anglo-American exclusivity. See also Parker (1998b), Jones et al.
(2005) and Fryer (2015).
Speculative Business Ethics Teaching
The second observation is that there seems to be no
reason why speculative business ethics teaching should
confine itself to ethical absolutist theories. Any set of ideas
that provide theoretical elaboration to currents of ethical
thought that pervade our culture, and which thus offer a
conceptual resource for thinking about ethically charged
issues, might be included under the rubric of ‘‘ethics the-
ory’’. Indeed, Hegelian speculative method would seem to
call for the conceptual net to be spread as widely as pos-
sible. Hegel was at pains to point out that none of the ideas
that circulate within a particular philosophical system are
definitive of it. Although some philosophical ideas might
seek to offer completeness, they should be seen as no more
than fragments of a wider system; that is, they should be
regarded as embodiments of the broader understanding that
resides within that system but which, at the same time,
offers only partial insights to it. As Hegel described it:
Each of the parts of philosophy is a philosophical
whole, a circle rounded and complete in itself. In
each of these parts, however, the philosophical Idea is
found in a particular specificality or medium … The
whole of philosophy in this way resembles a circle of
circles. The Idea appears in each circle, but, at the
same time, the whole Idea is constituted by the sys-
tem of these peculiar phases, and each is a necessary
member of the organization (1975/1830, p. 20/15)
To apply this thought to the study of business ethics is to
suggest that students should be introduced to a wide range
of theories if they are to develop a comprehensive set of
conceptual tools for immanent critique. For sure, this
should include some from the Anglo-American absolutist
tradition, but it could also include ethical relativist
perspectives, critical theory, as well as the range of
theoretical frameworks that have been offered by topics
such as gender studies and environmentalism. Not only will
this extend the critical resources upon which speculative
business ethics teaching might draw; it also offers fruitful
ground for the broadening of the ‘‘moral imagination’’
which Rorty (2006) sees as so important for moral
progress.
Concerning the Spirit in Which Ethics Theory is
Applied: A Critical Orientation
In order to fulfill its progressive potential, Hegel suggested
that speculative method should call established opinions
into question; it is, for Hegel, ‘‘the pathway of doubt’’
(Hegel 1977/1807, p. 49/78), which ‘‘brings about a state of
despair about all the so-called natural ideas, thoughts, and
opinions’’ (ibid, p. 50/78). Speculative business ethics
teaching therefore needs to tread a narrow path that avoids
either acceptance of established doctrine or reliance on
87
external standards of critique. In order to trace the route
that such a path should take, it helps to consider some
distinctions drawn by theorists who have considered the
application of immanent critique in a political context. For
instance, Dan Sabia (2010) distinguishes between what he
calls ‘‘first-order immanent criticism’’ and ‘‘second-order
immanent critique’’. As Sabia sees it, first-order immanent
criticism ‘‘is both inherently conventional and conservative
because it regards as valuable, and deploys directly, cul-
turally dominant understandings and norms’’ (Sabia 2010,
p. 686). Along similar lines, Craig Browne (2008) has used
the title ‘‘internal criticism’’ to differentiate a less-radical
form of enquiry from immanent critique. For Browne, in-
ternal criticism ‘‘appeals to standards and norms present in
traditions and documents, like bills of rights, constitutions,
and even international treaties, to criticize institutionalized
arrangements inconsistent with them’’ (Browne 2008, p. 8).
In contrast, immanent critique, according to Sabia,
involves
Not the deployment of conventional understandings
and standards in ordinary or even more reflective
discourse, but the assessment of the rationality or
worth of conventional understandings and standards
by somehow drawing on resources internal to the
society or culture of which they are a part. (Sabia
2010, p. 687)
Its aspiration, according to Browne is ‘‘The historical
grounding of analysis and contribution to the reflexive
liberation of subjects’’ (Browne 2008, p. 8).
Immanent critique, thus understood and applied within a
business ethics context, needs to be prepared to challenge
values, institutions, and conventions that prevail in the
corporate world. It should not accept dominant attitudes
about business ethics as unimpeachable; rather it should
regard them as putative statements to be exposed to critique
against the cultural underpinnings to which they appeal. A
speculative agenda for business ethics education, then, is
one which meets Schalk Engelbrecht’s call for a ‘‘radical’’
approach, which goes beyond ‘‘maintain[ing] and even
strengthen[ing] the existing framework of business through
the application of ethical concepts’’ (Engelbrecht 2012,
p. 344); one which is also alert to systemic ethical chal-
lenges presented by contemporary capitalism.
Concerning the Nature of Ethical Understanding that is
Sought: Tolerance of Ambiguity
Clearly, drawing on ethics theories to illuminate the ethical
ramifications of business scenarios is unlikely to result in
neat, unanimous conclusions. This is partly because to il-
luminate the progressive potentials and the contradictions
within a particular statement of business ethicality is not to
123
88
pronounce definitive judgement on it. It is also because, as
both Kaler (1999) and Rorty (2006) have pointed out,
different ethics theories are likely to deliver contrasting
insights. The speculative application of ethics theory may
therefore leave students in a quandary about the ethical
legitimacy of particular statements or the ethical probity of
particular scenarios.
Whether or not this is seen as problematic will depend to
a large extent on whether or not we look to ethical
evaluation to deliver unequivocal conclusions. If we expect
it to result in a secure, incontestable account of the ethical
legitimacy of particular statements of business ethicality,
or the right and wrongs of specific scenarios, then the
ambivalence that is intrinsic to speculative business ethics
teaching would indeed be a matter for concern. However, if
we are prepared to tolerate a degree of equivocation in our
ethical deliberations then we might look to ethics theories
not to provide the ‘right’ answer but to inform a compre-
hensive awareness of the ethical ramifications of a par-
ticular scenario; one which draws on a plurality of ethical
values that resonate within Western culture and upon
which each individual might ultimately base her or his own
opinion.
Indeed, to expect a range of ethics theories, which offer
conceptual explications of those values that resonate within
a culture, to deliver unequivocal conclusions would seem
to impose an unreasonable expectation on those cultural
values. It would be to regard culture as monolithic; as a
clearly demarcated, homogenous block, within which all
components parts are in harmony. This seems a misleading
way to depict culture. Cultures, after all, are not neatly
demarcated, homogenous blocks. They tend to be hetero-
geneous and ragged round the edges. Moreover, they are
constantly infused by fresh ideas, values, and commitments
that emanate from within and without. As Dan Sabia puts it
in his discussion of immanent critique,
Peoples or cultures have no beginnings or endings, no
distinct boundaries, and a multiplicity of authors or,
rather, author participants. Hence any interpretation
or reading or narrative about what a people or culture
or community is, about their alleged tradition(s),
character or ethos, their supposed Sittlichkeit, pre-
vailing ideas or worldview, is always open to charges
of oversimplification, reification, one-sidedness, and
the like. (Sabia 2010, p. 688)
Nevertheless, Sabia suggests that the fact that a culture has
neither sharp edges nor internal homogeneity need not rule
out immanent critique of the ideas that percolate through it.
Indeed, he suggests that immanent exploration that draws
only upon those elements within cultural understanding
that are harmonious with one another may result in no more
than a celebration of a particular body of convention. In
123
M. Fryer
particular, such homogeneity may only be found within the
value systems of a particular sub-culture, such as that
which characterizes a dominant elite. In the context of
business ethics teaching, such an approach would under-
mine the subject’s radical potential, restricting it to the
defence of the economic status quo; a role which Schalk
Engelbrecht refers to as that of an apologetic ‘‘corporate
pet’’ (2012, p. 349). If, on the other hand, ethical
exploration is to achieve the progressive, critical quality
to which Hegelian speculative method aspires, the very
plurality of visions offered by ethics theory should be
grasped as a productive resource.
In order to take such an approach, students need to be-
come comfortable with what Martin Parker has called
‘‘post-foundational thinking’’. That is, they should be en-
couraged to adopt, in relation to business ethics, ‘‘a rather
more provisional way of thinking—one that does not en-
courage dangerous certainties but instead focuses on the
‘Ethical’ ambivalence of any action or judgement’’ (Parker
1998a: S35). Business ethics teaching that meets a
speculative agenda should therefore prepare students not to
expect apodictic ethical truth. Rather, it should help them
to develop their capacity to respond to ethical tensions, to
embrace them as a stimulus to critical reflection, and ulti-
mately to make their own informed judgements about right
and wrong.
Concerning the Nature of Pedagogical Intervention:
A Facilitative Approach
A fourth criterion that seems appropriate to a speculative
business ethics agenda is that the style of intervention re-
quired from educators is not a prescriptive one. The role of
the educator would not be to reveal business ethics truths to
students for, in Hegel’s view, ‘‘truth is not a minted coin
that can be given and pocketed ready-made’’ (1977/1807,
p. 22/39). Nor should speculative business ethics be taught
in what John Hooker refers to as a ‘‘hortatory’’ (2004,
p. 85) manner; that is, one which uses business ethics
education as an exercise in ethical evangelizing. Rather, the
appropriate role would seem to be one of facilitation; of
providing students with opportunities to build their
awareness of positives and negatives that are immanent in
any version of business ethicality, so that they can move
towards a more adequate appreciation of the topic than
hitherto.
Departure from the Hegelian Aspiration
Finally, in relation to this last point, it is important to
mention an important way in which the speculative agenda
for business ethics teaching envisaged here departs from a
Hegelian aspiration. Hegel (1977/1807) seemed to expect
Speculative Business Ethics Teaching
that the progressive unfolding of spirit would result in a
historical endpoint, at which all subjectivities become
united and in which each finds absolute freedom. Similarly,
his speculative logic (1975/1830) sought to progress to-
wards an ultimate understanding, in which cognition be-
comes reconciled with its objects. Moreover, Hegel’s
philosophical writings aspired as a revelation of the course
of these progressive, utopian achievements. To apply such
an approach to business ethics teaching would be to seek to
equip students with an absolute ethical understanding,
within which the distinction between subjectivity and ob-
jectivity evaporates, enabling them to clearly perceive the
course of ethical truth in business scenarios.
Such an expectation would clearly be at odds with the
aspiration for speculative business ethics teaching pre-
sented here. The speculative approach that I am proposing
in this paper makes no such utopian assumptions. However,
a progressive aspiration need not necessarily presume the
achievability of a utopian goal; nor need it even presuppose
the existence of some fixed, absolute destination. The
aspiration envisaged here is not that speculative business
ethics teaching will enable students to achieve absolute
ethical perspicacity. Rather, it is that they will end their
course better prepared to respond to the ethical challenges
presented by business practice than they were at its start.
Conclusion
This paper has proposed that, despite criticisms of its
usefulness, ethics theory can play an important role in the
speculative teaching of business ethics. I have suggested
that ethics theory provides abundant resources for a
teaching agenda which seeks to develop students’ capacity
to make informed, independent judgements about the
ethical ramifications of business practice. To put this
agenda into practice is to use ethics theory as a basis for
immanent critique; to use it as means for exploring the
progressive potentials and contradictions that are immanent
in any particular perspective on business ethics. By fol-
lowing such an approach, it is suggested that students will
develop a broad and diverse understanding of business
ethics and that they will thus be equipped to make informed
ethical judgements. The quality of those ethical judgements
should not be judged in terms of congruence with apodictic
moral certainties. Rather, it should be considered in terms
of the quality of imaginative engagement from which it has
proceeded.
Such an approach is likely to be of interest to those who
believe that the role of business ethics education is to enhance
the ethical sensitivity of students and to prepare them to re-
spond to ethical challenges in a critically reflective manner.
By drawing on the insights offered by philosophically
89
informed ethics theory, then, speculative business ethics
teaching may correspond to a role that, more generally, has
been mapped out for philosophy by Max Horkheimer; that is,
to ‘‘be mankind’s memory and conscience, and thereby help to
keep the course of humanity from resembling the meaningless
round of the asylum inmate’s recreation hour’’ (Horkheimer
2004/1947, p. 126).
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