On The Value of Parliamentary Diplomacy: Daniel Fiott

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On the Value of
Parliamentary
Diplomacy
Madariaga Paper – Vol. 4, No. 7 (Apr., 2011)
Daniel Fiott
Research Fellow, Madariaga – College of Europe Foundation
This paper examines the role of parliamentary diplomacy as part of

and sometimes distinct from traditional forms of diplomacy. Beyond
providing some much needed clarity to the notion of parliamentary
diplomacy, this paper asks some specific questions: including, what are
the added benefits or weaknesses of parliamentary diplomacy in a
world marked by powerful states and increasingly influential non-state
actors, and under what circumstances may parliamentary diplomacy
complement the external activities of the European Union?
The views contained in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the Madariaga
College of Europe Foundation
14, Avenue de la Joyeuse Entrée Tel: +32 2 209 62 10

B-1040, Brussels, Belgium E-mail: info@madariaga.org
Introduction
The aftermath of the Portuguese Carnation Revolution (1974 to 1975) brought about a worrisome admixture
of domestic political repression and the excesses of colonial rule in certain African countries, and there was
much debate on the whole of the Portuguese Left as to the future political direction of the country. Having
filled the political vacuum brought about by the Revolution, it was unclear as to whether Portugal would fall
under the Left’s more radical Communist Party or the more moderate Socialist Party (PSP). Given the eager
eye cast by both Leonid Brezhnev and Gerald Ford on the situation, the decision could have had important
ramifications for the Cold War. Eventually, however, Portugal chose social democracy, but what swayed the
decision away from a turn to communism? There were of course many reasons including the need for
economic growth through a market economy, but more interesting was the role played by other political
parties across Europe in supporting the nascent PSP.
Indeed, in the 1970s many social democratic parties in Europe including the German SPD, the Swedish SAP
and British Labour grouped together to assist the PSP with the transition from dictatorship. This aid came in
the form of financial and human resources so that, should Portugal elect the PSP, there would be rapid
democratisation, de-colonisation of Portugal’s territories in Africa and EEC accession.1 This was a substantial
carrot and stick initiative led by political parties. What is interesting about this indirect form of intervention is
its sophistication, fostering inter-party dialogue instead of employing force and offering substantial gains in
the form of EU membership and swift political recognition by neighbouring countries. The German SPD also
managed to fend-off American and Soviet interests in the Iberian state by highlighting the geopolitical
overstretch this would cause, especially for the Soviets.
This introductory example highlights the potential strengths of the role to be played by political parties, and
“parliamentary diplomacy” more generally, but it is unfortunate that this form of diplomacy is often
overlooked. International politics is traditionally presumed to be the domain of diplomats and ministers, but
one should bear in the mind the significance not only of individual politicians and political parties but also of
whole parliamentary bodies in engaging in diplomacy. Accordingly, this paper examines the role of
parliamentary diplomacy as part of and sometimes distinct from traditional forms of diplomacy. Beyond
providing some much needed clarity to the notion of parliamentary diplomacy, this paper analyses the added
benefits and weaknesses of parliamentary diplomacy in a world marked by powerful states and increasingly
influential non-state actors, and under what circumstances parliamentary diplomacy may complement the
external activities of the European Union?
What is Parliamentary Diplomacy?

The idea of parliamentary diplomacy (“parlomacy”) is not new. The Roman Senate, for example, had played
both a role – albeit at the behest of Roman Generals - in first suing for peace and then sanctioning war with
Philip V of Macedon after the failure of the Treaty of Phoenice (205 BC). More recently it has been pointed
out that the United Nations General Assembly is, in essence, parliamentary diplomacy writ large. But
parlomacy is not simply about international congresses.2 Given the diverse array of forms of parlomacy, one
has to be cautious about who or what is said to conduct this form of diplomacy: here one must differentiate
between practice and actors.3 There are a number of parliamentary actors that do parlomacy starting from
individual parliamentarians, to political parties, to local parliaments or assemblies, to national parliaments, to
1
G. Devin, Internationale Socialiste: Histoire et Sociologie du Socialisme Internationale, 1945-1990, (Paris: Presses de la Fondation
Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1993), p. 118.
2
K.W. Thompson, “The New Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace”, International Organization, Vol. 19, No.3 (Summer, 1965), pp. 394-409.
3
For the differences between parliamentary diplomacy as a form of negotiation and as implying a diplomatic agent, see: N. Götz, “On the
Origins of ‘Parliamentary Diplomacy’: Scandinavian ‘Bloc Politics’ and Delegation Policy in the League of Nations”, Cooperation and
Conflict, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Sep., 2005), pp. 263-279.
1 | Madariaga Paper – On the Value of Parliamentary Diplomacy (Apr., 2011)

regional parliaments and ending with international parliaments. In general there are three major parlomacy
categories: i) parliamentarians; ii) political parties; and, iii) parliaments (be they local, regional or
international). Of course, the type of parliament selected will depend on the country and parliamentary system
one talks about: it is equally possible to speak of les députés or Mitglied des Bundestages.
All of the aforementioned different types of parlomatic actors can act in several formal and informal ways at
the intra-state, inter-state and intra- and inter-regional levels.4 There are, as Figure 1 below shows, different
forms of doing parlomacy. At the intra-state level parliamentarians and political parties are formally and
principally involved in scrutinising the foreign policy of their national government, and in this way can have a
direct bearing on the shape and extent of these policies (e.g. the British House of Commons). These same
actors may also lend their voice of support for policies, which adds legitimacy and more political weight to
them. At the inter-state level parliamentary delegations or multilateral parliamentary friendship groups can
interact to improve the legitimacy of a government in a third-country, and they may also play a role in
developing the representation of people also (e.g. the NATO Parliamentary Assembly). The intra-regional
level is also important, with the European Parliament promoting cultural exchange, dialogue and
understanding between the EU member states and between the EU and the rest of the world. The inter-regional
level sees all different regional parliaments meet for dialogue (e.g. Inter-Parliamentary Union).
As one can see from Figure 2 below there are a host of different activities for which parlomacy can be
involved in. It is noticeable that the activities of parliamentarians, political parties and parliaments tend to be
able to complete more of the formal and informal tasks listed (not an exhaustive list by any means). As one
moves from intra-state parlomacy to the inter-state level certain formal means of action become unavailable,
with less fora for the parliaments of two or more countries to vote or to participate in the cabinet meetings of
governments. Where intra-regional parlomacy is concerned - and here one thinks specifically of the European
Parliament - there are opportunities for parliamentarians to partake in committee hearings (e.g. the EP’s
Foreign Affairs Committee), political party interaction and to scrutinise the European Commission (i.e. a form
of executive scrutiny). Finally, inter-regional parlomacy can partake in far fewer of the activities open to other
levels. The diagram also suggests that the closer the level of parlomacy to power-holding institutions (i.e.
government or international organisations) the more formal activities they are able to participate in.
Figure 1 – Ways of Doing Parlomacy
Country A
Intra-State Parlomacy Political Parties

Government
Parliamentarians
Country A Country B
Parliament Parliament
Inter-State Parlomacy Delegations Delegations
Political Parties Political Parties
Parliamentarians Parliamentarians
4
One should distinguish between inter-state parlomacy, which can be undertaken by two or more parliamentary entities in an informal and
sporadic manner, and intra-state parlomacy, which concerns regular contact formally through an established structure (e.g. European
Parliament).

European Parliament Third Countries
Third Parties
Delegations
European
Intra-Regional Parlomacy Commission Country A
Political Parties
Political Parties
Government
Parliamentarians
Parliamentarians
Region A Region B
Parliament Parliament
Inter-Regional Parlomacy Delegations Delegations
Political Parties Political Parties
Parliamentarians Parliamentarians
Inter-
Figure 2 - Forms and Levels of Parlomacy Intra- regional
regional parlomacy
Inter-state parlomacy
Intra-state parlomacy
parlomacy
Formal Activities
Parliamentary Procedures (Committee hearings, votes, statements)
Parliamentary Interaction (Delegation visits, UN General Assembly)
Political Party Interaction (intra-party debate, cabinet meetings)
Parliamentary Duties (Observer Missions, Citizen Interaction, Media)
Informal Activities
Building mutual understanding and dialogue
Sharing experiences and expertise
The Value of Parlomacy

A number of factors contribute to the effectiveness of parlomacy. For example, the size of a parliamentary
body is important. The more individual parliamentarians there are then the more likely it is that skills and
expertise for conflict prevention, mediation and dialogue can be sourced. The financial and institutional
resources available to a parliament will also condition its ability to undertake parlomacy (i.e. the ability to
send delegations to third-countries). That said, one must not underestimate smaller parliamentary bodies.
Individual parliamentarians of high expertise and experience can still be found in smaller parliaments, and the
smaller parliament may have an added-value in engaging in a situation of greater concern and proximity to it.

If one considers the geographical, historical and cultural aspects of diplomacy then a smaller parliament may
be privileged if a common language or historical and cultural kinship exists.
Formal communication and interaction may be strained when conducting inter-state parlomacy. Whereas in
the EU the European Parliament provides for a formal institutional setting in order to engage and debate, this
same setting becomes watered-down beyond EU borders. It is true that while the Euro-Mediterranean
Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA), for example, provides a formal setting for the greater Mediterranean
region it only meets once a year. There can at times also be duplication of parliamentary institutions, which
can dilute the effectiveness and resources that might be achieved with one effective institution. The Latin
America Parliament (“Parlatino”), Andean Parliament and the Inter-American Parliamentary Group (IAPG) –
to name but a few of the parliamentary organisations in Latin and Central America - is to raise one such
example of this duplication.
Parlomacy tends to take a more pragmatic long-term approach to dialogue by building trust and
understanding. When utilising informal approaches to dialogue, parliamentarians and political parties can use
political camaraderie and affiliations to reach-out to interlocutors when traditional channels are strained. Aside
from trust-building, politicising a certain crisis situation through a camaraderie of political ideology may have
the benefit of re-framing conflict in other less harmful terms (i.e. than say ethnicity). But a shared political
creed or doctrine between actors can also lead to rivalry with other parties involved in dialogue. It may also
profoundly call into question the independence and sincerity of parlomacy. Furthermore, when dialogue
becomes merely a forum for political point scoring - or an indulgence for the egos of parliamentarians - then
langue de bois is likely to be privileged over constructive and objective debate.5
If parliamentarians are seen as too close and indistinguishable from their own governments then this can also
be viewed as a weakness of parlomacy. Indeed, the strength of parlomacy is its independence from
governments and other establishments. Parliaments are generally considered to exercise a certain degree of
control over their governments through budgetary powers and are less overtly elite than the diplomatic service
in composition, and this is seen to increase parliament’s standing vis-a-vis the government and the public. It
would be imprudent to suggest that the parliament is equal to the government in foreign policy terms, but
when parliamentarians act as truly independent actors by not succumbing to party discipline they can play an
innovative role. Alternatively, the fact that parliaments do not have the same powers as governments, nor the
parliamentarian that of a Prime Minister, means that they are mainly – albeit not exclusively – restricted to
using the power of debate.
Another important element related to parliamentary actors not having the powers of governments is that they
tend to be more utopian in aims and methods. Government implies being responsible for balancing between
values and interests, and having to take courses of action that may be the lesser of two evils. Government also
plugs into channels made unavailable to parliaments, such as intelligence and having discretionary contact
with governments in third-countries. While parliamentarians can vote on whether or not to go to war for
example, they are not involved in making decisions but rather only scrutinising them. It is for this reason that
there may perhaps be some element of friction between assertive parliamentarians and career diplomats or
even the minister for foreign affairs.
But even with these caveats in mind parliamentarians, political parties, delegations and whole parliaments do
bring experience and expertise to bear on preventing and managing crises and encouraging political dialogue.
While it is true that parliamentarians cannot always dedicate a concentrated amount of time on any one issue –
they do after all have many other duties (i.e. such as meeting with constituents) -, parliament is potentially a
5
S. Stavridis, “Parliamentary Diplomacy: Any Lessons for Regional Parliaments?” in M. Kölling, S. Stavridis, & N. Fernández Sola (eds.),
The International Relations of the Regions: Subnational Actors, Para-diplomacy and Multi-level governance, (Zaragoza, 2006).

treasure trove of various different forms and degrees of expertise. Of the total 735 current Members of the
European Parliament (MEPs), for example, 85 have held ministerial positions at the national government
level, which includes 10 former Prime Ministers and 10 former Foreign Affairs Ministers, and 108 have held
civil service posts up to the level of Secretary of State.
Encouraging Parlomacy
There are, therefore, many positive elements to parlomacy but the question is how it should be placed within
the framework of more formal diplomatic channels and practices. It is clear that Parlomacy should not and
cannot supersede formal diplomacy, but it should be considered an important element in its practice.
Accordingly, the practice of parlomacy may have to become more aware of three fundamental facets of formal
diplomacy if it is to become more successful: interests, timing and communication. It is the opinion of this
paper that a combined awareness of these three factors should improve the effectiveness and coherence of
parlomacy when related to traditional diplomacy.
Interests
The great difficulty with channelling parlomacy effectively is being able to properly manage the myriad
interests and objectives that may arise in any given instance of foreign policy. Interests are notoriously
difficult to define at any given time, and the sheer number of different interests from elites, business, unions
and NGOs (to name a few) vying for expression in a State’s foreign policy makes this task harder.
Parliamentarians must sit in this milieu of interests, and face the added difficulty of having to wrestle between
the needs of the constituents they represent and their own personal interests and moral conscious. This
entanglement of interests greatly impacts on the ability and reach of parlomacy. If, for example, the socialist
leader of Country A wants to pursue stronger diplomatic ties with communist Country B then he or she may
incur the wrath of the opposition, which may lead to electoral difficulties.
Some form of compromise over interests within the parliamentary body would be required therefore, which
can take the form of political horse-trading or genuine compromise. But this process would also rely on the
type of interests or objectives pursued. In this regard, Parlomacy should perhaps self-consciously disavail
itself of pursuing “interests” in the traditional reasons of state guise. Instead of interests, parlomacy should
perhaps better focus itself on inventing, experimenting and testing novel approaches to diplomacy.
Furthermore, beyond domestic preferences parliamentarians could play a key role in registering and
understanding the interests of other states and third-country domestic actors. Understanding the interests of
third-countries and their actors better, through exploiting non-official channels, would certainly be of
advantage to all.
Timing
One other element of traditional diplomacy which parlomacy can digest is the issue of timing. In the first
instance, parliamentarians should perhaps be given more resources and time to conduct parlomacy. Delegation
visits to third-countries are usually infrequent when compared to the permanent channels afforded to
embassies. Yet, without regular contact the ability for parlomacy to build relations with individuals and
entities in third-countries becomes strained. If the life-blood of the diplomat is diplomatic cables (now emails),
then face-to-face dialogue is that of the parliamentarian. Trust-building cannot effectively be attained without
time spent with interlocutors and sustained parlomacy. Without prolonged contact with actors in third-
countries there is little time for parliamentarians to really gain a full grasp of the people and country they want
to understand.

The second instance of timing relates to the deployability of parlomacy. Parliamentarians and parliamentary
bodies must know when they cannot play a worthwhile role and step aside. Parlomacy is not well-suited to
every aspect of foreign policy, and thus parliamentarians must be in a position to admit this. Nevertheless,
parlomacy does have a role to play in gauging what response is needed to crises or political stalemate. Based
on intuition, the situation may call for silent dialogue rather than the exaggeration that normally accompanies
the media spotlight. Timing over when this dialogue should be triggered, or when other tools or approaches
are required, is a large part of the role of parlomacy in international affairs. Through a different understanding
of a situation, parlomacy may have an added-value over traditional diplomacy in this respect.
Communication
But parlomatic added-value is predicated on parliamentarians having effective communication channels with
the organs of a State or entity such as the EU. If parliamentarians cannot feed their information and
understanding into the foreign policy “mainframe” then all is potentially lost. In this regard, parliamentarians
may have to better communicate their own abilities. That is, that the foreign policy identity of
parliamentarians has too often been concerned with promoting parliaments as bodies rather than the skills they
have to offer. In other words, instead of parlomacy solely fostering the parliamentary dimension of
international affairs, it should do more to promote itself as an integral element alongside traditional
diplomacy.
For example, more could be done to establish a permanent link between the newly established European
External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Parliament. Thus far, the EEAS has one person responsible
for relations with the European and national parliament(s), plus there is one member of the High
Representative’s cabinet charged with EEAS relations with the European Parliament. Given this state of
affairs, it might prove promising for the EU to design innovative means by which the work of
parliamentarians at the European and national levels can be fed into the EEAS’ work and vice-versa. For the
EEAS and the High Representative, closer diplomatic strategising with the European Parliament may also be a
means to add more democratic legitimacy to European foreign policy.
Conclusion
Parliamentary bodies such as national parliaments and the European Parliament should not be conceived as
some monolithic entity. Indeed, parliaments are able to mobilise many different actors ranging from the
activating grass roots campaigners to politicians to solve an international problem. As state-to-state diplomacy
is not always effective or successful, parlomacy may be an innovative means to defuse crises and build
political trust over the longer-term. Parlomacy’s traditional weaknesses, such as not having the powers of
government and having limited resources, are paradoxically its strengths. Under parlomacy experience,
dialogue and trust are put at a premium and knowing when this skill set should be deployed alongside or
instead of formal diplomacy is key. As Europe charts its course through the choppy waves of the future, the
innovative approaches contained in parlomacy may become increasingly important. Not only will it afford
2 Europe better diplomatic capabilities, but it may also give Europe better parliamentarians.

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ISSN 2033-7574
Diplomacy & Statecraft, 22:696–714, 2011
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DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2011.625828
Never Talk to Strangers? On Historians,

Political Scientists and the Study of Diplomacy
in the European Community/European Union
KAREN GRAM-SKJOLDAGER
Diplomacy is an institution that has undergone tremendous

Downloaded by [Koc University] at 04:43 23 September 2013
change over the last century—not least in relation to the new,

supranational institutions of the European Community/European
Union. Nonetheless, it is only very recently that political scientists
and historians have taken an interest in the changes brought about
by European integration processes for diplomatic norms, roles, and
practices. This article investigates the background for this late and
limited interest. It does so by comparing and contrasting dominant
theoretical trends that have shaped research on European diplo-
macy in the two disciplines since the Second World War. Against
this background it briefly evaluates the recent surge in research
on diplomacy and the European Union within political science,
and it points to possible avenues for further, joint, research com-
bining the transnational and sociological approaches adopted by
political scientists with the attention to temporality and national
specificities characteristic of historians’ dealings with European
diplomacy.
Diplomacy is one of the oldest instruments of statecraft and one of the

longest standing institutions of the international system. It is also an insti-
tution that has undergone tremendous change during the past century.
Traditionally associated with the Peace of Westphalia and the emergence
of the modern state system, it has been transformed by the spread of mul-
tilateral international co-operation and the increasingly dense networks of
economic, political, and cultural relations cutting across national boundaries.
Arguably, these changes are particularly pronounced amongst the states
that have joined the supranational European Communities (EC), later the
European Union (EU).
It is therefore hardly surprising that political scientists in recent years
have taken a growing interest in how the EC/EU has changed diplomacy.
696
Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of Diplomacy in the EU/EC 697
What is perhaps striking, however, is the fact that it is only within the last
decade that such an interest is detectable—and that it has no parallel in
history—even if exploring the impact of the EC/EU on diplomacy is fun-
damentally a question of exploring historical change. Addressing this late
and uneven interest in diplomacy in the EC/EU, this analysis is based in the
assumption that this state of affairs reflects important traits and differences
in the understandings of diplomacy in the two disciplines. In this sense, one
can identify and distinguish analytically amongst three theoretical perspec-
tives that have been central to the belated and limited interest in the impact
of the EC/EU on diplomacy within the two disciplines: a national perspec-
tive borne out of realist and liberal approaches, which views diplomacy first
and foremost as a tool of national interest; an international perspective that
has focused mainly on the general, international aspects of diplomacy as an
institution of international society on a global scale; and the transnational
or global governance research perspective, which in its earliest manifesta-

tions took a key interest in non-state relations and actors and juxtaposed
these with nation state representatives such as the diplomat.
In studying the EC/EU and diplomacy, political scientists have devel-
oped approaches that include international and transnational perspectives
and shift the theoretical ground towards sociological perspectives and modes
of analysis. Historians, by contrast, have maintained their political-functional
understanding and their interest in the national variation in diplomacy. But
it is possible by comparing and contrasting dominant theoretical trends that
have shaped research on European diplomacy in the two disciplines since
the Second World War to lay out a first, tentative roadmap for further, and
joint, research on diplomacy in the EU; and, on this basis, to argue for the
potentials of merging the theoretical insights from political science with the
temporal dimension and perceptiveness to the national variation character-
istic of history. In this way, it is possible to “Europeanise” historiography on
diplomacy and de-centre political science research on diplomacy in the EU,
making it aware of the deeper historical processes and broader international
and national contexts within which diplomacy in the EC/EU developed.
In dealing with diplomacy, there exists a principled distinction between
diplomacy and foreign policy. Often, and particularly in American scholar-
ship, the two terms are used interchangeably.1 This is not the case here,
where a distinction is made between foreign policy—understood as the
content and objectives of a state’s international relations—and the institu-
tion of diplomacy through which inter-state relations are conducted.2 Thus,
diplomacy is in its most narrow sense the institution that developed within
the Westphalian state system and which found formal expression in the
organisations of foreign ministries—it is, to quote Jozef Bátora, perceived as
“the organizational field” made up of foreign services.3 “Diplomat,” likewise,
refers to bureaucrats who work in national foreign services.
698 K. Gram-Skjoldager
Whilst there is a certain chronological pattern to the different concep-

tions of diplomacy that developed during the time when the EC/EU has
been an institutional reality, it is important to note that in teleological terms,
they are not separate states of mutually exclusive understandings of diplo-
macy that have replaced each other. Rather, they are perspectives that have
supplemented and enriched each other and expanded our understanding of
diplomacy.
The basic precondition for grappling with the question of how diplo-
macy has been affected and transformed by the European integration
processes is that it is defined as an independent object of academic enquiry;
it should not only be perceived as a tool of national interest but also be
viewed as an institution that connects national polities and is shaped by
changing international preconditions. During the Cold War, this was the case
only to a very limited degree. In this period, international relations (IR) and
history were equally disinterested in diplomacy. It was a subject that had, in

the words of James Der Derian, been “left as a foundling by historians at the
doorstep of diplomatic theorists, who only investigated when mature noises
like [Hugo Grotius’] de jure belli ac pacis were to be heard.”4 The scant inter-
est in diplomacy was closely related to the realist and liberal theories that
structured most IR debates and much international historical research during
the Cold War—and which basically viewed diplomacy as a minor tool of
national policy. In the national interest-driven international world associated
with realism, states are the only relevant actors and national interests are
defined in terms of power. This situation means that diplomacy has been
perceived basically in instrumental terms as a tool in the national toolbox of
power and influence5 —and, given the relative importance that realists attach
to force, “one of the lesser tools of foreign policy.”6 Neo-realism, despite its
focus on systemic-level theorising, has not changed this view. Whilst assum-
ing that state units interpret the environment in which they find themselves
before choosing appropriate behaviour, the socialising forces acknowledged
by Kenneth Waltz are seen as lying within the state units themselves and not
in any processual relation or institution between states such as diplomacy.7
As a consequence, realism has rarely theorised or explored diplomacy in the
context of the EC/EU or otherwise.
The same holds true for liberal approaches. Despite their focus on
co-operation and peaceful relations, liberal scholars did not develop any
theories of diplomacy either. Focusing primarily on how state behaviour is
shaped by state-society relations and viewing international politics in terms
of preferences of various groups, liberal theorists have not given diplomacy
priority as an independent object of theoretical development.8 In the con-
text of EC/EU research, a prominent example of this is Andrew Moravcsik’s
interpretation of key collective political decisions in the European integration
process. In the context of inter-state bargaining processes, states are seen as
separate entities that act and have national interests separate from those of
other states, and diplomacy figures as a constituent part of the states.9
A similar lack of interest in diplomacy may be discerned in his-
tory. Though far less explicit about—and often also less conscious of—the
theoretical assumptions underpinning their analyses, the work of most inter-
national historians has been based in what may be termed a “soft” variant
of realism. Generally speaking international historians of the post-war years
have been inclined to accept “the self-evident virtue of realpolitik, the cen-
trality of the state and the fact of international anarchy,”10 even if these
assumptions have rarely been explicated. The bulk of international his-
tory therefore aims to understand and explain national and international
decision-making processes and policy outcomes from a nation state per-
spective. As a consequence, generous interest has been paid to diplomats
and statesmen operating at the inter-governmental level and forming part of
formal international and European decision-making processes.11 However, it

is their role in devising policy that has been researched. Attention has rarely
been paid to how the gradually changing nature of the international and
European political processes has produced changes in the social structures,
role orientations, and patterns of actions amongst actors such as politicians
and diplomats.
This lack of interest in diplomacy as an independent object of study
in mainstream international history is reflected in the fact that research on
diplomacy in this period almost exclusively took on the form of organi-
sational histories. During these years, almost all European states had the
institutional histories of their national foreign services written;12 and these
histories in general were nationally compartmentalised and self-contained
organisational outlines that were largely unrelated to broader international
and European political developments—in the shape of European integra-
tion or otherwise. The only large-scale comparative study conducted before
the end of the Cold War was the 1982 Times Survey of Foreign Ministries
of the World. Edited by the British historian, Zara Steiner, this book was a
collection of a broad selection of essays on the history and organisation of
a range of different, though predominantly European, foreign ministries.13
It did not, however, address in any systematic way the changing precondi-
tions for these bureaucratic units brought about by a growing number—and
increasingly invasive forms—of international and European organisations.
Only in France did historians to any noticeable extent push past this
organisational mode of analysis when dealing with European diplomacy
after 1945. Here historians placed the subject of diplomacy on the histori-
cal agenda and developed a fairly sophisticated understanding of it already
in the 1950s. In 1954, Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle pub-
lished their Introduction à l’histoire des relations internationale, which was
inspired by l’École des Annales and propagated a broader and more com-
plex form of international history than the classical recounting of inter-state
high politics.14 On one hand, they wished to include the “forces profondes”
that shaped international relations such as demographic and economic con-
ditions and collective mentalities such as national and pacifist sentiments.
On the other, they insisted on the importance of events, on placing the
individual at the centre of the historical process and on the importance
of political history. It was Duroselle in particular who developed this sec-
ond part of their new international research agenda. In the latter half of
Introduction à l’histoire des Relations internationals, “L’homme d’état,” he
dealt with the decision-making individuals, their social background, their
ideas and resources; with how they were influenced by structural forces and
how they were in turn capable of modifying and bending these forces.15
Since then, in the words of Robert Frank, a “durosellienne” tendency has
developed in French international history, which has explored the foreign
policy decision-making process, the administrative organisation of foreign
policy making, and the individuals involved in this process.16 This litera-
ture also has strong realist traits, claiming the primacy of national interest
and taking a basically conflictual view of international politics as a zero-
sum game;17 and it does not address in any direct way the changes brought
about by the quiet transformation of the European political landscape. But it
does consider diplomacy and its changing norms and practices to be issues
worthy of independent academic interest and, in this way, points forward to
more recent studies of diplomacy.
Whilst soft realist and nation state centred perspectives have dominated
IR and formed the basis of the modestly sized historical scholarship on diplo-
macy since the Second World War, a minor theoretical strand has insisted on
viewing diplomacy as an institution of international politics worthy of a con-
siderable academic interest. Most IR research on diplomacy is rooted in the
“English School” and is focused on the common, international characteris-
tics of and developments in diplomacy. Emerging in the 1960s and based
just as much in history as in IR, English School researchers were the first
to formulate general reflections on the nature and development of diplo-
macy. Founded by British historians Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield,
the School held—and still holds—strong, and positive, normative assump-
tions about the political and moral quality of diplomacy; and it was within
this context that the notion of diplomacy as an institution of international
society was introduced.18
In his 2002 overview of English School studies of diplomacy, the
Norwegian political scientist and anthropologist, Iver B. Neumann, has iden-
tified three generations of English School scholarship.19 The main achieve-
ment of the first generation, represented by Butterfield and Wight, was to
place diplomacy at the centre of international politics—with Wight claim-
ing that diplomacy was the “master institution” of international relations.20
The second generation of English School writers—Hedley Bull and Adam
Watson—shifted the view of diplomacy slightly as Bull introduced the notion
of a “diplomatic culture” and claimed that diplomacy symbolised the exis-

tence of an “international society.”21 The third generation of the English
School, writing from the 1980s, took the interpretation of diplomacy one
step further. Developing a finely meshed typology of the various historical
forms of diplomacy, scholars like James Der Derian and Christian Reus-Smit
argued that diplomacy was a constituent rather than reflexive practice of
international society, and a practice that was embedded in broader moral
and social systems.22
Following the breakdown of the rigid bipolar Cold War structure, the
English School and its notion of an international society of states has expe-
rienced a renaissance. This revival also goes for its dealings with diplomacy,
making it the mainstay of a large and diverse literature on this subject.23
At the theoretical level, this literature has gathered the threads of previous
English School writings on diplomacy, viewing diplomacy as an institution
constituted by “a relatively stable collection of social practices consisting of

easily recognised roles coupled with underlying norms and a set of rules
or conventions defining appropriate behaviour for, and governing relations
amongst, occupants of these roles.”24
However, in relation to understanding the effects of the European inte-
gration processes on diplomacy, this literature has fairly little to offer. This
situation is partially due to its general international—or global—outlook.
Partially it is based in the fact that the English School literature is pred-
icated on assumptions about a state-based international system that is
fundamentally inter-governmental in nature and grounded on a dichotomi-
sation between international and national politics. Thus it has continued to
focus on diplomats’ double mandate as representatives of both nation states
and international society; and it also sees diplomacy as a “third culture”
in which diplomats, on one hand, function as boundary-maintainers that
uphold the discourse dividing politics into domestic and foreign spheres
and, on the other, constitute “a locus for mediation between political enti-
ties with diverse cultures.”25 Therefore, the empirical studies emerging from
these perspectives have also been concerned primarily with diplomatic state
recognition practices and the role of the corps diplomatique in manag-
ing mutually beneficial relations and reproducing the basic principles that
underpin inter-state relations.26
The new English School research on diplomacy is in some respects
backward looking. Thus, in pointing to the co-operative, mediating aspects
of diplomacy, the English School has to some extent brought the classi-
cal diplomatic self-understanding back onto the research agenda. Twentieth
century classics of diplomats’ writings such as Ernest Satow’s A Guide to
Diplomatic Practice and Sir Harold Nicolson’s Diplomacy as well as many
diplomats’ memoirs, are generally characterised by what Paul Sharp has
named a practical, or unreflective, cosmopolitanism.27 Whilst firmly believ-
ing in the sovereign state system and in diplomats as representatives of
sovereign states and their interests, diplomats have often simultaneously

argued—or implicitly assumed—that they function as a steadying, positive
influence in international politics, curbing the impulses of politicians and
public opinions attempting to push national self-interest too far. With the
setting up of “diplomatic studies” programmes at universities and other
research institutions across Europe and the United States since the end
of the Cold War, a new research field also has been created in which
both academics and diplomats engage based on these shared assumptions
about the positive role of diplomacy.28 In this context, a new academically
oriented type of diplomats’ writings on diplomacy has also emerged that
tends to emphasise the positive moral assumptions about diplomacy. One
example is the German former ambassador and professor of law and diplo-
macy, Wilfried Bolewski, whose book Diplomacy and International Law in
Globalised Relations (2007) includes bold statements such as: “Through its
flexibility and adaptability diplomacy will emerge as an instrument for this

universal good in the 21st century.”29
Whilst scholars relating to the English School have highlighted the inter-
national dimensions of diplomacy that have previously escaped scholarly—
and particularly historical—scrutiny, it is therefore also apparent that
this scholarship stands the risk of idealising the diplomatic profession,
over-emphasising its exclusive and distinct character, and overvaluing the
relationships amongst diplomats at the expense of their interactions with
the growing number of state and non-state actors. These new actors have
come to inhabit the diplomatic realm in the twentieth century—and not least
because of the new changes brought about by the increasingly invasive
forms of international cooperation, particularly the EC/EU. In one regard,
however, the empirical studies generated through the theoretical interests
of the English School do point forward. They mark the culmination of a
development amongst English School writers away from abstract theoris-
ing towards viewing and analysing diplomacy as a practice and as part of
social life. Thus, whilst Butterfield and Wight had as their primary aim to
develop a philosophy of history and adopted a rather speculative approach
to their subject based mainly in textual analyses,30 Watson, much more than
his predecessors, focused on diplomacy as a practice, viewing international
negotiation, information gathering, and communication as core practices
of the diplomatic trade. In focusing on the actual activities in diplomacy,
Watson historicised and sociologised the institution of diplomacy that IR had
previously treated as a given.31 Both the understanding of diplomacy as an
international institution and as a concrete political and social practice are
features that are echoed in recent political science research on diplomacy
in the EU.
Before looking at this research, however, it may be helpful first to
consider another recent theoretical development that has, at least initially,
inhibited the academic interest in diplomacy, but which has recently come
to enrich it. This is the transnational research perspective. As pointed out

above, an important reason for the fairly limited and secluded scholarship
on diplomacy within IR and international history is the predominance of
intergovernmental, nation-centred approaches in both disciplines. However,
part of the reason also lies in the fact that over the last two decades, develop-
ments in the research agendas in the two disciplines have been moving past
the international and national approaches and towards the transnational—
or global governance—perspective. And from the outset this perspective
was based in an—implicit or explicit—juxtaposition of transnationalism and
the study of intergovernmental institutions and actors such as diplomacy
and diplomats.
In IR, global governance approaches have argued that diplomacy is
not only to be conceived an increasingly unimportant but also as a neg-
ative force in international politics. Acknowledging that diplomacy was
once an important institution in international relations, scholars subscrib-

ing to this view have argued that technological developments and the
complex interdependence that characterises the globalised world have
blurred the national-international divide and made diplomacy increasingly
irrelevant.32 Alongside this temporal argument, global governance literature
has mounted a normative argument against diplomacy as a barrier to interna-
tional co-operation. Diplomacy, so the proponents of this view argue, is an
instrument of control used by governments to limit international interactions.
In its essential structure, diplomacy remains state-centric, and the diplomatic
preference for order and stability following from this mandate is at odds
with attempts to promote equity and justice and extend the ambit of rules
and regulations across states. From this perspective an academic interest
in diplomacy is uninteresting because it assumes that diplomats as national
representatives defend particular national interests and that states’ diplomatic
practices remain fundamentally unchanged.33 Adding to this view, studying
diplomacy is also problematic because it re-enforces the notion that govern-
ments are the main actors in international affairs. Consequently, to the extent
that the global governance literature has been concerned with diplomacy, it
has focused on the development of an alternative diplomacy amongst NGOs
and other transnational actors considered to increase the prospect of an
international order transcending the state system.34 In Europe, this approach
has taken on a distinct and influential form with the Europeanisation liter-
ature. In the face of the accelerating integration dynamics brought about
by the Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht, public policy
researchers have explored the growing transnationalisation and regionali-
sation of decision-making in Europe—and in doing so have tended to look
past the foreign services.35
International history, too, has had its “transnational turn” and here a
similar marginalisation of the classical state representatives has taken place.
Focusing on the flow of people, ideas, and goods across national borders,
it has defined itself in contradiction to traditional inter-state history and

tended to write the statesmen and diplomats out of the international his-
torical narrative.36 In the context of European integration history, these
trends have found a poignant expression in the German historian’s, Wolfram
Kaiser’s, re-conceptualisation of the EC/EU as a transnational political society
and supranational political system, highlighting the importance of informal
transnational networks in the EC/EU political system and the emergence of
a European public sphere.37
It is evident that the identification of emerging transnational political
opportunity structures in the transnational and global governance literature
forms an important, historically founded challenge to the dominant under-
standings of diplomacy—not least in the highly integrated European region.
Recently, too, political scientists have come to renew the study of diplomacy
as they have combined insights from the English School with the insights
generated by transnational research perspectives and taken an interest in

the changing forms and functions of diplomatic practices in the increasingly
integrated bureaucratic and political environment in the EC/EU.
The theoretical essays and empirical studies that have emerged on
diplomacy in the EU over the last decade may be sub-divided into two
categories: one taking a largely political-functional view on the changing
patterns of diplomacy and another, and more recent, adopting a sociological
perspective on this issue.
At a general level, Anne-Marie Slaughter in A New World Order pin-
points the views of the first body of research.38 She points to how “the
executive” in foreign affairs has become increasingly complex and differen-
tiated and draws attention to the development of executive transnational
networks that exchange information, co-ordinate policy, collect and dis-
tribute best practices, and so on. Stressing the pioneering nature of EU in this
regard, Slaughter has argued that these executive networks are themselves
an organisational form of global governance. Her points have been substan-
tiated and developed by a number of scholars headed by the British political
scientist, Brian Hocking, placing their analytical focus on the interactions
between the traditional diplomatic actors and other actors operating in the
diplomatic environment. Arguing that foreign ministries have lost their tradi-
tional gate-keeping role as primary points of interface between the domestic
and the international environment, this literature contends that diplomats
have gained an alternative and equally important role: they have become
“boundary spanners” mediating and managing relations between the grow-
ing number of bureaucratic and non-governmental actors that have become
involved in the production and administration of international policy.39 This
process, so it is argued, is particularly prominent in the European diplo-
matic arena due not only to the density of intra-European relations in
general, but also to two specific responsibilities of foreign ministries in rela-
tion to the EC/EU: the co-ordination of sectorial ministries’ affairs with the
EC/EU and member state participation in the common European foreign and
security policy.40
The question of how the EU has changed diplomacy in the mem-
ber states has been elaborated by Jozef Bátora who, in doing so, picks
up on a key aspect of the English School conception of diplomacy as
both a national and an international institution, understanding diplomacy
as an institution of “a Janus-faced character with a national side anchored
in particular sovereign states and a transnational side anchored in the set
of interstate diplomatic principles and rules.”41 Bátora considers how the
process of European integration has changed this institution. In particular
he has reflected on the new co-operative bilateral diplomacy in the EC/EU
area and on how the new institutionalised interactions between diplomatic
representatives in the Brussels-based body of diplomats, the Comité des
représentants permanents (COREPER),42 and supranational actors such as
the Commission and the European Parliament has changed diplomacy in

Europe and created a particular intra-European mode of diplomacy. In the
same vein, a study by Mai’a K. Davis Cross has explored the European
diplomatic corps as a transnational epistemic community. Using as one of
her examples the role of the COREPER in the brokering of the Treaty of
Maastricht, she has demonstrated how they have often exercised their own,
collective, agency—separate from member state preferences.43
Whilst this literature has identified and characterised important new
aspects in contemporary diplomatic practice in the EU, it does not to any
considerable extent consider the motives and perceptions underlying these
new patterns of diplomatic action; neither does it address the question of
how this change was brought about. These are questions that have been
touched upon by Rebecca Adler-Nissen. Her empirical focus, too, is the
COREPER diplomats. Conducting interviews with diplomats working here,
she has explored how the traditional mainstay of diplomats’ work—the pro-
motion of national interests—has been subject to new forms of socialisation
in what has otherwise been considered an EU institutional setting operat-
ing along classical intergovernmental lines. Like Davis Cross, Adler-Nissen
sees diplomats as representing both European and national interests. But
she claims that the clear distinction between what is national and what is
European—underpinning the analysis of Davis Cross—fails fully to grasp
the character of the “late sovereign diplomacy” of post-1945 Europe. In this
arena, political and legal authorities are overlapping and the very construc-
tion of national positions takes place “as part of a struggle for distinction
and dominance in a field where the stakes have already been defined.”44
Diplomats in the EU, she argues, operate on the basis of a—more or
less conscious—shared understanding of working in a particular direction,
towards fulfilling the aims of the treaties of “an ever closer union.” It means,
she argues, that the politico-administrative elites in the EU member states
have been undergoing a “Europeanization of national identity.”45 Whilst
assuming that legitimate authority stems from non-elected supranational

bodies such as the Commission, as well as state-based elected and non-
elected representatives, they do not view European and national loyalties
as a zero-sum game; they develop “a more pragmatic and experienced idea
that one is influential if one can come up with common solutions.”46
The points made by Adler-Nissen are significant not only because they
are based on some of the first in-depth empirical research of EU diplo-
macy, but also because her attention to the quiet transformations and shifts
in diplomats’ identities and loyalties47 accords with a broader socio-cultural
turn in the study of diplomacy. Thus Neumann has argued in favour of—
and conducted—anthropological explorations into professional norms and
values of diplomacy, using the Norwegian Foreign Service as his analyti-
cal entry point. Picking up on developments in the English School towards
“sociologising” the study of diplomacy, he argues that diplomacy should be
explored as a social practice alongside other social practices of the every-

day life of its bearers. Neumann is, in his own words, interested in “the
people internal to it [diplomacy], that is, the people embodying the prac-
tices involved.”48 Similar trends are discernable in French social science
research, where sociological group portraits of different diplomatic groups
have appeared.49
Besides these broader mappings of the social structures of diplomatic
profession, these trends have also taken the form of investigations into
issues such as how technological developments have changed the work-
ing of diplomacy and the working life of diplomats and added a gender
perspective to the research on diplomacy.50 Whilst in history, there is no
parallel to the strong, new interest taken in diplomacy in the EU, the turn
to sociological perspectives on diplomacy is discernible in the form of stud-
ies of gender and technology.51 And whilst there is still a clear, national
focus in these studies, they have become increasingly more contextualised,
breaking the mould of the classical organisational history, and relating to
broader political developments in Europe—including in a few instances the
European integration process.
Over the last two decades a diverse historical scholarship has appeared
exploring how different national experiences of twentieth century interna-
tional politics have reflected on the various European diplomatic services.
For instance, German historical research from the 1990s onwards has centred
on exploring the role of German diplomats and the German Foreign Ministry
in the Third Reich and in the transformation from the Third Reich to the
Federal Republic.52 Similar attempts to come to terms with the role played
by diplomats in the fascist era and their subsequent diplomatic careers have
been made in Austria and Italy.53
In Great Britain historical research has taken an altogether different
turn. Here, national narrations of the history of the Foreign Office and
Diplomatic Service have been blossoming since the Cold War, and Britain
is home to the most extensive scholarship on one single European Foreign

Service.54 In general this scholarship has been interested in understanding
how diplomacy has been applied and developed under changing inter-
national conditions with a main focus on Great Britain’s decline from a
world Power to a European middle Power. Whilst sometimes including an
American or Commonwealth perspective, the EC/EU plays a minor role in
these narrations.55
French historiography, by contrast, reflects France’s key role in the cre-
ation of the EC/EU with studies on how European co-operation has affected
the Quai d’Orsay.56 Thus, recently, an edited volume has appeared that
takes a comparative historical view on how European co-operation has
affected European national administrations.57 Though not focusing exclu-
sively on the Foreign Services, this is the first publication since Zara Steiner’s
1982 book on foreign ministries attempting to study national diplomatic
services from a wider, comparative historical perspective. The volume also

contains one contribution by British historian, N. Piers Ludlow, which tran-
scends the comparative setup of the volume; he studies the creation and
role of the COREPER that has also been explored in recent political sci-
ence research on EU diplomacy. Ludlow’s argument is quite similar to the
ones developed by the political scientists. The COREPER, so he argues, did
not only serve to counter-balance and increase member state control over
the European Commission. Pre-empting—and mediating—the arguments of
Davis Cross and Adler-Nissen, he shows how the permanent representatives
served as vital communication channels, mediators, and “trouble shooters”
with a shared esprit de corps that mediated between the Commission and
member states as well as amongst member states.58
Picking up on the themes raised by this edited volume and tuning in to
Hocking and Bátora’s more functionally oriented explorations of diplomacy,
Ann-Christina L. Knudsen and Morten Rasmussen have recently explored the
emergence of the EC committee structure in the 1960s and its implication of
classical state representatives such as diplomats.59 Investigating the commit-
tee structure in the field of agricultural policy-making during this period,
they demonstrate how the emerging political system of the EC/EU created a
new and very broad interface between the EC and national administrations.
This interest in the new patterns of diplomacy within the EC/EU is
framed by a broader historical interest in the changes in intergovernmental
diplomatic interactions with the emergence of summitry—both in the form
of bilateral summits amongst heads of government60 and institutionalised
multilateral summits of the European Council and the G7.61 However, these
explorations are still largely nationally structured, focusing on the motives
and gains of the various governments involved in the summit diplomacy.
Thus there are some indications that historians are approaching the
issue of how the EC/EU has transformed diplomacy in Europe and, con-
trary to much previous historical research on diplomacy, these studies are
not carried out by specialised historians of diplomacy but by historians

working with European and international history more generally. This is
hardly a coincidence, considering that there has been a more general ten-
dency amongst these historians to consider more seriously the particular
supranational character of the EC/EU polity and bring the new transnational
perspectives together with the study of classical nation state representatives.
As Ludlow pointed out in a 2005 article: “political historians [. . .] need to
move beyond the national political framework which has long been their
preferred stamping ground, and adapt their techniques to the rather different
challenges posed by supranational decision making”62
Seen together with the broader interest in exploring diplomacy from a
sociological perspective amongst historians, it is evident that even if there
is no coherent or explicit elaboration of themes about how the EC/EU has
affected the history of diplomacy in terms of approaches, political science
and history are currently synchronous. Assuming that these perspectives

are of critical importance for picking up and understanding the changes
that diplomacy in Europe has been undergoing, there are some concluding
reflections to be made on what may be potential avenues for further, joint,
research.
There is a fundamental incongruence between the far reaching changes
that the EC/EU has brought to inter-state relations in Europe and the late
and scant academic attention that has been paid to the effects of these
changes for diplomatic norms, roles, and practices. Since the Second World
War, research on diplomacy in the two fields has been shaped by three dom-
inant theoretical perspectives that for a long time have placed the question of
how the supranational EC/EU construction transformed diplomacy at a blind
angle: a national perspective based in realist and liberal approaches that has
considered diplomacy primarily as a tool for promoting national interests in
intergovernmental bargaining processes; an international perspective rooted
in the English School focused mainly on diplomacy as an institution of inter-
national society more generally; and a transnational perspective concerned
primarily with non-state actors, networks and processes.
The idea of diplomacy as an international institution has bound together
states, and the awareness of the transnationalisation of twentieth century
international and European politics have recently served to inform and
enrich political science research on diplomacy in the EU. For long dominant
in historical research on diplomacy, the national perspective has recently
formed the basis of a historical scholarship that is increasingly adopting a
broad political and cultural approach when looking at diplomacy in Europe
and, gradually, taking an interest in the changes to the diplomatic trade
brought about by the EC/EU. In sum, the most recent research on diplomacy
in the EC/EU area reflects a broader inclination within both political science
and history to confront and disaggregate diplomacy as an analytical category
and to challenge, or at least problematise, what Robert D. Schulzinger has
termed “the professional mystique” of diplomacy.63
However, it still seems that further insights may be gained if historians

engaged more actively with the political science research on the transfor-
mative effects of the EC/EU on diplomacy. Considering that the explicit
ambition of this political science research is to understand the historical
transformations of diplomacy in relation to the changing forms of political
and legal authority in the EU, there is a striking absence of historical depth
to analysis in these studies. Whilst referring to the macro-historical shifts that
have taken place from the Westphalian state system, the investigations that
are carried out are almost exclusively contemporary in character. Or put dif-
ferently: whilst this literature has a lot to say about the ultimate effect of the
European integration processes on diplomacy, it has less to offer when it
comes to understanding how this result came about.
Therefore it seems evident that history has something to offer in
terms of meso- and micro-level diachronic studies of the developments in
diplomacy—both in relation to the scholarship that has concerned itself pri-

marily with changes in the functional and formal relationships between
diplomats and other national bureaucratic units and non-governmental
actors and the sociologically-inspired research on the emerging diplomatic
field around the Council and the COREPER. In relation to the first body of
research, historical studies would have a lot to offer in terms of exploring,
through single national or comparative studies, when and how these new
relationships developed, if and how they developed differently amongst
different member states, and who or what were the drivers of change in
these processes.
Likewise, adding a historical perspective to the sociological analysis of
the diplomatic field around the Council and the COREPER seems relevant.
Whilst existing studies have convincingly identified key features of this field,
questions such as when and how this particular pattern of social and political
interactions developed, how diplomats from new member states have been
socialised into it, and whether it has changed over time have not been
addressed. Neither has the question of whether and to which degree the
diplomatic practices of the EC/EU deviate from diplomatic practices in other
multilateral settings been the object of empirical research. As several studies
have demonstrated, increasingly complex international environments have
in general changed diplomatic roles and patterns of actions.64 Even if it
seems reasonable to assume that diplomacy in the supranational EU setting
carries certain distinctive features, it is not clear when EU diplomacy started
setting itself apart from diplomacy in other multilateral settings and what is
the nature and extent of these differences.
In engaging with issues of this kind historians also may have some-
thing to offer in terms of methodology. Most political science research
has been based either in open sources or diplomats’ self-interpretations
as obtained through interviews. Consulting the archives of the various
diplomatic services or the EC/EU might offer valuable insights into the
perceptions, motives, and conflicts of interest underlying these processes

of change. Also, it seems relevant to include in the research on the Council
and the COREPER, in a more systematic manner, the national dimension
that has so far been at the centre of historians’ attention. In keeping with
Bátora’s view of diplomacy as a two-faced organisational field—a transna-
tional side anchored in interstate diplomatic principles and rules; and a
national side anchored in particular sovereign states—it would seem rele-
vant to explore in more depth the relationship and exchanges between the
interlinked fields of EU diplomacy and national foreign services with their
divergent institutional cultures, norms, and rules. For instance, it could be
interesting to explore in more detail how diplomats coming from different
national milieus have responded and adapted to the Brussels-based diplo-
matic environment, whether the political capital they have built up in their
national home institutions and in alternative international diplomatic settings
are equally transferable to the EU diplomatic field, and how their different
starting points and self-perceptions have shaped their interactions with this
environment.
Finally it seems relevant to look at the mirror image of these processes:
investigating how, in the context of the national foreign services, EU assign-
ments were perceived and integrated into and affected diplomatic career
patterns; exploring how the building up and maintenance of EU exper-
tise was secured in these various institutional contexts through recruitment,
training practices, and diplomatic postings; and looking into the informal
Europeanisation processes that must have developed as circulation and
integration between these different diplomatic fields increased. If histori-
ans would engage actively with the theoretical developments in political
science relating to the EU and diplomacy, this would not only serve to
renew diplomatic history by opening up a field of study that so far has
not been cultivated. It would also bring it in synch with broader research
trends in international and European political history and enrich political sci-
ence research by adding temporal and contextual perspectives so far largely
overlooked.
NOTES
I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their many helpful comments on a
previous version of this article. The article has been written as part of a postdoctoral research project
funded by the Danish Research Council for Culture and Communication.
1. One prominent example is Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, 1994). Cf. Alan James,
“Diplomacy,” Review of International Studies, 19(1993), p. 92.
2. For similar distinctions, see: Adam Watson, Diplomacy. The Dialogue between States (London,
1982); Sasson Sofer, “Old and New Diplomacy: a Debate Revisited,” Review of International Studies,
Volume 14, Number 3(1988), p. 196; Jan Melissen, “Introduction,” in Jan Melissen, ed., Innovation in
Diplomatic Practice (Houndsmill, Basingstoke, 1999), p. xvii.
3. Jozef Bátora. “Does the European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy?,” Cliengendal
Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, 87(2003), p. 20.
4. James Der Derian, On Diplomacy. A Genealogy of Western Estrangement (Oxford, 1987), 16.
Also see Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy (New York, 2005), p. 12–3; Sofer,
“Old and New,” p. 196; Barry H. Steiner, “Diplomacy and International Theory,” Review of International
Studies, Volume 30, Number 4(2004), pp. 493–94.
5. Paul Sharp, “Who Needs Diplomats? The Problem of Diplomatic Representation,” International
Journal, 52(1997), p. 615.
6. James, “Diplomacy,” p. 95.
7. Barry Buzan, C. Jones, and R. Little. The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism
(New York, 1993), p. 40. Cf. Jönsson and Hall, Essence, p. 17.
8. Jönsson and Hall, Essence, p. 17–8.
9. Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to
Maastricht (London, 1998). Cf. Rebecca Adler-Nissen, “Late Sovereign Diplomacy,” Hague Journal of
Diplomacy, Volume 4, Number 2(2009), p. 123–24.
10. Patrick Finney, “Introduction: What is International History?” in idem., ed., Palgrave Advances
in International History (New York 2004), p. 15.
11. For some excellent examples of this approach, see Sally Marks, The Illusion of Peace.
International Relations in Europe, 1918–1933 (London, 1976); Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction
of Western Europe 1945–1951 (London, 1984). Cf. Paul Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy:
Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865–1980 (London, 1981).
12. L.V. Ferraris, L’amministrazione centrale del Ministereo degli Esteri italiano nel suo sviluppo
storico (Florence, 1955); Klaus Kjølsen et al., Den danske udenrigstjeneste 1770–1970, Volumes 1–2,
(Copenhagen, 1970); H.G. Sasse, Hundert Jahre Auswärtiges Amt 1870–1970 (Bonn, 1970); Jean
Baillou, ed., Les affaires étrangères et le corps diplomatique français, Volume 2: 1870–1980 (Paris,
1984); Roger Bullen, ed., The Foreign Office, 1782–1982 (Frederick, MD, 1984); Vincenzo Pellegrini,
L’amministrazione centrale dall’Unitá alla Republica. La strutture e i dirigenti, Volume 1: Il Ministero
degli Affari Esteri (Bologna, 1992); Bert van der Zwan, Bob de Graaff and Duco Hellema, eds., De
Nederlandse ministers van buitenlandse zaken in de twintigste eeuw (Den Haag, 1999). In the case
of Germany, there are also studies attending to the re-establishment of the German Foreign Ministry
after the Second World War: M. Overesch, Gesamtdeutsche Illusion und westdeutsche Realität. Von
den Vorbereitungen für einen deutschen Friedensvertrag zur Gründung des Auswärtigen Amts der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1946–1949/51 (Düsseldorf, 1978); H. Piontkowitz, Das deutsche Büro
für Friedensfragen 1947–49. Ein Vorläufer des Auswärtigen Amts im Widerspiel der Kräfte (Göttingen,
1978); S. Tunberg, C.-F. Palmstierna et al., Histoire de l’administration des affaires étrangères de la Suede
(Uppsala, 1940). This is a genre that has effectively disappeared in the last two decades; however, see:
Iver B. Neumann and Halvard Leira, Aktiv og avventende. Utenrikstjenestens liv 1905–2005 (Oslo, 2005).
13. Zara Steiner, ed., The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World (London, 1982). Cf. Zara
Steiner, “Foreign Services and Modern Diplomacy: Suggestions for a Comparative Approach,” Cambridge
Review of International Affairs, 3(1989), p. 3–13.
14. Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Introduction à l’histoire des relations interna-
tionales (Paris, 1954).
15. For introductions to the French history of international relations, see Georges-Henri Soutou,
“Die französische Schule der Geschichte internationaler Beziehungen,” in Wilfried Loth and Jürgen
Osterhammel, eds., Internationale Geschichte. Themen—Ergebnisse—Aussichten (München, 2000),
31–44, here in particular 39; Robert Frank, “Penser historiquement les relations international,” Annuaire
français de relations internationales, 4(2003), pp. 42–9.
16. For examples of this approach, see: Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Histoire diplomatique de 1919 a
nos jours (Paris, 1953) (published in eleven editions from 1953 to 1993); Jean Doise and Maurice Vaïsse,
Politique étrangère de la France: diplomatic et outil militaire, 1871–1991 (Paris, 1987); Rainer Hudemann
and Georges-Henri Soutou, eds., Eliten in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert:
Strukturen und Beziehungen/Élites en France et en Allemagne aux XIXème et XXème siècles: structures
et relations, Volume 1 (München, 1994); Laurence Badel and Stanislas Jeannesson, eds., Diplomaties en
renouvellement. Actes de la journée d’études du 3 octobre 2008 à l’Université Paris-I Panthéon-Sorbonne
(Paris, 2009). Currently, the young French historian, Matthieu Osmont, is working on a PhD thesis on Les
diplomates français et l’Allemagne (1955–1990): (http://centre-histoire.sciences-po.fr/fichiers_pdf/fiches
_doctorants/ OSMONTMATTHIEU.pdf.
17. Soutou, “französische Schule,” pp. 31–32.
18. For instance, Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in
the Theory of International Politics (London, 1966)
19. Iver B. Neumann, “The English School on Diplomacy,” Clingendael Discussion Papers in
Diplomacy, 79(2002) on which the following is based. The working paper has later been published
as: Iver B. Neumann: “The English School on Diplomacy,” in Christer Jönsson and Robert Langhorne,
eds., Diplomacy, Volume 1 (London, 2004), pp. 92–116.
20. See in particular Herbert Butterfield, “The New Diplomacy and Historical Diplomacy” and
Martin Wight, “Why is there no International Theory?,” both in Wight and Butterfield, Diplomatic
Investigations; Martin Wight (Hedley Bull, ed.), Systems of States (Leicester, 1977).
21. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics (London, 1977).
22. Derian, On Diplomacy; Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State. Culture, Social
Identity and Institutional Rationality in International Relations (Princeton, NJ, 1999).
23. A testament to the revitalisation of research on diplomacy is the three-volume collection of
writings in the field: Jönsson and Langhorne, Diplomacy.
24. Jönsson and Hall, Essence, p. 25.
25. Iver B. Neumann, Diplomats and Diplomacy: An Anthropological View (PhD Dissertation,
University of Oslo, 2008), p. 130.
26. Neumann, Diplomats and Diplomacy; Costas Constantinou, On the Way to Diplomacy
(Minneapolis, 1996); Jönsson and Hall, Essence; Sharp, “Diplomats”; idem., “For Diplomacy:
Representation and the Study of International Relations,” International Studies Review, 1(1999),
pp. 33–57; idem., Diplomatic Theory of International Relations (New York, 2009), Paul Sharp and
Geoffrey Wisemann, eds., The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society (Basingstoke,
2007).
27. Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (New York, 1939); Ernest Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice
(London, New York, 1917). Cf. Sharp, “For Diplomacy,” pp. 624–29.
28. For a prominent example of one such programme, see Clingendael Diplomatic Studies
Programme: http://www.clingendael.nl/cdsp/); Sharp, “For Diplomacy,” pp. 44–45. For a critical
reflection on this development, see James, “Diplomacy.”
29. Wilfried Bolewski, Diplomacy and International Law in Globalized Relations (Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2007), p. 26. For a similar example, see Charles Chatterjee: International Law and Diplomacy
(London, 2007).
30. See in particular Butterfield, “New Diplomacy”; Wight, “International Theory”; idem., Systems.
31. Watson, Diplomacy.
32. Sharp, “For Diplomacy,” pp. 43–44; Brian Hocking, “Foreign Ministries: Redefining
the Gatekeeper Role,” in Brian Hocking, ed., Foreign Ministries. Change and Adaptation
(Basingstoke/New York, 1999) 4–5; Andrew F. Cooper, Brian Hocking, and William Maley, “Diplomacy
and Global Governance: Locating Patterns of (Dis)Connection,” in Andrew F. Cooper, Brian Hocking,
and William Maley, eds., Global Governance and Diplomacy. Worlds Apart? (Basingstoke, New York,
2008), pp. 2–3.
33. Adler-Nissen, “Late Sovereign Diplomacy,” pp. 125–26.
34. Cooper, Hocking, and Maley, “Diplomacy,” pp. 1–3.
35. For an overview of this literature, see Simon Hix and Claus Goetz, “Introduction: European
Integration and National Political Systems,” in Klaus Goetz and Simon Hix, eds., Europeanised Politics?
European Integration and National Political Systems (London, 2001), pp. 1–26.
36. Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht and Morten Rasmussen, eds., The History of the European Union.
Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950–72 (Oxford, New York, 2009), pp. 189–205; Kiran
K. Patel: “Überlegungen zu einer transnationalen Geschichte,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 52
(2004), pp. 626–45.
37. For instance, Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union
(Cambridge, New York, 2007).
38. Anne-Marie Slaughter, New World Order (Princeton, NJ, 2004).
39. Brian Hocking, Localizing Foreign Policy: Non Central Governments and Multilayered
Diplomacy (London, 1993); idem., “Foreign Ministries.”
40. Brian Hocking and David Spence, Foreign Ministries in the European Union. Integrating
Diplomats (New York, 2002), in particular Brian Hocking, “Introduction: Gatekeepers and Boundary-
Spanners—Thinking about Foreign Ministries in the European Union,” p. 2; Brian Hocking and
David Spence: “Towards a European Diplomatic System?,” Clingendael Discussion Paper in Diplomacy,
98(2005); Jozef Bátora and Brian Hocking, “Bilateral Diplomacy in the European Union,” Towards ‘post-
modern’ Patterns?,” Clingendael Discussion Paper in Diplomacy, 111(2008); Bátora, “European Union.”
In 2009, a special issue of the Hague Journal of Diplomacy was devoted to exploring the changes that
the EC/EU has brought about for the institution of diplomacy. See Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Volume
4, Number 2(2009).
41. Bátora, “European Union,” p. 1.
42. COREPER is made up by the head of mission from the EU member states in Brussels. Its role
is to prepare the meetings of the ministerial Council of the European Union.
43. Mai´a K. Davis Cross, The European Diplomatic Community. Diplomats and International
Cooperation from Westphalia to Maastricht (Basingstoke, New York, 2007), pp. 139–78 Cf. Jönsson and
Hall, Essence, pp. 160–61.
44. Adler-Nissen, “Late Sovereign Diplomacy,” pp. 132.
45. Ibid., p. 130.
46. Ibid., p. 131.
47. See also: Rebecca Adler-Nissen,”The Diplomacy of Opting Out: A Bourdieudian Approach to
National Integration Strategies,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 46(2008), pp. 663–84.
48. Neumann, “English School,” quote: 20; idem., “To be a Diplomat,” International Studies
Perspectives, 6(2005), pp. 72–93; idem., “Sublime diplomacy,” Millennium, 34(2006), pp. 865–88; idem.,
“‘A Speech That the Entire Ministry May Stand for‘, or: Why Diplomats Never Produce Anything New,”
International Political Sociology, Volume 1, Number 2(2007), pp. 183–200; idem., “The Body of the
Diplomat,” European Journal of International Relations, 14(2008), pp. 671–95. See also Costas M.
Constantinou, “On Homo-Diplomacy,” Space and Culture, 9(2006), pp. 351–64; Sasson Sofer, “Being
a Pathetic Hero in International Politics: The Diplomat as a Historical Actor,” Diplomacy and Statecraft,
12(2001), pp. 107–112.
49. Meredith Kingston de Leusse, Diplomatie. Une sociologie des ambassadeurs, (Paris, 1998);
Marie-Christine Kessler, “Les ambassadeurs: une élite contestée?,” in Vida Azimi, ed., Les élites
administratives en France et en Italie (Paris, 2006), pp. 171–85.
50. See Jozef Bátora, Foreign Ministries and the Information Revolution: Going Virtual? (Leiden,
Boston, 2008); Richard Grant. “The Democratization of Diplomacy: Negotiating with the Internet,”
Clingendael Discussion Paper in Diplomacy, 100(2005). Then Yves Denechere, “La place et le rôle des
femmes dans la politique étrangère de la France contemporaine,” Vingtième Siècle, Volume78, Number
2(2003), pp. 89–98; Neumann, “Body.”
51. Sir Alan Campbell: “From Carbon Paper to E-mail: Changes in Methods in the Foreign Office,
1950–2000,” Contemporary British History, Volume 18, Number 3(2004), pp. 168–76; S. Eldon, From Quill
Pen to Satellite: Foreign Ministries in the Information Age (London, 1994); David Paul Nickels, Under
the Wire: How the Telegraph Changed Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA, 2003); Helen McCarthy, “Petticoat
Diplomacy: The Admission of Women to the British Foreign Service c.1919–1946,” Twentieth Century
British History, Volume 20, Number 3(2009), pp. 285–321; Philip Nash, “America’s First Female Chief
of Mission: Ruth Bryan Owen, Minister to Denmark, 1933–36,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, 16(2005),
pp. 57–72.
52. Hans Jürgen Döscher, Verschworene Gesellschaft: das Auswärtiges Amt unter Adenauer zwis-
chen Neubeginn und Kontinuität (Berlin, 1995); Claus M. Müller: Relaunching German Diplomacy. The
Auswärtiges Amt in the 1950s (Münster, 1997); Eckart Conze, Norbert Frei, Peter Hayes, and Moshe
Zimmermann, Das Amt und die Vergangenheit. Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der
Bundesrepublik (München, 2010).
53. Rudolf Agstner, Gertrude Enderle-Burcel, and Michaela Follner, Österreichs Spitzendiplomaten
zwischen Kaiser und Kreisky. Biografisches Handbuch der Diplomaten des Höheren Auswärtigen Dienstes
1918–1959 (Wien, 2009); Bruna Bagnato, “Le cas du ministère des Affaires étrangères italien après
la Deuxième Guerre mondiale,” in Élizabeth du Réau, ed., Europe des elites? Europe des peuples? La
construction de l’espace européen, 1945–1960 (Paris, 1998), pp. 77–92.
54. Anthony Adamthwaite, “Overstretched and Overstrung: Eden, the Foreign Office and the
Making of Policy,” in Ennio di Nolfo, eds., Power in Europe? Great Britain, France, Germany and
Italy and the Origins of the EEC 1952–57, Volume 2(Berlin, 1992), pp. 19–42; Gaynor Johnson, ed.,
The Foreign Office and British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (Oxford, New York, 2005); Michael
Dockrill and Brian McKercher, eds., Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy,
1890–1951[a festschrift for Zara Steiner on her retirement] (Cambridge, 1996); Lorna Lloyd, Diplomacy
with a Difference: The Commonwealth Office of High Commissioner, 1880–2006 (Leiden, 2007); John
Zametica, ed., British Officials and British Foreign Policy, 1945–50 (Leicester, New York, 1990). Alongside
this scholarship, more popular accounts have also appeared. See for instance: Edward R. Dudley: True
Brits: Inside the Foreign Office (London, 1994); John Dickie: The New Mandarins: How British Foreign
Policy Works (London, 2004).
55. For the most recent and academically stimulating example of this genre, see: John W. Young,
Twentieth Century Diplomacy: A Case Study of British Practice 1963–76, (Cambridge, 2008). For two
exceptions, see Helen Parr: “Gone Native: the Foreign Office and Harold Wilson’s Policy towards the
EEC, 1964–1967,” in Oliver Daddow, ed., Harold Wilson and European Integration: Britain’s Second
Application to Join the EEC (London, 2002), 75–94; Elisabeth Kane, “Europe or Atlantic Community?
The Foreign Office and ‘Europe’: 1955–57,” Journal of European Integration History, Volume 3, Number
2(1997), pp. 83–98.
56. Jean Claude Allain and Marc Auffret, “Le ministère français des Affaires étrangères. Crédits
et effectifs pendant la IIIe République,” Relations internationals, 32(1982), pp. 405–46; Ghislain
Sayer, “Le Quai d’Orsay et la construction de la Petite Europe: l’avènement de la Communauté
économique européenne, 1955–1957,” Relations internationals, 101(2000), pp. 89–105; Raphaële Ulrich-
Pier, “Antiféderalistes et féderaliste: le Quai d’Orsay face à la construction européenne,” in Michel Catala,
ed., Cinquante ans aprés la declaration Schuman. Histoire de la construction européenne (Nantes, 2001),
pp. 103–18.
57. Laurence Badel, Stanislas Jeannesson, and N. Piers Ludlow, Les administrations nationales et
la construction européenne. Une approche historique (1919–1975) (Bruxelles, 2005).
58. N. Piers Ludlow: “Mieux que six ambassadeurs. L’emergence du COREPER durant les premières
années de la CEE,” in Badel, Jeannesson and Ludlow), Les administrations nationals; A revised version
of the article has been published as “The European Commission and the Rise of Coreper: A Controlled
Experiment” in Kaiser, Leucht, and Rasmussen, History, pp. 189–205.
59. Ann-Christina L. Knudsen and Morten Rasmussen: “A European Political System in the Making
1958–1970. The Relevance of Emerging Committee Structures,” Journal of European Integration History,
14(2008), pp. 51–68.
60. David Reynolds, Summits. Six Meetings that Shaped the Twentieth Century (New York, 2007).
61. Harold James, Rambouillet, 15. November 1975. Die Globalisierung der Wirtschaft (Munich,
1997); Johannes von Karcewski, “Weltwirtschaft ist unser Schicksal” Helmut Schmidt und die Schaffung
der Weltwirtschaftsgipfel (Bonn, 2008); John W. Young, “‘The Summit is Dead. Long Live the European
Council’: Britain and the Question of Regular Leaders’ Meetings in the European Community, 1973–1975,”
Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 4(2009) pp. 319–38; Reynolds, Summits, pp. 401–35. Emmanuel Mourlon-
Druol however links the new summit diplomacy to the changing EC and international policy environment
in the 1970s more broadly; see Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, “Filling the EEC Leadership Vacuum? The
Creation of the European Council in 1974,” Cold War History 10(2010), pp. 315–39 and idem., “The
Victory of the Intergovernmental Method? The Emergence of the European Council in the Community’s
Institutional Set-Up (1974–1977),” in Daniela Preda and Daniele Pasquinucci, eds., The Road Europe
Travelled Along. The Evolution of EEC/EU’s institutions and policies (Bruxelles, 2010).
62. N. Piers Ludlow, “The Making of the CAP: Towards a Historical Analysis of the EU’s First Major
Policy,” Contemporary European History, 14(2005), p. 371. Cf. Kiran K. Patel, Europäisierung wider
Willen: die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Agrarintegration der EWG, 1955–1973 (Munich 2009).
63. Robert D. Schulzinger, The Making of the Diplomatic Mind (Middletown, CT, 1975), in
particular: pp. 101–23.
64. Bertrand Badie, Guillaume Devin, eds., Le multilatéralisme: nouvelles formes de l’action
internationale (Paris, 2007); Samy Cohen, Les diplomates: négocier dans un monde chaotique (Paris,
2002).

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Madariaga Paper – Vol. 4, No. 7 (Apr., 2011)

This paper examines the role of parliamentary diplomacy as part of

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What is Parliamentary Diplomacy?

1 | Madariaga Paper – On the Value of Parliamentary Diplomacy (Apr., 2011)

Intra-State Parlomacy Political Parties

Inter-State Parlomacy Delegations Delegations

Political Parties Political Parties

2 | Madariaga Paper – On the Value of Parliamentary Diplomacy (Apr., 2011)

Inter-Regional Parlomacy Delegations Delegations

Political Parties Political Parties

Parliamentary Procedures (Committee hearings, votes, statements)

Parliamentary Interaction (Delegation visits, UN General Assembly)

Political Party Interaction (intra-party debate, cabinet meetings)

Parliamentary Duties (Observer Missions, Citizen Interaction, Media)

Building mutual understanding and dialogue

Sharing experiences and expertise

The Value of Parlomacy

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Never Talk to Strangers? On Historians,

Diplomacy is an institution that has undergone tremendous

change over the last century—not least in relation to the new,

Diplomacy is one of the oldest instruments of statecraft and one of the

or global governance research perspective, which in its earliest manifesta-

Whilst there is a certain chronological pattern to the different concep-

history were equally disinterested in diplomacy. It was a subject that had, in

formal international and European decision-making processes.11 However, it

of a “diplomatic culture” and claimed that diplomacy symbolised the exis-

constituted by “a relatively stable collection of social practices consisting of

sovereign states and their interests, diplomats have often simultaneously

flexibility and adaptability diplomacy will emerge as an instrument for this

to enrich it. This is the transnational research perspective. As pointed out

once an important institution in international relations, scholars subscrib-

it has defined itself in contradiction to traditional inter-state history and

generated by transnational research perspectives and taken an interest in

the Commission and the European Parliament has changed diplomacy in

assuming that legitimate authority stems from non-elected supranational

explored as a social practice alongside other social practices of the every-

is home to the most extensive scholarship on one single European Foreign

services from a wider, comparative historical perspective. The volume also

not carried out by specialised historians of diplomacy but by historians

and history are currently synchronous. Assuming that these perspectives

However, it still seems that further insights may be gained if historians

diplomacy—both in relation to the scholarship that has concerned itself pri-

perceptions, motives, and conflicts of interest underlying these processes

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