Francisco, Jr. vs.

House of Representatives (2003)

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention,

vs.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE

VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE
FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
G.R. No. 160261 | 415 SCRA 44 | November 10, 2003 | En Banc | Justice Carpio-Morales

Impeachment proceedings are initiated by filing of a verified impeachment complaint

FACTS:

On 2 June 2003, Former Pres. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against C.J. Davide, Jr.,
among others.¹ The House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the complaint on 22 Oct 2003
for being insufficient in substance. The Committee Report to that effect has not been sent to the
House in plenary. The following day and just nearly five months since the filing of the first
complaint, a second impeachment complaint² was filed by respondents house representatives.
Thus arose the instant petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against the
respondents House of Representatives, et. al., (the House) most of which contend that the filing
of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 3(5), Art. XI of the
Const. which provides: “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.” The House argues: the one year bar could
not have been violated as the first impeachment complaint has not been initiated. Sec. 3(1) of
the same is clear in that it is the House, as a collective body, which has “the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment.” “Initiate” could not possibly mean “to file” because filing
can, as Sec. 3 of the same provides, only be accomplished in three ways, to wit: (1) by a verified
complaint for impeachment by any member of the House; or (2) by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the
House.³ Since the House, as a collective body, has yet to act on the first impeachment
complaint, the first complaint could not have been “initiated”.

ISSUE:

Is the second impeachment complaint barred under Section 3(5) of Art. XI of the Constitution?

RULING:

Yes. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly revealed that the framers
intended “initiation” to start with the filing of the complaint.⁴ The vote of one-third of the
House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which
was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint. [Thus, under the one year bar on
initiating impeachment proceedings,] no second verified complaint may be accepted and
referred to the Committee on Justice for action [within one year from filing of the first verified
impeachment complaint]. To the argument that only the House as a body can initiate
impeachment proceedings because Sec. 3(1) of Art. XI of the Const. says “The House x x x shall
have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment,” this is a misreading and is
contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating “impeachment cases” with
“impeachment proceeding.”⁵’⁶

¹ On the ground of culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes.

² On the ground of the alleged results of the legislative inquiry conducted on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by C.J. Davide, Jr. of the Judiciary Development Fund.

³ Const., Art. XI, Sec. 3: x x x x x x x x x

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof x x
x

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either
affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override
its contrary resolution. x x x x x x x x x x x x

⁴  The well-settled principles of constitutional construction:

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should
be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. The object is to ascertain the
reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the
words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. It may also be safely
assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers.

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.

Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together. (Francisco,
Jr. v. House of Representatives, et al., G.R. No. 160261 [2003])

⁵ Following the principle of reddendo singula singulis, the term “cases” must be distinguished
from the term “proceedings.” An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be
decided by the Senate. Under Sec.3(3), Art. XI, the House, by a vote of one-third of all its
members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has “exclusive
power” to initiate all cases of impeachment. On the other hand, the impeachment proceeding
is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the
end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. (Ibid.)

⁶ There was a preliminary issue on whether the power of judicial review extends to those
arising from impeachment proceedings. The Court ruled in the affirmative. Our Constitution,
though vesting in the House of Reps the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,
provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power: the manner of filing, required
vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official (Art.
XI, Secs. 3 (2), (3), (4) and (5)). Where there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies, our courts are dutybound to examine whether the
branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits pursuant to its
expanded certiorari jurisdiction under Art. VIII, Sec. 1: the power to correct any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. (Id.)

N.B. There are two types of political questions: (1) justiciable and (2) non-justiciable. The
determination of one from the other lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. (Id.)

G.R. No. 167614               March 24, 2009

ANTONIO M. SERRANO, Petitioner,

vs.

Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW NAVIGATION CO.,

INC., Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS:

The petitioner, Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, was hired by Gallant Maritime

Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a Philippine Overseas

Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment.

During the petitioner’s departure for work, he was constrained to accept a downgraded

employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00,

upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by

the end of April 1998. The downgrade is contrary to the Chief Officer post that he initially

signed up for. (with higher salary rate).

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence,

petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May

26, 1998.

Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months, but at the time of his

repatriation he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an

unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days. He then filed with the Labor

Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of

his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73

LA Decision – Declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary

benefits. As to the benefits, the LA based his computation on the salary period of three months

only

Petitioner appealed to the NLRC citing that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to

their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts

Respondents also appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to question

the finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed.

NLRC – The NLRC corrected the LA’s computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to

petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the

constitutionality of the subject clause. Motion was denied.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge

against the subject clause.

CA- Dismissed petitioner’s motion due to technicality. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the

reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised

by petitioner.

Petitioner raised these main grounds to the Supreme Court:

1. CA erred  to not acknowledge the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner on the

constitutionality of said law, which unreasonably, unfairly and arbitrarily limits payment of

the award for back wages of overseas workers to three (3) months

The law in question is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 – Migrant Workers Act, to wit:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. – x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid

or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full

reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his

salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every

year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

The Arguments of Petitioner

Petitioner contends that the subject clause is unconstitutional because

(1) it unduly impairs the freedom of OFWs to negotiate for and stipulate in their overseas

employment contracts a determinate employment period and a fixed salary package and
(2) It also impinges on the equal protection clause, for it treats OFWs differently from local

Filipino workers (local workers) by putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum salary to which

OFWs are entitled in case of illegal dismissal, while setting no limit to the same monetary

award for local workers when their dismissal is declared illegal; that the disparate treatment

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-

impairment of contracts?

2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1,Article III of the Constitution, and Section

18,Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector

HELD:

NO.  Petitioner’s claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his

contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is not

tenable.

Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides:

“No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.”

The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a

prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected.

As to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part

thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application

to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by

enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.

2. YES. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall

any person be denied the equal protection of the law.

Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without

distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.

Such rights are not absolute. To be valid, the classification must comply with these

requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the

law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of

the class.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions

translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by

workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal

degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the

burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.

CASE DIGEST: DATU KIDA V. SENATE (G.R. NO. 196271)

G.R. No. 196271 : February 28, 2012 | DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY, AND IN REPRESENTATION OF MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF
AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN,
JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M.
KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, AND BASSAM ALUH
SAUPI,Petitioners, v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THRU SPEAKER
FELICIANO BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THRU ITS CHAIRMAN,
SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., SECRETARY OF BUDGET, AND
ROBERTO TAN, TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G.R. NO. 196305 | BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner, v. SIXTO BRILLANTES, IN HIS

CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FLORENCIO ABAD,
JR. IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND FELICIANO
BELMONTE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,Respondents.

G.R. NO. 197221 | REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner, v. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., IN
HIS CAPACITY AS THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondents.

G.R. NO. 197280 | ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN CONDING CANA, AND
PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN), Petitioners, v.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN, SIXTO BRILLANTES,
JR., HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, AND HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G.R. NO. 197282 | ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THROUGH EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.

G.R. NO. 197392 | LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, v. THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.

G.R. NO. 197454 | JACINTO V. PARAS, Petitioner, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.

OCHOA, JR., AND THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.

MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents-Intervenor. BRION, J.:

FACTS: These cases are motions for reconsideration assailing the SCs Decision dated October
18, 2011, where it upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the
constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the regional elections in
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on
the second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the
Presidents power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions
upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials.

ISSUES:

1. Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with
national and local elections? 

2. Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to comply with the
supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements? 

3. Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional? 

4. Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM? 

5. Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and
representative nature of ARMM regional legislative and executive offices? 

6. Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the President's supervisory

powers over autonomous regions?

HELD: The constitutionality of RA No. 10153 is upheld.

POLITICAL LAW: synchronization of ARMM

1. The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly there
was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective officials from the President down to the
municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or
shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting the
importance of this constitutional mandate. That the ARMM elections were not expressly
mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization cannot be
interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of
synchronization. The ARMM had not yet been officially organized at the time the Constitution
was enacted and ratified by the people. Keeping in mind that a constitution is not intended to
provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations for as
long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign, a constitution should be
construed in the light of what actually is a continuing instrument to govern not only the
present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the principles
embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of its adoption, a
constitution must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of
time, to be progressive and not static.

2. A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM
elections; it does not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In providing
for the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do not
amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In
fixing the date of the ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA
No. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.
Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, it is well-settled that the
supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 is
unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws.

Similarly, the petitioners contention that the plebiscite requirement applies to all amendments
of RA No. 9054 for being an unreasonable enlargement of the plebiscite requirement set forth
in the Constitution is incorrect. Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that the
creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. This means that only
amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of
autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which
Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification through a plebiscite.

3. The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of Section 7(1), Article VII of RA
No. 9054, which allows the regional officials to remain in their positions in a holdover capacity.
The petitioners essentially argue that the ARMM regional officials should be allowed to remain
in their respective positions until the May 2013 elections since there is no specific provision in
the Constitution which prohibits regional elective officials from performing their duties in a
holdover capacity.

The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the framers
of the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within which all elective local
officials can occupy their offices. Since elective ARMM officials are also local officials, they are,
thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes
irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a
holdover capacity. Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend
the three-year term limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of
three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and
cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.

4.The Constitution has merely empowered the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.Although the legislature, under the
Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the
power to postpone elections to another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and
circumstances provided for in the law. Both Section 5 and Section 6 of BP 881 address instances
where elections have already been scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to be
suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances, such as violence, fraud,
terrorism, and other analogous circumstances. In contrast, the ARMM elections were
postponed by law, in furtherance of the constitutional mandate of synchronization of national
and local elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any of the circumstances contemplated
by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881.

5. The President derives his power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government from
law, it falls under the classification of presidential appointments covered by the second
sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the Presidents appointment power thus
rests on clear constitutional basis.

6. There is no incompatibility between the President's power of supervision over local

governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the
specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs. The power of supervision is defined as the
power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance
with law. This is distinguished from the power of control or the power of an officer to alter or
modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.

The petitioners apprehension regarding the President's alleged power of control over the OICs
is rooted in their belief that the President's appointment power includes the power to remove
these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be
beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the President and not of the people.
This is incorrect. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the Governor,
Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will
remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections.
Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the
appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners fears in this regard are more apparent
than real.

DENIED.

Tañada v. Angara G.R. No. 118295 | May 2, 1997

Petitioners: Wigberto Tanada, et al.

Respondents: Edgardo Angara, et al.

Summary: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Philippines acceding to the World
Trade Organization for being violative of provisions which are supposed to give preference to
Filipino workers and economy and on the ground that it infringes legislative and judicial
power. The WTO, through it provisions on “most favored nation” and national treatment,
require that nationals and other member countries are placed in the same footing in terms of
products and services. However, the Court brushed off these contentions and ruled that the
WTO is constitutional. Sections 10 and 12 of Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony)
should be read in relation to Sections 1 and 13 (promoting the general welfare). Also, Section
10 is self-executing only to “rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony” but not every aspect of trade and commerce. There are balancing provisions in the
Constitution allowing the Senate to ratify the WTO agreement. Also, the Constitution doesn’t
rule out foreign competition. States waive certain amount of sovereignty when entering into
treaties.

Facts:

 This case questions the constitutionality of the Philippines being part of the World Trade
Organization, particularly when President Fidel Ramos signed the Instrument of Ratification
and the Senate concurring in the said treaty.
 Following World War 2, global financial leaders held a conference in Bretton Woods to
discuss global economy. This led to the establishment of three great institutions: International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), International Monetary Fund and
International Trade Organization.
 However, the ITO failed to materialized. Instead, there was the General Agreement on
Trades and Tariffs. It was on the Uruguay Round of the GATT that the WTO was then
established.
 The WTO is an institution regulating trade among nations, including the reduction of
tariff and barriers.
 Petitioners filed a case assailing the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the
1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos, to give preference to qualified Filipinos and to promote the preferential
use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.”
 It is petitioners’ position that the “national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the
WTO Agreement “place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as
Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First”  policy of the
Constitution.  They allegedly render meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by
Filipinos.”

Issue 1: Does the petition present a justiciable controversy? YES!

In seeking to nullify the Senate’s act as being unconstitutional, the petition no doubt raises a
justiciable controversy. It becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute

Issue 2: Do the provisions of the WTO Agreement contravene Section 19, Article II and Section
10 & 12, Artilce XII of the 1987 Constitution? NO!

Petitioners’ Contentions:

 Petitioners argue that the “letter, spirit and intent” of the Constitution mandating
“economic nationalism” are violated by the so-called “parity provisions” and “national
treatment” clauses scattered in parts of WTO Agreement
o This is in view of the most-favored nation clause (MFN) of the TRIMS (trade-related
investment measures), TRIPS (Trade Related aspects of intellectual property rights), Trade in
Services, and par. 4 of Article III of GATT 1994.
o “shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of
national origin”
 Sec. 19, Art II:The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.
 Sec. 10, Art XII: Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.
 Sec. 12, Art XII:  The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.”

Ruling:

 These provisions are not self-executing

o Merely guides in the exercise of judicial review and in making laws.
 Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII should be read and understood in relation to the other
sections in said article, especially Sec. 1 and 13:
o A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
o A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services
o An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life
 The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or
not.  Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitutio n to
allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.  And we hold
that there are.

 WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies

o Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the
Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each
member’s vote equal in weight.
 Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries
o Tariff reduction – developed countries must reduce at rate of 36% in 6 years, developing
24% in 10 years
o Domestic subsidy – developed countries must reduce 20% over six (6) years, developing
countries at 13% in 10 years
o Export subsidy – developed countries, 36% in 6 years; developing countries, 3/4ths of
36% in 10 years
 Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
o Encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets
 The Court will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization
as an economic policy.  It will only perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the
Senate committed grave abuse of discretion

Issue 3: Does the text of the WTO and its Annexes limit, restrict or impair the exercise of
legislative power by Congress? NO!

 A portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution.

 While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the
domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the
Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.
 The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered
absolute.  Certain restrictions enter into the picture: limitations imposed by the nature of
membership in the family of nations & limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.
[CASE DIGEST] Marcos v. Manglapus (G.R. No. 88211)

October 27, 1989 | 177 SCRA 668

Ferdinand Marcos, et al., petitioners

Hon. Raul Manglapus, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, et al., respondents

FACTS:

On September 15, 1989, the SC voted 8-7 to dismiss the petition of the Marcos family to allow
the return of former President Ferdinand Marcos from Honolulu, Hawaii to the Philippines.
The Court held that President Corazon Aquino did not act arbitrarily with grave abuse of
discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the
present time and under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare. 

The decision affirmed the constitutionality of President Corazon Aquino's prior refusal, fearing
the instability and security issues that may arise once the remains of former President Marcos
were to be brought back to the country. In a statement, she said:

"In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and
passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the
remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such
time as the government, be it under this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise
decide."

Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration. 

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not President Aquino has the power to deny the return of Marcos' remains. 

2. Whether or not President Aquino's refusal to allow the return of Marcos' remains is tantamount to
dictatorship.

HELD:

1. Yes. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom
executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of
executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the
Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in
the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.

This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the
regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the President,
particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the
general grant of executive power. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in
compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of
the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of
Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this
bounden duty.

2. No, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused with
the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment
No. 6. Whereas the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution are implied,
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution refers to an express grant of power.