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Populism and the Revival of Reform: Competing Political Narratives in the Philippines
Author(s): MARK R. THOMPSON

Source: Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 32, No. 1 (April 2010), pp. 1-28
Published by: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41288801
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Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 32, No. 1 (2010), pp. 1-28 DOI: 10.1355/cs32-la
© 2010 ISEAS ISSN 0129-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic
Populism and the Revival of

Reform: Competing Political
Narratives in the Philippines1
MARK R. THOMPSON
The strong showing in opinion polls by Senator Benigno Simeon "Noynoy"

Cojuangco-Aquino III since he entered the Philippine presidential election
campaign in the autumn of 2009 suggests that the long dominant "rich-
versus-poor" political narrative has been challenged by renewed appeals
for " good governance ". While reformism was the major narrative in the
opposition struggle against the Marcos dictatorship, it was eroded by
clientelism and anemic social reforms after the restoration of democracy.
Populism emerged as the most effective electoral discourse in the early
post-Marcos period, with Joseph Ejercito Estrada coming to dominate
Philippine politics by the late 1990s. His friend and fellow actor-politician
Fernando Poe Jr. then launched a major campaign for the presidency
in 2004 after Estrada had been deposed by an elitist uprising. The
incumbent President, Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo, ruthlesslessly broke this
actor-politician-based populist electoral connection. Yet she reaped no
upper class praise for this neo-traditionalist "success". On the contrary,
the widespread corruption and human rights violations (including the
notorious Maguindanao massacre) that inevitably results from such
a strategy unintendedly set the stage for the revival of reformism. In
the face of Arroyo's assault on it, the populist narrative had to be
reconstituted. Instead of relying on " movie star populism" with few
" command votes", Manuel "Manny" Bamba Villar Jr. has built perhaps
the strongest political machinery in the current presidential campaign
using his own wealth while employing an innovative form of " applied "
populism involving generous gifts to poor contestants on widely viewed
television shows. But despite the metamorphosis of populism and the
Mark R. Thompson is Professor of Political Science at the University

of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany.
2 Mark R. Thompson
revival of reformism, deep-seated structural problems in the Philippines

remain. Without major economic redistribution, the plight of the poor
is likely to undermine the success of either a new " reformist " or
" populist " president.
Keywords: Philippines, populism, reform, clientelism, narratives.
The announcement by actor-politician Joseph Ejercito Estrada in

October 2009 that he would run again for the presidency in the May
2010 election (dubbed his "take two" candidacy) sent a collective
shiver through the Philippine political elite and business oligarchy.
Estrada had been deposed as President by an elite-led "people
power" coup in 2001. Accused of massive malfeasance in office,
Estrada was placed under house arrest, convicted and sentenced to
a long-term jail term for plunder in 2007. Following the granting
of an amnesty by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo a month later,
he quickly let it be known that he had no intention of abiding by
his promise not to seek the country's highest office again.2 Yet with
Estrada trailing far behind the front runners at the time of this
writing, it appears his "movie star populism" does not have the
same electoral appeal it once did.
Instead, another presidential candidate, Senator Manuel "Manny"
Bamba Villar Jr., has adapted populism to a changing political
environment. Drawing on his own staggering wealth to finance
what is probably the campaign's most extensive political machinery,
he has developed what can be termed "applied populism" which
employs his "rags-to-riches" story as a metaphor for his vision of a
wealthy Philippines. Instead of appealing to voters based primarily
on his screen personality like Estrada, he offers immediate financial
assistance to poor contestants on televisions shows hosted by his
actor allies.3
As a political narrative, "populism" had long proved so
powerful in the Philippine context that it could only be defeated
by hook or by crook. With his direct appeals to the poor (known
in the Philippines as the masa ), Estrada was only one of two
opposition Senators elected in 1987. In 1992, he easily won the
Vice-Presidency (elected separately in the Philippines). He was elected
President in 1998 by the widest margin of any candidate since the
fall of dictator Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1986. Estrada's fellow actor
and close friend, Fernando Poe Jr. (Ronald Allen Kelley Poe, best
known as "FPJ" or simply as "Da King") took up the populist fight
Populism and the Revival of Reform 3
after Estrada was ousted by contesting the presidential election of

2004. Although outspent, out-organized and out-muscled (Arroyo has
proved to be a consummate master at "guns, goons, and gold") as
well as maligned by the mainstream media and loathed by the middle
and upper classes, Poe nearly won the election. The "Hello Garci"
scandal of 2005 revealed that Arroyo had been directly involved in
manipulation of the presidential polls a year earlier. This suggested
Poe had been cheated as had earlier challengers to the entrenched
elite order, such as the elected congressional representatives of the
Democratic Alliance - closely linked to the communist-influenced
Hukbalahap rebels - who were unseated in a powerplay by the
allies of President Manuel Roxas in 1946. 4 Philippine populism
was so strong that it could only be stopped, like the Huks, by
administration crooks.
By 2009, there were signs that the dominant political narrative
was shifting, however. The respected columnist and political scientist
Amando Doronila has recently suggested that:
there is no sign that masa [poor masses] politics is going to figure
decisively in the next few months before the election ... This is
2009, not 1998, and the dynamics of the 2010 election are vastly
different from those of 1998. Masa politics, or the rich-versus-poor
theme, is not the name of the game in 2010. 5
The sudden entry of the "reformist" Benigno Simeon "Noynoy"

Cojuangco-Aquino III into the presidential race after the (politically
fortuitous) death of his mother Corazon C. Aquino in August 2009
seemed to confirm this prediction. With his mother's mourners
becoming his supporters, Aquino took a clear lead in the presidential
opinion surveys when he entered the race in late 2009. His
candidacy - which stressed the restoration of good governance in
the country - was characterized as a political "game changer".6
Doronila appears to have exaggerated his point somewhat, however.
At the time of writing (based on pre-election surveys from January
2010), Villar has caught up with Aquino in the election polls.
These two leading candidates use competing "populist" and
"reformist" narratives in their presidential race which is to be
decided on 10 May 2010.
Changes in the character of populist appeals to the poor and
the return of elitist reformism in the Philippines may not seem
very surprising given the forces marshalled against populism. But
a brief look at Thailand after Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra
shows that this decline of populism in the Philippines was not
4 Mark R. Thompson
inevitable. If anything, the attack launched by the royalist-backed

elite group in Thailand against Thaksin was even fiercer than what
Philippine high society had hurled at Estrada and Poe. After upper
class-led "people power" protests against Thaksin, the Thai military
launched an overt coup against the populist leader in 2006. Despite
some clumsy attempts by the military at electoral manipulation,
support for Thaksin remained so solid that a newly created party
supporting him won a majority in an elected parliament.7 A
re-mobilized "uncivil society" unseated two pro-Thaksin Prime
Ministers in 2008 in a series of unlawful protests that included the
seizure of the country's international airport. A weakly legitimized
government led by Abhisit Vejjajiva hangs on through a fragile
coalition, fearing the day when it will have to face pro-Thaksin
forces in elections again. The populist "pathology" of Thai politics
remains unhealed.8
The continued dominance of populism in Thailand raises
the question of why there are competing political narratives in
the Philippines. The first part of this article offers a distinction
between "populism" and "reformism" as well as exploring their
relationship to "traditional" politics in the Philippines (which
includes "bossist" warlord violence). While reformism was the major
narrative in the opposition struggle against the Marcos dictatorship,
it was eroded by traditionalism which allowed populism to emerge
as the most electorally effective discourse in the early post-
Marcos period. The following section examines how Arroyo was
able to tether movie star populism through clientelism, armed
intimidation, a clever media strategy and vote stealing. But charged
with corruption and coddling warlords, Arroyo's dramatic loss
of popularity was a foil used by reformists who rallied around
the son of Corazon C. Aquino after "Cory's" death had sparked
widespread mourning. Despite economic growth, consistently high
poverty rates (and growing levels of reported hunger) have provided
a strong basis for continued (though evolving) populist appeals. The
importance of these two major political narratives in the upcoming
election raises the question considered in the conclusion: whether
either "reformists" or "populists" are likely to do much to help the
vast majority of Filipinos who remain poor.
Competing Political Narratives

Narratives are an ancient literary genre. The Old Testament,
Chinese chronicles and Greek epics are but a few examples of a
phenomenon that have described civilizations over millennia. As a

recent addition to the methodology of the social sciences, however,
narrative analysis has engendered disputes typical of the discipline
about exactly what such an application should involve. Narratives
examined can be biographical or those "told" by a group, openly
expressed or "hidden", personal or overtly political, contemporary
or "historicized", with the "story telling" involved analysed from a
psychological, policy, ideological, or subaltern perspective, among
others.9 It is beyond the scope of this article to enter into these
debates. Rather, the analysis here is limited to a focus on narratives
used by politicians in the context of electoral democracy in the
Philippines. The major claim is that politicians offer competing
"populist", "rich-versus-poor" and "reformist", "good governance"
narratives in the struggle for voter support.
Such a notion of political narratives does not fit easily into the
patron-client/elite-politics paradigm in the Philippines.10 According
to this long dominant view, elite politics in the Philippines is said
to be characterized primarily by patron-client ties and patronage, but
also by outright vote buying and electoral violence ("bossism"). In
this context, Julio Teehankee has adopted the useful term "command
votes" - blocks of votes in a candidate's bailiwick ( baluarte ) that
are "gathered and delivered through traditional networks such as
political machines".11 Usually this is done by traditional politicians
offering material rewards and other favours, but sometimes it involves
warlords intimidating or even killing opponents. The November
2009 massacre of a group of fifty-seven politicians' relatives, Non-
Government Organization (NGO) activists, lawyers and journalists
by a rival clan for the "crime" of trying to register an opposition
candidate for an upcoming election in Maguindanao province
in Mindanao is but an extreme example of this phenomenon of
"command voting".12
Teehankee argues that there is another kind of electoral appeal
available to politicians in the Philippines which, following the
literature on political marketing, he terms "market votes".13 These
votes are sought through media-based national appeals to voters, rather
than dyadic local ties. The key to candidates winning support in
this electoral "market" is constructing an effective "image". This is
best accomplished through favourable media reports and advertising
offensives (primarily in television and radio). The argument here is
that two such "images" are the result of key "narratives" frequently
used by candidates in recent Philippine politics, "populism" and
"reformism".14
6 Mark R. Thompson
Despite being an inexact, slippery and impressionistic political

narrative, one common feature of "populism" is that "the people"
- simple but good - are contrasted with the elite - privileged
and greedy.15 This does not mean, however, that "populism" actually
involves the rule of the people. Leading "populist" politicians in
the Philippines have been elites, albeit "black sheep" in terms of
social habitus in the Bourdieuian sense. Like "neo-" or "business"
populists in Peru (Fujimori) or Thailand (Thaksin), but unlike
leftist populists such as in Venezuela (Chavez) or Bolivia (Morales),
Philippine populists have been pro-capitalist.16 Estrada and Poe
made perfunctory alliances with the leading left-wing activists, but
their more important allies were their business cronies. Estrada did
not undertake any significant economic redistribution policies, but
rather carried forward much of the neo-liberal programme of his
predecessor, Fidel Ramos. Estrada and Poe did not rely on organized
labour for support, but on the large "informal sector" of the urban
poor and marginalized rural population.
Populism involves media-carried appeals by leaders in the form
of promises to help the common tao (people) at the expense of the
elite. As discussed above, populism can be usefully distinguished
from "clientelism" which involves ties between national leaders
and voters via local leaders who "harvest" votes through material
incentives or violent threats in their bailiwicks. In practice, populism
and clientelism overlap, with a successful politician mixing image
politics with some political machinery.17 However, politicians
employing a "populist" narrative rely primarily on their media-
transported image while "clientelist" ones will depend more on
dyadic networks.
Eva-Lotta E. Hedman has demonstrated how "movie star" populism
emerged in the Philippines. She argues that the "visualized lingua
franca" of Tagalog films underwent a dramatic transformation towards
social realism in the 1960s.18 "Proletarian potboilers" starring Estrada
or his friend (and even more famous actor) "FPJ" as downtrodden
heroes fighting for their rights against corrupt elites drew a vast
"masa" (the masses of the poor) audience that could later be
solicited for votes. The "familiar stories" portrayed in these films
were "already known, whether as 'social condition' or as individual
destiny".19 They drew on a "familiar trope in Philippine society and
cinema - that of the outlaw/criminal/rebel".20 Through a "dialectic
of recognition and appropriation, Estrada or 'Erap', thus appears as if
he knows, or could know, 'the real people who lived, labored, and
suffered nearby, round the corner'".21 Estrada effortlessly transferred
his image as an outsider and fighter for the poor in his movies to
the political stage. His nickname, "Erap", the 1960s slang inversion
of "pare" (friend), was the basis of his campaign slogan {"Erap
para sa mahirap'' "Erap for the poor") as he claimed to befriend
the friendless poor.
Like populism, reformist appeals are media/image-based; but
the character of its narrative is different. If populists ask for the
votes of the poor based on the promise "I will help you", reformists
seek support because "I am (morally) good". Populists claim to
champion the poor; reformists promise to govern honestly in their
name. Both decry corruption that characterizes clientelist politics,
but for different reasons. The populist narrative portrays corruption
as maintaining an unjust elite rule that oppresses the poor. For
reformists, corruption undermines government efficiency and thus
economic development that would benefit all, particularly the poor.
Populists make "class appeals", while reformists appeal to voters
across class lines with calls for "good governance". While populists
fight against long odds to defeat entrenched elites, reformists show
through personal sacrifice at the hands of corrupt officials that they
are worthy of public trust.
Like urban reformers in the United States in the early twentieth
century, Philippine reformists have claimed to act in the interest
of the nation, disregarding class differences.22 They also stress the
importance of education in uplifting the poor.23 These similarities
are not coincidental, as nearly fifty years of US colonial rule in
the Philippines led not only to the imposition of an American-style
system of government, but also to the development of a political
culture in a "colonial democracy" that in many ways mirrored
that of the imperialist power.24 One side of Philippine politics was
modelled on the most immoral aspects of American machine politics
(the famous pre-martial law, nationalist Senator Claro M. Recto
spoke of finding "our models, which we have already surpassed,
in those American political machines, with their Tweed, Hagues,
Pendergasts, and Huey Longs").25 Yet another side drew of the
tradition of US urban reformism, denouncing corruption and calling
for good governance. In so doing, the opposition could appeal to
deep-seated Philippine cultural traditions as well - to the awa (pity)
and damay (empathy) of the electorate. Such emotions are "socially
and culturally encoded" and associated with the pasyon (Christ's
passion) in Philippine folk religion as well as with the death of
national hero Jose Rizal as a martyr of Spanish colonial rule, as
historian Reynaldo Ileto has shown.26 If anti-government candidates
8 Mark R. Thompson
were imprisoned or even murdered by the ruling party or clan (as

for example Benigno S. Aquino Jr. was in 1983), the opposition
could point to such sacrifices as part of a narrative dramatizing the
need for political redemption.
Moralist appeals for reform were at the centre of Ramon
Magsaysay's successful presidential campaign in 1953 and of the
opposition Liberal Party's electoral effort in the senatorial polls of
1971. 27 Corazon C. Aquino's campaign script in the "snap" presidential
election campaign in 1986 against the authoritarian incumbent Marcos
was paradigmatically reformist. Her husband's "martyrdom" at the
hands of the Marcos regime had aroused strong popular emotions
and led to nearly two-and-a-half years of mass-based urban protest.
Besides standing accused of murdering its leading opponent, the
Marcos regime was charged with pushing corruption to levels
censurable even by the lax standards of pre-martial law politics.
Framed as the "Filipina Maria" (after the "Marian celebration"
commemorating the 2,000th anniversary of the birth of the Virgin
Mary in 1985), Aquino's campaign drew huge crowds around the
country and was covered by the alternative media. She promised
little more than "honesty, sincerity, simplicity and religious faith"
and asked Filipinos to join her in a "crusade for truth, justice
and freedom".28 Marcos understood the damage Aquino's moral
attacks were causing, and complained she had portrayed him as a
"combination of Darth Vader, Machiavelli, Nero, Stalin, Pol Pot, and
maybe even Satan himself".29
Despite his overwhelming advantage in "guns, goons and gold",
Marcos had to steal the election outright by rigging the actual
vote count as his attempt to manipulate the polls in advance had
failed, sparking the "people power" uprising that overthrew him
in February 1986. 30 Once in power, however, Aquino found reform
easier to promise than implement. Several corruption scandals
and a massacre of farmers protesting for land reform eroded her
administration's credibility. It was also rocked by nine coup attempts
launched by dissatisfied factions in the military (one of which she
had earlier protected through the "people power" uprising she
inspired). The return of clientelist politics badly damaged the
credibility of the reformist narrative. Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet
suggested that "the ballooning hopes inflated by the heady people-
power atmosphere of 1986 have since been punctured by political
machines, personalistic factionalism, patron-client ties, old-elite
family prominence, vote buying, ballot tampering, and violence in
the 1988, 1990, and 1992 elections".31 Though the presidency of
Fidel V. Ramos is generally credited with making greater progress

in implementing reforms than Aquino's, particularly in the economic
sphere, the narrative was wearing thin. Corruption scandals
reoccurred with depressing regularity and the initial impact of
economic liberalization did little to improve the lot of 90 per cent
of Filipino households which opinion surveys in the post-Marcos
era have consistently classified as belonging to the lower classes
(see below). Sensing this, opponents of Joseph Estrada, by then
the rising star of Philippine politics, turned to clientelism to try
to block his ascent.
All the patron-client networks, bosses' bailiwicks, and the
oligarch's wealth were not enough to stop the Estrada juggernaut
in the 1998 presidential elections, however. His leading opponent,
a classic "clientelist", "command-vote" politician, the Speaker
of the House, Jose de Venecia Jr., was soundly defeated. Estrada
circumvented clientelist networks. Vote canvassers found themselves
"outflanked" by a popular film star who had direct appeal to the
voters as the defender of the poor. Although the Estrada camp did
have some political machinery, media appeals to the voters were the
dominant elements in the campaign.32 Increasing urbanization and
the spread of the popular media made it easier to appeal directly
to voters. Political advertising had become the most important form
of campaigning.33
Given Estrada's mass appeal in 1998, what has changed just a little
over a decade later? Socio-economically very little. Populism cannot
be "read off" the social map of a country, but without favourable
"terrain" populists have little chance of electoral success. Despite a
decade of relatively high growth under the Arroyo administration (a
point which will be taken up at the end of this article), by some
accounts socio-economic inequality actually worsened between the
beginning of the Estrada and the end of the Arroyo administrations
while self-rated poverty only improved marginally. Market/opinion
researchers use a proxy measure, based on housing, to estimate
income. Housing is a very useful indirect measure, with the luxurious
villas of the rich contrasting sharply with the dilapidated shanties
of the poor. Based on two studies by different survey organizations,
the "A, B, C" categories of upper and middle class Filipinos shrank
to below 10 per cent of the population between 1998 and 2007,
while the percentage of the poorer "D" and "E" categories increased
to over 90 per cent.34 In terms of self-rated poverty (Filipinos who
consider themselves poor), quarterly Social Weather Station surveys
show it worsened during Arroyo's first three years in office to
10 Mark R. Thompson
66 per cent (up from 56 per cent at the end of Estrada's presidency).
It then "improved" to 46 per cent of the population who considered
themselves poor. But by 2007 - even before the impact of the
worldwide economic crisis was felt - it had worsened again (to 53 per
cent), raising it back up nearly to the levels under the Estrada
administration. More worryingly still, reports of hunger in the
population have risen from a low of 7.7 per cent under Estrada to a
high of 19 per cent under Arroyo, with nearly 5 per cent reporting
"extreme hunger".35 In short, the "materialist" basis in the Marxist
sense for populist appeals remains strong in the Philippines.
Defeating "Movie Star Populism"

If the economic conditions for the rise of populism remain ripe in
the Philippines, why could "movie star populism" (as embodied by
Estrada and Poe's presidential campaigns) be defeated? One argument
will be discounted here, although it remains widespread in the
Philippine media and fills the "coffee-table book" literature about
the overthrow of Estrada. It is the claim that Estrada discredited
himself and populist politics generally through his "immoral"
behaviour. Estrada's "excesses" are well known (and reasonably
well documented) but not unusual in Philippine politics (with, for
example, the Arroyo administration matching Estrada peso for peso
in the huge illegal gambling industry which was the ostensible
reason for Estrada's downfall). Estrada may have discredited himself
in the eyes of the upper and middle classes, but he did not lose
his base of support among the poor.36 Arroyo was nearly overthrown
in a kind of poor people's "people power" revenge in May 2001
(known as "Edsa Tres"). Claims that these pro-Estrada crowds were
"manipulated" by "unscrupulous" politicians ring hollow given
the degree of manipulation behind the elitist "Edsa Dos".37 Despite
Estrada's corruption conviction, his ratings among the poor long
remained solid.38
Viewed in terms of image politics, Arroyo was "at sea" during
much of her first (truncated) term in office. At first she tried to act
like a reformist, in the tradition of " Tita Cory" (Corazon Aquino as
the nation's caring aunt).39 As part of this effort, she also tried to
have herself dubbed " Ate Glo" (the doting elder sister) or "Zna ng
Bayan" (mother of the nation) by the media.40 Yet none of these
image makeovers worked because popular belief in her commitment
to reform was undermined through scandal. Arroyo's educational
credentials and technocratic style were an additional hindrance to
her attempt to establish a convincing narrative. Focus interviews with

poor Filipino voters have shown that while "they value educational
qualifications, they are also suspicious about those with superior
education" as they fear such politicians are more likely to be able
to manipulate them.41 Such "image problems" as a reformist appear
to have contributed to Arroyo's initial decision in late 2002 not to
seek re-election.
When Arroyo changed her mind and decided in October 2003 to
run for re-election as President, she threw off all reformist trappings
and focused on the advantages of incumbency. She was the first
sitting President to seek a second term since 1969 (when Marcos
"won" by cheating, spending and violence). Arroyo's electoral strategy
could not rely on clientelism alone, however, as the weakness of
"machine" politics in the post-Marcos Philippines vis-a-vis populists
suggests. She again faced an actor-politician as an opponent for the
Presidency. Her rival was "the cinematic Pinoy cowboy", Fernando
Poe, Jr. As with Estrada, his (even more numerous) fans became
his voters.42 Not surprisingly, Poe led Arroyo decisively in early
opinion polls.
Arroyo refused to surrender to the realm of "star appeal". One
of her cleverest campaign moves was choosing Noli de Castro,
a famous television news announcer, as her Vice-Presidential
candidate. With popularity ratings that matched Poe's, de Castro's
folksy stump speeches helped compensate for her overly intellectual
campaign rhetoric. While de Castro did not provide Arroyo with a
compelling populist narrative, it at least helped deflect Poe's own
movie star-based appeals to the poor. She also launched a blizzard
of nationwide television and radio "public service" advertisements
during the campaign by public agencies effusively thanking the
President. She also made sure that "FPJ's" image suffered in the
media, though her opponent managed to antagonize many a middle
class journalist on his own.
An Arroyo administration insider (anonymity requested) told this
author of another clever stratagem that many of her opponents long
suspected. The Arroyo administration "encouraged" former police
chief Panfilo Lacson, to run for President as well, although he had
once been a close ally of Estrada. Lacson had won the gratitude
of wealthy Chinese for breaking up kidnapping gangs that were
preying on this ethnic minority in the Philippines.43 Thus Lacson
(who had once been a leading opponent of Arroyo) not only split
the opposition vote with Poe but also cut into what might have
been a helpful source of funding.
12 Mark R. Thompson
Like Marcos in his controversial re-election campaign in 1969,

Arroyo cut out the political middle men, funnelling government
patronage funds directly to barangay captains and mayors. With
Poe strong in Luzon, she concentrated her patronage on the Visayas,
where she claimed a local connection based on her mother's side
of the family. As Carl Lande has shown, clientelism works best
when directed at regions thought to be favoured by a candidate who
comes from that area or is seen to have special ties to it.44 Besides
allocating state patronage, she also drew heavily on contributions by
wealthy ethnic Chinese (" taipans "). It was apparent that Arroyo did
not just have a decisive advantage in traditional politics, "guns, goons
and gold"; she had also mastered the "three Cs" of iieo-traditional
politics, "cinema, Chinese and corruption".45
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) performed miserably
during the election: failing in an effort to automate voting that
was dogged by allegations of corruption, leaving countless eligible
voters' names off voting lists and engaging in " dagdag-bawas" (vote-
padding and vote-shaving). In a devastating critique, a former Aquino
administration official, whose husband had played a major part in the
pollwatching effort against Marcos, argued that "if Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo is deluged with complaints about the Comelec leadership
and suspicions of their incompetence or their partisanship, she
only has herself to blame. She appointed them in the first place."46
The 140 plus election deaths was higher than in the previous two
Presidential elections combined (and greater than that during the
notorious 1969 election).47 Dubbed the "world's slowest election", it
took over six weeks for Arroyo to finally be proclaimed the winner
over the objections of an opposition outraged at being repeatedly
blocked from scrutinizing dubious ballots.48
Although Arroyo soon became an embarrassment to the Philippine
elite, she had done their dirty work. She had broken the "electoral
connection" between populist politicians and poor voters. She did this
by amassing patronage from public and private sources, recentralizing
clientelist networks, and directing funds to regions seen favourable
to her. She also countered Poe's media-based populist appeals and
managed to leave scratches on his iconic image. When this was
not enough, she tolerated armed intimidation and directed electoral
manipulation, allowing her to "trounce" Poe in the election by over
a million votes. Although by 2007 her popularity had plunged, her
clientelist networks, warlord allies and electoral manipulators were
still strong enough to win a majority of seats in the lower house
of Congress - a victory of "command" over "market" votes. Arroyo
practised (neo-) traditional politics more effectively than any Filipino

leader since Marcos.
Reformist Revival
The Filipino urban elite had largely turned a blind eye to Arroyo's
electoral excesses in 2004 fearing the return of Estrada-style
populism if Poe had won. The National Movement for Free Elections
(NAMFREL), an NGO once well-respected for its election monitoring,
seemed more interested in Arroyo's re-election than safeguarding
the ballot.49 But when wiretapped conversations between Arroyo
and COMELEC commissioner Virgilio Garcillano ("Garci") about
committing election fraud in Mindanao surfaced in the media in
2005, this elite support evaporated.50 Although Arroyo apologized on
television for a lapse in judgement, she was unable to defuse the
anger generated by the "Hello Garci" scandal. The mass resignation
of ten cabinet level officials and many of her top advisors left her
looking very vulnerable.
Yet Arroyo was able to rebuff attempts to impeach her (with her
safe majorities in Congress) and crush several feeble "people power
coup" efforts (the biggest of which was in February 2006 on the
20th anniversary of the original "people power" uprising). She not
only generously rewarded her loyal generals, but allowed them to
hunt down legal Leftists (including journalists) through extrajudicial
killings, with reportedly more than 900 left-wing activists killed
since she came to power in 2001. 51 Matters seemed to grow graver,
however, as she was engulfed by ever worsening scandals (one,
embarrassingly, involving her husband, son, and brother-in-law who
were accused of having links to illegal gambling lords, the same
offence used to justify Estrada's ouster). Polls show Arroyo to be
the most unpopular post-Marcos President.52 Yet Arroyo's enemies
seemed powerless against her.
Some observers have suggested that Filipinos suffered from
"people power fatigue".53 Yet in the Philippines, protestors alone,
of whom there have been plenty during the Arroyo administration,
have never been enough for "people power" to succeed. Rather,
people power has also required some form of military intervention
and the Catholic Church hierarchies' moral guardianship backed by
big business to bring down a government. With the top military
brass bought off by Arroyo, the Catholic Church on the defensive
after the death of Manila Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin and a major
14 Mark R. Thompson
sex scandal, and business opposition restrained by economic growth,

potential allies for an opposition insurrection were absent.
The failure of insurrectionism meant that the opposition to
Arroyo began to focus on the May 2010 election. The problem, as
has been the case in all post-Marcos elections, was the plethora of
candidates. With Estrada back in the political arena (thanks to a
clever "divide-and-conquer" pardon by Arroyo) and several Senators
maneouvering over presidential bids, there was no clear frontrunner
and certainly no candidate who could capture the still widespread
anti-Arroyo sentiment.
That appeared to change with the death of Cory Aquino in
August 2009. The "outpouring of grief' for Aquino surprised many
observers and even, it is claimed, the Aquino family itself.54 This
mourning was soon transformed into political capital for Cory
Aquino's son "Noynoy". As one observer has written:
Since that great outpouring during Cory's funeral, people have
been insisting that Sen. Noynoy Cojuangco Aquino step into
the shoes of his illustrious parents. There are persistent voices
saying he should run for the presidency ... These calls may be
just passing sentimentalism, fallout from the revivalist frenzy
that exploded after Cory died ... Or the calls we now hear
intermittently could as well snowball. There is something
about the Aquino franchise that evokes magic. In a season
that sees our people craving for a leader they could fully
trust, the revivalism could take hold ... We have, once again,
fallen into another emotional episode where our people
distrust those seen as too sophisticated or too shrewd. They
yearn for a leadership whose simplicity is anchored on strong
morality.55
By becoming a foil for the "moral" Aquino family, Arroyo had set
the stage for the revival of reformism. Though still early days in
the presidential campaign as of this writing, the high level support
registered for his candidacy in the first polls after his declaration of
candidacy for the presidency on 9 September 2009 suggests that such
a "revivalist frenzy" centred around his "sincerity" and promises of
honest government has indeed taken hold of the Philippine body
politic. Conrado de Quiros captured this Arroyo-as-foil-for-Aquino
sentiment well:
But the "Noynoy phenomenon" is not just about euphoria. It is

also about tyrannyphobia. Or a newfound unwillingness to tolerate
tyranny that burst its banks with the death of Corazon Aquino.
The outpouring of love for Corazon Aquino is matched only by
the outpouring of hate for Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Why has

Noynoy become phenomenal? Simple: Because he is the opposite
of Gloria. Or is seen as so. In the same way that Cory was the
opposite of Marcos and Obama was the opposite of Bush.56
It is perhaps surprising that in a country that has one of the world's

most developed, and critical, discourses on political nepotism
undermining democratic norms, it turns out that Filipinos also
appear to believe that there are such things as "good" dynasties.
Amando Doronila argues that the "groundswell of support for Aquino
following the death of his mother, President Cory Aquino, flows from
the public service record of his mother and his father, the martyred
former Sen. Benigno Aquino whose honesty and transparency appear
to have been accepted by the Filipino public."57 One can easily
raise objections to this view, particularly about Benigno Aquino,
"Nonoy's" father, whose political record included charges of murder
and other grave misdeeds.58 Even (saint) "Cory's" administration was
tainted by corruption charges. This was perhaps most embarrassing in
regards to the Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
which was meant to go after Marcos's "ill-gotten" wealth but was
instead accused of making illicit gains of its own.59 Most menacing
were the accusations that dogged Aquino's brother, Jose ("Peping")
Cojuangco Jr., who may again be poised to play a major role in
Noynoy's campaign. The accusations have done nothing to dampen
enthusiasm for Noynoy's presidential ambitions, who convincingly
plays the role of the loyal and honest son, solicitous brother, with a
"beautiful but quiet, well mannered and self-effacing girlfriend".60 Like
his mother, his lack of impressive political accomplishments - his
"blank-slatedness" - is seen as an asset rather than a drawback.
Aquino and his running mate - another famous dynast, Manuel
"Mar" Araneta-Roxas II, who abandoned his own presidential bid
as an act of "sacrifice" to the reformist cause - seem to set to
run a classic "reformist" campaign. It will be based around the
Liberal Party which is an old, famous, but relatively small party
that has claimed a certain "progressive" ideological orientation while
providing political shelter for plenty of unsavoury politicians in the
post-Marcos era.61 Several major NGOs and People's Organizations
(POs) have affiliated with the campaign under the auspices of the
Left (but non-communist) Akbayan party, which has entered into an
official alliance with the Liberal Party of Aquino and Roxas. Several
prominent "progressive" politicians have become closely involved
in this campaign.
16 Mark R. Thompson
The question remains though whether progressives with a

"pro-poor" agenda will have much impact on the campaign, much
less policies adopted should Noynoy win the election. In a recent
conversation, one high ranking member of the campaign (anonymity
requested) admitted to the author that neither Aquino nor Roxas
supported "asset redistribution" (be it land or other forms). Another
high ranking campaign staff member who spoke to this writer
disagreed, however, asserting Aquino's openness to social reform
was demonstrated by the candidate's efforts to encourage his family
to divest itself of the notorious Hacienda Luisita and have its lands
redistributed as part of the country's long-running (but only modestly
successful) land reform programme. In this regard, a thoughtful
article by Ben Reid based on the recent experience of activist
alliances with governments is of particular interest. Reid argues that
NGOs and POs which "crossed over" to work in government in the
post-Marcos Philippines were often "double crossed" by politicians
with other aims. Reid argues that "well-intentioned NGO personnel
who previously adopted a critical stance toward neo-clientelism
ultimately become absorbed by these relations".62 In a survey of
the non-communist Left's political activism since the fall of Marcos,
Nathan Gilbert Quimpo speaks of only "initial, albeit very modest,
gains" and of civil society's "limited usefulness" in "deepening of
democracy in post-authoritarian developing states". Based on these
difficulties, he calls for a "more judicious alliance policy" by the
Left in the future.63
The Metamorphosis of Populism

The two most recent polls available as this article was being
completed (from January 2010) showed Aquino in a statistical tie for
the upcoming May 2010 presidential race with "Manny" Villar. As
noted earlier, the latter has used a "rags-to-riches" narrative to try
to counter Aquino's reformist appeals.64 As reportedly the country's
richest politician, over the last three years he has poured massive
resources into building what is probably the country's strongest
political machine.65 Villar has apparently absorbed two key lessons
about recent political developments in the Philippines. The first is
that traditional political machinery alone is not sufficient to win
elections. In 1998, Estrada could not be stopped by politicians
seen as too "traditional" in their emphasis on gathering votes
through clientelist ties. The other extreme to avoid is to rely
almost exclusively on movie star-based populist appeals as the
Poe campaign did in 2004, leaving it vulnerable in terms of a

sufficient number of "command votes" needed to offset the Arroyo
administration's "neo-traditional" strategy, as discussed above. This
led Villar to adopt a hybrid campaign strategy which combines a
strong political machine flanked by populist appeals. He has won
the endorsement of some of the Philippines leading " trapos " (short
for "traditional politicians" but also the Tagalog for "dirty rag"),
including the De Venecia political dynasty.66 One political analyst
has claimed Villar is currently outspending Aquino by a margin of
ten to one.67 In addition, however, Villar has adapted populism to a
changing political environment. Instead of literally relying on "star
appeals" as Estrada and Poe did - who mobilized their fan base
for political ends - Villar has developed a new narrative style that
can be termed "applied populism". It involves sponsoring noontime
television shows watched daily by millions of poor Filipinos. Nikko
Dizon of the Philippine Daily Inquirer has written about the impact
of this novel campaign technique:
Among Villar's celebrity endorsers are hosts of noontime shows
- Michael V. from "Eat Bulaga" aired on GMA 7 and Willie
Revillame of ABS-CBN's "Wowowee" ... Hinged on Villar's
antipoverty advocacy, "Stop My Hirap" [poverty] aimed right at
the gut of the hungry masses ... The mechanics of the contest
[aired in "Eat Bulaga!"], which ends its two-and-a-half-week run
today, or two days before the formal election campaign begins,
are simple: Audience members write on orange sheets of paper
what they would do if they win P25,000 ... At the end of the
segment, the story of a poor, struggling citizen is aired, recalling
Villar's own rags-to-riches tale. The candidate's image and slogan,
" Sipag at Tiyaga" [industriousness and perseverance] is flashed on
screen. An industry insider told the Inquirer that depending on a
segment's concept, a portion buy such as "Stop My Hirap" could
cost from P700,000 to Pi million per episode [$15,000 to $21,500].
The amount did not include the prizes given away and the
talent fees of hosts ... Villar, whose net worth reportedly totals
P25 billion according to Forbes Magazine, has changed the political
landscape ...68
In this sense Villar has "virtually" merged traditional politics and

populist appeals. Material incentives are offered in medial form,
symbolizing his populist project of helping the poor. Poor contestants
on television shows represent the poor majority of voters whom
Villar promises to help. His televised generosity as a candidate is
a foretaste of his promised benevolence as the next President.
18 Mark R. Thompson
Villar - a one-time shrimp vendor who grew up in modest

circumstances to become a real estate billionaire - has used his
humble origins to develop an anti-elitist discourse typical of populism.
He has directed such attacks at Aquino who he has also tried to
tie to Arroyo in terms of (in)competence and dynasticism. As two
Philippine journalists report:
Villar scoffed at what he described as "self-righteous" and "elitist"
groups that have recently gathered around Aquino to impose anew
their will on the Filipino people. "These elitist groups think
they are the only ones who can run this country. They had their
chance; it's time somebody from the masses took the lead," Villar,
the country's richest lawmaker said ... He described the arrogance
of the rich assuming the role of the country's moral guardians
... Villar noted that the Aquino and Arroyo administrations were
both installed by "people power" revolutions. "We have never
used competence as a basis for voting for our president; it's
always about popularity and pedigree. Does one have to be the
son of Cory (Aquino) or the daughter of Dadong (Macapagal) to
be the president of this country? What about the son of a shrimp
vendor?" he asked. "As far as I know, we are a democracy and
not a monarchy."69
Conclusion: Political Narratives and Socio-economic Realities
With their competing reformist and populist narratives, Aquino and

Villar will probably be the two leading candidates in the May 2010
presidential election. Recent surveys of reasons Filipinos gave for
choosing a candidate suggest that reformism and populism both
run deep in the veins of public opinion.70 But will either candidate
actually be able to change the lives of Filipinos, the vast majority
of whom remain poor (many of them desperately so)?
To turn to Aquino first, it is legitimate to ask whether an
Aquino administration II will bring real "reform" to the Philippines
that, it is promised, will foster economic development and thus
improve the lives of the poor. Given the recent political history of
the Philippines, the question itself seems misplaced. No Philippine
presidency, even Corazon Aquino's, was notably free of corruption.
There is little reason to believe that one led by her son will be
any different, given the major role his relatives and other traditional
political allies are likely to play from behind the scenes. But even
if his administration proves somewhat "cleaner" than usual, it is
unclear whether this would lead to substantially higher economic
growth.
Unlike in Thailand, populism in the Philippines has not involved

much actual economic redistribution. Interestingly, the experience
of Thailand under Thaksin shows that some measures aimed at
poverty reduction, such as low cost health care, actually do help
relieve the suffering of the poor.71 Given that the pro-poor rhetoric
of the previous "populist" Estrada government was largely window
dressing, a certain amount of skepticism is justified in regards to its
current incarnation. In particular, the strong "traditional political"
orientation of Villar's campaign, his reliance on noontime television
celebrities to spread his appeal as well as charges linking him with
a major scandal (the so-called C-5 affair) hint that Villar's pro-poor
orientation may also prove to be largely "for show".72
Arroyo's presidency has, at least from a macroeconomic stand-
point, been a success, however loath her opponents are to admit it.73
Despite corruption in her administration - and of course there are
only perceptions not actual measures of its extent - this apparently
did little harm to the country economically. The real failure of the
Arroyo administration was its inability to reduce income inequality, as
discussed above. Given the apparent lack of genuine social reformist
commitment of either the Aquino or Villar campaigns, there is only
a limited chance of improvement on this front either.
Without a major industrialization drive, such as that happened
in South Korea in the 1960s, there seems little prospect of creating
a large middle class and thus raising the incomes of most Filipinos.
A discussion of the current troubles of the Thai economy - which
is much more industrialized than the Philippines and about
twice as rich from a per capita standpoint - is enlightening.74
Thailand and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines have successfully
diversified economically, no longer relying on agriculture as their
chief base of output. In the Philippines, one can point to the past
success of the electronics assembly sector and the current success
of Business Process Outsourcing (which in the Philippines primarily
revolves around call centres) as examples of such successful
diversification. Of course, the Philippines has also benefited from
massive remittances by its Overseas Foreign Workers (OFWs). But
Thailand, and more so the Philippines, have failed to deepen their
industrialization drive. They are not strong in major capital goods/
high technology sectors, with no "world beating" companies in
these categories that use local inputs and technological capacities.
The chief obstacle to progress in this regard is the lack of innovation
by major domestic companies. This in turn is hampered by
problems with "human capital" formation, particularly in regard to
20 Mark R. Thompson
education (which most observers agree is in a disastrous state in

the Philippines).
Given the limited prospects for moving up the developmental
ladder quickly, the appropriate question seems not whether reform
can "succeed" in the Philippines but rather what its inevitable
"failure" will mean from the standpoint of the vast majority of poor
Filipinos. However "clean" government becomes, they will remain
impoverished.
Another "populist" President who fails to undertake significant
social policies (which Villar has not even promised in his platform
as Thaksin once had) is unlikely to do much for the 90 per cent
of Filipinos in the lower class "D" and "E" categories discussed
above who will continue to suffer from chronic problems of housing,
employment, health care, education, etc.
"Clientelism" or "command voting" suffers from the problem
of corruption (the Arroyo administration's multiple scandals) and
political violence (epitomized by the Maguindanao massacre), which
is part and parcel of such a system. Plunging national popularity of
the incumbent due to malfeasance-in-office charges is a pattern that
Arthur Alan Shantz had already noted in late pre-martial law politics.75
This in turn sets the stage for the resurrection of reformism, which
makes direct "moral appeals" to the poor based not on the claim "I
will help you" but rather that "I will be good" once in office. Such
cross-class appeals can overcome massive clientelist disadvantages,
as Cory Aquino's 1986 presidential campaign demonstrated. Her son,
Benigno Aquino III, is likely to face a much more even political
playing field in terms of patronage resources. His campaign will
thus be more hybridic, consisting of local clientelist networks and
moralizing reformist rhetoric.
Similarly, Villar has combined "applied populism" (on noontime
television shows) with even stronger political machinery. This enables
him to avoid being labelled a "traditional politician" while at the
same time evade the danger of being destroyed by "neo-traditional"
politics as happened to Poe's 2004 presidential campaign at the
hands of a ruthless incumbent.
Whichever narrative combination proves to be the winner in
the 2010 Philippine presidential elections, the appeal of either a
new "reformist" or "populist" President may prove short lived. If
past experience is any guide, neither narrative can be expected to
be the basis for a sustained effort to improve the lot of the poor
who will long represent the overwhelming majority of voters in the
Philippines.
NOTES
1 Gratitude is owed to Julio C. Teehankee for suggesting the phrase "competing

narratives". Earlier versions of this paper were presented at De La Salle
University on 17 September 2009 and at the panel "The Politics of Change in
the Philippines" in the International Symposium "Designing Governance for
Civil Society", Keio University Center of Governance for Civil Society (CGCS),
Tokyo, 22-23 November 2009. At De La Salle University, I would like to thank
Eric C. Batalla, Francisco A. Magno and Julio C. Teehankee for organizing the
talk and offering helpful comments. At Keio, thanks are due to Yuko Kasuya
and Nathan Quimpo for their kind invitation and the participants at the
conference for their feedback. I would also like to thank the two anonymous
reviewers.
2 On 20 January 2010, nine years to the day after protests removed Estrada from
office, the Philippine Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that Estrada
could run for president again although the Constitution is ambiguous about
whether the ban on re-election is absolute or only applies to the incumbent.
The poll bodies' Second Division ruled against petitions to disqualify Estrada
with "populist" reasoning - "the better policy approach is to let the people
decide who will be the next President. For on political questions, the court
may err, but the sovereign people will not." Editorial, "Passing the Buck",
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 21 January 2010.
3 Villar has adopted orange as his campaign colour, long Estrada's trademark, to
emphasize its populist hue. Philipp Tabeza, "Estrada hits Villar for imitating
campaign color", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 30 November 2009.
4 Poe died in December 2004 of a heart attack. This helped Arroyo survive the
election-cheating scandal as the probable winner was no longer alive to claim
his electoral rights.
5 Amando Doronila, "Estrada is damaged goods", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 27 May
2009.
6 Alex Magno, "Game changer 1-5", Philippine Star, 20, 29 August and 3, 5 September
2009.
7 Andrew Walker and Nicholas Farrelly, "New Mandala's Stepping Stones to

a Coup", New Mandala, 2 December 2008 <http://rspas.anu.edu.au/rmap/
newmandala/2008/1 2/02/new-mandala-stepping-stones-to-a-coup/>.
8 Michael Montesano, "Contextualing the Pattaya Summit Debacle: Four April
Days, Four Thai Pathologies", Contemporary Southeast Asia 31, no. 2 (2009):
217-48. Besides using reformist rhetoric, the Abhisit government is also
attempting to strengthen its "vote canvassing networks" based on its newfound
allies in northern Thailand (defectors from the Thaksin camp), though, as recent
by-election losses suggest, with only limited success. A recent Ph.D. thesis
offers an extensive analysis of Thai vote canvassing. See Anyarat Chattharakul,
"Networks of Vote-Canvassers in Thai Elections: Informal Power and Money
Politics", Ph.D. thesis, Leeds University, 2007.
9 Catherine K. Riessmann, Narrative Analysis (London: Sage, 1993); Lewis P.
Hinchman and Sandra K. Hinchman, eds., Memory, Identity and Community:
The Idea of Narrative in the Human Sciences (Albany, NY: State University
of New York Press, 1997); Donald E. Polkinghorne, Narrative Knowing and the
22 Mark R. Thompson
Human Sciences (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1988); Prue
Chamberlayne, Joanna Bornat, and Tom Wengraf, The Turn to Biographical
Method in Social Science (London: Routledge, 2000); Don McAdams, Ruthellen
Josselson, and Amia Lieblich, eds., Turns in the Road: Narrative Studies in Lives
in Transition (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2001);
S. Shenhav, "Narrativizing Politics: On the 'Historization' of Political
Narratives", paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International
Communication Association, New York, 25 May 2009 <http://www.allacadmic.
com/meta/pl3675_index.html>; John Beverley, "Testimonio, Subalternity,
and Narrative Authority", in Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2nd ed.,
edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvoanna S. Lincoln (London: Sage, 2000),
pp. 555-66.
10 For a recent review of the literature which uses the closely related categories of
"patron-client" and "elite-politics", see Chapter One of Nathan Gilbert Quimpo,
Contested Democracy and the Left in the Philippines after Marcos (Quezon City:
Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2008).
11 Julio C. Teehankee, "Image, Issues, and Machinery: Presidential Campaigns
in Post-1986 Philippines", paper presented at "Designing Governance for
Civil Society", Keio University Center of Governance for Civil Society, Tokyo,
22-23 November 2009.
12 Francisco Lara Jr., quoted in "Political Entrepreneurs", Philippine Daily Inquirer,

28 November 2009 has argued that political families like the Ampatuans,
charged with carrying out the Maguindanao massacre, are part of a new breed
of warlords whose "powers depend upon their control of a vast, illegal and
shadow economy and an ever-growing slice of [national government] internal
revenue allotments" fuelling "a violent addiction to political office". Warlord
politicians have long murdered their political opponents in the Philippines,
two well-known examples being the gruesome killing of Moises Padilla at the
hands of an armed gang in the employ of the Lacson clan in 1951 and the
assassination of Evelio Javier by the Pacificador clan in Antique in 1986. Of
course, the murder of Benigno S. Aquino Jr. by agents of the Marcos regime
after being forced off a plane that had brought him back from political exile
despite the presence of numerous foreign journalists and supporters was the
most notorious case in recent Philippine history of the killing of one's political
opponent before he could pose an electoral threat.
13 Teehankee, "Image, Issues, and Machinery", op. cit.
14 Another important narrative, which can be termed "structuralist", has offered
a Maoist-influenced view of Philippine politics and society. But while the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) has used this narrative to justify
armed struggle by its military wing, the New People's Army (NPA), it has never
become well established in electoral politics, with the vacuum being filled by
a vaguely class-based "populist" narrative. Eva-Lotta Hedman, "The Spectre of
Populism in Philippine Politics and Society: Artista, Masa, Eraption!" South
East Asia Research 9 (2001): 5-44 (here p. 36). Also see the articles in The
Revolution Falters: The Left in the Philippine Politics after 1986, edited by
Patricio N. Abinales (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Series
15, 1998) and Kathleen Weekley, The Communist Party of the Philippines,
1968-1993: A Story of Its Theory and Practice (Quezon City: University of the
Philippines Press, 2001).
15 Margaret Canovan, "Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy",
Political Studies 47 (1999): 2-16; Paul A. Taggart, Populism (Buckingham, UK:
Open University Press, 2000); Hans-Jiirgen Puhle, "Was ist Populismus?" in
Populismus und Aufklarung, edited by Helmut Dubiel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,
1986), pp. 12-32.
16 Kenneth M. Roberts, "Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in
Latin America: The Peruvian Case", World Politics 48 (October 1995): 82-116;
Kurt Weyland, "Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: Unexpected
Affinities", Studies in Comparative International Development 31 (1996): 3-31;
Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, "'Business Populism' in Thailand", Journal
of Democracy 16, no. 2 (April 2005): 58-77.
17 Teehankee, "Image, Issues, and Machinery", op. cit.
18 Hedman, "The Spectre of Populism in Philippine Politics", op cit.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 This and the next paragraph draw on Mark R. Thompson, The Anti-Marcos
Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 29-32 and 144-46.
23 The persistence of this "education-optimism" in the Philippines was underlined
when Efren Penaflorida was named CNN's "hero of the year" for his campaign
to improve education in his home province of Cavite (just south of Manila).
He and his fellow volunteers used pushcarts to bring educational materials to
slum children as part of an "itinerant literacy movement" in order to "ween
them away from the vice and violence of the streets". "Pushcart to greatness",
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 29 November 2009. The editorialist continues in a
vein typical of the reformist narrative: "Penaflorida and the other CNN heroes
are an inspiring lot. They embody the hope that every person has for change
and reform amid government neglect and incompetence. They show that all
meaningful change starts from within. As Penaflorida told the CNN audience,
'You are the change that you dream, as I am the change that I dream, and
collectively, we are the change that this world needs to be.'" But Penaflorida's own
"hero's welcome" in the Philippines after winning the award was overshadowed
by the Maguindanao massacre, an indication of the persistence of violent elite
politics despite the best efforts of reformists.
24 The evocative phrase "colonial democracy" was coined by Ruby Paredes in
Philippine Colonial Democracy, edited by Ruby Paredes (Quezon City: Ateneo
de Manila University Press, 1989). Stanley Karnow's journalistic account, In Our
Image: America's Empire in the Philippines (New York: Random House, 1989)
emphasizes American influence, and Philippine imitation of both desirable and
undesirable aspects of US political culture.
25 Quoted in Teodoro M. Locsin, "Judgment Day", Philippines Free Press, 10 November

1951, p. 3.
26 Reynaldo Clemena Ileto, Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the
Philippines, 1840-1910 (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979);
Reynaldo C. Ileto, "The Past in the Present Crisis", in The Philippines after
Marcos, edited by R.J. May and Francisco Nemenzo (London: Croom Helm, 1985).
24 Mark R. Thompson
27 Eva-Lotta Hedman, In the Name of Civil Society: From Free Election

Movements to People Power in the Philippines (Honolulu: University of Hawaii,
2006); Mark R. Thompson, "Cory and 'the Guy': Reformist Politics in the
Philippines", UFSI Reports, no. 16 (Indianapolis: Universities Field Services,
1988-89).
28 These two quotes are cited from Lucy Komisar, Corazon Aquino: The Story of
a Revolution (New York, NY: George Braziller, 1987), p. 78.
29 Cited in Sandra Burton, Impossible Dream: The Marcoses, the Aquinos, and
the Unfinished Revolution (New York, NY: Warner Books, 1989), p. 312.
30 On the general significance of stolen elections, which involve the actual
falsification (or plain disregard) of the vote count, in sparking "democratic
revolutions", see Philipp Kuntz and Mark R. Thompson, "More than the Final
Straw: Stolen Elections as Revolutionary Triggers", Comparative Politics 41,
no. 3 (ADril 2009): 253-72.
31 Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, "Contested Meanings of Elections in the Philippines",

in The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia, edited by R.H. Taylor
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 160. But reformism
retained enough cache in Philippine politics to remain the dominant narrative
in the 1992 presidential election, with the two candidates with the strongest
reformist image finishing first (Fidel V. Ramos) and second (Miriam Defensor
Santiago), with most of the remaining seven candidates relying primarily,
or almost entirely on machine-based "command votes", including the most
powerful machine politician at the time, then House Speaker Ramon Mitra,
who finished a distant fourth. Teekhankee, "Images, Issues, and Machinery",
op. cit.
32 Isabelo T. Crisostomo, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Quezon City: J. Kriz,
1999).
33 Ana Maria Tabunda, Carmela S. Fonbuena, and Aries Rufo, Selling Candidates:
Political Advertising in the 2007 Senatorial Election (Manila: Konrad Adenauer
Stiftung, 2007); Glenda M. Gloria, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, and Carmela S.
Fonbuena, Spin and Sell: How Political Advertisements Shaped the 2004
Elections (Manila: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2004).
34 Pulse Asia, "Media Release", 7 April 2007 <www.inquirer.net/verbatim/pulseasia-
04302007. pdf>; Maria Cynthia Rose Banzon Bautista, "People Power 2: The
Revenge of the Elite on the Masses?" in Between Fires: Fifteen Perspectives on
the Estrada Crisis, edited by Amando Doronila (Pasig City: Anvil Publishing,
2001). Mahar Mangahas offers a slightly more optimistic view: "Discounting its
seasonality, Philippine GNP has been rising steadily in the past two decades.
But, since Philippine poverty has not been falling steadily, one can see that the
relationship between GNP and poverty is not at all close. But ... I can concede
that steady economic growth eventually lowers poverty." Mahar Mangahas,
"Social Climate: Study poverty more than GNP", Philippine Daily Inquirer,
22 August 2009.
35 Social Weather Stations, social weather indicators, tables "Self-rated poverty:
households who are ' mahirap ' (poor)" and "Degree of hunger in households,
Philippines" <http://www.sws.org.ph/>.
36 Note the sense of outrage in many of the essays in Between Fires, op. cit.
37 Carl Lande, "The Return of 'People Power' in the Philippines", Journal of

Democracy 12, no. 2 (2001): 88-102.
38 Teehankee, "Image, Issues, and Machinery", op cit. Although Villar has also
been linked to a corruption scandal, his populist narrative retains a strong
appeal to Philippine voters.
39 Mark R. Thompson, "Presidentas and People Power in Comparative Asian
Perspective", Philippine Political Science Journal 28, no. 51 (2007): 1-32.
40 Sheila Coronel, "The Problem with GMA I", I Report: The Investigative Reporting
Magazine, April-June 2003, p. 18.
41 Sheila S. Coronel and Yvonne T. Chua, "The poor vote is a thinking vote",
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 26 April 2004 <http://pcij.org/
stories/the-poor-vote-is-a-thinking-vote/>.
42 Uro Q. de la Cruz, "The Myth of Ang Panday (the Blacksmith)", I Report: The
Investigative Journalism Magazine, October-December 2002, pp. 3-8; Isagani
De Castro Jr., "Fernando Poe Jr.: Unqualified or underestimated?" Newsbreak,
5 January 2004.
43 Lira Dalangin-Fernandez, "Lacson: Poe should give in for 'practical reasons'",
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 21 April 2004.
44 Carl C. Lande, Post-Marcos Politics: A Geographical and Statistical Analysis of the
1992 Presidential Election (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993).
45 This phase was suggested to me by the historian Alfred McCoy, at the University
of Wisconsin-Madison in February 2001.
46 Solita Collas-Monsod, "Signs of unholy designs", Philippine Daily Inquirer,
14 May 2004.
47 Paul D. Hutchcroft and Joel Rocamora, "Faced with democratic deficit", The
Standard [Hong Kong], 3 June 2004.
48 Max Soliven, "Financial Times: Vote-counting in RP is a national disgrace",
Philippine Star, 15 June 2004.
49 Paul Hutchcroft, "The Arroyo Imbroglio in the Philippines", The Journal of
Democracy 19, no. 1 (2008): 141-55.
50 The potentially fatal consequences of vote manipulation were made apparent
by the November 2009 Maguindanao massacre. President Arroyo had close
links with the offending Ampatuan clan whom she had helped to fight Muslim
secessionists and who were accused of helping her steal the 2004 election.
Conrado de Quiros, "Cause and effect", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 1 December
2009; Editorial, "Arroyo legacy stained with blood", Philippine Daily Inquirer,
3 December 2009.
51 Agence France-Presse, "EU to help RP tackle extrajudicial killings", Philippine

Daily Inquirer, 9 October 2009 <www.inquirer.net>.
52 Mahar Mangahas, "Social climate: The popularity of Cory Aquino", Philippine
Daily Inquirer, 11 July 2009.
53 Patricio N. Abinales and D. Donna J. Amorosa, "The Withering of Philippine
Democracy", Current History (2006): 290-95.
54 Raul Rodrigo, Paalam Cory: An ARS-CRN Commemorative Special (Manila:
ABS-CBN, 2009).
26 Mark R. Thompson
55 Magno, "Game Changer", op. cit.

56 Conrado de Quiros, "The 'Noynoy' phenomenon", Philippine Daily Inquirer ,
1 October 2009.
57 Amando Doronila, "Transparency is now the defining issue in campaign",

Philippine Daily Inquirer, 16 September 2009. An editorial in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer decried rampant dynasticism in Philippine politics and reminded
readers that there has been no enabling legislation (by primarily dynastic
legislators!) on a constitutional ban on dynasties for the past twenty-three years.
"Dynastic Republic", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 16 December 2009.
58 These charges were detailed during Benigno S. Aquino Jr.'s trial under the
Marcos martial law regime. See Chapter Three in Thompson, The Anti-Marcos
Struggle, op. cit.
59 James Clad, "Tainted watchdog", Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 September
1987.
60 Inday Esspina-Varona, "The Rising Son", Philippines Graphic 20, no. 16 (21
September 2009): 17-21.
61 For a more optimistic view, see Julio C. Teehankee, "Citizen-Party Linkages in
the Philippines: Failure to Connect?" in Reforming the Philippine Party System:
Ideas and Initiatives, Debates and Dynamics (Manila: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,
2009).
62 Ben Reid, "Development NGOs, Semiclientelism and the State in the Philippines:
From 'Crossover' to Double Crossed", Kasarinlan 23, no. 1 (2008): 4-42.
63 Quimpo, Contested Democracy and the Left in the Philippines, op. cit., pp. 126,
158.
64 Veronica Uy, "Villar ties Aquino in presidential polls", Philippine Daily

Inquirer, 3 February 2010. With his old-style movie star populism, Estrada was
trailing both Aquino and Villar with polls showing he had approximately 15 per
cent of voter support. The meager 5 per cent backing for pro-administration
candidate, Gilbert Teodoro, who, interestingly, is Aquino's cousin, shows
the hopelessness of the pro-administration cause in such an atmosphere of
reformist revivalism and populist transformation. Even the recent flooding in
Metro Manila and vicinity as well as in northern Luzon caused by typhoons
Ketsana (Ondoy) and Parma in late September-October 2009, which killed at
least 500 people and affected up to five million others, does not seem to
have helped Teodoro's candidacy. See "Wading in the muck is for Teodoro
a double-edged sword", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 1 October 2009. Although
Teodoro's profile was raised in leading the relief efforts, it became a "poisoned
chalice" given the difficulties in the government-led disaster relief efforts. It
also emphasized the need for "reform" of government given the widespread
belief that extent of the disaster could be blamed on the failings of the Arroyo
administration.
65 Christine Avendano and Gil C. Cabacungan Jr., "Election: Good vs. evil? Rich
vs. poor?" Philippine Daily Inquiry, 14 September 2009.
66 Lira Delingin-Femandez, "De Venecia urges salons to back Villar", Philippine
Daily Inquirer, 30 September 2009.
67 Ramon Casiple quoted in Nikko Dizon, "Villar money rules noontime TV shows",
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 6 February 2010.
68 Dizon, "Villar money rules noontime TV", op. cit. The show name "Eat Bulagal "
is derived from "eat", which is both a reference to the show airing at lunch
time and a transliteration of "it", a game-slang in Tagalog for "lost" (in the
game), and from the Tagalog word " Bulaga " which is close to "surprise" in
English (but its closest equivalent is "peek-a-boo").
69 Avendano and Gil C. Cabacungan Jr., "Election: Good vs. evil? Rich vs. poor?",
op. cit.
70 In a December 2009 Pulse Asia poll asking Filipinos what their major reason was
for supporting a major presidential candidate, a plurality, 27 per cent (25 per
cent and 33 per cent of the D and E income classes, the two lowest categories,
respectively) said, "cares for poor", a populist code phrase. Only 21 per cent
(22 per cent and 17 per cent of D and E) gave "not corrupt/clean record" as
their main reason for choosing a candidate. But another 12 per cent (13 per
cent and 10 per cent of D and E) said they would vote for a "good person".
Not being corrupt and being "good" are catch phrases of reformism and shows
there is also a strong basis for making appeals to voters based on the claimed
high moral character of the candidate. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for
pointing out these survey results. See <http://pulseasia.com.ph/pulseasia/story.
asp?ID=702>.
71 Kannika Damrongplasit and Glenn A. Melnick, "Early Results from Thailand's 30
Baht Health Reform: Something to Smile About", Health Affairs 28, no. 3 (2009):
457-66. Although still highly elitist in approach, the Thaksin administration
engaged in at least some "genuine" populism, as opposed to the disappointing
record of social reform under Estrada.
72 Villar has been accused by a Senate committee or double funding the C-5 road
extension project. Testimony was heard that Villar inserted an additional P200
to the C-5 project in the 2008 national budget on top of the P200 million
already allotted. He was also accused of masterminding the diversion of the
original route of the C-5 extension, which would connect the South Luzon
Superhighway to the Coastal Road in Paranaque City, in order to construct a
Paranaque-Las Pinas road link. The realigned road passed through subdivision
lands owned by Villar's real estate firms, increasing their market value. Fel
V. Maragay, "Villar taunts accusers on C-5 scandal", Manila Standard Today,
2 November 2009.
73 In a recent cover story, the magazine BizNewsAsia, no. 19 (2009), "GMA's

Legacy: Economy, Infra, Integration", made a persuasive case for the success of
Arroyo's economic record. In eight years, from 2001-08, the economy expanded
one-and-a-half times, from $74 to $185 billion. The country enjoyed thirty-
three consecutive quarters of growth, the longest sustained expansion in its
modern history. An average GDP growth rate of 4.6 per cent during her
administration beats Estrada (2.8 per cent), Ramos (3.7 per cent), Aquino (3.6 per
cent) and Marcos (3.8 per cent). Inflation (at an average of 5.6 per cent) was
also lowest under Arroyo. Per capita growth (figuring in the over 2 per cent
population growth) was 2.65 per cent over these years. In the quarter century
before that it averaged only 0.2 per cent. The market value of listed companies
rose from P2 trillion in 2001 to P7 trillion in 2007. Arroyo made major
infrastructure investments in road networks, seaports, airports, power plants,
information technology and communication networks. The Philippines is finally
virtually fully electrified and wireless connected, with cellphone networks
28 Mark R. Thompson
reaching 98 per cent of the archipelago (with 80 per cent of Filipinos having
cellphones).
74 Richard F. Doner, The Politics of Uneven Development: Thailand's Economic
Growth in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2009).
75 Arthur Alan Shantz, Political Parties: The Changing Foundations of Philippine
Democracy (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1972).

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Populism and the Revival of Reform: Competing Political Narratives in the Philippines

Author(s): MARK R. THOMPSON

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Populism and the Revival of

The strong showing in opinion polls by Senator Benigno Simeon "Noynoy"

Mark R. Thompson is Professor of Political Science at the University

revival of reformism, deep-seated structural problems in the Philippines

Keywords: Philippines, populism, reform, clientelism, narratives.

The announcement by actor-politician Joseph Ejercito Estrada in

after Estrada was ousted by contesting the presidential election of

The sudden entry of the "reformist" Benigno Simeon "Noynoy"

inevitable. If anything, the attack launched by the royalist-backed

Competing Political Narratives

phenomenon that have described civilizations over millennia. As a

Despite being an inexact, slippery and impressionistic political

were imprisoned or even murdered by the ruling party or clan (as

Fidel V. Ramos is generally credited with making greater progress

Defeating "Movie Star Populism"

her attempt to establish a convincing narrative. Focus interviews with

Like Marcos in his controversial re-election campaign in 1969,

practised (neo-) traditional politics more effectively than any Filipino

sex scandal, and business opposition restrained by economic growth,

But the "Noynoy phenomenon" is not just about euphoria. It is

the outpouring of hate for Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Why has

It is perhaps surprising that in a country that has one of the world's

The question remains though whether progressives with a

The Metamorphosis of Populism

Poe campaign did in 2004, leaving it vulnerable in terms of a

In this sense Villar has "virtually" merged traditional politics and

Villar - a one-time shrimp vendor who grew up in modest

Conclusion: Political Narratives and Socio-economic Realities

With their competing reformist and populist narratives, Aquino and

Unlike in Thailand, populism in the Philippines has not involved

education (which most observers agree is in a disastrous state in

1 Gratitude is owed to Julio C. Teehankee for suggesting the phrase "competing

7 Andrew Walker and Nicholas Farrelly, "New Mandala's Stepping Stones to

12 Francisco Lara Jr., quoted in "Political Entrepreneurs", Philippine Daily Inquirer,

25 Quoted in Teodoro M. Locsin, "Judgment Day", Philippines Free Press, 10 November

27 Eva-Lotta Hedman, In the Name of Civil Society: From Free Election

31 Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, "Contested Meanings of Elections in the Philippines",

37 Carl Lande, "The Return of 'People Power' in the Philippines", Journal of

51 Agence France-Presse, "EU to help RP tackle extrajudicial killings", Philippine

55 Magno, "Game Changer", op. cit.

57 Amando Doronila, "Transparency is now the defining issue in campaign",

64 Veronica Uy, "Villar ties Aquino in presidential polls", Philippine Daily

73 In a recent cover story, the magazine BizNewsAsia, no. 19 (2009), "GMA's

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