People vs.

Henry Salveron
G.R. No. 102079, Nov. 22, 1993
Cruz,J.:

Doctrine:
We have held in a long line of decisions that the prosecution is allowed to call witnesses other
than those named in the complaint and information. While the accused in a criminal prosecution
is entitled to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him, it does not mean that he
entitled to know in advance the names of all the witnesses for the prosecution. The success of
the prosecution might be endangered if such right be granted to an accused for the known
witnesses might be subjected to pressure or coerced not to testify. The time for the accused to
know all the witnesses against him is when they take the witness stand.

Facts:
This case stemmed out from the fact that Gloria de Felipe was allegedly robbed and raped by
Raul Salveron and others, the father of herein respondent. During the trial, Raul was shot to
death while the other accused were luckier as they were not killed. They alleged that one of the
suspects of the killing and attempted killing was the husband of Gloria, Rosibal. Subsequently,
Rosibal was also killed wherein the suspect is herein respondent to avenge the latter’s father’s
death. The prosecution presented Victoriano Gregorio as the star witness who testified that he
saw what happened the day of the killing and positively identified the respondent to be the killer.
Respondent set up an alibi and argued that Gregorio shall be disqualified as witness as he was
not included in the list of witnesses attached by the prosecution in the information.

Issue:
Whether Gregorio is disqualified as a witness.

Held:
No.
The fact that Gregorio was not in the list of witnesses that was attached to the information was
satisfactorily explained by the prosecution. The record shows that the criminal complaint filed
with the municipal court on March 29, 1986 did not include Gregorio among the witnesses
because his sworn statement was taken only on April 1, 1986, and it was this list that was
merely copied when the information was prepared by the provincial prosecutor. At any rate, the
omission did not disqualify Gregorio from testifying later because, as we said in People v.
Pacabes:

We have held in a long line of decisions that the prosecution is allowed to call witnesses other
than those named in the complaint and information. While the accused in a criminal prosecution
is entitled to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him, it does not mean that he
entitled to know in advance the names of all the witnesses for the prosecution. The success of
the prosecution might be endangered if such right be granted to an accused for the known
witnesses might be subjected to pressure or coerced not to testify. The time for the accused to
know all the witnesses against him is when they take the witness stand.
Marquez vs. Espejo
G.R. No. 168387, Aug. 25, 2010
Del Castillo, J.:

Doctrine:
When the parties admit the contents of written documents but put in issue whether these
documents adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties, the deciding body
is authorized to look beyond these instruments and into the contemporaneous and subsequent
actions of the parties in order to determine such intent.

Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that
prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract, not its wording which is prone to mistakes,
inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to
mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.

Facts:
The Espejos were the original owner of two parcels of land namely Lantap and Murong. They
mortgaged both to secure loans from Rural Bank (RBBI) which was subsequently forclosed for
failure to pay the loans. Espejos bought back one of the two parcels of land from RBBI which
was evidenced by a Deed of Sale. However the said deed was not specific as to what barangay
was the location of the bought back land. The Espejos took possession of the Murong property.
At the same time, RBBI executed a Deed of Voluntary Transfer in favour of Marquez and Dela
Cruz who were the known tenants of the Murong property and after due payment, CLOAs were
issued to them. The Espejos then initiated the complaint to annul the CLOAs issued stating that,
by virtue of the buy-back, they were the owner of the Murong property. RBBI, however,
answered that the subject of the buy-back was the Lantap property. On appeal, the CA ruled in
favour of the Espejos stating that the Best Evidence Rule shall be applied in a sense that the
Deed of Sale is the best evidence as to its contents, particularly the description of the land.

Issue:
Whether the application of the Best Evidence Rule was proper.

Held:
No.
The Best Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
the best evidence is the original document itself and no other evidence (such as a reproduction,
photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The original is preferred because it
reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the document. There is no room for the
application of the Best Evidence Rule because there is no dispute regarding the contents of the
documents.

The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and correctly
express the true intention of the parties.

This dispute reflects an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an apparent failure of
the instruments to adequately express the true intention of the parties. To resolve the ambiguity,
resort must be had to evidence outside of the instruments. Though the CA cited the Best
Evidence Rule, it appears that what it actually applied was the Parol Evidence Rule instead,
which provides:
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all
the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest,
no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks to
contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or instrument.

However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at bar. In the
first place, respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI and petitioners;
they are strangers to the written contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol
evidence rule is exclusive only as "between the parties and their successors-in-interest."

Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an examination of the
parties’ respective parol evidence, in order to determine the true intent of the parties. Well-
settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails,
for the intention is the soul of a contract, not its wording which is prone to mistakes,
inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to
mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.