1AC---UNCLOS v3

1AC---Arctic
Advantage one is the Arctic---

Arctic climate change is accelerating leading to a host of impacts

Taalas 21 – WMO Secretary-General Prof. Petteri Taalas delivered a video presentation to the Arctic
Council ministerial highlighting WMO’s State of the Climate Report, which had a special section on the
Arctic, and the Year of Polar Prediction which seeks to improve observations in the data-sparse Arctic.
Prof. Taalas also participated in the 2nd Arctic Met Summit 2021, hosted by the Icelandic Meteorological
Organization, and showcasing the significance of a Pan-Arctic collaboration in Earth System Observations
and Modelling. He presented WMO’s Arctic services and took part in sessions on the importance of
creating a bridge between science and community. 5-20-2021, World Meteorological Organization,
"Arctic assessment report shows faster rate of warming," https://public.wmo.int/en/media/news/arctic-
assessment-report-shows-faster-rate-of-warming

New observations show that the increase in Arctic average surface temperature between 1979 and 2019
was three times higher than the global average during this period – higher than previously reported -
according to the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP ).

Climate change impacts on Arctic communities, ecosystems and species, especially when associated
with extreme events, are considerable and accelerating . Sea ice loss, glacier retreat and reduced snow
cover remobilizes previously deposited contaminants. While climate change is mainly driven by carbon
dioxide emissions, changes in emissions of air pollutants such as short-lived climate forcers also affect
the climate as well as human health. Globally, such air pollution is a major cause of premature deaths
and reducing air pollution from particles and ozone could prevent hundreds of thousands of premature
deaths in Arctic Council Member and Observer countries, it said.
The Arctic Climate Change Update 2021: Key Trends and Impacts. Summary for Policy-makers was presented at the Arctic Council Ministerial in Reykjavik, Iceland on
20 May.

The meeting concluded with a Ministerial declaration and a strategic plan reaffirming the Council’s
commitment to a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable Arctic region.

Goal 1 – Arctic Climate: monitor, assess and highlight the impacts of climate change in the Arctic to
encourage compliance with the Paris Agreement and support stronger global measures to reduce
greenhouse gases and shortlived climate pollutants, while strengthening circumpolar cooperation on:
climate science and observations; reduction of emissions; climate change mitigation, adaptation and
resilience; and exchange of knowledge and innovative technologies in support of these efforts
Goal 2 – Healthy and Resilient Arctic Ecosystems: promote pollution prevention, monitoring, assessment, conservation and protection of Arctic biodiversity,
ecosystems and species habitats, based on best available science, and respecting the importance of sustainable development for all current and future generations
of Arctic inhabitants;

Goal 3 – Healthy Arctic Marine Environment: promote conservation and sustainable use of the Arctic
marine environment for the benefit of all current and future generations of Arctic inhabitants,
encourage safety at sea, prevention of marine pollution and cooperate to improve knowledge of the
Arctic marine environment, monitor and assess current and future impacts on Arctic marine ecosystems,
work together to enhance cooperation on marine issues and promote respect for the rule of law and
existing legal frameworks applicable to Arctic waters;
The ministerial session marked the end of the two-year Icelandic Chairmanship of the Arctic Council and the beginning of the Russian Federation’s Chairmanship for
the years 2021-2023.

WMO has observer status with the Arctic Council, which is the pre-eminent intergovernmental forum for cooperation on Arctic affairs. The Council’s Ministerial
meeting is held every two years, giving the Foreign Ministers of the eight Arctic States and the political leadership of the six Indigenous Permanent Participants the
opportunity to strengthen international cooperation in the region, and review the quality work produced by the Council’s Working Groups.

The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) is the working group responsible for monitoring and assessing the state of Arctic pollution and climate
change, and for developing science-based recommendations for actions to support policy-making. It’s research informs WMO’s Global Cryosphere Watch
programme and polar activities.

Key findings included:

-Climate change is a here-and-now problem in the Arctic. Key indicators such as temperature,
precipitation, snow cover, sea ice thickness and extent, and Arctic assessment report permafrost thaw
show rapid and widespread changes underway in the Arctic . An important update is that the increase in Arctic annual
mean surface temperature (land and ocean) between 1971 and 2019 was three times higher ( a 3.1°C rise ) than the increase in the global
average during the same period. This is higher than reported in previous AMAP assessments.

- TheArctic is experiencing an increase in the frequency and/or intensity of rapid sea ice loss events,
melt events on the Greenland ice sheet, heavy precipitation, inland flooding, coastal erosion and
wildfires. There has been an increase in extreme high temperatures and a decline in extreme cold
events. Cold spells lasting more than 15 days have almost completely disappeared from the Arctic since
2000. Extreme climate and weather events affect ecosystems, infrastructure, and people. They can also
push conditions over thresholds for potentially irreversible change.

- The Arctic is home to approximately 4 million people. Climate change is driving rapid changes in the
Arctic that affect people—especially Indigenous Peoples— living in the Arctic and beyond . Changing
environmental and ecological conditions are having negative impacts on health and wellbeing, food
security, transportation, livelihoods, industries, infrastructure, and the availability of safe drinking water.

A fragmented governance regime makes dangerous exploitation of the marine environment

inevitable---revitalizing UNCLOS is key
Hossain 15 – Dr. Kamrul Hossain s a Research Professor, and Director of Northern Institute for
Environmental and Minority Law (NIEM), at the Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland. He is also the
lead of the Thematic Network on Law of the University of the Arctic. Climate Change Impacts on Ocean
and Coastal Law. Randall S. Abate, Oxford University Press 2015|Chapter 13: “Governance of Arctic
Ocean Marine Resources”
https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199368747.001.0001/acp
rof-9780199368747?rskey=1NFocG&result=2

The Arctic is often criticized for not having a comprehensive governance regime .
The characteristics of the Arctic as a region are
complex, which present an ocean in the center, surrounded by land and ice masses, making up the
territories of sovereign states and the indigenous peoples inhabiting the region for thousands of years.
The governance of the Arctic is widely recognized as a system of fragmented international, regional, and
bilateral regulations, which are complemented by non-binding soft law mechanisms, usually as a result
of the initiatives undertaken by the Arctic Counc il.52 The Arctic coastal states—the so-called Arctic 5, the states
surrounding the Arctic Ocean—see no need for any overarching governance regime for the Arctic.53 Instead, according to these states,

UNCLOS and the Arctic Council initiatives effectively serve as the framework for Arctic governance.

As a purely legal framework, UNCLOS is the most appropriate instrument to provide a governance framework in
the Arctic . Most of the challenges, requiring international and regional response, have emerged from
the transformation of the Arctic Ocean, making it gradually accessible and facilitating subsequent human
activities. The general provisions of UNCLOS applicable to the Arctic will be briefly discussed here. The Arctic coastal states, like any other
state parties to the Convention with coastlines, have a legal right to exploit surface and subsurface
economic interests within the 200- nautical-miles EEZ in the Arctic Ocean, albeit with contingent
obligations,54 pertaining to the protection and preservation of marine environment .55 In particular with respect
to ice-covered sea, the Arctic coastal states have a special privilege to adopt and enforce stricter laws and regulations within their EEZ to protect any irreversible
disruption of the ecological balance of the marine area, such as from pollution from vessels.56

The coastal states also have sovereign rights over the continental shelf up to 200 nautical miles and even
far beyond that where the continental margin forms a natural prolongation of the landmass of the
coastal states—the so-called extended continental shelf (ECS). Establishing sovereignty claims over this
marine area is most often connected to resource access, as the wording of article 77(1) of UNCLOS
affirms .57 Coastal states’ exercise of resource usage in the Arctic Ocean therefore lies both in the EEZ as well as in the established portion of the continental
shelf, whereas the coastal states, as with all other states, enjoy a set of rights in the area beyond national jurisdiction both in the high sea (beyond the 200-nautical-
miles EEZ) as well as in the “area” (the seabed beyond the determined portion of the continental shelf). Even though the central Arctic Ocean around the North Pole
is characterized as polar-cap, consisting of thick ice sheets and not accessible, the surrounding areas not ice-capped must necessarily be treated as high sea, and be
regarded as res communis omnium—the common heritage of mankind, where all the state parties to the Convention effectively enjoy basically all traditional
freedoms,58 albeit with certain legal obligations, such as peaceful and lawful use of the marine area,59 and with commitment for the conservation of marine living
resource,60 in the high seas.61

Given the likelihood of its status as a semi-enclosed sea, the Arctic Ocean offers coastal states certain
other privileges, such as to take measures to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration,
and exploitation of the living resources at sea, and to set joint standards concerning rights and duties
pertaining to protection and preservation of the marine environment .62 Concerning the “area”—the seabed beyond the
continental shelf—the responsibility is placed under the control of the International Seabed Authority (ISA),

where activities must be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Convention governing the
protection and preservation of the marine environment .63

The exercise of resource usage both in surface and subsurface water as well as in the seabed of the
continental shelf may have various consequences, the most alarming of which is the risk concerning
the protection and preservation of the marine environment . Living resources can be overexploited,
resulting in destruction of ecological balance. Extraction of nonliving resources, such as, hydrocarbons
exercises, may cause extensive pollution to marine environment if, for example, an accident occurs in
the process of extraction or transportation. In addition, other human activities, such as shipping, may
also contribute to pollution affecting marine living resources

A broader range of anthropogenic threats affect marine biodiversity, causing depopulation and
migration of species. UNCLOS includes provisions for the protection and preservation of marine
environment in part XII . This part provides that sovereign rights to exploit natural resources in the
marine area coexist with the duty to protect and preserve the marine environment,6 4 while addressing
an overall framework for marine environmental governance. On one hand, it sets out the “general”
obligations of all states to safeguard the marine environment in its entirety, and, on the other hand, it
offers a “comprehensive” structure for dealing with all sources of pollution at sea. Accordingly, part XII
of the Convention is regarded as an international “constitution” on the protection and preservation
of the marine environment ,65 which is applicable to resource governance in all marine areas, including
the Arctic Ocean.

Scenario one is Warming---

UNCLOS is the only framework for preventing climate change---it’s a key legal vehicle for
emissions prevention and enforcement
CIL 18 – The Centre for International Law (CIL) at the National University of Singapore (NUS) hosted a
two-day international conference on Climate Change and the Law of the Sea: Adapting the Law of the
Sea to Address the Challenges of Climate Change on 13-14 March 2018. The objective of the conference
was to bring together leading legal and scientific experts to discuss the impacts of climate change on the
marine environment and on uses of the sea and the challenges they pose to the law of the sea. The
conference also aimed to examine how the law of the sea could be used both to respond to climate
change impacts on the oceans and also to support mitigation and adaptation measures13-14 March
2018, Center for International Law, “Climate Change and the Law of the Sea: Adapting the Law of the
Sea to Address the Challenges of Climate Change” https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/Climate-Change-Law-of-the-Sea-Final-report.pdf
Panel 7 – Development and Adaptation of UNCLOS to Address the Impacts of Climate Change

Professor Alan Boyle of Essex Court Chambers gave a presentation on ‘ Addressing

Climate Change Impacts through UNCLOS Part
XV Dispute Settlement Mechanisms’. He began by introducing the value of litigation. He stated that
litigation can have a transformative effect by strengthening the hand of weak states and may put
pressure on UNCLOS parties to deliver on their climate change obligations. However he cautioned that litigation can be
politically difficult and expensive, and that it is risky as the applicant may lose. Professor Boyle outlined the three types of possible cases, being non-compliance with
UNCLOS pollution control obligations, non-cooperation as required by UNCLOS, or damage to a coastal state caused by a violation of UNCLOS obligations.
Regarding the threshold question of whether climate change is marine pollution as defined in UNCLOS,
Professor Boyle considered that it clearly is, either in the form of direct introduction of CO2 as a
‘substance’ into the oceans or as ‘energy’ due to temperature increase . He also concluded that there is an abundance of
scientific evidence to establish deleterious effects from either the direct or indirect effects of GHG emissions. Professor Boyle then outlined the relevant

obligations in UNCLOS, already discussed by other presenters, including Articles 192, 194, 207 and 212.
He stated that there is no doubt that UNCLOS deals with marine pollution coming from the air , and
that it does not matter which of these provisions is relied on to found a case. Articles 207 and 212
require states, in adopting laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution, to take into
account internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended practice and procedures . In the
climate change context, the internationally agreed rules and standards are found in the Paris
Agreement, and therefore Professor Boyle concluded that UNCLOS requires states to comply with the
Paris Agreement. The fundamental duty of cooperation is also interpreted in the context of the Paris
Agreement, so that parties must cooperate to implement the Paris Agreement.
Having identified the content of the UNCLOS climate change obligations, Professor Boyle turned to apply the UNCLOS Part XV system. An issue arises concerning
whether an UNCLOS climate change case would in fact be a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS or whether it would be more properly
characterised as a UNFCCC case. Professor Boyle stated that there would be a case under both UNCLOS and the UNFCCC, and therefore the question is which case
prevails. There is no compulsory dispute settlement jurisdiction under the UNFCCC and therefore the
UNCLOS dispute settlement system is comparatively attractive . Following the approach taken by the
South China Sea arbitral tribunal, only an express agreement excludes the jurisdiction of UNCLOS Part
XV, and provided that the case is pleaded as an UNCLOS case, an UNCLOS court or tribunal has
jurisdiction to hear the case. A violation of UNCLOS could be argued by reference to the Paris
Agreement, which is in accordance with Part XII’s expectation that its obligations be interpreted and
applied in accordance with other instruments . Professor Boyle identified two further issues, first the need to establish that a dispute
exists, and second the question of whether it is necessary to sue all GHG emitting parties. These issues arose in the recent cases initiated by the Marshall Islands at
the ICJ, where there was found to be no dispute between the various parties prior to the commencement of the case. Further Judge Tomka in the case against the
United Kingdom concluded that the obligations the subject of the proceedings were not of a bilateral nature between the Marshall Islands and the UK, as there
were many other states whose conduct was the same as that of the UK. Similar issues could arise in the context of a climate change dispute.

Under UNCLOS there is a choice of forum, with ad hoc arbitration being the default option. Most
developing states have opted by default for ad hoc arbitration, which presents issues as it is more
expensive than a standing court or tribunal, and each party has the right to appoint an arbitrator,
meaning that there could potentially be a large number of arbitrators . Although the ICJ or ITLOS would be a better option for
a case with multiple respondents, ad hoc arbitration due to its default status is likely to be the only realistic option unless the parties agree to a transfer. On the
question of who would be able to initiate the proceedings, Professor Boyle stated that the obligations in UNCLOS Part XII are erga omnes and therefore any party
can sue. Finally
turning to remedies, Professor Boyle identified options including negotiation, restitution, or
the most useful outcome of an order to comply with the obligations . Regarding the potential for damages, Professor Boyle
considered that there would be multiple problems, such as joint responsibility, proving causation and proving damage. He also stated that potentially it would only
be damage caused beyond a 1.5oC temperature rise that would be relevant. Professor Boyle ended by concluding that UNCLOS
Part XV would
provide a compulsory mechanism for a climate change case and would not be trumped by the UNFCCC if
pleaded properly. A case alleging non-compliance with UNCLOS climate change obligations would likely
be the best option, with a non-cooperation case likely to be without practical utility .
Professor Catherine Redgwell of the University of Oxford gave a presentation on ‘Treaty Evolution, Adaptation and Change: Is UNCLOS ‘enough’ to address Climate
Change Impacts on the Oceans?’ In her presentation Professor Redgwell recognised the central role of UNCLOS in addressing impacts and consequences of sea level
rise, warming and acidification.
She described UNCLOS’ provisions as ambulatory and capable of dynamically
evolving. Complemented by an array of other instruments, UNCLOS does not stand in isolation.
Professor Redgwell began by briefly outlining the relevant UNCLOS provisions including Articles 192 and
194 and the definition of marine pollution in Article 1. Like the other speakers she concluded that
climate change is clearly marine pollution . The obligations in UNCLOS Part XII must be read in light of
external rules and standards. For provisions such as 207 and 212, the benchmark is very weak, with
states only required to take into account external rules and standards. For Article 211 the benchmark is
much stronger as the laws must have at least the same effect as the international rules and standards.
Further, for example in the context of pollution from land-based sources (Article 207), the benchmark is
meaningless as there are no generally accepted international rules and standards to take into account at
all. For Article 212 (pollution through or from the atmosphere) the independent source of the legal
obligation, whether or not the UNCLOS party is party to it, would be the UNFCCC or the Paris
Agreement. Compliance with the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement is relevant for the interpretation and
application of Article 212. Professor Redgwell stated that the NDC obligation in the Paris Agreement is
one of conduct, but the temperature goal is one of result. On the other hand the NDCs and compliance
with them is clearly tied to each state, whereas the temperature target is more difficult to extrapolate in
terms of individual obligations. Professor Redgwell stated that perhaps the global stocktaking may lead
to a merging of the two different situations.
Professor Redgwell then highlighted several examples of environmental developments linked to Part XII
of UNCLOS that directly or indirectly serve to mitigate climate change impacts. The Polar Code was
adopted to address the effects of international shipping, however indirectly it is reducing stressors on
vulnerable ecosystems. PSSAs designated by the IMO are contributing to adaptation and enhance
resilience, and are linked to the obligation in Article 194(5) relating to rare and fragile ecosystems. The
establishment of MPAs more generally can be considered as an important measure to enhance
resilience of marine ecosystems. Areabased management tools including MPAs and also EIAs could be a
significant tool to emerge from the BBNJ negotiations. Professor Redgwell then discussed the development of the law of the sea
outside of UNCLOS, including through the UN General Assembly annual review of the state of the oceans and the law of the sea, with its annual resolution
reiterating concerns over current and projected climate change. The UN plays a catalytic role in raising awareness of the impact of climate change on the oceans, as
a global forum for law of the sea issues as a surrogate for a regular UNCLOS COP, and through dynamic evolution of UNCLOS such as the adoption of the 1994
Implementing Agreement and the BBNJ negotiations. Professor Redgwell also discussed the ongoing work of the ILA Sea Level Rise Committee that had been
discussed by earlier presenters. She outlined the possible mechanisms to respond to the issue of climate change and the oceans such as development of customary
international law, a new protocol to the UNFCCC, an amendment of UNCLOS or a decision of the UNCLOS states parties. She stated that other treaty instruments
can be influential in their own right such as the CBD, including the decision of its COP on the designation of MPAs as a strategy to adapt to climate change. Professor

Redgwell concluded by stating that UNCLOS is central to the regulation of the impact of climate change on the
oceans but it is not enough. External rules and standards can be brought within UNCLOS given its inclusive
language to effectively regulate for climate change mitigation and adaptation.

During the discussion session the point was made that although UNCLOS has long been read by reference to other
instruments , it would represent a quantum leap to read in the substantive Paris Agreement obligation
directly into UNCLOS as an obligation enforceable under Part XV compulsory procedures . A comment was made
on the need for UNCLOS states parties to revisit their dispute settlement choice under UNCLOS so that they are cognisant of the choice that they have made and its
implications. The idea of using special chambers as a more cost-effective option than ad hoc arbitration was also mentioned. The practical question of whether
states would in practice bring a case such as this to an international court or tribunal was also raised. It was acknowledged that in many situations an UNCLOS
climate change case would involve the applicant suing a state that they do not want to sue due to political or other reasons.

Regarding the issue of obligations of conduct in UNCLOS and obligations of result in the Paris Agreement, it was not considered to necessarily be an issue, as

although UNCLOS is fundamentally conduct-based there are some result-based obligations such as the prohibition on
dumping. The question is how to identify the obligation, and whether the UNCLOS and Paris Agreement obligations are different. The point was raised that at a
1.5oC temperature rise we are not ‘protecting and preserving the marine environment’, however the international community at the Paris Conference has accepted
this increase. In MOX Plant the court did not accept the argument that UNCLOS meant stricter obligations than had been agreed to under OSPAR, and a similar
outcome was reached in the Pulp Mills case. The
possibility of suing under UNCLOS procedural obligations such as EIAs,
rather than substantive obligations, was raised as a greater avenue towards success or awareness, and
potentially a way around the relationship between UNCLOS and the Paris Agreement .

The prospect of incorporating regional agreements on climate change into UNCLOS was discussed, with
no barrier identified for doing so. Regarding the work of the ILA Sea Level Rise Committee, comments were made about whether rules in UNCLOS
on the EEZ and territorial sea that are recognised to be customary norms will evolve to reflect the new reality. The question was asked how important the breadth

of those zones is to the customary rule. The

option of organic evolution of UNCLOS by practice or interpretation as a
middle ground rather than seeking to establish a new general or regional customary rule was suggested .
Pursuant to Article 311(3) a new agreement on baselines could be concluded on a regional level provided that

the rights of third states are not affected . However it was also commented that it is clearly undesirable to have
different rules on something as fundamental as baselines .

It’s try or die---Arctic climate change triggers the most important tipping points
Finger 16 – Matthias Finger Professor, Swiss Post-Chair in the Management of Network Industries,
Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale Lausanne. Published 2016, L. Heininen (ed.), Future Security of the Global
Arctic: State Policy, Economic Security and Climate |Chapter 7: “The Arctic, Laboratory of the
Anthropocene” Accessible via SpringerLink
In this section I will first show that the Arctic constitutes a perfect illustration, actually the most dramatic illustration and laboratory, of the Anthropocene, so-to-

speak ‘Anthropocene in action’. I will then argue that the Arctic is more than that, namely , a potential tipping point
for the global Earth System . This is what makes the Arctic particularly interesting and relevant and
justifies placing the Arctic in the context of the Anthropocene.

The main illustration of the Anthropocene in the Arctic is clearly climate change and subsequent
receding ice (Finger-Stich and Finger, 2012). To recall, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), in its third assessment report published in 2001, mobilized considerable scientific and political
attention about the effects of global warming on Arctic sea and land ice (IPCC, 2001, 2.2.5.2.). It also
modeled sea-level rise, which was said to be sensibly higher for the Arctic Ocean than for other oceans (3
mm./yr., instead of 2mm.). Other positive feedback mechanisms, such as induced albedo effect, melting permafrost with increasing carbon and methane emissions
and stratospheric ozone depletion were also highlighted (IPCC, 2001, 14.2.3.2; UNEP, GRID, 2007). For
example, in summer 2007 the North
West Passage was for the first time navigable without breaking ice, and the North East Passage to a
great extent as well (Roach, 2007). Climate models and scenarios of mitigation had to be corrected to
reflect the accelerating trend , considering also variables of the climate system such as snow cover,
permafrost, acidification of oceans, increase in the coverage of Arctic tundra and occurrences of large
forest fires. It is fair to say that the effects of anthropogenic global warming are most visible in the
Arctic, be it the extent or the speed of global warming. Paradoxically, the Arctic seems to be more
shaped by industrial civilization than most other parts of the planet, comparable only to the Alps, the
Andes or the Himalayas.

But what happens in the Arctic is not only a consequence of global change; change in the Arctic climate
may well become an accelerator of further global change . For example, and further building on the third IPCC Report’s findings,
the Arctic Council and the International Arctic Science Committee presented the upcoming Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA, 2005) to the IPCC. This

document brought global attention to climate warming in the region, which may suddenly accelerate
and lead to possibly catastrophic events with irreversible repercussions , such as the break-up of a big
ice shelf section leading to a rapid increase in sea level (UNEP, GRID, 2007). The metaphor and catchword used
to describe this situation – when unleashed changes start to proceed – was the ‘tipping point’ . For instance,
referring to the ice-melt of the summer 2007, Mark Serreze, scientist from the National Snow and Ice Data Center in Boulder (Colorado, USA), comments that
climatemodels had underestimated the rate of sea ice loss and that there is a tipping point under which
sea ice loss can no longer recover from year to year. According to a model developed by Marika Holland
from the National Center for Atmospheric Research, the critical sea ice thickness maybe 2.5 m. and then
‘you kind of fall over the edge’ (Serreze cited in Emmerson 2010, pp. 150–151).

More precisely, the Arctic cryosphere constitutes one of the main identified tipping points globally (Fleming,
2008; Lenton et al., 2008; Nuttall, 2012; Wadhams, 2012; Young, 2012): if we are to lose Arctic ice cover, and especially
Greenland’s ice sheet, then this will trigger an irreversible ‘dangerous change’ of the global climate
system. More generally, the Arctic holds four such tipping points for the Earth System: the first one is,
as mentioned earlier, the ice cover with its albedo effect; the second tipping point is constituted by the
effects of methane release both on land (permafrost) and in the sea; the third tipping point pertains to
the acidification of the Arctic Ocean; and the fourth one to changing ocean currents. All four tipping
points may irreversibly affect the Earth System as a whole.
The impact is extinction---methane bursts, global instability, and nuclear war
Cribb 17 – Julian Cribb, Principal of JCA, Fellow of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and
Engineering, Former Director, National Awareness, 2017 (“The Baker,” CSIRO, Surviving the 21st Century
Chapter 4, p. 91-94)

As to the mechanism that could suddenly release a huge amount of extra carbon into the atmosphere
and oceans and project global temperatures up by 6–9 °C, the most likely explanation is the one described at the
start of this chapter—the rapid melting and escape of billions of tonnes of frozen methane , CH 4 , currently locked in

tundra and seabed sediments. This phenomenon, dubbed the “clathrate gun ” (Kennett et al. 2003), is now linked by scientists not only with the

PETM event but also, according to palaeontologist Peter Ward, with the Great Death of the Permian, the worst annihilation in the history of

life on Earth (Ward 2008). The significance of the clathrates is that they consist of methane, a gas that is 72 times more powerful than CO
2 as a climate forcing agent in the short run, and 25 times stronger over a century or so . The clathrates could be
released by a process known as ‘ ocean overturning ’, a shift in global current patterns caused by moderate warming, which brings warmer

water from the surface down into the depths, to melt the deposits of frozen gas. Unlocking several
trillion tonnes of methane would cause global temperatures to rocket upwards sharply. Once such a
process gets under way, most experts consider, warming will happen so fast it is doubtful if humans could do anything
to stop it even if they instantly ceased all burning of fossil fuels.

This ‘ double whammy ’ of global warming caused by humans releasing three trillion tonnes of fossil carbon
which then precipitates an uncontrollable second phase driven by the melting of all or part of the five
trillion tonnes of natural methane deposits (Buff et & Archer 2004) is the principal threat to civilisation in the twenty-first
century and, combined with nuclear conflict (Chap. 4), to the survival of the human species .

The IPCC’s fifth report states that the melting of between 37 and 81 % of the world’s tundra permafrost is ‘virtually certain’ adding “ There is a high risk
of substantial carbon and methane emissions as a result of permafrost thawing ” ((IPCC 2014a), p. 74). This could involve the
venting of as much as 920 billion tonnes of carbon. However, the Panel did not venture an estimate for methane emissions from the melting of the far larger seabed
clathrates and a number of scientists have publicly criticised the world’s leading climate body for remaining so close-lipped about this mega-threat to human
existence. The IPCC’s reticence is thought to be founded on a lack of adequate scientific data to make a pronouncement with confidence—and partly to fear of the
mischief which the fossil fuels lobby would make of any premature estimates. However, it critics argue, by the time we know for sure that the Arctic and seabed
methane is escaping in large volumes, it will be too late to do anything about it.

The difficulty is that no-one knows how quickly the Earth will heat up, as this depends on something that cannot be scientifically predicted: the behaviour of the
whole human species and the timeliness with which we act. Failure to abolish carbon emissions in time will make a 4–5 °C rise in temperature likely. As to what that
may mean, here are some eminent opinions :

• Warming of 5 °C will mean the planet can support fewer than 1 billion people—Hans-Joachim Shellnhuber, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (Kanter
2009)

• With temperature increases of 4–7 °C billions of people will have to move and there will be very severe conflict —
Nicholas Stern, London School of Economics (Kanter 2009)

• Food shortages, refugee crises, flooding of major cities and entire island nations, mass extinction of plants and animals, and a climate so drastically altered it may
be dangerous for people to work or play outside during the hottest times of the year—IPCC Fifth Assessment (IPCC 2014b)

• Corn and soybean yields in the US may decrease by 63–82 %—Schlenker and Roberts, Arizona State University (Schlenker & Roberts 2009a) • Up to 35% of the
Earth’s species will be committed to extinction—Chris Thomas, University of Leeds (Thomas et al. 2004)

• Total polar melting combined with thermal expansion could involve sea
levels eventually rising by 65 m (180 ft), i.e. to the 20th floor of tall buildings,
drowning most of the world’s coastal cities and displacing a third or more of the human population
(Winkelmann et al. 2015)
• Intensified global instability , hunger , poverty and conflict . Food and water shortages , pandemic
disease , disputes over refugees and resources , and destruction by natural disasters in regions across
the globe—Chuck Hagel, US Secretary for Defence (Hagel 2014) • “Almost inconceivable challenges as human society struggles to adapt… billions of people
forced to relocate.… worsening tensions especially over resources… armed conflict is likely and nuclear war is

possible”— Kurt Campbell, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Campell et al. 2007).

• “Unless we get control of (global warming), it will mean our extinction eventually”—Helen Berry, Canberra University
(Snow & Hannam 2014).

Arctic ocean warming alone guarantees extinction---oxygen exhaustion, global pandemics,

and severe weather
Bill McKibben 19, Schumann Distinguished Scholar at Middlebury College, Fellow of the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences, “This Is How Human Extinction Could Play Out”, Rolling Stone, 4/9/2019,
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/bill-mckibben-falter-climate-change-817310/

Oh, it could get very bad.

In 2015, a study in the Journal of Mathematical Biology pointed out that if the world’s oceans kept warm ing, by 2100 they might
become hot enough to “ stop oxygen production by phyto-plankton by disrupting the process of
photosynthesis .” Given that two-thirds of the Earth’s oxygen comes from phytoplankton, that would
“likely result in the mass mortality of animals and humans .”
A year later, above the Arctic Circle, in Siberia, a heat wave thawed a reindeer carcass that had been trapped in the permafrost. The exposed body released anthrax
into nearby water and soil, infecting two thousand reindeer grazing nearby, and they in turn infected some humans; a twelve-year-old boy died. As it turns out,

permafrost is a “very good preserver of microbes and viruses , because it is cold, there is no oxygen, and it is dark” — scientists have
managed to revive an eight-million-year-old bacterium they found beneath the surface of a glacier. Researchers believe there are fragments of the Spanish
flu virus, smallpox , and bubonic plague buried in Siberia and Alaska.

Or consider this: as ice sheets melt , they take weight off land, and that can trigger earthquakes — seismic activity is
already increasing in Greenland and Alaska. Meanwhile, the added weight of the new seawater starts to bend the Earth’s crust. “That will give you a massive
increase in volcanic activity. It’ll activate faults to create earthquakes, submarine landslides, tsunamis, the whole lot,” explained the director of University College
London’s Hazard Centre. Such a landslide happened in Scandinavia about eight thousand years ago, as the last Ice Age retreated and a Kentucky-size section of
Norway’s continental shelf gave way, “plummeting down to the abyssal plain and creating a series of titanic waves that roared forth with a vengeance,”
wiping all signs of life from coastal Norway to Greenland and “drowning the Wales-sized landmass that once connected Britain to the Netherlands,
Denmark, and Germany.” When the waves hit the Shetlands, they were sixty-five feet high.

There’s even this: if we keep rais ing carbon dioxide levels, we may not be able to think straight
anymore. At a thousand parts per million (which is within the realm of possibility for 2100), human cognitive ability falls 21 percent.
“The largest effects were seen for Crisis Response, Information Usage, and Strategy,” a Harvard study reported, which is too bad, as those skills are what

we seem to need most .

But it's not too late---the aff stops tail-end risks.

Dunne 20 [MA from City, University of London Daisy, 4-9-2020, Deep emissions cuts this decade could
prevent ‘abrupt ecological collapse’, Eco-Business, https://www.eco-business.com/news/deep-
emissions-cuts-this-decade-could-prevent-abrupt-ecological-collapse/]
By comparison, limiting global warming to below 2C – the goal of the Paris Agreement – could delay the date of
exposure by up to six decades, according to the research.

The results “show very clearly that it is not too late to act and the benefits of acting now will be
massive ”, a study author tells Carbon Brief.
Burning up

Rising temperatures and changing rainfall patterns are expected to make existing habitats inhospitable
for many animal species. Due to this, some scientists expect that climate change will overtake land-use change to become the largest threat facing
wildlife by the end of the century.

However, it is not yet certain at what point this century the effects of climate change will begin to overwhelm ecosystems. The new study addresses this question by
looking at when various land and ocean ecosystems are likely to be exposed to possibly intolerable increases in temperature.

The results suggest the fate of ecosystems could hinge on the world taking immediate action to tackle
climate change , says study author Dr Alex Pigot, a research scientist at the Centre for Biodiversity and
Environment Research at University College London . He tells Carbon Brief:

“Our results show that with

continued high emissions of greenhouse gasses, losses of biodiversity and disruption
of ecosystems from climate change are likely to happen abruptly and could occur much sooner than we
had expected.

“According to our models, biodiversity losses are likely to be already underway in the tropical oceans and over
the next few decades these
risks are expected to escalate rapidly, spreading to tropical forests and then higher latitudes by 2050 .”
Corals to forests

For their research, the authors estimated the first date at which species in different world regions are likely to face temperatures beyond what they are known to
tolerate in the wild.

Exposure to such temperatures could cause species to die out in that region – or to go “locally extinct”. However, it is possible that some species could adapt to
intolerable temperatures, Pigot says:

“It is important to note exposure does not necessarily mean extinction. Some species may be able to persist at temperatures warmer than those under which they
have previously been found, but this is not something we should blindly assume. Indeed, for some species we already have very good evidence that their current
[temperature range] is likely to correspond closely to their physiological limits.”

They did this for more than 30,000 species spanning the world’s habitats, from tropical coral reefs to highland pine forests.

It should also be noted, however, that the authors only studied changes to temperature and rainfall exposure. They did not model other climate-change impacts
known to affect wildlife, such as heatwaves or the disappearance of Arctic sea ice.

The authors looked at the timing of exposure under several scenarios for future climate change, known as the “Representative Concentration Pathways” (RCPs).
These scenarios include one where future greenhouse gas emissions are very high (RCP8.5) and one where temperatures are limited to below 2C (RCP2.6). (It is
important to note that RCP8.5 is not a “business as usual” scenario, but rather a scenario where no policies are put in place to tackle climate change.)

The two maps below illustrate how the risk to wildlife differs in these two scenarios. The maps show the risk of an ecosystem seeing an “abrupt exposure event”
under RCP2.6 (top) and RCP8.5 (bottom). An “abrupt exposure event” is defined as when more than 20 per cent of all species in an ecosystem are exposed to
temperatures beyond their natural range in a single decade.

The maps show how, under

high emissions, many biodiversity hotspots, including the Amazon, parts of southern
Africa and southeast Asia, could face a very high risk of exposure to intolerable temperatures by the end
of the century.

The research finds that, under

2C of global warming, only 2 per cent of ecosystems worldwide are likely to face
an abrupt exposure event by the end of the century. Under 4C, this proportion rises to 15 per cent .
The authors also find that limiting
global warming to below 2C could delay the time when ecosystems first
experience abrupt exposure events by up to six decades , when compared to the RCP8.5 scenario of very high emissions.
This is indicated on the charts below, which show the projected percentage of the world’s ocean (left) and land (ecosystems) exposed to intolerable temperatures
under RCP2.6 (light blue) and RCP8.5 (purple) from 2020-2100. (The chart also shows results for RCP4.5 (orange), a scenario where future emissions are moderately
high.)

‘Not too late’

The research finds that, under

a very high emissions scenario, ecosystems could be exposed to intolerably high
temperatures as early as this decade. However, this does not mean it is too late to act, Pigot tells Carbon Brief:

“Our results show very clearly that it is not too late to act and the benefits of acting now will be massive
and will accumulate over time. By holding warming below 2C, we can effectively ‘flatten the curve’ of
how climate risks to biodiversity accumulates over time, delaying the exposure of the most at-risk
species by many decades and averting exposure entirely for many thousands of species .”
The findings are “very strong and convincing” says Peter Soroye, a PhD candidate in biology from the University of Ottawa, Canada, who recently published a study
on projected bumblebee declines worldwide. He tells Carbon Brief:

“One of the critical things that this and other large-scale studies on climate change-related biodiversity
impacts show is the positive effect of reducing carbon emissions on future biodiversity . Work like this
demonstrates that while future climate change will modify ecosystems around the globe – overwhelmingly for the worse – we can mitigate many of

these impacts by rapidly reducing our carbon emissions.”

Scenario two is Oceans---

Pursuits of harmful geoengineering are inevitable and will destroy marine life---only the plan
establishes an effective legal framework that stops unilateral attempts in favor of effective,
cooperative solutions
Doelle 15 (Dr. Meinhard Doelle, Professor of Law at Schulich School of Law, Marine & Environmental
Law Institute, Dalhousie University, drafter of the NS Environment Act and as policy advisor on the 1992
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, served as a non-governmental member of the Canadian
delegation to the UN climate change negotiations between 2000-2006, “Geoengineering and Dispute
Settlement Under UNCLOS and the UNFCCC: Stormy Seas Ahead,” Chapter 16 of “Climate Change
Impacts on Ocean and Coastal Law: U.S. and International Perspectives,” edited by Randall S. Abate,
Florida A&M University College of Law, Oxford Scholarship Online, January 2015,
https://tinyurl.com/52zeane7)
***note – SRM = solar radiation management, CDR = direct carbon dioxide removal, OIF = ocean iron
fertilization, DSP = disputes settlement procedures
Impacts of climate change on oceans are not limited to the impacts of unmitigated climate change. Efforts
to mitigate and adapt to climate
change also affect ocean ecosystems. Efforts to produce renewable energy in the marine environment, for example, through offshore wind,
wave, and tidal energy projects all will have some impact on marine ecosystems. More recently, geoengineering has emerged as a possible
tool to respond to climate change, but with potentially significant implications for ocean systems.
As concern over our ability to avoid the worst impacts of climate change through traditional mitigation efforts has risen in the past decade, geoengineering

has moved rapidly from the periphery into the mainstream. With the ongoing impasse in efforts under the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)2 to ensure an adequate global mitigation effort to avoid a runaway climate scenario, some
scientists and policy makers are turning to geoengineering as an alternative tool. 3
For purposes of this chapter, geoengineering is defined as the “intentional large-scale manipulation of the environment”4 The key aspects of the definition are the
intent and the effect of the action: environmental change must be the primary intent of the action, and its effects must be at a continental or global scale.5
Geoengineering can affect a range of environmental systems for various purposes. The focus in this chapter is on marine-based efforts to alter the climate system to
mitigate climate change impacts.

A number of the
options currently considered either propose making direct use of oceans to engineer the
climate, or are expected to have significant impacts on oceans. Given the current absence of a global consensus on how to best tackle
climate change— and the uneven distribution of emissions, mitigation efforts, adaptation capacity, and vulnerability— it is not difficult to anticipate a future where
countries faced with the impacts of unmitigated climate change will have divergent views on whether and how to use
geoengineering technologies to avoid the worst impacts.
Geoengineering options, however, come with their own impacts, risks, and uncertainties. These impacts, risks, and
uncertainties will likely be viewed differently in different parts of the world. Countries at risk from the impacts of sea level rise or extreme

weather events, for example, after decades of failed attempts to push for adequate mitigation, may at some point feel justified to implement

geoengineering options unilaterally, especially if they offer cost effective ways to prevent impacts that can no
longer be avoided through global emission reduction efforts. More generally, some regions will be more vulnerable to climate change, some regions will be more
dependent on ocean resources, and some regions will have higher capacity to adapt to climate change. Consequently, the uneven
distribution of
potential benefits, impacts, risks and uncertainties can reasonably be expected to lead to disputes over the
deployment of geoengineering.
This chapter explores how the dispute settlement procedures under the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)6 and the UNFCCC are likely to respond to
disputes over ocean based geoengineering initiatives designed to counter the effects of climate change. This focus is chosen to illustrate the challenge of solving
such disputes, recognizing that there are many other forums that may be utilized to resolve geoengineering disputes. Among these are other multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs), such as the Convention on Biological Diversity,7 human rights tribunals, and domestic courts.8

This chapter addresses the issues surrounding dispute resolution over geoengineering in five steps. First, the promise, impacts, risks, and uncertainties surrounding
geoengineering in the oceans are briefly explored. Second, possible violations of substantive provisions of UNCLOS or UNFCCC as a result of unilateral ocean iron
fertilization (OIF) effort by member states are identified. Third, an overview of the various dispute settlement procedures under UNCLOS and the UNFCCC is
provided. An assessment of key issues, such as choice of procedure, triggering, and mechanism for resolving disputes over geoengineering is offered. The chapter
concludes with some final thoughts on dispute settlement at the intersection of ocean governance and climate change.

I. Ocean-based Geoengineering Methods

In a post-Kyoto world of stalled climate negotiations and continuously rising greenhouse gas emissions, geoengineering has
attracted the interest of those looking beyond conventional mitigation solutions. Geoengineering can be classified into two basic
methods: direct carbon dioxide removal (CDR), and solar radiation management (SRM). 9 CDR refers to mechanisms that
remove atmospheric CO2, and thus address one of the causes of anthropogenic climate change by reducing the greenhouse effect.10 CDR methods include large-
scale enhancements of land-based sinks, weather modification, and biochemical and mechanical schemes intended to increase the oceanic uptake of CO2.11 SRM
methods aim to mitigate climate change by reducing the amount of solar radiation that the Earth absorbs, by changing the planetary albedo, or reflectivity.12 One
notable advantage of SRM over CDR is that the climate change mitigation effects can be observed much faster for SRM methods.13 Geoengineering activities can
take place on land, in the ocean, in the atmosphere, or in space, though land and ocean-based methods have been the subject of the most experiments to date. In
the following section, SRM and CDR methods of geoengineering that utilize the oceans are briefly described.

A. SRM Methods
1. Aerosol Marine Cloud Brightening
Injection of aerosols into clouds is an SRM strategy that can be deployed from the oceans. It would involve a fleet of remote controlled vessels
that would spray water droplets into marine clouds with the aim of increasing cloud condensation, and thus raising cloud albedo.14 Models show that
impacts are unlikely to be homogeneous,15 so it is difficult to predict its efficacy. Cost estimates of marine cloud modification by aerosol
injection from ships are generally significantly lower than conventional mitigation measures, though estimates are subject to considerable uncertainties.16
Aerosol marine cloud brightening can cause changes in precipitation and weather patterns, and have potentially adverse effects
on the ozone layer and high-altitude clouds.17
2. Ocean Surface Albedo Modification
This SRM method involves altering the reflectivity of the surface of the ocean. Seitz, for example, describes a technology where instead of
injecting aerosols into clouds, tiny bubbles of air, or hydrosols, are injected into the surface of the water.18 The brightened surface has higher albedo, which results
in lower heat absorption. Hydrosols may be preferable to aerosols, because they have a shorter life cycle, and their effect can be more tailored if negative ecological
impacts are observed.19 Ships equipped with the technology to disperse hydrosols already exist, and the application of hydrosols can be more localized compared
to cloud-brightening aerosols.20 While this method does not pose as much risk to the global weather patterns, it
could alter ocean convection
patterns, increase ocean acidification, and affect marine life through pollution and changing light

conditions.21
B. CDR Methods
1. Ocean-based Weathering
This CDR method works by increasing the ocean’s alkalinity, either by adding strong bases into the water, or
through an electrochemical reaction.22 Since higher uptake of atmospheric CO2 by the oceans can lead to
ocean acidification, this method would counter that process, and encourage further absorption of CO2. Some of the drawbacks
include the safety concerns with transporting the chemicals necessary for dissolution, or the energy necessary to complete the electrochemical reaction.23 In
addition, large areas of ocean would be involved in deploying this technology, and substantial land areas affected by the mining of the resources needed.24 As an
alternative, the chemical reaction can take place at a power plant where CO2 is being released, and the solution that would be created by that process would then
be released to the oceans.25

2. Physical Pump

Another CDR technology that can use the oceans is a physical pump, consisting of large vertical pipes that will enhance the downwelling and upwelling effects within
the ocean. The idea is that increasing the circulation of the water will increase CO2 sequestration rates.26 Despite the natural solubility pump contributing more to
the deep ocean CO2 deposits than the biological pump, current estimates of the efficacy of this CDR method show that a displacement of 1 million m3/s would only
result in a sequestration of 0.01 to 0.02 GtC/year.27 Solubility pump projects carry the risk of transporting dissolved CO2 from the deep ocean to the surface, and
releasing it into the atmosphere.28

3. Biological Pump: Ocean Iron Fertilization (OIF)

Phytoplankton close to the ocean surface draws CO2 from the atmosphere by performing photosynthesis and turning CO2 into organic carbon.29 OIF works as a
CDR mechanism by increasing the productivity of the plankton, and thus drawing down CO2 from the atmosphere.30 The most efficient location for OIF is in the
Southern Ocean, an area with high-nutrient low- chlorophyll (HNLC) waters, where the main factor limiting CO2 absorption is iron.31 Once iron is added, plankton
growth is encouraged, and more photosynthesis occurs. The definition of OIF under the London Convention and the London Protocol is “any activity undertaken by
humans with the intention of stimulating primary productivity in the oceans”32 The economic appeal of OIF is potentially strong: the estimated cost, again subject
to high uncertainties, is significantly lower than conventional mitigation options.33

OIF is perhaps the most piloted and researched ocean-based method. Between 1993 and 2009, 13 in situ ocean fertilization experiments were
conducted. A number of factors that may limit its efficacy were discovered.34 Despite the extensive research that has been conducted, the potential environmental
effects of OIF are not well known. Some of the possible
negative effects include increased ocean acidification and algal
blooms, leading to eutrophication and anoxia.35 Algal blooms can travel, and thus cause an impact on a
much larger area of the ocean than what was originally fertilized. The increase in phytoplankton resulting from OIF comes at
the base of the food chain.36 There is a potential positive aspect associated with the growth of algae: an OIF technique was actually patented as a way of increasing
fish stocks.37 It is unclear, however, how the increase in productivity will affect individual species and ecosystems.

C. Concerns Regarding Geoengineering Methods

In addition to specific concerns associated with each of the individual SRM and CDR methods described above, there are general concerns with the use of
geoengineering to mitigate climate change. First, given the current state of knowledge, which is largely theoretical, it is difficult to determine whether the negative
impacts of some geoengineering projects would outweigh the promised results, and whether it would lead to yet unknown environmental and social damage.38

Second, successfully deploying geoengineering strategies risks reducing the incentive to lower greenhouse gas emissions, and thus cause a moral hazard by
becoming a substitute to more direct action on climate change. 39 Even the serious consideration of geoengineering may result in a reduction of effort to pursue
more traditional climate mitigation solutions by governments and private investors alike. This moral hazard is exacerbated by the fact that some geoengineering
proposals do not mitigate all negative impacts of climate change; for example, albedo modification still leaves the oceans open to acidification from atmospheric
CO2. Geoengineering could leave important effects of the increase in GHG concentrations unmitigated, but could nevertheless gain traction with those reluctant to
change because it does not challenge the status quo of high carbon consumption.40

Finally, and perhaps most pertinent to this chapter, the explicit purpose of geoengineering is to cause global effects on the climate system, while most ocean-based
SRM and CDR methods can be carried out unilaterally. This means proponents may be faced with international conflict and questions about the legitimacy of their
efforts.41 In the final analysis, it
is the cost and the ability to act unilaterally that has the greatest potential to make
geoengineering attractive to states most vulnerable to unmitigated climate change who may grow increasingly frustrated by the global
stalemate on conventional mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage, and the increasing evidence of dramatic impacts.

II.. Possible Geoengineering Disputes under the UNFCCC

Identifying specific substantive disputes related to geoengineering under the UNFCCC regime is a particular challenge given the state of the UNFCC regime. Some of the key elements of the
current regime, particularly those contained in the Kyoto Protocol,42 are not likely to survive past 2020. Many new elements are currently under active negotiation. Elements of the framework
convention itself could be amended as a result of the negotiations currently under way. It is far from clear whether the issue of geo-engineering will be specifically addressed as part of the
2015 agreement, or whether agreement will be reached at all.43 As a result of these uncertainties, possible disputes under the UNFCCC related to geo-engineering are considered at a fairly
high level.
Disputes under the UNFCCC with respect to geoengineering would likely fall into two broad categories. One would explore whether geoengineering generally or a specific method is prohibited
under the UNFCCC. There is little basis for such positions under the UNFCCC as it stands as of this writing, but it is conceivable that the 2015 agreement could address the appropriateness of
geoengineering as a way to achieve the objectives of the UNFCCC.

The second category would consider whether geoengineering generally or specific methods are recognized, endorsed, or otherwise sanctioned under the UNFCCC in some form. Framed most
broadly, disputes could focus on whether geoengineering efforts are considered to be efforts consistent with the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC in Article 2. More specifically, they could
entail question about whether efforts to pursue geoengineering would count toward a Party’s mitigation or adaptation efforts, finance obligations, or commitments regarding the development
and dissemination of climate technologies. An emerging issue might include whether impacts from geoengineering could be the basis for assistance under the emerging loss and damage
mechanism.44

In the absence of more specific agreement on the role of geo-engineering, there are some general provisions in the UNFCCC that may offer some basis for resolving these disputes. The
UNFCCC preamble, for example, draws on a number of principles from the 1972 Stockholm Declaration.45 Some of the provisions that may be relevant to a dispute include Principles 2, 3, 6, 7,
and 21. Of these, Principle 21, a codification of the customary international law principle against transboundary harm, is the one specifically referenced in the preamble, so is most likely to be
given weight in case of a dispute under the UNFCCC.

Article 2 also has potential to be relevant in disputes over geoengineering: The ultimate objective of the convention is to “achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the
Convention, the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”46 With regard
to SRM methods, this provision makes it clear that the UNFCCC priorities lie in addressing the root causes of climate change, namely concentrations of atmospheric CO2, so it seems unlikely
that proponents of SRM geoengineering will be able to argue that their purpose is to fulfil the ultimate objective of the Convention.

Article 3.3 potentially raises complex questions about the application of precaution to geoengineering.47 Assuming that uncertainty over the impacts of geoengineering continues, it seems
clear that as long as conventional mitigation measures still have a reasonable chance to succeed, precaution would weigh against implementing geoengineering methods. However, if
geoengineering methods are pursued at a time when conventional mitigation is unlikely to prevent run-away climate change, it will be much more debatable whether a precautionary
approach would advocate for or against the use of geoengineering. Furthermore, differences between SRM and CDR methods would suggest some significant differences in the application of
precaution, most notably the fact that CDR methods may address ocean acidification and other effects of GHG emissions while SRM methods do not.

Finally, Article 4.1(b) and (d) are likely to be relevant to disputes over the use of geoengineering as mitigation measures. Subsection (b) provides a general mandate that “Parties shall formulate
and implement programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change by addressing anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases.”48 Subsection
(d) more specifically commits Parties to “promote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs ...
including ... oceans as well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems.”49

Oceans are specifically identified as a significant sink for greenhouse gases. These provisions could therefore be used by a party to seek to justify geoengineering projects as fulfilling these
commitments under the Convention. For developed country parties, this commitment is further reiterated in Article 4.2(a), which states that they shall develop national measures to mitigate
climate change by protecting and enhancing greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. Similarly to Article 4.1(b), the provision does not mandate a specific activity.

On balance, it would seem difficult to use UNFCCC articles 3.3, 4.1(b) and 4.1(d) as persuasive justifications for deploying geoengineering projects because the UNFCCC does not mandate the
impugned action specifically. According to article 33.3(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in interpreting a treaty, “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation” shall be taken into account.50 This would imply that if parties have not generally accepted the meaning of the
UNFCCC to be that of compelling specific action, they cannot use it as a defense. To date, the more reasonable interpretation of UNFCCC would seem to be that it is not compelling specific
actions. Furthermore, paragraph (c) states that one must also consider “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties,” meaning the position could not
be supported without discharging the state’s responsibility pursuant to general principles of international environmental law, notably the prevention of transboundary harm.51

The role of geoengineering as an appropriate mitigation strategy under the UNFCCC will be brought to the attention of UNFCCC negotiators as a result of the release of the IPCC Fifth
Assessment report.52 To date, however, there has been no official endorsement by the IPCC, which defines mitigation as “actions that reduce net carbon emission and limit long-term climate
change.”53 In its Fourth Assessment Report in 2007, geoengineering is referred to as “speculative.”54 It is not examined as thoroughly, due to a lack of studies showing reliable results.55

In 2011, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Expert Meeting on geoengineering concluded that there could be some overlap between geoengineering and mitigation, but
did not discuss the possibility of updating the definition of mitigation to include geoengineering.56 The report does, however, refer to CDR geoengineering methods as addressing the same
point of the carbon cycle as some accepted mitigation techniques.57

The Summary for Policy Makers released as part of the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC only briefly mentions geo-engineering. It points out, for example, that many impacts of climate
change are already irreversible unless GHGs are actively removed from the atmosphere. The IPCC refrains from making a comprehensive quantitative assessment of geoengineering, pointing
again to the lack of sufficient evidence. It does, however, highlight some of the limitations of CDR methods, and states that SRM methods “have the potential to substantially offset a global
temperature rise,” but could give rise to further environmental concerns.58

III. Dispute Settlement under the UNFCCC

MEAs have generally distinguished between non-compliance procedures (NCP) and dispute settlement procedures (DSP). NCPs focus on questions of a Party’s compliance with its treaty
commitments and obligations, whereas DSPs are designed more broadly to deal with disputes related to or arising out of a treaty. The UNFCCC makes provision for both, though the NCP has to
date not been set up, and neither process has been used.

The NCP in the form of a multilateral consultative process, contemplated under Article 13 of the Convention, is not required. The COP is simply mandated to consider the establishment of such
a process to be available for Parties to resolve questions regarding the implementation of the Convention.59 After some effort to develop this multilateral consultative process during the early
COPs, this effort has been abandoned for the time being.

Article 14 of the UNFCCC establishes the more traditional DSP.60 While it has not been used to date, its essential elements are set out in Article 14 of the Convention with the following three
defining features. First, the process only contemplates disputes among Parties.61 Second, Parties have some choice over the process, with compulsory conciliation serving as the default if
parties have not either selected the same compulsory process or otherwise agree on a process for resolving their dispute.62 Third, the outcome of the compulsory conciliation process is non-
binding.63

Process options other than the default conciliation process include the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and arbitration.64 Declarations regarding choice of forum can be made under Article
14.65 The Netherlands have accepted both the ICJ and arbitration as compulsory with regards to countries that have accepted one or both of these forms, and the Solomon Islands have
accepted arbitration as compulsory.66 As a result, a dispute under the UNFCCC DSP is most likely to proceed through conciliation, assuming disputing Parties do not otherwise agree after the
dispute has been formally registered.

The dispute settlement mechanism under Article 14 of the UNFCCC is open to Parties to the Convention, which include states and regional economic integration organizations (the European
Union). Private actors are not parties to the Conventions, and would therefore not be able to initiate a DSP. If a state party wanted to pursue the settlement of a dispute relating to a
geoengineering project, the dispute would have to be brought against a state party with some responsibility for the project, even if a privately owned corporation executed it.

UNFCCC does not exclude other avenues for settling disputes; it actually provides for this possibility under Art 14.1.67 If, however, the dispute is not settled twelve months after the
notification of the existence of a dispute, it shall be submitted to conciliation.68 An exception arises where both parties have made [the same] default selection under 14.2.69 It is unlikely that
this would arise under current conditions, given the small number of parties who have made a selection, so an unresolved dispute is most likely to go to conciliation after twelve months.

Article 14 does contemplate guidance from the COP on the design of arbitration and conciliation procedures,70 though no such procedures have been finalized to date. The focus of the COP
instead has shifted to the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol adopted the DSP of the UNFCCC, but also developed a detailed NCP in the form of a compliance system to deal with the full range of
commitments and obligations Parties accepted under the Protocol, ranging from accounting and reporting on emissions and credits to meeting specific emission reduction targets.
The Kyoto compliance system consists of a facilitative branch responsible for a broad range of Party commitments, and an enforcement branch with a mandate to impose prescribed
consequences for breaches of obligations dealing with emission reduction targets and accounting of emissions and credits. While the DSP and the facilitative branch of the Kyoto compliance
system have been essentially inactive, the enforcement branch of the Kyoto compliance system has rendered a number of decisions, and is likely to continue to be active for a few more years.
The rulings of the enforcement branch could potentially serve as a resource to other dispute settlement processes.71 While an assessment of the Kyoto compliance mechanism is beyond the
scope of this chapter, its future is currently very much in doubt as the current negotiations are based on an expectation that the Kyoto Protocol itself will not continue past its second
commitment period.72

Beyond these non-compliance and dispute settlement procedures under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, the COP itself has played a significant role in dealing
with disputes that have arisen under the UNFCCC. Among such disputes that have come before the COP have been appeals of decisions of the Kyoto compliance
committee73 and complaints about decisions of other institutions created within the UNFCCC, such as the Clean Development Mechanism.74 As the number of
institutions under the UNFCCC grows, so will the pressure to develop formal dispute resolution mechanisms to respond to complaints from
Parties and private actors about the manner in which these institutions are carrying out their mandates.

There is only limited guidance on how disputes over the appropriate forum for resolving disputes might be resolved. The Kyoto
compliance system is clear on the limits of its mandate, as is the appeal procedure from the Kyoto compliance system to the COP.
This still leaves ample room for disagreements among Parties as to which forum would be most appropriate to resolve a given dispute.
Furthermore, none of the current mechanisms is accessible to non- parties, though negotiations are under way on a possible appeal mechanism for decisions of the
CDM executive board by non-parties affected by a decision.75

It is conceivable that a dispute over geoengineering under the UNFCCC would turn into a debate over the seriousness of environmental impacts, risks, and
uncertainties of the geo- engineering technology compared to the impacts, risks and uncertainties of unmitigated climate change, with the precautionary principle
at the center of the debate. At the heart of such a dispute would be the magnitude of the harm. Which set of negative effects will be more serious: the loss of fish
stocks and damage to the marine ecosystem due to anoxia, for example, or the increase in the effects of climate change as a result of a decision not to deploy
geoengineering?

In addition to comparing the magnitude of harm, the resolution of a dispute over geoengineering under the UNFCCC would likely also turn on the nature of the
harm. For example, article 3.3 of the UNFCCC seems to place climate change “above” other environmental impacts in terms of the application of the precautionary
principle.76 The argument could be centered on the effectiveness of the geoengineering technology, the question of how much CO2 it could sequester, and what
climate impacts these efforts could avoid. Underlying all these issues would be the risk and uncertainties, which are considerable both with respect to the impacts of
geoengineering, and the impacts of unmitigated climate change. As discussed in the following sections, a
dispute under UNCLOS may have a
different focus, as it may be more squarely focused on the impacts on marine ecosystems.
IV. Possible Geoengineering Disputes under UNCLOS

Compared to the UNFCCC, relevant provisions under UNCLOS are easily identified, have been in place for
decades, and are not subject to active negotiations. This allows for a more concrete assessment of how the provisions of UNCLOS may
respond to geoengineering disputes. The most relevant group of obligations under UNCLOS that are likely to be relevant are provisions in Part XII dealing with the
protection of the marine environment, particularly Articles 192, 194, 195, and 210.77

UNCLOS, Part XII deals generally with State obligations with respect to the marine environment. As early as 1991, academics characterized Part XII as constitutional
in character, reflecting in part existing custom, but at the same time providing the first comprehensive statement on the protection of the marine environment in
international law.78

The starting point for Part XII is a general obligation under Article 192 to “protect and preserve the marine environment,” 79 balanced with a reaffirmation of the
right of States to exploit their natural resources “in accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment.” 80 Under this part of the
Convention, States are obligated to take all measures consistent with the Convention necessary “to prevent, reduce and
control pollution of the marine environment from any source, using the best practical means.” 81 Article 194 is
central to any analysis of State obligations regarding geoengineering. It provides the foundation for the following specific
obligations that provide further guidance on what a State may be expected to do to protect and preserve the marine environment:

• an obligation for States to act individually or jointly as appropriate82;

• an obligation to take all measures necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment83;

• an obligation for States to use best practical means at their disposal84;

• an obligation for States to act in accordance with their capabilities85;

• an obligation to endeavour to harmonize policies with other States86;

• an obligation for States to control activities under their control or jurisdiction so as to not cause damage by pollution to other States and their environment87;

• an obligation to prevent pollution from spreading to areas outside of a State’s jurisdiction of control88; and

• a specific obligation for the preservation and projection or rare or fragile ecosystems, and the habitat of species at risk.89

Article 195 directs States on measures to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment.90 It does so by obliging States to prevent the
transfer of harm from one type or area to another. While the exact scope of this provision is not clear, it does, at a minimum, introduce the concept
that measures must be designed so as to not result in other environmental damage, an issue that has been the
subject of considerable controversy in the context of geoengineering. In so doing, UNCLOS may have been ahead of its
time, providing a simple, yet potentially very effective tool to require States to take a holistic and
integrated approach to addressing environmental issues.91
Article 210 calls on states to adopt regulations “to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment by dumping.”92 This provision is generally
interpreted as giving power to the 1972 London Convention, which provides for detailed international rules regulating dumping.93 Breaching the general
prohibition on OIF under the London Convention could be argued as a breach of UNCLOS pursuant to Article 210.94 This could apply to other geoengineering
methods that include actions that constitute “dumping.” The importance of this link is accentuated by the recent negotiation of an amendment to the 1996 Protocol
to the London Convention.95 The exact relationship between the London ocean dumping regime and UNCLOS is far from clear. Uncertainties include whether the
placement of iron constitutes dumping for purposes of Article 210, and whether the reference to the London Convention includes the 1996 Protocol and its 2013
amendments, which provide for a permitting process for the placement of iron for scientific purposes.96 Under certain circumstances, UNCLOS could be used as a
possible justification for geoengineering. A Party might make the case that the threat of climate change to ocean pH in the form of ocean acidification is more
severe than the environmental harm of the geoengineering project. Since
there is a strong link between atmospheric CO2 and
ocean acidification, sequestering CO2 might be argued to fulfill a state’s responsibility under UNCLOS
Article 192 or 194(1).97 This justification would, however, not be available for SRM methods. It is also less likely to be successful for OIF
given the breadth of evidence regarding its potential negative environmental impacts.

V. Dispute Settlement under UNCLOS

The UNCLOS dispute settlement procedures set out in Part XV of UNCLOS have been described as rivalling the
process set up under the World Trade Organization in terms of potential for resolving Party-to-Party disputes and the power
conferred on dispute resolution tribunals,98 although they are limited in scope to defined subject matters set out in UNCLOS.99 The process is set out in three
sections of Part XV. The first section establishes the rules under which the Parties to a dispute are to agree on a dispute settlement tool.100 The second section sets
rules for initiating a dispute settlement process in the absence of agreement.101 The third section provides some limited exceptions to the binding dispute
settlement process.102 Two features of the UNCLOS process that have been particularly noted by commentators are the ability to initiate the process without
having to agree on a procedure, on a case-by-case basis, and the binding nature of the outcomes.103

This part of the chapter considers how the dispute settlement process under UNCLOS would respond to a claim related to a State’s use of marine-based
geoengineering to reduce the impacts of climate change. It focuses on aspects of the UNCLOS dispute settlement process that are likely to be relevant to
geoengineering.

As with many international dispute settlement procedures, the overriding obligation on Parties is to resolve disputes through peaceful means.104 Parties are
encouraged to seek agreement on how to resolve disputes. The binding settlement process set out in Part XV of UNCLOS is intended as a safeguard for cases where
disputes cannot be resolved by Parties on their own, and where they are unable to agree on a process for resolving the dispute peacefully.105 Consensus on how to
resolve a dispute will often take the form of a specific agreement reached at some point after the dispute arises. Agreement can also arise from State obligations
enshrined in another treaty to which the disputing countries are Parties, if that treaty sets out a process for resolving disputes under UNCLOS.106 Whether the
UNCLOS dispute settlement process can be initiated, therefore, depends in general terms on whether a settlement is reached through an alternate process agreed
to by the Parties, and whether the alternate process excludes the application of the UNCLOS dispute settlement process.107

Subject to these conditions, any Party to UNCLOS can initiate a binding dispute settlement process against another
Party to the Convention.108 The choice of procedure is determined based on a number of factors, including any declarations filed by the Parties under Article 287(1)
on which of the following procedures are acceptable to it:

• the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) process under Annex VI109

• the International Court of Justice (ICJ)110;

• an arbitral tribunal established under UNCLOS, Annex VII111; or

• a special arbitral tribunal established under UNCLOS Annex VIII.112

In the absence of a declaration, a Party is deemed to have selected the arbitral tribunal procedure under Annex VII.113 In cases where two Parties to a dispute have
not selected a common procedure in their respective declarations, the arbitral tribunal procedure under Annex VII will likewise be the applicable procedure.
Regardless of the choice of procedure, the tribunal chosen has general jurisdiction concerning the interpretation and application of UNCLOS, and has the authority
to determine its own jurisdiction to hear a particular dispute.114 In
addition to UNCLOS, a tribunal selected to resolve a dispute
under these provisions is authorized to consider other rules of international law to the extent that they are not incompatible with
the rules set out in UNCLOS.115 A tribunal’s findings are final and binding on the Parties to the dispute, but not binding on
other Parties to UNCLOS, and, therefore, at least in theory, are not precedent setting for purposes of interpreting the provisions of UNCLOS.116

While there are a number of differences between the four procedures set out in Article 287, the most important factor for Parties is likely to be the level of control
over the selection of members of a tribunal on the one hand, and the level of expertise of those members on the other hand. ITLOS and the ICJ have the advantage
of being permanent tribunals and as such are more likely to make predictable rulings, and rulings that take into account the implications of specific rulings for the
future of dispute settlement under UNCLOS. The arbitration process under Annex VII has the advantage of providing a Party with more control over the membership
of the specific tribunal hearing a particular dispute. In addition, the Annex VIII special arbitration tribunal process has the advantage of the flexibility to be able to
ensure special expertise in the subject matter under dispute.117
Given the consistency in terms of jurisdiction, scope, and outcome of these four processes, a detailed comparison of the four
options is not necessary for purposes of determining whether a dispute over the deployment of geoengineering could be brought under UNCLOS.
More important for purposes of this analysis of whether a Party can bring a successful claim under UNCLOS is the
question of jurisdiction with respect to a claim, as well as substantive issues related to such a claim. On the issue of
jurisdiction to force a tribunal ruling under UNCLOS, the most important rulings to date under UNCLOS have been two rulings related to a dispute over Southern
Bluefin Tuna.118 In addition, the ruling of the ITLOS in the dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom (The MOX Plant Case)119 offers some indication that
the ITLOS will be reluctant to accept claims for which the UNCLOS process is unavailable where the issue under dispute is also relevant under another international
agreement with a dispute settlement process.120

environmental degradation caused by a geoengineering project could be

There is a reasonable basis for concluding that the

covered by the UNCLOS articles pertaining to protection of the marine environment, namely Articles 192, 194 and 195. Furthermore,
the London Convention and its 1996 Protocol can be viewed as implementing UNCLOS Article 210, and could constitute an
appropriate international standard for purposes of Article 297(1) to extend the application of the compulsory dispute
settlement process to geoengineering projects in coastal waters. Even disputes pertaining to OIF
undertaken within a coastal country’s territory could, therefore, potentially be subject to compulsory dispute
settlement under UNCLOS.

Another important feature of the UNCLOS DSP is the availability of provisional measures for the
purpose of prevention serious environmental harm, pursuant to Article 290.121 This may be helpful when dealing
with environmental problems associated with geoengineering. Provisional measures are only available when specified
conditions are met. For example, in the MOX Plant case, the applicant did not meet the bar of sufficient urgency to
warrant the enactment of provisional measures. 122 In the Southern Bluefin Tuna dispute, the declining of
fish stocks fulfilled the urgency requirement, and ITLOS set fish catch totals as a provisional measure.

Ecologically safe and effective ocean geoengineering solves ocean acidification---but the plan
is key
Webb et al. 21 – Romany M. Webb is an Associate Research Scholar at Columbia Law School and
Senior Fellow at the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law. Korey Silverman-Roati is an Associate
Research Scholar at Columbia Law School and Climate Law Fellow at the Sabin Center for Climate
Change Law. Michael B. Gerrard is the Andrew Sabin Professor of Professional Practice at Columbia Law
School and Faculty Director of the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, “Removing Carbon Dioxide
Through Ocean Alkalinity Enhancement and Seaweed Cultivation: Legal Challenges and Opportunities”,
COLUMBIA PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER, FORTHCOMING (2021).
https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3743&context=faculty_scholarship
*Acidic = low pH, indicates that alkalinity enhancements increases ocean pH levels*

Deep economy-wide cuts in carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions are essential to avert
the worst impacts of climate change. However, many scientists now agree that simply cutting future
emissions will not be enough, and it will also be necessary to remove previously emitted carbon
dioxide from the atmosphere . There is growing interest in the potential for enhanced carbon dioxide
removal via the oceans, which have absorbed approximately twenty-five percent of all carbon dioxide
released into the atmosphere to date.297

A number of approaches have been proposed for increasing carbon dioxide removal and storage in the oceans. One
option is ocean alkalinity
enhancement, which can be performed either by discharging ground alkaline rock into ocean waters or
through an electrochemical process, involving the application of an electric current to water.298 Both
techniques ultimately increase ocean pH levels , which enables greater uptake of carbon dioxide.299
Another approach to increase carbon dioxide uptake is seaweed cultivation, which involves the farming
of kelp and other macroalgae that absorbs carbon dioxide as it grows and stores it in biomass.300

The legal framework applicable to ocean alkalinity enhancement, seaweed cultivation, and other carbon
dioxide removal projects will differ depending on precisely where they occur. Under international law,
each country has jurisdiction over areas within 200 n.m. of its coastline, and further in some
circumstances.301 In the U.S., coastal states have primary control over areas within three n.m. (or, in
Texas and on the west coast of Florida, nine n.m.) of the coast, while the federal government controls
U.S. waters further offshore.302

There are no international or U.S. federal laws dealing specifically with use of the oceans for carbon
dioxide removal, but various general environmental and other laws could apply to projects depending
on how they are conducted. Moreover, projects conducted in areas under the jurisdiction of other countries, would be subject to their laws.
Potentially applicable laws in key countries will be explored in a series of (forthcoming) papers convened by the authors.

Ocean acidification causes extinction---we’re at a tipping point now

Cross, 19 - academic researcher and presenter at Warwick University, Goldsmiths, University of
London, and Edinburgh University, member of the temporary research programme at Sandberg Instituut
‘The Commoner’s Society’ ( David, ‘Fossils Reveal How Ocean Acidification Can Cause Mass Extinction’,
octobr 23 2019, https://www.azocleantech.com/news.aspx?newsID=26690 )//hecht

Known as the K-T extinction, the event marks the end of the Cretaceous Period and start of the Tertiary Period. As well as starting a catastrophic chain of
events that included tsunamis and earthquakes, the asteroid expelled a massive amount of sulphur-rich bedrock into the atmosphere which could have caused
violent acid rains.

directly led to the acidification of the planet’s seas . “Before the impact event, we could not
This would have

detect any increasing acidification of the oceans ,” said the study's lead author, Michael Henehan, a scientist at GFZ German Research
Centre for Geosciences in Potsdam, Germany.

According to the paper, published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, the after-effects
of the impact radically altered
the chemical make-up of the ocean which in turn made the acidic seas uninhabitable to the tiny
creatures such as plankton. These diverse organisms provide a crucial source of food to many other aquatic
organisms and species, thus, the severe disruption to the marine food chain caused by K-T asteroid may have played a
significant part in the scale of the mass extinction.

While the sudden intensification of the ocean’s

acid levels would have lasted less than 1000 years – less than a heartbeat of geological time – this
would have been, “long enough to kill off entire ecosystems ,” says Pincelli Hull, co-author of the paper and professor of geology at Yale.
While this may all make for stimulating reading for some, it comes with an ominous warning for many as today’s oceans are also undergoing a process of
acidification.

There may still be some way to go for current acidification levels to reach the same magnitudes as the K-
T extinction, but it is, “moving toward that scale, but it’s not quite there yet ,” says Hull. However, the
combination of ocean acidification, extreme climate events, and environmental disaster could
accelerate the chances of a major ecological collapse on the planetary scale.
Arctic ocean sustainability is the controlling internal link into global marine health---
extinction
Eddy Carmack 19, Senior Research Scientist Emeritus for the Department of Fisheries and Oceans at
the Institute of Ocean Sciences, Gail Whiteman, Director of the Pentland Centre for Sustainability in
Business at Lancaster University, Jeremy Wilkinson, Sea Ice Physicist at the British Antarctic Survey, and
Jan-Gunnar Winther, Director of the National Centre for the Ocean and the Arctic, “4 Reasons Why The
Arctic Is Key To Our Planet’s Survival”, 1/9/2019, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/4-
reasons-why-the-arctic-is-key-to-our-planets-survival/

There are four reasons why the Arctic Ocean is distinct from other oceans and critical to our planet’s survival :

First, while this relatively small (by ocean standards) marine environment holds only 1% of the world’s ocean volume and occupies only 3% of the world’s ocean
surface area, its impact on the global climate system is disproportionately large .

Second, though small in area, it scoops up over 10% of global river runoff and claims twenty of the world’s 100
longest rivers.

Third, the Arctic marine domain comprises about a third of the world’s coastline .

And fourth , the Arctic Ocean contains one-quarter of the world’s continental shelf , of immense socio-
ecological importance .
On all counts, the little Arctic Ocean holds its own on the global stage.

Despite its importance, the Arctic Ocean sometimes goes missing from public ocean-talk as more ‘local’ marine issues take centre stage. A key point for non-experts

is to recognize that the Arctic Ocean is different from other oceans and it is the critical driver of the global
oceanic conveyor belt . For example, the Gulf Stream and North Atlantic Current are strongly regulated
by processes that occur in the Arctic. The Arctic Ocean is remote to many of us, but its influence can be felt
everywhere .

How do we know this? Oceanographers have robust scientific evidence on the role the Arctic plays within our
planet. For instance, the global hydrological cycle determines the distribution of water around the
planet – and affects food and water security globally . This cycle begins in warmer climates, with the equatorial trade winds and mid-
latitude westerlies. It is refined and shaped by the global distribution of land masses that, in the northern hemisphere, collect precipitation and direct it poleward
through massive rivers. These rivers introduce substantial amounts of fresh water into the upper layers of the Arctic Ocean, providing the required conditions for an
ice cover to form, and regulating nutrient supplies and biological productivity.

But these dynamics are undergoing unprecedented and worrying changes that are already visible. Jonathan Smith, producer of Blue
Planet II, reflected on the new realities of filming in the Arctic Ocean: “We were all set and ready to film but we needed two major things – walrus and ice. I had
expected that walrus may be hard to find, but I did not expect it to be hard to find ice in the Arctic…. the crew were all commenting how surprisingly warm it was.”
They were not mistaken. Over many years, scientists have been recording changes in global temperature, hydrological cycles and sea-ice cover. These changes

have all had significant and eminently observable effects on the Arctic Ocean . Over the past two decades alone, summer sea-
ice coverage in the Arctic Ocean has decreased by about seven million square kilometres to just over 3 million square kilometres. This loss represents a surface area
larger than all but about a dozen countries in the world.

However, the Arctic Ocean is not just a passive victim of anthropogenic change: it also drives disruptions back to the global system in ways that were overlooked
even a decade ago. Though the exact mechanisms are still debated, Arctic sea-ice loss may be affecting both ocean currents and mid-latitude weather patterns

along our southern borders. And the processes occurring in the Arctic play a vital role in connecting the Pacific and
the Atlantic. The fabled Northwest Passage is more than a destination for explorers and commercial ship traffic; the Arctic is a n
oceanographic freight train that ties together and influences other maritime regions and the global
climate system .

Ocean regulations prevent extinction from food insecurity, resource overuse, pollution,
acidification, oxygen deficit, biod, mangrove, seagrass and reef collapse, and eutrophication
Mustafa, et al 19 (Saleem Mustafa, Abentin Estim and Rossita Shapawi, Borneo Marine Research
Institute, Universiti Malaysia Sabah, “Future-Proofing Oceans for Food Security and Poverty Alleviation,”
in Decent Work and Economic Growth, Encyclopedia of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, eds. Leal
Filho W., Azul A., Brandli L., Özuyar P., Wall T., published online 3-14-2019, DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-
71058-7_57-1)
Oceans help us in multiple ways and should be of everyone’s concern, not just that of researchers. They form the largest ecosystem and
life support system of the Earth. Covering about 71% of the surface of this planet, oceans generate more than half of the oxygen we breathe,
hold 97% of the world’s water, regulate climate, supply food and pharmaceuticals, provide millions of jobs, offer unlimited recreation, and allow trade and transport

(Bokova 2013). No matter how far we live from the coast, the influence of the sea is omnipresent. Our dependence on the sea is increasing
with the growth of human population . It is a source of protein for more than 1.0 billion people . The
ocean-based economy has been estimated to be US$ 125–145 trillion per year (Constanza et al. 2014). The value of goods and services originating from coastal and
marine environments is about $2.5 trillion each year, making oceans the seventh largest economy in the world which helps in the livelihoods of 10–12% of the
world’s population (Northrop 2018). The total asset value is estimated to be $24 trillion (WWF 2015). Obviously, marine conservation is not a luxury; it is a necessity
and should be considered for developing business models for sustainable income, food security, poverty alleviation, and social welfare.

The term “blue growth” has become a new buzz word, to highlight the significance of oceans in the global economy. It refers to enhancing the use of coasts and
oceans in a way as to optimize the benefits from sustainable development of marine resources. It
is a long-term strategy based on the
realization that the sea is a driver of global economy and has the potential for endless innovations to
spur economic growth, significantly increase its contribution to food security and to curb poverty (ECORYS-
EU 2012). Food security is a major global challenge. How much it matters is not difficult to understand from some basic facts and figures. Out of 7.6 billion people in
the world, nearly 821 million are suffering from undernourishment or chronic food deprivation (FAO 2018). This figure amounts to one out of every ten persons.

Almost all the hungry people live in developing countries. By 2050, there will be more than 9 billion people , and the demand
for food will be at least 60% more than what it is today (Breene 2016). Land-based ag riculture cannot meet
the demand . Land available for agriculture has declined, and humans have outstripped its carrying
capacity in many ways. Oceans can be a large part of the solution to this massive problem (Mustafa 2015;
Mustafa and Shapawi 2015; Mustafa and Estim 2018) provided they are in a healthy condition . Seafood is a major factor in

food security. This can be imagined from the fact that capture fisheries in 2016 supplied 80 million tons of fish, while aquaculture yielded about 90.9 million
tons (SOFIA 2018). Including seaweed in this global production raises the total production to 190.2 million tons (SOFIA 2018). The value of global fish exports in 2017
rose to US$ 152 billion (FAO 2018).

Ocean economic opportunities are linked to ocean sustainability without which the blue economy
benefits cannot be reaped for the present and future generations . All the key dimensions of human-
ocean interaction need to be understood and appreciated for their significance in poverty alleviation ,
societal welfare, and human survival .

This entry discusses the significance of futureproofing the oceans, i.e., anticipating the future scenarios by best
available evidence and scientific analysis and taking measures for minimizing the adverse effects that
future events might produce on the ecosystem services . This is essential for future-proofing the supply of
seafood and integrity of our economic systems due to the worsening condition of the oceans resulting
from pollution , acidification , warming , oxygen deficit , biodiversity loss , and many related problems.
Key Challenges Constraining Ocean Services
Oceans are facing tremendous disruptions from human actions , directly and indirectly. The main impacts are
overfishing , pollution , habitat degradation , introduction of alien species , and those linked to climate
change ( acidification , warming of seawater). These changes are impairing the capacity of oceans to continue to provide the ecosystem
services which have a bearing on food security and human well-being. The effects on marine food web and biodiversity are receiving considerable attention. Some
of their consequences are well-understood, while others are largely unknown (Jackson 2010; NRC 2010).

Future-proofing of oceans requires reducing impacts and strengthening their resilience to withstand
shocks and further impairments. Marine critical habitats deserve priority because of the roles they play in biodiversity and creating living
conditions for the species that support the seafood supplies (Roberts et al. 2005). There is no dearth of information showing that the

decline of harvests from the sea is linked to degradation of habitats such as mangroves , seagrasses ,
and coral reefs . Besides, they help in sequestration of carbon and contribute to reducing the effects of
ocean acidification (Roberts et al. 2017). Of all the pollutants that have been taking a heavy toll of marine environment, the plastic waste has come to the
forefront of widespread attention (Estim and Sudirman 2017). About 8 million tons of plastic could be entering the oceans if the measurements presented by
Jambeck et al. (2015) are given credence. Out of this, 236,000 tons are microplastic (van Sebille et al. 2015) which is hazardous for marine life.

Eutrophication (a process in which a body of water becomes overly enriched with nutrients and minerals
that induce excessive growth of plants and algae and cause oxygen depletion ) of the sea frequently
triggers the formation of harmful algal blooms , often referred to as “red tide” (blooms of toxin-producing unicellular plantlike organisms,
referred to as “dinoflagellates,” that impart a red tint to the sea water (Pinet 2009)). Certain species of the algae produce toxins that become

concentrated in tissues of filter-feeding fish and shellfish. A large number of seafood species die or are rendered unfit for human consumption.
People who consume contaminated shellfish may suffer poisoning, some of which are potentially fatal (Mustafa et al. 2018).
Emissions from burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil, and gas) increase the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. As oceans continue to absorb this gas, the
sea water becomes acidic, and this disturbs the metabolic functions of marine organisms which become vulnerable (Pinet 2009). This has potential effects on
fisheries as well as fish farming systems that depend on water supply from the sea. Simultaneously
with acidification, the warming of
sea linked to changing climate could have devastating effects on seafood production (Mustafa et al. 2013, 2015; Cho
2018).

Food Security and Poverty Alleviation

Food security is commonly understood as a situation when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet
their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life (FAO 1996). The role of food harvested from the oceans for household food security depends
on many factors, including availability in the market, accessibility, affordability, and stability of supply in all seasons and cultural practices in harvesting and
consumption (FAO 2016). Fish landed by small-scale fisheries are a source of protein, omega-3 fatty acids, and micronutrients (vitamins and minerals), especially for
the world’s impoverished people. Without capture fisheries, they could not afford these nutrients from other foodstuffs that are expensive. Many small pelagic fish,
especially sardines, anchovies, some species of mackerel, and others that are marketed at low price, are not nutritionally inferior and are regular food for low-
income coastal communities. They have a direct significant contribution to food security and in lifting many people out of poverty and malnutrition. Being
planktivorous (species that consume tiny organisms in the sea called as plankton which drift in the sea and are unable to swim against water currents), these fish are
key to developing more sustainable and climate-friendly seafood systems. Anchovies and certain smaller marine crustaceans are eaten whole, and this amounts to
more efficient utilization of sea harvest. For a better assessment of the role of fish, it is necessary to understand that poverty has many dimensions related to lack of
means to meet the basic personal needs such as food, clothing, and shelter. Thus, it is not merely lack or shortage of money but many aspects of life experiences in
matters of health, education, and quality of life marked by deprivations as explained by the United Nations Development Programme in 2006.

Farming of species such as groupers and lobsters which sell at a high price may be beyond the purchase capacity of poor communities, but monetarily it helps
people through employment opportunities that the farming creates. However, in the context of food security, it should be of concern that landings of low-price
species are not diverted to feed expensive farmed fish. The integrated multi-trophic aquaculture that combines farming of high-value fish, shrimp, or lobster with
seaweeds and benthic invertebrates (animals that do not have vertebral column and live on, in, or near the seabed) is the low-carbon aquatic food farming that
maximizes the yield for growers and minimizes the impact on the environment (Estim 2015) in addition to making fresh food available to the indigenous
communities.

Seafood production and processing provide jobs and income to millions of people (fish workers and their families). This helps in their capacity to buy food to stay
nourished. There is a long value chain comprising harvesting associated with the capture fisheries or farming, processing, and marketing which are all labor-
intensive and engage a large number of people. Women control most of these operations, and this helps in meeting the social empowerment goals of sustainable
development. In most of the developing countries where malnourishment is widespread, the communities benefit directly from small-scale fisheries (Cliffe and
Akinrotimi 2015).

While the Sustainable Development Goal 2 (end hunger, achieve food security, improve nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture) exclusively deals with this
matter, all the other Sustainable Development Goals are directly or indirectly connected to sustainable and healthy food (Fabbri 2017), and seafood is playing an
increasingly important role in this matter. These are the reasons why fish ranks high in programs aimed at combating malnutrition and poverty (Belton and Thilsted
2014).
An economic powerhouse of the scale of oceans requires generating a momentum for action across the society and a massive mobilization of informed people. It

is too late to leave oceans to take care of themselves and undo the damage done by the humans. We
need to assume stewardship role and demonstrate it by responsible actions and solutions to revive
the ocean ecosystem . Therefore, investment in ocean management should continue through formal education for development of expert human
resources and generation of knowledge. The informal education should simultaneously need to pick up to bring all the sections of the society on board for dealing
with the issues of sustainability and future-proofing (Ottosson and Samuelsson 2009).

Causes fish wars – extinction

Dr. Julian Cribb 16, Adjunct Professor of Science Communication at the University of Technology Sydney
and Fellow of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering (ATSE), Principal of
Julian Cribb & Associates, “Surviving the 21st Century: Humanity's Ten Great Challenges and How We
Can Overcome Them”, p. 74-75
In 1999 the Oslo Peace Research Institute issued a ground-breaking paper by Indra de Soysa and Nils Gleditsch which drew attention to the fact that, in the first
decade of the post-Cold War era, most conflicts began with develop- ment failure and contests between the different players over those fundamen- tal resources
for life: food, land and water. “The new internal wars, extremely bloody in terms of civilian casualties, reflect subsistence crises and are largely apolitical,” they said
(De Soya and Gleditsch 1999). This represented a chal- lenge to the long-held academic view that scarcity is a product of war—rather than war a being product of
scarcity. In fact, humans have always contested key resources vi et armis—and politics, religion, patriotism and ethnicity are just the way we tend to marshal
ourselves into opposing groups around them. Peter Gleick’s work on water conflicts lends substance to the warnings of two UN chiefs, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and

Ban Ki-Moon, of the increased danger of wars breaking out over this indispensable resource as scarcity takes hold. ‘Food wars’ (including so-called ‘fish
wars’ ) have erupt ed on numerous occasions in Africa—where the Rwandan genocide and drawn-out bloody con- flicts in Darfur and the
Horn of Africa are particular examples—but also in Central America and Asia (Messer et al. 1998). These fights are almost always over the

fundamentals of human survival and tend to originate as civil conflicts, which then spiral out of control
to embroil neighbour states and even the superpowers .

In the emerging era of resource instability, described in Chap. 3, the risk of war is liable to increase in proportion to the scarcity of
essential resources, be they water, farm land, food itself, oil, gas or strategic minerals. The possibiity that some of these conflicts will

involve the discharge of chemical, bio logical or nuclear weapons cannot be discounted. For example, in their Age
of Consequences report, Kurt Campbell and colleagues at the US Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) foreshadowed that with the famines and global
disruption arising out of severe climate change (2.6 °C, in their sce- nario) “It is clear that even nuclear war cannot be excluded as a political consequence.

Moreover, so-called “limited nuclear war” in any part of the world can escalate to a full-scale nuclear
exchange among the big nuclear powers .” With catastrophic change of 5° or more, “The probability of conflict between two destabilized
nuclear powers would seem high.” Furthermore “Armed conflict between nations over resources and even territory, such as the Nile and tributaries, is likely, and

nuclear war is possible” (Campbell et al. 2007).

It’s reverse casual---only the plan makes UNCLOS effective at protecting the Arctic broadly
Nevitt 14 – Mark Nevitt has served as the Sharswood Fellow at Penn Law and Professor of Leadership &
Law at the U.S. Naval Academy. He is currently Associate Professor at Syracuse University College of
Law. His research focuses on climate change’s legal and national security implications, 9-30-2020,
"Climate change, Arctic security and why the U.S. should join the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea," Center For Ethics and the Rule of Law, https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/news/10524-climate-
change-arctic-security-and-why-the-us/news/cerl-news
In addition, climate change is both opening maritime trade routes and offering the possibility of natural
resource extraction on the Arctic’s continental shelf. It is also creating a whole new operational domain
for the world’s militaries.

Unlike Antarctica—which is also being dramatically impacted by climate change— the Arctic lacks a
comprehensive, Arctic-specific treaty . The Arctic region is largely governed by the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the increasingly important work of the Arctic Council, and a
hodgepodge of laws and bilateral agreements. But climate change is increasingly stressing this legal
and policy framework.

UNCLOS, aptly described as “A Constitution of the Oceans,” remains one of the most comprehensive and
complex international law treaties ever negotiated. It will take on increased importance as the Arctic
adjusts to its 21st century climate reality. The United States, however, remains the only Arctic Council
member that is not party to UNCLOS . This is short-sighted and contrary to U.S. national security,
environmental, and economic interests. Despite continued U.S. intransigence on law of the sea
ratification, a remarkably diverse coalition of American national security experts, environmentalists, and
business interests support the United States becoming a party to UNCLOS. To be sure, the United States
accepts UNCLOS’s key navigational provisions as binding as a matter of customary international law. But
as a non-party to UNCLOS, the United States increasingly lacks a “seat at the table” on core law of the
sea matters and cannot avail itself of its adjudicatory bodies. It also cannot take advantage of key
UNCLOS provisions, such as submitting information to establish the outer limits of Alaska’s continental
shelf. Climate change’s opening of maritime trade routes and the possibility for natural resource
extraction reinforces the need for the U.S. Senate to provide its advice and consent on this critical
treaty.

In what follows, I will argue the U.S. should join UNCLOS and I will highlight three UNCLOS provisions that take on increasing importance in a
changing Arctic.

Article 38: The Right of Transit Passage Through the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route

The right of transit passage will take on increased importance as climate change opens two Arctic
maritime routes: the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route.
These two seasonal waterways—the Northwest Passage that runs through Canada and the Northern Sea Route (sometimes referred to as the Northeast Passage)
that hugs the Russian coastline—are both found in the Arctic. The Northwest Passage contains several possible routes running through the Canadian Arctic Islands,
linking trade from northeast Asia via North America to the northern Atlantic. The Northern Sea Route provides the shortest maritime link between eastern and
western Russia while offering another global maritime shortcut for the world’s shipping.

The right of transit passage applies to straits that are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another
part of the high seas or exclusive economic zone. All ships and aircraft enjoy this right, and UNCLOS makes clear that this right “shall not be impeded” provided that
ships and aircraft proceed without delay through (or over) the strait. But does the right of transit passage fully apply to these two Arctic waterways? It remains
unclear.

As the Arctic sea ice extent decreases, shipping from all nations—to include nations outside the Arctic
such as China—will also increase as nations seek faster and cheaper routes. Yet the international right of
transit passage is running headfirst into Russian and Canadian claims over these waters. Canada, for
example, asserts that much of the Northwest Passage traverses through an Arctic Archipelago that are
historic Canadian internal waters. In addition, Russia asserts a similar internal waters claim over three
straits that makeup the Northern Sea Route. Both Russian and Canadian claims challenge the right of
transit passage through these waters. While these claims have been protested as excessive by both the United States and European Union,
their precise legal status remains unclear.
While the United States and Canada signed a 1988 Agreement on Arctic Cooperation that has defused tensions between these two allies, consider how much the
Arctic (and world) has changed since 1988. How much longer can the “agree to disagree” approach hold?

Article 76: Defining the Continental Shelf

The five Arctic coastal states (Denmark (via Greenland), Russia, United States, Norway, and Canada) all
have continental shelves in the Arctic Ocean. Converging at the North Pole, each nation’s extended
continental shelf comes together the way orange wedges meet at the stem. Approximately half of the
Arctic’s ocean floor is composed of the continental shelf, the largest percentage of any of the world’s
oceans.
Why is the Arctic continental shelf so important? A coastal state’s continental shelf comprises the seabed and subsoil that extend far beyond the territorial sea.
The United States has an enormous continental shelf off the coast of Alaska, and the seabed and subsoil
provide access to valuable oil, natural gas, and minerals. Unlike other maritime zone delineations, the
continental shelf lacks an express outer limitation. Under UNCLOS, for example, each coastal state’s
exclusive economic zone extends out to 200 nautical miles. But a coastal state’s continental shelf is not
limited to 200 nautical miles, and it is far more difficult to determine its outer limit with precision. Under
UNCLOS, each coastal state’s continental shelf extends beyond its territorial sea “throughout the natural
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin .” What, exactly, constitutes a natural
prolongation is a complex scientific and technical question that is made even more difficult by the costs to procure this information in the harsh Arctic environment.

As climate change renews the possibility for Arctic oil, mineral, and gas extraction determining the
precise breadth of each nation’s continental shelf will take on increased importance. Indeed, the U.S.
Geological Survey estimates that 30% of the world’s undiscovered gas and 13% of undiscovered oil lies
north of the Arctic Circle. UNCLOS can aid in resolving competing continental shelf claims with the
procedures outlined in Article 76 that establishes the Commission for the Limits on the Continental Shelf
(CLCS).
With Canada’s Arctic submission to the CLCS in May 2019, each Arctic coastal state—but not the United States—has submitted information in support of its
continental shelf claim. Not surprisingly, each Arctic coastal state seeks a fairly broad interpretation of “natural prolongation” and the outer breadth of their
continental shelf. Russia, for example, asserts a continental shelf that extends to the Lomonosov Ridge, an area that extends to the North Pole several hundred
miles from its Arctic coastline.

As a non-party to UNCLOS, the United States is likely prohibited from making a submission to the CLCS in
support of its Arctic continental shelf claim off the Alaskan coast. While the CLCS can only make
recommendations on the breadth of each nation’s continental shelf, “the limits of the continental shelf
established by a coastal state on the basis of these recommendations shall be final and binding.”
Regardless of the finality of CLCS decisions, the United States should ratify UNCLOS and immediately
make an Alaskan continental shelf submission to the CLCS.
Article 234: Ice Covered Areas

As highlighted above, climate change is dramatically altering the Arctic icepack’s size, opening up
shipping lines and navigational waterways for the first time in human history. Beyond the disputed
claims by Russia and Canada over the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route, climate change is
forcing us to look with fresh eyes at each Arctic coastal state’s authority over Arctic “ice-covered areas.”
Article 234 (“Ice-covered areas”) of the law of the sea treaty states:

Coastal states have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the
prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the
limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence
of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation
…[s]uch laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and protection of the marine
environment.

This provision is taking on increasing importance in the Arctic, which has large swaths of ice-covered
areas that are melting due to climate change. Article 234 bestows special regulatory authority for Arctic
coastal states over ice-covered areas up to 200 nautical miles, the limits of the exclusive economic zone.
Yet climate change raises several key questions about the outer scope of this authority. What, for,
example, does “for most of the year” and “severe climatic conditions” mean? And won’t climate change
gradually diminish any regulatory authority over ice-covered areas as the Arctic ice pack melts? Further,
how should we apply Article 234 to the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route? And how can this
provision be reconciled with the right of transit and innocent passage discussed earlier?
Despite these questions, both Canada and Russia have taken a forward-leaning view of their authority under Article 234. Russia has asserted an expansive view of
this authority, requiring notification of foreign ships prior to transiting the Northeast Passage. While this runs counter to other UNCLOS provisions concerning the
right of innocent passage through another nation’s territorial sea, it, too, remains unresolved.

The U.S. Should Ratify and Sign the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

The United States is an Arctic nation. And the Arctic Council’s 2008 Ilulissat Declaration reaffirmed the
Arctic Council’s commitment to the law of the sea framework. While the United States is not a party to
UNCLOS, the United States has actually been a good law of the sea partner in upholding navigational
freedoms throughout the world. And the U.S. Navy has complemented and enforced many key UNCLOS
provisions through freedom of navigation operations. The United States has also worked hard to resolve
disputes peacefully, a core law of the sea principle. But the United States lacks a seat at the law of the
sea table, and its credibility and commitment to the law of the sea are questioned by other nations— a
point made painfully clear in both the Arctic and in ongoing disputes in the South China Sea. As these
three provisions highlight, the law of the sea will be central to resolving current and future disputes in
the Arctic. President Bill Clinton sent UNCLOS and the 1994 Amendment to the Senate for its advice and
consent in 1994. And both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama urged Senate law of the sea
treaty ratification. While the Senate held hearings in 2004 and 2012, a vote on UNCLOS ratification died
on the vine. Whoever wins the 2020 U.S. presidential election should renew calls for Senate ratification.
And the Senate should provide its advice and consent to UNCLOS without delay.

New international agreements fail---only increasing the strength of UNCLOS solves

Lodge 11 – Michael W. Lodge is a Legal Counsel, International Seabed Authority, Arctic Science.
Published March 2011 , International Law and Climate Change Legal Aspects of Marine Science in the
Arctic Ocean| Chapter 18: “The International Seabed Authority and the Arctic,” accessible via Springer
Nature, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-24203-8

VI. Conclusions: The Role of the ISA in Arctic Ocean Governance

Whilst recognizing the need to pursue strengthened cooperation in order to fully implement the
relevant provisions of the UNCLOS framework, it seems doubtful that there is a need for new
international instruments or regimes . There would appear to be ample opportunity to strengthen
international cooperation in a manner that is complementary to the implementation of existing
instruments and that does not undermine the role of existing mechanisms .

In this regard, as envisaged by the relevant provisions of Part XI UNCLOS, the Authority may act not only as a vehicle for the
dissemination of the results of marine scientific research and analysis, particularly on the marine environment of the Arctic, but also as an intermediary for the
development of the programs referred to in Art. 143 UNCLOS that aim to strengthen the research capabilities of developing States and technologically less
developed States.

One way in which this could be achieved in practice is through a memorandum of understanding
between the Authority and a competent regional organization or institution, such as the Arctic Council.
The Arctic Council is not an international organization per se, but a form of cooperation sui generis.
Nevertheless, its main functions of ensuring the protection of the environment and coordination of
‘common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection
in the Arcti c’are fully consistent with the responsibility of the Authority to ensure the effective protection of the marine environment from the harmful
effects of deep seabed mining. A number of organizations are already observers to the Arctic Council, including several United Nations programs and bodies.

A good example of how regional cooperation within and between States and competent international organizations can be organized in order to effectively combine
sustainable management and use of resources with environmental protection can be seen in the North-East Atlantic. Here, the Convention for the Protection of the
Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (‘OSPAR’)establishes a regional mechanism for the protection of the marine environment. As part of this mechanism,
the OSPAR Commission cooperates closely with other relevant organizations in the region, including the North-East Atlantic Fishery Commission (‘NEAFC’) and the
Authority. In this regard, a memorandum of understanding between OSPAR and the Authority was signed in 2010 following approval by the governing bodies of
both organizations. Also in 2010, as a result of a lengthy process of consultation and cooperation, both OSPAR and NEAFC put in place innovative measures to
manage a number of maritime areas beyond national jurisdiction. Discussions
are ongoing as to how the Authority should
respond, in respect of the Area, to the measures adopted by OSPAR for the water column beyond
national jurisdiction, but the point is that a framework exists for such discussions . Moreover, the
framework that has been established through the mechanism of a memorandum of understanding fully
reflects the respective competences of each organization. In this way, States with an interest in the
region are in a better position to give effect to the obligations of cooperation inherent in the UNCLOS.

Ratification is key---nothing else is sufficient

Oxman 04 – Bernard H. Oxman, UnclosDebate, "Statement of Bernard H. Oxman: Oversight hearing to
examine the "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea" ." Testimony before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Environment & Public Works, March 24, 2004.
https://www.unclosdebate.org/argument/287/us-should-ratify-un-convention-law-sea-unclos

With respect to the underlying objective of promoting stability in the law of the sea, four main
advantages of widespread, including U.S., ratification have been identified:

Treaties are perceived as binding. Legislators, administrators, and judges are more likely to feel bound
to respect treaty obligations. … Even nonparties are more likely to be cautious about acting a manner
contrary to a widely ratified Convention; if they do, they are more likely to be isolated when their claims
are challenged.

Treaty rules are written . Treaty rules are easier to identify and are often more determinate than
customary law rules. Even if one argues that a customary law rule is identical to a treaty rule, that
argument in and of itself is elusive and hard to prove. Even a nonlawyer reading the text of a binding
treaty knows he or she is reading a binding legal rule, and can often form some appreciation of what the
rule may require.
Compulsory arbitration . Parties to the Law of the Sea Convention are bound to arbitrate or adjudicate
most types of unresolved disputes regarding the interpretation or application of the Convention. This
can help forestall questionable claims in the first place. Perhaps more importantly, it provides an option
for responding to unilateral claims that may well be less costly than either acquiescence or
confrontation. Because states are not bound to arbitrate or adjudicate disputes absent express agreement to do so, this benefit of the Convention … is
dependent upon ratification.

Long-term stability. Experience in [the twentieth] century has shown that the rules of the customary
law of the sea are too easily undermined and changed by unilateral claims of coastal states. Treaty rules
are hard to change unilaterally. At the same time, the Law of the Sea Convention establishes
international mechanisms for ordered change that promote rather than threaten the long-term stability
of the system as a whole.
 1AC---Plan
Thus the plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its
protection of water resources in the United States through the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea
 1AC---Russia
Advantage 2 is Russia---
Climate change makes hybrid war and gray zone miscalc in the Artic inevitable---now is key
Goodman et al 21 – Sherri Goodman, Kate Guy, and Marisol Maddox, Center for Climate and Security,
an institute of the Council on Strategic Risks Vegard Valther Hansen, Ole Jacob Sending and Iselin
Németh Winther, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. January 2021, The Center for Climate and
Security “Climate Change and Security in the Arctic” https://climateandsecurity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2021/01/Climate-Change-and-Security-in-the-Arctic_CCS_NUPI_January-2021-1.pdf

As the High North becomes more accessible and gains strategic importance, it will play a critical role in
regional and global security relations in the years to come . Geopolitical tensions, institutions in various
states of flux, increased commercial, civilian, and military activity, and emerging threats to populations
and infrastructure are likely to pose significant challenges to stability in the region, particularly in an
Uncurbed Warming Scenario.

At the macro-level, these risks are unfolding against the backdrop of accelerating climate change and
increasing global instability, which will challenge conventional methods of international cooperation .
Climate change effects will further exacerbate existing international cooperation challenges on trade,
arms control, and cyber operations, especially under an Uncurbed scenario . Climate change will also offer opportunities
for cooperation on shared risks, including with commercial and other non-state actors, as evidenced by the Paris Agreement and other initiatives . In an era

that is increasingly characterized by irregular warfare, however, part of the challenge will be in balancing
cooperation with an appropriate recognition of the risks of hybrid warfare and gray zone tactics.

These macro-level developments will affect security in the Arctic, where climate change serves as a
multiplier of risks . In a low emissions scenario, likely marked by high levels of multilateral cooperation on shared climate concerns, smaller Arctic
countries like Norway are likely to retain relative strength. In a high emissions scenario, climate change will rapidly
destabilize systems without the benefits of strong multilateral action , requiring states and other
actors to take on higher costs, deal with internal instabilities, and compete in new ways, all of which
could be particularly dangerous to small countries.

Developments across 2021 and the early years of this decade will have profound implications on the
direction of security and stability in the region over the ten year time horizon of this repor t. With the election of
U.S. President Joe Biden, it is likely that an aggressive climate foreign policy agenda, with the overarching goal of curbing global emissions, will be pursued by the
United States. The global pressures of the coronavirus pandemic and related economic crisis could produce significant green stimulus spending from the worlds’
major economies, as global expectations also mount for countries to follow a path to reach carbon neutrality by mid-century. These growing domestic and
diplomatic mitigation commitments increase the likelihood of realizing a Curbed Warming Scenario.

Likewise, global commitments to better integrate climate change into security planning could be
promising for multilateral defense capabilities in the High North. President Biden has pledged to exert
significant U.S. diplomatic power in the Arctic region , which could be a stabilizing force and
opportunity for the development of new regional institutional capabilities . NATO has likewise begun new efforts to
integrate climate into its 2030 strategic planning processes, and the EU is emerging as a more important actor to coordinate and mobilize resources to mitigate and
adapt to climate change in the region and abroad.

Given these opportunities and growing regional challenges, it is a key moment for the Norwegian Ministry of Defense to advance new efforts to address the critical
shortfall in capabilities and partnerships around climate security in the Arctic. Dialogue will be critical among militaries operating in the region, and few rules or
institutions exist to resolve crises or misunderstandings that may arise alongside the changes caused by a warming climate. Norway is well-positioned to establish
new mechanisms of cooperation, and could readily advance a Military Code of Conduct for Arctic Forces, as described in this report.

If Arctic tensions continue to grow in the years ahead, it will be increasingly important for security actors
in the region to prioritize understanding climate change in their forecasts and scenarios. It is clear from
our initial forecasting in this report that long-term security outcomes in the High North will significantly
depend upon success in efforts to curb global climate changes . The current decade will be critical for
determining which security pathway the Arctic region will follow - one of cooperation, clean energy
transition, strengthened institutions, resilient infrastructure, and globally proportionate military activity;
or one of rapidly escalating change, fossil fuel demand, destabilized institutions, and high likelihood of
short-term focused, aggressive commercial endeavors .

Arctic competition spills up and escalates---unchecked Russian Arctic access leads to re-
militarization risking great power conflict
Breitenbauch et al. 19 – Henrik Breitenbauch is the director of the Centre for Military Studies at the
Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. Kristian Søby Kristensen is the deputy
director of the Centre for Military Studies at the Department of Political Science, University of
Copenhagen. Jonas Groesmeyer is a research assistant at the Centre for Military Studies at the
Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, 11/28/2019, “Military and Environmental
Challenges in the Arctic”, Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/11/28/military-and-
environmental-challenges-in-arctic-pub-80424/ceng

Three related changes are afoot in the Arctic. The first is environmental. Until recently, it made physical
sense to distinguish between the ice-free areas of the North Atlantic Ocean and the Norwegian
coastline, on the one hand, and the more or less permanently frozen areas within the Arctic Circle, on
the other. So far, these two geographic areas have also corresponded to two different kinds of politics:
regular security politics, including through NATO, in the Atlantic; and tentatively more cooperative
international politics among the coastal Arctic states . Yet as polar ice melts and contracts, the Arctic,
too, risks becoming a zone of increased great-power competition.
In contrast to how climate change plays out in the global South, where state capacity is lower and states are more susceptible to the negative effects of climate
change, the Arctic contains strong states that have the institutional and problem-solving capacities to prevent new conflicts from arising. As
a result, in the
Arctic, climate change may actually enhance trade, research, and travel opportunities due to increased
potential access.

Nevertheless, such increased access will eventually lead to greater state presence in the region. In this way,
climate change risks putting further pressure on bilateral and multilateral relations in the Arctic .
Smaller states can become targets of geopolitically motivated foreign investment, such as China’s
interest in buying a swath of land in northeast Iceland .1
RUSSIAN REMILITARIZATION

Russian remilitarization . While NATO member states and Russia have significantly reduced the size of their
The second change comes in the form of

navies, Russian development of new missiles in effect makes distances smaller and regions closer to each

other. The range, speed, and precision of these weapons make it more difficult to separate the North
Atlantic and the Arctic as distinct theaters of operations, as both the Baltics and the Norwegian Sea can
be the targets of attacks from the Barents Sea as well as from land. Land, submarine, and air-launched cruise missiles
challenge NATO’s ability to reinforce both mainland Europe and the North Atlantic.2

From the Russian point of view, increased militarization of the Arctic makes sense and is legitimate. With
several straits and passages becoming more accessible, Moscow is gaining access to both onshore and
offshore resources , such as fish and possibly mineral wealth.
The trouble for NATO is that militarization in the Arctic can become militarization of the Arctic , with ramifications
beyond the region. The new strength and breadth of Russia’s access-denial strategy increasingly enables
Moscow to threaten distant targets without deploying traditional power projection . The Arctic may still be relatively
free of Russian maritime or air forces, but it has the potential to become a base from which Moscow can threaten targets of strategic

value in the Arctic and as far away as the North Atlantic and Europe . In that sense, Russia’s military buildup
cannot be isolated from the bigger picture of strategic competition with NATO and allies’ obligation to fully carry out their
deterrence and defense obligations.

Russian nuclear development signals intentions to dominate the Artic absent effective legal
norms
Ungureanu 21 – Mihaela Ungureanu, Legal Researcher at Finabel – European Army Interoperability
Centre, 4-1-2021, "Nuclearisation and Militarisation Saga: Russia is Testing a Nuclear Torpedo in the
Arctic – Finabel," https://finabel.org/nuclearisation-and-militarisation-saga-russia-is-testing-a-nuclear-
torpedo-in-the-arctic/

A few days ago, satellite images surfaced of the infrastructure on Alexandra land island, Arkhangelsk
Oblast, designed to advance the creation of the Poseidon 2M39 missile, also named “doomsday”
because of its devastating power, which will be tested next summer. “ Doomsday” is an underwater
nuclear torpedo designed to hit the ocean floor, kicking up a radioactive tsunami that could spread
deadly radiation over thousands of miles of land, rendering it uninhabitable, thus threatening the
coastline security of the United States (Colson, 2021 ). Therefore, the Pentagon’s reaction has not been long awaited. Press Secretary
John F. Kirby stated that the United States is closely monitoring the progress, and reiterated that the US has its own interests it will defend as well. It was also

outlined that the militarisation of the Arctic is not a scenario that the US is happy about (Lopez, 2021).

Experts warn that the torpedo being developed is powered by a nuclear reactor and is intended to sneak
past coastal defences to deliver a warhead of multiple megatons. The radioactive waves resulting from
the detonation would render part of the coastline uninhabitable for decades. Such a move is of
particular interest and concern for the US and its allies because Russia seems to be refurbishing its
Soviet-era fleet of nuclear and conventional-powered icebreakers, nuclear torpedoes, etc. The fact that
such bases are inside the Russian territory, thus part of legitimate defence of its borders, shall by no
means be understood as there-to-stay. The Russian’s Realpolitik strategy is prone to advance at any
moment to establish a de facto control over areas of the Arctic circle that are further afield and more
ice-free (Walsh, 2021).

The event is part of a broader discussion about the strategic region of the Arctic. The US and Russia are similar in a way that both are
placing nuclear deterrence at the centre of their security strategies. Therefore, it is obvious that an
increasingly ice-free Arctic due to climate change, new ice cutters, and the enhancement of ports, will
make the Arctic more accessible. Moreover, it is not the first time that Russia is testing nuclear weapons in the Arctic. In 2017, it tested the
“Skyfall” nuclear-powered cruise missile which is still an experimental and largely speculative weapon. On the one hand, optimistic voices tell

that the disputes will be solved by peaceful means following International law as in any other region
(Regehr, 2019).

On the other hand, a less optimistic vision warns about a confined nuclear weapon region. One
cannot ignore that the construction of the
Poseidon 2M39, firstly announced in 2015 on Russian television, is in full-scale development now,
intended to be tested next summer. CNN posted a conclusive picture of the infrastructure development
since then. The geopolitical calm and lack of direct threats today is not a reason for wishful thinking.
Russia’s show of power always comes with concrete objectives in mind, either economic, security, or
both (Devyatkin, 2018).
The New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) ratified in 2011, showing Russian and US commitment to a significant reduction in nuclear weapons over the next
seven years was a promising step (Simpson, 2012). Under the treaty, Russia and the US were limited to an equal number of deployed strategic warheads and
weapons carrying them, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles. It aimed at imposing strict rules for transparency and compliance. Its importance was even
greater in the face of the 2019 collapse of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty which left the New START as the only pillar for preventing a deadlock
between the two. Fortunately, the New START, which was about to expire in 2021, was agreed to be extended until 2026. However, there are still unanswered
questions about provisions that the future treaty will include (Reif & Bugos, 2021).

Moreover, it is well known that Poseidon is part of a new generation of weapons pledged by Vladimir Putin in 2018 as a strategic game-changer in a fast-changing
world (Hruby, 2019, 4-14). However,
Russia insists that it only has economic intentions in the region, as the Arctic
is believed to hold approximately 240 billion barrels of oil and oil-equivalent natural gas, which is almost
10% of the world’s known conventional petroleum resources (Urban, 2015). It is believed that in the
future, oil reserves will come to an end and thus, Russia will preserve its dominant position in oil export .

Nevertheless, one cannot oversee the strategic military objective apart from economic considerations.
As the largest of the five littoral states of the Arctic Ocean and according to its 2013 Arctic strategy,
Russia seeks to maintain the role of a leading Arctic power . The area’s features such as the direct access it provides to the
Atlantic Ocean and the Arctic, its relative proximity to potential targets, and an array of important defence industry and infrastructure facilities located there, make
it well suited for strategic nuclear operations. Russia’s nuclear deterrence remains not only a key element of its security policy and military strategy but serves also
as a symbol and guarantee of Russia’s great power status. (Conley et al., 2020, 6-20 )
Moreover, criticism towards the aforementioned
strategy is that it defines the Russian’s Arctic Zone (RAZ) external borders as a matter of military security
(clause 18e ). Normally, such work is intended to designate the limits of an exclusive economic zone,
not for military purposes which directly contradicts the ever-mentioned economic consideration
(Heininen et al., 2014, 20).

In the light of aggressive Russian foreign policy in the Baltic Sea region, Syria, and Ukraine and meddling
in Western democratic processes, why believe that Russia’s behaviour in the Arctic will remain
cooperative? The dichotomy of cooperative versus competitive Russia is not new. For example, during
the Cold War, the Soviet Union sold oil and gas to Western Europe and bought Western goods, while
maintaining the Warsaw Pact as a strategic buttress against NATO (Klimenko, 2016).
By developing such a powerful nuclear torpedo while negotiating for an extension of the New START, it enhances the evidence that it adopts different foreign policy
behaviours depending on the context. Another example is striving to outweigh NATO and US in the Arctic while at the same time being a cooperative member of the
Arctic Council. Furthermore, it calls for cooperation in the region while maintaining that NATO is a primary national security threat. At home, Russian leaders
express the hope that tapping natural resources and opening a Northern Sea Route will enhance Russian power. Abroad, Russian diplomats insist that Russia is a
regional Arctic player that is ready to cooperate through multilateral organisations (Grietsenko, 2016, 3-18).

Without doubt, the Arctic serves to bolster Russia’s “greatness”, however it shall not be perceived as a
dominant regional power yet . In both the pan-Arctic and the Barents Sea region, states are wealthy, highly developed, and not dependent on
Russia for trade or security. There are EEA members (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden) and NATO members (U.S. Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway).
Despite the violation of sea law by staging large scale exercises and protesting against NATO’s activity in
Norway’s Svalbard archipelago, it ultimately requires the support of Nordic countries for investment,
finance, and technology to enhance its own energy production and regional development. Coupled with
the sanctions over the Ukrainian conflict, it definitely limits its power (Closson, 2017, 2-9).

Nevertheless, the conclusion, based on today’s state of affairs, is that Russian aspirations are not to be neglected , especially in
the light of newest events. The Arctic is one of the few regions in the world where Russian and Western
leaders meet on an equal level, therefore, abiding by international rule in demarcated boundaries,
concluding binding agreements is of tremendous importance for enhancing peace and stability for
all.

Independent of Russia, overlapping claims and resource competition make escalation

inevitable absent effective legal frameworks
Pezard et al. 18 [Pezard, Stephanie, Senior Political Scientist and Associate Research Department
Director for Defense and Political Sciences (DPS), Abbie Tingstad, and Alexandra Hall, The Future of
Arctic Cooperation in a Changing Strategic Environment: Insights from a Scenario-Based Exercise
Organised by RAND and Hosted by NUPI. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE268.html. AKIM]
1. Introduction

In recent years, the Arctic has been described in the media as having the potential for starting a resource
war or even a ‘new Cold War’1 due to factors ranging from the gradual shift from persistent thick ice cover to
more open water for longer periods and the presence of hydrocarbon and mineral resources in the
Arctic seabed, to occasional inflammatory rhetoric from officials on sovereignty issues in the Arctic and
the resurgence of security and military focus on the region . Yet by most accounts cooperation in the Arctic region remains strong –
nations have generally agreed that coordinated action furthers the interests of all. While the Arctic appears more conflict-free than many other regions, how well
established is this pattern of cooperation, and how resilient can we expect it to be? No Arctic stakeholder seems to find value in conflict at present, but
interpretations of cost and benefit to aggression in the region could change as the Arctic evolves in
response to changing climate, economic opportunities and other factors.
To address these questions, RAND Europe organised a tabletop exercise (TTX) on international cooperation in the Arctic region hosted by the Norsk Utenrikspolitisk
Institutt (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs – NUPI) in Oslo, Norway on 6 and 7 June 2017. Participants from seven countries with territory in the Arctic
(Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Russia and the United States) and the United Kingdom were invited to discuss a series of focal events that could alter
the regional security environment in the 2020 decade. Participants included representatives from diplomatic and defence organisations, shipping and oil industries,
indigenous communities and security research institutions.

The purpose of this exercise, which drew on two prior RAND projects,2 was to gain a better understanding of how the fictional yet plausible developments detailed
in scenario steps within the TTX could impact established norms of cooperation in the far north. These focal issues included the outcome of a United Nations
recommendation on overlapping Arctic Ocean continental shelf claims, increasing Arctic Ocean access leading to desired use of transpolar routes, an incident
involving maritime harassment, and a near-collision between two vessels. Focal issues were selected according to the following criteria: 1) issues are representative
of Arctic security and stability concerns in 2017 – the year the exercise was conducted; 2) these could potentially occur and plausibly raise tensions among two or
more Arctic nations in the 2020 decade; 3) no single Arctic nation is characterised as an ultimate aggressor pushing for conflict.

Participants were provided with starting conditions or core assumptions reflecting the status of different Arctic nations and other stakeholders at the beginning of
the 2020s. These were based on relevant factors and decisions, and extrapolated to the mid-2020s in plausible ways that did not reflect dramatic departures from
the 2017 present. Participants were then asked to consider the possible reactions, and available courses of action, of each of these stakeholders to four successive
focal events or ‘moves’, which were designed to trigger responses varying from low-intensity and diplomatic to potential conflict, although specific military options
were not discussed. Participants also considered whether other, similar events could have been more challenging for maintaining cooperation than the specific
scenario under consideration. Through this facilitated event, the potential implications of decisions, actions and other regional developments were explored, with a
view to identifying factors that, individually or in combination, could lead to increased tensions in the region. The intent was to generate insights about the overall
strength of regional cooperation and potential triggers for increased Arctic tensions that will be of use to policymakers and others when examining the likely
impacts, advantages and shortcomings of potential policy options.

This Perspective summarises key insights gathered from participants in the three areas covered by the exercise scenarios:

• Overlapping claims on extended continental shelf (Section 2): Upcoming recommendations from the Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf (CLCS) regarding extended continental shelf claims may become a source of tensions between states receiving a

positive notification and those told they need to submit more scientific evidence to substantiate their claims. Regardless of the outcome, these decisions

will mark the beginning of what will likely be protracted negotiations between claimants to delineate the seabed.

• Increased maritime activity (Section 3): The development of economically viable and potentially strategically important maritime shipping routes
along the northern coasts of Russia (Northern Sea Route) and Canada (Northwest Passage) – both for the purposes of trans-Arctic voyages which in some cases can
reduce transit time by days or weeks, and to serve the needs of increased hydrocarbon and mineral extraction within the region – could
trigger
economic benefits for all Arctic nations and other stakeholders . However, it may also trigger competition
between those countries that could serve as new economic hubs, increase risks to safety and the
environment, and elevate concerns about security .

• Escalating maritime incidents (Section 4): More open water for longer periods in the Arctic may encourage elevated
activity by a diverse range of national, commercial, environmental, private and other actors whose
interests may, at times, collide (in some cases, literally). Without robust tools, mechanisms and procedures to
handle potential incidents ranging from incursions into other states’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs ), to
harassment, to accidents at sea, Arctic stakeholders may find themselves at high risk of escalation of what might otherwise
have been minor safety, security and environmental incidents appropriately handled by local authorities.

Section 5 offers concluding thoughts on prospects for continued cooperation in the Arctic; what areas represent potential flashpoints according to participants in
the exercise; and their suggestions to preserve dialogue and collaboration were any of the TTX scenarios to become real. This Perspective is based exclusively on the
insights gathered from participants in the TTX and accordingly should not be viewed as an attempt to provide a comprehensive view of areas of cooperation and
potential tensions in the Arctic.

The insights below are constrained by the participants’ backgrounds; the format of the TTX, which limited discussion time; and the scenarios that were presented to
the participants. These scenarios were based on previous RAND research3 and selected based on the likelihood, as perceived by the TTX organisers, that they would
provide an interesting angle to examine various sources of tensions for various Arctic stakeholders and spur a lively discussion among participants. As a result,
scenarios tended to emphasise contentious issues rather than cooperative behaviour. Different scenarios, different participants and a different TTX format would
undoubtedly have generated a different set of insights.

2. Overlapping claims on extended continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean

The first scenario presented to participants examined the potential consequences for cooperation of upcoming CLCS notifications regarding claims to extended
continental shelves in the Arctic region. To provide some brief background, the
CLCS examines claims from nations that are
signatories to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regarding alleged extensions of their
continental shelves. While coastal nations have the right to exploit the seabed of their EEZ, i.e. within 200 nautical miles of their coast, the seabed
beyond that limit is considered part of the high seas, and the common heritage of mankind, unless the coastal state can prove that it represents a natural extension

of its continental shelf.4 CLCS recommendations, based on the scientific evidence provided by the claimants, are generally recognised
as authoritative by all UNCLOS signatories (and also by the United States, which abides by these guidelines despite not acceding to the
agreement) and serve as a basis for subsequent bilateral or multilateral negotiations between states to
delineate their continental shelves in the event of overlapping claims.

2.1 Relevance for regional stability

In the Arctic, several countries have overlapping claims pending before the CLCS (see Figure 1). In 2001 Russia was the
first to submit a claim, which was subsequently revised upon the request of the CLCS and resubmitted in 2015. Denmark submitted five laims between 2009 and
2012, one of which overlaps with Russia’s. Canada announced it would soon submit its own claim, which is expected to overlap with Russia’s and Denmark’s.
Exercise participants discussed the political, symbolic and economic value of the disputed continental shelf area, the time horizon for its potential exploitation, the
benefits of remaining within the boundaries of UNCLOS even in the event of a negative notification for some countries but not others on the part of the CLCS, and
potential wildcards that could create tensions between Arctic states in this context.

2.2 Insights from exercise

While resources will not be extracted from the seabed until far into the future, there are immediate benefits to a successful claim The economic value of the
continental shelf being claimed will not materialise until decades hence. Most of the Arctic’s natural resources are believed to be located within the coastal states’
EEZs, which are undisputed. Exploitation of the oil resources in the disputed seabed would only be economically viable if the price of oil were to be remarkably high,
and presuming technologies made such deposits extractable in the relatively near term. Interest in gas exploitation is also limited in the short to medium term due
to plentiful supply in other geographical areas. Furthermore, exploiting the Arctic seabed far from the coast poses infrastructure and logistical challenges, both to
extract resources and to transport them to international markets. While such infrastructure can be developed, the distant time horizon also creates uncertainties as
to whether exploitation will still be viable once infrastructure is in place – by then, oil prices may have plummeted again or renewable energy developed in
unforeseen ways. Another element of uncertainty is the safety and social acceptability of such exploitation. Extraction of resources means increased traffic, and a
single shipping accident in the Arctic could not only be very deadly but also have lasting, damaging consequences for the environment and populations, potentially
affecting – among other things – the overall economic attractiveness of the region. Other possible economic benefits, including fishing (with the exception of crabs
and other bottom-dwellers) and shipping, are not relevant because the CLCS only makes recommendations on the seabed, and rights to exploit the seabed do not
extend to the column of water above.
Some participants, however, underlined the possibility of more immediate economic benefits and a first-
mover advantage in the seabed areas with disputed claims. A state asserting its rights to a given seabed
area – whether following, or objecting to, the CLCS decision on the scientific validity of its claim – could theoretically give away
exploitation licences to external companies, bringing in equities from other states and reinforcing the claimant’s
position. In other words, this would be a move that would be difficult to ‘undo’ by states that believe they
have (and may have been recognised to have) a more legitimate claim than the first mover . Companies would potentially be interested
in acquiring such licences despite the lack of immediate commercial incentive because they represent assets and are held as stores of value. This point suggests that
the disputed seabed area can have some immediate value even if exploitation is to be delayed by decades.

Political value of the claims may constrain negotiations

Another potential source of tensions is the fact that extended continental shelf claims are highly
political . Both Canada and Russia face domestic imperatives that may lead them to adopt ‘hard’ positions in
negotiations. Former Prime Minister Stephen Harper put a ‘marker’ on the North Pole despite scientists charged with collecting geological evidence on the
extent of the Canadian continental shelf disagreeing with it.5 A Russian submarine’s planting of a flag on the North Pole

seabed in 2007 was viewed favourably domestically (despite the Kremlin claiming no official role in it) and with consternation
internationally. Russia’s position is particularly difficult because of potential opposition from the Parliament to

a negotiation outcome where Russia ‘loses’ some of the seabed it claims . The resolution of the territorial dispute with
Norway in the Barents Sea deal was unpopular domestically, but the leadership pushed it through nonetheless.6 As Russia is vesting a lot of

prestige in the North Pole issue, a similar situation may arise, with a Russian leader simultaneously wary
of the political impact of ‘losing’ the North Pole and reluctant to have this issue block negotiations and
prevent potential development of the remainder of the claimed area . While solutions for compromise exist – for instance,
agreeing to consider the North Pole a ‘no-man’s land’, such solutions might require careful messaging on the part of the Russian leadership to win domestically.

Domestic considerations are also important for Denmark, whose position is influenced by its relationship with Greenland. Since 2009, Greenland has been assuming
self-rule, and could in theory organise a referendum over independence at any time. Denmark made a considerable investment in terms of the resources it devoted
to substantiating scientifically its claim, and a positive recommendation from the CLCS would both justify this investment and support the position of those who
claim that Greenland stands to gain from remaining within the Kingdom of Denmark.

The North Pole has a strong symbolic role . This may even be its only role, considering that exploitation of resources in the North Pole area
would be exceptionally difficult and make little sense economically. If more than one country claiming the North Pole receives a positive notification from the CLCS,
the issue will be resolved through bilateral (or even possibly trilateral) negotiations. As
the ‘ultimate symbolic prize’, as one participant described
it, the question of which country can claim the North Pole will be a particularly thorny point of discussion,

especially perhaps for countries like Russia and Canada with strong Arctic identities.

Yet while there is potential for tensions, Arctic

countries are more likely to respect CLCS decisions and negotiate than
attempt to circumvent international norms
The first-mover7 advantage identified earlier also represents a potential source of tensions, if the first country with its claim adjudicated starts selling licences (if not
starting exploration) before overlapping claims are adjudicated too. Moving
first also establishes a marker that could frame
future negotiations. Furthermore, it would be difficult to dislodge a state that is starting to explore the
seabed, short of military confrontation – and in any case, most of the waters in discussion are not conducive to any continuous presence,
whether military or commercial. The potential for tensions is therefore higher if CLCS decisions are staggered in time
– as they likely will be, since submissions are examined in the order received – than if all decisions come at once.

Once states start to negotiate, there is also a risk that some will use various means of pressure for their
position to prevail. In one such scenario, Russia could put economic and political pressure on Danish business and
economy, or could also put pressure on Greenland or entice Greenland to leave Denmark. For Denmark, it might be easier to have a trilateral conversation with
Russia involving also Canada, for instance, as it might have difficulty withstanding such pressure on its own.

However, these situations in which countries abandon established international norms – by proceeding with
selling licences before formal negotiations, establishing more physical presence (e.g. through use of a heavy icebreaker for scientific research) before claims are
settled, or entering premature and/or aggressive negotiations – appear
quite unlikely considering that all nations involved have
much to gain by adhering to them. Even if states are not completely successful in their North Pole seabed claims, UNCLOS and the
CLCS recommendations process provide legitimacy to claims elsewhere (including the large areas of uncontested claims in
the Arctic).

In that context, participants focused on the likelihood that Russia might contest or ignore a UNCLOS notification in its disfavour. Russia
has gained
much from the successful negotiation of the Norwegian-Russian delimitation in the Barents Sea,8 a
precedent that might provide incentives for the Kremlin to cooperate with Arctic neighbours on other
territorial issues. Russia has also received a ruling in its favour in the Sakhalin area and the Sea of Okhotsk, which has likely boosted its confidence in UNCLOS and
the ability of international rules and norms to benefit the country. Conversely, a
decision by Russia to contest or ignore a CLCS
recommendation in this case may prompt other countries to follow suit – including in cases where Russia has made
successful claims. Finally, there is also a general understanding that established international borders bring more clarity to investors, benefiting all countries. As a
result, the peaceful diplomatic handling of potential conflicts in the long term is the most likely scenario .
2.3 Potential wildcards

The resolution of overlapping claims could raise tensions if:

• Countries that see their claim contested decide to create a set of tactical alliances of open and closed seas outside of the UNCLOS framework. These defections
would undermine the international rules and institutions that most countries rely on, and create uncertainty for all maritime-related businesses throughout the
globe.

• To accelerate its path toward independence, Greenland seeks to attract large investments from Russia – which could at that point be involved in negotiations over
the seabed with Denmark – or from China, whose position in principle is to oppose the division of the Arctic between Arctic states and to promote instead the idea
of the region as a global common. This would create tensions with Copenhagen. Yet a more plausible development would have Greenland following the example of
Iceland, which started to welcome Chinese investments in 2008 in a challenging financial environment, but has subsequently made efforts to balance these with
investments from different sources. Overall, Greenland remains more likely to choose Western partners.

• Faster than expected, sea-ice melting is enhancing access and making the extraction of resources more plausible – possibly adding more urgency to the seabed
delineation issue. Yet under that assumption, the greatest source of tensions might be around fishing, which would be immediately available, rather than in relation
to the seabed and its resources.

• Resources other – and easier to extract – than hydrocarbons, such as bioengineering, might develop rapidly, possibly in the 2030s–2040s. More generally,
unforeseen technology and economic developments represent wildcards in terms of the attractiveness of the contentious seabed areas.

• Some countries receiving a positive recommendation from the CLCS might decide that their rights over the seabed extend to the water column above – potentially
questioning the future fishing and shipping rights of others, and undermining UNCLOS as a legal framework.

3. Increased maritime activity

The second scenario step presented a series of developments resulting in increased maritime activity in the Arctic. The TTX move posited that Russia develops the
Northern Sea Route both to service its booming hydrocarbon extraction activities and for international shipping, using flexible tariffs similar to those used by the
Suez Canal authority; Canada partners with China to exploit, and bring to Asian markets, minerals and oils extracted from various sites in its northern regions; and
China invests increasingly in mining and infrastructure projects in Iceland, Greenland and Svalbard.

3.1 Relevance for regional stability

The purpose of this scenario was to explore potential tensions around increased traffic along the northern coasts of Russia and Canada; the legal status of the
Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage (pictured in Figure 2), considered respectively by Russia and Canada as internal waters while other nations,
including the United States and China, argue that the principle of freedom of navigation should prevail instead; the impact of resource extraction and exploitation
on indigenous communities; the potential competition to attract, and benefit economically from, international shipping; and the involvement of non-Arctic nations
such as China in the exploitation of Arctic resources.

3.2 Insights from exercise

The Northern Sea Route is critical for Russia’s economy and infrastructure , making its value as an
international shipping route secondary The Northern Sea Route is essential for Russia’s transportation
needs in the north, as it is cheaper to use than railroad and river systems. Russia sees it as critical, in particular, to develop its
extractive industry in northern Siberia – to include ambitious LNG projects9 – and bring the resources it exploits to world markets. This route also
offers economic perspectives to indigenous populations – for instance, Russian Saami could potentially use it to bring reindeer meat
to international markets. Overall, the Northern Sea Route makes economies in northern areas of Russia more sustainable.
Russia’s control over shipping through the Northern Sea Route and its collection of transit fees provides some of the investment that is required to maintain a route
it needs in any case for its own industry. Yet the route’s main purpose is destination shipping rather than transit. Current traffic volumes in the Northern Sea Route
are so low in comparison to the Suez Canal that any substantial swap, by Asian ships going to Europe, of the latter for the former would likely take decades.

Increased shipping prospects mean new opportunities for cooperation but also potential competition to
become the new Arctic shipping hub

Increased activity in the Northwest Passage would require infrastructure development . Assuming that the Passage
can become an effective international shipping route, Canada would likely facilitate bureaucratic procedures and reduce transit fees in order to make it more
attractive to ships than the Northern Sea Route. The
United States and Russia would see a large increase in shipping traffic
across the Bering Strait, and the United States could develop a shipping hub in Alaska as a refuelling
point.

If volumes of traffic were to increase substantially in the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route (the former being less likely
due to a particularly challenging geography and lack of infrastructure), existing hubs such as Singapore would be affected, as well as countries that depend on
revenues from shipping and building vessels including icebreaking ships and icebreakers. Increased activity in the Northern Sea Route could prompt the creation of
new hubs, possibly in Iceland, Norway, Greenland or Canada.10 One option that might be explored is the creation of a common
northern port facility with several companies and nations working together to create an economy of
scale. Finland, too, could try to benefit from this increased northern traffic, and already has a railway project that would connect Rovaniemi in Finland to Kirkenes
in Norway.11

Increased ship traffic increases the probability of accidents and the risk of oil spills, which could be mitigated by new technology

As ice-covered waters are opening, an important source of concern remains the risk of an oil spill. The Bering Strait, for instance, is a complex area to navigate, and
an increased presence of large oil tankers would create new hazards for populations and the environment. The impact of an oil-tanker accident on the environment
and human activities remains unknown. Global fish stocks would likely be affected, although some species are more resilient than others. Indigenous peoples’
activities and food security would be impacted as well. Coastal Saami, for instance, are largely dependent on fishing for their subsistence, and an oil spill in the
Northwest passage would affect sea mammals that are critical to the subsistence of indigenous peoples in Canada.

Heavier maritime traffic in conditions as unforgiving as those found in the Arctic would require improvements in knowledge and data to mitigate risks to the people
and to the environment. Potential upcoming challenges include protecting the global positioning systems (GPS) of ships from cyberthreats12; generalising the
practice of equipping vessels with automatic identification systems (AIS); improving data to reduce uncertainty with regard to hydrological conditions; keeping track
of moving or partly melted ice, which represents a bigger challenge than permanent ice, using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and sensors; and developing vessel
traffic systems in ‘high-risk’ areas like the Bering Strait, where large ships routinely pass small boats operated by indigenous seal hunters in icy and foggy conditions.
The vision of the Arctic as an area of geostrategic competition can be harmful to the development of such systems, which require bilateral or international
agreements to be most effective.

China’s investments are welcomed by Arctic nations although its intentions are still viewed with suspicion

China would likely be a key player in an Arctic shipping boom. China’s investments in mineral extraction in northern Canada as well as the publication by its maritime
safety administration of a dedicated navigation guide in April 2016 suggest that it has a keen interest in using the Passage.13 While Canada’s view of the Northwest
Passage as internal waters differs sharply from China’s (and, for that matter, the United States’) view of it as international waters, the mutual economic benefits for
China and Canada suggest that they may simply continue to agree to disagree on that point.

Increased maritime shipping in the Arctic might increase competition among Arctic nations to attract foreign investment, including from China, while remaining
wary of a reinforcement of China’s position as a key economic actor in the region, lest it is balanced by involvement from other actors. Recent Chinese-funded
infrastructure developments, such as the Joint China–Iceland Aurora Observatory (CIAO) in Iceland14 and the radar project – stalled as of August 2017 – in
Svalbard,15 also raise questions as to China’s long-term strategy in the region. Participants were prompt to point out, however, that overall large-scale and
multinational projects tend to promote cooperation due to the fact that the companies and countries involved stand to lose too much from conflict.

3.3 Potential wildcards

•A military build-up in the Arctic could negate the positive effects on Arctic cooperation of an economic
boom. One scenario leading to this point could have European nations respond positively to US demands to raise their defence budget to 2 per
cent of their GDP – a move that may prompt Russia to increase its own spending, part of which would go to the

Arctic. This, in turn, could trigger increased military activity from other Arctic nations to match Russia’s
build-up, in a classic security dilemma pattern.
• If indigenous people were to express strong opposition to the development of mineral extraction projects, decision makers in Arctic nations would have to make a
choice between maintaining unity at home or taking part in the economic boom of the region. Participants, however, noted that many of these communities own
rights to their land, and as a result stand to benefit directly from resource exploitation.
• The opening of a Transpolar route would reduce the utility of the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route for transit shipping, although they would likely
still be used for destinational voyages and Arctic natural resources development. While it cannot be predicted when such a Transpolar route will be open for long
enough during the year to be viable, participants underlined that this option will be explored, since it cumulates benefits: not only would it be the shortest route
but, unlike the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route, it would not – at least at this point – be under the control of any nation.

4. Potential for relatively minor maritime incidents to escalate

Participants then examined a third and a fourth scenario in quick succession. First, participants were asked to consider a situation in which a radical environmental
group based in Canada attempts to board and block the way of a Danish-leased Russian icebreaker investigating possible oil-drilling sites in the newly Danish North
Pole seabed area. There is no resulting violence, but the icebreaker is turned back to Murmansk and Canada, Denmark and Russia must decide how to address this
incident, which might occur again in the future. In addition, Norway must reaffirm how it would treat the environmental group’s vessel if it entered Norwegian
waters. The primary issues arising from this situation include handling an incident of attempted maritime piracy, ensuring safe passage for icebreakers in the future,
and navigating law enforcement with multiple countries involved.

Following this, participants examined a near-collision close to Alaskan waters in the Bering Strait involving a Russian ice-class tanker travelling south but carrying no
cargo and a Finnish icebreaker travelling north and carrying members of the US, Finnish and Swedish coastguards travelling to a NATO maritime exercise. The
primary issues arising from this situation include resolving safety concerns and convincing each party that there was no nefarious intent. In this particular case,
participants were asked to consider US suspicions of Russian spying activity, Finnish and Swedish concerns about Russia’s reaction to NATO activity, and Russian
umbrage at perceived accusations of having malicious intent.

4.1 Relevance for regional stability

The third and fourth focal issues presented to exercise participants both examined the potential for escalation of relatively minor maritime incidents that might
otherwise have been adequately handled by local authorities. Importantly, these scenarios assumed that the limited tools, mechanisms and procedures for
conducting a response would create a decision-making gap in which stakeholders, thrown into situations for which they are not adequately prepared, could
miscalculate the effects of their initial response and raise tensions rather than alleviate and diffuse the situation.

The third scenario focusing on harassment at sea by a radical environmental group was inspired by real events leading to the arrest of several members of
Greenpeace by Russia after an Arctic protest event. Speeches and protests about Arctic environmental issues are not uncommon, and there is reason to believe that
these activities will continue – or ramp up – as the Arctic maritime environment opens further, perhaps inviting additional economic activity, which is the subject of
environmental concerns. This could theoretically test the strength of cooperation if such events take on symbolic strategic importance and cause amplified reactions
beyond the scale of what is strictly necessary. In this example, Russia, Denmark, Canada and Norway could all potentially choose to view their responses to the
event through the lens of asserting sovereignty and maintaining rights under international agreements to perform (or not) certain activities in the region.

The fourth scenario builds upon a number of concerns for the international Arctic community, including maritime safety, domain awareness and information
gathering, and NATO involvement in the region. The event exploits countries’ fears about their limited awareness of what happens in and around their Arctic
territory. As with the previous scenario, reactions to this event could become amplified if it takes on symbolic strategic importance and is compounded by lack of
information. Although we have argued that it is unlikely the Arctic will experience conflict in the 2020 decade, the risk of misinterpretation and miscalculation is
substantial, and is exacerbated by the challenges in acquiring accurate information.

4.2 Insights from exercise

Response to these incidents would most likely focus on safety and diplomacy

Safety of all mariners would be the primary, immediate concern of all countries involved. Any response operations would follow international guidelines and norms
for search and rescue, as well as law enforcement.

Some tensions might arise between the different countries involved. In the first scenario, Russia might fault Denmark for not taking a stronger stance or look to
Canada to reign in the activities of its citizens. Both Denmark and Norway could fear a loss of credibility if their respective responses to the situation were not strong
or immediate enough. In the second scenario, the United States might choose to take exception to a Russian vessel operating so close to its coastline, and Finland
and Sweden could decide to interpret Russian presence as a threat to their sovereign choices to participate in a NATO exercise.

However, most exercise participants agreed that these issues would be raised – and likely diffused – diplomatically
without spilling over into an operational setting . Maintaining economic possibilities in the region would be difficult with rising geopolitical
tensions, and all Arctic nations appear to generally agree on this as a strong motivator to use diplomatic discussions to address concerns. At worst, these

events could elevate the level of mistrust between nations, which could lead to a temporary decline in
information sharing and ultimately escalate tensions due to misperceptions . However, some participants did point out
that in some cases relationships at the strategic level are somewhat divorced from activities at the operational or tactical levels. For example, Norway and Russia
might be engaged in a high-level diplomatic dispute while at the same time effectively coordinating day-to-day or week-to-week activities relevant to the Barents
Sea region or other areas of mutual interest.

Nations would worry about how these events play out domestically and in the media

Interestingly, many participants thought that the domestic implications of these events might be equally as
concerning as responses at the international level , or even more so. In the first scenario, both Denmark and Norway might have to
answer domestically for their respective responses to Russia. Canada might have to address whether it is adequately supporting its citizens abroad. The Russian
population would closely watch how the Kremlin decided to frame its message about the environmental group. There might also be implications for Russian-based
environmental groups, especially if they came out in favour of the Canadian group’s activities.

In the second scenario, this event could impact the discussion on whether Finland and Sweden should join NATO. Domestic Russian audiences would probably
favour a strong Kremlin response to any accusations from the United States, Finland and Sweden of nefarious activity in order to appear to ‘save face’ on the
international stage. Finally, the
US public might choose to view this incident as another example of ‘Russian
meddling’ in US affairs and expect a strong condemnation of Russian involvement in the incident .
In both of these scenarios, the media would likely play a strong role in how events are interpreted and played out. The ability of the media to elevate voices of
environmental groups (both those in favour of and those against the activities in the first scenario) and local Arctic communities might determine whether these
actors experience reputational and political damage.

Any suggestion of a security void could invite external involvement in Arctic affairs

In either scenario, the

appearance of weakness or indecisiveness on the part of the Arctic actors could leave an
opening for nonArctic states with interests in the region to establish a greater and/ or more security-
focused presence. Participants argued that when Arctic states appear distracted or, worse, to be experiencing elevated tensions with each other, non-
Arctic actors might establish more presence in order to fill the real or perceived security void. For example, it was suggested in the exercise that China could choose
to send armed state escorts for commercial vessels. This could be perceived as beneficial by Chinese commercial ships in avoiding potential piracy incidents, for
instance, that would typically be addressed by more local law enforcement entities that are, in these scenarios, presumably focused elsewhere. Any additional –
especially armed – presence of non-Arctic actors could potentially raise tensions further.

4.3 Potential wildcards

The responses to maritime incidents could raise tensions if:

• Countries use the opportunity to make their stances on longer-term security issues clear. With respect to the environmental protest scenario, this could happen if
Denmark chose to view the event as a test of its ability to administer Arctic territory (this would be especially important with regard to relations with Greenland).
Moscow might also decide to respond strongly against the environmental group in order to dissuade future incidents of what it would likely call ‘piracy’. This pattern
could also arise in the Bering Strait near-collision scenario, in which the United States, Finland and Sweden could want to assert sovereignty, and Russia might make
clear its right to conduct economic activities without experiencing what it might deem ‘harassment’. Wanting to make stances on these longer-term issues clear
could lead countries to react with more force and a tougher bargaining stance than if addressing a single maritime safety incident.

• Should a pattern become established in which maritime safety incidents occur time and time again, this might test Arctic nation patience and lead to ‘finger-
pointing’ in which nations or other actors begin to blame one another for the problems occurring.

5. Conclusion: How solid is the current state of cooperation between Arctic nations, and how can this be maintained?

Through this exercise, participants

examined a large variety of potential stressors for Arctic cooperation, which
prompted even more ideas on what could go wrong – ‘wildcards’ – between Arctic nations.

Yet overall, participants’ reactions to the scenarios presented generally emphasised the factors that would
promote cooperation , such as the shared economic benefits that result from a peaceful and predictable environment attractive for investors and
respectful of indigenous and other local communities. Participants also recalled historical precedents where potential

tensions were resolved, such as the initial resistance of indigenous populations to increased extraction activities in Alaska in the 1970s, or the long but
ultimately successful negotiation by Norway and Russia of the delimitation of their respective territories in the Barents Sea.

Another recurring theme throughout the exercise was participants underlining the importance of the
legal frameworks (such as UNCLOS) and institutions (such as the Arctic Council) that provide some degree of
governance to the region. These frameworks and institutions provide some means for Arctic nations to
continue establishing procedures and capabilities for handling emerging security and safety incidents so
that these can be handled in relatively predictable ways that avoid miscommunication and
miscalculation. The Arctic Council and other organisations have planned years to decades ahead for potential issues that might arise in the region – such as
accidents requiring search and rescue, and oil spills – by establishing agreements, policies and operating procedures that work in favour of safety and security for all
Arctic nations.
Arctic war leads to extinction---Russia strikes first and miscalc circumvents barriers to conflict
Klare, 20—professor emeritus of peace and world-security studies at Hampshire College and senior
visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association (Michael, “A World War Could Break Out in the Arctic,”
https://www.thenation.com/article/world/nato-russia-norway/, dml)
In early March, an estimated 7,500 American combat troops will travel to Norway to join thousands of soldiers from other NATO countries in a massive mock battle

with imagined invading forces from Russia. In this futuristic simulated engagement—it goes by the name of Exercise Cold Response 2020 —allied
forces will “conduct multinational joint exercises with a high-intensity combat scenario in demanding winter conditions,” or so claims the Norwegian military
anyway. At first glance, this may look like any other NATO training exercise, but think again. There’s nothing ordinary about Cold
Response 2020. As a start, it’s being staged above the Arctic Circle , far from any previous traditional NATO

battlefield, and it raises to a new level the possibility of a great-power conflict that might end in a
nuclear exchange and mutual annihilation . Welcome, in other words, to World War III’s newest battlefield.
For the soldiers participating in the exercise, the potentially thermonuclear dimensions of Cold Response 2020 may not be obvious. At its start, Marines from the
United States and the United Kingdom will practice massive amphibious landings along Norway’s coastline, much as they do in similar exercises elsewhere in the
world. Once ashore, however, the scenario becomes ever more distinctive. After collecting tanks and other heavy weaponry “prepositioned” in caves in Norway’s
interior, the Marines will proceed toward the country’s far-northern Finnmark region to help Norwegian forces stave off Russian forces supposedly pouring across
the border. From then on, the two sides will engage in—to use current Pentagon terminology—high-intensity combat operations under Arctic conditions (a type of
warfare not seen on such a scale since World War II).

And that’s just the beginning. Unbeknownst to most Americans, the Finnmark region of Norway and adjacent Russian territory
have become one of the most likely battlegrounds for the first use of nuclear weapons in any future
NATO-Russian conflict. Because Moscow has concentrated a significant part of its nuclear retaliatory
capability on the Kola Peninsula , a remote stretch of land abutting northern Norway— any US-NATO success in actual
combat with Russian forces near that territory would endanger a significant part of Russia’s nuclear
arsenal and so might precipitate the early use of such munitions. Even a simulated victory—the predictable result of Cold
Response 2020—will undoubtedly set Russia’s nuclear controllers on edge.

To appreciate just how risky any NATO-Russian clash in Norway’s far north would be, consider the region’s geography and the strategic factors that have led Russia
to concentrate so much military power there. And all of this, by the way, will be playing out in the context of another existential danger: climate change. The melting
of the Arctic ice cap and the accelerated exploitation of Arctic resources are lending this area ever greater strategic significance.

ENERGY EXTRACTION IN THE FAR NORTH

Look at any map of Europe and you’ll note that Scandinavia widens as it heads southward into the most heavily populated parts of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and
Sweden. As you head north, however, it narrows and becomes ever less populated. At its extreme northern reaches, only
a thin band of Norway
juts east to touch Russia’s Kola Peninsula . To the north, the Barents Sea, an offshoot of the Arctic Ocean, bounds them
both. This remote region—approximately 800 miles from Oslo and 900 miles from Moscow—has, in recent years, become a vortex of
economic and military activity.

Once prized as a source of vital minerals, especially nickel, iron ore, and phosphates, this remote area is now the center of extensive
oil and natural gas extraction . With temperatures rising in the Arctic twice as fast as anywhere else on the planet and sea ice retreating ever
farther north every year, offshore fossil-fuel exploration has become increasingly viable . As a result, large reserves of oil and

natural gas—the very fuels whose combustion is responsible for those rising temperatures—have been discovered beneath the Barents Sea and both

countries are seeking to exploit those deposits. Norway has taken the lead , establishing at Hammerfest in Finnmark the
world’s first plant above the Arctic Circle to export liquified natural gas. In a similar fashion, Russia has initiated efforts to exploit the
mammoth Shtokman gas field in its sector of the Barents Sea, though it has yet to bring such plans to fruition.
For Russia, even more significant oil and gas prospects lie further east in the Kara and Pechora Seas and on the Yamal Peninsula, a slender extension of Siberia. Its
energy companies have, in fact, already begun producing oil at the Prirazlomnoye field in the Pechora Sea and the Novoportovskoye field on that peninsula (and
natural gas there as well). Such fields hold great promise for Russia, which exhibits all the characteristics of a petro-state, but there’s one huge problem: The
only practical way to get that output to market is via specially designed icebreaker-tankers sent through the Barents Sea
past northern Norway.

The exploitation of Arctic oil and gas resources and their transport to markets in Europe and Asia has become a major
economic priority for Moscow as its hydrocarbon reserves below the Arctic Circle begin to dry up. Despite
calls at home for greater economic diversity, President Vladimir Putin’s regime continues to insist on the centrality of

hydrocarbon production to the country’s economic future . In that context, production in the Arctic has
become an essential national objective , which, in turn, requires assured access to the Atlantic Ocean via
the Barents Sea and Norway’s offshore waters . Think of that waterway as vital to Russia’s energy economy in the way the Strait of
Hormuz, connecting the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean, is to the Saudis and other regional fossil-fuel producers.

THE MILITARY DIMENSION

No less than Russia’s giant energy firms, its

navy must be able to enter the Atlantic via the Barents Sea and northern
Norway. Aside from its Baltic and Black Sea ports, accessible to the Atlantic only via passageways easily
obstructed by NATO , the sole Russian harbor with unfettered access to the Atlantic Ocean is at Murmansk on
the Kola Peninsula . Not surprisingly then, that port is also the h ead q uarters for Russia’s Northern Fleet —its most
powerful—and the site of numerous air, infantry, missile, and radar bases along with naval shipyards and
nuclear reactors . In other words, it’s among the most sensitive military regions in Russia today.

Given all this, President Putin has substantially rebuilt that very fleet, which fell into disrepair after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
equipping it with some of the country’s most advanced warships. In 2018, according to The Military Balance, a publication of the International Institute for Strategic
Studies, it already possessed the largest number of modern cruisers and destroyers (10) of any Russian fleet, along with 22 attack submarines and numerous
support vessels. Also in the Murmansk area are dozens of advanced MiG fighter planes and a wide assortment of anti-aircraft defense systems. Finally, as
2019
ended, Russian military officials indicated for the first time that they had deployed to the Arctic the
Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, a weapon capable of hypersonic velocities (more than five times the speed of sound), again
presumably to a base in the Murmansk region just 125 miles from Norway’s Finnmark, the site of the upcoming NATO exercise.

More significant yet is the way Moscow has been strengthening its nuclear forces in the region. Like the United States, Russia
maintains a “triad” of nuclear delivery systems, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), long-range “heavy” bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs). Under the terms of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), signed by the two countries in 2010, the Russians can deploy no more
than 700 delivery systems capable of carrying no more than 1,550 warheads. (That pact will, however, expire in February 2021 unless the two sides agree to an
extension, which appears increasingly unlikely in the age of Trump.) According to the Arms Control Association, the
Russians are currently
believed to be deploying the warheads they are allowed under New START on 66 heavy bombers, 286 ICBMs, and 12
submarines with 160 SLBMs . Eight of those nuclear-armed subs are, in fact, assigned to the Northern
Fleet , which means about 110 missiles with as many as 500 warheads —the exact numbers remain shrouded in secrecy—
are deployed in the Murmansk area.

For Russian nuclear strategists, such nuclear-armed

submarines are considered the most “ survivable ” of the
country’s retaliatory systems. In the event of a nuclear exchange with the United States, the country’s heavy bombers and ICBMs
could prove relatively vulnerable to pre-emptive strikes as their locations are known and can be targeted by American bombs and
missiles with near-pinpoint accuracy. Those subs, however, can leave Murmansk and disappear into the wide Atlantic Ocean at the onset
of any crisis and so presumably remain hidden from US spying eyes. To do so, however, requires that they pass through the Barents Sea, avoiding
the NATO forces lurking nearby. For Moscow, in other words, the very possibility of deterring a US nuclear strike hinges on its
ability to defend its naval stronghold in Murmansk , while maneuvering its submarines past Norway’s Finnmark
region. No wonder, then, that this area has assumed enormous strategic importance for Russian military planners—and the upcoming Cold Response 2020 is
sure to prove challenging to them.
Only US-Russia war causes extinction---other nuclear wars don’t
Cotton-Barratt 17 [Owen; February 3; Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute, Lecturer
in Mathematics at Oxford University, Ph.D. in Pure Mathematics from Oxford University; Global
Priorities Project, “Existential Risk,” https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-
2017-01-23.pdf]

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons.
However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither country’s
population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse:
the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere , which would
absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling , severe ozone loss , and agricultural disruption – a
nuclear winter .

According to one model 9, an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons 10 could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around
8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they
would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great.
An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the
world’s nuclear weapons, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.11
Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two

billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate might be pessimistic.13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to outright human

extinction , but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten
civilisation . It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area
where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt,
would have high returns.

It is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the next century, and existing attempts leave very large confidence
intervals. According to many experts, the most likely nuclear war at present is between India and Pakistan.14 However, given the relatively modest size of their

arsenals, the risk of human extinction is plausibly greater from a conflict between the U nited S tates and
Russia . Tensions between these countries have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out
the possibility of them rising further in the future.

Counter forcing alone causes extinction

Starr, ’14 Steven Starr, the Senior Scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility and Director of the
Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri. Starr has published in the Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms Reduction (STAR) website of the Moscow Institute of
Physics and Technology, June 11th, 2014, “There Can be No Winners in a Nuclear War”, Truth Out,
https://truthout.org/articles/there-can-be-no-winners-in-a-nuclear-war/, EO

Nuclear war has no winner. Beginning in 2006, several of the world’s leading climatologists (at Rutgers, UCLA, John Hopkins
University, and the University of Colorado-Boulder) published a series of studies that evaluated the long-term

environmental consequences of a nuclear war, including baseline scenarios fought with merely 1% of the explosive power in the US
and/or Russian launch-ready nuclear arsenals. They concluded that the consequences of even a “small” nuclear war
would include catastrophic disruptions of global climate and massive destruction of Earth’s protective
ozone layer. These and more recent studies predict that global agriculture would be so negatively affected by such a war, a global famine would result, which
would cause up to 2 billion people to starve to death.

These peer-reviewed studies – which were analyzed by the best scientists in the world and found to be
without error – also predict that a war fought with less than half of US or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would
destroy the human race. In other words, a US-Russian nuclear war would create such extreme long-term damage to the
global environment that it would leave the Earth uninhabitable for humans and most animal forms of
life.
A recent article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Self-assured destruction: The climate impacts of nuclear war,” begins by stating:

“Anuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear
winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self-assured destruction .”
In 2009, I wrote “Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflicts” for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. The
article summarizes the findings of these studies. It
explains that nuclear firestorms would produce millions of tons of
smoke, which would rise above cloud level and form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would
rapidly encircle the Earth. The smoke layer would remain for at least a decade, and it would act to
destroy the protective ozone layer (vastly increasing the UV-B reaching Earth ) as well as block warming
sunlight, thus creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last 10 years or longer.

Following a US-Russian nuclear war, temperatures in the central US and Eurasia would
fall below freezing every day for one to three
years; the intense cold would completely eliminate growing seasons for a decade or longer. No crops could be

grown, leading to a famine that would kill most humans and large animal populations.

Electromagnetic pulse from high-altitude nuclear detonations would destroy the integrated circuits in all
modern electronic devices, including those in commercial nuclear power plants. Every nuclear reactor
would almost instantly meltdown; every nuclear spent fuel pool (which contain many times more radioactivity than found in
the reactors) would boil off, releasing vast amounts of long-lived radioactivity. The fallout would make most of the US

and Europe uninhabitable. Of course, the survivors of the nuclear war would be starving to death anyway. Once nuclear

weapons were introduced into a US-Russian conflict, there would be little chance that a nuclear holocaust could be avoided. Theories of “limited

nuclear war” and “nuclear de-escalation” are unrealistic. In 2002 the Bush administration modified US strategic doctrine from a
retaliatory role to permit preemptive nuclear attack; in 2010, the Obama administration made only incremental and miniscule changes to this doctrine, leaving it
essentially unchanged. Furthermore, Counterforce doctrine – used by both the US and Russian military – emphasizes the need for preemptive strikes once nuclear
war begins. Both sides would be under immense pressure to launch a preemptive nuclear first-strike once military hostilities had commenced, especially if nuclear
weapons had already been used on the battlefield.

Both the US and Russia each have 400 to 500 launch-ready ballistic missiles armed with a total of at least 1800 strategic nuclear warheads, which can be launched
with only a few minutes warning. Both the US and Russian Presidents are accompanied 24/7 by military officers carrying a “nuclear briefcase,” which allows them to
transmit the permission order to launch in a matter of seconds.

Yet top political leaders and policymakers of both the US and Russia seem to be unaware that their launch-ready nuclear weapons represent a self-destruct
mechanism for the human race. For example, in 2010, I was able to publicly question the chief negotiators of the New START treaty, Russian Ambassador Anatoly
Antonov and (then) US Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, during their joint briefing at the UN (during the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference).
I asked them if they were familiar with the recent peer-reviewed studies that predicted the detonation of less than 1% of the explosive power contained in the
operational and deployed US and Russian nuclear forces would cause catastrophic changes in the global climate, and that a nuclear war fought with their strategic
nuclear weapons would kill most people on Earth. They both answered “no.”

More recently, on April 20, 2014, I asked the same question and received the same answer from the US officials sent to brief representatives of the NGOS at the
Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee meeting at the UN. None of the US officials at the briefing were aware of the studies. Those present included top
officials of the National Security Council.

It is frightening that President Obama and his administration appear unaware that the world’s leading scientists have for years predicted that a nuclear war fought
with the US and/or Russian strategic nuclear arsenal means the end of human history. Do they not know of the existential threat these arsenals pose to the human
race . . . or do they choose to remain silent because this fact doesn’t fit into their official narratives? We hear only about terrorist threats that could destroy a city
with an atomic bomb, while the threat of human extinction from nuclear war is never mentioned – even when the US and Russia are each running huge nuclear war
games in preparation for a US-Russian war.

Even more frightening is the fact that the neocons running US

foreign policy believe that the US has “nuclear primacy” over Russia;
that is, the US could successfully launch a nuclear sneak attack against Russian (and Chinese) nuclear forces
and completely destroy them. This theory was articulated in 2006 in “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,” which was published in Foreign Affairs by
the Council on Foreign Relations. By concluding that the Russians and Chinese would be unable to retaliate, or if some small part of their forces remained, would not
risk a second US attack by retaliating, the article invites nuclear war.

Colonel Valery Yarynich (who was in charge of security of the Soviet/Russian nuclear command and control systems for 7 years) asked me to help him write a

rebuttal, which was titled “ Nuclear Primacy is a Fallacy .” Colonel Yarynich, who was on the Soviet General Staff and did war planning for the USSR,
concluded that the “Primacy” article used faulty methodology and erroneous assumptions , thus invalidating its conclusions. My

contribution lay in my knowledge of the recently published (in 2006) studies, which predicted even a “successful” nuclear first-strike ,

which destroyed 100% of the opposing side’s nuclear weapons, would cause the citizens of the side that
“won” the nuclear war to perish from nuclear famine , just as would the rest of humanity.

The plan is sufficient and necessary to solve---UNCLOS provides a governance framework for
disputing claims and increases Arctic alliances to counterbalance and resolve Russian
militarization
Reiley 14 [Reiley, Matthew, Lieutenant Colonel United States Marine Corps. Securing US Arctic Interests
and the Role of UNCLOS. US Army War College, 2014. AKIM]

[Figure omitted; edited for ableist language]

The Arctic’s receding ice offers potentially great benefits to the U.S. resulting from access to Arctic
natural resources and an expanded global commons . These economic opportunities however are not uncontested. Russia and
other Arctic nations have parallel interests and have made resource claims under the auspices of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which the U.S. is not a signatory. This leaves the U.S . mute

[silent] and on the sideline to influence the outcome of Arctic resource claims , particularly those of
Russia who stands to gain the most if the U.S. is not engaged . In addition to securing resources, UNCLOS provides
legal certainty for operations at sea that are vital to securing the global commons and assuring
freedom of navigation. The U.S. should ratify UNCLOS as a critical component of policy to peacefully
achieve U.S. interests while facing an assertive and regionally powerful Russia.
Framing the Problem

Climate change is having a sweeping effect around the world, but nowhere are these changes more economically significant than in the Arctic. The Arctic is the
smallest and most shallow ocean, roughly one-sixth the size of the Indian Ocean, 1 with an average depth of 987 m due to one-third of the ocean being “underlain
by continental shelf.”2 The receding polar ice cap (figure 1) is exposing vast resource wealth in these shallow waters .
According to the U.S. Geological Survey’s 2008 Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal (CARA), 90 billion barrels of oil, 1669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion
barrels of natural gas liquids are potentially available for energy exploration.3 The
preponderance of these natural resources are
located offshore with multiple competing claims on who has sovereign rights for exploration . Control of
unexplored energy reserves will be increasingly valuable as global energy demands continue to rise, and it is in U.S. interests to secure a piece of these resources
quickly and peacefully. The
most prominent obstacles to realizing these resources is the U.S. lack of conformance
to UNCLOS and an assertive Russia pursuing parallel interests .

The receding ice also exposes a potential alternate maritime route linking the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans. Maritime shipping accounts for 80 per cent of global trade in volume and 70 per cent in value.4 Shaving up to 5000 miles off maritime routes enhances
global trade by making it faster and cheaper. While the fabled Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route are unlikely to be accessible year round, all
industrialized nations have an interest in using these emerging global commons provided the region is stable and the route is secure. The U.S., more than any other
nation, has reaped the benefits of an interconnected and globalized world, and stands to be a major beneficiary of Arctic routes linking the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans. Since WWII, the
U.S. has been the primary contributor to security of the global commons, but doing so
for the Arctic will demand a cooperative approach . Securing the Arctic commons will be challenging due to a lack of supporting
infrastructure, extreme weather conditions, and unresolved territorial disputes that have potential to grow into military conflict.

The Arctic more than any other region lends itself to involuntary tension between states . As the U.S. Coast
Guard Commandant Admiral Papp points out, there are more hurricane force storms in the Arctic than in the Caribbean each year; the sub-zero environment makes

metal brittle, industrial fluids freeze, and electronics fail; while simultaneously putting intense stress on the people operating under those conditions.5 These
dangerous conditions emphasize the need to have stable and reliable rule sets that all countries
abide by while operating within the Arctic .
While not intuitive, securing U.S. territorial claims, and safeguarding an Arctic global commons, are at odds with one another despite both serving economic
interests. The
surest way to stake territorial claims is through military power, however exploiting seabed
resources or providing a secure global commons demand cooperative and peaceful solutions as a
precursor for industry to operate with confidence. Military clashes would distract from realizing the
economic benefits the Arctic has to offer.

Russia has been extremely focused on securing its Arctic interests and, under the provisions of Article 76
within UNCLOS, has made claims (as yet unrecognized) to extend its Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) to encompass nearly
half of the Arctic region. 7 UNCLOS Article 76 allows a coastal state benefits from an extended continental shelf and exclusive rights to seabed
resources and Russia has sought to claim these rights under UNCLOS.8 Russia has also been the most aggressive Arctic nation in

enhancing its naval capacity within the region . Russia maintains a fleet of 37 icebreaking vessels, dwarfing the next closest Arctic state
of Sweden who possess 7, 9 and have also indicated they will grow a deployable Arctic combined arms capability by 2020.10

Russia is not the only state to make Arctic claims under Article 76. Iceland, Norway, Denmark, and Canada have all either submitted, or are in the process of
submitting, claims to extend their EEZ. The U.S., however, is restricted from taking similar action. It has no international legal authority to make seabed claims
beyond 200 nm because it is not a party to UNCLOS. Lack
of membership also constrains U.S. ability to formally dispute the
resource claims made by other Arctic nations .

Ratifying UNCLOS would serve both U.S. economic and security interests. UNCLOS membership subjects
U.S. interests to international regulations, but more importantly, provides a direct and powerful voice at the
negotiations table to influence those regulations. The U.S. also gains the opportunity to rally other
Arctic nations to resolve territorial disputes peacefully. Without strong Arctic partnerships and UNCLOS
membership, the U.S. and Russia stand to be at odds with one another. Given Russia’s geopolitical history and its security
exposure, Russian militarization of the Arctic is almost assured as a result of this friction given the

economic and security implications (figure 2 depicts the expanse of exposed Russian coastline). Military confrontation in the
Arctic puts the U.S. at a significant disadvantage . Readily available defense resources are dwindling
due to burgeoning debt and U.S. strategic priorities are focused toward Asia . Aggressive military postures would also
disincentive using the Arctic as a global commons for maritime commerce, and put all Arctic parties perilously close to inadvertent escalation of a conflict from
friction associated with Arctic operations. Ratifying UNCLOS is a crucial step in developing an effective strategy built on
soft power principles. Joseph Nye, a renowned political scientist, defines soft power as “the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of
framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.”11 A soft power approach is most likely

to advance U.S. security and economic interests in the Arctic and build the necessary Arctic partnerships
to counter-balance Russia.
Only the plan forces cooperative solutions to Russian disputes
Pezard et al. 17 [Pezard, Stephanie, Senior Political Scientist and Associate Research Department
Director for Defense and Political Sciences (DPS), et al. Maintaining Arctic Cooperation with Russia:
Planning for Regional Change in the Far North. Rand Corporation, 2017. AKIM]

Finally, the United States would be in a better position to pressure Russia to abide by its commitment to
UNCLOS —whether Russia denies the CLCS’s eventual decision or distorts it through its own interpretation of the law (Finding 4)— if it were an
UNCLOS signatory itself. Ratifying UNCLOS would ensure that the United States has the appropriate
foundation—like the other Arctic countries and many others around the world—to help resolve relevant maritime disputes
according to a cooperative process . This step is mentioned in the U.S. Arctic Strategy as an element of the third line of U.S. effort in the Arctic
(“Strengthen International Cooperation”), noting that “Accession to the Convention would protect U.S. rights , freedoms, and uses

of the sea and airspace throughout the Arctic region, and strengthen our arguments for freedom of
navigation and overflight through the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route .”5

And the US is the vital internal link into overall UNCLOS legitimacy and effectiveness---absent
the plan, no stable governance is possible
Stuart et al. 14 [STUART, ELLE, associate at K&L Gates, KENNETH SCHULTZ, Professor, and DAVID
SLAYTON, Commander. "THE POLAR BEAR IN THE ROOM: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE CHANGING
ARCTIC." (2014). AKIM]
Other authors have admirably covered the multiple issues presented by America’s continued refusal to ratify UNCLOS so I will not cover those arguments here.235
The fundamental problem with America’s continued refusal to sign UNCLOS is that institutions function
most effectively when there is broad support for them, particularly among powerful states . Although America
recognizes UNCLOS as customary international law, UNCLOS is limited in its efficacy when faced with a state actor that

cannot participate in its institutional mediation . Since American interests are served through broad adherence to customary legal
norms encoded in UNCLOS, there has not been a large incentive to ratify UNCLOS up till today. However, as we saw in the Beaufort Sea case, America can
only take advantage of UNCLOS up to a point. America is excluded from submitting claims through
the CLCS for an extended continental shelf beyond the 200-mile EEZ, which limits the amount of
territory it can claim in the Arctic .
The question moving forward is what will happen if the United States decides, as Canada, Norway and Russia have, that it is in their interest to claim additional
territory in the Arctic. The first possibility is that American policymakers decide to abide by the cooperative tone in the Arctic and ratify UNCLOS before submitting a
territorial claim to the CLCS. This is possible, since UNCLOS generally enjoys widespread bipartisan support.236 However, the political intransigence that has stymied
efforts at ratification in the past has not gone away, particularly in this polarized political time. While it is likely that the clear harms of continued non-ratification of
UNCLOS would outweigh these political concerns, it is not a guarantee.

Why would America want to extend their territorial claims in the Arctic? Preliminary studies indicate that America’s extended continental shelf totals close to one
million square kilometers (an area twice the size of California) and much of it lies north of Alaska; thus, there is a clear economic incentive for America to ratify
UNCLOS in order to stake a claim.237 If America decided that this territory was extremely important to them for economic or security reasons, it is
theoretically possible that they could unilaterally claim the area . It is not beyond the realm of reason that a state could act in a
unilateral way in the Arctic; states do it all the time in other areas.238 While this outcome is less likely than a decision to ratify UNCLOS and play by its rules, it is an
important consideration. The future of the Arctic, as we have seen throughout this thesis, is not set. Economic shocks to the system can provide incentives towards
both conflict and cooperation; thus, both situations need to be considered.

Beyond domestic national interests, the

ratification of UNCLOS by America would be beneficial because it would
support the UNCLOS regime not only in the Arctic, but also around the world. In the Arctic, the existence of a
major player outside of the UNCLOS institution sends the signal that playing by the strict rules of
UNCLOS is not of paramount importance . This signal is only strengthened due to America’s full
participation in other Arctic institutions, like the Arctic Council. Alternatively, if American government leaders
came together to ratify the treaty, it would show America’s commitment to the rule of law in the Arctic,
particularly at a time when the Arctic is attracting increased international attention .

Russian forces would survive a first strike

Rodriguez 19 (Luisa Rodriguez, Research Analyst at Rethink Priorities, “Would US and Russian nuclear
forces survive a first strike?” Effective Altruism Forum, June 17, 2019,
https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/dtQ5hpYjniYKWhmhx/would-us-and-russian-nuclear-forces-
survive-a-first-strike)///JP

Currently, the
total number of nuclear warheads in Russia’s nuclear arsenal is estimated at 6,490, with
~1,600 deployed (Kristensen & Korda, 2019). While I’m most interested in understanding the distribution systems of _ _deployed warheads as I did in the
case of the US arsenal, the breakdown of deployed Russian warheads is more poorly understood; the US releases declassified reports on its arsenal while Russia
doesn’t. Given that, I can only assess the distribution of nuclear warheads in the air-based, sea-based, and land-based legs of the triad for the strategic nuclear
forces — comprised of high-yield nuclear weapons that can be delivered over long distances.[10] I focus on the strategic forces as those are the weapons that would
be used to target military facilities, industrial areas, and cities, while shorter-range _tactical _nuclear weapons are intended for use in battle (Kristensen & Korda,
2019). Of the approximately 2,670 strategic forces inventory, 1,165 nuclear warheads are land-based — 414 of those are road-mobile — 786 are air-based, and 720
are sea-based (Kristensen & Korda, 2019). Again, locating
enemy submarines is extremely difficult, making counterforce
targeting against Russia’s SSBNs very challenging. However, unlike the US, Russia’s submarine fleet has a history of extremely poor
“operational readiness” (McKinzie, eds. 2001, p.66).[11] [12] Moreover, while the Russian navy has drastically improved in the past couple of decades, its
submarines could be vulnerable during a first strike if only a few submarines were actually on patrol, or if they were positioned near their own naval bases, which
the US would easily be able to target, as they have done in the recent past (Kristensen, 2013).[13] As is the case with US SSBNs, new technologies in
remote sensing make Russian SSBNs increasingly vulnerable. At the same time, countermeasures are difficult and extremely
costly and time-consuming to develop (Lieber & Press, 2017a, pp. 46-48). Given that the US is believed to have a bigger nuclear modernization budget, Russia may
be at a considerable disadvantage when it comes to the survivability of their SLBMs (Lieber & Press, 2017a; Tian et al., 2019; Kofman, 2019).[14] Given all of this, I

have a lot of uncertainty about whether or what proportion of the Russian SLBMs would survive a first
strike. I can imagine it could be as few as 10% or as many as 100% of Russia’s SLBMs (between 40 and 430). Russia’s
air-based strategic bombers Unlike the US, Russia does not have stealthy strategic bombers (for now). Instead, it has air-launched cruise missiles

(ALCMs), shorter-range missiles, and nuclear gravity bombs that would be launched from heavy
bombers.[15] While they lack stealth technology, Russia’s heavy bombers maintain their survivability by being able to
launch cruise missiles from really far away (thousands of kilometers), shielding them from US air defense systems
and fighter aircraft (Military Watch, 2018). So, my sense is that Russia’s heavy bombers have comparable survivability to
the US’s stealthy strategic bombers. Like the US air-based nuclear forces, Russia’s is vulnerable at a few ‘choke points’ — before take off, mid-
attack, and during refueling and repair — but is overall very survivable. While, as I described above, radar and other technologies are

improving, Russia’s heavy bombers will likely remain relatively survivable for the time being. This in mind, I
expect some fraction of Russian heavy bombers to be destroyed during a counterforce attack, but I believe many or most would remain

unscathed. I guess that somewhere between 60% and 100% (280 and 470) of Russia air-based nuclear
warheads would survive a first strike.[16] Russia’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) Within the ICBM leg of the triad, deployed ICBMs
can be further broken down into: silo-based ICBMs, which both the US and Russia have, and “road-mobile” ICBMs, which only Russia has. Like the US’s land-based
nuclear forces, Russia’s
silo-based ICBMs would be vulnerable to attack. Also, like the US’s land-based forces,
super-hardened silos would make the destruction of 100% of Russia’s silo-based nuclear weapons
extremely costly, but improvements in US technology mean the US could get reasonably close (Lieber & Press, 2017a; McKinzie, eds. 2001). For example,
the accuracy of US long-range ballistic missiles has improved dramatically since the end of the Cold War as a result of substantial progress in submarine geolocation
and missile guidance systems. Whereas in 1985 US SLBMs had only a 9% change of effectively destroying a hardened silo, today that chance has increased to 90%
(Lieber & Press, 2017b, p. 3). Russia’s road-mobile land-based ICBMs have the additional tactical challenge of being
‘relocatable.’ Through bilateral arms control treaties, Russia has shared the coordinates of locations associated with a number of mobile ICBMs (associated
garrisons, parking sites, etc.) (McKinzie, eds. 2001). The US also has intelligence on the dispersal patterns of road-mobile ICBMs, satellite imaging that’s high-
resolution enough to see road-mobile ICBMs (as long as they aren’t in underground tunnels), and the ability to monitor communications between road-mobile
missiles (McKinzie, eds. 2001; Lieber & Press, 2017a). According to McKinzie et al., road-mobile missiles are kept stationary at
garrisons and parking sites periodically (2001). Many of them would only ‘disperse’ after a first strike early
warning. Any road-mobile missiles still in the garrisons by the time a first strike arrived would be destroyed with relative ease. One to two 300kt nuclear
warheads allocated per garrison known to be sheltering road-mobile ICBMs would yield a high probability of successfully destroying the missile systems positioned
there (McKinzie et al., 2001). What’s more, the launch sites that would be used by Russia’s mobile missiles are both relatively easy to identify and easy to target,
meaning the US would have some success destroying road-mobile missiles even after they’d dispersed (McKinzie et al., 2001). But road-mobile
missiles
that have been mobilized and aren’t positioned at a launch site would be much harder to target, and in
fact, used to be considered “inherently survivable” (see a discussion of the general consensus about this in Long & Green, 2014;
McKinzie, eds. 2001, 54). According to Long and Green, “In particular, mobile nuclear weapons — ‘ relocatable targets’ in the

common parlance — are now generally viewed as untargetable in a first strike. A secure second strike
has therefore become almost synonymous with a state possessing significant numbers of [SLBMs]
and/or mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)” (2014, p. 40). Once located, road-mobile missiles are easier to destroy, even
while moving, as they have weaker defenses than silo-based missile systems (Long & Green, 2014; Acton, 2010). In fact, a nuclear bomb wouldn’t have to detonate
particularly close a road-mobile target to it to destroy it. For example, a 100kt ICBM detonated in the air would damage a road-mobile missile system anywhere
within an area of 26 square kilometers (McKinzie, eds. 2001). And if the bomb detonated is big enough, the road-mobile missile system wouldn’t be able to drive
outside the radius of the detonation quickly enough to escape the blast, even with early warnings. According to Long and Green (2014 ),
improvements in
technology, in particular by the US, is getting closer to being able to locate road-mobile ICBMs .[17] Modern
sensors now take advantage of techniques like spectroscopy and interferometry, among others, allowing them to, for example, detect vapors that leak out of missile
silos and trucks from a distance (Lieber & Press, 2017). Similarly, remotely piloted vehicles like drones will be able to monitor the movement of mobile-ICBMs,
allowing the US to finally track mobile-ICBMs over time after they’ve been identified (Lieber & Press, 2017). But according to James Acton, co-director of the Nuclear
Policy Program and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “locating
mobile ballistic missiles is exceptionally
hard,” and even taking improvements in US technology into account, “it is still fiendishly difficult to
locate mobile missiles hidden by a well-prepared enemy” (Acton, 2010). We're just not at the point where we can reliably detect
and track road-mobile nuclear forces. Taken together, I expect that — assuming Russia didn’t launch on warning — between 75%

and 99% (340–440) of Russia’s silo-based ICBMs and between 10% and 50%, or (30–120) of its road-mobile
ICBMs would be destroyed in a US first strike. Russia’s Missile Defense Systems According to CSIS Missile Defense Project, "Russia
now possesses some of the most advanced air and missile defense systems in the world” with missile
defense systems across the country, and 68 nuclear-armed interceptors are located surrounding
Moscow (2018; Secretary of Defense, 2019). To date, the defense systems have been limited to destroying aircraft,
drones, cruise missiles, and short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles, but the arrival of Russia’s newest
surface-to-air missile (the S-500) in 2020 may allow it to target US ICBMs (Ritzen, 2018; CSIS).[18] But my impression is that these
systems are intended to protect the capitol — not necessarily to protect Russia’s nuclear arsenal. I therefore don’t expect them to have any meaningful impact on
the survivability of its nuclear arsenal. Surviving a US first strike Taken together, I expect that Russia’s nuclear forces would likely fare a bit worse than the US’s
during a first strike. If we assume that Russia’s deployed nuclear forces are distributed across the three legs of its triad in proportion to the distribution of its
strategic warheads, Russia could be left with up to 1,240 nuclear warheads after a first strike . Realistically though, I expect
it would be far fewer — perhaps as few as 450. In either case, Russia would still be able to mount a formidable second strike[19].
Like above, my conclusions could be quite different if it turned out either the US or Russia were being deceptive about the size, composition, and capabilities of their
nuclear arsenals or missile defense systems. While I think it’s relatively less likely that the US would execute a cyberattack to augment a first strike against Russia,
cyberattacks and other unknowns add to my uncertainty. Conclusion For now, it seems like neither
the US nor Russia would likely be able
to execute a ‘perfect’ counterforce strike, making it unlikely for either to put an immediate end to the
nuclear exchange. Uncertainties about deception, cyberattacks, and other unknowns, I expect that between ~990 and ~1,500 of the
US’s deployed nuclear warheads and between ~450 and~1,240 of Russia’s deployed nuclear warheads
would survive a first strike. However, improvements in technology could substantially threaten the
survivability of deployment systems that have been considered ‘inherently survivable’ for decades.
 1AC---Pre-empts
Aff creates regulatory certainty which boosts industries
Houck 13 [Houck, James, interim dean and a distinguished scholar in residence at the Pennsylvania
State University Dickinson School of Law and International Affairs and a retired vice admiral. "The
Opportunity Costs of Ignoring the Law of Sea Convention in the Arctic." Penn State Law Research
Paper (2013). AKIM]

This paper has examined the question of whether the United States’ failure to join UNCLOS helps or
hurts U.S. interests in the Arctic. After reviewing the range of U.S. interests and UNCLOS application
thereto, as well as the objections of UNCLOS opponents, there is little reason to conclude that joining
UNCLOS could hurt U.S. interests . Indeed, in many ways, UNCLOS accession would benefit the United
States. Going forward, the precise extent to which accession would help U.S. objectives will depend in
large measure on the importance policymakers attach to resources on and below the seafloor more than
200 miles from Alaska’s coast. If the United States wishes to maintain maximum flexibility to develop
its potential resources in this domain , the U.S. should accede to UNCLOS at the soonest earliest
opportunity. Failure to do so increases the likelihood that the “package deal” so favorable to U.S.
interests will not endure to the detriment of U.S. interests.

Representatives of major U.S. corporations with potential interests on the seafloor have rightly
expressed concern about making necessary investments and proceeding with seafloor projects as long
as the United States remains outside UNCLOS . As long as the United States remains outside UNCLOS,
any U.S.-licensed activity on the U.S. extended continental shelf will be legally suspect and vulnerable
to challenge . Given these risks, as well as concerns about international reputation, important U.S.
industries will likely remain unwilling to proceed . In the meantime, UNCLOS member states continue to
queue up to perfect their own outer limits of the extended continental shelf before the CLCS. If the
United States were to accede to the convention today and submit a proposal to the CLCS tomorrow, the
CLCS will not likely consider the petition until at least 2030. This time frame will continue to expand until
the United States joins the queue, which it cannot do from outside the convention.

The forfeiture of UNCLOS benefits, on the seafloor or elsewhere, is particularly troubling given that the
benefits are available at minimal cost. As discussed within, opposition arguments suggesting otherwise
suffer from important legal defects as well as flawed policy assumptions. Given that many of these
arguments have played a prominent role in the current UNCLOS stalemate, Arctic policymakers must
consider whether there may be new, more effective ways to persuade undecided senators to confront
the specifics of opposition arguments.

Aff’s overwhelmingly bipartisan

DOS ND – The US Department of State manages the foreign policy of the United States, No Date, “Law
of the Sea Convention” https://www.state.gov/law-of-the-sea-convention/

2004 Senate Foreign Relations Committee votes 19-0 in support of joining the Convention. Senate
Report (Sen. Exec. Rpt. 108–10; includes hearings). A vote of the full Senate does not take place.
2007 President Bush urges the Senate to approve U.S. accession to the Convention. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee votes 17-4 in support of joining the Convention. Senate Report (Sen. Exec. Rpt.
110–09); SFRC Hearing Report (S. Hrg. 110–592). A vote of the full Senate does not take place.

2012 Senate Foreign Relations Committee holds four hearings on the Convention; no vote is taken.

Supporters

The following organizations and companies have expressed support for U.S. accession to the Law of the
Sea Convention, as modified by the 1994 Agreement.

American Bar Association

American Chemistry Council

American Exploration and Production Council

American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)

American Geological Institute

American Geophysical Union

American Petroleum Institute

American Sportfishing Association

AT&T Inc

Biotechnology Industry Association

Boat Owners Association of the United States

Center for a New American Security

Center for Oceans Law and Policy, University of Virginia School of Law

Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America

Chamber of Shipping of America

Citizens for Global Solutions

ConocoPhillips

Defenders of Wildlife

Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc.

Environmental Defense Fund

ExxonMobil

Independent Petroleum Association of America

International Association of Drilling Contractors

International Seakeepers Society

International Union for Conservation of Nature

Joint Ocean Commission Initiative

Kelly Energy Consultants

Lockheed Martin Corporation

Level 3 Communications LLC (LVLT)

Marathon Oil Corporation

Marine Conservation Institute

Maritime Law Association of the United States

Maritime Trades Department, AFL-CIO

Military Officers Association of America

National Association of Manufacturers

National Fisheries Institute

National Governors Association

National Marine Manufacturers Association

National Ocean Industries Association

Natural Resources Defense Council

North American Submarine Cable Association

Ocean Conservancy

Oceana

Pacific Crossing Limited and PC Landing Corp.

RARE, The Association for Rare Earth

Rowan Companies, Inc.

Rule of Law Committee for the Oceans

Seafarers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO

Telecommunications Industry Association

The Financial Services Roundtable

The Humane Society of the United States and Humane Society International

The Nature Conservancy

The Pew Charitable Trusts

Tyco Telecommunications (US) Inc. (“Tyco Telecom”)

United Nations Association of the USA

United Nations Foundation and Better World Fund

United States Oil and Gas Association

U.S. Chamber of Commerce

World Shipping Council

World Wildlife Fund US

Manchin supports the plan’s marine resource protection --- and he pushes the plan, not Biden
which means no internal link
JMN 21 (Senator Joe Manchin, Newsroom, “Manchin Introduces Bipartisan, Bicameral Bill to Support
Chesapeake Bay Restoration Efforts,” May 26, 2021,
https://www.manchin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/manchin-introduces-bipartisan-bicameral-
bill-to-support-chesapeake-bay-restoration-efforts)

Senator Manchin’s legislation would help protect the Chesapeake Bay Watershed, improve ecosystem
management and increase environmental stewardship opportunities Washington, DC – U.S. Senator Joe Manchin
(D-WV) introduced the Chesapeake Bay Science, Education and Ecosystem Enhancement (SEEE) Act, which aims to
restore the health of the Chesapeake Bay Watershed, strengthen fisheries management and expand
environmental education programs for residents across the Chesapeake Bay Watershed. “I am proud to cosponsor this
bipartisan, bicameral legislation to support restoring the health of the Chesapeake Bay watershed, an incredible
wildlife area that includes multiple counties in West Virginia. I look forward to working with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle as
we work to reauthorize the NOAA Chesapeake Bay office and the programs they support to benefit the habitats in our state and
across the Chesapeake Bay region,” said Senator Manchin. The Chesapeake Bay SEEE Act would: Reauthorize the NOAA
Chesapeake Bay Office (CBO), a key partner of the Bay Program and leader of the Program’s fisheries, environmental literacy, climate

resiliency, and habitat work. The bill would allow NOAA CBO to collaborate with universities, nonprofits, and other Bay
stakeholders to promote integrated coastal observations – such as monitoring and observing restoration activities,
collecting and analyzing marine resources data – and information sharing to assist policymakers, resource managers, and the public.
Direct NOAA to support coordinated management, protection, characterization, and restoration of Bay habitats
and living resources, as well as the Interpretive Buoy System along the Capital John Smith Chesapeake National Historic Trail. Authorize
the Chesapeake Bay Watershed Education and Training (B-WET) program, which awards educational grants related to Bay restoration.
Reauthorize NOAA CBO through 2025, funding it at $12 million in FY22, $20.7 million in FY23, $22.57 million in FY24, and $24.627 million in
FY25. The Chesapeake Bay is the largest estuary in the U.S. More than 150,000 streams and rivers thread through the Chesapeake’s 64,000-
square-mile watershed, which is home to 18 million people across West Virginia, Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Delaware, New York and the
District of Columbia.v Senator Manchin was joined by Senators Mark Warner (D-VA), Tim Kaine (D-VA), Ben Cardin (D-MD), Chris Van Hollen (D-
MD) and Bob Casey (D-PA). Companion legislation was introduced in the House of Representatives by Representatives John Sarbanes (D-MD),
Bobby Scott (D-VA) and Rob Wittman (R-VA).