Professional Documents
Culture Documents
3, Fall 2017
D
ebates about the role that Islam portant of these new thinkers who stressed
should play in shaping politics the role of violent jihad was Sayyid Qutb.4
and political systems have been Like most jihadi ideologues, Qutb was a
around since the beginning lay Muslim rather than a cleric, employed
of Islam itself. Islamism as a sociopoliti- within Egypt’s Ministry of Education and
cal movement, however, originated in the fairly worldly, having spent two years in
twentieth century, its beginnings linked the late 1940s in the United States. As
to problems associated with imperialism, with the rest of the Muslim Brotherhood
modern states, rapid urbanization and leadership, Qutb ran afoul of the new Free
the rise of mass societies. The organized Officers regime, which came to power in
expression of Islamism began in 1928, Egypt in 1952. He spent years in prison be-
when Hasan al-Banna founded the Muslim fore finally being hanged by Gamal Abdel
Brotherhood in Egypt.1 The Muslim Broth- Nasser’s regime in 1966.
erhood and its affiliates remain the gold Qutb’s fatal offense was writing the
standard for the institutional expression of slim volume Maalim f’il-Tariq (Mile-
Islamist thought.2 stones), in which he called for the violent
While the Muslim Brotherhood en- overthrow of Nasser’s regime on the
gaged in violence from time to time in grounds that it was jahili, anti-Islamic.
Egypt and elsewhere during the middle Qutb’s book was a call to arms for jihadis
of the twentieth century, Islamist politi- throughout the Sunni Muslim world, in
cal thought in general was not predicated much the same way that Vladimir Lenin’s
on the use of violence to achieve political What Is to Be Done? was for Communists.5
ends.3 This began to change in the 1960s, Qutb’s work provided the intellectual
as new schools of Islamist thought began to foundations for the jihadi movement in the
advocate the use of violence to accomplish contemporary Sunni world and remains
their political goals, usually the overthrow influential in jihadi circles to this day.6
of local regimes that were viewed as apos- While this essay focuses on global ji-
tate. Within the Sunni world, the most im- had among Sunni Muslims (there is no real
*
The author wishes to thank Daniel Byman, Mohammed Hafez and Robert Springborg for their invaluable
comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Any remaining errors of fact or interpretation are his alone.
© 2017, The Author Middle East Policy © 2017, Middle East Policy Council
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Robinson: The Four Waves of Global Jihad
equivalent of global jihad among the Shia), an important global aspect. Like Christian-
it would be remiss not to mention that the ity, Islam is a proselytizing religion, and
intellectual foundations of modern jihadism thus pious Muslims (like pious Christians)
in the Shia world arose at nearly the same believe aspirationally that the whole world
time. In 1970, while in exile in Najaf, Iraq, must one day share their religion. As a
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini delivered a result, one can always find this type of
series of lectures on Islamic government global religious reference in the writings
in which he argued that the shah’s govern- of Islamist and jihadi thinkers (and other
ment was illegitimate and un-Islamic and Muslims), but this is different from placing
must be removed.7 The implication was a global strategy for change or violence at
clear: violence might well be necessary to the center of one’s political project. Early
effect regime change in Iran. Khomeini was jihadi thinkers in particular focused on lo-
the most famous voice to articulate a Shia cal issues, primarily what Muhammad Abd
rationale for violence in order to imple- al-Salam Faraj would later call the “near
ment a more just political and social order, enemy”: local Muslim regimes.10
beginning in the 1960s; however, he was Global jihadism emerged as an off-
not alone. For example, from the late 1960s shoot of the broader jihadi movement in
until his death under mysterious circum- the 1980s or, more specifically, with the
stances in 1977, Ali Shariati (a Sorbonne Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in Decem-
PhD) articulated a political-religious ideol- ber 1979. While the global jihadi move-
ogy that married Shiism with Marxism, ment has grown substantially over the past
much as Liberation Theology among leftist four decades, it has remained a fairly small
Catholic priests had woven together Chris- component of militant jihadism, which still
tianity and Marxism in the 1970s.8 overwhelmingly focuses on local issues.
Thus, as we date the emergence of Global jihadism has now witnessed four
Islamism to 1928 with the establishment of distinct waves. None is part of some grand-
the Muslim Brotherhood, we can like- er conspiracy, but rather a response to a
wise date the emergence of modern jihadi specific crisis from which a particular idea
thought — the call for violence to imple- of global jihad emerged. Each wave has
ment a political agenda under the banner had a defining idea about what was meant
of Islam — to the 1960s. Their intellec- by global jihad and at least one ideologue
tual foundations now laid, both Islamism who most closely articulated it. In every
and jihadism surged in importance in the case, the idea of global jihad was clearly
Muslim world in the 1970s and 1980s. The shaped by the crisis from which it arose.
reasons for the dramatic rise of these two I will briefly summarize the four waves
phenomena are complex and varied, in- here and then treat each one in more detail
cluding the sudden strengthening of Saudi below. The first wave of global jihad began
Arabia and other conservative oil states with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
and the general failure of secular republics 1979 and the subsequent call for Muslims
in the Middle East to deliver economic from around the world to come and help
growth and good governance.9 liberate Afghanistan. This jihad against the
The key point in this discussion is that, Soviets continued throughout the 1980s
in both intellectual construct and practice, to be primarily a classic anti-colonial
neither Islamism nor jihadism contained jihad, but during this time a jihadi offshoot
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Middle East Policy, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, Fall 2017
emerged dedicated to the idea of freeing all armed insurrections to overthrow local
occupied Muslim lands around the world. regimes had largely ground to a halt in
Although this would begin with Afghani- failure. The defeat in Egypt was par-
stan, the global jihad was to move on to ticularly stinging to Bin Laden, given the
other lands viewed as properly Muslim but importance of Egypt as the most populated
occupied by infidels — from Palestine to and strategically important Arab country.
Kashmir to Mindanao and, ultimately, to This second wave of global jihad had its
Spain (al-Andalus). The idea was that a heyday from 1998 to 2001 with a series of
“solid base” of mujahideen warriors would increasingly audacious direct attacks on
travel the world working with local Mus- American targets, culminating in the terror
lim populations to liberate Muslim lands, attacks of September 11, 2001. What came
forming a type of “Jihadi International.”11 to be known as “al-Qaeda Central” was
This first wave came to an end after the largely defeated by 2002 but sputtered on
Soviets left Afghanistan and the Jihadi in diminished form under Bin Laden until
International idea proved impractical. 2011, when he was killed by U.S. Navy
The second wave of global jihad — Seals at his compound in Pakistan.
Bin Laden’s “America First” or far-enemy The third distinct wave of global jihad
strategy — can be dated from about 1996. began with the overthrow of the Iraqi state
It arose out of a crisis of defeat, particu- in 2003 by U.S. forces and intensified with
larly in Egypt and Algeria, where jihadi the civil war in Syria that began in 2011.
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Middle East Policy, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, Fall 2017
Azzam laid out his arguments in a directly to fitna, internecine Muslim dis-
series of texts, the two most famous being cord. For Azzam, takfir would weaken the
the 1984 fatwa (religious opinion) The ummah rather than strengthen it.13
Defense of Muslim Lands and the 1987 Azzam’s radicalism was not limited to
book Join the Caravan. Azzam’s basic the expansive, globalized nature of armed
argument may be summarized as follows: jihad. Azzam agreed with Sayyid Qutb
Muslim lands have been lost over time to that armed jihad was not an episodic set
non-Muslim forces, and they need to be of discrete events (the orthodox Muslim
taken back for use by the Muslim ummah view) but rather a permanent state for all
(community). The two most important Muslims, reminiscent of Leon Trotsky’s
places to begin the reconquest of Muslim argument for permanent revolution. Azzam
lands globally are Afghanistan and Pal- can also be credited with the idea of the
estine. Where Muslim lands have been “cult of martyrdom,” including religious
occupied, it is obligatory for all Muslims justification for suicide bombings. Suicide
(fard ayn) to participate in their recapture, is a mortal sin in Islam, as in Catholicism,
which can only be accomplished through making Azzam’s task of justifying suicide
violent jihad. No other method will be operations difficult.
successful, since occupiers will not readily Azzam’s call for young Muslim men
give up such territory. The strategy is for a to “join the caravan,” and come to Af-
solid base of mujahidin (the “beating heart ghanistan to fight, successfully recruited
and thinking mind of jihad”) to travel the thousands to the cause, although foreign
world and work with Muslim communities fighters did not play a decisive role in the
to undertake “peoples’ jihads” to liberate ultimate defeat of the Soviets in Afghani-
occupied Muslim lands. stan. The withdrawal of the USSR in early
Azzam’s signature innovation was the 1989 left the followers of global jihad with
call for global jihad based on a “solid base” a dilemma: where to take the jihad next?
(qaidat al-sulba) of well-trained Muslim Should they follow Azzam’s advice and
mujahidin from around the world, a sort fight in Palestine or some other occupied
of “Jihadi International.” Azzam’s vision Muslim lands, or follow Zawahiri’s takfiri
was at once both radical and traditional: line and put their resources into over-
he interpreted jihad in a far more glob- throwing apostate rulers in the Muslim
ally expansive manner than had been the world, particularly Hosni Mubarak? More
case previously, but he maintained a strict traditional Muslims simply left for home,
focus on territory. Armed jihad to liberate knowing that the particular jihad to liberate
occupied land is an orthodox, traditional Afghanistan was over. The debate among
use of the concept of jihad. Indeed, Azzam global jihadis was furious and may have
rejected the takfir argument made most contributed to Azzam’s assassination by
strenuously by Ayman al-Zawahiri, that the car bomb in Pakistan in November 1989.14
post-Afghan jihad should focus on over- The Soviet withdrawal, along with
throwing apostate Muslim regimes, begin- Azzam’s death, helped bring to a close the
ning in Egypt, not on liberating territory, first wave of global jihad. One last effort to
which would be far more difficult. Azzam realize Azzam’s vision of a Jihadi Interna-
saw the use of takfir, ex-communication tional that would travel to occupied zones
of Muslims, to be a slippery slope leading to liberate land occurred in Kuwait follow-
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Robinson: The Four Waves of Global Jihad
ing the Iraqi invasion in August 1990. Az- most were now on the defensive against re-
zam’s former pupil and colleague, Osama newed regime efforts in the post-Cold War
bin Laden, approached the Saudi royal regional environment. The conflict in Bos-
family with an offer: instead of bringing in nia following the collapse of Yugoslavia
the Americans and other infidels to liberate attracted a large number of Muslim volun-
Kuwait, allow Bin Laden to put the band teers from different lands, but it would be
back together, bring in 100,000 mujahidin an exaggeration to say they were fighting
from around the world, and liberate Kuwait under the banner of global jihad.
with Muslim hands. The Saudis, of course, Indeed, the 1990s were proving to be
had no interest in enabling tens of thou- a very difficult decade for jihadis of all
sands of foreign jihadis to roam around the stripes, whether local or global. After 20
kingdom, and declined the offer, setting a years of sustained success, either taking
spurned Bin Laden off on his own path to power in countries or becoming significant
change the nature of global jihad. political actors, both Islamists and jihadis
were losing ground as the 1990s wore on.16
AMERICA FIRST, 1996-2011 The two most important examples of this
The Saudi decision to reject Bin Lad- reversal of fortune were Egypt and Algeria.
en’s offer to bring in foreign mujahidin to The Egyptian regime had proved unable to
liberate Kuwait tipped the scales decisively stamp out either the growing influence of
against the idea of a Jihadi International, as Islamism or the low-intensity conflict of
it proved to be unworkable in practice. The Egyptian jihadis, led by both the Islamic
rejection also profoundly affected Bin Lad- Group (al-gamma al-islamiyya) and the
en’s thinking, bringing him much closer (at Jihad Organization (tanzim al-jihad). Areas
least for a few years) to Zawahiri’s takfiri of Cairo had become dangerous places for
idea that the fundamental problem was the police and security personnel to visit after
nature of regimes in the Muslim world. dark, including one very large neighbor-
How could any proper Muslim leader hood periodically referred to as the “Is-
prefer the use of hundreds of thousands of lamic State of Imbaba.” Predictions of
American and other infidel forces to — as the likely fall of the Mubarak regime and
the jihadi narrative would have it — the the coming to power of Islamists of some
genuine and pure mujahidin, who had stripe were commonplace.17 Yet by 1997,
just demonstrated their power in defeat- to the chagrin of Bin Laden and other ji-
ing one of the world’s two superpowers in hadis, the insurrection in Egypt was largely
Afghanistan? For Bin Laden, this decision defeated, with many jihadi leaders calling
demonstrated an intrinsic corruption. for a ceasefire and acknowledging that
In the early 1990s, banned from Saudi their path of violence had been a mistake.18
Arabia because of his growing militancy In Algeria, the story was largely the
and holed up in Sudan, Bin Laden had little same. The political liberalization that
to do other than entertain the occasional began in the late 1980s swept into power
jihadi visitor and perhaps lend a hand to the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS in its
militants next door in Somalia.15 At the French acronym, essentially the equiva-
broader level, there was very little, if any, lent of the Muslim Brotherhood) in the
organized global jihad during this period. 1990 municipal elections across Algeria.
Local groups remained active, although With the FIS halfway to the goal of win-
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Middle East Policy, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, Fall 2017
ning national parliamentary elections, the tate regimes, beginning with the overthrow
Algerian military staged a coup in Janu- of Sadat.21
ary 1992, stopped the elections and took Borrowing Faraj’s near-enemy/far-
power, prompting a bloody civil war. enemy rubric, Bin Laden turned it upside
While Egypt’s conflict was generally one down in two ways. First, he decided that
of low intensity, the Algerian civil war Israel was just a symptom of a larger prob-
was all-out and bloody. It featured some lem; it was the United States, not Israel,
extremely gruesome acts of terror against that should be viewed as the far enemy
civilians, the likes of which would not be (adu baid). Second, Bin Laden believed
seen again in the region until the rise of that it would be impossible to overthrow
ISIS. By 1994, the Islamists and jihadis apostate regimes in Cairo, Riyadh and
were mostly fighting among themselves, elsewhere without first breaking their links
and, as in Egypt, by 1997 the civil war had with Washington. So the focus of direct
been largely won by the Algerian state.19 action should not be on the near enemy
How did Bin Laden make sense of this (adu qarib) of the apostate regimes — not
reversal of fortune? Was it not inevitable yet, anyway — but rather on American
that apostate regimes would collapse under targets, both military and civilian. Once
the righteous pressure of the mujahidin? the Americans had been driven out of the
And how was it that local apostate re- region, he assumed that the local regimes
gimes in many parts of the region — not would fall rather easily. Bin Laden was
just in Egypt and Algeria — had proven convinced that the Americans would not
to be much more durable than Bin Laden have the stomach for a fight, given how
had expected? It was in this context that easily they were driven out of Lebanon
Bin Laden developed his “America First” and Somalia.
idea. According to this notion, it was U.S. The first iteration of Bin Laden’s
support for apostate regimes that allowed transition to a “far enemy” or “America
them to survive. The logical strategy, then, First” strategy was his 1996 “declaration
was to drive the United States from the of war,” written shortly after he had been
Middle East, thereby making local regimes forced out of Sudan and taken up residence
more vulnerable.20 in Afghanistan. This long and meandering
Bin Laden drew his inspiration from document, appealing mostly to those in-
Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, the ideo- terested in internal Saudi dissent, received
logue for the jihadi group that had assas- little attention at the time. It is something
sinated Anwar Sadat in 1981. In his tract of a hybrid, still very much a takfiri-jihadi
to fellow jihadis on the “missing duty” of argument for the illegitimacy of the Saudi
armed jihad (al-farida al-ghaiba), Faraj state (and the religious leadership that gave
warned his fellow jihadis not to waste such a state legitimacy), but also bringing
precious resources fighting the “far en- in the United States as the key enabling
emy,” which Faraj defined as Israel. Even power that allowed not just apostasy in
if jihadis successfully liberated Jerusalem, Saudi Arabia, but also anti-Islamic action
apostate Arab regimes in Cairo and else- in Palestine and across the region. With
where would end up claiming credit for it. this document, Bin Laden kept one foot in
Rather, Faraj urged the jihadi movement to the door of the takfiri near-enemy camp,
focus on the “near enemy” of local apos- but took a step with the other foot toward a
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Middle East Policy, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, Fall 2017
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Robinson: The Four Waves of Global Jihad
AQI was technically a branch of al-Qaeda March 2011 the Arab Spring protests had
for two years, it remained very much a come to Syria, rapidly leading to a mili-
Zarqawi operation with Zarqawi’s goals. tarized response by the regime and, over
AQI focused its efforts on bombing Shia time, its loss of control over large swaths
targets and publicly executing foreign- of Syrian territory. It was in this vacuum
ers, only periodically attacking American that ISI reorganized and recovered from
military forces in Iraq. Straying so far from its near destruction in Iraq. The vehicle
al-Qaeda’s party line earned Zarqawi a for ISI’s entry into the Syrian conflict was
letter of rebuke from Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Nusra Front in Syria (jabhat al-nusra
who noted that the issue of the Shia was fil-sham); indeed, Baghdadi and Zawahiri
best saved for a later date, as American engaged in a public squabble over whom
forces were the proper target at that point. the Nusra Front belonged to. Having lost
Besides, the posting of videos of execu- that argument when the head of the Nusra
tions of civilians was doing serious harm Front, Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, de-
to the image of the jihadi cause.27 clared allegiance to al-Qaeda, ISI nev-
Relations between Zarqawi and al- ertheless had become powerful enough
Qaeda, never great, continued to sour until to take and hold much of the Euphrates
Zarqawi was killed by U.S. forces in June River valley in eastern Syria in the absence
2006. Four months later, AQI formally of government forces. The Nusra Front
broke with al-Qaeda and declared itself a concentrated its efforts in the western part
state: the Islamic State in Iraq (al-dawla of the country, particularly Homs and Idlib
al-Islamiyya fil-Iraq), or ISI.28 The idea provinces. Gaining significant territory in
of a territorial state appears to have taken Syria in 2013 and early 2014 allowed ISI
root, at least in part, as a solution to the to declare itself an Islamic state in both
natural tension that had arisen between Iraq and Syria, or ISIS.
what became the ISI alliance of jihadis and The apex of ISIS history occurred
Iraqi Sunni nationalists: a territorial state in June 2014, when its forces rapidly
to appease the nationalists, but run under spread out from its new base in Syria and
sharia to appeal to the jihadis.29 However, took over Iraq’s second city, Mosul, and
without Zarqawi’s charismatic (if thug- much of the territory where Sunni Arabs
gish) leadership, ISI stagnated, unable to held a demographic advantage. On June
hold territory and increasingly alienating 29, 2014, from the pulpit of the twelfth-
the Sunni community it claimed to repre- century Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul,
sent. U.S. efforts to begin working with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi formally declared
Sunni Arabs in Iraq, particularly tribal the re-establishment of the caliphate and
groups, starting in 2007 (broadly lumped proclaimed himself the new caliph. The
together in American parlance with the territorial expansion of ISIS quickly hit its
later troop escalation, or “surge”), further natural limits — Sunni Arab areas with-
weakened the position of ISI. out a meaningful state presence in Iraq
Two nearly simultaneous events and Syria — and during the ensuing three
reversed ISI’s fortunes. First, Abu Bakr al- years, Iraqi, Kurdish and American forces
Baghdadi took over ISI in 2010.30 Bagh- slowly drove ISIS back. As of this writ-
dadi proved a skillful leader, able to rally ing, it appears likely that ISIS will lose
his troops and think creatively. Second, by its territorial caliphate sometime in 2017,
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Middle East Policy, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, Fall 2017
although it will likely continue to exist as a was to drive out their international support,
jihadi group for some time to come. the United States. For ISIS, the solution
This brief summary of the develop- to societal apostasy was to forcibly purify
ment of ISIS as the third wave of global society, allowing its members to live pious
jihad has stressed the differences between lives under sharia.
ISIS and al-Qaeda, even though some of Those solutions need different strate-
the roots of ISIS were in al-Qaeda. Those gies. For al-Qaeda, the strategy was to
differences can be further refined, beyond direct violent attacks against American tar-
personal rivalries and diverging histories, gets, both civilian and military. For ISIS,
by focusing on four issues: the nature of the strategy was to grab and hold territory,
the overarching societal problem faced, declare a state, and implement true sharia
the solution to that problem, the strategy to (or at least the ISIS interpretation of it).
achieve the requisite solution, and the orga- Savage violence was essential to create the
nizational vehicle to carry out that strat- conditions to implement that strategy.
egy. Al-Qaeda considered the overarch- Finally, the organizational form needed
ing problem to be the durability of local to implement the strategy was completely
apostate regimes that resulted from their different. Al-Qaeda saw itself as an elite
ties to Washington. Al-Qaeda believed that vanguard. To al-Qaeda, recruiting the right
if those ties were broken and the Americans types of jihadis was more important than
driven out, the apostate regimes would mass recruitment. By comparison, mass re-
begin to fall. By contrast, ISIS focused on cruitment was the ISIS goal, and its media
neither the far enemy nor the takfiri regime, production reflected it. Baghdadi and oth-
but on apostasy itself. According to this ers routinely put out the call for all Mus-
thinking, Muslims cannot be truly Muslim lims — and especially those with needed
unless and until they live in an Islamic state talents — to join them in their caliphate.
that implements sharia. It was a simple but ISIS had its leadership stratum, of course,
appealing argument, much easier to market but saw itself as a mass-based populist
and recruit with than an arcane “far enemy” movement, not an elite force.
doctrine. Thus, ISIS focused on the req- There are a large number of primary
uisites of state creation, a focus al-Qaeda texts that lay out the ideology (and evo-
did not share. However, to the degree that lution) of ISIS. Perhaps the three most
ISIS concentrated on state-building issues, important are the 2004 book The Manage-
it was through a sectarian lens: Shia rule in ment of Savagery (idarat al-tawahhush),
Baghdad and Damascus must be replaced the 2004 letter of allegiance from Zarqawi
(eventually) by rule by the caliphate. 31 to Bin Laden and the 2014 speech by
One of the striking things about the Syrian Baghdadi announcing the caliphate.32 The
civil war is just how little ISIS has fought Management of Savagery better describes
against Syrian regime forces, preferring to the strategic use of extreme violence by
battle local groups to hold onto territory, its ISIS than any other work. For its author,
first priority. Abu Bakr Naji (a pseudonym), over-the-
The second major difference between top savagery is needed in order to force the
al-Qaeda and ISIS was the solution to the state to disengage from parts of its claimed
overarching problem. For al-Qaeda, the territory. Drawing on the experience of Al-
way to make local apostate regimes fall geria in the 1990s, Naji’s idea was notably
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Robinson: The Four Waves of Global Jihad
put to use in Iraq, where ISIS (AQI, ISI) a more humane and historically accurate
was easily the most vicious in its imple- fashion.
mentation of post-2003 violence. Once in Perhaps what set ISIS apart from its
power in its territorial state, ISIS continued jihadi competitors was its brilliant market-
to implement Naji’s call to savagery, as it ing strategy, making global jihad cool for
served a number of political purposes. the small segment of the world’s popula-
What these documents have in com- tion it targeted: young, somewhat mar-
mon (along with other ISIS documents) ginalized males seeking glory and mean-
is an emphasis on three issues: creating a ing in their lives.33 Declaring a caliphate
territorial state, virulent anti-Shiism and was a stroke of genius, no matter that
the use of spectacular violence for politi- every major cleric in the Muslim world
cal ends. These ideological foci strongly who weighed in on the subject dismissed
differentiate the third wave of global jihad Baghdadi’s declaration as wrong-headed
from the first two. The most important on many different levels.34 For market-
point was the push for a territorial state ing and recruitment purposes, it was the
as soon as possible. Other jihadi groups, sexiest, most outrageous — and most
even those that support a new caliphate in effective — move Baghdadi could have
theory (most view it as an inevitable step made, stirring the imagination of some
in the future), have been reticent to declare Muslims. For young men willing to come
a caliphate, primarily because if it were to and fight for the caliphate, ISIS promised
be defeated and disappear, it would consti- a sort of Disneyland for jihadis: infinite
tute a historical disaster for the movement, thrills from doing outlandish things with
likely setting it back decades. Al-Qaeda little real-world accountability. The gore-
warned ISIS against declaring a caliph- stained videos that ISIS regularly put out
ate for exactly this reason. However, once repulsed most Muslims, but captured the
ISIS had declared it, to great excitement imagination of just enough of its target
in some quarters, al-Qaeda responded, demographic.35 ISIS never sought the ap-
falsely, that it had already declared a new proval of the keepers of Islamic tradition
caliphate earlier. (the ulama), wanting instead to create its
The emphasis on immediately declar- own imagined history. Even Zarqawi’s
ing a territorial state as the central necessi- mentor, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, one
ty of jihad dates back to Zarqawi, although of the few clerics with a track record of
he was killed just months before the first supporting jihadi movements, denounced
declaration of a new state was made in his former pupil.36 In the end, the ulama
2006. As ISIS’s territorial caliphate shrinks decisively rejected the ISIS program and
and disappears, its critics will likely have its ephemeral caliphate.
been proved right about the folly of such a
declaration. Conversely, it may be argued PERSONAL JIHAD, FROM 2001
that the ISIS experience, however heinous The gradual destruction of the ter-
in many ways, put the idea of re-estab- ritorial caliphate in the 2015-17 period
lishing the Islamic caliphate on the front represented the demise of the third wave of
burner in the Muslim world. However, global jihad, even though acts of violence
those outside of ISIS who support the idea will no doubt continue to be carried out in
would likely attempt to implement it in the name of ISIS from time to time. The
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Middle East Policy, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, Fall 2017
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Robinson: The Four Waves of Global Jihad
troops? Indeed, it was Suri’s willing- work about the Algerian revolution against
ness to draw on non-Muslim sources that France, as he closely followed the later
further antagonized the purists among civil war in Algeria in the 1990s. Spec-
the global jihadis, with whom Suri had tacular and gory violence and its ritual
a long-running feud. He coined the term importance were central to Suri’s ideas on
“Salafi-jihadi” and did not use it in a how the global jihad should be waged and
complimentary fashion. For Suri, among have impacted ISIS thinking as well. Other
the principal impediments to the success parts of his arguments are likewise famil-
of global jihad were puritans who refused iar, including his agreement with Abdullah
to cooperate with other jihadis if they did Azzam (whom he knew) that global jihadis
not share absolute agreement on all points must avoid the temptation to indulge in
of theology. He witnessed such inflex- takfir, fighting fellow Muslims through the
ibility among Arab Salafi-jihadis fighting threat of excommunication. He also shared
in Afghanistan, who refused to cooperate the common jihadi contempt for the ulama,
with the Taliban because they viewed them for their role in weakening the Muslim um-
as not sufficiently Muslim. The Taliban, mah over many decades, even centuries.
like most Pushtun Muslims in Afghanistan, Suri’s strategy for the survival of global
incorporate elements of the ancient tribal jihad in desperate times, of keeping hope
code of pushtunwali in their understanding alive, focused primarily on three elements.
and practice of Islam, a practice foreign First, he believed that the global jihad had
to other Muslims. Suri stressed the impor- entered a period of jihad fardi or “personal
tance of strategic cooperation among dif- jihad.” The idea has entered the English
ferent jihadi groups, even when there were language as “leaderless jihad.”41 Because
minor points of theological or ideological the Afghan emirate had been lost, and
difference, advice he was never particu- thus the critical aspect of territoriality of
larly successful at convincing puritanical the movement was gone for the foresee-
Salafi-jihadis to follow. 39 able future, it was important for individual
Much in Suri’s arguments is common Muslims and groups of like-minded jihadis
to other global jihadis, particularly those to undertake small-scale violence around
of the al-Qaeda strain. He believed that the world in the name of global jihad. Suri
there is, in fact, a global war against Islam realized that such pinprick attacks would
led by the United States, designed to keep not by themselves pose an existential or
the Muslim world weak and to plunder even a strategic threat to the United States
its resources. Suri argued that violence and its allies. However, such attacks could
is a necessary central feature of resisting keep fear alive in the minds of the enemy
the war on Islam, and that such “military and would encourage other Muslims to
operations” must include attacks on civil- undertake similar attacks, always under the
ians. Indeed, there is a ritualistic nature banner of global jihad. Such “lone wolf”
to Suri’s call for violence, reminiscent of and small-cell attacks are virtually impos-
Franz Fanon’s argument in The Wretched sible to entirely stop. In fact, many such
of the Earth about the cleansing quality small-scale attacks in the name of global
of killing one’s oppressor with one’s own jihad have been successfully undertaken in
hands, to feel his blood on your skin.40 It Europe, the United States, Canada and else-
is quite likely that Suri had read Fanon’s where in the years since Suri’s call to arms
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was published.42 Suri was correct, it seems, the English-speaking world and an Ameri-
in suggesting that, while such attacks can citizen, was killed in Yemen in 2011 in
objectively pose little significant strategic a U.S. drone strike.
threat, they do generate an outsized fear in The era of “personal jihad” was par-
many victimized nations, thereby keeping tially absorbed by ISIS, particularly as the
the hope of global jihad alive for the future. territory under its control shrank. As the
The second critical feature for Suri was caliphate came under increasing pressure,
the use of the media and new information ISIS called on all followers to engage
technologies. He was the first major jihadi in the type of violent personal jihads for
ideologue to recognize the power of the which Suri had given an ideological and
Internet and call on jihadis to take full ad- strategic foundation. Most of the 140
vantage of it. While global jihad was a se- terror attacks conducted or inspired by
rious business, its marketing needed to be ISIS from June 2014 to February 2017 fit
hip and savvy, appealing to a younger gen- the Suri model of individual or small-cell
eration of Muslims in ways that stultify- operations.44 While such personal-jihad
ing speeches by Ayman al-Zawahiri could tactics have been adopted by ISIS, they are
never accomplish. While Suri disappeared not fundamentally linked to its fortunes.
from the scene years before ISIS was able Personal-jihad attacks are not foundational
to establish a territorial state, the ISIS mar- to the notion of an ISIS caliphate, nor
keting department certainly learned from will the likely disappearance of the ISIS
Suri’s arguments. Its vivid and gory videos caliphate mean the end of such attacks.
of executions and battlefield exploits were The messaging of many acts of jihad al-
celebrations of the type of media work fardi in the West have included reference
Suri envisioned. As well, it was critical for to ISIS or have been claimed by ISIS,
individuals and small cells embarking on a but the two phenomena are not the same.
personal jihad of violence to leave messag- Personal jihad in the Suri framework will
ing behind to insure that people knew their long outlast the territorial state of ISIS and
violence was not random criminality but, even the group itself as it transforms into
rather, global jihad. a “regular” jihad organization.45 Because
Third, in the absence of a territorial of both the pervasiveness of new media
state (which remained a long-term goal and the difficulty of detecting all acts
for Suri), individual jihadis should remain of personal jihad in advance, this fourth
linked together in a virtual network made wave of global jihad will likely prove to
possible by new information technolo- be the most durable. It represents more of
gies.43 The Internet and other media are not a deadly nuisance that will murder people
only useful in marketing jihad, but in or- from time to time than a strategic threat,
ganizing it as well, keeping jihadis linked but it is already proving to be exception-
together and learning from each other, ally difficult to stop.46
even in the absence of a central hub. The
al-Qaeda jihadi ideologue Anwar al-Awla- CONCLUSION
ki demonstrated the role the Internet could This essay makes three broad argu-
play in linking together fellow jihadis and ments. First, a distinct offshoot of the
radicalizing them virtually. Awlaki, the broader jihadi movement emerged in the
most important global jihadi ideologue in 1980s that made global claims and had a
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Robinson: The Four Waves of Global Jihad
global reach. Prior to this point, the various and blossomed with the ungoverned spaces
jihadi groups — those militants who used allowed by the Syrian civil war. The focus
violence to advance their political agenda on creating a territorial Islamic state im-
under the banner of Islam — that had aris- mediately made the ISIS wave both unique
en in the 1960s and 1970s were focused and vulnerable, with the end of the territo-
primarily or even exclusively on local rial “caliphate” likely to be realized during
issues, mostly local regime change. The 2017. The fourth wave, Personal Jihad,
Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghan- was the brainchild of Abu Musab al-Suri
istan in December 1979 was the precipitat- as he witnessed the destruction of the
ing event that gave birth to the global-jihad “Islamic emirate” in Afghanistan and the
strand of thinking and organizing. killing or capture of many of the leaders
The second and larger claim in this of the global-jihad movement. Networked,
essay is to argue for a reconceptualiza- small-scale, media-savvy attacks around
tion of the global jihad into four distinct the world were his best means to keep
waves, each coming out of a specific crisis, hope alive during a period of defeat.
each with its own distinct ideological The third broad claim in this essay is
arguments, and each producing particular that the fourth wave of global jihad is a
strategic goals and organizational forms. more durable form of organization and
Borrowing from the Communist experi- violence likely to be around for many
ence, I describe the first wave as that of years to come. Small-scale attacks can be
the Jihadi International, a global band of murderous, to be sure, but do not constitute
mujahidin that would fight around the either an existential threat or even much of
world in concert with local Muslims to lib- a strategic threat to the West. Their ability
erate occupied Muslim lands. The Soviet to create havoc is more of a challenge to
invasion of Afghanistan gave birth to this local countries in the Muslim world, but
model, which essentially died out by 1990 even there, sober perspective is needed to
with the death of Abdullah Azzam and the assess actual levels of threat. The only re-
failure of the model to be applied to Ku- ally plausible route for global jihad to rise
wait after Iraq’s invasion and occupation. to the level of strategic threat is for major
The second wave of global jihad, America powers to respond poorly, to over-react,
First, was birthed by Osama bin Laden thereby polarizing relations between the
beginning around 1996, as “near enemy” West and the Muslim world. In the words
regimes proved to be durable in the face of of ISIS, such polarization would help re-
jihadi pressure. move the “gray zone” and make the strate-
The essential defeat of al-Qaeda in gic context more suitable to jihadi goals.47
Afghanistan by 2002 following the attacks This was a classic Vanguard/Leninist tactic
of 9/11 left the hollow shell of a central or- to provoke the state into over-reaction, but
ganization, which continued to limp along one that has rarely worked well in practice.
until Bin Laden’s death in 2011. Militants The four waves of global jihad each
allied with al-Qaeda then focused over- arose out of a specific crisis. The waves
whelmingly on local conflicts, in Syria and themselves represent one response to each
elsewhere. The Caliphate Now! third wave of those crises and are not part of some
of global jihad arose from experiences in broader grand conspiracy of stages. To
Iraq following the U.S. invasion in 2003 be sure, those conspiracies of stages do
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Middle East Policy, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, Fall 2017
exist in the fertile minds of some jihadi fewer than 100,000 men, about the size of
ideologues, including Abu Bakr Naji in one small city in the Muslim world. The
his Management of Savagery, mentioned outsized attention that global jihadis have
above.48 But global jihad is, at base, a rela- generated over the past four decades de-
tively marginal movement that simply does rives both from their own acts of spectacle
not have the power to force a specific evo- and violence, and from the power of the
lution of history to its benefit and ultimate information revolution around the world to
victory. The totality of all global jihadi unduly glamorize political murder.
fighters in these four waves numbered
1
A good introduction to the life and thought of Hasan al-Banna can be found in Gudrun Kramer, Hasan al-
Banna (OneWorld Publications, 2009).
2
The earliest extensive study of the Muslim Brotherhood was Richard P. Mitchell’s classic book The Society
of the Muslim Brothers (Oxford University Press, 1969). For an excellent recent history of the Muslim
Brotherhood, see Carrie Rosefsky Wickam, The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement
(Princeton University Press, 2013). The best analysis of the early years of the organization can be found in
Brynjar Lia, The Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Movement, 1928-1942 (Ithaca
Press, 1999).
3
Violence by the Muslim Brotherhood was in any case more broadly used against colonial powers than
against local regimes, particularly postcolonial regimes.
4
The Arabic word “jihad” comes from the verb jahad, “to exert an effort,” and is a commonly used word out-
side of any religious context. In contemporary orthodox Islam, the religious meaning of jihad has two forms:
the “greater jihad” to resist temptations and lead a good and pious life, and the “lesser jihad,” or jihad of the
sword (jihad al-sayf), which is the armed defense of the Muslim community or its lands. An armed jihad may
only be called for by a religiously qualified individual. In their stressing of armed jihad over all else, in their
appropriating the credentials to call for jihad, and in their expansive understanding of the nature of armed
jihad, the ideologues studied in this essay do not take an orthodox view of jihad.
5
Milestones is widely available online, both in the original Arabic and in English translation.
6
Qutb was a prolific and influential writer even before his political radicalization in prison, and many of his
books have been translated into English, including In the Shade of the Qur’an, Social Justice in Islam, The
Islamic Concept and Its Characteristics, Basic Principles of the Islamic Worldview and his autobiographi-
cal A Child from the Village. The best study of Qutb is John Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Islamic
Radicalism (Oxford University Press, 2009).
7
The lectures, with annotation, can be found in Hamid Algar, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declara-
tions of Imam Khomeini (Mizan Press, 1981).
8
For a good biography of Shariati and his ideas, see Ali Rahnema, An Islamic Utopian: A Political Biography
of Ali Shariati (IB Tauris, 2014).
9
The literature on Islamism and its jihadi offshoot is extensive. A good place to start is Gilles Kepel, Jihad:
The Trail of Political Islam (Belknap Press, 2003).
10
Faraj was the principal ideologue of the group that assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981.
It was Faraj who coined the now-common dichotomy between a “near enemy” and a “far enemy” in his book
The Hidden Obligation (al-farida al-gha’iba). This book has been translated into English in Johannes J.G.
Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East (Mc-
Millan, 1986). See also Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge University
Press, second edition 2009).
11
“Solid base” — qaidat sulba — is one translation of “al-Qaeda” and is the original meaning of the term
in jihadi circles. It is the Arabic phrase that I am translating as Jihadi International, in order to capture its
meaning in a broader comparative political sense; that is, a sort of jihadi equivalent to the old Communist
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Robinson: The Four Waves of Global Jihad
International, or Comintern, which sought to advance Communism globally “by all available means,” includ-
ing violence. A parallel use of the word al-Qaeda during the 1980s was qa’idat al-ma’lumat, which referred
to the database of foreign fighters who had enlisted to fight in Afghanistan.
12
An excellent introduction to Azzam’s life and writings is “Abdallah Azzam,” by Thomas Hegghammer, in
Al Qaeda in Its Own Words, eds. Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli (Belknap Press, 2008). Hegghammer is
currently working on a biography of Azzam, which is sure to be the best source on his life.
13
Robert Springborg has suggested that Azzam’s focus on territorial liberation may have reflected his Pal-
estinian origins and the Palestinian struggle to liberate their historical territory; similarly, Bin Laden’s later
focus on Saudi Arabia may have reflected the importance of his upbringing in Jeddah. The same may be said
for Ayman al-Zawahiri, in that his arguments in favor of takfir could be viewed as a cover for his deep-seated
desire to overthrow the regime in Egypt, which had jailed him. In each of these cases, there may well have
been a tactical or even psychological dimension to the broader strategic arguments made by these ideologues.
Private communication.
14
It is not clear who was behind the assassination of Azzam, and there is a long list of the “usual suspects.”
The two most credible theories of responsibility revolve around Pakistan’s military intelligence (ISI) and the
factional struggle within al-Qaeda between Azzam and Zawahiri.
15
There is debate about the extent of Bin Laden’s involvement in Somalia during the early 1990s, includ-
ing in the “Black Hawk Down” incident. Bin Laden claimed to Peter Bergen that he and allied Arab jihadis
played a role, but no real evidence has been produced to corroborate the claim. See Peter L. Bergen, Holy
War Inc.: Inside the Secret War of Osama Bin Laden (Touchstone, 2002).
16
Kepel takes up the decline narrative in the 1990s in his Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam.
17
For an excellent discussion of the concerns about the stability of the Egyptian regime at the time, see the
article by “Cassandra” (a pseudonym adopted by a senior American scholar of the region), “The Impending
Crisis in Egypt,” Middle East Journal 49, no. 1 (Winter 1995).
18
The renunciation of violence by Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (“Dr. Fadl”) was particularly germane, as he had
been a close associate of Ayman al-Zawahiri and an important ideologue of global jihad. While in prison, he
wrote Wathiqat Tarshid al-’Aml al-Jihadi fi Misr w’al-’Alam (roughly, Guidance on the Proper Place of Jihad
in Egypt and the World) in which he strongly criticized the ways in which he and other jihadis had misused
violence. Sharif became a target of criticism in jihadi circles as a result. The renunciation of violence by the
Islamic Group can be found in translation, with an excellent introduction by Sherman A. Jackson, in Initiative
to Stop the Violence (Mubadarat Waqf al-‘Unf) (Yale University Press, 2015).
19
For more on the Algerian civil war, see Luis Martinez, The Algerian Civil War, 1990-1998 (Columbia
University Press, 2000). For an interesting account of the “lessons learned” from the violence in the Algerian
civil war, see Jacob Mundy, Imaginative Geographies of Algerian Violence: Conflict Science, Conflict Man-
agement, Antipolitics (Stanford University Press, 2015).
20
Ironically, the Sunni jihadi Bin Laden’s strategy of driving the United States out of the region in many ways
mirrored the post-revolutionary Shia regime in Tehran’s regional strategy as well.
21
See Jansen, The Neglected Duty, esp. 192-93.
22
The original Arabic text was printed in Al-Quds Al-Arabi newspaper on February 23, 1998. There are many
English language translations, including here: https://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm.
23
The best discussion of the rise of al-Qaeda in Yemen is by Gregory D. Johnsen, The Last Refuge: Yemen,
al-Qaeda, and America’s War in Arabia (W.W. Norton, 2014).
24
See Hugh Kennedy, Caliphate: The History of an Idea (Basic Books, 2016).
25
Cole Bunzel, The Kingdom and the Caliphate: Duel of the Islamic States (Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace, February 2016). See as well Bunzel’s paper for the Brookings Institution: From Paper State
to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State (March 2015).
26
The lower estimate can be found in Sean C. Reynolds and Mohammed M. Hafez, “Social Network Analysis
of German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq” in Terrorism and Political Violence, published online Febru-
ary 14, 2017, 1. The higher estimate can be found in Robin Wright, “Does the Manchester Attack Show the
Islamic State’s Strength or Weakness?” New Yorker online, May 24, 2017.
27
Zawahiri’s letter to Zarqawi in the original Arabic can be found here: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/Zawahiris-Letter-to-Zarqawi-Original.pdf. An English translation can be found here:
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Zawahiris-Letter-to-Zarqawi-Translation.pdf.
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28
Not to be confused with Pakistan’s military intelligence service, noted earlier.
29
This insight comes from Mohammed Hafez in a private correspondence.
30
Baghdadi is his nom de guerre. Baghdadi’s birth name was Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali Muhammad al-
Badri al-Samarrai. After the declaration of the caliphate, Baghdadi went by “Caliph Ibrahim.” An excellent
account of the formation of ISIS, and particularly its use of apocalyptic traditions in Islam to recruit and mo-
bilize, can be found in William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision
of the Islamic State (St. Martin’s Press, 2015).
31
Although the ruling Baath party in Syria is secular, the regime is dominated by members of the Alawi sect
of Islam, a Shia offshoot. ISIS routinely referred to the “Nusayri” regime, an insulting reference to Alawis.
32
The Management of Savagery can be found here: https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/abu-bakr-naji-
the-management-of-savagery-the-most-critical-stage-through-which-the-umma-will-pass.pdf. Excerpts in
English from Zarqawi’s letter may be found in Kepel and Milelli, Al Qaeda in Its Own Words, 251-267. The
complete letter, albeit with a poor translation, can be found here: https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/31694.
htm.The official text of Baghdadi’s speech was released by ISIS under the title This Is the Promise of Allah,
and can be found in English here: https://ia902505.us.archive.org/28/items/poa_25984/EN.pdf.
33
The Reynolds and Hafez article on “Social Network Analysis” discusses social background considerations.
34
See, for example, the letter from ulama denouncing the declaration, found here: http://www.lettertobagh-
dadi.com.
35
Polling data routinely showed support for ISIS among Muslims in the single digits. See http://www.pewre-
search.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/in-nations-with-significant-muslim-populations-much-disdain-for-isis.
36
The best account of Maqdisi is Joas Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihad: The Ideology and Influence of Abu
Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
37
Suri’s long (and quite repetitive) treatise can be found in full on the Internet in the original Arabic, but has
not been fully translated into English. Brynjar Lia provides a good translation of key excerpts in his Architect
of Global Jihad: The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri (Columbia University Press, 2008). Jim
Lacy also provides a partial translation in his A Terrorist’s Call to Global Jihad: Deciphering Abu Musab al-
Suri’s Islamic Jihad Manifesto (Naval Institute Press, 2008).
38
The best work on Suri is by Brynjar Lia, especially his Architect of Global Jihad, including Suri’s criti-
cisms of Bin Laden’s strategy.
39
For an excellent discussion of Suri’s feud with puritanical Salafis, see Brynjar Lia, “Destructive Doctrinar-
ians: Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s Critique of the Salafis in the Jihadi Current,” in Global Salafism: Islam’s New
Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijar (Columbia University Press, 2009).
40
Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Grove Press, 1963).
41
For an early example of this, see Marc Sageman’s excellent analysis Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in
the Twenty-First Century (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
42
It should always be remembered that global jihadis have killed far more Muslims than non-Muslims.
43
This form of informational and networked warfare was first made famous by John Arquilla and David
Ronfeldt in “Cyberwar Is Coming!” Comparative Strategy 12, no. 2 (Spring 1993).
44
http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/17/world/mapping-isis-attacks-around-the-world/index.html.
45
But even as ISIS normalizes into a more generic jihad organization, it will likely remain able to carry out
deadly terror attacks as the root causes of Sunni alienation in Iraq and Syria will almost certainly be ignored
by the regimes in Baghdad and Damascus. For more on post-caliphate terror by ISIS, see Seth G. Jones et al.,
Rolling Back the Islamic State (RAND, 2017) and Robin Wright et al., The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, al-Qaeda and
Beyond (USIP and the Wilson Center, December 2016/January 2017).
46
A smart article on how to deal with this form of violence can be found in Daniel Byman, “How to Hunt a
Lone Wolf: Countering Terrorists Who Act on Their Own,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2017).
47
For ISIS’s discussion on the “gray zone,” see its propaganda publication Dabiq, Issue 7, “From Hypocrisy
to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Gray Zone,” hosted by the Clarion Project at https://clarionproject.org/
docs/islamic-state-dabiq-magazine-issue-7-from-hypocrisy-to-apostasy.pdf.
48
See also Brian Fishman, The Master Plan: ISIS, Al Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory (Yale
University Press, 2016).
88