SERlE ORIENTALE ROMA

LXXI

RAFFAELE TORELLA

THE ISVARAPRATYABHIJNA.KA.RIKA.
OF UTPALADEVA
WITH THE AUTHOR'S VRTTI

Critical edition and annotated translation

ROM A
ISTITUTO ITALIANO PER IL MEDIO ED ESTREMO ORIENTE

1994
 Distributed by Herder, International Book Centre
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En-ata Corrige
In Italy by Libreria Distributrice Degrassi,
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p. XIV, fn. 3, I. 3 Sadan;lha Sadardha
p. XVII, I. 7 wawe wave
In India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka by Munshiram Manoharlal according to
XXXI, I. 7 according
Post Box 5715, 54 Rani Jhansi Road, New Delhi 110055. ' sandhi
XLIX, n. 8, I. 2 Sandhi
p. 75 invert the content of notes 9 and 10
p. 96, fn. 2, II. 1 2 12 15 b cd
p, 99, fn, 1,1. 1 put puts
p. 102, I. 2 °ni~!han °ni~!hat

p. 113, fn. 9, I. 18 hahyarthiilllllllcyatva hahyarthalllimeyatva-

p. 124, I. 6 contextually contextually has
o o
p. 126, fn. 42, I. 20 arthaparicchedena paCWniil?1 paraspariivacchedena
p. 129, fn. 4, 1. 23 a ab
p. 134, I. 14 by on by
p. 137, fn. 6, I. 1 B. Bh
p. 152, I. 17 bring being
p. 155, fn. 8, I. 2 p. 25) p.25)
This volilme is pllNished with a gran! /''OIn the constituted
p. 158, I. 8 constitued
Consiglio Nazioflale delle Ricerche '(CNR) paiijikc7
p. 162, fn. 4, I. 15 paiicikci
p. 162, fn. 4, I. 20 alterity otherness
»
p. 185, fn. 30, I. 2 »
»
p. 186, fn. 34, I. 8 »
»
p.212,fn.9,1.3 »
p. 170, fn. 25, I. 7 recognizes which recognizes
p. 178, fn. 11, I. 3 as with
p. 180, fn. 17, l. 6 syat sym
p. 183, fn. 22, I. 1 *conception conception
p. 187, II. 10 13 14 him .. , his Him ... His
p. 195, I. 8 Wisdom Science
p. 235, I. 12 acchurita acchurita

TUTTI I DIRITTI RISERVATI

Prilllcd ill Iialy Slall/palO ill Ilalhl

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I should like to express my gratitude to IsMEO

for accepting this book for publication in the Serie Orientale Roma,
founded by Giuseppe Tucci. In paying tribute to the memory of Prof.
Tucci - my paramaguru - I must also acknowledge him as the first
western scholar to realize the importance of the Kashmiri Saiva tradition
and to promote its scientific study. I ideally place this work at His feet.
I thank IsMEO and the University of Rome "La Sapienza", whose
financial support enabled me to make several journeys to India in search
of MSS of Utpaladeva's works.
Then, I express my gratefulness to the Libraries that allowed me to
photograph and use their MSS for this edition: Research and Publications
Department, Srinagar (A.K. Reina, Assistant Director), Oriental Research
Institute and MSS Library, Trivandmm (Dr. K. Appukuntan Nair and Dr.
T. Bhaskaran, former Directors; P.L. Shaji, MSS Assistant) and Oriental
Institute Library, Baroda (Dr. R.T. Vyas, Director). I heartily thank Pandit
Dinanath Shastri, Srinagar, who generously put at my disposal his private
collection of MSS, then destroyed during Muslim desorders in Srinagar.
Special thanks are due to Felicity B. Lutz for her valuable assistance
in the English version of this book, and to my student Francesco Sferra
for preparing the Indexes and helping me very much in correcting the
proofs.

Finally, I wish to thank Raniero Gnoli with whom I discussed many

passages of this work. To this extraordinary scholar - and gentleman - I
dedicate this book.

Rocca Priora, October 1993.

RAFFAELE TORELLA

VII
 INTRODUCTION

In the complex and varied cultural panorama of ninth-century Kash-

mir we find all the major components of the religious-philosophical ten-
dencies in India at the time and, together with these, some particular
situations that led to new developments, which were also later to spread
very far from their place of origin. The tradition of Buddhism (rooted in
Kashmir since very ancient times) is present both with the realist schools
and the Vijfianavada, and culminates in the great cultural prestige of the
so-called 'logical school', which seems to elude too definite a colloca-
tion within one or other of the great Buddhist currents to which, by
turns, contemporary followers or opponents and modern scholars assign
it. The Brahmanic elites were still engaged in elaborating or perfecting
their reply to the doctrines of Dignaga and Dharmaklrti, whose circula-
tion in Kashmir was to be further stimulated by the presence of Dhar-
mottara, summoned by King Jayaplc;la to his court (Riijatarmiginf
ry.S.498). Thus works of great importance were composed that had a
major influence throughout India, such as the Nyiiyamm~iarf of Jayanta
Bhana and the Nyiiyahh[j,\'a~1Cl of Bhasarvajfia. Then, still in the Brah-
manic sphere, though pertaining to another side, there was the spread of
Vedantic schools apparently independent of SaIlkara, each of them being
distinguished by a particular configuration of the elements common to
them all (Brahman, maya, avidyii, vivarta, etc.) and indicated by a
variety of denominations I. There are various evidences of the activity of
Mlmaf\1saka schools. In addition to this, a tradition of studies in literary
criticism and aesthetics flourished during this period (Ingalls 1990: 1-10),
and was to constitute the major cultural branch of Indian aesthetics. Lastly,
there was an equally important tradition of studies in grammar and
general linguistics, in which the legacy of Bhartrhari seems to have a
prominent place.
Corresponding to this 'high' cultural tradition on the religious plane,
there was obviously with the exception of the Buddhists the smiirta

I Cf. citrahra!zll1aviidill (SO YI.3b), sphulilig(ltmavlidin (ihid. lOe) etc.

IX
dimension of Brahmanic Olthodoxy, characterized by the ancient popular
devotion to Siva and Vi~I)U, and to the pantheon connected with them. A
series of texts, linked to the cult of Siva and Vi~r)u, were already becom-
ing stratified probably a couple of centuries before the period under con-
sideration (but some are definitely much older). These express ideals and
thrusts that are absent in the Brahmanic sphere, mainly since they have
been consciously excluded because of their non-conformity to existing
social and religious structures, or even their possible disruptive force.
These texts give voice to a need for a more direct participation in the
experience of the divine, no longer seen as a transaction managed by
specialized personnel with a view to obtaining clearly defined and cir-
cumscribed benefits - culminating in an impersonal liberation projected
into an indefinite future - but as a transfiguration here and now of the
whole person, whose components, including the purely physical, become
the very protagonists of the path of liberation and not the unwelcome
extras. In this framework, and by carefully observing the nature of these
texts and of their addressees, it becomes immediately clear that we
cannot propose a scheme of interpretation centring on the polarities
Brahmanic ortodoxy - popular thrusts, or ritualism - ecstatic anti-ritualism.
In general, the Tantric adept, as Sanderson (1988: 662) has correctly
described him, is in actual fact a hyper-ritualist, who does not cancel the
inherited ritual but replaces it, often only by modifying, enriching and
making it more complicated 2 . He sometimes goes as far as to transform
it into a labyrinthine religious play, the highest and most complex ex-
ample of which is perhaps the Saivasiddhanta ritual, analyzed in such a
masterly manner by Helene Brunner (see Bibliography). The ritual elem-
ent rests on a basis that is broadly shared both by Vai~l)ava and Saiva
Tantrism, even in the currents that are ideologically more far-removed
from each other.
In ninth-century Kashmir the Vai~l)aVa school of Pailcaratra and the
variolls currents of Tantric Saivism had begun to follow different paths.
The Paficaratra was already heading towards an inexorable decline which
was gradually to lead to its disappearance from Kashmir and its firm
transplantation in the South of India. However, this was not without
producing as its final fruits some original figures of thinkers poised bet-
ween the Vai~l)ava and Saiva faith, such as Vamanadatta (cf. Torella
forthcoming) and Utpalavai~l)ava, aware of the affinity of the two tradi-
2 In any case, never totally negating it (ef. Sanderson 1990: 77, 82-83).
x XI
tions, which appears also, on the scriptural level, in a line of Pancaratra
texts marked by non-duality.
The Saiva tradition, which would continue to characterize social and
religious life in Kashmir, is for its part far from being unitary and if the
skein of texts, subdivisions and orientations is now beginning to be
unravelled, we are particularly indebted to a series of penetrating studies
by Alexis Sanderson3 to which I refer here. What is evident is the
presence in Kashmir during this period of a sharp distinction between a
dualist tradition and a non-dualist one with extremist tendencies. The
former, the so-called Saivasiddhanta, which embodies a kind of 'nonnal-
ized', mild, Tantrism - so much so that some scholars tend even to
exclude it from the Tantrism proper perpetuates many of the social and
religious institutions of the 'orthodox' order which it aims to replace: it
basically accepts the caste system, prefers to understate the non-vedic
nature of their Agamas and tends to identify with the establishment, in
maintaining a marked separation between pure and impure. It creates a
self-sufficient and all-pervasive ritual system, which, integrated by yoga,
leads the individual soul by degrees on a journey towards itself and the
reappropriation of its own true nature of Siva: the last station is the
achievement of the state of liberated Siva, for ever distinct from the
other monads of liberated individuals and from the supreme Siva, who
alone performs the five functions on the cosmic plane.
Opposed to the Saivasiddhantins in many respects, the non-dualist
Saivas follow the teachings embodied in another great division of the
Saiva Agama, that of the Bhairava Tantras, in which the terrific form of
the God - at least in the most radical texts - expresses first and foremost
the overthrow of the behavioural norms, conventions and distinctions
through which an attempt is made to give a definite and recognizable
structure to reality - fragile fences that the Power of the God, his Sakti,
sometimes superordinate to him, now derides now disrupts. The adept
enters into harmony with this Power, or rather he is possessed by it,
through practices and behaviours that here and there reveal their more or
less remote rooting in the practices of the Kapalikas, who challenge what
the Indians see perhaps as the horror par excellence, the macabre fre-
quentation of the cemeteries, where they evoke the terrible Mothers by
eating putrefying human flesh etc. Some divinities of important Bhairava
Agamas still display the animal features and hideous attributes, as well
3 Sec Bibliography; ef. also Dyezkowsky 1988 2 •
as the names, that link them to this ancient substratum (cf. Sanderson
1988: 670,674-75). At other times, instead of this (or alongside this), we
find that sex is resorted to as the central moment of the rite: the adept
worships the Goddess by offering her a cup containing the klll.ujagolaka,
or mixture of sperm and female secretions that the ritual union with his
partner has just produced. Gradually relieved of its original burden of an-
tinomianism and orgiastic transgression - and later totally eliminating the
funerary aspect (Sanderson 1985: 202) -, this mobilization of energies
through practices that challenge the current concept of purity and tend
towards the overflow of the powers of the senses becomes the charac-
teristic of the so-called kaula way (kalllaprakriyii) to liberation.
Several of the Bhairava Tantras are kallla in nature, especially the
Yamalas, but also, though to a softened and subtler degree, the so-called
Trika Tantras. Among them an older stratum may be distinguished, con-
sisting of the Siddhayogdvarfmata, the MY and the TantrasadbllClva, in
which the term trika does not yet appear and which feature the essential
doctrines but not the awareness of forming a group or school4 , as is the
case for the later Devyiiyiimala, Trikasadbhiiva, Trikalzrdaya (or °siira) ,
NWSal?ldira etc. 5 .
SOMANANDA (875/900-925/950)
This 'school' (with the scriptures that are linked to it in various
ways, such as those of the Krama) would probably have been destined to
remain one of the many Kashmiri Tantric school whose names we hardly
know and whose outlines are blurred, had it not been for the develop-
ment, mainly within it, of the first seeds of what was to become the
4 Cf. Dyczkowsky 1988 2 : 187 n.189. On the three phases in the development of
the Trika see Sanderson 1986: 170 n. 6; etc.
S In the light of current knowledge, it is not easy to define what is really meant
by one Tantra belonging to a particular 'school'. Every Tantra contains a mass of
elements - at times even contradictory to one another - a portion of which may be
shared also by Tantras belonging to different currents that are sometimes even far-
remoted from each other ideologically. For instance, cL the long, important passage
on the 'voids' etc. in chapter I (pra,I:/Iayogc7dhikc7ra) of the Tantrasadbhc7va (MS,
National Archives, Kathmandu, No.A363, f.8a 1.6 - LII b 1.1) an old and 'radical'
Trikatantra of the VidyapI\ha -, that is present almost verbatim in a 'mild'
Bhairavatantra, in many respects close to the Saivasiddhanta, like the SvT (IV.234-
296), belonging to the lower MantrapI\ha.
XII
flowering of an extraordinaty series of works and masters that between
the ninth and twelfth centuries constituted one of the highest achieve-
ments of Indian speculation and spirituality af all time. The complex
work of exegesis of the scriptures 6 , the reformulation of their teaching
and the organizing and hierarchizing of their contents indicate first and
foremost its decision to emerge into the open, to escape from the dimen-
sion of a restricted circle of adepts - which is what must have been the
original nature of these schools - and to offer itself implicitly as an
alternative to the dominant Saivasiddhanta, or at least to establish itself
within it as a non-extraneous element (or rather as an element which,
though not intended to constitute the whole, was able to give it its
ultimate significance). In order to do this it was necessary to extract a
homogeneous though varied teaching from the diverse texts; to purge it,
without changing its essential nature, of all that it was felt could not be
proposed to a wider circle in other words, of all that was bound to
create an instinctive and insurmountable resistance - by attenuating the
sharper points or removing every actually concrete aspect, and finally
translating it into a discourse whose categories were shared by its ad-
dressees and engaging in a dialogue that would not be afraid to confront
rival doctrines.
Yasugupta and Kalla~a with the doctrine of the Spanda, on the one
hand, and Somananda, on the other, were the first to undertake this task.
The former chose a plan that was more closely connected with spiritual
experience, the latter one that was more in terms of conceptual elabora-
tion (though his work is clearly based on direct experience7 , which is
sometimes visionary and ecstatic). But both the teachings and the tone of
the SS and SK and of the SD are perfectly compatible: Somananda is
certainly aware of the doctrines of the Spanda which echo here and there
in the SD (even the term spanda is to be foundS), they all implicitly refer
(, The first to take this path must have been the philosophers of the Saivasid-
dhanta. Sadyojyotis and Vyakhyani (cit. SD III.13cd-14) were certainly Somanan-
da's predecessors (though their date cannot be fixed more precisely). Earlier than
Somananda is probably also Brhaspati, the author of the Sivatallll,Wstra repeatedly
quoted by Abh. in the T A, who is coupled with Sadyojyotis in the introductory stan-
za of RamakaJ)\ha's commentary 011 the Mok,wklirikcl.
7 Cf. the I'l'tti on IPK IV .16, sClk,~c7tkl'taparame,vvarabharrclrakc7h7rair bharra-
,vrTsomc7nandapc7daib.
R SD VII.19a, 24b.
XIII
to the authority of the VBh9. A late tradition (Chatterji 19142 : 25 n.3)
even includes Somananda (along with the other masters of the Pratya-
bhijfHl) in the spiritual line descending from Vasugupta. Somananda
knows and criticizes (for his Sakta tendencies) Pradyumna Bhana, who
comes immediately after Kallata in the Spanda lineage. I will not dwell
here on the Spanda school, to which an exhaustive monography has
recently been devoted (Dyczkowsky 1987), except to say that its teach-
ings, which had already emerged as a post-scriptural elaboration, were
subsequently re-elaborated, especially by K~emaraja, and incorporated in
the synthesis of Abh. 's Trika, not without being to some extent strained
and depersonalized I o.
All the scant information we have on Somananda indicates his close
relationship to the Trika and the Krama. At the end of the SD he himself
informs us that he belongs to the Tryambhaka (or Terambha) marhika
founded by the son of Durvasas, who was asked by Siva himself to save
the secret doctrine from oblivion. This is the same Tryambhaka who in
the TA is considered the depositary of the non-dualist Saiva tradition, in
other words especially the Trika II. We learn from Abh. that he wrote a
commentary now lost - on the Pa/'atril?1.~ika, which belongs to the
ekavlra form of the Trika. A surviving passage of the Kramakeli of
Abh., quoted and commented on by Jayaratha (TAV III p. 192), men-
tions Somananda as a disciple of the Krama teacher Govindaraja, who,
before dying, passed on to him the doctrine of the Ka\1s taught in the
Devfpafica,~atika; this doctrine was transmitted by Somananda, through
his spiritual line, down to Abh. (ibid. p. 194).
The only work by Somananda that has come down to us, the SD (cf.
Gnoli 1957, 1959), is considered to be the first of the Pratyabhijfia
school. In this difficult, discordant but fascinating work, he alternates
expositions of a non-dualist doctrine that is felt to be still very near to its
'! K~emaraja connects the Spanda, first af all, with the Krama (SN p. 74 el'al1l
copakramopa.I'(Jf?IIf(lrayor mahc7rlha.I'(Jf!lpll{J/a7rm!1 dar/;ayall ... ) and, secondly, with
the Trika (Sa<,lan.1ha) and the Mata (p. 49, 47). The concept of spallda (Sanderson
1988:695) is present in the Jayadrallwyc7l1lala and in other texts linked to the KalI
cult,
10 See, for instance, in the SSY the superimposition on the SS of the doctrine of
up{lyas, which Abh. had derived from the MY.
II TAY vol. I p. 28 llikhila.\'c7stropalli,wdblllltasya ,1'a(lardhakramavijllc7l1as),a
Iraiyamblwkasall({7Ilad\'c7re~w aval{lrakatvc7t; TA XXXVI.I2 Iryambhakc7mardakabhi-
khya.l'rfllc7tha advaye dvaye / dvayadvaye ca llipW1c7 krame~w .\'iva.\'c7salle (Jayaratha:
adl'aye iii Irikakulc7dall).
XIV
scriptural sources - though these cannot be clearly distinguished -, logi-
cal justifications, visionary tirades and summary dismissals of opposing
doctrines; he presents an exceedingly long and malevolent demolition of
the theories of the Grammarians. The central nucleus is the powelful and
effective affirmation of Siva as the only reality: he does not render the
universe so pale that it is transformed, as in the contemporary Vedantic
schools, into an indefinable play of shadows, but illuminates it from
within and constitutes its life. In this universe where everything is
penetrated by Siva nothing remains in the margins, all is mirrored even
in the humblest thing and the whole nature of Siva is present in it (SD
III.l8ab sval1i~rhe /;ivatii deve prthivyadav apfdrsam) - directly, just as
gold is directly gold in the jewel, though it assumes a particular form.
The doctrine of the sarvasarl'iitmavada is the other face of the ekasivata.
Though this was already a long-standing concept 12 , here it acquires very
special importance and implications because it serves as the theoretical
context for the experience of the Tantric adept who has set out on the
path of the expansion of consciousness and energy: the object, though
maintaining its own identity, must not act as a dam, nor oppose itself
rigidly, but allow itself to be bent and, finally, uprooted, become an
integral part of this free flowing.
The principal argument in favour of this doctrine clearly derives
from the Vijfianavada. If there were a real diffence in nature between
consciousness and things, the phenomenon of knowledge would be im-
possible, because things, whether they have a concrete form or not
(atoms), cannot become the object of consciousness (IV.30). No relation
between things themselves would be possible, if they did not share one
and the same principle (VI); this principle is precisely consciousness,
which exists equally in all things (V.12). 'Being' is, actually, being
united with the manifestation of consciousness (cidvyaktiyogita; cf.
IV.29; IV7ab sarvabhiive,l'lI cidvyakteh sthitaiva paramarthatii). Thus
everything is pervasive, incorporeal and endowed with will, like con-
sciousness (VA). If things can be efficient, it is because they 'want' one
particular action that is peculiar to them (VI6,37). And if they want it,
they must also know it, in other words be conscious - first and foremost,
12 This conception is already referred to in the MBh (Wezler 1982). See also
Wezler 1992.
XV
of themselves. All things are in all conditions 13 knowing their own self
(V.105ab sarve bhavab svam atman(Jf!l jananta/z sarvatab sthitab). And
that self, continues Somananda in a visionary crescendo, is the same as
mine, as that of other subjects: "The jar knows by my own self. I know
by its self; I know by the self of SadMiva, SadMiva knows by my self ... "
(Y.I06 ab). All things have the essence of all others, because every thing
has the form-nature of all things. Everything is in everything, with the
various configuration of forms. I have the nature of the jar, the jar has
mine. In knowing himself through the different things, Siva resides
autonomously, being constituted by the manifestation of consciousness
and differentiated in the manifold differentiations (y'107cd-I09). Once it
has been established that everything has the nature of Siva, the question
of the unity and multiplicity of the universe becomes pointless, and so
does the question of its reality-truth; even as regards the so-called 'er-
roneous' cognition there is no real falsity (nzitlzyatva) , because even in
the eyes of the opponent it has, anyhow, some kind of efficiency (IY.IS-
20). Though the world of ordinary experience (vvavahara) is said to be
unreal, the reply is that the Lord is also manifes't in unreality l4 (II1.77).
But what is then the nature of manifested things, which on the one hand
are limited and, on the other, cnjoy a state of expansion, being united
with the supreme pacification of Siva (V.6)? Like everything that exists,
they are states in which Siva freely manifests himself (IV.47). It is true
that they have power, they are .\~akta, but, as everyday experience also
shows, having power, or being able to do something, does not mean
being independent 15 • If they are saktis, Siva is the possessor of these
saktis, though being inseparable from them; he is the only real .~akta in
ways as infinite as his powers (IV.4-5). If they are states (avast/zel,
bile/va), he is their substratum 16.
We are, therefore, in a markedly .\~([iva or .~an1hlwva context, in the
sense that the Power - though being inseparable from Siva (III.2cd) - is
subordinate to him. Once this premise is established, it is possible to let
it take the stage and see it rise in many points of the work to the role of
1.1 The subject cannot be insentient even with regard to the mere 'heing' or
'standing' (V.14).
14 And also in pain (V.9).
15 If things were in themselves totally independent, the unification (aflll-
sal!ldlulfla) of their cognitions would be impossible (SOV" p. 147).
16 Cf. (punning on the root bllll-) [V.51 ab lasmlid sl'aym!l svahl/{/I'CfW blu/I'air
hila V! hllaved hllavafl.
XVI
protagonist 17 . Somananda, following the teaching of the Trika, distin-
guishes a triad of powers - iccha, jiiiina and kriya - (connected with the
level of Sakti, SadMiva and lsvara respectively), which in fact are never
really separated from each other. Prior to them, at the top of the Saktitat-
tva plane, there is a moment in which they are completely mingled and
about to unfold: this is the state called uflnzukhitata, alll1n1ukhya 'proten-
sion' or pratlzama tutib 'first moment (of the will)' (l.18cd), 'wawe'
(SDVr p. 16 tarmiga, zinni). When these powers are totally dissolved in
unity with Siva, we have the supreme state, characterized by the supreme
lysis (nirvrti) and the conscious beatitude (cicinlpahlacia). But in no case
can one speak of Siva as quiescent or isolated (Mnta, kevala) (III.87b-
88), insofar as devoid of power (III.90ab)18, nor can one speak of cessa-
tion of the perception of the self, since Siva would then be insentient
(ja(la; IIl.90cd-91ab). His turning to creation - and more generally to his
five functions springs out of his own joy (anzac/a); he plays at conceal-
ing himself and assumes the nature of maya down to the Earth (1.32).
Thus it cannot be said that the universe is 'imagined' as Siva, or vice
versa, because the one is directly the other (III.83). Just as gold is not
'imagined' as such neither in the simple jewel of solid gold nor in the
earring in which the work is so refined as to set aside, as it were, its
nature of pure gold, so Siva is 'formed, arranged' (k.!pta) as universe -
in the sense that he has become such, or freely presents himself in this
fonn (SDVr p. 133, k.lptafl s(lf!lpannab svayaql sthitab); kalpana is, on
the contrary, imagining something where it is not (III.87c-91ab). There-
fore, the nature of Siva is present in everything, whether we know it or
not (VII.lcd). Even differentiation has Siva as its essence l9 , hence there
is not really a bond nor, consequently, liberation (III.72). Furthermore, it
is the very belief in the actual existence of bond and liberation that con-
stitutes the basic impurity (VII.S7cd). All the ritual prescriptions, Mstras
and teachers only serve the purposes of everyday life and are in any case
a way in which Siva manifests himself (III.48-49ab). Ritual bathing,
17 This is anything but an isolated case in the Saiva scriptures and treatises (see
also, in the Paficaratra tradition, the Lak,mllfafllra etc.).
18 If we admit the reality of Siva's state of inactivity, we are obliged to admit
that, in spite of everything, the three powers are present in it; it is precisely this
meeting of the three powers that constitutes the requisite of reality (III.56).
19 Even if in Saiva scriptures themselves we sometimes find the unreality of the
world affirmed, there is no real contradiction here, since this is merely a device to
promote detachment (III.95cd),
XVII
offering to the fire, puja etc. (VIL87 ff.) are extemal forms whose core is
the awareness that everything is resolved in Siva. He who worships, he
who is worshipped and the act of worship are in reality all one - Siva
(VIl.94cd). The Siva principle, whether it is known or not, does not
suffer any real obstruction (VILI fO. Fire, whether externally perceived
or not, still generates light, and gold, if it is not known, does not there-
fore become a stone. All this is doubtless true; it is true that the gem of
desires remains such even if it is not known, but only if man knows it as
such can he enjoy its effects (VIlA). The same may be affirmed regard-
ing individuals' identification with Siva. It has been said that even a fire
that is not known generates light, but so much more will be generated by
a fire aptly arranged for this PllIvose, such as a lamp in a house
(VILIOcd ff.). Thus a means must be taught whereby the attained aware-
ness of the nature of Siva produces visible effects in the souls
(VII.l2ab). This means is represented by logical argumentation, the
scriptures and the teacher 20 (VII.Scd). The SD condenses all this.
It is therefore easy to imagine on which arguments in particular
Somananda challenges the opposing doctrines. First of all he attacks all
those who in various ways claim that the external world is unreal, espe-
cially the various types of Vedantins (VI.3 ff.), who consider it as an
illusory manifestation (vivarfa) of Brahman, caused by nescience, or the
Vijfianavadins (VI.33-34) who affirm the reality of knowledge but make
unreal objects arise from it and, moreover, do not admit a subject of this
knowledge whereas every action, and therefore also the action of
knowing, is necessarily dependent on an agent subject. The thesis of the
Saktivadins is also rejected for a similar reason: they consider Power as
the sole reality, without taking into account that a power, even though it
is supreme, is implicitly dependent on a subject that possesses it. Then
there are those who admit agent subjects but make each of them an en-
tity that is separate and distinct from the Lord; those who sharply divide
bond and liberation, like the followers of the Nyaya-Vaise$ika (VI.28cd);
and those who claim a Brahman devoid of consciousness, and hence
jw1a (VI.29). Even those who claim the reality of the cxternal object,
like the bahyavadin Buddhists, are wrong because they do not admit a
unifying principle of reality, and thus make the passage from the moment
of sensation to the moment of mental elaboration impossible (Iv'80cd
20 Cf. p. XXXVII.
XVIII
ff.), and likewise the operation of apoha, through which they seek to
elude the universal.
It is essentially on the basis of these arguments, used either in isola-
tion or together, that the op~osing doctrines (apart from those already
mentioned, Jaina, Paficaratra, Saivasiddhanta, Sarnkhya etc.) are gradually
dismissed. Several of these objections are concentrated in the criticism
of the doctrines of the Grammarians - namely of Bhartrhari - which
differs from the others for its disproportionate length (the whole of
ahllika II) and its aggressive, sarcastic tone.
These Grammarians who think themselves so clever - says
Somananda quoting passages from the VP and the vrtfi - claim that the
supreme Brahman is to be identified with PasyantI-vac, but the latter at
the most is identifiable with the power of Knowledge, that cOlTesponds
to the plane of Sadasiva - definitely not to the highest plane. In fact, as
the word itself says, PasyantI 'sees' something. But what is the nature of
its objects? If we say that they are externalised images that it itself has
produced, we must ask ourselves whether they are real or unreal. In the
first case the distinctive feature of this philosophy is lacking, namely
seeing the manifestation as illusory (vivarta); the unreality of what it
sees would have repercussions on it, rendering it asatya, which is inad-
missible. If the cause of this perceiving unreal things is nescience, it is
the latter that must be established as being real or not: if it is real, then
PasyantI is contaminated by it; if it is not real, it is not understood how
there can be a relation between a real thing and a unreal one. The same
is also true of its creation. Moreover, this nescience can be seen neither
as an attribute of PasyantI (for the above-mentioned reasons); nor of
something else, since nothing real exists apart from it; nor is it to be
considered as independent, because then it would be impossible to sup-
press it. Neither can avidya be imputed only to the middle level, because
in any case it is Pasyann that is the cause of it. If Pasyann is to be iden-
tified with the spho!a, we must ask ourselves how words, unreal as they
are, can manifest it. No means of knowledge can prove its existence,
since for you nothing is real except it. Even the belief that pronouncing
a COlTect word leads to heaven results in attributing to the only reality
that can be its subject characteristics which are contrary to its nature,
such as the desire for particular fruitions, etc. It is not possible to posit
as the highest reality that which, because of its very nature, always
remains - however you put it an instrument of action (vac). Not even
identifying the ,~abdafattva without beginning and end with Para Vac
makes sense, since this means identifying the object (sound) with the in-
XIX
strument (voice). If, then, Pasyann is said to be only a proper noun and
hence to escape all the criticism conceming the fact of seeing, etc., and
that it is only the feminine ending that counts - which is intended to
express its being the power of Knowledge -, the reply is that, if it has
nothing to do with seeing, it is insentient and therefore cannot be the
power of Knowledge either. Then, the attributes that a verse 21 assigns to
PasyantI are criticized one by one. And so on in this vein, until his final
outburst: But why on earth have you left the sphere of grammar and
taken it into your heads to deal with a field which is not yours, like
philosophy?
VTPALADEVA (900/925-950/975)
Though Somananda is unanimously recognized as the founder of the
Pratyabhijfia, the school was not to be named after him or his work, but
after the work of his disciple Vtp. The term pm/yaMijliana occurs only
once in the SO (IV.120a) and has no pregnant meaning, since it is llsed
as an argument to demonstrate the essential unity, or possibility of unifi-
cation, of cognitions (against Buddhists ctc.). If, on the one hand, it is
true that the IPK are a 'reflection' of the SO, as Abh. says22, on the
other hand it is undeniable that thcy contain important novelties, not so
much in the basic doctrine as in the far more aware and acu(e determina-
tion of the aims proposed, the ways of attaining them and the ambit
addressed.
First and foremost Vtp. , bcing perhaps actually aidcd by the nega-
tive example of the SO, decides not to mix registers. The IPK is to be a
purely theoretical and rigorously argumented work, though based on a
scriptural background. The authority of the revelation must not be super-
imposed on the rational demonstration, and for this reason it is allotted a
specific space, the third Adhikam 23 • Vnlike what occurs here and there
21 avihhc7gc7 tu pa.~yantl sarvalab sat!lhrlakramc7 I sval'l7pajyotir evc7l/tab s17k,mlc7
wig anapliyinf II. This verse, frequently quoted, is included (with reserve) by Rau
along with the entire passage to which it belongs - in the kc7rikc7 text (LI67); Iyer,
instead, takes it as a quotation given in vrlli.
22 Ipv I p. 7 .oirfsomc7nandanc7thasya vljfWnapralihimhakam.
23 Cf. IpVV III p. 400 jfic7nakriyc7dhiklirayugalena tattvartha.l·w!lgrahasahitena
svaprakc7.<:e 'pi yuktyupab{'f!lhile lIif'l7pile ".I·valaff" ity (//!I.l'ab p17ritab, c7galllc7dhikc7re~/(/
xx
in the SO, any emotional colouring is banished. This does not mean that
Vtp. was solely a logician: the ex~ra~rdinary intensity of his hymns24,
which were to be collected in the SSA and are still recited daily by the
brahmins of Kashmir, proves it. In a sense Vtp. inaugurates what was to
become a salient feature of the whole Trika in Abh. 's synthesis: namely,
the tendency not to constitute a monolithic doctrine and a world of
religious experience to oppose en bloc everything that does not coincide
with it (as in the ekantin trends) but to distinguish planes, that are
hierarchically ordered but in which the 'higher' does not automatically
cancel the 'lower' (as Somananda had already said, Siva is everywhere,
even in differentiation, pain and hell). This is the perspective of the
paramadvaita, such an elevated viewpoint that it does not fear what is
different from itself, is not put in a critical position by it, is not forced to
make a choice. If we take the IS, then we find a still different face. Were
it not for its certain attribution, we would never suspect that the refined
Naiyayika speaking here is the same person as the Saiva theologian of
- ' - 25
the IPK or the bhiikta of the SSA -.
But let us retum to the IPK and, firstly, let us see how Vtp. deter-
mines the choice of his opponents. The most important feature is that the
Saivasiddhantins virtually disappear, at least as direct targets, and the
stage is dominated by his critique of Buddhism. This is a message Vtp.
~ddresses to his dualist cousins, whom - as will be seen more clearly in
Abh. - the Trika does not intend to defeat, but to use as a basis for its
emergence from the dimension of a restricted circle and for its establi-
shment in the stratum of social normality, by internalizing, or in any case
circumscribing, its own specific difference 26 . The fact that the MV that
is, a text containing distinct dualist lines (Chatterji 19142: 10, Sanderson
1992) and as such is venerated also by the Siddhanta - was chosen by
Abh. (following his master Sambhunatha ?) as the basic text for the
tam eva artham upodhaiayatci "c~c7stratab" ity ayall1. Here Abh. is referring to the
well-known passage of the Kira~lc7gama, Vidyapc7da IX.14b.
24 We should recall, on the other hand, that the very starting point of Pratya-
bhijfia theology is the state of devotion, the mahe.fvarasya dasyam mentioned in the
first verse of the IPK. Cf. SSA. XVA etc.
25 It is only the last verse that enables us to see it in the right perspective.
26 This attitude is aptly outlined by an oft quoted verse: anta~1 kau/o bahifl ,~aivo
[okacc7re tu vaidikalJ I sc7ram c7dc7ya tisrheta narfkelaphalCll!1 yatM II (cf. Sanderson
1985: 203-205; id. 1988: 699)
XXI
Trika is a clear indication of this attitude 27 . Choosing Buddhism, and
particularly its logical school, as number one enemy means reinforcing
the undeclared alliance with the Saivasiddhantins, who see Utp. siding
with them against those who had already been the opponents of
Sadyojyotis (see for instance the first chapter of his Nardvaraparrk,wi)
and were to be the opponents criticized by NarayaIwkm)tha and especial-
ly by Ramakm)tha, who displays a particularly vast knowledge of their
works and doctrines. This lengthy examination and criticism of the
teaching of the Buddhist logicians resulted in, or at least was accom-
panied by, the peculiar phenomenon of a more or less conscious absorp-
tion of their doctrines and their terminology, that was to leave substantial
traces in the structure of the Pratyabhijfia28 . This may have been a
deliberate ehoice by Utp.: to increase his own prestige by assuming the
ways and forms of a philosophical school which was perhaps the most
respected and feared, even by the many who did not agree with it. But
certainly one must also view this in the light of the complex relationship
with the Nyaya.
The Nyaya was also given a wide berth as an opponent. This, too, is
probably part of the manoeuvre to place the Trika in a broader Saiva
context, seeing that the Saiva faith was known to be pre-eminent among
the Naiyuyikas. It is probably for this reason that we see Utp. assuming
a Naiyuyika guise in the Is (Abh. also dealt with the philosophy of this
school in the Kat!ulnlllkhati/aka, now lost 29 ). Against the realism of the
Nyaya, that claimed the reality of the external object and the actual exis-
tence of concepts such relation etc., Utp. sets the critieism of the Bud-
27 According to Abh., the Trika -- and consequently the MY, which is its cs-
sencc - rcprcsents thc csscnce of the entire Saiva tradition and not of the sole non-
dualism (T A 1.18 da:icl\I'(ada.I'm'(/.I'I'a\I'(abhinfl(//11 yae ('1/(/.1'(//1(//11 I'ihho(l I lalsciulIll
Irika,I'c7slrcll!1 Iii falsC/NII!1 lIIcllin/lIIalam II).
2X I will not dwell on this point, which I have already dealt with elsewhere
(Torella 1992). Also Somananda presents and criticizes themes and doe trines of
Buddhist prcIllU/!/(/ tradition (inference, the universal as exclusion of the other, in-
stantaneity; cL in particular SO IY.68 fL, Y,44 IT, within a general criticism of the
inference placed outside the context of ekwiiI'Cllci -, Y1.77 rL) and refers, more or
less explieitly, to two verses by Oharmakirti (PY 111.282 in SO 1,45 and PY III.354
in SO VI.39). In the SO we find peculiar terms of Buddhist logic, such as
sl'alak\I'(/(/(J (lY.7Ia), apolia (YL76c), Sl'(lrlliallllmc7na (Y.55a), parclllllfllcllla (Y.6/c)
etc., but they are always referred to the opposing doctrines, without showing any
trace of conditioning or appropriation (as it is in Utp, and Abh.)
29 Cf. IpyV I p. 20.
XXII
dhist logicians, but only to show that they would easily get the better of
its relatively ingenuous realism if the Pratyabhijfia did not intervene to
support it. After letting the Buddhist logicians demolish the Nyaya
categories, he shows how the Buddhist alternative is in fact equally inad-
missible. It does overcome the Nyaya, but remains as though suspended
in mid air, since it is proved - in its fragmented and isolated universe
to be incapable of accounting for the network of relations and the cir-
cularity of the world of human experience. So - Utp, seems to say, and
later Abh. was to put this more explicitly one might just as well accept
the view of the Nyaya in the sphere of the vyavahiira, on condition that
one sees through it the pervasive presence of Siva as constituting its
dynamism and internal coherence. It could equally well resolve the in-
consistencies of the Buddhist view and render them acceptable. In this
way, Utp. achieves the result of both showing the superiority of the
Pratyabhijfia to Buddhism and warning the Nyaya not to count too much
on its forces alone, detached from those of the new Saiva theologians.
Another important aspect of the strategy of Utp. 's Pratyabhijfia is the
glaring reversal of Somananda's attitude towards Bhartrhari, who, from
being a punctiliously criticized and even derided opponent, becomes one,
of the major inspirers 30 throughout the IPK (as I have sought to point
out in the notes to the traslation), and in particular in one of its essential
doctrines. I am referring to the identification in Siva of the dual prakii,~a­
vimarSa pole the first understood as the motionless cognitive light that
constitutes the basic fabric, the founding structure of reality, of the
'given'; the second as the spark that causes this luminous structure to
pulsate by introdueing self-awareness, dynamism, freedom of interven-
tion, of self-assertion, thus expressing in theoretical terms what is the na-
ture of an unpredictable divine personality, like that of the violent and
loving Siva handed down in the Scriptures and with whom Utp.
dialogues in his mystical hymns, pf'([kii,~a forms, together with a large
group of synonyms or quasi-synonyms (from the roots bhii-, pratibhii-,
bhiis-, avabhiis-, iibhiis-, pratib1zcls-, prath- )31, a close-knit constellation
30 The fact that the Pratyabhijna shows at one time the influence of the Bud-
dhists and of Bhartrhari does not appear as a contradiction, if we take into account
the undoubted relations and mutual exchanges between the doctrines of the Buddhist
schools (Madhyamika, Yijnanavadin, logicians) and the doctrines of Bhartrhari (cf.
e.g, Lindtner 1993).
31 To these must be added another key term, splillr-, where the light is enriched
by a 'vibrant', dynamic, connotation - which makes it into the intersection point
with the doctrine of the Spanda.
XXIII
of 'luminous' tem1S indicating the notions of being manifested, emerging
from the dark, coming to consciousness or, more in general, of being the
object of knowledge and finally simply 'being', whose use was already
firmly established especially in Vedantic and Buddhist (particularly logi-
cal) contexts; prak([sa and synonyms frequently occur in the VP.
Apart from isolated and uncertain cases in the Saiva scriptural tradi-
tion (d. Oyczkowsky 1987: 233 n. 10; cf. also SO II.83d, 84c),
vimada 32 , in the pregnant sense Vtp. attributes to it, cannot but derive
from Bhartrhari's teaching, especially if we consider its link with light,
on the one hand, and the word on the other. Of course, I am referring
here to the two very famous and most quoted stanzas I.l31-32 of the
VP 33 , whose influence, though extending over the whole structure of the
Pratyabhijna, we find concentrated in particular on two closely connected
aspects. One (IPK 1.5.19) concerns the only way deemed possible to ac-
count for a common fact in everyday experience, such as the immediate
and seemingly toughtless action that still achieves its purpose namely,
that of affirming the presence of a subtle reflective awareness even
within the sensation or movement captured at its most direct and undif-
.12 jiill/(/r.~a has been translated in various ways and there are good reasons for
each of them: 'cogitazione, pensiero' (Gnoli), 'prise de conscience (Silburn), 'self-
consciousness, freedom, determinate consciousness' (Pandey), 'raissaisissement in-
fini' (Hulin), 'Betrachtung, Urteil' (Frau wallner), 'self-representation' (Sanderson),
'prise de conscience active, Jibre activite de la Conscience' (Padoux) etc. The trans-
lation 'retlective awareness' that I have generally adopted - drawn from Matilal
1968a, who however uses it to translate allllvyavasaya (also Dyczkowsky uses it fre-
quently) seemed to me broad enough to be adapted to the different contexts and
meanings in which the term is used. Being neither too precise nor too vague, it per-
mits me not to disseminate the text of different expressions for the same term.
Vimada is accompanied by a series of terms deriving from the same root with dif-
ferent preverbs (paraO, pratyavaO, avao, aD). A differentiation between them might
be attempted by identifying a more intimate and analytic element in vimar.l:a, a more
instantaneous and indefinite element in parlimarsa, one more characterized by intro-
jection and return to the subject in pratyavamada . However, the close reading of
the texts of this school indicates that, even if these different nuances are in principle
not unfounded, they are largely used as interchangeable terms. Another important
notion, closely connected with vimada and probably first introduced by Utp. -, is
that of c(/I/latkara 'astonished, wondrous, savouring' (see below p. 118 n. 23). It could
be defined as a vimar,\'a enriched with a strong aesthetic connotation.
33 See below p. 125 n. 41.
XXIV
ferentiated moment 34 . The other aspect regards the two solemn general
fOllllulations (1.5.11 and 13) that define vimada (pratyavamarsa in the
vrtti) as the essential nature of light (avabhc7sa; prakc7sa in the vrtti) and
i~dissolubly link consciousness (citi etc.), reflective awareness (pratya-
vamarSa) and the supreme word (para v([c)35.
The presence of Bhartrhari, not only in the substance of these
doctrines but often also in their verbal formulation, could not be more
direct - even if the vrtti of VP36 does nothing to emphasize the apparen-
tly very general meaning of the verse but, on the contrary, seems to do
its utmost to keep it down to earth. In making this doctrine one of the
crucial points of the Pratyabhijna, Vtp. appropriates another prestigious
tradition, that of the Grammarians, and Bhartrhari in particular, whose
teaching on the all-pervasive power of the word is, moreover, connected
with a very ancient speculative trend, which also continues in the
Agamic tradition close to Vtp. This is incorporated with no effort in the
philosophy of the Pratyabhijna, enriching it with implications, and -
something that must not be underestimated - it furnishes a further,
penetrating argument in the dispute against the Buddhist logicians, one
of whose basic theses was precisely the absolute otherness of direct
sensation from determinate knowledge. However, it is true that the
criticism of the tripartition of the word held by Bhartrhari (cf. below p.
120 n. 26) remains - according to what appears from the passages of the
(rkc7 sketchily quoted by Abh. in the IPVV. But it seems to sleep into the
background, compared to the general acceptance of BhartrhaIi's teaching
as a whole. One might even say that Vtp. criticizes the tripartition also
because this, though unanimously recognized by the contemporary
exegesis of the VP anel explicitly mentioned by Bhartrhari himself, appears
34 This conception is not to be referred solely to Bhartrhari as will be seen
later on - but may also be considered as a development in philosophical terms of
the experience of the 'effervescence of all Powers' (sarva.~aktil'ilolata), described in
Chapter I of the SD and, in turn, derived by Somananda from the scriptures (first of
all, the VBh).
35 See below p. 120 n. 26.
36 The question of the identification of the author of the vrtti on the first two
K[j~lcJas of the VP - indicated in the colophons as Harivr~abha - with Bhartrhari
himself is still to be considered an open one (see the recent contributions by Akluj-
kar 1972,1993 and Bronkhorst 1988,1991, for and against this identification respec-
tively). In the course of this work I shall provisionally accept the thesis of identity,
which seems to me the more likely and which, above all, has always been accepted
by the Indian tradition.
XXV
to him not in line with the general plan of the VP, to which a quad-
ripartition like the Saiva one would be more suited. The mention of a
supreme form of Pasyantl made in the l'{"tti on the SO (p. 38) - which
Somananda had not taken into consideration -, even if later Utp. con-
siders it included in the criticism of Somananda, might be understood as
Utp. 's airing of a hypothesis of fourth level in Bhartrhari himself. An in-
direct confirmation might be represented by the explicit equivalence that
his disciple RamakaJ:ttha (Spalldakiirikiivivrti p. 153) establishes between
sabdatattl'(l and Paravac, which, therefore, does not coincide with PasyantI
but of which the latter is an emanation. Moreover, RamakmHha seems in-
clined not to underline the illusory nature of the Sabdadvayavadins'
vivarta, but he considers it simply as a different way of denominating
that process of the Lord's articulation in the multiplicity of the universe
which the Saivas call s'aktiprasara 'flowing of the Power' (ibid.).
At any rate, it is clear that we are far removed from the attitude of
Somananda37 , who minimizes even thal aspect which by contrast was to
strike Utp. so forcefully - namely, the inevitable presence of language at
the heart of every cognitive activity (SO II. 19-20)3R. And I like to think
that thc l'idwu/o Utp. places in front of Bhartrhari's name when, in SOV!"
p. 84, he quotes in full a verse of the Sa~/dl/(ltl/salJlik,w739, which
Somananda is fiercely attacking at the time, is a kind of veiled apology,
:17 Furthermore, the conception of the Ahsolute that results from an overall view
of the VP appears close to that of the Pratyabhijiia. Positions such as that expressed
in the Sadhalla,I'(/mlldde,l'a (vv. 39-41) could easily have heen subscribed to hy
Somanancla himself (who refers only to the Ka(I(/a I), even if we do not read it in
the light of Helaraja explanation (PrakTr(wkapraka,l'a I p. 262 ckalll eva sW!lvill-
/I/(/yam parmll .'iahda/millllla I(/Ih(/ lalhamslhilam iii karikarlha(i). The very notions
of avidya and vivaria, examined in the whole of the VP, seem to escape
Somananda's criticism. Al'idya, in fact, is not a principle extraneous to Brahman but
a .I'akli (VP [ Vrtli p. 9) and, as such, docs not weaken but rather accentuates Brah-
man's centrality. Similarly, the term vivaria (and related forms) seems to be used by
Bhartrhari to underline the continuity of Brahman in the manifold world of
manifestation rather than to signify a dc-realization of the latter. Somfll1anda,
however, is certanly not the only one to interpret Bhartrhari in this way; while some
of his early critics, like .layanta or Santarak~ita-Kamalasila, show they arc at least
aware of the problems in interpreting these key-terms, the later Veclantins will not
seem to have any doubts about reading them in the light of the subsequent
Smikarian doctrines.
}X The verse figures as an objection that Somananda essentially p,iss over.
3Y Quotations of this work attributed to Bhartrhari (lyer 1969: 9-10), now lost,
arc also to be found in the Spallc/apradTpika (pp. 4, 22). Of the two different titles
XXVI
a timid dissociation from what he finds himself commenting on with the
devout diligence of a disciple.
A further original contribution by Utp. to the philosophy of the
Pratyabhijfia is the doctrine of the iiblziisas. Somananda had not develo-
ped his own idea of the ontological status of the manifested world, but
had only asserted strongly and repeatedly its reality (satyatii) and its
having the nature of Siva (sivan7patii). Things are 'states' (avastlzii,
bhiiva) of Siva, and their emergence is due solely to his will, brought
about by nothing other than a natural overflowing of energies, whose
characteristic feature is 'joy' (iimoda) as well as 'play' (kriQii). Utp.
includes the world of manifestation in his great luminous metaphor.
Every aspect of reality is a light; it is a reflection in the mirror of
consciousness and has its ultimate reality in consciousness.
By combining elements drawn from the VaiyakaraJ)a and the Bud-
dhist prama~1Cl tradition, Utp. presents these 'manifestations' (iibhiisa) as
having the nature of universal (in fact, each one of them is connected
with a word). They can appear in isolation or aggregated around a
dominant manifestation and are provided with a single or complex causal
efficiency, on the basis of a compatibility that has its ultimate foundation
in the law of Necessity established by the Lord. United among themsel-
ves, thus becoming more and more particularized and, finally, combined
with three manifestations endowed with a special individualizing force -
space, time and form - they constitute the world of everyday experience.
It is easy to glimpse in this conception elements drawn from the
Vijfianavadins (consciousness as the receptacle of everything that is
gradually manifested), from the Vaiyakarm:ws (the idea of a hierarchy of
universals) and from the logical-epistemological school of Buddhism (cf.
Torella 1992: 332 fT.). In this case, too, the word aMiisa as a philo-
sophical term, was not invented by Utp., but was commonly used in the
Vedantic and Buddhist schools. It also occurs in the S040, but, even
that are attrihuted to it Sahdadh(IIIlSaIllTk,I'a in the SDVr and $a(/dhatllsamTk,wl in
the SpalldapradTpika (Dh(Jlllo is only the abbreviated form; ef. Gaurinath Shastri
1959:61, who traced out one more quotation from this work), the right one is most
probably the latter (which, besides, better lends itself to be abbreviated), as can be
deduced from Utp.'s commentary: dhatll,wrkopagamar hhcdavade 'pi ... This work
may possibly have been an examination of the six Vaise~ika categories (even though
I am not aware of any other occurrence of the term dhmll in the sense of padarlha),
or (1. Bronkhorst's personal communication) of the six dlu/tlls mentioned in Bud-
dhist works, such as the c~ik,~asamllccaya.
40 Cf. I.33c, I1.21e, HI.78b, IV.98c, Vl.58d etc.
XXVII
when it does not appear in a context where explicit reference is made to
opposing doctrines (various kinds of vivarta), its use seems to be merely
sporadic and casual, and in any case devoid of a precise technical con-
notation. In one respect, iihhiisa is not distinguished from prakiic~a (and
related terms), and the two terms often seem interchangeable (sviihhiisa,
svaprakiisa etc.; cf. ssA I.lc siviibhiisaf/). In another (namely, in its
more technical use, as in the so-called iiMiisa theory), though the essen-
tial unity of nature remains, iibhiisa is seen as a particle, an individual-
ized and extroverted form of the 'great light'4!, 'cut out' in it. This frag-
mentation of the light is accompanied by, and also presupposes, an
analogous descent of consciousness to the state of fragmented subjec-
tivity of the manifold individual subjects (the true subject is avic-
chinniibhclsa; cf. IPV II p. 138); see in particular Abh.'s commentaries
on IPK II.3.1-2. The relation between consciousness and iiMiisa is that
between the mirror and the reflected image, subtly analyzed in Chapter
III of the TA (cf. also MMP pp. 147-53). The ontological status of the
iibhiisa is therefore a mixture of autonomy and eteronomy, without its
basic reality ever being called into question: reality is precisely being
manifest (lPK 1.4.14 and vrtti; cf. APS 5ab evam apy avabhiisclllu;wktii
sattocitii bhavet). Though he never explicitly repeats Somananda's
extreme formulations ("the jar exists, knowing itself'), by using a typically
Vijfianavada argument, Utp. underlines the necessarily common nature of
consciousness and its object: only that which is itself light, i.e. sen-
tience 42 , can shine in knowledge; to say that something is insentient is
like saying it is inexistent (APS l3ac). Even when an iihhiisa is viewed
as external - as 'this' - the 'this' continues to have its foundation in the
I; it may also be said that the reflective awareness of something in terms
41 In this case the Saiva tradition interprets iihhiisa as 'limited light', by attribut-
ing to (/0 the meaning of I,m!; in this sense, the supreme Siva is lIiriib/z(ISa (Ipvv III
p. 271).
42 Among the rare passages in the Saiva scriptures that explicitly touch on and
philosophically elaborate this point, see that of the Ucchll,l'IJwhhairal'(l (cit. SSV p.
4; Torella 1979: 39): "How is it possible, 0 Dear One, that these be objects of
knowledge, without being also subjects of knowledge. It is for this reason that im-
purity does not exist.", and of the Kiilikiikrama (cit. SSV pp. 57-58; Tore II a 1979:
112): "Knowledge shines within and without, in various forms, and there is no exis-
tence of object that is outside knowledge. The whole world is, therefore, constituted
by knowledge, and no entity is perceived without knowledge. Knowledge has the
same nature as the object. [oo. J The single nature of knowing and the knowable
comes out of their mutual implication in the cognitive act."
XXVIII
of separation, of 'this', has been fully achieved only when it rests in its
innem10st being, thus becoming the reflective awareness 'I' (APS 16). It
is the same light of the self that is manifested as self and as other (APS
13cd).
Conceiving of the supreme reality as an absolute I is another innova-
tion made by Utp. (cf. Dyczkowsky 1990), though in my opinion there
are no substantial differences between this and Somananda's dynamic
Self-Siva which underlies the whole universe and express himself in it.
Utp. is the one who chose to use this word regardless of the associations
generally attached to it in Indian thought, being aware of the fact that the
risk of a reification that has always weighed heavily on the word iitman
was even more negative, and that this makes it less suitable for expressing
the umpredictable overflowing of the divine personality. The term 'I' is
implicitly aimed against the two conceptions that are, after all, closest to
the Pratyabhijfia and which it most aspires to differentiate itself from: the
consciousness devoid of a subject of the Vijfianavada and the static
iilman-hrahman of the Vedanta. "The resting of the light in itself, or the
supreme condition of the I, is absolute independence from every other,
autonomy (sviilantrya), agency, Lordship" (APS 22cd-23).
I will not present in detail all the argumentations Utp. develops in
the Jiiiinao and in the Kriyiidhikiira (regarding which I refer directly to
the translation and notes). They mainly take the form of a debate with
the Buddhist logicians and also betray, as has been pointed out, their
strong influence. Utp. 's constant preoccupation is to show, in every con-
text he deals with, the need for a single, dynamic subject that unifies and
animates the discontinuity of reality and constitutes the substratum of every
limited subject, as well as of every form and activity of everyday life.
This I or Consciousness is, on the religious plane, Siva. In his
highest form, the supreme divine personality is solely 'I' - consisting of
consciousness and beatitude - in whom all the principles are contained
though in a state of complete dissolution. He is present throughout the
IPK as the ultimate essence of every reality and is also directly men-
tioned here and there, even if the stage is generally occupied by a less
extreme form of him, which balances between transcendence and im-
manence. In fact, being an expository work, which requires an object to
teach and a recipient of this teaching, it cannot but deal with that form
of the God which is open to the world of manifestation, whilst firmly
remaining its sovereign. On the supreme plane there is only the I resting
in his fullness and no trace of the knowable remains; even the Pratya-
bhijna has to withdraw from this plane, leaving it in the background. In
XXIX
the various models of tripartition that the IPK presents, following in the
wake of the Trika (aham, aham-idam, idam; suddha, ,fllddhii~~llddha,
,~lIddha; para, pariipara, apara) , this more accessible fonn of the God is
connected with the second level. It is mainly indicated as Mahesvara,
Isvara, Isa, Prabhu, whereas the supreme form is often given the name of
Siva or Paramesvara, but there certainly are exchanges between these
two series which indirectly points out the fact that it is a question of a
sole reality and that every distinction of degree and figure is purely
instrumental to the expository requirements.
After leaving the sole force of independent argumentation to work in
the first two Adhikaras, Utp. - though in a subordinate way, as may be
seen from the disproportion between these sections - allows revelation to
take the floor4 3, being aware that there is a marked limit beyond which
experience and reasoning no longer suffice (cf.lPV II p. 213). And thus
in the first iihnika of the Agamiidhikiira he goes on to describe the
principles that constitute reality - from Sadasiva to the Earth - without
expressly mentioning Siva or Sakti but considering them, or so it appe-
ars, as fused in the figure of the supreme knowing subject (III.Uc), of
43 Utp. does not name any of the scriptural sources of the IPK. Abh. in fpV II
p. 231 expressly mentions the $a(lardhas(lra (see below p, 193 n. 13, probably the
same as the Trikahrdaya (or Trikasiira) quoted for the first time by Bhaskara in the
S'ivasl7traviirttika (p. 31) and then, repeatedly, by Abh., K~emaraja and Jayaratha
(Dvivedi 1983: Upodghata pp. 39-40). The nature of this text - belonging to the
so-called second stratum of the Trika scriptures, but also quoted by Abh. as an
authority for the Krama cult of the twelve Kalis indirectly confirms Utp. 's position
in the Saiva tradition. According to Jayaratha's explanations (TA V III p. 194), the
Krama doctrine taught in the Devfpa17cw'alika, as well as the Trikadarsana, had been
handed down to Abh. through the lineage deriving from Somananda that is,
through Utp. and Lak~maDagupta (the latter, in particular, also being his teacher in
the Pratyabhijfia) . In a definitely Krama context K~emaraja (PH p. 20) quotes as an
authority a short passage from the lost IP{fka, and a Krama flavour can he noticed
here and there in the SSA (see e.g. chapter VIII), Regarding a passage from the vrtti
on IPK IV.S, vaslulab ,{aklivik(ISO vi,I'valll, Ahh. names the ,5'rflllmigald.I'clslra as
heing the source; and, in fact, elsewhere (SDVr p. 107) Utp. textually quotes the
passage of this Tantra which Abh. alluded to. The Mmigalc7 (or Sarvalllwigala) is in-
cluded in the list of Bhairavatantra given by the ,~rfkall{hfsaqlhila. Abh. (IpV II p.
228) also mentions the Rourava (but with reference to a doctrine referred to but not
accepted by Utp. ; see also the quotations from the Kiilottara in the SDVr) and,
in particular, the MP A, a text belonging to the Saivasiddhanta but whose peculiar
emphasis on the role of knowledge (presented as a more prestigious alternative with
respect to ritual) is well-known.
xxx
the Isitr (III.1.2 vrtti). Abh. (IpVV III p. 258) identifies this supreme
principle, which is apparently placed at the top of the scale of tattvas and
not beyond it, with the sivatattva . By integrating, as seems possible, the
scant indications of the IPK with what Utp. says in his commentary on
the SD, one can state it is the sivatattva that presents itself as constituted
by all the tattvas (p. 22 sarvattavamayatayii ,fivatattviivasthiinam). Still
according the SDVr, it is the supreme Lord Siva, endowed with the two
powers of consciousness and lysis, or light and beatitude (p. 23
svarupiinupravi$(acinnirvrtirilpasaktidvayab prakiisiinandamayab pilrlJab
paramdvarab siva~l prasrtafi); he assumes the fOlm of the various
principles, beginning with Sakti (SD 1.29). Cf. IPK rY.I4ac sarvathii tv
antariitilliinantatattvallghanirbharab ,fivas cidiinandaghanab; SDVr p.
106 eVGI?l slIvarzlavat paramdvara eva pilrvoktecchiidisaktimiin tathii
tattvabhllvanakiiryakara~liidiprakiiravaicit,.ye!lG [ .. .J sthita~l; in SD
III.2Id and in the vrtti he is called cfivatattva. In passages like these, we
seem to witness the overlapping and merging of Siva seen as the first or
last tattva and of the highest divine personality who is beyond the very
dimension of tattva - even if supreme - containing and transcending all
the tattvas without exception. This impression is reinforced when Utp.
passes from the noetic register of the IPK to the emotional register of the
bhakti in the SsA.
A great deal of space is devoted to the structure of the limited sub-
ject in the second iilzllika of the Agamiidhikiira. The divine subject
(pati) - whose body is constituted, as it were, by the universe - is
counterposed with the 'beast' (pa,fu), the fettered soul, in its various
forms depending on the maculations that characterize it. In the concep-
tion outlined by Utp. there are two components from different sources:
the hierarchy of subjects - which is a peculiar element of the Saivasid-
dhanta 44 - and a version of the three maculations which, though deriving
from the analogous doctrine of the Saivasiddhanta, has an utterly monis-
tic qualification. The (7~lava, mayrya and kiirma maculations 45 completely
lose their original nature of 'substances' that physically obstruct the self
of the pa,fu from without and resolve themselves into erroneous attitudes
of the individual consciousness 46 . The ii~lava maculation, with its
44 Which Abh. was to take up through the MV.
45 On the different denomination of the three maculations in dualist and non-
dualist schools cf. Sanderson 1992:286 n.23.
46 Cf. MV 1.23cd malam ajiiiillam iechanli; SS 1.2 (a)jiiiilwrri bandhab . Cf. TA
1.22 ff.
XXXI
obliterating the one or the other of the components of sUbjectivity (con-
sciousness and freedom, bodha and svcltantrya) determines that identity
crisis onto which the other two are grafted: the mayic one - which
causes the I to see the world of objects as separate from himself - and
the karmic one - which makes him consider his own actions as the
causes of the series of rebirths, miring him in the saqlsara. The cause of
all three is the power of maya, which has its roots in the very will of the
Lord (III.2.S vrtti). The individual knowing subject, variously con-
taminated by these three maculations, is then distinguished according to
the four levels which he tends to identify with (void, vital brcath, mind
and body) and the conditions (aI'Clstha) in which his experience of reality
may take place (waking, sleep and deep sleep, corresponding to direct
perception, to mental costruct and to partial or total suspension of all
activity and knowledge). The fourth state, in which duality is overcome,
corresponds gradually to the conditions of Vijfianakala, Mantra,
Mantrdvara and Isa; the state beyond the fourth is the one in which
every trace of the knowable is dissolved in the absolute I of Siva.
As we have seen above, the limited subject tends to identify with
four aspects progressively higher in rank, which are however still in-
cluded in the sphere of the objects: the body, the mind, the vital breath
and the void. Their predominance causes the eGlipse of the two com-
ponents of his authentic subjectivity, consciousness and freedom (bodha
and svcltantrya-kartrtd). Liberation, therefore, consists in inverting this
relation namely, in the consciousness-freedom establishing themselves
at the centre of the individual, while pushing the components of the fic-
titious I in the nUlrgins 47 - and takes on the form of a knowledge that is
'characterized by penetration in it' fatsam(IVl',l:o!ak,\'(/~zam (IPK III.2.l2d).
Here we have one of the key words of the Kashmiri Tantric tradition,
which, furthermore, possesses the particular feature of allowing one to
glimpse the succession, or rather, the coexistence of two different con-
ceptions of the individual l's escape from his limits. In fact, in samdl'e,l:(/
the meanings of 'to enter, to penetrate into' and 'to be penetrated, pos-
sessed by' coexist, thanks to the dual transitive and intransitive sense of
the root I'i,\~-4R. In the earlier stages of these schools the term must
doubtless have been mainly used to mean the loss of individual identity
and the paroxysm of energies which derive from being possessed by the
47 Cf. TA I.I73cd-174ab and Jayaratha's commcntary.
4H Cr. Sandcrson 1986: 177 n. 33; on this IeI'm see also Hara 1966.
XXXII
terrible divinities linked to the funerary and sexual transgressions,
evoked in the Kapalika rites 49 . In the later phase represented by the
Trika and the elaboration of its teachings, the prevalent use of the term
in its active meaning sometimes appears as a conscious declaration of
new intentions - even a kind of damnatio memoriae of a past that has
become uncomfortable for those aiming at new integrations 5o . Utp. uses
dvi,f- with the active meaning in the first of the final verses of the IPK
(' ... entering in the Siva nature ... '). Also in the first verse of the SD 51
samdvi,~tafl is definitely active, but, since it is referred to Siva, the result
is that it is my form that is penetrated by the God. As Utp. explains, it is
Siva who has become one with my form, in the sense that he has entered
realities such as the vital breath etc., which in themselves are not dif-
ferent from the other inert things such as the jar and so on, in order to
make them into centres of individual conscious life; indeed, the more in-
tensely he penetrates them, the more the extraordinary powers emerge
(p. 3 .),(lvatyd ca nu/trayd saf1l(lvdas tiivanmiitrasiddhism!lbhavab). And,
therefore, he who seeks these powers must increasingly deepen this
'entry' into himself. However, Ulp. concludes, we can imagine that both
Siva and man enter and 'are entered', since the movement towards unity
is the same in both. These considerations have left their mark in the way
Abh. develops the laconic text of the kdrikd, tatsamdvdao, which is only
glossed in the vrtli with tacc/wkti,\·ol1liivdao. Abh. says (lPVV III p.
327) that this word is intended to refer to the two forms of liberation in
49 In the ,~aivafi(Jrihh(/,I,(1 ([v(,,\:(/-SlIlII(II'('.'ia is considered to be the form of libera-
tion peculiar to the Kapalikas (Sanderson 1985: 213 n.90, Brunner 1992: 46-47 n.65,
Brunncr 1986: 518-19). Says Sivagrayogin (p. 342): kapcllikab SWlla\·('.I:('II([ s(llIlyalll
IIpag(/('challli / lalha hi yalha gruhafl {JllrII,I'(',I'\' al'i,\'anli tatll(',\:varuglll,la IIlllkt(',Q'
iil'i,\'allli; what makcs such a conccption of liberation unacccptabic in the eyes of a
Saivasiddhantin is its dangerous resemblance to possession by evil spirits and the
subjcct's loss of idcntity and autonomy (p. 346 lallia sali hhfltal'i,I'(aSY('l'(ISl'cltall-
Iryapaftya plIl'II,l·iirl/wtl'clyogat). Thcse themcs had already been tOLlched on in the
oldcr dualistic Saiva Iraclition (cL Pa/'(/fllok,\'(/f/irasakarikcl v.l3b cll'e.\:(,flasl'alafltrata;
RfllnakmHha's (Tka p. 286 hhfl{(7I'i,l'{asy('va PIII!ISO IJIllkWv (/sWlIalltryall/ el'e.Vvaras(l-
fIIal('li; ihid. p. 283 (fllyais III ladc7 1)(I/'(/fII("I'varagll(wib sW/.\:f'(/yasl/wir eva sidd/wb
.I'(/fllc/vi.l'yalc gra/wir iva {J"I'lI,1'(i ity cll'e.\'apak,wb).
5(1 This proccss rcaches ils completion with K~eIllaraja, for whom .1'Wllclv(':ia as a
tcchnical term seems to have lost any specific idcntity (PH p. 45 sall/clve.Vasa-
fIIclf!altyCidiparyayafl sall/(Idhi b).
51 (/.I'lI/adrfipasalJlilvi,I'(ab .1'\'c7lf11(/l1(/ftll(lllil'(/f'(/(IC / .I'i vab karoNI lI!iaycl lIall/ab
.vaklya 1iI1(7/lI/all(' II,
XXXIII
life. In the one case it has the mean1l1g of 'complete and perfect entry
into the own true nature' (satyas1'Cmlpe samyag c7 samallfclt pravda-
laksanam; active meaning) and corresponds to the state beyond the
fourth in which the adept, after becoming aware of the supreme nature of
the J, becomes as though withdrawn from the knowable which formed
his fictitious identity. By contrast, in the other the various components of
the levels of the limited subject are gradually penetrated by the elixir of
the I, until they become, so to speak, transfigured, removed from their
nature of knowable realities. This experience, which corresponds to the
fourth state, can be extended further, until it flows into the state beyond
the fourth, wherc the components of limitation, including sm11skara, are
totally dissolved and incorporated in the 1. The passive sense of the
second explanation of SOfl/(/I'c,{a and its relation with the above passage
of the SOV" become evident from what Abh. adds later (ihid. p. 330),
this time apparently referring to tacchaktisilIllc7vc,\"ao in the 1,!,lti: t([sva
saI!1l'iddlw,.,lliifl ,~aktil'i,\~(\\'c7fz salllyag cll'i,\"allfo l'ihl1l7tJr IItthc7pawlIlti (crr.
above n. 49):12.
The fourth state and the state beyond the fourth can be attained
through the practices centred on the vital breaths, described in the
Agamas. Utp. briefly touches on this point at the end of the
Agalllc7dlzikdm. The duality of the pr(i~/(/ and opiil/o that characterizes thc
waking and dream states is overcome with the entry into the SOIt1(II1([,
which suspends and unifies them, corresponding to the state of deep
sleep. The subsequent level, represented by the IIdal/a, marks the end of
the limited condition, which culminates with the all-pervasive presence
of the \'y(7l/o in the supreme condition of Siva.
52 Thereforc, therc is a difTerence between the two III,.W/ITliiS delincated by Abh.
The first pertains to the jlmllill, who reaches it instantly thanks to an intcnse and
flashing 'pcak experiencc'; thc second, by contrast, pertains to the yogill and is thc
fruit of the rcpcated practice of this ,\'(///I(/I'C:((( , lIere thc adept docs not halt whcn
his sciI' enters into the nature of Siva; this is mcrcly his starting point. He slows
down this identification and intensifics it at the same timc, cxtending it gradually to
all the levels of the ficlitious I (body, mind clc.), which the j,lallil/, on the contrary,
only abandoned. This second III"yam({, reached in two stages - says Abh., following
Utp.'s fTkc7 - pertains to the l'i,Yc,wi/({,.:i({l/(/s, namely to tlte schools that prevalcntly
teach a ,ydklild\'(/ilil, i.e, that stress tile 'power' clement in the self (p. 331). These
arc opposed by the s{/Illdl/yai!a,.,yal/(/s, which place the emphasis on thc subject in
his transcendence and whose form of Illryama thc one described first - tcnds to
cancel (he knowable and aims for pure consciousness (this is the vya(i,.cka-(lIryama
XXXIV
In the TattvaSGf!7gralzadhikiira the path to liberation passes through
the overcoming of the activity which, throughout the IPK, is considered
as the very core of the condition of limited subject: the vikalpa - the
dualizing, discursive thought, that unfolds through antinomies and or-
ganizes reality in terms of separation in all its forms. The two different
methods taught by Utp. give the same result liberation in life - the one
by the gradual attenuation and elimination of mental constructs through
the cultivation of their opposite (the nirvikalpa), the other by allowing
them to flow and progressively purifying their contents. I shall retum to
these later.
The whole of Utp.'s work, however, is built around teaching the
'recognition' of the Lord, which also the two above-mentioned forms are
part of (lPVV III p. 354 paficablzifz f fhc last fivc stanzas) pratya-
hhUiiafll/akm!l nzok,mtattvalll). This new and easy way is merely the trig-
gering in the devout of an act of identification, which does not reveal
anything new but only rends the veils that hid the I from himself; a
cognition is not created but only the blur that prevented its use, its enter-
ing into life, is instantly removed. The way by which the master creates
the premises for this to occur may, on the contrary, be gradual: this is
what Utp. does with his work, which aims through a series of arguments
at bringing to light the powers of the I and those of the Lord, until iden-
tification is triggered. The practice of such a linear (avakra) path is
enough to enter into the naturc of Siva and achieve the condition of
liberated in life, which may also be accompanied by the extraordinary
powers (lPVV I p. 111 dvaraprafyabllljfi(lkrfO 'bhYlidayo j!vanll1l1k-
til'ihlllltilak,\,(/~lOfl). This 'penetration' still presupposes a body and, in any
case, a state in whieh the distinction between the I and Siva has not yet
been dissolved:>1. This occurs within everyday reality just as it is. The
light of liberation does not cause its colours to fade, does not cover them
but brightens them, performing the miracle of eliminating otherness
whilst maintaining the richness of individual flavours.
Says Utp.:
"Dwelling in the midst of the sea of the supreme ambrosia, with my
mind immersed solely in the worship of You, may I attend to all the
to whieh the (/\'),a(ircka- of the I'i,\'e.,l'ad(/r,yallas is opposed). Utp. and Abh.'s inclina-
tions lie towards thc laller.
5.1 IPV II p. 258 dch({pcllc III {Jara/l/c,vl'a/'{/ cl'aikarasab iii kah kufra kafhm!1
salllal'c,vah.
XXXV
 common occupations of man, savouring the ineffable in every thing."
(SSA XVIII.l3)
"May my desire for the objects of the senses be intense, 0 Blessed
One, like that of all other men, but may I see them as though they
were my own body, with the thought of differentiation gone". (VIII.3)
"May I aspire to liberation by worshipping You, without withdrawing
from experience and the world, and without even seeking the
dominion [of the extraordinary powersl, but becoming intoxicated
with the abundant liquor of devotion". (XV.4)
The householders of Kashmir, whose desire for an intimate ex-
perience of communion with the absolute, though profound, withdrew
before thc abysses of transgression and loss of identity, were not to
remain indifferent to the insinuating message of the Pratyabhijfia.
THE FUTURE OF THE PRAry ABHIJNA
If Utp. 's teaching did not remain an isolated, though brilliant, fruit of
the Saiva tradition, this is probably due to Abh., who took it to constitute
the theoretical and speculative side of his great synthesis of the principal
currents of non-dualist Kashmir Shaivism. The privileged position that
the PratyabhijiUi occupies in the paddhati of the Trika (in the broad
sense), not only in the treatment of the himbapl'CltimiJaw7da in the third
fillllika of the T A, but in the work as a whole - as well as, in various
ways, in the MVV, the PTV, the ParyalltapCl/ka.~ika etc. was so to speak
the sounding board that amplified and spread its teaching. It is virtually
impossible not to find traces of the characteristic themes of the Pratya-
bhijfia in the Saiva authors who came after Abh., as well as in later scrip-
tures such as those of the Tripura (Yoginfhrdaya, Tripurfirahasya etc.).
The doctrine of the fibhdsas, consciousness as the synthesis of prak(Ua-
vil1wr,\~a, ahmiltd, cafllatkdra, the four levels of the limited subjectivity
occupy either isolated or combined an important place even in some
Vai~l)aVa scriptures, like the Ahirlmcinyasat?lhitcl and the Lak,vmltanfra.
Nor must one think that this influence was limited to Kashmir, since it
was very strong also in south India, where the Trika, Krama and Tripura
schools wcre widespracl (Sanderson 1990:80-82). This is also evident
from the inclusion of the Pratyabhijfia in the SDS of the Southern Indian
Madhava (14th c.) and the presence of MSS of works by Utp. and
XXXVI
Somananda54 in southem scripts (for example, it is to be noted that the
only complete MS of the IPvrtti is in Malayalam characters).
The doctrine of the llpayas, stated briefly and as though in passing in
the MV (1I.20-23), is taken up again with great emphasis by Abh. and
comes to constitute one of the main structures of the Trika, serving as a
device to incorporate diverse spiritual traditions in this great synthesis,
without levelling away their individuality. I will spare the reader yet
another exposition of the doctrine of the upaya 55 Uust as I spared him
that of the tattvas) and confine myself to some considerations par-
ticularly on the first two: the non-means (allupaya) and the divine means
uambhava). Firstly, we must remember that, according to Abh., there is
no real difference between anllpaya and Sclmbhava - the former only
representing the higher plane of the latter56 and that the Scll11bhava is the
sole 'direct' means (sak,~clt, TA 1.142a), whereas, of the two others, the
anava is only a means of access to the ,~akta and the sakta to the
,fambhava (l42b and Jayaratha's commentary). In the non-means 57 the
adept immediately establishes himself at the centre of the supreme con-
sciousness without the need of a jumping off point. The teaching of a
master pronounced once only, or a series of arguments, or faith in the
scriptures are sufficient (T A 1I.49ab). Even if these causes may be
endowed with succession, the phenomenon they trigger is not; in fact, in
particularly privileged cases, it may arise by itself, without any of these
detonators. The intensity of this state of penetration is such that even a
mere chance encounter with a subject who has entered it may in certain
cases detennine instantaneous liberation (11.40). Everything appears dis-
)4 Which shows that the early Pratyabhijfia texts continued to be studied also in-
dependently of Abh. 's interpretation.
5) One of the most concise and clear enounciations is to be found in the
Talltroccava: (allllpc/ya) p. 161 tatra sa parame/;varaprakc7/wb kasyacid aviratapra-
halldhatayc7 plillar lIpayanirapek,wtayc7 hhc7ti ekavc7raf!) gu/,//vacanam Tdr,~Clf!) samyag
avadhcll'ya; (.Wff/hhava) p. 163 kasyacit til l)(lrame/;varaprakcl.~as tadTyc7Y(If!1 .I'Vcl-
tall tl'ya.\'a ktwi lIiljllatc7yal!1 prake7.'iate [. .. / ahaf!lsvc7tantrya.~aktibhasitavi.l:vc7hl/(7sab
parame.l:varo vih/Illl' eko lIitya iti fIll/hur Ifluhllr bhavayan sa eva; (Nikta) p. 165
yasya tv ittham apy avikalpakab sa1l1c7ve/;o lIolieti sa savikalpabhclvanaya sat-
tarkanlpayc7 s(l/!lskllrutc vikalpam; (c7(wl'a) p. 167 yas til sattarkqlCl 11Cl nirmala-
sl'a/Jhiivalll clscldayati tasya dhyiinadikam llcyatc.
56 TAv 1 p. 182 sa el'(l {larih!l kii,I'fhii1!1 prapta.1: Cclll11pilya ity tIC·yate.
57 The expression 'non-means' is not to be taken literally; it alludes to the far
more subtle nature of this means - which, however, remains such - with respect to
the others (cf. TA 11.2-3 and Jayaratha's commentary).
XXXVII
 solved in the Bhairavic fire of consciousness to him who has entered this
state (IUS).
While this kind of sanlill'dasP> concerns the innermost aspect of con-
sciousness, in the divine means the stress falls on its power of Freedom
(TSa p. 10, Talltmccaya p. 163), or its manifesting as the universe. Here
there is indeed a means-end relation, though in a very subtle form. The
adept can start from any aspect of the knowable, taken in its dimension
that is closest to consciousness and not yet differentiated from it, ane! see
it as an image refleeted in a mirror distinct but inseparable from its
support. This experience, strictly devoid of discursive representations
characterized by the scission between subject and object, rests on the
Lord's power of Volition, in which the manifestation is still completely
enclosed within the desire to create: "All is born of me, is reflected in
me, is inseparable from me" (T A III.2ROab). Unlike (he wllllhlya where
everything happens in an instant, once and for ever, this experience is to
be repeated essentially the same and progressively extended to all the
aspects of reality (TA ITI.274 ff.). Through repetition and succession
(T A V II p. I :WlIlhJzm'O!)(lym!l kr(/lIlCilmllJ{(/fIl, T A llL27 I a hllllYO bJlIlyafl,
Taillroccava p. 163 III II Ii III' Illit/llIfl) the adept reaches liberation in life,
the fourth state. One can only speak of liberation in life with respect (0
the divine means; in the ([1l11I}{lya it eannot even be said that one is
somehow liberated from something; ill it, means and end coincide (T A
m.272-7J).
The Pratyabhijfia is traditionally connected with the (l/lilpaya. Abh.
does not say this explicitly; he just refers, towards the end of the treat-
ment of the (f1l1l1}(lya, to two authorities: the Ol'flliflW/UI.v{lstra and
masters sllch as SOl11ilnanda etc. Regarding the latter, .Tayaratha's com-
IlIcntary only mentions the SD and quotes the well-known passages
V[LI 0 led and V[I.S-6, the sccond of which, moreover, also appear
through in the final stanza of Ahllika II of the T A. [n fact, it is
Som~\nanda who expressly mentions Ck{/\'{//W?l (VU.5c), which consti-
tutes one of the essential features of the olllllhlya (which always takes
place sakrd 'once and for ever'). The central teaching of the Pratya-
bhijfia seems less extreme: we might say a .vcllJlbhm'()pilya in the broad
sense which leaves room within it for both experiences - sovereignty
:iX '
Evcn though thc modcrn authors somctllllcs tcnd to usc IIpc7ya and .I'(l/I/(/I'I'.\'a
as synonyms, an obvious distinction bctwccn them rcmains (d, TSa p. 9 pclra-
1I1I'.<lI'I//'{/ ,\'(/lI/clVc.\:O lIil'llpclyoka C\'(!, ctc,).
XXXVIII
and complete dissolution in the I, tllrya and tliryatTta, seen as forms of
liberation in life. The end of the Pratyabhijfia is, indeed, jTvanmukti (IPVr
on IV. 16 ctatpariSllallclla simtc7vdat jlvallil cva 1Il1ikto bhavati) a con-
dition which Abh. does not connect with the allllpiiya but with the
.fall/hluml (TA III.272). The Pratyabhijfia furnishes a series of prelimi-
nary arguments to the act of recognition, which, though with a different
intensity, is at the basis of both the allllpc7ya and the .fc7mbhava. In fact,
also the (fill/payo requires 'purification through the composition of a
series of arguments' (T A II.49a Yl/ktiprctcayaracanollmc7rianClvasc7t )59;
and, in the ambit or the .{:c7l1lbhavopc7ya, Jayaratha (TAV I pp. 239-40 on
TA I.216) notes that it is only thanks to the teaching that leads to the
recognition of the true nature of the self that these practices can be
productive, whilc those same states exempt from discursive representa-
tions which from time to time are spontaneously produced in the
unaware and fettered subject (pCdll) remain sterile.
Also the practice outlined in IPK IV. II, with its emphasis on vilwl-
paJulllo and krmlld'o , is typically :!;c[mhhava. K:;;emaraja in PH p. 40
makes this clearly understood by quoting this passage to illustrate an
experience he defines l'ika/pam akiiiciccintakatl'cll([ pra.vamoyall, which
echoes the definition of .l:alllhhm'(fS(lIIl(/l'C.\:(/ in MV 11.21.
But in the IPK other means are also laught. If we want to read it in
the light of Abh. 's systemization, we will have to classify as (/~l([l'a the
practices and experiences centring on the vital breaths hinted at in
II1.2.l9-20 and recognize in the experience described in IY.12 - "He
who , havin bo all as his essence, thus knows: 'All this multiform de-
ployment is mine', he, even in the flow of mental constructs, attains the
state of Mahda" - the elements that characterize the .\~(/kt()p(/ya, i.e. the
progressive purification of discursive representation and its transfor-
S') Ahh, is rcl'erring here, according to .rayaratha (TA V I p. 41), to the recogni-
tion of the identity of the individual self and of the Lord, attained through the
demonstration of his own theses and the invalidation of opposing ones, and therefore
precisely to the IPI(. The later Saiva tradition was to connect the name of Utp. with
the work of constituting thcse logicat argumcnts; cf. Mahc7I1{/yaprak(7.~a (Trivan-
drum) III.64b Yllklilall\'(/vicak.wlI,Iai(1.
(,() This gradual proccss of attcnuation and elimination of thc vika/pa.l' ~ cxplains
thc !'{,lIi ~ is graftcd onto an expcrience in which the crcation of the Lord appcars in
all clarity and devoid of I'ika/pas, since the idea of diflercntiation docs not arisc
(hhl'dc7l1l1dayild viko/pojjltilil .I'/WI'{(/vahl/(I.w[ co; cf. IpV I pp. 34-35). Thanks to this
practice the adcpt bccomes a//(/varalallirl'ika/pakasa/!ll'cdallaf'(JI//(//Ilc7/ahha,I'ilalt{,da-
Y(/(I (IPVV III p. 3W)).
XXXIX
 mati on into pure reflective awareness 61 (Sivopadhyaya is explicit in con-
cluding his commentary on VBh 109, p. 95, where this verse is quoted
as an authority: iym!l .~(lktr blllVl).
The teaching of the Pratyabhijfia, in both its aspects of philosophical
elaboration and spiritual achievement, was transmitted by Abh. and his
disciple K~emaraja, thus influencing the diverse currents of Tantric
Saivism which, either explicitly or implicitly, were to tend to model their
theoretical structure upon it.
The case of K~emaraja deserves special mention. With the PH he
composes a kind of catechism, of Pratyabhijfia ill filice, addressing the
many who would have been unable to deal with the dialectical subtleties
of the major work (the IPK and its commentaries). In the PH - a work
perhaps modest in itself, but important because of its wide circulation
and the influence it exerted especially over the Saiva-sakta schools of
South India (cL Mahesvarananda; the texts connected with the Tripura
(2
school etc. ) - we witness a kind of apotheosis of the Pratyabhijfia:
from a single school accepted and valued within the great synthesis of
Abh. 's Trika it ends up by canst itllting the very framework, in which
K~emaraja also inserts teachings from other schools, especially the
Krama 6J .
THE ISVARAPRATY ABHIJNAKARIKA AND ITS COMMENTARIES
The IPK - which made the name of Ulp. famous mLlst have been
an early work, given the fact that all his other philosophical writings
presuppose it and contain specific references to it.
His other works include the following. SDVr, named Padasatigati in
the third introductory verse (Mahesvarananda calls it by this name in the
MMP), which has come down to us only up to IV.74. IS and vl'tti: a
demonstration or the existence of the Lord written from a Naiyayika
viewpoint, arguing against Mlmaq1sa, Saq1khya and Buddhists. SS and
vrtti: the exposition of his own conception of relation against the oppos-
(d Cf. the vrffi: par(IIIlClI'.I'alllcllr(11l a.I'(',I'(/1I I'ikalpclll S{//i1{Hldayata(1. Sec also the
commentaries on this verse by Ahh. (IpVV III p. 393 l'ikalpc7 avikalp(l Mavallti)
and by K~emaraja (PH p. 28 .I'I/ddhal'ikalpa.<:aktilll I/llcl.l'ayallfi).
62 The Yogillflirdaya-S('tllbClndlia and Lak~rnlrama's commentary on the
Paratrim/.ika call it ,S·akfis17tra.
6.1 On the possible connection of Utp. with the Krama sec above p. XXX n. 43.
XL
ing theories, especially the Buddhist ones (see below pp. 95 ff.). APS:
restatement of his conception of sUbjectivity and its relation with object,
first expressed in the IPK 64 . The SSA deserves a separate mention65 :
twenty mystical hymns composed by Utp. at different times during his
life and later collected and 'edited' by his disciples 66 . In them, moments
of exaltation alternate with moments of discouragement, enriching and
cracking the mask of the impeccable theologian of the major works 67 .
Utp. devoted two commentaries to the IPK, a short one (vrtti) -
edited and translated here - and a long one (vivrti or rrkii)68, of which
only fragments have come down to us (Torella 1988). Neither of these is
really and truly a word for word commentary. The vrtti confines itself to
presenting the content of the stanzas in another form and briefly pointing
out its implications; the vivrti takes the kiirikiis and the vrtti as its start-
ing point and often develops into far-reaching excursuses. The link bet-
ween the satras and the vrtti is a particularly close one. Despite the fact
that they are presented as being artificially differentiated:. they substan-
tially constitute a single work, since - according to Abh. (IPVV I pp. 16,
183) they were composed at the same time. Proof of this lies in the
fact that the namaskiira, present in the siUras, is not repeated at the
beginning of the vrtti, whereas it is in the trkii (ibid. pp. 2-3). This
makes the vrtti specially important for grasping the 'original' meaning of
64 The commentary that Utp. certainly composed on this work (see MMP p.
133) has not come down to us.
65 Sastraparalllar.I'a v. 8 (cit. Pandey 1963: 163 n. 3) "There are, it is true,
everywhere thousands of rivers of beatiful verses, but none of them resembles the
divine river of the Stofrava!f".
66 Two other verses attributed to him, but not included in the ssA, are quoted
in the Mallc7/layaprak(7.I'a of Sitikar)\ha p. 12 (yaf kif!lCif eva bhiJtclllaf?l hhavc7va-
ra~I(//!1 prati I 11(1 kil!lcid eva hhakfc7niil!l bhavadavara~zam II; sarvas(//!lvinl/adfblle-
dabhi/lnal'i.I'rc7ntiIl1l7rtaye I IWlllab pf'(llllcltrvaplI,I'e .<:ivacaifallyasilldhave II, see also
Bhc7vopahc7ravivara~lil p. 43); Yoginfllrdayadfpikii p. 287, after quoting the latter
verse as belonging to the PCI/'(lpaiicc7.<:ika, quotes another one (yatra yafra milifc7
/lwrfcayab I talra tatra vihlll/r eva jrt?lbhate II) and attributes it to the Stofrc7va!f (is
it that by Utp. '1).
67 The MS given as 'Manfrasara by Utpaladeva' in the Bhandarkar Oriental
Research Institute Library, indicated by Rastogi (1979: 134) as a possible un-
published work of Utp., actually contains the PTL V of Abh., whose second verse
says, in fact, sadagalllapral'(/lIe,l'1/ halil/dlia VYClkrfCII11 trikaf11 I .<:rfmadllfpaladevfyal!l
talltrasarmll III Var(lyafe II.
6H His length must have been equivalent to 6000 or 8000 Hokas (Torella 1988:
141).
XLI
the stanzas. In the (fk(l, that was composed later on, we already find mul-
tiple interpretations of the same verse, all considered equally possible but
evidently being the outcome of further reflections.
The karikas, the v!'tti and the (lUi represent three distinct and relative-
ly autonomous stages in the exposition of the Pratyabhijfia doctrine and,
accordingly, it is as though Utp. has taken three ditferent roles (hlzfilllika)
karikao or sfitrakam, l'!'ttikam and (7kJikara cIPVV I pp. 2-3) almost
three different persons, capable of dialoguing and disputing with each
other, and yet remaining within the higher unity of the gmllt/wkara or
,I;clstmkclra. The kc7l'ikas, the l'rtli and the (Tka are seen by Utp. in the {ik(1
- as we can gather from the Ipvv as respectively linked to thc three
planes of Pasyantl, Madhyamfi and VaikharI on which the Supreme Word
(Paravac) is articulated. On the supreme plane the essence of the doctrine
still lies in the consciousness of its author Utp" undivided from Siva,
and it is given the name of 'heart', precisely because of its quintessential
nature. On the PasyantI plane it takes thc form of stitra, insofar as a
differentiation begins to be outlined (as tit 1'(fwl) , which is necessary if it
is to become an object to be taught and explained to other men. Thcn,
on the Madhyama planc, the essence is disclosed (ul/lilT/ita) in the I'!'tti
and finally, on the VaikharI plane which corresponds to the I'il'!,/i -,
having now becomc clear through the refutation of the opponents' pos-
siblc objections, it is fully differentiated and thlls accessible to the com-
prehension of all (IPVV I p. 16).
To this distinction between thc planes of the doctrine corresponds the
diversity of levels in the recipients of the tcaching. Both thc stitra,I' and
the \'!,lIi arc aimed at those who arc not impregnated with the latent
traces of their earlier adhesion to other doctrines. The study or the
sl7Iras-l'rtti as a whole prepares them for the subsequent phase which
consists in thc study of the stlrm.\' alone, indcpcndently of the v!,lIi. On
the contrary, those who arc under thc influence of erroneolls conceptions
deriving from the profession of different doctrines, are obliged to follow
thc whole coursc beginning with the (fka. When thc (lUi has removed
these errors, they can have access to the .I'tI//'{/.\' accompanied by the Frlfi,
and subsequently to the .1'17//'(/.1' taken alonc, until they reach the heart of
the doctrinc in identity with the consciousness of the ,vastrakiira Uhid.).
Abh. devoted two of his most important works to the doctrines of
Utp. The one (Vim([I',<iini) is a commentary on the stanzas alone, thc other
(Vivrtivi!1lodini) a commentary on the vivrri or {7kii, which, as we have
seen, was in its turn a commentary of the complex karikiis-v!'lIi. No
commentaries predating Abh. 's have come down to us, even though an
XLII
exegetic tradition must already have existed (cf. IPVV II p. 210), which
was probably only oral. From Abh. 's sporadic annotations we come to
know that the texts of the Pratyabhijfia 69 were already beginning in his
time to present some doubtful readings and variants for some points
were already circulating.
Information on the chronological order of Abh. 's two commentaries
is contradictory. What would appear to be the more naturale sequence -
first the lengthy commentary on the (Tka and then a reduction of the vast
and varied material to a smaller size and a more concise and incisive
form - seems to be confirmed by what Bhaskara says at the beginning of
his sub-commentary (I p. 3)70. But Bhaskara has not proved to be a reli-
able source in this respect, since he later (Bh I p. 316) does not hesitate
to invert the order71 • However, a passage from the IPVV, which
unequivocally mentions the Vimadinf72 , is decisive on this point.
Abh.·s contribution to the Pratyabhijfia - in the light of what can be
inferred from the hints at and quotations of the (fka contained in the
Ipvv and other passages of the (fka which have been handed down to us
in various ways - appears far less original than is generally thought.
Despite the inevitable di friculty in reading a text like the IPVV, which is
an extensive and diffuse commentary on a work that has not come down
to us, it seems clear that the majority of the themes and subjccts that
Abh. touches on find their direct correspondence - or at least their start-
ing point - in Utp. 's (ika. [n fact, thc IpV itself, which according to Abh.
73
is intended to be a commcntary on what the karikas are in themselves ,
accomplishes its task through a carefully gauged and considered sys-
tematization of a rich speculative material whose early origin is to be
glimpscd in the (7ka . In his interpretation of the stanzas Abh. essentially
echoes the interprctation or interpretations of Utp., sometimes enriching
them with new arguments. He only diverges from Utp. in four instances
(,9 The later authors onen refer to one or the other of the three texts (IPK, \'!'lIi
and \'il'rti) only by the mention 'iii p/'{/tyabhijiWyc7m'. _
70 On this basis Pandey 1963: 32 maintains the priority of the IPVV.
11 The first passage, too, was incorrect in considering the_ SOV, as the first of
Utp.'s works, whereas, on the contrary, it often refers to the IPK and its commen-
taries.
72 III p. 230 (fllcllai\'(/ (/.\:(/yclI(/ (/s/1/clhhib slit/'{/l'illlal',\:ill),(JIIl ckarasatl'ella ida!!1
SlItl'm!1 1'),(7kll),(/((//1/, il/(/ til Yclvadgati I'ici/rayitlllll illllw!1 vihllc7gclI(J (/pek,~c7
1'),(/kll),cI((/.
- -1.\ Ipv I p. 3<) (1s/1/(7kalll III slitravyc7khYcllla ev(/ IIdyama(1.
XLIII
 BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE
(1.3Ab bhranter arthasthitif/ katham; 1.4Aab flaiva Izv anubhavo hllati
smrtall p{i/,vo 'rthavat prthak; I. 7.1c akralll(7nalltacidr;7pa; IIA.lOd sthi-
The IPK with Dtp.'s vrtti has been edited in the KSTS (see Biblio-
rasvarthakriy(7karam) in the last instance this is explicitly declared; see
graphy); the text of the vrtti, corrupt in many points, breaks off at the
p. 179 n. 14 - but in none of them is the overall thread of discourse sig-
beginning of III.2.9. The text of the kiirikiis is obviously included also in
nificantly altered. Discrepancies are sometimes to be found between the
text of the kc7rikas and vrtti as has been established here on the basis of the two editions of the fpv 77 and in that of the IPVV.
The kiirikiis have been integrally translated into English (twice: Pan-
the MS tradition and Abh. 's quotations from it. This is often due to the
dey 1954, together with the fpv; Kaw 1975-76); partially - Jrianiidhikara
fact that these are not actual quotations, but paraphrases, which some-
and ahnika I of the Kriyiidhikc7ra into German (Frauwallner 1962). The
times expand and sometimes contract the text; at other times, it is a
question of errors that have crept into the MS tradition of the fpvv or vrtti has never been translated.
of errors already present in the text of the vrtfi that Abh. had before him
(see the Apparatus).
That the fpv of Abh. ended up by eclipsing all the other com-
mentaries - including those by Utp. himself 74 - and that it has become
established as the standard commentary, thanks both to its intrinsic
quality and to its author's great prestige, may also be seen from the fact
that it is the only one for which sub-commentaries were composed, such
as the vyilkhya of Bhaskarakamha or the anonymous commentary in the
Madras Government Oriental MSS Library 75, and others only extant in
fragmentary MSS, }ike the fpV-l'YClkhyc7 in Trivandrum Library
(No.15413C) or the IP-anvayadipikc7 (by one Sadhananda?) in Mysore
Library (No.B.187 of the old Catalogue) 76.

74 This is proved by the scant MS tradition of these works (only one complete
MS of the vrlti and a short fragment of the (ikci have come clown to us) and the very
few quotations from them. While K{iemaraja ancl Jayaratha (obviously, besides Ahh.)
show their knowing the (7kii, also independently of the IPVV, the only mentions of
the Vrffi I am aware of arc in late works and by authors belonging to South India
(Mahesvarananda and Kr~r)adasa; sec text notes p. I n. 9 and p. 63 n. 218.
75 I have learnt from N. Rastogi that the edition of this text was prepared long
ago by K.C.Pandey and himself, but its pUblication has been as yet stopped by
problems concerning precisely this joint authorship.
76 There arc also at least two other (late) commentaries on the kcirikc7s alone,
one by Nagananda in the Adyar Library (No.28. B. 24, mentioned in Raghavan
1981: 31) and the other by the Kashmirian Bha\!araka Sundara (lPKallllllldi;
Research Department Library, Sri nagar, No.1083). The colophon of a MS of the
77 If I chose to quote the IPV according to the edition which also contains
I'rlfi (sec below p. LIII) mentions Bha\!araka Sundara as he who would have
Bhaskara's sub-commentary, it was not because of my considering it the more cor-
composed a commentary to take the place of the final part of Utp. 's vrffi (missing in
rect (it is rather the opposite!), but only in oreler to be able to give a single reference
. all the Kashmirian MSS). During my last visit to Srinagar, I tried - without success
- to sec the MS of the Kallllllld7, possibly misplaced. for both texts.

XLIV XLV
 them - besides other MSS of the vrtti - also other commentaries on the
IPK, first of all the IPV which seems to be felt as the standard one, as
the inclusion in the text of glosses drawn from it and sometimes the par-
tial or complete reproduction of its colophons shows (see below)l. In
ABOUT THIS EDITION spite of these difficulties, met with in any contaminated tradition, the
picture that comes out is relatively clear, at least in outline.

This edition is based on nine MSS (and the comparison with the in-
complete text edited in the KSTS). Of these, eight are in Sarada script
and are indicated with the letters from Gh to T (the MSS K Kh G are tel

/~
thosc used for the KSTS ed.; the reference to them is limited to the read-
ings quoted in the foot-notes of that edition). The ninth MS, marked with
the siglul11 T, comes from Kcrala ,md is in MalayaJam characters.
A first division is to be made bctween thc MS T on the one hand
T [b]
which is the only one complete and generally gives better readings, ane!

/~
the Sarada MSS - on the other which all break otT at the same point
(beginning of the I'rtfi on m.2.9), have lacunae and corrupted passages
and, in general, less satisfactory readings (cf. text notes ,liilinc7dltikc7ra
35, 41, 59, 72, 92, 279, 293, 371, 3H4, 3HH, 3H I, 40H, 417, 461; Krivao J [cl
H, H9, 14H, 151, ISS, 167, 170, 181, IH6; f\gafJ/Oo 9, 39,46,64,74, '77;
etc.).
Moreover, within the Sarada MSS (dating from XVII to XIX cen-
tury) we can distinguish between a very homogeneous group of seven .
Gil N c eh .Ill N T (to which we may add K Kh (1) - and J. This MS, I< I<h G Gh N C Ch Jh N T
though sharing many of the features common to the seven others, is the
only one that shows a considerable amount of readings identical with, or
sometimes similar to, those only found in T (cf. text notes Jliclllao 53,
105,237,242,263,281,322,383,404,427,432,444,445, 449; Kl'ivc7° We start from a work which probably did not have a large circula-
21,43, 7{), H7, 116, 120, 130, 159, 165,218; clc.). . t ion and was reproduced in few copies. The scrutiny of the extant MSS
Already on the basis of these !'irst considerations it is possible to at- permits us to assume an archetype [al in Sflrada eharacters, complete,
tempt to outline a sfellllll([ codiclIlIl, bearing however in mind the factors which however some corruptions have already crept into (at least those
of uncertainty determined by the peculiar features of the Indian MS indicated in JJlc7J/{idhikara text notes 92 and 167, Kl'iyc7° ISS and 2(5)2.
tradition, and particularly of the Kashmiri one. The transmission of texts This MS, or a faithful apograph of it, was brought from Kashmir to
in Sarada script (as pointed out by Biihler I H77) is normally the work
not of simple scribes or devotees, unaware of the content of what they
are copying, but of learned pandits, of scholars, who mostly do not limit
I N even reproduces large portions of the "fpy in the margin and between the
themselves to passively copying the MSS, but compare them with others,
lines. In other cases (Kh G) it is the l'!,tti that may be found in the margin of a MS
record various readings in the margin, choose between alternative read- or the IPY.
ings found in the exemplar, make- explicitly or not emendations of 2 Ahh. in the Tpyy had already noticed variolls readings in the MSS of the I'!,tfi
their own. Moreover, in the case in question, they orten have before at his disposal.

XLVI XLVII
Kerala, probably around XII-XIII century when the Trika school spread
over South India. T derives from it, although not directly. The exemplar
of T (which belongs to XVIII century) was already in Malayalam script,
for some mistakes in T can be explained as misreadings of Malayalam
characters. The good quality of T is a further example of the high stan-
dard of the Kerala MS tradition. From ta] at least another MS also
derives, which was probably the only one that later survived Muslim in-
vasion, although with the loss of the last portion; we shall refer to it as
the hyparchetype [b]. From [b], incomplete and with a certain number of
corruptions but still relatively correct, derive J and the hyparchetype [c].
In this manner it is possible to explain, on the one hand, the many read-
ings that J, alone, shares with T and, on the other, the still more substan-
tial affinity of .I with the other Sarada MSS. As regards the latter, which
constitute a very compact family, we may assume a common ancestor,
i.e. the hyparchetype [c], which further corruptions have crept into. Be-
sides these corruptions shared by the whole family, there are some others
that are peculiar to single MSS or groups of them1. Probably, it would
be possible to go farther on and identify genetic connections within the
family K Kh G Gh N C Ch .Ih N T, too. But, at this point, the con-
tamination of the MSS and the scribes' work of collation and emenda-
tion4 makes this attempt rather complicated and its result, anyhow,
doubtful. These considerations and, above all, the awareness that such
further investigation is bound not to have any direct bearing on the es-
tablishment of the text have induced me to refrain from it.
For this edition the testimony of IPVV, vvhich sometimes quotes literal-
ly, sometimes paraphrases or simple gives the contents of the vrtti, has
been largely made use of. Since it mostly proves unvaluable in confirm-
ing or discarding a reading, ehoosing among equivalent ones, or even help-
ing to restore passages corrupt in all MSS, I have decided to include it in
the critical apparatus on a par with the MSS, though being well aware that
in so doing I have departed from the established usage of classical philol-

.l A passage from the .I//{/IIc1dhiki.ira seems particularly fit to illustrate the progres-

sive corruption from la] to the above group of Sumdn MSS (cf. text note 4(5):
~i/W//(llIlIhha\'c//a //(/ hhi/lllosyc7lf1asyo I'llpyajl1all(/syc7prcllllci(lyo/1I (correct reading,
only found in T), °jl1ii//c7//uhhm'clI{/ bhi////asya I'llf1yajt1iillosyciprcitl/(/(lye sci 1,
~i/iiil/(IIII/hha\'c jt7l7l1asyc7pramcl(lye sa N, jt1c7//(/syaprcilllii(lye sci Gh Ch (Osyth/ ) .Ih N
T (C 1h then correcte,d into the reading 1).
<1 Sec, for instance, the isolated concordances of single MSS with correct read-
ings only found in T (T .Ii/c7//ao n. 253; C .It7c7/wo n. 395; Ch .Ih Kriyc7° n. 118; etc.).

XLVIII MS eh, f. 19a

ogy. But I have preferred to put together in a single apparatus what (MSS
and testimonia) is in this case equally important for the constitution of the
text, so that the reader is not compelled to continually go from one ap-
paratus to the other.
Abh.'s commentary composed around 1015 represents the oldest
evidence for our text - older than any extant MS. This constitutes its uni-
que importance; however, I have made a cautious use of it and followed
it only when I could find some kind of support in the MSS. For in many
a case, even when IPVV seems to quote literally, it is apparent from the
MSS evidence that Abh. is giving a text either approximately remembered,
or reworded, or mixed with his own glosses. In these cases, if all the MSS
agree on a different but equally satisfactory (and often more concise) read-
ing, I have accepted the latter.
I have followed the division of the text into adhikaras and ahnikas, as
in the IPV and IPVV, though the MSS vary greatly on this point, some
of them even showing no division at all. I have given the colophons in
the simplest form, like that often found in T. There is some doubt as regards
the TaftvaSW!lgrahadllikara, which is taken by the IPV as consisting of a
single allnika 5 whilst the IPVV divides its commentary on the adhikara
into two l'ima}',\:os (third and fourth, first and second being devoted to the
two alll/ikas of the Agallladllika}'c/'). In the respective introductions the
IPVV refers separately to 15 (IPVV III p. 355) and 3 ,<:/okas (ibid. p. 400).
Considering that no MS of the vrtti shows a division into two ahnikas 7
and that this division might have been introduced by the {Ika which the
IPVV directly refers to -, I have taken this adhikarcl as a unitary section.

In the text, < > angle brackets enclose what has been added to the
transmitted text by conjecture; [ I square brackets indicate editorial dele-
tions. No mark has been used for conjectural emendations of transmitted
readings; they are acknowledged as such and accounted for in the
Apparatus. Sandhi has been nonnalized R•

5 Try II p. 2XO r... ! c7gafllc71'II/(/,\W!lgrahw!1 ,{:/okc7,1',1ada,{:akclI(/ dan'ayali "svc71I1/ai-

va .I'(/i'VOiallllllliilll" ilyc7dillc7 "lIlpaicIIOpap(7dilc7" ity (/lIlcllaikcnc7hllikclla.
(, Of the MSS, only J T correctly divide the Agall/c7dhikc7ra into two c7hnikas.
7 In fact, it is only C N that mention the name of the Tattva,\'(//!lgrahc7dhikc71'a.
H I have only occasionally dealt with the peculiar varieties of Sandhi, scribal

mistakes etc. in the Sharadu and Malayalam MS tradition.

XLIX

THE MANUSCRIPTS I
Gh
The MS belonged to the personal collection of Pt. Dinanath Shastri,
Srinagar, who, with grcat kindness and generosity, allowed me to
photograph it. This MS no longer exists, having bcen destroyed along
with the entire collection in the course of the recent Muslim desorclers in
Srinagar (Dinanath Shastri's personal communication).
The MS is on paper, written in Sarada characters, consisting of 28
folios numbered on the verso from I to 28, with 16 lines per page, measur-
ing cm. 21,4 x 17,6. On the first page the l'rfti on the first seven karikcls,
omitted in the text, was added in the margin and on a small streap of
paper pasted in the left margin; the hand is apparelltly the samc.
Beginning: 0111 Ilallzafi sa/'{/.lw/fyai II 0I!1 11OII/({(1 pratyak,Wlsl'O-
rii/JaY(/(/I/(/llC II
End: karfryoge 'pi hodlu/I/(II!1 kamlO({/n.lclllcll!1 l'idye/;\'(/rakhyallclill
hhillll(/\'cr/yahIzClktl'clw II/clydll/a/(//!l II Then, karika IIT.2.1 O.
There is only a division into adlzikcims; within each of them the
numeration or the kcirikc7s is continuous. Rare corrections in the margin.
Research Department Library, Srinagar, No. 824.02.
The MS is on paper, written in SaracW characters, consisting of 48
folios numbered on the verso from 2 to 49, with II lines per page,
I The MSS K Kh (J arc described in KSTS Ed. <IS follows: "(K) Ms. belongs to
Pandit Harabhatta Shastri. On Kashllliri paper in Sharada character. Size 10" x 6". II
is in the Tal<lpatra form. (Kh) and ((3) Ms. These are, in fact, the Manllseripts of
the Ishvarapratyabhijna-Karikas with the Vimarshini <Inti their margins contain the
Vrtti in question. The Ms. (Kh) belongs to Rajanaka Maheshv<lra. III Sharacla eharae-
IeI', on old Kshmiri paper. Correct, Size 1/4 foolscap, paper-bound. The (G) Ms. ~ Got
on loan from PanLiit Rama Kokila, a well known I'anciit of Srinagar. Size 1/4 foolscap,
bOllnd in leather, almost without mistakes, on old Kashmiri paper, in beatiful Shara-
cia character." (p. 3). The prinled edition is referred to in the Apparatus as E.
L Ll
measuring cm. 18,7 x 14,1. It has been profusely annotated by a dif-
ferent hand with single glosses or long passages (mostly drawn from the
IPV) between the lines and often entirely covering the margins. There is
only a division into adhikclras; within each of them the numeration of
the karikas is continuous. Between ff. 35 and 40 there are a few pages
without glosses. A passage based on the IPV is inserted in the text bet-
ween f. 2a line 8 and f. 2b line 6.
Beginning: (The first page is missing) °hdvare I ajacJatma ... (kar.
I.1.2).
End: same passage as in Gh; then the remaining karikas without com-
mentary. Finally: salllapteym!z pratyahhUiIa I ,slIhlzalll astll sarvajagatam.
C
Research Department Library, Sri nagar, No. 892.
The MS is on paper, written in Sfmlcla characters, conslstmg of 23
folios numbered on the verso from 1 to 23, mostly with 21 lines per page
(sometimes 17-19), measuring cm. 25,6 x 17,1. Sporadic corrections and
glosses by other hands in the margins. There is only a division into
adlzikaras; within each of them the numeration of the karikas is continuous;
sometimes a different hand notes the end of the aiznika in the margin.
Beginning: 0111 !l(/17/(/f/ .I:iwlya.
End: same passage as in Gh; then the remaining karikas without
commentary. Finally: {attva.I'(//!lgrahadhikc7raf! II iti ,\:r/lIladlltpa/adevc7cc/rya-
viracifa pratyahhUiI(lvrfti(1 salllilplo (sic) .\:ivc/ya lIamab II adifab .1:/OkC/lli
190.
Ch
Research Department Library, Sri nagar, No. 1672.
The MS is on paper, written in Sarada characters, conslst1l1g of 30
folios numbered on the verso from I to 22 only, measuring cm. 25,2 x
16,5. It is divided into three portions written by different hands, ap-
parently in different periods.
First part: IT. I 11 a. 13 lines per page. It begins with: Of!l Ilamo
gllravc I 0I!1. Some glosses by different hand in the margin only in few
pages. The vrtli on each kc7rikii is introduced by afm vrftib. Division into
alzllikas. The colophons arc as follows. iti pz7rvapak,wvivrtib; paradar.l:a-
llClIlII/)(IIJa It i(z; srnrt i.l'o k fill irz7pa (/(/ I?I ca f II rt!za Ill.
 Second part: ff. 11 b-22b. 14-18 lines per page, neither glosses nor End: same passage as in Gh; then the remallllllg kiirikiis without
corrections. F. 13 is missing, lacuna from o,,;akiiliispar/;iif (vrtti I.5.14) to commentary. Finally: h·fmatsllndarahhaffarakel.1a pratyabhijiiiivrttifz sam-
p17r~lTkrteti subham astu deviidll1iil?l miinll~yakTtiiniim I.
iitma,sabdiic ciiham iti (vrtti 1.5.17). Colophons: iti ,,;rfmadiiciiryiibhil1a-
vagllptaviracitiiyiil!l pratyabhtjiliisiitravimarSinyiil!1 jiliina,<;aktilli;'ilpa~w"l
pallcamam iihnikam; iti ,<;rTmadiiciiryiibhinavaglipta O etc. apOh(L<;aktilli-
rilpWlal!l ,\'(1;,tlwlI1 iilzllikam. The colophons of the six lillnikas are derived
Research Department Library, Srinagar, No. 2352
from IPV; the portions of ,flokas found at the beginnning of each clhllika
The MS is on paper, written in Sarada characters, conslstlllg of 16
also come from the opening .<;lokas in the IPV. No division between
folios numbered on the verso from 1 to 16, with 22 lines per page,
a/lIlikas VII and VIII.
measuring cm. 26 x 17,9. Neither division into iihnikas nor numeration
Third part: ff. 23-31a. 23-28 lines per page. Some glosses in the mar-
of verses. Rare corrections in the margins.
gins drawn from the IPVV. Neither division into a/lIlikas nor numeration
Beginning: 0I?1 srfgurur jayati Ol!l srTman paramasivo jayatitamam II
of verses. End: same passage as in Gh; then the remaining lalrikcls
End: same passage as in Gh; then the remaining kiirikas without
without commentary. Finally: S(//!lpllr~lcY(//!I (sic) pratyabllljilc7,<;(istralll.
commentary. Finally: tattvasal!lgrahiidhikc7rab iti srTmadutpaladeviiciirya-
viracitii pratyabhWic7vrttib .
J
Research Department Library, Srinagar, No. 1662. T
The MS is on paper, written in Sarada characters, consisting of 37
University of Baroda, Central Library, Sanskrit Division, No. 807.
folios numbered on the verso from I to 37, with 21 lines per page,
The MS is on paper, written in Sarada characters, consisting of 56
measuring cm. 13,4 x 16,9. Corrections in the margins or between the
folios numbered on the verso from 1 to 55 (no number on the last folio),
lines, generally tending to replace the readings that J shares with T with
with 12 lines per page. Neither division into iilll/ikas nor numeration of
those found in the other Sarada MSS. The numeration of the kiirikc7s is
verses. Rare corrections by other hand in the margins.
continuous, but there is a division into ii!1I1ikas within each adhikc7ra; the
Beginning: 0I!1 ,\~rTga~ldaya IlClIIIClf/ Ot!l Ilamab ,fiwlya (to be noted: f.
colophons are derived from the IPV.
14a in the margin: 0111 nal110 bhagavotc Wlslldcviiya).
Beginning: OI?l Ilanwb .'iiwlya.
End: same passage as in Gh; then the remaining kiirikas without
End: same passage as in Gh; then, kc7r. 1I1.2.1O.
commentary. Finally: sam[J17r~lcym!l pratyabhUiiii,\,(lstral?l I ,<;ubham astu I
.I~iVLlYo!!l nomafl.
Jh
Research Department Library, Sri nagar, No. 860 T
The MS is on paper, written in Sarada characters, consisting of 22
Oriental Research Institute and Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum,
folios numbered on the verso from I to 24, with 16-17 lines per page
No. 8900A.
(from f.l3 onwards, 20 lines), measuring cm. 21,9 x 14,8. F. 17 (from 2
The MS is in palm-leaves, written in Malayalam characters , consist-
JL3.1 idam ct(ld!R ity CVat!! to II.3.7 aviruddhc7vahhc7sc7nc7m cka O ) and f. 20
ing of 21 folios (corresponding to ff. 4-24 of the whole codex), with 11-12
(from 11.4.9 °kramc~/(/ jal1aycd ghatam to vrtti II.4.9 tatab pariO) are miss-
ing. Some folios are misplaced. Notes and corrections by different, much
more recent, hands in the margins and between the lines. The numeration
of the kc7rikas is continuous; no division into ahllikas. 2 P.L. Shaji, MSS Assistant, provided me with a dev(/I/clgar! transcript. The colla-

Beginning: 0111 nClI1/O mahdmdydvaryai II Ol?l llama Ii .l'ivc7ya sa,\~ij!(lya tion of the MS, however, is based on my own reading of the Malayalam text. In this
connection, I would like to tell a very instructive story, whieh should caution against
,<'ivadaya namo lIama!1. -

LIII
LIl
lines per page, measuring cm. 27,2 X 7,5. According to the infonnation
kindly supplied by P.L. Shaji, the MS was collected by Ramasubha
Shastri, Kadinamangalam, from Chirakkal Palace Library on 9/911941.
On paleographic evidence, it is not later than XVII-XVIII century. The
Tpv!' begins on f. 4b, 1.2, after an incomplete anonymous work dealing
with the theories of error. The palm-leaves have become dark, especial-
ly at the edges, from which small fragments are missing here and there;
in some places they have been eaten by insects. No numeration of ver-
ses; there is a division into alzllikas, with some inconsistencies (prathamalll
ahllikalll; d\'it~)'(flll ... etc.; iti jilalladhikara!l; n(/\'(lIllalll ahllikam; da/wmalll
ahnikalll; kriyadlzikar( (!,{~)'alll; dvadas~all/afll ahnikam; kl'iyadhikara~l;
agalllcldhikar( pratlzalllilhnikalll: agallladlzikarafl; neither division into
ahllikas, nor mention of the title for the last adlzikara). The MS often
has voiceless stops instead of (correct) voiced stops, evidently clue to the
absence of the latter class of sounds from the scribe's own language (i.e.
Malayalam).
Beginning: katlzm!ICid asadya .... (kar.l.I.I)
End: SOlllcll,tcyalll 1.\:\'(lJ'(tpratyablzijIHiV!'ffi!1 II" hhfn/~lalll ahlzayaprado
h!wl'ohh(/yakrolldasya hefl/s tato h!,ddhallllli prathitabhfral'ori!ci!lII L\:o
'I/{akasyi.lf/{akab / hh('/'(I/!I w7yati yas sl/yogilliwtlws tasya prall/IIII'
h!/({irm'o \'i,\~\'(tsll1il/ /JI/{//'(f~/(ldik!,d \'ijayate Vijlli!II(//'lI{lafl pamb 1,\:lIhham.

the widesprcad practice of working with South Indian MSS lIsing dCI'(//lilg{/rT copies.
Prof. II. Alper (whose lIntimely death in tl)X7 saddcned all of liS) came across this
MS, too. Having realized its importance but not knowing Malayalalll script, he asked
for and obtained -- through the good offices of Prof. K. Kunjunni Raja ~ a transcript
by a pandit of Madras. When /\lper came to know that I was already working on the
IPYr, he was so kind as to send me his transcript. The comparison of the pandit's tran-
script and mine was startling. The dillerences were so many as to make mc doubt
about Illy actual understanding of Malayalam. Thus, I carefully checked some por-
tions of both transcripts with my photographs of the original MS. It soon becamc clear
that the astute pamlit besides definitely having an imperfect knowledge of Malaya-
lam script ~ had prepared his transcription keeping the KSTS Ed. bel'ore him: some-
times he (hadly) copied from tile MS, sometimes found it more practical to copy from
the printed edition. Also his transcription of the last portion of tile 1'I'lIi, not available
in the KSTS Ed., is vcry inaccurate and full of mistakes .
.1 This versc is quoted in MMP p. ITl and ascribed to K~emara.ia.

LlV
TRANSLATION
 11.1

SECTION I . KNOWLEDGE

CHAPTER I

1 . Having in some way l attained the state of servant of Mahdvara

and wishing to offer assistance also to the whole of mankind, I shall -
by giving it logical jllstU'ication - make possible the awakening 2 of the
recognition (�{ the Lord, which brings about the achievement of all suc­
cess3
- I who have obtained, thanks to the benevolence of the Supreme
Lord4, the benefits that derive from being His servant5- a state it is very
difficult to achieve being ashamed of my solitary success, shall, by the
method that w ill here be described, enable the whole of mankind to re­
cognize thei r Lord, in order to gain my complete fulfi lment through the
attainment also by them of the S upreme Reality. - 1

2. What intelligent being could ever deny or establish the cognizer and
agent, the Se({, Mahdvara, established /1'Ofll the beginning (adisiddhe)?

I I.e. in a way that eludes all description.

2 I have thus tried to render the various meanings that Utp. gives to the one verb
upapc7dayiillli (eL Ipyy I pp. 31-32; eL also the closing verse of the IPK). The main
meaning of the causative here is .\'alllartMicara(lG, i.e., to act i n such a way as to
bring about the production of a certain action ( i n this case the awakening of reco­
gnition).
J Thus, following the order that appears most obv ious, I refer the compound sama­

.I'1a.\'(/f!lpatsalllavc7ptihetllnl to pratyahhUI1c7m, but, as Abh. poin ts out on the basi s of

the (lUi and the vrlli, it not only qual ifies tatpratyabhUt1c7m but also diisyolII. The
compound, which is i m p l ic itly understood as tatpurtl,I'(J in the vrlli, is the object of
i ntricate interpretations, sometimes as tatpllrtl,w and sometimes as bahuvrThi, i n the
fPY .
4 Or also, as Abh. suggests (sec text note I), «thanks to the benevolence of the

rnastep>.
5 CL the vigra/w of the compound (sec text note 2).

85

I 1 .2 The Self of all beings, the substratum of the establishment of all
objects 6, who embraces the establishment of himself1 since otherwise it
would be impossible to establish all the various objects - self-luminous,
whose nature is uniquely that of cognizer, formerl l established, 'ancient',
possesses knowledge and action. Sovereignty (ai.fl'aryaf(l) is established
through inner awareness. Therefore only the foolish strive to establish or
deny the Lord. - 2
H()1,vevel; since He, thouRh heinR directly perceived (dr�te 'pi), is
3.
not discel'lled for what He is hecause (�{ delusion , precisely for this
reason, by brillRillR His powers to liRht, the recoRllitioll (pratyabhijfHi) ()(
Him is showll.
- However, since the Lord, though established through inner aware­
ness 9 (sl'asal!lvedallasiddhanl), does not enter the sphere of full and defi-
(, According to Abh. (see text note I I), this is to bc understood as meaning that
the eognizer constitutes the final stage ( l'i.l:rc7l1lislhcllla) of the cognitive act, at h ich ; ledge, which is in itself capable of self-percepti on, becomes evident (pra­
the revelation of the object (praka,oia) becomes retlective awareness ( l'illlar.l:o).
7 The cognizer becomes implicitly conscious of h imself, of his being 'l ight', pre­
cisely through perception (the 'illumination' of the object); indeed, the i l l um i nation of
the object its perception - presupposes a light i nto wh ich it cnters, a l ight that by
defin ition is not i ts OWI1 but pertains to the subject.
x Thc bcing establishcd of the subject always 'precedes', as an (/ priori condition
of knowledge, and for this reason eludcs any objeetification that attempts to capture
it, so to speak, from behind. That would be l ike trying to step ahead of one's own
s!ladow, as a wel l-known vcrse of the Trikahrt!aya (quoted in SSV p, 4) puts it. Abh,
(lPVV I p. 5 1) gives the example of inferring fire from smoke, which, i ndeed, impl ies
that it is always thc smoke that is already establ ished first: the difference being that
the priority or the sel I' is ad ill/illillllll (vada yac/a IIpakral//ah lada lacla pl7r\'a­
sidcllialwlIlI ity C,I'O 'Ira par(lfllclrll/((h) , This is precisely what the nearness of ptl/w/­
siddlw to pllril//(( signifies, which taken singly may apply to various things (see text
note 15); the same theme wi l l be taken up again later.
'I The expression .\'1'a,I'((I/II'(,(/(/lIasiddha interprets and orientates, by l i miting its
mean ing, dr,v!c in the karika, which, insofar as it is passive, seems to degrade to the
status of object He who is the subject par ('.1'1'('1/('111'(', the Lord. B ut, Abh, notes (sec
text note 19), this expression, too, is, in the strict sense of the word, inadequate, as
the (ika itself has pointed out (I/(/pi ,1'1'(/,I'(I/(II'cc/allil.l'iddl/(/II'{(f1i (III//(I//((h); it can be
accepted only if understood in a metaphorical sense, as expressing the undeniabi lity
of the experienee of the I. The theme of the absolute impossibil ity of objectifying the
I, Siva, recurs with particular insistence in the work of Utp, Cr. Ipvv III p, 1 62 yat
P/'([/IICV/krlo 'snlili S(l/'\'() 'PY c7l11wlli Ic(ijalc I katli(l/!I P/ ,(l//lcy7kcl/'{l//(/1// sahaW/!1 tall
I//all1',1'1'(//'([(/ II 'Everyone feels ashamed in himsel I' at seeing that he is transformed
into an ob jet of cognition; then, how might the Great Lord stand this ?'
R6
lo
nite knowledge (ahrdaymigamatviif) because of the delusion caused by 11.3
!l
maya, His mere 'recognition> i s here shown - i n the form of the acqui­
sition of unswerving certainty - through the i l lustration of that sign of
12.
recognition that is represented by the faculties peculiar to Him - 3 -
4. Indeed, the foundation ()( insentient realities rests on the living
being,' knowledge and action are considered the life of the living being,
- There are two kinds of reality: insentient and sentient. The estab­
lishment of an insentient nature rests on the living being; the being such of
the living, i.e. life, is represented precisely by knowledge and action. - 4 -
5. Knowledge is se(f-established (svatal) siddham) ,' action , when it
man(fcsts itself th/'Ough a body, becol1les cognizable a/so by others. Thanks
to it, knowledge ill others can be guessed,
- In living beings action, when it reaches the final stage of bodily
movement, also becomes directly perceptible in other subjects 1 3 ; know­
sidlzyati) also in others precisely through action 1 4, Therefore, the Lord,
10 Lit.: 'docs not reach the heart', i .e. the plane of viII/ada whieh alone makes a
cognition fully accomplished and effective (cf, Ipvv I p. 80).
II
The reality of the Self is not therefore 'known' as happens with any object
i n phenomenal real ity, which, not shining itself. needs to be i l l u m inated by con­
sciousness but is simply 'recognized'. Moreover, this act of recognition i s not
something that was not there formerly and must be brought i nto existence, but eter­
nally present and merely eoncealed, it is only 'shown' (dar.oiyale) as predomi n ant, by
placing it ncar (lIpa) , in eontaet with the heart (IpVV I p, 87 see text note 26). Thus
Abh. intends to remove the act of recognition from the sphere of the vyavallclrasc7dllalla
as wel l (d, p, 173 n, :1), In fact, there may not be anything asic/dlla in the Lord, not
even as regards any aspect of l'ym'ollc7ra (prakhyc7-lIpc7kllyc7, jFicllla-abhidhc7na) con­
cerning him, for in this case even the establishmen t of the smal lest portion of the
knowable would become i mpossible (IpVV I p. 87 ladasiddhall pram('ya/dasyclpi hi
110 Weil .I'iddhir il), IIkWI/I).
;
1 2 That is, ab lVe all, the powers of knowledge and act ion.
L1
Th is means that aetion, as an inner reality (I'ill/ar:io) , inseparable from know­
ledge, is also self-estab l ished. The poss ibil ity of objectifieatio n only regards its ex­
treme phenomenal form of bod i l y movement.
1 4 It' action i s exam i ned first in the 1'l'lIi, thus reversing the order of the kc7rikc7
where knowledge is ment ioned first, this is because action is the means by which
knowledge (from which it is inseparable) can be inferred in others (Ipvv I pp, 104-
105), That bodily action, and the usc of the word, presuppose knowledge is a gene-
R7
I 1.5 the Self perceived as 'I' in oneself and others, is established insofar as it
is directly experienced through inner awareness. Because of the obscuring
01 his true nature caused by the power of maya, the Self is thus 15 erro­
neously conceived. 5 -
ral ly recognized fact; ef. for instance Dharmakfrti's Sallt(ll/c7ntamsiddhi 1 -2 (Kitagawa
1 955: 5 8 ; Steherbatsky 1 969: 64). B ut to infer knowledge means to objectify it and
it is for this reason that Utp. in the karihi and in the {Thi prefers to resort to other
expressions, such as to conjecture, suppose, guess etc. (cr. iilwl/(/!!1 tarkal/(/f(l silmbha­
I'al/(I/II ibid. p. 1 0 1 ) . The problem, however, arises again and is given an elaborate
solution in IPYY I pp. 1 05- 1 OS. Abh. begins by stating that since it is a question of
an inference founded on the sl'ab/[(lvalietli (see below p. 1 79 n. 1 7) that does not
aim to make known an object not formerly known, but only to rid it of erroneous
conceptions the real basic sctf-Iuminosity of knowledge and of the subject i s not
contradicted. After a series of objections and rep l ies, fol l owing the l ine of argument
in the !Tkc1, the conctusion is reached: a certain level of objectification in inferring
knowledge i n another body is undeniable, but this appl ies only to the i n itial and medial
stages, whereas in the end (paryante) knowledge appears in all its lum inosity, at unity
with the subject making the inference, as happens at the eonctusion of every cogn itive
act. [n saying pra.l'idhyati the I'("lti intends to express the emergence of the natural
self-lum inosity of knowledge and to exctude the possibi l ity of its being a l um inosity
induced by the subject, as is the case for the common object of knowledge (siddhm(1
bhal'ati, Ila til ,\'lldvalll).
1 5 I.e. in the �ay that will be described i n the fol lowing chapter. In understan­
d i ng ta.l'ya both as objective and subjective genitive ( i t is Abh. himself who underl i­
nes this, sec text note 43), the Self bccomes both the objcct and thc subject of the
error: the Self in its freedom is m istaken about i tself. I ndeed, cvery reality, cven crror,
has the Lord, the Sclf, as its u ltimate sourcc.
88
12.1-2
CHAPTER I I
[Objectiollt There is one type of cognition 2 i n which the par­
1 -2.
ticular reality (svalak�al)ao P appears and another type of cognition,
I In the whole of almika II a Buddhist pilrvapak$in is speaking; h i s arguments
are broadly speaking those of the Buddhist logicians, that gradually become more
specifically 1'(jlianavadil/, sawr(lntika etc. The target of Buddhist criticism her� �re
some atmaw/dins whose (various) positions are only partially shared by the Satva
c7tmavc7dill, One m ight almost say that Utp. sometimes uses the Bud �h ists' own
weapons to demolish doctrines which, though apparently c l oser to the Saiva posi­
tions, remain, however, extraneous to what is their core and essential tenor. I n the
text the word 'Objection' refers to the Buddhists and the word 'Reply' refers to the
atm(/l'adins,
2 I have understood ekalll ... paralll here in the p lainest sense, which is also the
one explained i n the 1'("lIi. Abh. (Ipyy I p. 1 1 4) l ists three possible i n terpretations,
and the one accepted here i s the third . The second, which Utp. adopts in the f7ka,
takes ekam as 'single, undifferentiated', i n this sense refeITing to d i rect experience
(allllhlia1'a) as opposed to the vikalpa, which assumes different forms (memory, im­
agination, doubt etc.). The only d ifferentiation in direct experience i s the one deriv­
ing from the variety of its objects. Thus param, apart from 'another' correlated to
'one', is also to be understood as 'subsequent', in the sense that the vikalpC/ always
depends on a previous d i rect experience.
J The swilaksal/a - which Dharmottara understands as a karllladhc7raya 'unique
'
character, uniqu � reality' (NBT p. 70 svalll asadhara(Wlll lak,I'a(lWll tattvm!l
svalaksanClm) - is, for the B uddhist logicians, the object of d i rect perception,
Dhan�ak lrti (no definition of swilak,I'a(1O is found i n the extant works of Dignaga)
describes it as fol l ows: capable of causal efficiency, dissimi l ar from everything else,
not being the object of words and not being known i n the presence of s igns that are
different from it (PY III. 1 -2); and that which, owing to its being far or near,
determines a d ifference i n the form that appears in cogni tion (NB 1.13). The
sl'a/ak,I'a([(l says Mok�akaragupta (TBh p. I I) - is something real, unique, determined
by a space, a time and a form which arc peculiar to it; he g ives the examplc of a
. m,
particular jar, capable of containing water, with a definite place, time and fo :
directly present to knowledge, devoid of differentiation into m an y properties,
different from what belongs to the same or a different class. The svalak,w(w strictu
sensll is an absolutely undiv ided reality; i t is an instant (NBT p. 7 1 pratyak,wsya hi
k,w([(l eko grahyab). The term ,I'l'alak,w(w is borrowed by the ,I'aiva authors to denote
"an entity having a character which is only its own, consisting in a determined place
_ :
time and form which 'contract' its own nature" (IPY I p. 86 svam allyc1nanuyaYI
svan7pasm!lkocabhiiji lak,I'a(wl!1 de,{akah7karan7pm!l yasya .). The basi c difference
..
89
1 2. 1-2 called mental elaboration (vikalpaO), inseparably connected with dis­
cOllrse (sabhiIapam), which appears ill mall/fold forms, For neither of the
two is there allY necessity to posit any stable perceiving subject, sillce he
does not apP(,(lIA in them. Also the 1I0tion (i '/' (ahaqlprantii)) has ill
reality as referent the body etc ...
One type of cognition, consisting in the direct perception of the
clearly manifested (sphl/(avabhclsaO) particular reality, is called 'exempt
from mental elaborations' (nirl'ikalpakalll) ; the other type of cognition,
on the other hand, which, permeated by the word , appears in the various
forms of memory, doubt, fantasy etc . , is called 'representation, mental
elaboration' ( l'ikalpaO). Neither the one nor the other are admissible as
depending on another entity distinct from knowledge itself in the form
of consciousness, since this other entity is not perceived (tasyallupalah­
dhefz). Who, then, is this permanent Self? Even on the basis of the no­
tion ofT, which is indissolubly connected with discourse, the existence
of a cognizer, who transcends what are si mply cognizable realities, name-
ly the body and so on, cannot be ascertained 5, 1 -2
with the B uddhists l ies precisely in conceiving of place-time-form not as the intrinsic
nature of the thing but as thc contingent contraction of an entity whose real nature
is, Oil the contrary, expanded (l'ikasi!asl'a/JI/(/v(/ (,I'a , l'i!a!(l(IIIc1; cf. S D V .6e), 'open'
(cf. iPVV II p. 27). Though appearing as a unitary entity, the sl'(/lak,\'(/�/(l, in U tp.'s
v iew, is in raet formed by a number of a!lhasa,\', i .e, universals, which have become
a particular owing to their mutual del im itation and their connection with space and
time (Torella 1 9X7: 1 6X-(9). In the process of part icularization space and time are
considered the most essential elements (an!a/'(/figa). If, already in perception itself,
the sl'(/lak,l'Il//(/ appears as a un itary reality (thc world of practical experience is,
i ndeed, made of SI'ol(/k,\·(/�/(/.I') , this is duc to thc un ify i ng power of thc mi nd «(1/I1I­
s(/f!ldh(illa) which l inks together a group of (/1>1/(/.1'0,\' by making them subord inated
to a predomi nant one (sclllliinadhika/'{/I/ya; see below pp. 1 66- 1 67) Thus the .�(li\'{/
position may be derined clhha.I'(lnikul'IlIlI!Jarlllakcll'lida as opposed to the ni/ ,(//!I.(·a.\·I 'iI­
lak,I'(/(I(/w7d(l of the B uddhists (on SI'(/I(/k,I'(/�/(/ in thc Buddh ist f1/ ,(/lI/a�/(/ tradition see
Steherbatsky 1 930": I X I - 1 9X, Katsura 1992: 1 35 - 1 37).
· 1 The B uddhist logicians acknowledge the validity of non-pcrception as the
criterion for establishing the non-existence of something that could (if prcsent) be
perceived (dr.(·y(illupolahdhi); this subject will be extensively taken up again later.
5 The B uddhist knows he is laying himself open to an obvious objcction: how
is it possible to say that no 'I' is manifested in knowledge when, on the contrary,
we all usually say « I know, I am happy or unhappy, I am thin or fat». But he has
his answer ready: this notion of T docs not reveal a permanent subject but rerers to
the series of distinct moments of cognition litl(lna,l'an!(lna) and of body (.'Ia/'//,(/.I'ol/­
WI/a) on which apparcnt pcrsonal idcntity is based. And in any casc this cxpericnce
90
3, [Reply] How could }ve e"'(plain memory, which conforms to direct 1 2.3
perception when the latter is 110 longer present, if there were not a per­
manellt se(f, who is the subject of the perception ?
- S ince the fonner direct perception has disappeared at the moment
of the memory , the memory, whose essential quality is precisely its
dependence on that former perception of the object, could not arise,
unless one admits the persistence6 of the awareness of this perception
also at the moment of the memory, And this lasting awareness at dif­
ferent times is precisely the self, the perceiving subject. - 3 -
4, {Objection] Evell if we do acknowledge the existence of a self,
memory is srill not explained, given that the perception no longer exists
and that only through it ! the perception} does memory have access to
the ()1�jC(,ts formerly perceived. {Reply] . But memory acts on those very
things that were the ()l�iect of the perception . . .
- Once the direct perception (manifestation) of the object has ceased,
the object no longer exists even for memory, since it is assumed precise­
ly through direct perception, Therefore, even if one acknowledges a self
consisting in a unitary consciousness, memory finds itself without an ob­
ject and thus all worldly activity collapses, If, on the other hand, you
claim that memory has as its object that of a perception that no longer
exists . . , 4
5, . . . ills(�lar as the occurrence of memory is due to the latent impres­
siems le.lf by direct7 perception. {Ol�jectiolll fl tliat is how things stand,
what need is there for this useless burden of a permanent se(f?
wou ld eomc into the category of the vikalpu, since i t takes place through verbal
mediation (the word T); and therefore, even if an T existed, it would become trans­
formed into object.
(, Or, if we accept the reading clva/'!a!e or clvar!eta, 'the arising again'.
7 Th is is the reason for the c7!fII(/vadin's reply; the cIImawldin and the B uddhist
piln'apak,I'in completely agree on this point. However, whi l e this admission allows
the ii!fII(/w7c/in to elude the critic ism levelled at him in the previous verse, he lays
himself open to further, even more radical criticism: once the fundamental role that
the ,1'(/f!lskam plays in memory is acknowledged, resorting to a permanent self be­
comes superfluous. The grounds of the B uddhist argumentation are clearly outlined
by Abh. (Ipvv I pp. 126-7) . Every cognitive act has two levels: an outer and an
inner one, The first (bahinl/ukl/(/) consists in the i l lumination or perception of the
91
1 2.5 From direct perception there derives a latent impression (sGf!1skiirafl);
the memory arising from this confonns to that fonner perception and
makes that perception - in which the object is i mmersed - manifest. I f
things are explained in these tel111S, why i s it necessary to assume a use­
less permanent subject, since even the supporter of the ex istence of the
self acknowledges the existence of the latent i mpression and this alone
IS enough to account for memory? - 5
6. ff the qualities are separate [extrinsic to the self} , then, since the
nature (�f the se(f remains unaltered, the latent impressions are sl({f;cient
to e.\plain the phenomenon (�f memory. The su/�iect (�f memory is there­
fore only a mental COllstl'llct (kalpital)), as was the subject qf the percep­
tion .
The self, even if it is invoked as a snbstratum of qualities that are
distinct from it, such as pleasure, pain, knowledge etc. serves no useful
purpose. Indeed, it does not perform any function in the phenomenon of
memory R, since it does not undergo any modification, seeing that it does
not combine with the above-mentioned qualities, which are conceived as
separate. Therefore, as in the case of the subject of perception, to say
that the self is the subject of memory is purely a mental construct. - 6
object , the second (alllanililklla) is constituted by the sel f-consciousness (sl'a­
sCI/!n'cdalla) of this perception. According to the B uddhist, the aill/i/l'adifl stakes
everything on this continuity of sel f-consciousness (to which he g i ves the name of
atll/all) to explain the phenomenon of memory, and in so doing leaves memory
without an object w h ich can only derive from the hahirmllklw level of the former
cogn ition. Now, if this has completely ceased there cannot be a melllory (wh ich cor­
responds to saying 'that') and, if it is fu lly present there, there is only a new direct
perception. What is required is 'the non-cessation of something that has however
ceased (na,I'!asyapy (/flc7!;afl)' and this is precisely what the .1·([f!lskc7ra is. Even the
aill/avadill cannot refute this ei ther and thus he g ives renewed v igour to the Bud­
d hist's attack, w h ic h is e xpressed in the second part of the karika.
H The karika is parrying an objection that the cltll/(lwldill m ight raise, this time
on behal f of a Yaise�i k a: the .1'W!lskara is a quality (dharll/a) of the self, on a par
w i th knowledge, pleasure and pain, and as such presupposes a substratum (dllarmill)
where it inheres ( i .e. the self); the dhal'lllill, on the other hand, cannot be represented
by a salllelllo, because it must be a unitary reality (da) (cf. Ipyy I p. 130); but i f
one w ishes to preserve the permanence of t h e illmall one must consider these
qual ities as separate from him and not able to mod i fy h i m (this is explained in IPY
I pp. 92-3 and Ipyy I p. 130). In this case, however, neither a .I'(Jf!lskiira which docs
not mod i fy the self, nor a sel f which is not Illodified by the .I'afll.l'kara, can explain
the phenomenon of memory.
92
7.If 9 cognition 'were consciolls (citsvarupam) then it ought to be per- 12.7
manent like the self ' o ; �f, on the contrary, it were not sentient, how could
it illuminate objects?
- If cognition were by nature conscious, then, unable to be associated
with time and place - which are qualities pertaining to objects -, it would
become permanent etc., l ike the selfl l . I f, on the other hand, it were not
sentient, how could it i l luminate the object? - 7 -
8.[Reply] . Just as the intellect assumes the form qf the object, so it
aSSllmes the sentience (caitanyaq1) of the self' 2 . [Objection}. In that case
it is not insentient, for (f it were so, it could not illuminate the object.
9 After confuting those who maintain that the e x istence of the self i s d i rectly
perceptible or i n ferable, the {J17rI'Clpak,�ill turns to attacking the 'sovereignty'
(ai,vvarya) of the self, i .e. its being endowed w ith the powers of cognition and ac­
tion. Cognition as a real ity or function d is tinct from the self is primarily criticized;
this is a conception that may be ascribed to the atll/avlidills in general but - as we
shall see rejected by the S ai vas.
10 This is, of course, the opinion held by the .majority of c1tmavlidills. The
reasoning is as fol lows: the sel f is Ilitya, because i t is citsvan7pa sva{Jraka,�a, and
time can quali fy only objects. Abh. (IPYY I pp. 1 35-6) mentions the positions of
the followers of the S alllkhya (kapitallalll 1(IVal lIilya eva asall), of the Mimalllsakas
(jailllilllyab pllru,�m!1 .1'W!IVidn7palll eva slikhadyavaslliabhillllw!1 lIIallyallle .. ,
ciiln7pcll!I.\;CII{l lIityafl. (f\'(Isll/(I/{I.I'ell(J til Clnityo 'sti, this is a doctrine which stems from
the BhaHas, cf. S Y , A 1111(1I'cida, v v . 26 ff.) etc. The positions of the ([tmal'cidills d if­
fer greatly as regards whether the self is conscious or not.
II
I f cognition , a s distinct from the sel f, i s conceived a s being conscious by
nature - and such, for instance, is the position of the Yaise�ikas and the Prabhakaras
it follows that it, too, is permanent. The contradiction that arises ( i n the eyes of
the B uddhist) and is not made clear in the l'/'lti nor, i t seems, in the (lkc7, is pointed
out by Abh. (Ipyy I p . 103): if both jl7c7na and almall are lIilyC/, there can be no
relation between them, because, according to the B uddhists, the only relation i s that
of cause and effect, which, i ndeed, cannot e xist between two permanent reali ties.
Abh. (Ipyy I p. 134) points out a further consequence: cogni t ion thus having the
same properties as the self, would only be another sel f, and thus the hetll that it
represents in the inference of the self would become asiddha.
12
This i s the Salllkhya theory, according to which the hllddlli, though itself in­
sentient, cognizes by means o f the light that i s reflected in i t from the p url/,w. Thus
the /JlIddhi would be both insentient and sentient (cid-acit), which is a position the
p17rl'apak,l'ill recognizes as untenable ( i n order for i t to be able to ful f i l its function
in the final analysis it must be sentient and therefore the criticism levelled earlier is
valid) . The v iew of the S aqlkhya i s inadmissible - it is said, among other, i n the
Ipy and Ipyy because only a clearer thing can receive the reflection of another
and the /J/lddhi is certainly no 'clearer' than the sel f.
93

12.8 The intellect (huddhib) is cognition l J . Though it is itself insentient,
just as it assumes the reflection of the fonn of the object, so, in the same
way, it also assumes the reflection of the sentience pertaining to the self.
Thus [in assuming them both 14] , it can i lluminate the object. However,
[it is replied] it follows that it must be sentient by nature.
Therefore 15 cognition, though it exists, is not related to anything else
[i.e. to a subject] , because this has been recognized as untenable. Action,
on the other hand, neither exists in itself, nor as related to anything else.
8 -
9.A lso action [as a separate reality is logically inadmissible as it]
consists ill the coming iI/to being q( bodies etc. in dl�ffereflt places etc.
(tattaddeSadijatata) 16 and nothing more. since nothing more is percei\'ed;
nor is it tenahle thot it heing ol/e ane! also characterized hy sllcces-
sion may he related to (/ unitary reality.
Action, too, conceived as one and constitued by variolls preceding
and sllcceeding parts, consisting in thc activity of factors (kc/rakaO) 17 , is
not tenable, as it is not possible to attribute unity to something charac­
terized by succession, i.e. that exists in a multiplicity of moments 1 R• Nor
is it admissible that it has a substratum that is both characterized by tem-
1.\ The various reasons for this apparently i nappropriate identi fication (of the
organ with the fUllction etc.). are extensively analyzed in I PVV I pp. 149-50.
1 4 c r. text note 87.
1 5 That is, on the grounds of the arguments put forward in this and the previous
karika from which the conclusion is reached that cogn i t ion is nei ther permanent nor
rclated to a subject.
1(, Cr. e.g. :rs 706 de,l'iilllaropalahdhes III llairalllarye�1!I jalllllw/(/(t I s(l/nclnopa­
/'(/\'(/,I'liillill!1 galiMm7nlib pradipal'(/I II.
17 Th is is an allusion to Patarljal i's famous definition, kclmkii(lcll!l {J1'(11'!,llil'i,\'c,l'([h
kriycl (Mahc7/JI/(I,I'ya, vol. I p. 258), understood in v arious ways by generations of
commentators (e.g. What i s the meani ng o f kc7rak(7(lcllII? The subject, the subject and
object, all the kclraka,l' w i thout distinction,? etc,). Th is is the background to the whole
0(' the Kriyi/,I'(//nllddc,\'(1 0(' the V I', which is, in turn, the reference point for the Saiva
conception o f action (cL the extensive and repeated quotations from this fundamen­
tal text in the fpv v's comment OIl this verse),
IX
This i s a reply to all implicit objection, formulated in IPVV I pp. 186-7: there
are, indeed, col lective units such as the army etc., but here the various antecedent
and consequent parts, l inked by a reciprocal relation, exist simultaneollsly; this is
not so in the case of aetion,
94
19
p aral succession and is unitary in nature • Action is only 'to go 'to 1 2.9
change and so on, which is but the assumption on the part of bodies etc.
of new states of existence at v arious and diverse times and places, since
nothing else distinct from this is perceived. - 9 -
1 0. The variolls things come illfo being in concomitance with the
presence of certain other things: this is what is experienced ane! nothing
more. There is no relation (saqlbanclhal)) other than that of cause and
effect 20,
- What is directly perceived is simply that, when a certain preced­
ing thing is present, a subsequent thing comes into being. As was argued
in the case of action, no relation of action and factors (kriyc/kiirakaSClf!l­
bandhafl) exists, since such a 'relation' is not perceived as a distinct
entity. There is no connection between things other than that of cause
and effect. - 1 0 -
1
1 1. {A relation (saqlbandha F . however conceived, IS inadmiss-
19 The d i fference in nature i nherent in the various antecedent and consequent
parts detell11ines a d ifference in nature in the substratum they share (cf. Ipvv I p.
193),
20
TpV I p, I 17 summarizes the series of criticisms the pilrl'apak,�ill levelled
against the Saiva statement «the I is sovereign (isl'ara) because it is in union w i th
knowledge and action (jiWnakriyc7yogc7I)>>, ,mana is produced (k(Jrya) by i t s own
group of causes, such as the faculty of s ight etc.; kriyc7 does not exist: t herefore they
cannot be karyas of the self (nor can the self, by defi ni t ion, be a kc7rya of them).
And therdore, given that the only relation acknowledged by the B uddhists i s that of
karya-kc7raIlCl, it follows that there cannot be any relation between .if/cilia and kriya
on the one hand and the sel f on the other.
2
1 I n presenting t h e Buddhist criticism of t h e concept o f relation
(sanlballdlra)
Utp. rders to D harmakl rt i's arik,I'(/, The complete text of this short work,
S(//!lhalldhop
and the "rtli with which Dharmaklrti accompanied it, has only survi ved in Tibetan
translation (the commentarie s S{l/!lhOlldlwparik,I'(J(ika and °alll/slira, respectively by
V i nltadeva and Sarikaranand ana, arc also extant only in T i betan translation ) . The
Sanskrit text of twenty-two of the twenty-five karikc7s that compose it can be ob­
tai ned from Devasuri's Svc7i1wldaratllc7kor(/ (sec Frauwallner 1934: 26 1-3(0) and
Prabhiicandra's P/,(/lIIc}'(Ik;l!1/(/I(lIIIc7rtii�I<'O (sec 1ha 1990). L i ke Dharmaklrti , after
deal ing with the concept of relat ion in various parts of h i s lIIaglll/lII OpIlS, the PV,
felt the need to return to it both organ icall y and concisely i n the S P, s i mi l arly - and
this docs not seem merely coincidental aner the IPK , Utp. also composed the S(I/!I­
hOlldlrasiddhi (with a I'rlli) , a short work in which he out l i nes the Saiva conception
of relation. I ndeed, the critical reference point for the latter is the S P, an ardlw,<,/oka
95
12. 1 1 ible F2 since, as it rests all the two related terms 23 , it cannot he unitary
in nature; since a thing that is [already] accomplished (siddhasya) cal/­
not 'require' (Oapek?aI)iit) another and dependence (piiratantryaO) etc. are
not logically tenable 24. Thus the agent, too, is merely a mental construct.
of w h ic h is even included in the text (4b ity ami/m7b smym!1 hhi1w/s t{ill yojayati
ka/pallcl, corresponding to v . 5b of the SP). Some verses quoted by Abh. in Ipvv
I, w ithout any reference to their source, also come from the SP. It is worth quoting
them i n ful l , also because they d i ffer i n some p l aces from the form in which the
same verses arc quoted by Devasuri and Prabhacandra (the l atter arc i n square brack­
ets): bh(/1'CIhhcdapratuyarlhm!1 S(//!Iy(�;yallic 'hhidhayakcl(1 (v. 6b, cit. p . 1 95), pa.l:yalln
ekam aelr,I'/asya eli/dane ladadadollc I a/)(/Cl:yall [Prabh . apa.l:yal/ kclryam allveti
villi1py akhYellrbhir [Prabh. I'illel l'y{ikhyc7trbhir] jallo(1 II dadallc7dar.I'alle fIlllkt\'(l
kelryalJ/{ (lelhcr lIa sW!lhlwl'c7t {as([f!lhhal'!il/ I karwidi.l:rulir apy alra Iagha\'(il'lhm!1
lIil'dilc7 II ( v v . 1 3- 1 4, citt. p. 1 99), ity ([lIIi.<:I'(/(1 sl'a)'W!I bMw/s l{ill yo;ayali
[lIIi.l:rayalij ka/pallel II Ii/III e\'(/ Call1ll"lllldhc7(wib kl'iyakc7rakawlcillah / hha\'(l­
hhcdapralllyol'lhw!1 S(//!lyojYOlltC 'hhidhayadclb /1 ( v v . 5 b-6 citt. p. 2(0), Sa/!I.I: ca sal'­
l'(/lIif'(I.\'(/fI/SO "'Iavall kalhall/ apek,wle I (/[1ek,l'I/ yadi [pal'apek,\'(! hi; Prabh. i nverts
the two hemistichs I S(//!lhallclha(1 so 'sail kalhalll a[1ek,\'(/le ( v . 3, cit. p. 2(3), .. 1(111 .
lIIi.<:rayali ka/pallel ( v . 5b, cit. p. 2(4), dvill'C sari [ Dev . dl'i,l'{he sa ca, Prabh. (ll'iNc
sa ('(1/ kalhm!1 hlwvcl ( v . 2a, cit. p. 2(5 ) , siddhe kcl [I(I/'{/lolIll'alc7 ( v . l a, cit. p. 2(4).
It should be noted that thc readings given by Devasuri and Prabhacandra are general­
ly more in l ine with the Tibetan translations.
22
I n Dharmaklrti's opinion t h e connection between calise and effect is not a
relation (as conceived by the real ists), since the essential requis ite of a relation i s
the simultaneous presence of the two related terms o n w h ich i t rests equally -
whereas cause and effect must necessarily belong to two d ifferent moments in time
(cf. PV 1 1 1 .246 asalab prag as(lll/al'lhyc7t P(l.I'CelC cClllllpayogola(1 / pl'aghh<7vo(i
.I'iIITahcf{illillll . .1/)
. ( S P v. 7 kiil'yakam(/(/h//(Ivo 'pi (({yor asohahhdvatab / prasi­
dhyali kalhw!1 d\'iS{/1O 'dl'i,l,{he .1·(/f!lhalld/w!c7 katllall/ II). Thus, the cause-effect
rcl at ion i s , in the fi nal analysis, unreal precisely qua relation, being reduced to a
concatenation of prcsences and absences (alll'(/ya-vyalirC'ko, hhcivo-oh//(!va); cf. Sp v .
1 7 ctc7vOIIIII(/(ra[i.c. hhiil'iihhcl\'(/uilailw/I'lhafl karyakdrallago('(l/'(/h / I'ika/pcl dal':iayall­
Iy al'IMII lIIilhyiil'thii gha{ittill im II.
21
The fact that it rests on the two related clements is, as we have seen, the es­
sential feature of a relation, as it is commonly understood by the real ists: in the
opin ion of the B uddhist opponent this is a contradiction i n terms, but precisely be­
cause this is the essential requisite it cannot be abandoned w ithout rejecting the very
concept of relation (sec SP v . 1 1 ab (l\'i,l,{ho hi ka/wil s(If!lI)(llld/1O 1/(110 'llyal
. las),(1 .
/(J k,l'I/(/(/III).
24 Here, too, a dircct reference is made to thc S P the first i;/oka.l' of which are
devoted to confuting one by one the various forms in which a relation may be
represented, Utp. expressly mentions and criticizes only api'k,I'c/ and Pcl/'{//(fllll'ya: the
karikii, however, adds o(/(/io and the (ika shows that this is i ntendcd to refer to
l'l/pa.\1e,l'(f, w h ich in the SP is actually examined in v. 2 , after pclratallirya and before
(/pi'k,I'ii.
96
A relation is based on two tenus (dvi$thab) and i t is not logically 12.11
tenable for i t to rest on both and preserve its unitary nature. Neither i s
a relation conceivable i n the fonn o f a reciprocal requirement
(allyollyi7pek,�i1°) between two things which are already accomplished25
nor in the form of a dependence (pfiratantryaO) of two self-contained
things 26 . On the grounds of what has been said, j us t as the state of
cognizer is a mental construct, the same holds good for the agent27.
2 5 I . e . they already have their own independent e x istence. Primar il y one must
distingui s h , as Utp. does here, between apek,�a and pclratantrya, often generically
translated as 'dependence'. I n apek,�{i the sense of 'need, requi rement, expectation'
predominates: the shoot 'requires' the seed ( S S Vr p . 2 mikllra eva Ii/jam apek,mte);
the gen i t i tve r{ijHab 'requires' ('depends' on) pllI'II,wb (apek:jel, clka,ik:j{i ; see Ipvv I
pp. 203-2(4), without which i t would remain incomplete. Dharmaklrti's criticism (SP
v . 3 p(l/'{/pek,wl h i sClI!lbandlla(1 s o 'san karham apek,l'{Ite / sal/I.� c a sorvanin/sCII/lse
17//(1\'(/(1 kat//(ull apek,wlc II) is taken up agai n in the {lka and then i n Ipvv ( I pp.
203-2(4). If a cause i s e x istent (sat) i t cannot 'require' anything else; if i t is non­
existent (asat) it cannot 'req u i re' at all; nor can it be said that a thing 'requires' its
effect in order to be qual i fied as a cause, because this is not anything other than its
very nature, but i s identi fied with it. I f one objects that its nature, though being ful l y
present, m a y not b e reali zed a s s u c h i n prac t ical reality (vyavahara), o n e m a y reply
that, if the vyavahara i s cognit ion and verbal i zation (jlli1l1a-abhidhalla), then it i s the
subject ( i .e . the m ind), not the thing, that is d irectly i nvolved, and t herefore h e is
given the responsibil ity for estab l i s hing such unreal relations (ef. SP v. 5b ity
allli.l:I'a(l S\'(/Y(//!I Ma\'(ls lall lIIi.\·rayali ka/pan(/). In the case, then, of r(�illab ( w h ic h
i s sat) with respect to {J1I1'II,m(l (also sat) there i s no reciprocal apek,�a, but o n l y of
the former towards the latter, (lpVV I p . 204 /'{�;Hab sala(l sati eva pili/lsi apek,�eti •
lIa III (/IIYOllyapek,I,(1 alra vivak,l'iW); therefore i t cannot be represented as sCII/lhalldha,
which - we know - must be dvi,I'{ha.
26
The cri t icism of pclmlalllry(/ ( more precisely 'dependence' as subord ination,
heteronomy) is outl ined i n the first verse of the S P (paratalllryall/ hi S(//!lhalldha(1
siddhe ka {JaralalllraW). Abh . notes , fol lowing in the steps of the {Ike! (IpVV I p.
2(4), that a reciprocal 'requ i ring' (allyollyc7pek,\'(7) may well come w i t h i n the s phere
of /}(/ralallirya; but this is still not enough to ful fi l the prime req u i s ite of SClI!lballdha,
which is that it must be equally present in the two related terms (dl'i,I'{lw). I n effect,
in the relation of pc7ralallll'ya anyollyapek,w/'l7pa (glossed in the {lkc7 w i th
parasparolllllllkhata and allyollyal/1 alllllll/lkhya), l ike that of w i fe and sacrifieer i n
the sacrifice or of t w o lovers making love, one cannot say that t h e 'expectation' (111/­
IIIlIk/WI(I) of the one coinc ides with that of the other. Thus 1I11111l1khatcl docs e x i st ,
b u t i t is not a proof of s(fqlbandha.
27 It is the usc of language ( D harmaklrti notes) - serv ing as a means of d i f­
ferentiating things that suggest the e x istence of relations l i ke that of factors and
action. This relation has no correspondence in real ity, but is merely the result of the
synthes is of discursive thought (ka/palla), w h ich, in fact, comes about through lan-
97
12. 1 1 Thus 28 how IS i t possible to claim that the Self IS the Lord of all?
13.1
1 1 -

CHAPTER III

1.Agreed. 1 However, that form of cognition which is memory, though

arising from the latent impression deposited by the former direct percep­
tion, is restricted to itse(f (atmani�tham) and does not know the original
perception 2 .
- Memory, though arising from the reawakening of the latent impres­
sion deposited by the former perception, because it is restricted to itself
exclusively knows only its own form. I t cannot be claimed that memory
determines the object formerly perceived, since it [memory] does not
penetrate the former d irect perception. 1 -

2 . A cognition is se({-revealing (svabhasaiva)'l and cannot be the ob­

ject of another cognition, jllst as the cognition (�f taste is not known by
that (�f shape. The fact that [memory] arises from latent impressions im­
plies its similarity to the former perception, bllt not its cognition of that
(taclgatil))4 .

1 The author shows that he partly shares the v iew that the [n7rl'apak,l'ill put for­

ward regarding memory in the prev ious ahllika, especially w i th respect to the im­
portance of the function of the ,1·wllskaras. He departs from thi s v iew, however, when
he exam ines their role, taking into account the impossibility (also recognized by the
B uddhists) of one cogni t ion becom ing the object of another.
2 Every cognition and memory is a form of cogni t ion is svaswll1'Nlana and
it is in this sense that the e xpression (/flllalli,I'{halll, w h ich generally refers to insen­
guage (1(1111 I ka/pal/(IIII! (,I'a C(/l/IlrllllC/llil!wi(I kriyakiirakcl\'(7cill(/(1 / MC1\'(/h/tcc/apra­
tient realities (jw1a) , must be understood. It i s 'confined, restricted to itself' in the
lIIyarll/(1/11 SW!lyojyalllc 'hltidhiiyakcl(I). The valuation of ka/polla accord ing to Dhar­ _
sense that it is only aware of itse l f and not o f other cogni t ions (cf. I PV V I pp. 2 1 0-
maklrti can obviously not be shared by Utp. (cf. SSVr p. 5 ) .
2H
I l ).
In Ipvv I p. 206 it is debatcd whether the two terms of the s i m i le are on
. \ T h e ex pression sI'Clhltc7sa ( c r. below p . 1 6 1 n . 2 , p . 1 62 n . 4 ) m a y be in­
the same plane. I n fact, from the previous arguments, in the case of /,Wlrfl'(/, /11(/1/(/
terpreted in variolls ways and my translat ion of i t has been l e ft deliben�ely vague.
is acknowledged and only the existence of a subject is denied ( and should the lat­
The \'/'fli understands i t as s\'(/s(/fl/vedallaikaI'l7pa. Abh. glosses it in the I PV i n two
ter exist, the possibil ity of a relation between the two is denied), whereas in the case
d iffer� nt ways (ahhasa(t praka.\,a;I/(/IIClla sa .1'1'(1/11 1'l7pafl/ avyahhiu/ri )�asyab; svasya
of karlrfl'(l even krive! itself is denied. It is repl ied that the example tends to show
C(/ ah//(/S(I//(//11 /'[iP(ll11 yasya(l, which coincides with the vrtli); in the I PV V he even
their equality as regards being ka/pila; and it is added that also j icll/a is essentially
i gives four di fferent interpretations.
kriY(1 because of the verbal root it contains and that therefore the confutation of .
4 The s(IIII.I'/a/m of the former perception is reawakened by a present perception
-

kriya also i m p l ies the confutation of that particular kriyii that is jl1iil/o, which places '
- sim i lar to t he other - w h ich g ives rise to the memory. The s(II!lsk{l/'(l, therefore,
them on the same plane. ensures this 'simi larity' in the memory, but the memory itself has no d i rect access

98 99
13.2 - Every cogl11tlve act i s by nature only aware of itself (sva-
satrlvedana ikarilpii) and does not become the object of another cognition:
if the cognition o f shape could grasp the cognition of taste and vice versa,
then the one would perceive the object of the other and i n this way every
restriction on the activity of the individual senses would cease to exist.
S ince memory arises from the latent impression left by the fanner per­
ception it only bears a similarity to that perception but does not have
direct cognition of the latter ; and, moreover, as there is no cognition of
this former perception (tadabhiil'iit) not even the similarity to it can be
maintained. 2 ceived be taken to be due to error. And moreover, [if i t is a question of
3. [Some might ol�iect thatlS memory appears erroneously (bhrantya)
as having as its o!�iect something directly perceived (dr�talamba nata),
being redllced, instead, to the only determinative activity directed at
thelll6 (tadavasaya tal)), despite the fact that they havc ncvcr directly
cntcrcd its cognitivc sphcre (atadvi�aya tve 'pi ) . B ilt this olJicction , too, is
inconsistcnt.
And it cannot even be c1ai mece that memory has these as i ts
object only erroneously , in the sense that it makes the object of its own
determinat ive activity (adhyavasyati) the former direct perception and its
object, which i n reality are not experienced , as happens when one states
that one sees si lver when faced with mother-of-p earl. 3 - _
4. HowPo is it possihlc to rcdllce the truc naturc (�t' mefl/ory to this?
(smrti laiva kathaq1 tavad) . And how is it possihlc that the establishmcnt
to (cannot 'know') the fonner perception and therefore nor can it, strictly speaking,
establ ish the s i m i larity between the latter and the present perception which has
reawakened the ,I'(l/{Iskiira, This, as will be shown later, i s an operation that presup­
poses the l. A s one can gather from the I'{'tti, and as Abh, (Ipyy I p . 2 1 4) explains,
tad in tadgatili has two d i fferent meanings, the first o f which refers to 011((111/(/\'(/
and the second to sc7dr.1yo; the first is to be considered the cause of the second: '1/(1
tadgoti(I' it)' (/fret d\'(/v orthall tacclwhdcl/a aflllhhal'asya .w/dr!;yasya ca parc7fi1ar,l;{if
I tatra prath(///I{7rtho dl'iflyasl!lill h('tlltl'CI/(/ l!Iofltal'ya(1. fpy I pp. 1 29-30 defines
the question with great c l arity (and in this the Sanskrit language is an unr i v alled in­
strument): s(//!lskc7rc7t [1or(//{1 sovi,wya/(/I/{(7trm!/ slIIrte/i siddham, I/(/tll (//111-
hlul\'ovi,wyafl'olll, fliipy osya I'i,myasya piir\'(/fllIhhm'((I'i,wy7krtOfVOIII iti lIi.l:('aya I',mh.
:; This is once again a Buddhist speaki ng.
(0 The former perception and its object.
7 As Tpyy I p, 236 (ef. text note i 30) explains lIa negates the whole sentence.
K The author states the reasons that induced h i m to consider
( i n the last fie/c/a
of the previolls karika) the opposing thesis untenable,
1 00
�f objects (arthasth i til)) should come about thanks to error 9 ? And, if such 13.4
is the case, what sense is there in claiming dependence on the latent im­
pressions left by the former direct perception?
- Memory cannot be identified with something that derives only from
determinative knowledge (adhyavasiiyamiitriit), the object of the former
perception being absent (tadvi�ayasal!lpramo�e) because it [the former
perception] is not made manifest [in the memory, according to your con­
ception] . Neither can the definite establishment of an object formerly per­
'enor'] why insist so much on the fact that memory - conceived of as
enor - arises from the latent impressions, when, on the contrary, it is dif­
ferent from the fonner direct perception from every point of view, (tadbhin­
l1ayogak�emayiifl) I O, not coming into contact with it in any way? - 4 -
S. II I the determinative knowledge (avasayasya) is err01� how can
it thcn, being insentient, establish objects? If, 011 the contrary, it is
l) The essential core of memory is the former percep tion recalled to m ind. There
is therefore no new cognition and it is only a new cognition that can be imputed
for error (cf. Ipyy I p . 239 and text note 1 36). The vrlfi and, as can be gathered
from the Ipyy, also the (fkc7, leave no doubt as to the meaning that U t p . attributes
to the second pelda of the karikc7 (iJhriilltd Ci7rthasthitib kathom). I t must be p o inted
out, however, that the interpretation of the fpy (I p. 1 32) is completely d ifferent . I t
essentially says that obviously n o estab l i shment of the nature of t h e object can derive
from error, s ince the former i s not m an i fest in error ( i f one understands error, as the
opponent docs, as osotO or iitlllakhyiiti), and that on the contrary everyone can see
that the organizatioIl and fUIlctioning of the world of experience depend on memory.
Therefore memory cannot be an i l lusion, This i nterpretation of the kiirika
(misunderstood in B h .'s commentary) i s , in fact, what everyone would give on a f i rs t
reading, and i t anticipates t h e argumentation t h a t U t p . actually presents further o n .
10
In the expression yogak,�el1la (according to Ipyy I p. 240) yoga (which has
the general meaning of the attainment o f something not formerly possessed) stands
for the object's own nature characterized by l i ght-knowledge (praka,�a), and k�ema
(the preservation of what has been attained) refers to the part-object. Thus these fea­
tures d ifferentiate slIlrti-bhranti from onubhova, s ince i n the former there is no new
cognition (I read anapflrvatv(/( i nstead of apflrvafviit) and the object is not really
present.
II
The argumentation of this verse presupposes the opponent's objection,
clarificd i n Tpy [ p . 1 33 : the determi nation (adhyavasiiyo) o f the former d irect per­
ception and its object, which is brought about by memory, establishes a partial
s i m ilarity of the latter to the perception; and for this one neeas to resort to the
.1'(Jf!lskarc/.I', The discourse, therefore, turns to the nature of this odhyavaselya (and
101
1 3.5 conceived of as being sentient. h01V can it, restricted as it is to it­
sdf and to its own ideation (nij o l lekhan i� than) . establish objective
reality ?
It is the detenninative knowledge (adhyavasayafl) alone that - er­
roneously - establishes objects, and not its self-awareness l 2 (svasa/!lvit).
If such is the case, it is insentient and - being insentient - how can i t
cause t h e establishment o f objects? Thus, even if one were t o ack­
nowledge it was insentient, [this should be understood in a limited way,
that is, in the sense that] it would only be able to make manifest objects
pertaining to the past, or illuminate only non-external objects - itself and
its own ideation (abahyasV(ltmollekham(ltrapraka.\�a�l) - and, therefore, i t
could not equally b e accepted a s the cause of that establishment o f ob­
jects we are dealing with 13. 5 -
6 . Thus. Ihe /llllctioning (�f the hllmall world - which stems precise­
ly /1'0/1/ the III1U/catio/l (amlsaq1dhanaO) cd' cognitiolls. in themselves
separate /Imn olle another and incapable (�l knowing one Of/other -
wOllld be destroyed . . .
Cogn i tions are restricted to themselves only (svatmamatraparini- 1 3.6
0 rhitani) and cannot be the object of other cognitions (aparasal?lvedyani)
being by nature [exclu s ively] conscious of themselves. B u t then how
would the dimension of human activity and behaviour (lokavyavaharafl)
- culminating in the teaching of the absolute reality - be possible, s ince
this consists precisely in the interconnection between the objects of
knowledge? (anyonyavi,wyaSCll!lgharranamayafl) 1 4 . 6
7 . . . . 15 (( there were no Mahdvara who contains within himself all
the il(ti'nite forms, who is Oll e , whose essence is consciollsness, possess­
ing the powers �l knowledge, memory and exclusion 1 6 .
- The m utual unification of all cognitions of things i s [constituted
by] the consciousness principle (cittattvam) whose form is all, since noth­
ing distinct from it is admissible. The powers of knowledge etc. only per­
tain to this consciousness principle. It has been said 1 7 : «From me derive
memory, knowledge, exclusion». - 7 -

this i s what the present karika i s about) and as Ipyy [ p . 243 underl ines (a­
dhv(/v(/silval/u1Ira.v)'a rtll'al!1 d17,l'ilall/ . tadd\'(lrc(/(/ III SlIlrtvadhya\'ilsilyasycli) through
the confutation of this conception of the adhY(/\'(Jsciyo in genera l . the form in whieh
i t operates i n the ambit of memory is also confuted. If the object is illuminatcd by
it, thell one cannot define i t crror; if it is not i l l u m i nated, then this means that
memory does not have access to thc objcet and thereforc i t docs not make sense to
speak of 'similarity'.
I The (/(/II),(/\'(I.I'I/.\'o is on the one hand i nsentient (as regards its actual not com­
ing into contact with the object, its being hlm/llli) , and on the other sentient as
regards its sci f-awareness. But only thc first aspcct is significant in this case,
1 .1 14
Th is point is made clear in a passage from thc [PYV ( l p. 243) , which due See Torella 1 9X X : 1 60-66.
15
to its importance and elarity I have quoted in full (sec text notc 1 4 1 ). The (ldhwlI'(lS(/)'1I It continues from the preceding karikil.
: 16
is i nsenticnt insofar as it docs not i l l um inate the object it aims at determi l; ing . I f i t Cf. Ipyy [ p. 276. The i m pl ication of the opponents' theses is recogni zed as
does not i l l u m inate t h e external object (othcrwisc it would b e no di fferent from direct untcnable (I/edycj j(/I/(fslliilifl) and it is this untenabi l ity that leads to the confirma­
cxpericnee) and neither can it be said that it docs not i l l u m i nate at all (otherw isc it tion of what they sought to deny (prasmigal'iparyaya), i .e. the Self as the subject of
would s i m ply be jW/a), nonctheless, it is acknowlcdged that at least it i l luminates i t­ knowledge and act ion, u nifier and coordi nator of the d iscontinu i ty of rcality. Con­
sel f and its own ideat ion. But even this is not suffic ient for it to cause the deter­ sciousness is thc u n i fication of cogni t ions both in the sense of 'becoming one'
m ination of cxternal objects, becausc precisely as regards thc latter (and it is this (ek7/JlwwlIIa) and of 'making one' (ck7kara(w). 'merging together' (mic�rlkara(w). In
that counts hcre) it i s inscnticnt. All this criticism of the ((dh\,((v(/.w/ \,(/ aims at reduc­ the 1'1'lii a/ll/sm!ldhel/la and ciliallWllI1 arc in a relation of sc7l1/clllc7dhikaral.lya since
ing its signi ficance in the phenomenon of memory, with i he ult imate purpose of action and the subject of the action arc in reality thc same (YI/klam eva abliedella
making way for the admission of another principle that may cons istently explain the I/f!acar(//.I (//!I kriyakarlrob paramcirlhala aikyat). See Tore l l a 1 98 8 : 1 66-67.
17
point, i.e. thc self, as we shall sec later. Bhagavadg l/(/ XV, 1 5 .

1 02 1 03

1 4. 1
CHAPTER IV
1 . The Free One (svairI), the perceiver of the object formerly per­
ceived, continuing also to exist latel� has the reflective awareness: 'that'.
This is what is called 'remembering'.
_ �
The light-perception of the o ject formerly perceiv�d is n�t extin­
guished [at the moment of memory ], since he [the knowm� subject, the
.
Lord] also continues to exist later as the perceIver of the object fo�er y
perceived. Having here (atra)2 a reflective awareness of an ob� ect III
terms of 'that' - as formerly perceived - on the part of he who IS one,
the Lord (vibhu/:l), agent, is the function called 'memory'. - 1 -
(svakale), either as a single manifestation 'jar' or as the totality of its 1 4.2
components (akhilatmana).
- Thanks to the power of memory (smrtisaktyii) the subject, when
having a reflective awareness (pariimrsan) as 'that' of the particular en­
tity formerly perceived, must make it manifest [in the present]
(iibhiisayaty eva)5, for there could be no reflective awareness of an ob­
ject made manifest [only in the past] (prakiisitasya)6; and this manifesta­
tion occurs at the very moment of the act of remembering (svasattiikiila
eva). Therefore it is not erroneous to state that there is the manifestation
at the moment of the memory, of an object, which, however, is no longe;
present at that moment. At certain times the object appears in the form
� of a single manifestation7, i.e. limited to one of the many manifestations
that constitute it, such as - in the case of a jar - 'jar', 'golden', 'individual
substance', 'existence' etc., depending on the subject's intentions 8 . In these
cases its manifestation in memory is distinct and vivid (sphutaO)9. At

2. [He who remembers] must necessarily, having a reflective aware­

ness of (amp§an) the particular entity (svalak�a1).arp.) 3 formerly made from it (paramar.sana/ll ca praklisanantar7yakam) . The question this karikli is meant
manifest, make it manifest4 at the actual moment of the memory to :mswer is pn:cisely how to bri�ge the gap between the prakasa of the object _

WhICh occurred m the past, at the tIme of the former perception) - and its paramar.sa'
being effected now by memory.
Yogasutra I. 1 1 anubhutavi�ayasam-
� .In the sense that making the object manifest in the present is the necessary
1 Cf. the classical definition of memory in c�nditIOn . for the memory to be such. abhasayaty eva glosses abhasayet; therefore
pl'amo�al; smrtil;. . , . . thIS �pta�IV� IS. to be und rstood in the sense of niyoga (cf. IpV I p. 1 6 1 ).
dmg �o Abh. � . mtelflretatIOn . �IS supported by Abh.'s argument (see text note 1 60). Cfr.
2 I.e. in the present limited condition, at least accormory IS th�s SI:ra _hImself as ThIS mterpretatIOn
ct of m� .
which is, in tum, based on the flka. The subje a. ThIS IS unde rlll�ed m IPVV II p. n. 4.
had already been suggested in the previous
kal'ik
m uktam , tadanusarelJa flk�yam apl. an
, �?
13, 7 Th
� singl� abhasa in the memory is only single relatively speaking, i.e. it is
1 1 sutravrttyor bhagavatal; smartrtva mean perva der , vlvld ha/ll not combmed WIth other abhas�s suc� as 'golden' etc. In actual fact, due to the very
ly taken to
where it is excluded that vibhu may be simp am . . The phenomenon of memory, nature of memory, the connectIOn WIth the abhasa 'time' is inevitable and this is
vibhu tvam , na tu iha vyap akatv . sufficient in itself to make it svalak�alJa and in this sense sphuta (cf. trv I p. 1 59
krtva bhavafiti
ct Siva , t�e �upr eme Consciousness, must neces­
though having as its ultimate subje �bh�santaravya� isrG/Jabhave 'pi tll klilabhasaSal'(lbhedenaiva svalak�alJyG/!1 tasya
It WOUld. n�t make sense t� speak of
sarily occur on the individual plane , otherWIse And thIS IS what th.e vrtfl refers to abhasasya karofl klilasakter eva bhedakatvat iti vak0iate / evam lavat svalaksan7bhavah
"
...
a before and after of a perceived object, etc note 157) « ... functIOn
.

of the Lord praktanadehabhasasacivyadYlIditaklilabhasayojanaya ghatabhasasya iti).

with atra, which is glossed in Ipvv (see
text
body, the phys
.

Ical body etc. ;> and at

: This theme is extensively developed later (II 2. 5-7).
contracted in the breath of life, the eightfold samaropitasvatantrya, whIch glos­ The readings of the MSS oscillate between sphllta and asphllta and, at first
sion .
greater length ibid, p. 1 1 , where the �xpres SIght, there seem to be arguments in defence of both. In fact, in the nkli the
ses atra in the aka, is cited and explamed. space �d manifestation of an object in the form of samanya is said to be asphllta. B�t this is
3 The obje�t of memory
is the svalak�alJa, or the ind�vi.dual e.ntity in so as regards the so-called independent vikalpas, whereas we have seen that for
ly an assoc IatIOn WIt? a form er_ tIme
time. In memory, in fact, there is necessari but a gene ra vl�alpa (�f. IPVV �emory t�e cas� is different. The flkli goes on to say that in general many samanyas,
.
d be no mem ory �
and place, otherwise there woul . tra/ll tat m combmmg WIth one another, mutually delimit each other and thus may be said
'vasyal1J sphurau / anyatha vlkalpama
II p. 1 9 smrtau hi pragddaklilayogo to become sphllta, and, once they have been further delimited by the abhasas of
bhavet). -�VV II p. space etc., they finally give rise to the svalak�G/,1as. It is true that the case in ques­
fact, there would be no paramarsa, but - . as .
- ,

4 Without prakasa, in tIon concerns a smgle abhasa, but its status in memory is a particular one, as has
immediately follow prak lisa, bemg mseparable
18 remarks - the latter should also

1 05
1 04
1 4.2 other times, on the contrary (anyada tIl ) , the object appears in its totali ty ,
since this is the subject's intention: i t s manifestation is equally distinct
and vivid (tathaiva), as i n the previous case l O . And finally, the subject
whose mind is intensely concentrated without interruption even directly
visualizes the object formerly perceived (dr,I'{arthaO) I I . - 2
3 . It \\'ould /lot be possiblc to speak (�( the lII a ni(estation (�( the ob­
; fore a unity of the distinct cognitions such as direct perception, memory
ject being relllembered i( it appeared as separate .Iimll the mClI/o ry 1 2
just been said. Moreover, the (lka adds, the scllllclllya even when taken s ingly may
be sphilfa (compared to others). when i t implicitly contains other broader and more
generic sclm(jllyas (e.g. the sil/l/(/IIYu of the dha \'(/ tree, compared to the salllelllYo o f
tree in genera l ) . S e e Tore l l a 1 9RR: 1 (1)-70. The eoncept of a h ierarchy of selmiillyas
as regards their extension probably steill s from l i nguistic specu lation.
10
In IPY I p . 1 60 the degree of sflhllla f\'(/ i n this case (where there is a com­
bination of d i fferent a/JI/(/slIs) is eonsidered greater than the former: i .e. it is ali­
splrllfil.
II
I t is the case that ihid. p . 1 60 is defined afYllll laspllllfa, Ipyy I I p . 29, fol ­
lowing t h e (lkcl, considers it implicit in t h e expression akhi/a(III(/II(/ in the kiil'ika,
that would therefore he understood as referring in the hroad sense to a Illult i pl icity
of ilhhc7s([s (hillil'iih//(/SO{JII/llk,wlI/wlI) and with a further di lTerentiation within i t
(silll/agm(l'iI a n d aSlll//(/gra(l'a), Thus t h e ob ject w o u l d appear in t h e memory as a
combination of many ahllii.l'(fs: when the latter do not cover the whole (a.\'wllagl'll­
( I'U) of the object this is the intermediate level ( i ntroduced in the l'(lli by ullyada
(II); when, on the olher hand, the object is recalled in the tota lity of its aspects, the
memory is so v i v i d that it closely borders on the d i rect perception from which it
di ffers only in thc fact thaI its object is a thing 'already' seen, The expression
d/',I'la/'llw d istingu ishes this from other forms in which the object v isualized had not
bccn previously seen but ex perienced in various ways through the revelation of the
scriptures. as in the case or the v isual ization of deities etc ,
12
I n other words. i f t h e objcct appeared a s external t o and distinct from the
memory (Ipy I p , 1 63 hliilll/a(l'ellii /Jilhirtipo{uyii) . then the requirements for direct
perception and not for memory would exist. The object is present in the memory
only through the m an i festation of the fortner perccption, but it is only in it, i,e, in
the past (tada) , that the ob ject halli/' {/ I'ahl/(lsalc, What is man i fested in the present
is only the reflecti ve awareness ( l 'iIllO/',\'(//W), See A bh,\ lucid formulation of the
question in IPY Y , which may serve as a general definit ion of memory aceord ing to
the Pratyabh i jfHi: pfi/'l'adrs!((lail'a ,1'([ I'illl([/',va san idl7I1II1((//wI'ill/a/',\:ohhtllllil}(lli(ii sa i(i
I'illl((/',\-({ /lCI'ole ( II p, 30), This stanw actually shows how the apparent inconsisten­
cy between a ( present) I'illla/',\:(JI/(/ and a ( past) {/lIIlhl/(/l'(/ is only resolved by the I
which ensures the possi bil ity of unifying the various cogn it ions occurring at di fferent
ti mes, A further clari ficat ion is provided by IPYY II p. 32, The fimkc/,i'a concem ing
the parl -object (({/'llidl/l,I'e) in the fortner perception belongs to I he past ; but the
pmkll,\a as grasped by the l'illlar.V a , concern ing the part-sel f ( .I'I'c7(IIIIII!I,I'(' ) , is not
1 06
therefore the lInity of cognitions that OCCllr at different times IS neces- 1 4.3
sary, and this Ilnity is precisely the knowing subject.
- And the object fonnerly perceived, manifesting itself together with
the perception in the present 'light' of the memory (tatkalikasmrtiprakase)
(directed at that past time), is necessarily not separate from the memory,
since that which is separate from the light cannot shine. There is there­
etc. and this unity is constituted by the self, the knowing subject. To
elaborate: 3 -
4,In fact, in memory the former perception is not mamfested
separately - like the o'�iect - since it appears as resting 011 the self, as
the expression 'I perceived in the past ' indicates.
- In memory the former perception - unlike what happens to the per­
ceived object that is remembered D - is not manifested as separate (dif­
ferentiated) , since it is the self itself that is manifested - the object of
the notion T - whose essence is informed by this perception. And it is
precisely that reality present at many different times, known as '1', that
is the self.
l i m i ted by time (katallill'accitillllil cva ) . Thus the I'il/wr,i'a in the memory can connect
itsel f with the villlor.l'(/ in the pcrception and, through it, with the former light of the
object - in this way meet ing both requirements, that is, taking p l ace in the present
and not being di vorced from /1/'(/kc7,\:(/ (t1l1l1lc7l1lariyakm'imadasahila!1 p{lllar I'imadas
I{I idalllll lalla!I),
1 .1 In the perception the object appeared duc to the power of maya as if it
were separate, external to consciousness, Th is may not happen i n the memory for
otherwise it would not be memory (IP Y Y I[ p. 34 slllara�l(Jlilil'lI 1/(/ hhavc(); in fact,
the l ight of memory embraces, so-to-speak, the object llluch more strongl y (ihid.
ar(halll ali(alll{/I!I krodTkaro(i), However, this is true only to a certain extent: the
assumption of external ity - in the form of residual traces, as a shadow (ibid,
('I/(7\,{/IIIc7lre�lll) - continues to exist ( p . 32 prlliaghhcll'aprak(7.\:(/hlrilll(//Io '1II1varlale),
remaining in the object remembered i n the background. I n underl ining t h i s, Utp, also
impl icitly draws a sharp distinction between the 'external' thing, on the one hanel,
and perception, on the other: u n l i ke the thing, the latter can never be objecti fied (sec
nexI kiirikc7) , Thus those who think they can do w ithout the I as the u n i fier of
d i fferent cogni tions, by claiming that memory has access to its object simply by
embodying ( i,e. objectify i ng) the former perception of it, are m istaken. I n IPY I p,
1 67 Abh, gives an interpretation of the example concerning the status o f the object
(arlllo\'(11 in the kc7rik(7) both as sadhartllYoo and l'aidlwf'myad!\I'fclllla ; neither of them
rel'lects the interpretation found in the vrlti,
1 07
 5 . The cognitions [of othersl are not man{fested [as an object] even
1 4.5
in that particular cognition belonging to the )'ogins. The ollly means of
knowing them is se(f-awareness. What has just been stated also applies
If they are acknowledged as an ol�iect (�f cognition (meyapade 'pi va).
For the omniscients, too, the cognitions belonging to other subjects
- which can be known only through self-awareness 1 4 must always be
manifested as resting on their own self (sl'Cltmaf'll(lIu/ eva); and, there­
fore, what in reality occurs (tattvalll) is the identification on the part of
the yogins w ith the self of others l 5 (paratll1atapattir eva). Should one at­
tribute [to the cognitions of others] the nature of cognizable object
(prameyakak;,yc7yc7l1l api) such as the jar etc . , they would have to be
manifested each in its own form of pure awareness C�l/ddhabodhc7tflla lla
"fi{Je�/(/), whereas that is impossible 1 6 . 5 -
1 4 I .e. that i ntrospective awareness that onc has of every cognition or that every
cogn i t ion has of itsel f. This posi t ion had also been accepted by B hartrhari; see the
last four verses o f the Jmisalllllddc,{:(/, in part i c u l ar v. 1 06 yi/lhii jyolib prakcHclli/
lliillyclldhhipraka.lyalc I jiir7f1clkaras lalhallycllo 1/(/ jllc7f1cllopagrhYi/IC (Abh. quotes
this verse in another section of the Iryy giv ing a sl ightly d i fferent read ing of the
second hemistich: jlliillarfi{J(}f!1 Imha j,Wllc nclnyalrahhip/'{/kiI\:yalc) 'Just as l ight is
not i l l u m inated by another l ight, in the same way, the form of cogn i t ion is not
determ ined by another cognit ion' (trans! . Iyer 1 97 1 : (2) and v. 1 1 0 yalo "i,wyaril{Jcfla
jii!/II(//,/IPW!I lIa grhyalc I arlha/'llp(/\,ivikl(l/!I ('(l sl 'an/pilI!1 lliimdhiiryalc II 'As the
form of the knowledge is not cognized as an object, its form as distinct from that
of the object is not grasped' (trans\. I ycr 1 97 1 : (3). See also Helaraja's lucid
commentary. For a penetrating analysis of the various theories about 'knowledge of
knowled!.';e' I refcr to Mati lal 1 986: 1 4 1 1 79 .
1 5 Ti lis is the most obvious mean ing of the text of the \'I·lIi. According to A bh .'s
interpretation (IrYY II p. 47, sec text note 1 89), who in turn takes this from the {Ikil.
10111'(1111 is 'the being such of the omn isc ient' (mentioned at the beginning of the "rlli),
meaning the condition of subject identi fied with the S upreme I (parc7ll11a \,edaka(\'(/III ) ;
thus the mean ing of the sentence would be the fol lowing: 'the condition of su bject
identi fied with the Supreme I , pertaining to thcse yogins, means in point of faet the
attai nment o f identi fication with the sel f o f others.' On the yogin's cogn ition o f other
m i nds see Dharmaki rti's Sall/(]lIc1ntara.l'iddhi vv. 89-93 (Stc herbatsky 1 %9 : 89-92,
Ki tagawa 1 95 5 : 1 08- 1 0) .
1 6 The nature of every cogn it ion is i ll the final analysis ,vuddhalJOdhil and it
should appear in this form to the yogin's eogn ition: but preeisely this is i m poss ible,
beeause descending to the condition of ved\,(/ necessarily entails the flawing of :illd­
dh(J(1'i/ (see l PYY II p. 52 .\WI.I'lIIill Sl'i/Slllill dar.I·(/l/c yad('.\'(// ! I !Jodllilsya ,\'lIddhw!1
nipillll
• . . . 11(1 fiidri
i(//!I lI iruparc7gw!1 l'edvataf!1 p(//'{/cillajiiallc 'hhyeti; c f. also IPY I
p. 1 83 J. A s i m i l ar remark is made by Helarnja. commenting on YP I l L I . I 09 : cr.
1 08
6.The memory l 7 expressed as 'thus that cognition occurred in me' is 1 4.6
none other than an analysis (vyakaraI)am) in terms of differentiation of
IS
the memory expressed as '[that thing] was seen by me' .
- The memory presented as 'thus that perception OCCUlTed in me', i n
which the cognition i s mentioned separately, is nothing more than the
analytic exposition of the memory understood as ' [that thing] was seen
by me', which is characterized precisely by having a reflective awareness
of the visual perception as residing in the knowing subject. - 6 -
7 . Determinate cognition (avasa) too, in the form of '[ see this' or
'this is a jar' regards (manyate) the visual perceptioll as beillg indissolub­
ly inherent ill the sulJject of the determinate cognition (avasatari) 19 .
- Also in the detelminate cognition of the object i n front of one
whether it appears in the form 'I see this jar' or 'this is a j ar' the v i sual
Prak7r(wkaprakc7..ia I pp. I 03-4 gha{c�jfWnalll iii III jl1c7nm!1 lIa jt1ilnart7pc7nllpilli, ya(o
gha{qjt1anagal(//!1 vi,mym!1 n irfipya jt7allanlpa'll kimapi (ad i(y c(ilvad yadi parm!1
lI inlpayilllf!1 :iaklloli, na III .I'd tadlya hodlwrilpatcl (asya pralibhilsate parasm!lve­
dalla iva «But the cogni t ion ' [T h i s i s ] the cognitio n o f a j ar ' does not come after
the form of the cognition [ ' Th i s is a jar ' ] . for, having brought to the i ntellect the
object in the cogni t ion of the jar, it can at the most bring to the i ntellect ' that i s
some form of cogn i t ion ' ; t h e awareness character [hodhan/pata] o f t h a t [cogni tion,
namely ' Th i s i s a j ar ' ] i s not retleeted in i t as i n the case of somebody else's
cognition.» (tran s \ . A k l uj kar 1 970: 1 79).
17 This kc7rikd aims at confuting anyone who might s t i l l wish to claim, in
presenting the memory as 'I remember having had this perception', that the percep­
t ion appears as the object in the memory (cf. Try I p. 1 77 ) .
1 8 Abh . (TrY . I p. 1 82) also poi nts out a d ifferent interpretation of the karika,
supported by 'others' (allYc Ill), but he keeps to that of the l'rtti.
1 9 Thi s kc7rika is in reply to the hypothetical objector who might seek to in­
val idate the principle of the non-objeetifiab i l i ty of cognition (applied here to memory
in order to show the need for the I as the fundamental reali ty ) , by claiming that the
determinate cognition (adhyal'Llsc7ya, vika!pa) that follows the undifferentiated per­
ception (llirvika!pa) knows the latter as object (ef. Try I p . 1 86, Ipvy II p . 54). I t
must b e remembered that the adhyavasc/ya plays a n essential role i n memory, be­
cause memory is not l in ked directly to the anllhhava itself, but to the Clllllbhava as
filtered and determi ned by the adhyavasaya; indeed there is no memory of an CllIll­
hhava not followed by adhya\'asc7ya (IrYY II p. 54 avika!pi(c SmarCl(I(ISaf!lhhavclt).
The criticism levelled at the adhyavasclya therefore const itutes both an analogical
and a direct criticism o f memory .
1 09
14.7 perception one becomes aware of (pratyavamr.(vate) has the knowing
subject as i ts constitutive reality20 . - 7 -
8 . Ther(fore , when there is the reflective awareness 'that is seen by
me, that was seen by lIIe', 'this', 'that', the two clements though divided
into perceivil/g su/)ject and perceived object are man(t'ested within the
{true] cognizer (pramatari).
- There fore in memory or in generic mental elaboration (vikal-
pamiUre) 2 1 which both presuppose the reflective awareness of a former
perception only the 'object' part in the form of 'this' or 'that' may be
expressly mentioned, even without being intermixed with the word 'per­
ception' (drksahdc711I1Vedlzm!1 vinclpi). Nonetheless, in all cases, the per­
ceiving subject and the perceived object, though 22 they appear to be
separate due to the in fluence of maya. are man i fested as absorbed within
the one cognizer. - 8 -
20
The 'I' that is the subject of the determ inate eoglllt loll is that same T that
constitutes the centre of the allllhlw\'(/. even if the latter may be sllch that the \ docs
not appear in it ('this is a jar' as opposed to '\ see this j ar'). But the absence of the
I is only apparent and does not eOnCeITI the al1l1h/z(/\'a in itsel f but a part icular aspect
of the following adhy(/ \'(/s!.iya. which, depending on the circumstances, may stress
the objective ( i .e. when one is intent OJI bringing about some practical activity con­
nected with it) or the sUbject i ve element (ef. Ipv \ pp. 1 87-8).
21
I .e . in t h e determ inate cognition (lIdhy([\'{/.w/\,lI) that follows t h e d i rect
'
pcrception. In the cOJlstruction I have followed A bh.'s i r;d ications (see text note 2(2).
22
Utp., unl ike Abh. (see text note 2(7 ), assigns api a d i fferent place from the
one i t Occul�ies i n the kc7rikii. The separateness o f the percei ver and the percei ved -
Abh. says ( I PVV I I p. 58) deVeloping Utp.'s remark in the (ika is only apparent
as the very lise of the dual form shows. On the basi s of the .I'aitm'il'ak,l'(/ prineiple,
in grc7ityagf'(/lwkatc7bhilllli./I' arthall each term refers both to itself and the other; they
are interdependent (anyollyc7pek.,\'(/II) . For the analysis of a s i m i lar use of this
gramll1at ical argument see Torella 1 <)8 7 : 1 54- 1 57 .
1 10
1 5. 1
CHAPTER V
1 . The o�jects that are man(t'ested in the present can be man(t'ested
as external only (( they reside within .
- Even in direct perception I , however2, the manifestation of objects
as separate" is admissible only if they are absorbed in the cognizer
(praflultrantartinclllclm ) 4 . 1-
2 . I( it were not essentially light, the ol�ject wOl/ld remain non-light
as be(ore) .. and the light is not d(ft'erentiated [t'rom the ol�ject] ,' being
light constitutes the very essence (�t' the ol�ject.
I In this the man i festation of the object is present, unlike in memory etc., in
which the direct presence of the object has vanished.
2 The reference is to an i m p l i c i t objection to which this kc7rika is i ntended as a
reply (cL TpV I p . 1 95 . Tpvv I I pp. 67-8 ) . I f it has been said that i n direct pereep­
t ion the object appears as external, d i fferentiated from the knowing subject, and that
in memory (and also in I'ika/pa ete.) it appears in union w i th i t , h o w is it possible
to claim the dependence of the l atter on the for mer'? Indeed, this k(lrika establishes
the sense in which the 'external ity' of the object in direct perception is to be under­
stood .
.1 Separate from the mayie cognizer, identified with the m ind, the body etc.
,I The only true cognizer in the absolute sense (paramarl/wpmmc7tr, TpV I p.
1 (7), i .e. the Supreme Consciousness.
5 An object that i s external to consc iousness does not exist at a l l , since i t would
be ja(/a and what i s ja(/a cannot s hine in knowledge; cf. SO IV .29-3 1 , V . 1 2 etc. This
princi p le, w h ich often recurs i n V ij fi anavada texts, has a lucid and synthetical
formulation in a verse of Prajfiakaragupta ' s Pralll(/�/(/\'(/rllikcl/W!lkc7m (quoted in TBh
p. 35) yadi ,1'w!II'edyale I17/W!1 kali1(1f!1 bc7hyw!1 lad IIcyale / 11(1 eet sClI!II'edyale 1171(//!1
kalh(lf!1 hahY(//!1 lad lIeyale « I f blue is percei ved, then how can it be called
' external "? And, if i t is not perceived, how can it be called ' external "?»; see also TS
1 998 IT., etc. Furthermore, the V i jfianavadin says, blue and cogn i tion of blue are
never perceived separately (.I'a/w{Ja/al/lhli a ) ; therefore, they are non-different. Cf. the
wel l - known passage from the PVin (1.55ab; Steinkellner 1 <)72: 206) sa/wpalam­
/Jhal1iyallu/d ahi1edo n Tlataddh iY0(1, also quoted by Abh. (IpVV II p. 7 8 ) . For a
comprehensive treatment of the i n ference based on sallOpalambhaniyama, see Iwata
I <)9 1 . Among the many examples i n monistic ,f;a;v(l texts e f. the verse from the lost
Uccilll,l'mahilai/'(/ \'(, (cit. SSV p . 4) yi/vall / /(/ vedaka ell' Iclvad vedyc/(1 kalh(//?/ priye
I I I
1 5.2 - I f it did not have l ight, i.e. the cognizer, as its own nature, the jar,
just as i t was not manifest [to the cognizer1 at first, would continue not
to be so even at the moment o f cognition. What constitutes the object's
being manifest (prah7,�amlinaNj) is light insofar as it is its own form (sva­
riipabhlltab) and not a separate reality 6 . - 2
3 . [{ light were llndUlerentiated {ill itsclt7 and d(fferelltiatcd /.fi"Ofll ob­
jects/, thell objective reality would be CO/1{used. The ()/�ject that is il­
luminated must itsel{ be light,' that which is not light call/ lOt he es­
tablished.
Light, conceived as absolutely undi fferentiated [as regards itself]
(prak(is'alll([trm!lf and as di fferentiated from the object would be com­
mon to all objectsH. In this case the delimitation of objects ('this is the
light-cogni tion of a jar ; this other, of a piece of material') would have
no plausible grounds. Therefore, the establ ishment (siddhifz) of the object
depends on its essence being light (prak([,\�([tnzatiiyattii). - 3
4. {O/�iection t Since consciousness-light (bodhasya) beillg lIfldU�
ferentiated cannot be the ca/lse ()( a lIIultirorm IIwnUcstation , all this
I l'cdaklll!1 l'('dyalll ekill!l III /al/\,(//!I /l(lsty (),\'lIcis (({Ialz II. Sec also SPr 1 . 1 2
1\,(/(!allllakoll'(//!1 hhc7\'(///(II!1 l'im(/allii no kcc(lII(I I yal prakii.lyada.l:(7),iil() lIaprakil.�afl
praka.l'lIll' II; etc.
f > In rormulating the Saiva position, Utp. is impl icitly critical particularly of the
Buddhist and KUll1arila theses. According to the Buddhists (k,\,(I�likil\'(7dill) the
man i festation ( perception) of the objcct is understood as a 'luminous' moment
produced in a chain of moments, e.g. o r a jar a luminous moment determined by
a concurrence of causes, such as the operation o f the sense of sight, l ight etc. For
Kutllarila, on the contrary, an added qual ity, 'being mani fest' (praka(ala) occurs in
the object, from whose presence a fonner cognitive act i s i n ferrecl. I n both cases the
light is not separate as Utp, also maintains but it is found, so to speak, com­
pletely resolved within the object (IPYY II p. 69 (I/"I!z(/.\'0/"7/"{/II/(/glla(1) and one is un­
able to unclerstand how a thing can be cognized only by some and not by others.
According to Utp. there is an i l l uminat ion of the thing (whose essence is l ight) by
the l ight o f the subject.
7 c r. text note 2 1 6 .
H I .e. i t would i l l u m inate all objects indiscriminately.
IJ The preced ing argulllentatioJls may lead to a Y lj iianavad in-l i ke conception. In
order to underm ine this, Utp, temporarily opposes i t with the SautrUntika criticism
(wh ich he agrees with u p to a point, at least with the motives ror it) and in this con­
text presents their doctrine known, at least in later sources, as ill/l/llIcYilhahya/"llw-
1 12
variolls mall({estation lacking ill all apparent calise (akasmikaO) leads to 1 5.4
the illference of al/ external object {as its only possih/e cause].
The establishment of the being of insentient reali ties is merely their
becoming mani fest (abhasamanataiva) , and this is precisely h av i ng
mani festation as their essence (abhasatmataiva). Their true reali ty , there­
fore, l ies in the one pure consciousness. The gradually changing manifesta­
tion of objects which occurs though there is no diversity in the latter in­
duces one to hypothesize an extemal object, d i fferent from consciousness
(tato 'nyanz), not shining (apraka,�amallam), as the cause. This reasoning is
analogous to that which establishes the existence of the senses to. - 4 -
5 . Not even a varied reawakening (�f the karmic residual traces can
he taken to he tlze calise [of the multiform manifestations}, for in that
vada (Sa/"v(/siddhclllla,wlI!lgraha Y .2ab s(lulrc7l1tikallla(e ni(yo [0 (//!I?J bc7hyar(has tv
al/llllllyall', 7ab vi,myatl'(Jf!1 hi hetutv(Jf!1 jl7clllclkclrall)(l�wk,mllli; TBh p . 36 arthasya
svan7pe�/(/ l/c7sli ),l'dall m!1 'bhc7ktm!l syc7d arthavcdall am' iii vacanc71; S DS p . 94 (Jf/ll­
II/C)'(//!I satyam ity clslhitclll \'z;lic)'am allllIllC),(lm iIi). The blihyc7/"thc7l1l1meyaw7da as
upheld by B adhanta SUbhagupta i s mentioned and criticised i n TS vv. 2050-5 5 . I f
consciousness i s ahhinlla, a s the Y ij n anavadins claim, and no other cause can con­
v incingly explain the emergence from it of the various d ifferentiated images that
constitute phenomenal reality, all that remains is to hypothesi ze the e x istence of ex­
ternal objects as the source (bimba) of the reflection (pratibimba) present in con­
sciousness. The existence o f the external object is strictly speaking only i n ferable
(llilyallllmcj'(/(I; on the proof by the method of vyalireka see T B h p . 3 5 ) , not
d irectly perceivable, as it i s in Yaibha�ika conception: i n cognition only c7kclras figure.
Mok0akaragupta summarizes the v ariolls positions as regards the rea lity of external
object as fol lows (TBh p . 36): yi' ' pi ladc7ramh/iakc7(1 paramc7�wvo vai,�e,vikclnclm,
.wlk,vc/dadhyak,mgllcarc7 vaihha,I'ikallc7!!1 dar.l·alll', .1·vc7ldirasalll(/fpa�/(/prava�Ic7(1 sall(rc7l1li­
kiina!!1 lIIalc, Ic ' pi yogc7('arc7�1c71!1 dar.I:(/lIl' lIa s([I/lbl/(/vanti; see also S DS p. 35 Ie ca
madl,)'alllika-yogc/('c7ra-salltrc7ntika-l'aiiJ//(I,l'ikasallyl1c7bhi�1 prasiddlla hallddllc7�1 yalhakra­
IIlal!1 sarva.vi/nyalwl-bc7llya,·tha.I:i/,I)'atva-ba!zyc7rllla,lllllll'yatvahc711yc7rlhapratyak,vatva­
widall cIIi,I'(lwIIIC. (In Sautrantika epistemology this is to be understood i n the sense
that the thing, the absolute particular that is the object and cause of the direct per­
ception, is ( i m perfectly) cognizable only through the filtered i mage of discursive
thought alllllll(/lla in the broadest sense -: i f, on the one hand, there i s absolute
otherness between the thing and its mental image which is sc7mclllya in nature there
is, nonetheless, an undeniable coordination, too: the one is the cause of the other).
Sautrantika criticism docs not succeed in undermining the Y ij ii anavadi n position, but
serves to show the need for a more coherent and comprehensive conception, which
is represented preci sely by the deri n i tive conclusion (siddhelllta) of the Saiva doctrine.
1 0 I ndeed we do not perceive the senses d irect l y but we i n fer their e x istence
from the existence of cogn i tion, which only occurs through them (ef. below I . 5. 8.).
1 13
1 5.5 casc a ncw qucstion would arisc: what is the callse of the variety of' slich
a reawakening ?
- The varied reawakening of the karmic residual traces does not
occur outside consciousness; also what might be the cause of this
reawaken ing i s not seen. Consequently the cause of differentiated
manifestations cannot be anything but the external object I I . - 5
6.That lIIay be (syad etad) 1 2 . [BlIt] seeing that ordinary worldly ac­
tivity call he accomplished 011 the hasis ()l slIch 'manilestatiolls' alolle ,
what sense is thcre i n wallting to rcsort t o an external reality other {thall
cOllsciollSIlCSS] , which is /lot sllpported hy reason ?
Ord inary human activity takes place through objects prec isel y in­
sofar as they are manifested (dblzclsanulflair c I 'drthaif/). So what harm
cou ld there be in considering them essentially 'manifestat ions' (clh/{(lsaO)
and nothing more L l? In which case there is no longer any need to resort
to an external object, since they alone are suffic ient to ensure the com­
plete funct ioning of practical real ity (tciI'aW lokayatrdsamdptefl).
Furthermore 1 4 , the external object is contradicted by the criteria of right
II
The argumentation of those who claim the existence of external objects con­
tillues with the reply to the ex pected V ijfianavildin objection. A detailed account of
the argulllents set forth by the two opponents ( V ijiianavad i n ' s l'iisallc7l'oicitrya and
Sautrun tika ' s pmtyay{/\'(/icitrya) is to be found in S DS pp. XO-X4; Vacaspatil11isra
also refers to them in the BhCifllall and 'f'iitparyadipikii ( La Val lee Poussin 1 90 1 : 1 90,
n. 1 1 4).
12
At this point the author takes u p the di scuss ioll in the first person (but the
same thesis with the same arguments m ight also be put forward by a V ijfiunavadin),
after having voiced the opposing theses of the hiih w/rtha\'(/dill.l'. Abh. secs two pos­
sible interpretations of the expression syild etad: the partial ac knowledgement of the
opposing theses and then the exposition of his own, introduced by a killltll that is
to be understood; or the silllple add ition to the adversary's thesis of another even
more convincing one, his own (the l'(lIi gives the latter interpretation) . But, as can
be seen, the general mean ing remains the same.
1 .1
I t is understood b y this that the external ob jects themselves 'inferred' precise­
ly as such i.e. illum inated, brought to consciousness through i n ference - arc in­
separable from the l ight o r consciousness which is their essence; for if they were
outside it, there would be no knowledge of them (cf. I. 5. 9 . ) . This implication is
taken u p and developed by Abh. (IPV I , p. 222) .
14
A fter the fundamental negative reason given in the previolls lines, additional
reasons (ahhYliccayahddl/(/ka) are put forward. Utp. ' s remarks are the same as those
a Vijfiilnavadin might make; c f. Vi'II.I-Olikii 1 1 - 1 5 and 1'!,lIi, Sth iramat i ' s hhc7,I),O on
1 14
cognition (pramii�zabiidlzitafz): this is so if i t i s considered as having parts, 1 5.6
since this would res u l t i n attributing t o i t contrasting quali ties etc.; if i t
i s considered as devoid of parts i t i s still contradicted i n v arious ways
(bahldaM, because it is simultaneously i n contact with the six directions
of space, etc. 1 5 - 6 -
Tri,!I.I'ikii I , Alolllballap(I/'ik,l'cl 1 -5 etc. Particularly exemplary is the argumentation i n
Vit!I.�atiUi, often taken u p again by later authors (ef. Mok�akaragupta's T B h , S D S
etc. ; see also L e v i 1 932: p . 5 2 note 2 ) and, implic i tl y , also referred to by Utp.
Vif!l.�atikc7 I I reads: lIa tad efallll lIa celllekm!1 l'i,\'aya(i paramc7(llIsa(i I l1a ca te
SOI!iI/(//(1 yasnult [)(lralllc7/.1l1r lIa sidhyati II «The object is not one; it is not m u ltiple
as composed of many atoms; and i t does not even consist i n these atoms
agglomerated, s ince the atom is not established.» The first thesis belongs to the
Vaise0ikas who consider the object an individual substance (dral'ya), a totality
(avayal'ill) formed by a complex of parts. The B uddhist tradition is unanimous in
rejecting the ([vayavill as a mere mental eostruct (see Mililldapaiiha pp.26-28 (PTS
Ed. ) , SalllYIII!([lIikaya I p . 1 35 (PTS Ed.), TS 555-620 and PmZiikcl, Pal,lQita Asoka's
A l'ayovillif'(lkara(w etc. ) . The second thes is may also be ascribed to the Vaise�ikas
who consider the atoms, imperceptible if taken singly, as being the parts that
const itute the amyavill (cf. TBh p . 36 ye 'pi tadllralllhhakii(i paralllcl(WVO vai.l:e,l'i­
kc7l1alll . . . ). The third thesis is upheld by the Vaibhu�ikas (sec, for example, A K I.35d
saiici{(7 da.l-(/ rapillab Bhii,l'ya: p(/iiCelldriyodh(/tava�l, paiic(Jvi,wY(lb salicitc7b para-
1II(/(IlI.wlIigltc7tal\'(lt) and, in a modified for m , by the Sautrantikas; the Sautrantika
criticism of the Vaibhu::;ika conception is e xpressed in various places in the A KB h .
The V ijfianavada rejects t h e theory of t h e agglomeration of atoms, however
formu lated (sm/caya, swig//(Ita, .1·ollllldc7ya etc. ) ; see b/uI,I'ya on Trif!I.�ikc7 I , Vif?I.�atiUi
1 2- 1 5 and v(l!i, ModltYcllltm'I'/JIIc7ga(ikci p . 2 1 (Stcherbatsky 1 9362: 93-95) . One of the
Abhiclharma passages which lends s upport to this thesis is sw7cit(llallliJall(7b paflca
l'(ill<7nakc7yc7b. This is also quoted by Dignuga ( V(l!i on PS I.4ab; see Hattori 1 968:
XX-X9) who endeavours to show how it is possible for direct perception to have a
group of entities as ob ject while remaining avikalpaka. The same passage is quoted
by M anorathanandin in his commentary on PV III. 1 94, where Dharmaklrt i ' s defence
of Dignaga's controversial statement begins. According to D harmaklrti, arlhc7ntar{l­
hhisolllhalldhai jc7yallte ye ' (I{/\'() 'pare I IIktc7s te swkitds te hi lIilllittw!1 jf1c7l1ajan­
III(///(/b II «Those other atoms which come into being in close relation [ Manoratha­
namlin glosses: ' in c lose proximitY ' 1 to other things [ i.e. atoms] are called ' agglom­
crated ' . They are the cause of the arising of knowledge». In this way Dharmaklrti
tries to show that the agglomeration is not a di fferent thing from the atoms them­
selves. This position, too, expressed from a Sautrantika standpoint, is, however,
altogether unacceptable to a V ijfiunavadin l ike Sthiramati, who conc l udes his
criticism (Bha,l',Ya on Tril!I.l-ika I ) by pointing out the internal contradiction: l1a hi
aswkitc7l'ast/ulta(i saiicitavaSlhaYclf!1 1}(lramcl(lIlnc7I!1 ko.l:cid cltlll(lli.l:aya(i I tasmad
asaiicitaval sw1citc7 api !)(lraliu/(WI'O lIai\'(l/mfliJallalll.
1.0 A critical allusion to the Vaibha�ikas' a(IlIS(//!lcayavclda. If the u ltimate real ity,
the atom (Ji(l/'(lfllcl(llI), has no parts, it is not understood how this can aggregate to
1 15
1 5.7 7 . Indeed, the Consciolls Being, God, like the yogin, independently of
material callses, in virtue of ' His volition alone, renders externally
mal/ifest the multitude of objects that reside within Him l 6 .
- It i s there fore the consciousness-pri nciple alone that, in his sov­
ere i gnty, renders man i fest as external the multi tude of things such as
the jar, cloth etc . , which are spontaneously man i fested as being informed
by his very sel f 1 7 . Since his power is infinite, this external manifestation
o f objective reality takes place through his volition alone without resort­
ing to causes such as clay etc. - 7 -
8 . Neither can olle speak (�f il�ferellce (f the thil/g that is the ol�ject
of this has /lot been formerly directly perceived (anabhatapurve) . This is
also the case as regards the senses, whose direct perception lIIay be said
(0 have occurred through the perception (�l a reality that has the charac­
teristics (�f a calise (hetuvastunal)), sllch as the seed etc. I X
In ference i s an act o f reflected thought (vimar.\'anam) which has as
its object a thing that was formerly man i fest to consciousness and [as
such J is internal to it (p[jrl'al'abhatal/ta�lsthita eva); it occurs on the basis
o f the direct perception of an object invariably concomitant wilh this en­
tilY and involves the l inking [of this entity] with this or that determinate
others, aggregation only being possible through a contact between parts which by
defi n i t ion it docs not possess (sec e.g. Vi,!I.l:a/ikc7 I I ff. and "rlli). Sec also Dignaga's
A/al/liJal/uparTk,\'c7 v v . 1 -5 . In the text Iwhll.va(1 m ight equally well refer to the
previou s pramcJ(whiidhi/a(1.
16
c r. SD I . 44 45ab yogil/cllll icchaya yadwlI/ niillcJrt7popapallitc7 I 1/(/ cclsli
-
.wldhal/a'!! kil!ICill mrdadicc//(II!I l'illcJ pm!Jho(1 1/ /a///(I h/wgal'lldicchail'a /a/I/(7/I'cl/(/
prajilyate; c f. also 1 1 1.35-37.
1 7 .1·l'tl/marfipatayo{wpal// /(/I'ahhasalll. Upapalll/(/o, according to Abh. (lpvv I I
p . 1 46). i s intended to underl ine that this manifestation as Self is not something that
has to be proved. but is itsel f taken for granted and self-evident. Thi s expression i n
t h e text m ay equal ly w e l l refer to ci//a/ivalll: «which is spontaneously man i fe st as
Self» (sec text note 236).
I � Thi s kc7rik<i and the fol lowing one examine i n fe rence, s ince this is used by
the h(lhyc7r/h(/\'(/dill to establish the existence o f the external object. In stating the
inevitable necessity that it should operate on an object w h ich has already been direct­
ly present to consciousness (iiiJhc7ta) and that therefore. as was shown earl ier. is in­
ternal and coessential to it, Utp.'s aim is to exclude the possi b i l ity that i n ference
m ight establish the ex istence of something that is absolutely other than conscious­
ness, i.e. the hahyiirtha. To achieve this he is compelled, as w i l l be seen, to include
the concept of scllllcinya/oci!"I'{a within the pra/yak,m/odp!a.
1 16
time and place 1 9. The senses, too, are i n felTed only partially and generi- 1 5.8
•
cally (kir!lcinmiitram), as cause, and this was, i n fact, formerly directly
present to consciousness, through the perception of the seed etc.2° - 8 -
9. B lIt the ol�ject that is outside the light [completely extraneolls to
it] has not been man(lested to consciollsness at all; thus its existence
canllot be established evell through iI�rerence.
There has been no manifestation at all o f the object that is outside
the manifestation as j ar etc . , since this would be logically untenable;
therefore its existence cannot even be established by inference. - 9 -
1 9 This defin i t ion of i n ference does not only refer to the mode of the cognitive
act, but as is clari fied i n this last sentence i t is careful to add that it aims at
proving the e x istence o f an object that is able to propose itself as the possible ob­
ject of a purposeful activity ( i .e. specified by a defin i te time and p lace; cf. text note
243 ) . I t is true that the sphere of i n ference is constituted by the general (cf. NB 1 .
1 6) . but i t s u l t i mate appl ication i s t o t h e particular: i t s 'usefulness' consists i n per­
mitting one, v i a an argumentation in w h ic h there are only conceptual abstractions,
to establish the existence, for instance, of a 'determi nate' fire, which at this moment
cannot be directly perceived, and to act consequently (ef. NBT p . 2 1 alll/lllCllltllll ca
liligasamlwddh(/f!1 niya/alll al'/hw!1 dadaya/i). As He/lI!Jil/dll(lk(1 p . 34 puts i t , yat
lIIahc7l1a.wldc71' allagllil'yc7I,!,//(/f11 l'as/II/1I(I/I'm!1 pl'c7g allllb/lI/tal!l 11(/ tat /adde.Wdi­
sW!I!Jal/(lhitaya;\'(ll/lIIl/cll/al'ikalpcl/u slIlal'ya/e kin til yatra pradc.�c pl'elg anal/lI!J/1lltal!l
/a/sallliJolldhilaycl (cr. Shah 1 967; 278, 280; Katsura 1 98 4 : 227).
'
2() Accordi ng to the hahyiil'/hawldil/ the existence of the external object i s in­
ferable from that of the a/J//(Isa, just as from the occurrence o f perception the exis­
tence of the sensory facu lty is proved. even though the latter is never directly per­
ceived. We have, therefore, an i n ference based on the general correlation
(.I'tllllclllya/odp'!a) as understood, for instance, by Jayanta (NM I p. 1 20 slilllclnya/o­
dr,l'!tII!1 /11 ya//'(/ salll/Jal/dlwkc7I(' 'pi liliga[read Iiligi/sl'an7palll apratyak,Wl/11 nityapa­
rok,1'01II ('\'(/ sc7I1/(ll/ya/o l'yc7p/igraha!liid al/llll1lyate ya/ht7 .l:ahdc7dYlipalahdhyc7 .�I'O/f'(ldi
kt!ra!/(/fl/. which B h . I p . 23 1 follows very closely), where the object was and con­
t inues to be inaccessible to direct cogn i t ion. Utp. replies that in this case it is not
the sensory facu lty as such, in its particular individuality, that is i n ferred, but its
generic nature of cause (therefore only one of the many clhhc7sas of w h ic h it is com­
posed), which i t shares with an i n finite n umber of other objects, such as the seed,
and in which it had been perceived several t imes before. Thus, here too. we arc
faced with a case of pratyak,\'(//otir,I'(a, in which there is perception l i mited to a
general aspect (scllllclllya/otir,I'!a, but in the Saiva sense of the term ) , w i th the
aforementioned conseqllences. It m llst be kept in m ind that the terms pratyak,w/oo
and .wl/llc7l/ya/odr,I·(a have been, si nce Vntsyayana, understood i n v arious ways (sec,
e.g., ,�'c7harahh(7,1'ya on MiIl1(II?IStlstilra l. 1 .5 , NM I pp. 1 20-2 1 , TS 1 44 1 1 454; cf.
also Matilal 1 985 : 29 II) .
1 17
15.10 1 0. The multitude of things cannot but shine resting on the self of the
Lord, otherwise that act of reflective awareness which is volition
(icchamarsal)) could flot be produced.
As in the self of the Lord, whose essence is consciousness , so also
in the objective realities themselves there i s a shining w ithout
di fferentiation 2 1 , for otherwise reflective awareness, in the form of voli­
tion, which necessarily concerns objects that are already shining lto the
subject ] , consisting in the state of creator, could 110t exist 22. - 1 0
1 1 . The essential na/llre qf light is reflective awareness (vimarsam ) ;
otherwise light, though 'coloured ' by o/�iects, would be simil(l/ ' to all
insentient re(/Iity, silch as crvs/a! and so 011 .
Reflect ive awareness (pratyavamar,l:ofl) const itutes the primary
essence (lIlllkhya atflla ) of l ight. In thc absence of this reflective
awareness, l ight, though objects make it assume different forms, would
mcrely be 'limpid', but 110t sentient, since there is no 'savouring'
(camatkrtefz) 23 . I I
21
The autonomous shining beyond every duality and scission. which is peculiar
to the sci I', is a stalc that also extends to things whcn t hcy arc i mmersed in thc sel f
(cf. IPVV p . 1 67 aill/lilli hi lIil'hhiisWIIi/IIC 1<Il/ahhedaslhillll!1 kalliw!1 1/(/ nil'hhc7sc!a)
in such a way that the cond i t ion of idlllllil docs not devclop.
1
2 The w i l l to produce something at every level prcsupposes an object that
is in some way already present, 'shining', in consciollsness (sec below p. 1 26 n. 43).
Vol it ion, in ordcr to be sllch, must be connceted with a desired object that 'lim i t s'
it from w i t h i n , that g i ves it a contcnt. The w i l l of the Lord, therefore, presupposes
the shining of the whole of objective reality, which, not being scparate frolll the sub­
ject, shines as the 1 shines (d. [I'VV II pp. 1 66- 1 (7 ) . Furthermore, vol i t ion, being
a part icular form of re lkc t i ve awareness (d. SD I I . S4-5 ) , is already in itse l f the
proof of the existence of the 'l ight' with which we know i t is inseparably connected
(sec iNdo p. 1 (17 11'1/(/ ([I'II.VWllllhl/(/l'ino l'illl(JI',1'a1 lalpraki/,\:{) '/l1ll11lyole; p. 1 69 i('('hadi
!)(/I'(/III111'.\'(/)'i:ic:\'{/ el'o /)(Il'iillllll'.\'(/.1: (,1I prakii:ia.l'ya sl'ahhiim fi).
21 CWI/alkr!i, (,(lIIlolke/ra, is one of the key- words of this school. Abh. (ip v v II
p. 1 77 ) says: «Cafl/alk('li Ill e ans the act of a person savouring (hhlllzjal/asya), that
is, tlie bliss cons t i tuted by the fu ll achievement of frui tion». 811111/jiil/a, Abh. explains
later, is he who, engaged in savouring a taste stich as sweetness etc . , unlike a
vorac ious glutton, lets the experiencc rest on the cogn izing subject . that is, makes
the 'sub ject' part predom inate over the 'object' parI. CWI/alkiim, in its h i ghest form ,
is therefore both the act of savouring and fu llness, absolute independence,
consciousness devoid of obstacles (al'igli/1(/ saml'il) a savouring which is in the final
analysis a savouring of one's own se l f and of olle's OWIl bliss, which eludcs every
1 18
1 2. Precisely for this reason the self has been defined as 'sentience' 1 5.12
(caitanyam) meanillg by this the activity of consciousness in the sense of
being the slll)ject qf this activity. It is thanks to sen/iency, in fact, that
the self (lifj'ers .limn insentient reality.
- Sentience - that is, the power of consciousness, perceiving - though
an abstract (hhc7vaO) 24 , has been said to be the primary nature - the
reflective awareness (l'imar,,; oO) of the substance self, being that which
-
distinguishes it from insentient reality. This activity of being conscious
means prec isely being the subject of such activity 25 . - 1 2
screen or intermediation of the world of objects, and even goes beyond that rel ative
and momentary transcendence that one has i n the aesthetic experience of poetry and
the theatre. The terms w i t h which it is glossed or with which i t is c l osely related
may be grouped according to its principal components: cogni tion, b li ss , wonder. The
first group incl udes, for example, l'illlada (pratyal'alllariw etc.), carva�lii, iisl'iida,
ra.I·(/II(/, pral7li; the second includes al/anda, nirl'rti, vi/;rclllti, /aya; the t hird l'ismaya,
l'ikilsa. This last sense (prevalent in the sphere of rhetoric and aesthetics, and i n non­
tech n ical usage) refers to the wonder and astonishment that accompanies the return
of rea l i ty to its original 'v irgin' state, the transfiguration that this type of experience
operates on reality in freeing it from the veils of the I and of the m ine. Utp. seef!1 s
to have been the first to usc t h i s word pregnantly. However, already vismaya in SS
(I. 1 2 l'ismay!) yogahhfillliki/h) , glossed by K�emaraja w i t h c7.i:cal'yamcl�/(/tcl (sec also
the verse from the KII/ayukli, c i t . SSV p . 1 3 , atma ('([il'(ltmanc7 Ftc/to yadii hhal'ali
sadhakaib I rac/a l'ismayam alma vai c7ll11allY eva prapll.fya(i II) and (,moda in S D
(e.g. I . 7b yada t u lasya ciddhal'mal'iiJhal'l/lIIot/ajrmhhayc7) glossed by Utp. precise­
ly with ('(/II/(/I/;(/ro, seem to h in t at very s i milar concepts. On call1atkclra sec GnoIi ,
I 96S : X LV - X LV I I , 59-62; Gnol i , 1 97 5 : 3 2 and n . 90; see also H u l i n 1 97 8 : 343-58,
Masson-Patwardhan 1 969: 46; id. 1 970: 1 7-8 and notes; Larson 1 976.
.' 4 Bham can also be understood here i n the sense of 'quality (of the substance
seI O'; the general meaning is basical ly the same (cL n. 25). Accord ing to Katyayana's
),{lI'Ililw on P. V . 1 . 1 1 9 tas\'({ hhiil'(/s ()'(f(a/au (sec n. 2 5 ) , the abstract nomi na l
suffixes (hl/(/l'apratyoya) , s �lch as sY{/l1 in coilallyam, denote an essent i a l quali ty
(hMl'(/ being thus i n terpreted as gU(l{I) ; cr. the remark of HeW.raja (Prak7r�/(/­
k(/praka.I'a I p. 1 94) ifl/wlII al/'{/ l'i,\'C,\'(/�li/I!1 s),(/I'I7pc�w param IIparm7jayat siltre
hhal'(/.\·({hc/cl/(/ pmlipc7dilalll , hlw l'(/ty (/Slllat lelia prakc7rc�w dravyalll iti hhav(J(1.
2 5 Being 'conscious' is the attribute (dharllla) of the substance (dral'},a, dharmin)
'self, that i ; in fact t he drav)'(/ pal' ('.1'1'1'1/1'11('1', because everything w i thout d i s tinc­
t ion rests on him (cf. IPV I I�. 24S). Saying 'the sciI' is sen t ience' ( S S . I. I), i nstead
of 'the self is sentient' or ' i n the sclf' there is sentience', means underl ining the ab­
solute pre-em inence of' this quality over all others (cL IPVV I I p. 33 bhal'a­
pralyaye<l/a> laddharl//aprc7dlu/llym!l dar/;ilolll; see also PV 1 . 6 1 -2). In fact , per­
manence, incorporeity etc. may also pertain to other entities, whereas ..c onsciousness
only pcrtains to the sel f and i t alone su ff'ices to characterize it (cL IPV I p . 24S,
1 19
1 5 . 13 1 3 . Consciollsness has as its essential nature reflective awareness
(pratyavamarsaO); it is the supreme Word (paravak) that arises Feely. It
is Feedom ill the absolute sense, the sovereignty (aisvaryam) ()l the
supreme Se((
Th is is the First Word (adycl \'(IC) 2 6 , in which the expressible i s
S S V p . 2 ) . «The suffixes o f the abstract -fa and -(1'(1111 says KiHyayana (\'(lrtfika
V on Pal) . V I \ 1 9 ) ind icate that qual i ty whosc presence in the drm'Y(f determines
- 2. 1 5 etc.); cf, Iyer 1 96 8 : [ 43-5 , A k l uj kar 1 970: 69-70 and n , 6, A k l uj k ar 1 990.
the appl ication of the name (yasya glllwsva hi dral'Yc hhc7\'(/t !iahdallil'c,I'as (adahhi­
dhallc ((/(I'al/ hh(/\'(//(/(I : one can guess the quotation in a corrupted passage of IPVV
I I p. 1 86, vad aha lIIadhyalllo /Illlllih yasya gU(liIsya hi ) . In the part icular case
. . .
of eailullya the abstract is particularly significant: CC(Wli/, as Abh . says (IPV 1 p.
247 ) , is a krdallla and as such its abstract denotes a 'relation' (sllf!l!wlldha) and,
through the relation, the two related elcments, i.e. the subject and the action of per­
ceiving, of be ing conscious (ci(-) . Abh.'s argulllentation is impl icitly based on the
grammatical maxim (sec Tore II a 1 98 7 : 1 58-."\ 9 ) slIlIlclsakrlladdhi( \\'1I SW!lhalldl/(7hhi­
dln/1111111 (1Ilya(ra n7<Ihyailhilllwn7pal'y(/hhicari(asal!lhlllldhchhya(1 ( Kielhorll I X74: 537;
c f. Slradeva's Brlwlparihha,I,(I I'rlli 1 ]0 and Haribhilskaragnihotri's Parihhc7,l'ii/Jhaskarah
1 32 in Parihhii,l'c7s(//!lgrallil pp. 272 and 373-74) «(the abstract nominal suffi xes)
when suffixed to compounds, to words formed with primary derivational su ffixes
and to words formed with secondary derivational su ffixes, name relations, except
(when words of the aforement ioned types) arc idiomatic or have the same phon ic
form (as a word expressing a general property or universal ) , or name an invariable
re lation» (transl. Hayes 1 9X ] : 7 1 0) . This /iarih}/(lsii is also quoted in I-Ielilrfija's Pm­
finwka/il'llka.I'a on VP ill S I ( [ p. 1 94 ) and, in an abridged form (.I'(//IIiis(/kl'lIa(/­
dhilC,1'1/ sill!l!Jal/dhiihhidlll/llulII) ihid. p. 55 on V P ! I I . 1 .4 7 ) . Kaun�la Bhana (who also
quotes the same maxim in a s l ightly mod i fied form) in Vwlka/'(/(/(/hhfi,\'(/(/(/.\'(Ira p.
344 refers to the treatment of the matter by B hartrhari h i msel f' in the MBh (1ka (not
found i n the fragmentary text that has come down to us). Ta(ll'u/Jodhill/ on
Siddll(llIlakillllll[((/i I n I (cL Hattori 1 96X:X5) even seems to ascribe the authorsh i p
of the maxim t o B harlrhari h imsel f. Cr. also, from a d i fferent point o f v iew, V P
1 1 1 . 1 .34.
.'(, 'rhe I'rlli does not dwell on the levels of the Word; it mentions only the
supreme level (ddyc7 rae). On the contrary, this sub ject is developed in the (1kii as
is seen from I PV V where the polemic with the Vaiyakaral.1Hs, which Somilnanda
had started in Chapter I! of' the SD ((,noli 1 959; Gaurinath Shastri 1 959: 69; Ruegg
1 959: I I ), is also reproposed. Grammarians ( part icularly B hartrhari ), as is known,
are criticized for hav ing concei ved a div ision o r the Word into three levels, instead
o r four, and for having consequently ident i fied the supreme level with Pasyanfi. For
a description or the levels of I'iie sec PTV pp. 1 02- 1 59 (Gnoli 1 9X 5 : 60-97 ) ; Ruegg
1 959: 79-H I , Gnoli 1 959: 55-63, [yer 1 969: 1 42- 1 45 , A k l u j kar 1 970: 67-75, Padoux
1 990: 1 66-222. Though Bhartrhari is unan imously thought (e.g. in the Saiva trad ition;
but cfr. I ntr. p. X X V I ) to be the upholder of the threefold div ision, the VI' seems to
hint at a further level, which llIay be seen as the supreme form of PasyanO (V P I I'rlli
[ 20
un differentiated 27, w i thout beginning or end i n that i t i s constituted by I 5.13
perpetual consciousness, autonomous. Thi s is pure freedom, independent
of any other reality, which has the name of 'sovereignty'. - 1 3 -
1 4. It is the luminolls vibrating (sphuratta) 28 , the absolute being
(mahiisattay29, unmodified by �]Jace and time; it is that which is said to
be the heart (hrdayam) of the supreme Lord, insofar as it is his essence.
p. 2 1 6, but this interpretation seems more open to doubt) or as para pmkrti ( V P I II .
A mong the Vaiyakaranas only Nagesa (MBhUddyota pp. 40-4 1 ; Pam/llalagllllmal1jll�a
p. 68 call1rl'idha hi wIg as(i . ; see also h i s commentary on the Yogasiltra) expl icitly
..
maintains the d i v is ion i n to four levels. I t i s to be noted that, four centuries before
Nagesa, Sayana in the 8,gl'cdahha,l'ya proposed, among others, the same i n terpretation
of the verse calwlri ),(lkparimita pa(/(llli . . . , quoted i n the Paspasa. I t woul d have
been very intercsting to see how B hartrhari, whose (1ka on that portion o f the M B h
i s extant (Bronkhorst 1 990), i nterpreted i t , b u t u n fortunately he i s completely s i lent
on that point. The verse, however, is quoted in the Vrl(i o n VP I . [59 and interpreted
there i n terms of tripart ition (p. 220).
27 Abh, rel'ers to three d ifferent interpretations of ah/zinna1'(lcya g iven in the (11((1
(IPVV p. 1 9 1 ): ,w,vrhlo or p{///camlsamiisa and kanlladhamya, that i s , ' i n (or from)
which the expressible is undifferentiated', 'designated as undifferentiated'.
2 K Sphlll'affcl and the closely related term spanda are specially fit to designate
the h ighest .I'ak(i of Paramdvara due to their paradoxical nature of i mmovable
movement - 'osc i l l at ion sur place' (Hulin 1 978: 290) ; kililciccalalla/ll, Abh. says,
-
where kilwil stands for the appearance of movement, agitation in something w h ich
is, however, motionless, firm. In ordinary usage, too, the adjecti v e spalldal'al is
referred to one who is firmly establ ished though being ful l of the freedom o f many
deli berations, In comparison w i th spallda, spliuraffc7 (Abh, records the use of this
term anel concept by Sar1karanandana) also contains a 'luminous, s h i ning' connotation,
One may say mama spllll/'{/(i glia!a(1 only in the sense that thi s shin ing-vibrating
which belongs to the I is transferred to the object. Truly speaking, it i s the I (whose
essence is l ight) who partially departing or, i n a sense, not departing at a l l , from
his nature of consciousness s hines-v ibrates as an object (ibid. p. 200).
2 9 Cf. the concept of lIIaMsa(((/ in B hartrhari. «It is being [sattc7] which, being
di fferentiated according to the object in which i t is present, is called the u n iversal,
All words arc based on that. That is the meaning of the stem and of the root; it is
eternal i t is the great Soul; it is the meaning of the suffixes -tva and -tal.» (VP III. 1.33-
34; trans\ . [yer 1 97 1 : 25-26). Words, whether one accepts the thesis that they denote
the universal (j(/(i, .\'(IIII(/lIya) or the individual substance (dravya), a l l express, in the
end, the pure being in the most general form, the maMsatW, i .e. the satta not qualified
by any particular content. This is valid not only for nouns which refer to accom­
pl ished realities - but also for verbal roots which express processes to be accom­
pl ished. Th is, so-to-speak, universals' universal (mahasall1c7llya), present in a l l things
and embracing even non-being (cf. PrakYl'(wkaprakii,�a p. 4 1 sarvabhave,w sadn7pw!1
sc7I11(/llyall/ alll/galalll / abh(7I'a.l'yapi imddhyalalre(w lIiriil)(I(Ic7(), is Brahman itself.
121
1 5. 1 4 It i s , by nature, luminous vibrating, i t i s the subject o f this luminous
v i brating; i t i s not to be understood as the counterpart o f non-being
(ablzavapratiyoginl) [but] it also pervades non-being; it is existing, being,
the subject o f the action of being; pcrmanent, because untouched by
space and time. It is the power o f the activity o f consciousness, whose
essence is reflective awareness. It constitutes the foundat ion of the self
of the supreme Lord, who is all things; the variolls i'igall/(/s call i t the
'heart' JO. - 1 4
I S. Precisely hy virllle (�r this he tmlLlInrms himse(1' into the reality
which is the objcct 01' cognition (jfieylkuryat) ; l){It this olJject docs not
subsist independcntly {(!I' thc sll/�jectJ . II' he wC/'c to tend towards it ·l l his
/i'cedolll would ccase.
- By v i rtue of such pure frecdom, he knows no object that has any
foundation outside himself, but , on the contrary, his power being
unrestrained, he transforms his very self, which i s not the object o f cogni­
tion, into cognizable real ity. I f he had to depend on a cognizable object
scparate from himself, his state as the subject of cognition would lapseJ 2 .
15
1 6. Thc Lord, thanks to his jhwlom which is absencc 01' duality, hy
crcatillg il self' !lot devoid of' .f/'ccdofll variollsly rcprcsenting him in rhc
/()f'fIlS (!r l.<:(/ cte. rendC/'.\' (hc eanying Oll ( (d' practical acti\'ity possih/c.
Therefore the Lord, by virtue of his freedom which is perfect full­
ness characterized by unity with the cogni zable object, mani fests himsel f
as that part icular cogni zing subject of that particu lar moment, represent­
ing him in the forms of lsvara, Siva, the perceiving subject and so on,
acting thus for the purpose of the various pract ical activities such as crea-
tivc medi tation etc.-n . 16
3 0 On the 'heart' in the Saiva texts and. i n general, i n I ndian tradi t ion see Mul-
Ier-Ortega 1 9X<J.
1I
I .e. towards an object eoneeived of as independent of h i m .
.12
The subject is by ddin itol1 free (.IW/llllllm).
.1.1 It is only the I ,ord's power of freedom that renders possible this paradoxieal
blend of object iv i ty and true subjeetivity. The terms of the quest ion arc lueidly ex­
pounded by A bh . , in an earl ier passage of IPVV ( I p. l OX ) : « A lthough freedom and
dependenec are two d iametrieally opposed rcal i ties and mutually exclude one
another, ParmlleSvara in his supreme freedom combines them ( vojllyali) when he
1 22
1 7. The variety of notions such as 'f etc. , does 110t entail diversity in 1 5.17
the natllre of the se(f, because a se(f is created precisely as he who l�nds
himself to heing the object of the reflective awareness 'f
(ahar11l11fsyataiva), like action which is expressed by personal endings
(tinvacyakannavat).
- He who is the object of the reflective awareness 'I' on the plane o f
the present cognizi ng subject does not have the nature o f 'this' (idantii),
which he should have being the object of cognition34 . In the diversity o f
ways i n which the self is definitely apprehended a n d i n which he appears
to perception, what is expresseded [e.g.] by the word 'iSvara' is the cog­
nizing subject and no other; only, this happens indirectly, through the
reflective awareness T 35. S i milarly, that reality , for e xample, that is
creates d i fferentiated representations s u c h a s Isvara, t h e self etc. T h e i r idallf(l com­
ponent makes them able to become the object of meditation, worship, teac hing and
so on, and, on the other hand. their unveiled ahalllii component ensures the attain­
ment of their true nature».
.14 The power o f freedom of Paramesvara, i n the sphere of the general process
of the objec t i fication of the self - from which all stems causes a certain l ayer to
remain as though suspended between the T and the 'this'. 'Thi s' i nsofar as con­
structed, 'created' (llirmila) just l i ke any reality posited as external, b u t u n l i ke these,
c loser to pure subjeeti v ity and capable of reilllmersing itself in it by v i rtue of the
contact with the T. Thi s is the case with not ions (and words) such as Siva, lsvara,
sel l', cognizer, which are on the one hand an objectified reality, separate from con­
sciousness, and on the other not completely so (IPVV II p. 2 1 0 lIa ca afyall((l/!I
P !'tlwk sl'Cllm!lIlY em); lIa ('(/ alll.'(\'aralll, Abh. adds elsewhere (TpV I p. 272), other­
w i se meditating on I.'(l'ara or alll.\:l'ara would be the same thing, which is con­
tradicted by the di fferent fru its that deriv e from it.
1 5 The real sel f, consciousness, is characterized by ahm!l-parclfllada; on the con­
trary. real ity and denom inations such as S iva, lSvara, B hagavan, I etc. are charac­
terized by idm!l-parclflwr.l;a whose sphere includes the indiv idual parc7l11adas
(,I;il'ap(tr(llIIar.l'a etc . ) . The issue raised is how a single real ity can be the basis on
which both creator and created (lIinllila) rest. According to U tp.'s reply, as developed
by Abh., u n i fication is provided by the ahW!l-parcllllar:ia which also underl ies the
notions o f S iva, 1 svara etc. It is the I (allalll) i n faet as Abh. says (IPV 1 p. 27S­
t)) - which consti tutes the u l t imate outcome, the defi n i t i ve resting place (l'i,I'rc7l1li­
.I'llullla) of this kind of cogn i t ion (but also, he adds later, of all the others, w i thout
distinction); even for the cogni t ion 'blue' the final resting p l ace is the I , t hough this
is more di fficult for the average intellect to grasp). This distinction between the two
planes is outl ined by Abh., fol lowing the (lkc7, i n a passage of Ipvv ( II p . 2 1 3). In
the case of the, so to speak, primary ahCII!l-parclmada, from the very beg inning
(lIpakralll(J em) there is awareness of freedom . I n the parclmar,l;([s concerni n g atl1lall ,
1.\Wtr(1 etc. this is true only as regards the final outcome; at the beginning, on the
1 23
1 5 . 1 7 denoted by the verbal form 'he cooks', i s expressed by the word 'action';
for, as has been said: «The words 'action', 'quality', 'universal', 'relation'
etc. do not express [directly] the various actions etc. because they are
denoted instead through the verbal form 'he cooks' and so on» 36 . From
the words '1,�Va,. a' and ' self' one reaches the understanding of one's own
self, but only i nsofar as one contextually the reflective awareness 'I', that
is, not d irectly. The apprehension of the self, however, effectively takes
place, j ust as the object previously perceived is known by memory,
through the direct perception3 7. - 1 7 -
Owing to the power of !I1cl)'cl, for the Lord it has as its ol�iect a
1 8.
cognizable reality d(flerentiated [fi'O/ll se(f7 and IS called by the names
(�l cognition , imagination, determination etc.
- By the power of maya, to Paramesvara3 R whose essence is light,
the world which consists of his own sel f - i s manifested as differen­
tiated. This very Consciousness, therefore, appears as sensory cognition;
precisely this reality which is manifested as differentiatedW forms the ob­
ject o f memory, imagination (sat!lkalpafi) and determination (adhya­
wlsdyafi). Though40 appearing in the form of the fu nctions of the inter­
nal sense (manasO) and the intellect (fmddlll' O) what is acting is in fact
,
none other than Consciousness itself. 18 -
contrary, there is the condition of depcndcnce peculiar to the 'this', insofar as thosc
notions arisc markcd by objcctivity, dcspite the fact that thc OI/(I/!I-pari/lllar.l'a i s
present i n them and pervades thcm from within.
3 6 Untraced quotation. I n tenor i t may be compared to V P III 6 . 1 , which Abh.
quotes in Ipvv I( p. 2 1 5 .
.17 Thc parallelism i s clearly cxplained b y A b h . (ibid. p . 2 1 3) .
JH I n dcpart ing from what appears t o b e t h e plainest interpretation ('the power
of mnya of the Lord'), Abh. (IPVV I I p. 2 1 7) fol lows thc indicat iolls in thc (tW. I n
the eyes of t h c Lord (or rather, of the l i m ited subject i n whom he is freely con­
tracted) the world is made to appear as di fferentiated from the self.
39 According to Abh . (IPVV I I p. 2 1 8) fosyoi\'(l hhillllasya is not to be under­
stood as wlllbllllta.l' },a, which .- it is objected would be all right for .I'lIIrfi and
adhY([\'([.I'ii},([, but [; ot for .wullka/p(J (s(;l!lka!pc III IWI'O ekm'i,mya lIfflu/pyafc ) . I t
'
rne,;ns the external object i n the broad sense o f the word, i .e . that which is subject
to thc power of m[lyn. _ suitablc occasion (lIillliff(l), such as the subsequent occurrence of a s i m ilar cognition
40 The cOllcessive mean ing of api refe rs here, according to IPVV I I p. 2 1 8, to
the implicit objection: how can cogn it ion, determ ination etc. havc Consciousness as
their essential nature, since they are functions of the i ntcllect, the 1/1(111([.1' and the
senses, which are in themselves insentient (see text note 29 1 )'1 Cf. S K I . 6-7 .
1 24
1 9. Even a t the moment of the direct perception (sak�atkarak�af.le 'pi) 1 5.19
there is a reflective awareness (vimarSal:t). How otherwise could one ac-
cOllnt for sllch actions as running and so on, (l they were thought of as
being devoid (�l determinate awareness (pratisaI!1dhanaO) ? 4 1 .
Even at the time of that cognizing which i s characterized by direct
perception there is in consciousness a reflective awareness of the object
(arthapratyavamadafl), in a subtle forl1142 . In fact, a rapi d action such
4 1 In other words there can be no prakiisa w i thout vimarSa. The two examples
g iven in the karikci of moments that might be considered as not having d iscursive
articulation - the first moment of direct perception and rapid action only appear to
be so. The d iscursi v e art iculation i s already contained in embryo in the sensorial
e x perience, and so too - s t i l l in a 'contracted' (sailll'arfifa) form - is the l inguistic
articulation, inseparably connected with it, for otherwise it wou l d not be able to occur
after the perception; s i m ilarly, even the most rapid and thoughtless action cannot but
contain, however sketchily, an articulated awareness of the ends to be aehieved etc.
(cf. Hulin 1 978: 294-96). In formu lating this conception, which may be consi dered
one of the p i vots of Pratyabh ijfin p h ilosophy, Utp. fol lows in the footsteps of
Bhartrhari (d. VP I . 1 3 1 -32 11(1 so 'sfi pratyayo toke yab c�ahdiillllg(JlIli/d rfC I 011 II vid­
dl1(l1l1 il'a jiWII(/f!1 Sa/WlIll <:a hde l la hhc7safc II viigl'llpafc7 ced IIfkramed avabodhasya
.
.\:asl'a(i I lIa prakc7.\:ab praka.I'efa .1'(1 hi pra fyavallladilli II) «There i s n o cogni tion i n
the world in which the word docs not figure. A l l knowledge i s , as i t were, intertwined
with the word. If this etcrnal identity of knowledge and the word were to disappear,
knowledge would ccasc to be knowlcdge; it is this identity w hich makes identification
[or, i n a broader sensc, 'rcflcctive awarencss'] possible» (trans!. Iyer 1 965 : 1 1 0- 1 1 ;
see Matilal 1 990: 1 33- 1 4 1 ) and is constantly aware of Dharmaklrti's d i ametrically op­
posed posi tion (cL in particular PV III . 1 74- 1 9 I ab; and, obv iously, the well-known
dcfiniton of prafyak,\'(/ as ka/palliipo(/ham in PS; see Funayama 1 992).
42 A potcntial linguistic articulation Uahdahhc7vanc7), says B hartrhari (vrtfi on
V P L 1 3 1 , p. I lI8 ) , is prescnt in various degrecs in every cognition; it i s therefore
also present in the cogn i tion devoid of mental elaboration (al'ika/pajIIalla), though
only in a contracted and h idden form (.\·(//�lhrfaI'l7po). ( B u t at this point one - and
first of all a Buddhist - m ight wonder on which basis i t is then possible to draw a
distinction betwcen .\'(lI'I·ka!pa and lIirl'ika/pa, and, moreover, what Ilirl'ika/pa i s . An
elaborate answer to these crucial questions is given by Abh. in fpvv I I p . 239-40).
Thi s condition makes the cognition that occurs remain, in one sense, as though it
had not occurred, becausc it is not able to man i fest its cffects (kc7rya) , namely, to
attain the plane of verbal communication and practical use ( Vr�abhadeva's Paddhafi
p. 1 88 ) . That this cognition, however, ha� occurred is proved by the fact that a
(Paddhafi p. 1 89 sadr.'iagrahaw/dcr lI illl ilfc7t ) may reawaken it and render it man i fest.
B h artrhari g i ves the example of a person walk ing q u ickly, wholly intent on reach ing
h i s destination, who seems not to notice anything that hc meets along h i s path
leaves, clods of earth -, until, some time l ater, he finds himself faccd with a s i m i lar
1 25
1 5. 1 9 as reci ti ng, running and so onnecessarily occurs through a detenninate
awareness (Oanl/sClf!ldhiinena)43 of the intention of reaching or leaving
this or that place etc. which is seen at that moment44 . - 1 9
20. The determinate cognition (adhyavasa) 'this is a jar', heyond the
lingllistic sign alld the thing sigllUi'ed (namaru paO), is the very pOll'er of
the slIpreme Lord. It is IIwn((ested ill the same way as the self and not
in tams (�f 'this' 45 .
object and this brings t o m ind the cognitIOn that he did not previously realize h e
had had. This is possible, says B h artrhar i , only i f we adm i t the e x istence within the
first perception o f a .\:ohclah/u/\'(/flcl which, a fter being 'contracted' (cL Ipvv It p.
226) as i t was, has now become fu l l y manifest ( \'wlkla). Then let u s consider the
' times and places etc. - 2 1 -
case o f a sensat ion taken ill its very first moment ( \ll'fti p . 1 70 {if'([lhafl/o(iallipam
and not destined to further development. Even the indist inct cognitioll that derives
from it, based on an inner formulation such as 'this, that' is malic possible only by
the presence o f a .\:uhdahhiil'illlii. though in a subtle form . Finally I w i l l quote one
last, particularly significant. example from those B hartrhari g i ves. This is the analysis
of the process that leads from the perception o f a group o f words to the
comprchension o f thc mean ing o f the sentence they form. The text o f thc Vrlli (pp.
1 9 1 -(2) is ambiguous in some places and I understand i t i n the l ight of
Vr�abhadeva's interprctation (wh ich is, however, questionable; e f. A k l u j kar 1 970:
1 47-4X). What appears at first is the indete rm inate reality o f a series (� f separatc
words-meanings, isol ated from one another. Subsequent ly ( ul/(/f'(/ka/afll ; Poddhali p .
1 9 1 ahhillflll(iw/iirlho{Jilricchedad 1I1/(/raka/(/III) there is a relkct i ve awareness
(PI'ili.\'(/\'(/I/lor.\:(/ ) , namely a determ i nation of the mean i ngs understood from the words
( Paddlwli ibid. padchhyo '1lIlh/1l7llil/(lllI arlhlillam dka/'(/lIinlp(lI.li/) and a coord ination
(IIIIIIS(//Ild//(III(/) , namely the ascertainment, with mutual connection, o f the mean ings
obtai ned from the words ({'add/wli ibid. fl(/dehhyo 'mgallil/(III/ arl//(/p(/ri('('h('d�'­
IIli\,(/dltara!lwlI); finally, the constitution of a single overall meaning ( £'karlhakaril\'(III1 ) .
/\ 1 1 this dcpends on hav ing the word as essence ( \'(ignipa/(/YIIIII /Jaddhll/II ) . It is to
be noted that prat)'(/\'all/ar,vll and IIl/llS(/II/c//U///o arc precisely the two terms on which
lJt p.'s Vr/ll on this kiirika is centred.
,1.1 A IIIIS(//lid//(/I/(/, to be understood also in the sense of 'coordination' of thc dis­
t inct w i lls to leave one thing and seck another, prescnt in the act o r volit ion (sce
text note 2(4). /\ s stated before ( 1 .5. 1 0), volit ion is a part icular form o f reflective
awareness; it must include a \'ill/ar.vlI 'this i s that', though in a generic form , touching
the desired objcct in same way. In this state the powers of volition, knowledge and
act ion are united with the l i ¥ ht fu l l of consciousness and bliss (lPVV II p. 233 and
S DVr pp. 9 1 -(2) . Sec also SD 1.9. 1 l ab.
·1·1 According to /\bh. (lPVV II p . 233, see text note 2(4) the ex pression dc.Wdt
may be understood in two ways: 'other su bstances or qual it ies' or 'substances etc.
cxisting elsewhere or o f another nature'.
I , The karika is to be understood as a rcply to an ob ject ion which we find made
, .
explicit by Abh. in IPV and IPVV. The objector adm its that the determinate cogni-
1 26
- The determinate cognition 'this' and 'jar', beyond the l inguistic ex- 1 5.20
pression and the thing signified, which i n themselves appear as differen-
tiated [from the subject] , consists essentially i n the power of Conscious-
ness: it is manifested, like the self 4 6, i n ten11S of non-differentiation. 20 -
21. HowevCl; ins()j'ar as they C01(j'onll to the time and place of the
dUferentiated cognizahle reality, [perceptive] cognition, memory . and
determinate cognition etc. appear to be successive47.
- Di fferentiated cognizable reality, such as the j ar and so on, i s made
manifest to the Consciousncss 4 � as differentiated by this or that time and
place due to the power of maya. [Perceptive] cognition, memory etc . ,
closely resting on this differentiated reality, are manifested at different
tion in the subtle form the previous kc7rikc7 spoke of may be cons i dered not separate
from the subject or from the ' l i ght', as we have seen, but he wonders how one can
continue to claim this once the determinate cognition (adhyavasliya) 'this is a j ar'
becomes ev ident (sphl/fa) and , on being articulated i n words, ful l y assumes the form
of \'ika/pa. The word 'jar' l i ke the thing it s ign i fies is m an i fested as an objec­
tive real ity. separate from the l ight of consciousness, and this cannot but have reper­
cussions on the determ inate cognition thc very essence of which is the l inguistic
expression. The mean ing o f U tp.'s reply i s the following. Noone has ever said that
i t is the ordinary m an i fested word (which i s only the lowest level o f language) that
constitutes the vi/l/ada ; i t is, on the contrary, on the same level as any rea lity that
appears as externaL This word and the th ing i t s ignifies arc only the object of
uni fication by a determ inative cogn ition, which i s rooted in the Lord's pure power
o f consciousness (of w h ich i t is one o f the man i festations). In u n i fy ing I/(l/1/a and
I'II{)(/ (.\:ahda and al'l//(/) determ inate cognition remains distinct from them, on another
level, retriev ing them through the outcome of its very process w ithin the sphere o f
the T.
, 6
1 The various notions of sel f, cogn izing subject, Lord etc. s hi ne d irectly to the
consciousness as 'I' (cr. above kc7l'ika.\· 1 6- 1 7 above).
,17 One can explain th is kal'ika, too, as the reply to an u n fo rm u l ated objection,
which it is poss i ble to intuit from the thread o f the argumentation and w i th the aid
o f Abh ,'s commentaries. If every form o f cogn i zing the objector wonders in the
ultimate analysis i s resolved ill the '1', what results is an absolute u nity of cognition
i ll wh ich thcre i s no room for spat io-temporal d i fferentiations (which may charac­
terize only the ob ject). And yet this d irrerentiation is ev ident at every moment o f
ordinary experience . . .
<IX
See above n . .lX.
1 27
1 6. 1
CHAPTER VI
l . The reflective awareness '/', which is the very essence of light, is
flot (/ lIIelital constl'llct (vikalpal)), although it is inforll/ed hy the word
(vagvapul)). For a v ika\pa is all act ()f ascertainment (villiscayal�) present­
illg a dllality (dvayaks;epi) I .
The reflective awareness concernll1g the self, the reflective
awarenes s '1', which constitutes the very nature o f l ight, cannot be called
I'ikalpa even if it is essentially associated with a 'discourse' (sc7bhiliipo
'pi)2 since the word that informs it is the supreme word . Indeed, the
l'ikalpaJ is an ascertainment ( lI i.\�('([y a �/ ) acquired through the negation
or the opposite4 , and, as regards pure l ight, there is no possibil ity or the
existence or something that is its opposites . - 1
I W i thout a dual ity of this - non-this, Abh. remarks (IPVV I I p. 280). how can
the funct ions pecul iar to !'iklli/hl be carried out, that i s , how and what to u n i fy . d i v i ­
d e , imagine ?
Utp. rders here critically to the well-known defi n i t ion of kalp(Jllii given by
Dharmaktrt i ( N B l . 5 ) IIhhilaPilSiIf!l.wrgayogYiI/Jralihhasii p/'{/{ffib kalpallii. which in
turn derives. with Illod i ficat ions. from Dignuga ( PS I. 3d lliil//ajllfyeidiyojollii; cf.
Funayama 1 9(2). D uring the discussion of t h is subject in Ipvv, Abh. repeatedly
quotes passages fwm Dharfl1011ara, w h ich turn out to bc ei ther paraphrases or Sllll1-
maries of passages from the N BT (ad I. 5 ) .
.\ On vika/pa in general sec Matilal 1 986: 3 1 3- 1 5 . The terlll vika/p(l is analysed
in IpVY II p. 274 in a few di fferent, hut compat ible (or even complementary) ways,
each of them singling out an aspect of this complex notion. a) I'il'id/wka/pallii, to be
understood e ither as pUll ing together what is d i fferent iated in real ity (hhililiasYclpi . . .
yojallc7) o r a s conceiving as man i fold what is one in real ity (ckasyiipi \'(/ividhyella ke"­
pal/ii). b) Cutting (k/p- in the sense of vicchec/al/a) another form which has been imag­
ined ( vivid/w.lya ('(/ /;wikila.l),o nipiilll(l/'(/svo ka/pal/w!1 vic('het/all(JIIl). c) A fter divid­
ing ( I'ihl/(/jya) , remov ing frolll the other and protect ing by making it enter into the
cogn izer's mind ( vi-ked-pa) . And later on (p. 2X I ), tI) \'i\'idhell!1 ka/pallwlI, i.e. man i fold
conceiving, in the sense that at same time i t has something being affirmed and
something being negated as its object (vidh!yallliillufli,l'idhY(JlIlcillu/ayc7) .
,1 The m a i n characteristic of vika//)(J is that of pro ject ing the object outside the
I . of knowing i t in terms of separation: 'th i s'. In analyzing the working of vika/pa,
;I hlliku V I dwells particularly 011 its aspect of 'exc lus ion'. In the {/\'ika/paka state the
thing is ' fu l l', j llst l i ke consciousness, but it cannot becoille the object of practical
1 28
To elaborate: 1 6.2
2. III fact, tlte manifestation of two opposite realities is possible in
tlte case (�f :iar' and '/lOll-jar'. On the contrary, the manifestation of a
usage as regards cogll ltlOn, communication and so on (lPV I pp. 309-3 1 0
tadavika/pada/iiiya/!1 citsvabhiivo 'sew g/w{ab cidvad eva l'iSvasClI'lraf/ pz7r�1([�I, no co
tella kecid vyavaharab). For thi s purpose the subject i n the mayie world has to break
into pieces what is ful l in itself, d i stinguish and negate: knowing becomes contrasting.
Also in this case Utp. appears drawn into the orbi t of B uddhist thought. The first
formu lation of the apo/w theory is found, as is well-known, in the PS and in the
Nvclvalllllkha, though apparently s t i l l l i m i ted in its app lication to the ambi t of the
i I� fe;'ential process and the denotation of words (for the development of the apolla
theory in D i gnuga's works see Frauwallner 1 959: 99- 1 06). The word expresses things
as quali fied by the negation of the other meanings (sahdo 'rthantaraniv/,ttivisiiifan
eva bliiiw/n aha, cit. in PVSY p p . 62-63; the passage comes from the vrtfi on PS
V.36d, Hattori 1 980: 7 1 ) . Or again: ' [The word] expresses its meaning through the
exclusion of others' ( PS V . l cd . . . SWirl/will Clnyapohella hhcI,w te), I t was, then,
Dharmaklrti who extended the application of the apoha to all the fields where
universals operate, that is, in the broad sense, to the contents of d i scursive thought
(PV 1 . 1 34 tellc7l1yc7pohavi,I'ayab proktab S(llll(!nyag()Cara�1 I ,\'ahd(/,'i co bl/ddhayas
caim vaslllllY e,1'(11II a.I·(J/!lhhawlt II; PVSV pp. 92-93 taSl11elt siddham etat sarve ,\:abelc1
vivekavi,wya vika/p([,'i cal. Therefore, words (or vika/pas), do not express u n iversals,
undividedly present in s ingle particular things, as the Realists maintain - but only
a 'di fference' (Meda) through the exclusion of what is other, namely, of a l l those
things which arc joi ned by the fact of having d i fferent effects w i th respect to the
thing intended. The i ntrinsic nature of the thing constitutes its d ifference, the
exclusion of what is other its (potentially) common d imension (PV 1 . 1 80a cimyete
.I'vc7lf//w/(/ hhedo \'yc7I'/'ltyc7 ca .I'alllclllala); the anyiipoha, after a l l , is seen to s hare all
the essential characters of the scllllc7l1ya, that is, ekatva nityatva pratyekaparisamapti
(cL PS V .36cd; Katsura 1 992: 1 32). Therefore, the word is applied to that d ifference
in w h ich the exclusion of the other has made a common structure appear (PVSV p .
62 . . . hhec/c .1·(/I/Ii!lIanlpapralihhc7siny c7k,I'I/)latadanyavye!l'/,ttir nive.l:yata iti). How­
ever, it is not a question of two distinct operations (with a relationshi p of vi,l:e,\'ya­
vi:ie,I'Cl/.w), Dhannakt rt i says and J i nendrabuddhi w i l l repeat, a few centuries later,
in h i s commentary on the PS (Stcherbatsky 1 9302: 464) - since the denotation of
its own mean ing entai l s by itsel f the exclusion of others, precisely inasmuch as the
nature of its own meaning is the 'di fference' (PVSV p . ( 3 ) . But, Dharmaklrti adds
a l ittle later (PV 1 . 1 28 ) , the di fTerenee is not a real thing ( vastll) - nor is exclusion
-; it is only a relative term . Something real would be the form (nlpa) , but the object
of the word is not nlpa but hheda (ahlic7va, vil'eka; PV I . I X5 and PVSV thereon).
A lmost all the debates of the later B uddhist thinkers, who w i l l attempt to recast the
apoha theory taking into account the Nyuya and Mlmuq1su criticism, are centred on
these points. The current d i v is ion ( Mookeljee 1 935: 1 32-33) between 'negativists'
( D ignuga and Dharmakl rti; for a d istinction of their respec t i ve posi tions see Katsura
1 992: 1 42- 1 43 ) , 'pos i t i vists' (SuI1tarak�ita and Kamalastla: the word expresses firstly
1 29
1 6 .2 r('ality that is other alld differ(,lltiabl(, 6 from light. on th(' same plane
(iva) 7, is not possih/(' .
a pos i t i ve entity and only secondly, by i m p l ication. the exclusion of the other. TS
1 0 1 8 WSWI C(f prafihiflll}(l.l'ya ga{(/l' c\'(I\'agafllyalc I siill1auhwld ally(/\ ·i.�/1',1'O
IIclSYclllyiillllak(flii yalaf! II) and 'synthetists' (Jrl anasrlm i t ra and Ratnaklrt i : the word
e xpresses a positive entity qual i fied by the exclus ion of the other; Ratnaktrti's
Apohasiddhi p . 59 lIilsfllohhir apoha.�ahd(,lla vidhir 1' \ '(/ k1'l'a/o 'hhipr1'laf! I lIiYpy
anW1\'y(/\,rllilllalrmll / killill al1ya{l()//(/l'i.�i,l'fO vidhif! .I'ahdiil/(IIII arlhaf!. then taken u p
again b y Mok0akaragupta) seems too simplistic and fai l s t o grasp what appears as
a substantial unity with d i fferent formulations (Katsura 1 986. S iderits 1 986). The
I'ratyahhijr1a position is very close to Ratnakt rt i's: the words (and l'ika/pas) rest on
a real ity which is mainly affirmat ive, qual i fied by the implicit negation of the op­
posite (II'VV II p. 289 1I/llarU/ITkrla{lraliyogvahhiil'al'iJisl{/\ 'idhipradhall(/\'(/SIIIl1i.,I'fha/l ;
p. 280 l'idhall l 'i.iuinlalv({1 ll i.l:('ava.l'ya) . In this process three moments may bc singled
out: i magining what is othcr than thc objcet intcnded. then supcrimposing i t onto the
object alld lastly ncgating it. ( i/Jid. p. 289 vika/paycl, aropaY1'1 ll i,I'1'dh('c ca . Or,
accord ing to another formulation: every apprehension includes the superimpos it ion
of the m an i festations to he excluded and their negation ( ihid. p. 290 sa/Til {1I'(IIIIC"C,1'lI
{mil ipaII ir apoliya/lhasaroP(/ 11 i,l'cdh(/\ 'WI{Iii /'(1/11 a (I kii ri Ill ) .
5 The countercorrelatc of light. its contrary, cannot in fact b e eithcr
a{lrakil.\:a/l/(Illa because in this case it wou ld simply not exist or / JI'Ilkil.\:alllill1a -
-
because it would be of the same essence as light (iPVV I I p. 279).
(, C r. TpV I p. 307 b/iC(/illll(l ... lI{lo//(/llcil/l/(/ka/Jhci!all(/\'.\'(I }(lraSulii,I·(IO(r [ both H h
/
and KSTS Ed . read incorrectly o \,w7pc7nlsahislloh I . O n the plane of knowablc reality
it is poss i ble to imagine. with respect to a 'blue', a 'non-bl ue' (and what is other than
blue indeed e x ists); why then. on the plane of the knowing subject, i magining a rea­
l i ty other than consciousness should be inadmissible ? Th is object i on is put forward
by Utp. and Ahh. (II'VV II p. 288) and answered as fol lows. On the plane of {lra-
1I/1')'a. created hy may" and made of a multi tude of ahhasils, ol1tkall'a and \'(/icilrya are
not surprising, whereas in pure light a real i ty d i fferent (d. hhillllasya in the \'rlli) from
the nature of prwlI(Ur cannot possibly e x ist. But even adm itting that l ights rnay be
di fferentiated in their nature owing to a di fferentiation of space and t ime, nonethcless.
just as. when a certain 'blue' is ascertained. only ye llow etc. arc negated not the other
'hl ues' - . l ikewise. when a l ight is ascertained the other l ights arc not negated. The
two parts of this argument unfold what is implicit in (h'iflyasva h/iillililsya in the l'l'lli.
Therefore, even if there were a 'second' (clc.) light, this would not be subjecl to exclu­
sion. However, a 's('('ond' l ight is not ad m issible as a reality (Ipv I p. 30X //(/ ('(/
prakd.\'as\'(/ SI'ill'llpoi!e,('(/kl7lahliei!o YClla i/\,j(iya/i (I/'{/kii!;(/ c/;(/slIldi! upo/ryalc ) . A
'second' l ight as the product of mcntal construction cannot const itute a p/'{/Iiyogill in
the same way as 'being cause, clTcd, instantaneous' cannot be cons idered a p/'{/Iiyo­
gill with respect to 'blue' (IPV V I I p. 282 s \'(/k(//palliika/pilcl/(f i/l'iriYCIlIl //(/ praliyo­
giporiplt/'{/(I(///I kriyale I //(/ hi lIi/asya kilra(WlvakilrvlIll'(/ksall ikoll 'ildi {lralivogi/ )(fksc
Sec also above n. 5 .
\'(//'Ialc, 11(/ hi lal firlhak kincit) .
7What i s needed for two ent i t ies t o be termed prulivogill is precisely their op­
pos ing each other while remaining on the same plane. My translation makes the
1 30
Otherness w ith respect to light (prakiHefaratvam) i s not possible, 1 6.2
since an opposite reality, second to and distinct from l i ght, called non­
l ight, is not manifested. There being no possibility of exclusion
(vyapohanilyogat), since such an opposite reality does not exist, one can-
not, therefore, speak of mental construct (vikalpataO) [with reference to
ahCll!lpratyavamada]. - 2 -
Likew ise:
3 . For we cal1 vikalpa Ihe ascertainment of a certain thing (tan­
niscayanam) I e.g.} �iar' arrived at through the exclusion of its opposite
(atadvyapohanat) by the knowing sul�iect ollly (matraiva), in whom that
and Ihe opposite (�( that arc l1Ion((('s(('(1 (tadatatpratibhabhaja) 8 .
- The ascertainment 'jar', brought about by the free knowing subject
only within whom lie the manifestations of that [the j ar] and i ts opposite,
and that takes place through the exclus ion of the opposite: this is the ac­
tivity called vikalpa. 3 -
4-5 . Having left th(' plane (�( Consciouslless because of the influence
(�( maya, that ref7ectiv(, ([warell(,ss 'I' which addresses d(fferentiated
r('oliti('s e.g . the body, the intel1('ct, the vital breath or that imagined
entity, similar to ether - understood as the knowing sul�iect, that reflec'­
til'(, ([ll'(lr(,lI(,SS, ncluding what is other thall its ohject, is a v ikalpa,
value of iVil explicit and i n so doing follows Abh .'s commentary. B h . , too, insists
on this point (II p. 3(7) IlI lyakak,I'."'(/ ('\,a hi {Jralispardhilayc7 bhcd1'llil pllra(r slhc7tIll(1
,\:aklloli iii IlIlyakak,I'.\'ilsl'ctv IIklalll ; Abh. (IpVV II p. 282) adds praliyogil\,W/1 hi lal­
s I/i{iml{)a 1/1/(/11'(1/ 11.
x The B uddh ist description of l'ika/pa's lIIodllS opcralldi thus seems l iable to be
shared also by the Saivas. Moreover. on a close scrutiny. it i s only w i t h i n the .�aiva
context that it may logically stand and elude cri ticism. Indeed, i f one accepts the
B uddh ist presupposi t ion of t h i ngs being self-confined, it res u l ts that what appears
from thc cogn ition of a thing is onl y that same thing and the awareness of its cogn i­
t ion. and one docs not understand where the 'other' t h ings and their negat ion spring
from . But th is d i fficulty concerns only the B uddhist (Ipv I p. 308 CVW!I .Wkya(r pary({­
I1l1yOjyo 11(/ III vayalll) , not the .\:a il''' conception centred in a cogni zer who is not
bound to the present object and its cogn i tion (Ipvv II p. 29 1 vi,wyaladdar.\:a­
lladipiiralal1lryam lIjiha(17) but is free to dynam ical ly aggregate, separate and merge
all the various cogn i tions. The central i ty of the I, which characterizes the .I:aiva con­
ception, is pointed out by the particle ('I'{I in the karika (lIIcllraiva) and in the vrlli
(1'1'(1/11(/1111' e \,a ) .
131
1 6.4-5 which arises precisely from the man(festation of an opposite reality to be
excluded 9.
- The reflective awareness T as the knowing subject, which because
of the power of maya (miiyclcsaktyii) of the Consciousness-prin ciple itself,
of the Lord, addresses real ities that are manifested as separate such as
the body , the intellect, the interior tact ile sensation 1 0 or that imagined I I
entity which is the void (Hinya), beyond them, similar to ether 1 2 - this
form of reflective awareness T is nothing other than a vikalpa, l ike 'this
is a jar', since it excludes the various opposite entities that are manifested,
such as the body and so on. - 4-5 -
6. The connection, in the case ()f OIl entity that is man(fested at a
c{'I'tain tifll e (kadacitkavabhase) , with something that was formerly
IllCln(fested etc . , this connection, too, which O('CI/I'S thanks to tile late, ; t
impression , is a mental cons/mct (kalpana) since it is applied to realities
that arc I/wn(/'es/ed as differentiated I J .
Within the sphere o f the various totally d i fferentiated and discon­
tinuous man ifestations such as the body, the void etc . , the connection in
. (as was seen in the case o f the first), does not have the characteristics o f the vikal­
!) I n Il i' S cOIlllllental' lCs A tlh. .Ifltroduees these two stanzas with an objection to
which they furn is h the reply. The reflect i ve awareness T (ah(ff!I{lm{ym'(ll/wda) oc­
curs through the exclusion of 11On- [ ; is it not therefore a I'ikal{la itsel l'? The answer
is that there are two k inds of ah(//!lpratya\'(lInar:(a, one is pure and the other is im­
pure; the objector's remark is pertinent only to the latter, which is the object of the
two stanzas.
10 (. ' I . .
,){)(II'S(/ ( lut alliara ) IS t Ile sensory f aculty that reveals the ex istence of the
- c ludes (fPY I p. 327), in every anllS(//!ldhc7na, namely in every act of u n i fication we
/mlll([, just as (/l/la/ik(/J'iII./ a reveals that of the mind and the sense of the I , or sight
reveals that of the body. But i\ bh., in commenting on the (7ka, grasps other mean­
ings of this iillill/'{/{\'afl/ of the /milla (not to be confused with physical breath) , name­
ly its not being d i rected outwards, its being the essential element and its perIneal­
ing all the senses (cL IPY Y II pp. 295-7).
I I I magined insofar as, unlike the other realities with which subjectivity i s
wrongly identi fied, it cannot b e directly known b y t h e internal and external senses
(i!Jid. p . 2(7) .
12
For example, it shares with ether 'vac u i ty' and the fact that it is not a pure
nOll -entity (ihid. p. 2(7 ) . On the void sec below pp. 2m IT.
I .l
Once again it is usci'ul to resort to Abh.'s commentaries to understand the
l ink between the prescnt stanza and the previous one. The not ion of the I
(a!t(/f!If!mlyaya) is not only to bc div ided i nto pure and im pure C\'uddlw - a,�uddl/(/) ,
but each of these two forms has in turn two aspects: a n immediate awareness through
a direct internal ex perience and a medi ated onc which is the result of a connection
1 32
unity (aikyayojand) with former manifestations, w it h a n individuality, 1 6.6
with a name, (a connection) made possible b y the latent impressions
which ensure the internal permanence of the fOlmer manifestations, - this
connection in unity, which is essentially an activity of the knowing sub-
ject (pramiitrvyiipiiranipii), is merely a mental construct and precisely
that called 'recognition'. - 6 -
7. Thus also in the course of ordinary reality l 4 the Lord, entering the
body etc., renders externally manifest by his volition the multitude of ob­
jects that shine within him .
- A t the moment o f the original creation, as i n the course o f everyday
reality, Mahdvara, by virtue of the power of maya 1 5 , by entering the
body etc. conceived of as self, creates the [limited] knower and thanks
to the power of doer (kartr,�aktyii) gradually 16 renders the various objects
(all llSGI!ldhc7l1a) between several clements. Now in the case of the aSliddha­
a!tCll!lpratyaya (which concerns us here), the direct form (allubhavanlpa) e.g. 'I am
the body', namely ' I am t hin', 'I am old' etc. - has already been spoken o f and ack­
nowledged as vikalpa (see above kiirikiis 4-5) . B u t it might be objected that the
second form , s ince it works through u n ification 'that which was previously a child,
then an adu l t , with a determinate name, c haracter etc. i s the I - and not exclusion
pa. The present stanza answers this objection by essentially saying that an
anlls(//!ulhiina that has as its object reali ties conceived as biihya and iJhinna cannot
bring about a real u n i fication as it is polluted by their appearing in the sign of l'ikal­
po. On the contrary, i t is on the p lane of Sadasiva where the 'this' is not yet !Jhin­
n(l that illlll,\'Ol?ldhiina brings about a ,�lIddl/(/-ah(//!lpratyaya. However, A b h . con­
perform in ordinary real ity, the l ight of vidyii.�okti (see below p p . 1 93- 1 94) shines
for an instant: each of these may be taken by the l im i ted subject as the first step i n
t h e process leading to t h e overcoming of d ifferent i ation and duality.
1 4 The five act ivities of the Lord take place not only on a cosmic level but also
i n everyday reality, which is, i n various ways, continually penetrated and supported
by them (eL S S Y pp. 1 0- 1 2 , PH p p . 22-26).
1 5 Utp. glosses icchaya with I/ulyii,\:ak{ya and karlr.�akty(l; as Abh. explains
(IPVY II p . 323) miiya.vakli is responsible for the identification of the I with the
various scats of l i m i ted subjectivity (body etc. ) , kartr.\:akti i n the form of kala and
vidya - for the m an i festation o f real ity as external.
1 6 I.e. l in king the various m an i festations w i t h particular subjects and then remov­
ing them from those to l in k them w i th others and so on (cL IpVY II p p . 3 1 6-7);
this pertains to the m icrocosm i c level o f the five divine operations (creation, reab­
sorption etc . ) . Or, according to another i nterpretation (ibid. p. 323), gradually con­
necting on the pure, m i xed and impure levels of creation.
1 33
1 6.7 that shine w ithin him extemally manifest. Creating is precisely rendering
manifest in this way (tathiibhiisanam eva). On the contrary, if he does
not enter the body etc . , then the whole manifestation of objective real i ty
will take place spontaneollsly and simultaneously in the fOlll1 of 1 am all
'
this' l 7 . - 7 -
8 . Therefore it is definitely ascertained that whether in memory, or
in v ikalpa that depends 011 exclusioll or ill direct perception , the
nlmllfestatioll (?f the ol�jecf is il/temal .
- In every kind of cognition (.I'(//Wlsm!/vits/I) , all objective man i festa­
tion is always shining as absorbed in the cognizer (pl' Clmiit! 's(//!I!fl/a!l) like
the consciousness-princ iple, in an appropriate way (all/lr(jpye�/(/) 1 8 . - 8 -
9. However. in direcI perception, which consists in renderillg the ob­
ject otemall), man (lest, [Ihis malll le.I'la/ion J occ/lrs spontaneollsly
(naisargikal)), while ill lIIemory etc. tllis is il/Formcd fly Oil (l fonner per­
ceptioll .
- In direct percept ion, conslst l11g in rendering thc object externally
man i fest l '), the manifestation o f the object within thc consciollsness (cit­
taftl'asYcll/tar) is spontaneous (sa/zaja)20; on the contrary, in memory etc.
it has as its essence a former perception, and it is for this very rcason
that memory is said to arise from latcnt impressions2 1 , - 9 -
17 It is the pl ane or Saclasiva-lsvara.
IB
When. ror example, the eogn i t ion appears as 'this is a j ar' and there does not
seem to be any reason to claim a connection w i th the subject, even then, on the con­
trary. the fact that the cogn ition and its object rest ultimate ly on the cogn izing sub­
ject reveals that their nature is essentially consciousness. The e xpression lillltrilpyl'lI({
seems to refer to the possibil ity or relative d i lTcrent iations or degree within a basic
ident ity; see also above I. 5 . 10 and I'r1li.
I t) In the sense of percei v ing it as other than sel l ' , as 'th is'.
20
I.e. i t docs not depend on external factors ( rormer perceptions), but, as Abh.
says (lI'VV ([ p . 329), it stems from the freedom o f the Lord himsel f ( c r. tex t note
353). A lso sec PTV p. 22 1 (.1'1·II.1'iifllarlhyodhllllla"), [PVV ( p. 1 1 4 (sl'o.l'li/l/orlhyol-
1110 II irI'ika /pa kajihiI iii") .
.' 1 The criterion on the bas is of which it is possible to make a general d istinc­
tion between the various k inds or cogn ition l ies in the spontaneous or mediated
man i festation of the object. The object is man i fested spontaneously in direct percep­
tion, and mediately in I'ika/pa (or rather in a certain k i nd o r I'ika/po ; sec the fol­
lowing karikii), where the man i festation of the object must necessarily pass through
the reawakening o r a former perception. Therefore we have as homologous terms
1 34
lO. It is also spontaneous in the case of the v ikalpa that acts 1 6.10
autonomollsly (svairacariI)i) rendering particlilar configurations manifest
in the melltal sphere at will.
- However, the i ndependent (svatalltrab) vikalpa22 renders this or that
thing manifest, whether new or characterized by a different organization
of its parts, making it the object of the mind even if it has never entered
the field of the senses such as sight etc . ; and it renders it manifest at
will without considering its having been previously perceived23 . Within
the sphere o f this form of vikalpa the manifestation of the object is spon­
taneous, too. - 1 0 -
1 1 . There/,o re, owing to the fact o/, rendering man(fest at will, what
is mCl/fally conceived, knowledge and action have been proved to be fit/ly
evidellt (sphu!e) ill every heing.
By virtue of the capacity for creating and knowing objects not for­
merly experienced, found in the vikalpa, the presence of the power to
know and create everything is evident in everyone. - 1 1 -
lIaisargika�al'yal'adl/(/lIa�sflhllrata 011 the olle hand and sCl/llskc7r(�ja�vyavadhc7l1a�
asphll!o{({ O il the other (cf B h I p. 337). The fact of making the object m an i fest as
external . which is mentioned as characteristic of d irect perception, does not constitute
an equally valid criterion; in fact, as Abh. notes, in the other k inds of knowledge,
too, the object is projected outside the I, into the a//tabkara(w.
22
There are two k i nds of I'i/w/pa, according to whether it depends or does not
depend on a former direct perception. The first k ind i n cludes, of course, memory
(slIIrti), determ ination (adhym'as(lya) . con jecture ( lltprek,w(w) ; the second, to which
the stanza refers, -- the autonomous (.Iwi!al/tra) l'ika/pa � i nc ludes fantasy
( lIIo//orajva) and i magination (.I'{//!Ika/pa).
2
3 Both k i nds of I'ika/pa work O i l material furnished by former perceptions. The
'novelty' (//(lvala, aprin'at\'(I///) w h ich c h aracterizes the object of the vika/pa called
' independent' is not therefore to be round in an i m possible 'novelty' of the individual
ahl/(/sa, but i n not considering the former man i festation o f the object at a particular
time and p lace (which i s . on the contrary, essential in the two main k inds of 'depen­
dent' I'ika/pa -- memory and determination) and in the d ifferent connection (y(�jal/c7)
or the ind i v idual ahhc7sas � d i rrerent compared to the former experience w i th the
consequent creation or new arrangements (sa//nive.va) . The example Abh. g ives of
this is imagining a w h i te elephant, with two trunks, a h undred tusks etc. Another
clement that characterizes the autonomous vika/pa is that i t comes into being and
ceases independently of the subject's w i l l , as the m i nd's free wandering (sec Ipvv
I I p. 332; i ll the compound .\'(//!lsthc7//ayoja/l{/I!I.I'ena, I. 1 4, the final /1(/ is to be read
separately).
1 35
I 7.1
CHAPTER VII
I. And this intuitivc light (pratibha) 1 inf7ucnccd (OrCi�ita) by thc suc­
cession of all the various objccts is thc knowing subject, which is con­
SCiOllSIlCSS dcvoid (�f successioll and limit 2 , Mahdvara.
- And this light (ahhCisaft) variegated nYccllllritafl) by the succession
o f all the v arious objects is, insofar as i t rests internally, the knowing
subject, called the 'sel f', which pervades the times o f all the cognitive
acts (sarvas(/f!ll'itkalaI'Y[lpl) and consists o f consciousness devoid of suc­
cession and l imit; and it is Mahesvara in that it is the creator as regards
the cognizable reality that constitutes its 'body' (svaligahlllltc). 1
2. Relatioll (jfHUeyam) is possible if things, throllgh the paths (!f tlic
various and distinct cogllitil'C acts, COIllC to rcst 011 a single knowing sub­
ject.
Once they have merged and been absorbed (lIpa17ya) into the sea
of the single knowing subject through the currents of the many cognitive
acts [ flowing into him l 3 , the di fferent objects are set in the network o f
I Pralihlta, which I have translatcd vaguely as 'intuit i ve l ight', is t h e rcvelation,
the prcscntation of the object to consciollsllcss, its i l l u m ination by the light of the
subjcct (pl'iIli-/JIIli), in which in the final analysis it rcsts. Thc succession which
seems to be projcctcd on thc l ight when thc objects sh ine within it ( or rathcr when
i t sh incs as objects) d isappears at thc moment when the percept i on of the objcct as
external reality 'this', becoming introvcrted , d issolves and finds its root i n the I: 'f
perceive th is'; cr. the formulation in APS v . 22, oftcn quoted in Saiva texts,
pmka.I'a.l'yc71/ll(/l'i.vriilllir (/h(//1Ihh(/1'0 hi k7rtifa(1 . PraliiJha i s here to be understood as
synonymous with prakasa , ahha.l'(/ (c l'. 1 .6.3) and 1I0t i n the pregnant sense of
' i ntuition ' , that is, a special, superhuman kind of direct v i s ion (cf. Gopinath Kav i ra j
1 966: 1 -44, Gonda 1 963: 3 1 8-48, Iyer 1 969: 86-92; Tola- DragoneHi 1 (90) .
} I n h i s two commentaries Abh. divides the third pi/da into akm/llcl (re ferring
to pralihhii) and an([lIl(/cidI'lIP(J(1 (referring to prallii/W). The 1 ,(lIi, on the contrary,
takes i t as a si ngle compound, referring to pra/llclra.
J Or also, following Abh.'s commentary (sec text note 3(7): 'by the means repre­
sented by the currents of the many cognitive acts', currents that force the objects from
the external to the internal plane, i nto consc iollsness.
1 36
connections pertaining to practical reality (Ovyavaharasamallvayam) , such I 7.2
as, for instance, the cause-effect relation and so on. - 2 -
3 . A cOllncction between objccts having a spa tio-temporal Sllcces­
SiOll and bcing sc(f�colltained is established by their manifestation ill
terms (�l llnU/'cation (sakrdabhasao )'1. Otherwisc, no connection at all is
possihle.
- Things, both in thei r own nature and manifestationS , are self-contai­
ned. A connection between them depends on their simultaneous and uni­
tary manifestation (YllgapadckabhclsaO). This undivided [manifestation, i .e.
connection] is possible only if absorbed into the knowing subject. - 3 -
4. Thc perceptiolls alld non-perccptions (pratyak�anupalambhanam) ,
which in thcll/selves COllCel'll this o r that separate part, may cause the
cstablishmcnt ()l thc callsc-cffect rclation only (f thcy rest on a single
knowing sIlIJ;ect.
Perceptions and non-perceptions determine the cause-effect relation
and also its establishment (tatsiddhifi) 6 , [onlyl once they have entered
into a connection with one another (samanvayam agatya) through a
single knowing subject. I f they do not enter into a reciprocal connection
(asClmallviWfl) perceptions and non-perceptions fade away at the moment
4 Cf. IPVV I I p. 343 .I'akrcchahdo hhcdalli,l'cdhaWlparyc prayukla(i; ihid.
sakrelabll(/sclw dc.l'aka/asl'al'llpahhc7sayojanaikyabhllsclla. On sakrdc7hhclsa see also
below p. 1 55 .
5 Namely, both in themselves and a s regards the cogni tions that have them as
object, or, as Abh. says, both in perception and ascertainment (see text note 369).
(, Utp. is referring here to the criterion adopted by the B uddh ist logi c i ans ( B .
attributes i t t o ladikc7e1i) t o ascertain the existence of a cause-effect relation. This
criterion i s based on the combination and interrelat ion of a certain number o f per­
ceptions and non-pcrceptions (cf. PVin I I pp. 33-4, HB p. 4, SP 1 3 , PVSV p. 22).
Fire, for example, may be considered the cause of smoke s ince, fire having been
percei ved, smoke, not initially perceived, is perceived later. D harmakl rt i docs not ex­
pl icitly state the number of these perceptions and non-perceptions: though their
div ision into five seems the most l i kely (this is what Dharmottara i n the PVi n-(7kc7,
Madhava in the S D S , and Abh. i n the IPVV understand), some commentators
Sakyamati, Kan)akagomin, Arcala only recogn ize three as being essential (see
Steinkellner 1 967 : I I , 97 n . 49). The dispute between these two v iews has been
studied in Kaj i yama 1 963, where the Ki/ryakilrallahhavasiddhi of JfianasI'l m i tra (a
Irikal'(/din) has been translated.
1 37
I 7.4 in which they make known one after the other their respective objects,
and are not able to display any mutual dependence7. 4 between cognitions which are restricted to themselves alld do not contradict
5.The selrconsciouslless (svasaq1V ittil; J which in memory is the pro(�(
(d' memory's J'ery beillg , that same self�('onsciollslless and nothing elsc
establishes the subsistencc o( the former dircct perception .
- S ince [ at the time of the memory J the self-consciousness of the
former direct perception no longer exists, it is the self-consciousncss of
the memory and nothing else which establi shes the exi stence of this
former perception, as it does for the memory itsel f. This sel f-conscious­
ness consists in the knowing subject characterized by the man i festation
of a single identical objed'. The status of effect acting as logical reason
- (karyalilig(l{(l) may not be attributed to memory since, as the mani festa­
tion of the former perception is no longer present, it cannot be said that
a cause-effect re lation has been establi shed9 . 5
7 lIere the all usion is to the d i fficu l t ies inherent i ll the B uddhist conception of
causal ity: thc whole of thc fourth ahllikll o r the Kriyildhikilm will be devoted to the
discussion of this.
B The argulllent that melllory is the man i l'cstation and proof of the e x istence and
cont inuity of the knowing subjcc t . already c x tensively dealt with earl ier, is here in­
c identally taken u p ollce aga in. I t is in effect through nll'lllory that the subject may
establish that l ink between perceptions and non-percep tions capable of prov ing til e
e x i stence of the cause-clTect relation. This connection. a s has been seen in the
previous kl7l'ika, docs not really pertain to the cogn i t ions themselves, but is projected
onto them by the suhject . The cont inuity of self-consciousness thus reveals itself in
Illelllory . I n fact . i t is the very same .1' 1'(/,\11/11 1 '1'<1(/110 which illuminates the memory
that i l luminates, Iliakes man i fest, the forlller percept ion now no longer existent
on which the meillory is based . /\bh. lucidly d istinguishes this type of argumenta­
t ion supporting the existence of the self, based on memory ( insofar as i t reveals the
oneness of self-consciousness ), from that also based on memory, put forward earl ier
(c1'. j PV I pp. :163-4).
() U t p . 's ailll here is to reject a possible objection - name ly that there is IlO need
to resort to the work or a cont inuous S I'OSal/l\'cc!{/l/a, but that memory is enough in
i tsel f to connect u p with the fon ner percep t ion, si nce by general consensus t il e cI'­
rect can lead to t he knowledge of the cause. What U t p . does not acknowledge is
prec isely t he adm issibility of such an i n ference, whose logical reason (/ilig{/) i s
represented b y t h e nature of effect (hI/YO) attributed to t h e llIemory: between the
perception that OCCU lTed in the past and the present memory there is no cause-effect
re lat ioll , whieh presupposes a cOll t inuity (sec text note 379 for the development of
this argu lllentat ion ) . Therefore those who invoke memory as the lIn i rier of cogn i ­
t iolls which arc in themselves separate i m p l icitly finish up b y invol v ing prec isely
1 3R
6. Also the invalidating-invalidated relation (badbyabadhakabhaval)) I 7.6
one another (svatmani$thavirodhinarp) may exist ollly by virtue of their
restinf{ 011 a sillf{le knowing s lll�ject.
- What contraddiction can there be between cognitions which are only
directed to the single manifestations that are their own (bhinnasvab!zasa­
matrani;,{hallam) 10 and, consequently, how can one speak of an in­
validating-invalidated relation with reference to them? l I On the contrary,
this relation is admissible if they rest on a single knowing subject. 6 - -
7.[Someone might however o/�ject that1 just as the cognition of (In
empty slllface entails at the samc time the cognition of the absence �(
the jm; so the cognition ()l lllother-qrpearl entails the lIoll-validity �( the
cognition ()( silver (rupyaj fianapramatvavit) 1 2 .
that knowing subject they wanted to avoid, who, as we have seen, is identified w i th
the continuity of self-consciousness on which memory is based.
10
O r also: « that insist only on themselves (O,I'I'{/O) i .e. o n their own self-aware­
ness - and on the m an i festation ( OiibhasaO) that is their object», following Ipvv I I
p . 37 1 Sl'(lslIIil/ l'i,I'{lYc (/til/alii ca .1·1'a.I'(/f!I\'cdanc (also Ipv I p . 365, which substitutes
sl'arilpc for .ITaS(JI!I \'cdallc) . This is an interpretation that does not basically d iffer
from the text of the 1'!'Ili but consti tutes the development of what is there implicit,
apparently fol lowing the indications in the {ika (cf. Ipvv II p . 3 7 2 1,!,lIa1l 1'i1'rl(l1l c a
.1'1'(/,\' c(/ iibha.I'(/,� c a i i i sl'a,<: ca vi,wya,\: ca i i i yoiyam). Or, Abh. continues, only the
ahha.l'a ( the content o f the cogn i t ion) may be considered ment ioned i n this expres­
s ion, s ince the inval idation can concern only that and not the 'se l f-awareness' com­
ponent (pp. :172-73 alha 1'(1 .I'I'a.I'(/fllvcdallahhagc hadhcI.I,at!lhhavc7d iihhiisamc7tram
c\'a silI!1hha\'(/dhiidhall/ iha lIirdi,v!alll): in this case the Sl'(lllIWo of the karika is to
be understood in the sense of ahhasa (p. 373 lada ('(f salrc 'pi svc7tlllagralia(lctnl
ahhiisa!l7lparYClw Y0i.V(/II1). /\bh. (lPV I pp. 26S-6) indicates yet another possible i n­
terpretation of the karika as a whole, which is real ly rather contrived, b u t is, in the
end, not far removed from the general meaning considered so far. As regards the
sense in which the e xpression .I' l'(lhhasa is lIsed i n the logical schools of B uddhism
(grc7/wkahhc7sa and .l'l'a.l·w!I\'cdal1a) ef. Hattori 1 968: 1 0 1 fT.
I I /\ Iso the i nval idating- invalidated relation is t herefore poss i ble only thanks to
the SUbject's rreedom to act on cogn i t ions that arc t hemselves unrelated and there­
fore incapable, except in a uselessly general way, of being in oppos i t ion to one
another. /\ecording to the Saiva v iew, an inval idating condi t ion is one w h ich inter­
rupts the cont inuation of the result of another (Ipvv II p . 372 yal yasya pha­
lalllll'rllihhwigalll kamli, lal lasya Mdhak(/lI1: eL Rastogi I (86) which presupposes
precisely the continuity and oneness o r the knowing subject. Sec also SD I V . I S fT.
12
Th is karikcl voices an objection e xpressed from the point o f view of the B ud­
dhist logicians (lPV V I I p . :176 dlwl'I/lOlIampeldhyc7yc7didar.<:ifClIII ), according to
1 39
I 7.7 - The cognition of the absence of the j ar 'on this surface there i s
110 j ar ' - is precisely the cognition o f the empty surface (kcvala­
bhlltalajFiilnam cva), since the empty surface appears as the absence of
the j ar. Analogously, one may say that the cognition of mother-of-pearl
whom the i nv al idating-invalidated cogni t ion rel at ion does not need any s ingle sub­
ject on which to base itsel f, but it i s the correct cogn i tion that entail s by itself alone,
implicitly, the non-val idity of every other d i fferent cognition of its object. The prin­
ciple is the same as pointed out in the karikel as the one underl y ing the explana­
t ion of the concept of non-being (ahhc7m) and non-perception (aflllpalahdhi) given
by Dharmottara i n the N BT. The cogni tion of the absence of the j ar, though being
in itsc l f d is t inct from that of the empty surface, is essentially connected with it, just
as determined cogni t ion is l inked to perception and represents its subsequent stage:
the same cognitive act embraces both of them (d. N BT pp. 1 22- 1 23). Dharmottara
here depends directly 011 Dharmakirt i , who had extensively debated the question i n
several of h i s works ( P Y , PYS Y , H B , N B ) . The essential points of Dharmaki rt i's
conception which he sharply distinguishes from his teacher Isvarasena's adllr.\:aflu­
fI/(llra (Steinkellner 1 966: 75 IT; 1 992: 3 1 5 )- may be summari7.ed as fol lows (l refer
to H B pp. 2 1 -2R*). Non-perception is not a d istinc t !lmmelllo connected with a par­
t ic ular p1'Wl/cyu of its own (ahlll[\'(1), as for instance K umurila m aintains. It consists
in a pos i t i ve pcrception of somet hing that ex ists , a pcreeption and object that
however are d i fferent from the cognizer's expectation (aIlY0f!alabdhi , allyahhal'!I,
I'il'i/k,\"ilopalahdhcl' allyatl'iit) and in this way reveal an absence. From the posit ive
percept i on of an 'other' thing one may pass to the cognition of the absence of the
th ing intcnded only on determinate condit ions: first o r all, that the two things pos­
sess an equal capacity to susci tate a certain cogn i t ion (al'is/,\'(ayogyahi) and that
therefore they are necessarily associated in a single cogniti ve aet , and, furthermore,
that for the thing that is the object of negation there subsist all the conditions neces­
sary for its perception ( l i sted in N B I I. 1 3- 1 4 ) . The cognit ion of the absence is im­
mediate: the perception of the one thing alone entai l s the determ ination of the ab­
sence of thc other (hlll/\'asiddhir c l'li{J([f"(Jsyahl/(/I·a.l'iddhifi). Seeing that a surface is
empty in thc cl assical example is knowing that the vase is not therc ( Iasya
kaim/v(/I/l apa/,{/.I'ya I'aika/YIII/l ) . I f this is possible, it is because it is the very na­
ture o r every cogn it ion to define its objec t contextually by excluding the other (tat
paricchit/a{fi laclallyad v\·(I\·a('chillalti). As Dharmaki rti states several times using d i f­
ferent arguments, we are not deal ing with an i n ferential proeess here, by which from
the being there of the other we arrive ( v i a mediation) at the not being there of the
thing aimed at, because between the two there is no real sWl/halldlw on which the
relation of liriga-liligill may rest (lla I'ai kllla,vcil .\·w!lhalldhad allyahlu/va.\' lada­
bhilmgml/aka i,l"(ah , kil!l II' aIlY(fhlli/\,(/ e \'(/ ladahhal'ah). The non-perception there­
fore directly reveals the absence of a thing (ahluJ\oa) and promotes the use ( ver­
bal ization etc . ) of this notion in practice (ahlll! \,a\,ym'aha/'{/). A llllpalahdhi may be
used as a 111'111 to establish (/hhel l'(/\'yal'ahel/,(/ , but only when it is a question of i l ­
lum inating and guid ing a torpid intellect (mildlwflmtipa{fall) that needs to arrive b y
degrees at a notion that i s , o n t h e contrary, immediate in a normal person.
1 40
is, at the same time, the cognition of the absence of s ilver, since there I 7.7
is no mutual identification between mother-of-pearl and s ilver. And there-
fore it is the very perception that constitutes by i tself the invali dating
cognition (pratyak�m!l bZidhakam) , - 7 -
8 . That is inadmissible. From the cognition of the empty sllIjace all
that is provcd is mcrcly that this sllljacc is not a jat (tasyaghatatmata),
alld !lot thc abscncc 011 it of a jar that is accessible to perception
(upalabdhiyogyasya) 1 3 ,
- From the cognition of an empty surface i t i s proved that this sur­
face is not a j ar, but not that on this substratum there is not a d istinct
jar, capable for its part [ if it were there] of being the qbject of sight.
- 8
I J Utp.'s reply is based on the d istinction between two types of abhava:
tc7d{llfIlyaO 'the surface is not the jar' and l'yalirckao 'on that surface there is no jar'
(the two terms reeur in Ipy and Ipyy ; the Navyrmyaya would say salllafladhikara�lGo­
vyadhikara(lilhhell'a or an)'onyaO-,I'w?l,mrg{[hhava, cf. Matilal 1 96R: 50, 1 1 6, 1 4R; or
tad{llmyaO - ,1'wll,mrgahhcll'a, c f. Jha 1 9R I: 1 84- 1 R7); i n the first the possibility of
perception has no part, i n the second i t i s essential. The example proposed by the
B uddhists would be valid only i n the first case, but not in the ease that i n terests
them here, in which the negation is not genera l i zed but concerns, according to their
own formulation, an object characterized by hypothetical v is i b i l i ty (dr,';yatva). Its ap­
plicat ion to vyalirckahhcll'a i s erroneous for aliprasatiga (Ipy I p . 374), The same
point had already been made by Kumurila in the SY (Ahhavaparicchcda, in par­
ticular v v . 3R-39 and Parthasurat h i mi sra's l ucid explanation in the Nyelyaratflelkara).
Dhannakirti had also foreseen this possible objeetion to h i s own theory: if the
reference to the cogn i t ion that simultaneously defines its object and excludes that
which i s other may serve to account for the i mmediacy of the eog n i t ion o f absenee,
what results, however, is a generali 7.ed negation eoneerning all that is other than the
object effec t i vely perceived, thus rendering i mpossible the app lication of those dis­
tinctions (ckajr/all([,\'W!I,\'argi , llpalabdhilak,\'a(wpriipla) mentioned above ( H B p, 26*
yady ekaparicchedad cVelnyovya va(·chcda/.l .I'idhyati, sarvasyelflyasyavl.l'e�·e(lG
.
lalriibllc7vil.l'iclclhir hhavct, na 11iIyayogyclv{l.l'lhasyaiva . llpalahdhilak,l'a(wp/,c7ptasyclfl ll­
palabdhir ahh(/l'a.l'adlwn7li l'i,Ve,I'CI(lat?l ca flO vaktal'yam, aflllpalahdhilak,I'([(lCIpraptc7-
Ilelm api lalra vya vacchcdcll) . Dharmaklrti repl ies by referring t o the narrow sense
in which the term 'other' is to be understood in the context of the allllpalohdhi, as
explicitly stated at the beginning (ihid. p . 22* avi,{:i,l'(ayogyatelf'l7payor ckqii/iina­
.I'at!lsargi(l()/l para.l'parelpck,\·am cWIllyatvam ihahhiprctam), In conclusion, from the
non-perception, as it has been defined, there fol lows the determination of the ab­
sence of something defi n i te in a defi n i te lime and place (p, 27 taslIlud yathoktad
cW/ll llpalmllhMI kvacil k(ldacit kasyacid abhav(l.l'iddhib).
141
I 7.9 9.The surface is always a separate and distinct reality (viviktam),
since things are se((-contained (svatmani��hitel:J); and therefore how can
the cognition 0/ it sometimes (jatu) lead to estahlishing the not being
there (�f a t!iillg distinct /i'O/l/ it ?
- The surface is always separate from what is other than itse l f and
so how can the cognition of it establ ish only in some cases (kadacid eva)
the absence on it of a distinct entity, such as the jar l 4? The separation
from a distinct jar (hhillnaglia(aviviktata) might be an occasional aspect
(kadikitkm!l /'lI/HIl?I) of the surface only provided that also the associa­
tion with that j ar (gharasahitatapi) sometimes constitutes its own form.
'But this is not the case : there are always two things, each sel f-contained,
and the association (sahityam) between them is not another individual en­
tity which, though disti nct from them, comprises both of them (tadatirik­
tam ubhayatlllakalll) 1 5 . However [the objector repl ies ] , a single cogni tive
act in which the two manifestations appear associated (lIhhaYclhhasaSm?l­
sargatfll a kam) const itutes in itsel f the absence o f another cognit ion in
which only one o f the two is manifested (ekilhhil,w�iiWllclfltar(lhlzcl\,{l/'lI-
I ·j U tp.'s objection serves to induce h i s opponent to play the last card he was
saving. in a sense h i s most important one, that on which the Buddhist conception o r
t h e 1I11I1fJ(//a/Jdfli rests. and w h i c h gives i t its orig inal ity. In order t h a t t h e nOll-per­
ception of a thing A may define its absencc, all the eondi tions of percept ibil i ty must
exist (both as regards the thing and the subject), and there must be the positive per­
ccption of a thing B (and this is the essential point) which enters into such a rela­
t ion with A that a single cogn itive act must necessarily grasp both of them ( N BT
p. I () I ckclldriyajl7iillllgriihym!1 /o('(Jllc7dif!l '(/!lidll(lllc7hhilllllkhw!1 l'II.I'llId\'(/\,(/1II 1111\,011-
'
yiipl'k,1'II1II ckajihlllOsiIl!l.wrgi kalhYlllc). If t h i s cognitive act takes place and on i y B
is percei ved this mcans that A is absent. It is in t h is sense that the Buddhist equa­
tiOll perception of B equals absence of A Illust be understood ( N BT p . II R (/r­
IIiajHiillc C I'(/ f/l'illyak,l'{lsya gIW!ilS\'ilhhiil'lI IIcYllle). Th is is as we have seen (kc7rikc7
7) perfectly homologous to the Buddhist explanation or hiidhc7: cognition of
Illother-of-pearl equals inval idation of cogn ition of s i l vcr.
1 5 What guides Utp.'s criticism, here as elsewhere, is his intent to underl ine the
i mmob i l i ty of phenomenal reality (objects, cogni tions taken in themselves etc.), in
order to make the affirmation of an T necessary, as the only source of that dynam ism
which is present at all levels of practical reality, and which renders i t possible. In
doing t h i s he cannot but find h imself continually disputing with the Buddh ists, who
in certain respects take the oppos ite path. Here he denies t hat siihitYil, gha!il,\'ilhililtil,
is something that may be perceived when space is percei ved, as its nature; it is not
an objec t i ve givcn, it is merely a mental construct (IPY Y I I p . 3R4 l'ik(//pallalllcllrwlI
cla/). This subject is dealt with extensively by Abh. fol lowing on from the (ikii (cL
ihid. p. :'IR3).
1 42
pam) 1 6 . [A cogmtlve aet ] nevertheless [it i s replied ] deli m i ts the object I 7.9
as being self-contained: the determination of the absence of the j ar does
not occur as a direct consequence of the datum (na vastubalena), as i s
the case, 011 the contrary, i n the determination o f the existence o f the
place, which depends on the perception o f the place. However [the ob-
jector says] it ean be arrived at through the absence o f the effect, that
is, through the absence of a single cogni t ion in which the two things are
man i fested 1 7 . Not even this is admissible: it would be a cognition arrived
at through mediation (v)'(/vadhclnena pratltifz) , whereas the establishment
of the [empty] place derives immediately from the sight of it (pradda­
dadancld eva) 1 8 . - 9 -
1 0. However, 011 the sill/ace in questioll there is a beam of light, or
- .Ic)r the bline/man a S(�tt, warm, etc. tactile sensation : it is these per­
ceptiolls that establish 011 this sill/ace the 1101l-ident(fication of their ob­
ject with the jar l 9.
16 The opponent shows that he is perfectly aware (who can be more so than a
B uddhi st?) that ,wlhitya does not belong to the sphere of t hings, but to the sphere of
cognit ions (cf. e.g. PY I . 87 S(/I!IS!:iyalllc lIa hhidyallte sl'ato 'rlhc7�1 piiramc7rthikc7b /
riipam ekalll (/lIck(ff!1 ca 1(',1'/1 Imddhcr IIpap/al'a�l) and reformu l ates h i s position i n
less equivocal terms. U tp.'s reply is developed b y Abh . i n Ipyy II p p . 3R4
(pratil'i,mY(ff!1 paryal'(lsyal . . . ) 3 8 5 . Dharmaklrti for h i s part might say that if such
an 'association' (sahilaW, .1·w!l,wrga) i s not a given fact (\,(/.1'111), it i s however present
in cognition and it is revcrberated by cogni tion on the things that gave rise to it (in
the background l ies the princ iple expounded in PY I. 1 09 ckapratyavomadasya
hclllll'(ld dMr ahhedilll / ekadMhclllhhc7l'clla I'yakflllcllll apy ahhiflllalc7 /1).
1 7 The B uddh ist opponent, p u t on the spot, thus ends up by presenting the nega­
t i ve judgement «on the surfaee there is no jar» as an i n ference, coinciding substan­
tially with the first of the eleven types described in NB I I . 30 IT (reduced to three
in H B ) , sl'lIhh(/\'(lllllpa/ahdhi; as Kamalasl l a points out in TSP p. 5 8 7 and as I'esults
prec isely rrom its formulat ion i n the ITt/i, it is resolved i n a kc7ryclllllpa/abdhi. The
B uddhist has therefore i l l icitly changed p lane and Utp. promptly points this out. Bud­
dhist logic is perfectly aware of the dual level o r the negative j udgement ( N BT p.
1 23 ato dp'.\'(IIlIlf!a/olllhllO 'hhc7wljl7clllm!l hllll?1 pravartayati I/O III akrl(//(I karoflty
ahhc7mlli.I,(,(IYO '1II1P(//Olllhhc71 pral'rt/o 'pi pratyak,I'c!/(/ krlo '1lIipa/amhhclI([ pral'artita
IIkla iii) ancl, as has been seen (cL above n. 1 2) , admits the presentation of the nega­
t ion in terms of i n ference only to demonstrate the abh(/Favyavalu7ra in certain cases.
This final s h i ft in perspective is thus equ ivalent to a surrencler.
I H Th is is also the B uddhist position restated so often (cf. e.g. H B p . 27*
dar,�allal/alll([r(//!1 I')'m'adllilllclla I'il/cdam astidm!1 til Iliisflti), that the B uddhist in­
terlocutor ended up, however, by contradicting.
1 9 A fter criticizing the opposing thesis, Utp. now puts forward h i s own; it i s
'unknown t o the ancients' (Ipy I p . 376 ciralltallair aparidr,l' (am; B h . ibid. , circlII-
1 43
1 7. 1 0 - The verbal fonn ulation and rel ative behaviour (vyavahartum ) 'there
is the absence of the j ar on this surface, there is no j ar ' can be legimately
brought about by sight or another sense (alokadi) 2o only once they have
directly perceived in the place in question a beam of l ight or, in the
shadows, a warm, soft etc. tactile sensation constituting in the first case
the absence of the shape of the j ar, and in the second of its tangible form.
10 -
1 1.A pisaca is a d{{ferent thing from light (analokal) ) ; [nevertheless]
beillg invisible, he fIlay reside within the light, just as he may he within
the sill/ace in question : /imll every point ol viell' (sarvatha) his presellce
may !lot he denied.
On the basis of what has been said, the fact that l ight is a different
thing from the pi.fclea does not entail the negation of its presence within
the l ight. The pi.Mea is, in fact, invisible and , though it is different from
the l ight, it can reside within the l ight, in the same way in which it can
without any di fficu lty also reside within a ball o f clay. Therefore the ab­
sence of the pi.l;c/ca, as hc is not vi sible, is not proved both from the
point of view of the opposing doctrines and of our own2 1 . - I I -
lill/air hi .l'lIdd/whlllllaladr,l'(cr c\'(7hhri\'(/.wld/wkalwlllI) referring to the masters o f
Ruddhist logic, whose conception was here t h e object of h i s criticism. I t is not the
cogni tion of the empty surface i n i tse lf that may lead to the establ ishment of the ab­
sence of the jar, but the perception, through any o f the senses, of something else
that mllst necessarily be ill its place (this principle is categorical ly expounded by
Abh., Tpv [ p. 376 ilia lihiil'a eva hlu7I'iilllaf'{lsya ahllri\'(/). I n this way the presence
of all the factors essential for perception to take place (ll/ialahdlli/ak,\'a(w) is ascer­
tained in the subject which the Buddhists also demand (dr:iya = IIpalahdhilak,m­
(I(f/mlplu) , since a v isllal or auditory ete. percept ion actually takes place and may,
--
by percei ving a particular object , legit imately i mply the non-pereeption of another
(the object whose absence one w ishes to establ ish). A l l w i thout unduly confusing
/idhaw and adheya (IPV V II p. 382 i'ka.l'yail'(J hi kal/wlII adhiiradheyaW): the per­
ception required to establish an absence is not that of the surface (ddham) , but the
space above i t , w h ich Illay or may not be occupied by a jar etc. «(Jdheya: cf. ihid.
p. 388).
20
I t i s t o be noted that here t he word ri/oka is used i n t h e same sentence first
in the sense of ' l i ght', then in that of 'sight'.
21
I n the opponellt's eyes, t he Saiva conception runs the risk o f m ak i ng the
l'yaliri'kc7hll({\,iI, which is essential i n prac t ical real i t y , become an undifferentiated
{([datlllyah/u]),(l, eonsequently i ncluding even the negations of what is i mperceptible
by nature. Indeed, this verse confirms that t he Saiva and B uddhist theories fully agree
on this poi nt.
1 44
1 2. Thus the cogmtlOn of mother-of-pearl may appear as the 110/1- 1 7.12
being of the cognition of silver; howevel� it cannot reveal the non-validity
of the former cognition of silver 22.
The cognition o f mother-of-pearl i n itself appears as the non-being
of the cognition of s ilver; but through the direct cogn i tion of mother o f
pearl which takes place a t that particular moment (tadcln/ntanaO) one does
not obtain the non-validity (aprclmcll.1yam) of a distinct cognition of s i l­
ver that occurred in the past. - 1 2 -
1 3. Not even i/!t'crence can account for the invalidation of a cogni­
tion , due to the property-possessor not being established (dhatmyasid­
dhel)) 2 3 ; 011 the contrary the iI/validation , established on the basis of
everyone's inner experience (svasaq1Vedanasiddhay24 , is coherently ex­
plained (yukta) as deriving from a unitary knowing su/�ject.
- At the moment of the cognition o f mother-of-pearl the former
cognition of silver no longer subsists. Therefore, since the property-pos­
sessor is not establ ished, the i nvalidation may not be explained in terms
of inferenee25. On the contrary, it is explained (sidhyati) by maintaining
that it is i n the sel f-awareness (svasw!lvedane) - consisting i n the unitary
22
The discussion now returns to the invalidating-i nv a lidated cogni t io n rel a t ion,
after this long d igression on the coneept of negation has furnished the elements
needed to darify the erux of t h i s relation and its implications.
2.1 The preeeding karikris h ave shown that, remaining in the sphere o f the B ud­
dhist concept ion, perception alone i s not able to account for the i n v al i dation (badh(l)
of a cognition. Nor, t h i s Wrika adds, would a possible B uddhi s t recourse to i n ference
aehieve this purpose. 'Also' (api), as Abh. suggests, may also refer to dharmyasid­
dher: in this case there would be an allusion to the asiddhi of the reason addueed,
as well as of the property-possessor. The dhal'lnyasiddhi is a form of logical fallaey
(helw7hhiisa) , included by Dharmaklrti in the asiddha type (NB I IL65 dharmyasid­
ciliaI' aflY asidclha!! - yatha sarl'agala (/{Illeli sddhye sarl'alropa/abhyalllallagU(wtvcllII).
On the meaning and translation of the term d/wrmin see K i tagawa 1 960: 387.
24
I translate i t i n this way on the basis of the i m med i ate meaning, whieh
believe - remains valid, even i f the I'rtli chooses to make a so-to-speak concentric
meani ng emerge in its plaee, whieh eontains the analytie explanation of hridhil.
2S
In faet , the i n ference would be as fol lows: the eognition o f s i l ver (dharll/in)
is faulty (dharma) because of the cogni t ion of mother-of-pearl, or of the cogni tion
'it is not s i lver', or also because the thing i n question becomes the objeet of two
eont rad ietory cogni t ions (three possible hellls). The fault, as the vrlli makes e1ear,
l ies in the fact that at the moment of the i n ferenee the cognition of s i lver, produeed
in the past and momentary aeeording to the B uddhists, no J onger exists. The fau l t
of asiddhi may also b e attributed t o t h e possible heilis (cf. IPVV I I p . 397).
1 45
1 7. 1 3 knowi ng subject that the relation constituted by the two cogmtIOns
referring to a s ingle object is man i fested (ekadeHiva,�tafll b hYllbl/(1yajFid­
namayasat!lbandhahhasallat). The congruence with reali ty which i s subse­
quently ascertained (p{dcat,\'W!lvac!afi), and which causes one to say that
the one cognition is valid and the other is not, can take place insofar as
the fonner cognition is also man i fested in the self-awareness o f the
present dircct perception. The determination o f the congruence also
depends on the unitary knowing subject26. - 1 3
1 4.Thlls ordillary worldly ([('til'ity, whether pllre or impllre27, is ex­
perienced as resting on the Lord associated (khac ite) 2R with the
IlWII(/'cstatioll (�/' greatly d(flcrcllfiated ol�iccti\'c realities.
All practical activ ity, based on d i fferentiation due to the power o f
maya, is purc for those who possess such knowledge, impure for those
who are blind because of nescience29. It is possible to grasp, through
d irect experience (sal!lblul\,yate 'nllb!im 'ena), that all this daily practical
activ ity is founded on the B lessed Onc'o, engaged in the man i festation
of the various d ifferentiated realities. - 1 4
26
Two stages may be dist ingu ished in the inval idating process: firstly a con­
fl ict (\'irodlw) between two cogn it ions, and then the asccrtainment of their con­
gruence with real ity (S(//11\'(7da) on the basi s of their ability to produce the expected
results ete . Vi/'(llllw is possible, Abh. continues on t he bas is of the (ikii (lPYY [ l pp.
403 - 4 ) , only i f there i s a single and unitary sub.iect of the two cognitions ( \'imdhasya
h7/'al/lIIll rlld cka,l:rayal l'at!1 tat silli ckaslllill P/,IIII11III1/'i .iI7cyalll): similarly, ,1'(I/11 \'(7dll,
taking place only after (pamto!l) the cog n i t ions, requires the uni f'ying act ion of' the
subject. There f'ore, since the inval idation depends on I'imdlw and smllvado and these
in turn depend on a single cognizer, i t f'ol lows that the inval idat ion also depends on
this.
n In the acti v ity of everyday l i fe ( l'wII'ahara) there is an im pure aspect, con­
sisting of sales, purchases, quarrcis etc ., in which the vulgar man is immersed, and
a pure aspcct, cOll s isting of teach ing, meditation , i n i tiation, ritual cercmonies, per­
taining to the man who has entered on the path of freedom. The value of this div ision
is, however, far from being absolute and dimin ishes with the gradual c ievation o r
consc iousness.
2H G lossed (lPY I p. 390, IPYY \I p. 4(4) with s\,a/,/lpallallyalhahlll/I'cl/a
IIpa/'akll'.
29 I.e. sakata. prataycikala al/d l'ijiiiil/{7ka/a (ihid. p. 40(1).
.HIPractical real ity is possible as such i n that it is rooted in the S u preme Con­
sciousness and this may be known through d i rect experience itself ( i .e. not through
i n ference). This experience is accessible also to obtuse souls incapable of arriv i ng
at it i m mediatciy, through med itation and the repeated practice of this teac h ing. (cf.
ihid. p. 405) .
1 46
I 8.1
CHAPTER VIII
1.However (kevalam) 1 , the man(festatiolls sometimes depend 011 the
dircct sCllsory experience which takes place at that velY moment
(tatkalikak�asamak�yaO) at other times they do not, as in the case of the
blilldmall, darkllcss etc?
- Sometimes the manifestations are conveyed by the present direct
experience, thus determining the cognition that may be formulated as 'this
is a jar'; on the contrary, in the case o f darkness etc. they derive from a
former perception. - 1 -
2. 011 thc ('ollfrary, therc is 110 difference (vise�ab) ill the intrinsic
cxistclI('e (sattayam) (�/' thc man(festation (�f the ol�ject within the sphere
�f thc mental constmcts regarding fi/tllre, present or past ol�jects.
In the mental constructs that follow d irect perception
(pratyak,Hlpr,�thap(/ti,\'//), such as memory and conjecture, or in the others
that are not dependent on it (svatantre,\'//), concerning the three times, the
man i festat ion of the object remains internally the same3 . 2
3 . Evcfl (/' pleasure etc. alld the C{[IISCS (d' the statcs �/' pleasure etc.
are real (vastu�;u) and thcir manifcstatio/l cxists (sadbhave), nevertheless,
I Here kl'l'ahilll introduces a qua l i fication of the general statement that concluded
the prev ious c7h llika: the whole fabric of phenomenal e x istence has its reality within
the Lord.
2 This explains how the c7!Jhasas d iffer in clearness or v i v id ness (sphU{aIVa; IPY
I p . 402-3). The v i vidness o f an ahhlisa depends on its association with the aMasa
'direct experience'. Thi s is m issing, therefore, when the subject is i n the dark or b l i nd
(but not born blind) and i s replaced by its reconstruct i on on the basi s of former
direct experiences. On the contrary, this is altogether absent in the case of a person
who is born hlind, u nles� one acknowledges (IPYY II p. 4(8) that it occurs through
the latent traces left by former e x istences .
:l The abha,I'a 'blue' is essentially the same whether i t appears associated with
the dhhc7.1'a ' [ sec' or ' [ remember' or ' ( imagine'. S i m ilarly the ahl/(Isa 'seeing' remains
essentially the same even i f i t is associated i n turn with the ahhasa 'blue', 'jar' etc.
I n the end everything, w ithout distinction, takes on the form '1' ( 1 percei ve, 1 remem­
ber, I imagine the colour blue: cr. IPYY I I p. 409).
1 47
I 8.3 because they belong to the past, an ejfective simi/ar4 COlldition of
pleasure is 1I0t5 pJ'Odllced (tathasthitil:U.
The manifestations of pleasure, pain etc. and those o f the factors
that cause them, though they always exist intemall y6, do not bring about
a state of j oy etc. because, due to their belongi ng to the past [in the case
in question], they have no extemal existence at the present moment and
only the manifestations that exist at the present moment (tadatva­
vW,<;f{ifl{llll) are able to produce the above mentioned state. - 3 -
4. If: however, pleaslire etc. is intellsely reproduced (ga<;lham ulli­
khyamane) throllgh melltal representation, then that salli e state
(tathasthit il)) comes abollt ill the sll/Jjeet, in the sallie wa/ , sillce he vivid­
ly e.\periellces that pleasure.
Reproduced through an autonomous mental representationR with
particularly intense effort, pleasure etc. becomes completely vivid and
causes, in the same way, joy (vikasaO)9 etc. - 4 -
5 . Extemal existence (bahyata) is to be considered an accessory COII­
ditioll (upadhil)) and not the I'ery essellc£' (atma) (�t' the man(t'estations (�l
heing and non-being. These, therefore, iIlS(JlclI ' as they are inner
m([II(t'estations, always exist.
,I S i m i lar to that experienced in the past, when that part icular pleasure and its
causes were present.
5 The negative, required by meaning and supported by all three commentaries,
is based on read ing the compound {(l{lii7s{li ili(i as {olhcl·a,slhilib, thus attributing to
the negat ive particle the sense o r prcJsajvaprali,I'cdha (the only one to say so explicit­
ly is Bh I p . 4(6). Talhii may also not be considered part of the compound that fol ­
lows, b u t lathiislhitill must, in any case, appear joined ( as i t stands for lalha aslhilih ) ;
h(]w � ver it is o n l y so in B h ' s yoja/l(l and never in t h e kiirikc7s or quotations in [PV
and I PVV.
(, United with the I .
7 I .e . l i ke that deriv i ng from an 'external' pleasure.
H Utp. spec i fics that i t is l'ikalpa 'autonomous' in order to exclude memory,
which l i ke determinate knowledge or j udgement i s strictly dependent on direct
perception (d. text note 425). The role of memory is l i m ited to supplying the ob­
ject for the mental evocat ion, which having freed it from its tics with a particular
past time, place and subjeet, brings it so v i vidly back to consciousness that it ap­
pears as if i t were altogether new (sec ihid. p . 4 1 1 ; c f. also karila7 I . 4. 2).
! ) On I'ik(/sa ('expansion', joy) sec Gnoli 1 96X: 46-47.
1 4R
- A l l the various m an i festations , concerning both being and non-be- I 8.5
i ng, even if they do not appear as external, nonetheless have an existence
(sattasty eva), for instance i n memory and so on. The fact that they exist
externally is only an accessory condition and not their own f0l111. The
same is true of the manifestation of 'non-being', even though this [only]
has an internal existence (antafzsattayam api), since it does not exist
1 0.
exte rnal l y - 5 -
6.These manzt'estations being internal (antaratvat), ins�lar as they are
one with the knowing s lll�ject, canllot have causal effi ciency which
presupposes d{!j'erentiation . Even when the condition of externality [�t' the
manzt'estations as regards the knowing sll�jectJ exists, the causal effIcien­
cy is d{!j'erelltiated on the basis (�t' the dUrerentiatioll of the manifesta­
tions (bhinnabhasabhedatal)).
- Even if all the various manifestations, such as blue, pleasure etc .
permanentl y exist w ithin, nevertheless, precisely because they consist
only in the knowing subject, they do not possess causal efficiency, which
is based on the differentiation typical o f the relation of cause and effect
etc . Even if there is the condition o f differentiation from the knowing
subject, causal efficiency, being l inked to the manifestations, is seen to
be di fferentiated according to whether it pertains to the form and so on,
conforming with the diversi ty o f the manifestations (e.g. their being men-
tal, sensory etc , ) " . 6
fns(!I'ar as they are essentially constituted by consciousness (cin­
7.
mayatvc) the manite' stations permanently reside internally; il1s(�t'ar as they
arc manit'ested as external owing to the power (�t' maya, they also exist
extemally.
As their own form is consciousness the manifestations permanent­
ly reside intcrnally. One speaks of external manifestation when the
things, remain ing ul1separatecl from l ight (praka,\:al'yafirikte��u) are made
10
C f.
S DVr p. 1 30 lad avastl' api prak(HalllcllWIII cidn/pam eva, kCl'al(//11 bahye
Sec S D I I I .7 8ab.
praka.\:(/I/c7h/i(7v{id a\'(/slll IIcyale.
I 1
In other words, this is a necessary but not a sufficien t condi t ion: i n order for
a man i festation to produce a determinate e ffect a series of speci fications and rela­
tions with other aMasas are also required. On causal effieiency (arthakriycl) sec
below p. 1 66.
1 49
I 8.7 by the power o f maya to appear (prakcHyamanc,w) 1 2 extemally as the
object of d irect perception 1 3 • But even when they are directly perceptible
(taddpi) they do not cease, for this reason, in the final analysis to be in­
ternal. On the contrary, in the case of intending to create and so on
(sisrk,wldall) even things come to be i nternal. - 7 -
8 . Even tlie mental representation (ullekhal)) which occ/lrs ill the
sphere q( discursive thought (vikalpe) is extemal, because it appears in
terms ()( separation (prthakprathal)) . Indeed, internality is lInity with the
1 2 B y using the causative form the 1'("lIi seeks to underli ne the heteronomy
(pc7ralall/rva) of the man i festat ions of objective real ity which ordinary experience
dom i nated by the power of mfiyu tends to consider extraneous to and independent
of consc iousness. On the other hand, grammatical speculat ion is able to place the
correct l i m its on a statement such as this, which, i f t aken l i terally, runs the risk o f
leading one just a s far from the truth a s that against which i t was advanced. I f the
responsi b il ity for the act ion of becoming m an i fest, of shining (praka.1'-) rested sole­
l y with the primary subject of the causat ive (lie/II) or, in other words, with con­
sciousness, this would mean that the subject were completely extraneous to the
reality of l ight and in that case truly hahya, or from the Saiva point of v iew, a
mere not hing. But as B hartrhari says (d. VP I l l . 7 . 1 22- 1 28), the subject of the ac­
t ion induced, in the causative for m , can only be someone who possesses the requ i re­
ments to act as a free agent of it (cL the passage in Abh.'s lost Sil'odl',I'rya/0(,(/1I0
q uotcd in PTV p. 225, 111'('1',1'0 'fli .\'(/ hill/\'ed YOSVl/ .lok/IlW nilma l'idya/e) ,Tore l l a
1 98 7 : 1 57-58). The meaning of t h e causative docs n o t g o beyond t h e , more o r less,
cogent stimu lation or thc 11('/11 so that the kal'/I' performs the act ion in question: only
what is i ll itsel f ahle to shine or, in other words, that which is essentially light, may
be made to appear or shine (cf. also TA X . 3 8-45a). The status or the ahllc7sa is
thus to be found in this del icate balance betwecn sl '(7/oll /I',1'a and flc7ra/all /I'V(L
1.\ Ahh, (I PVV I I pp. 2 1 -2), following the thread of the (ikil, deals at length with
the various impl ications contained in the expression 'as direct ly perceptible'
(lI/'(Jt\'okS({/I'CIIO), and he begins by imagining the su rprise of those who expected to
see also the I'ika/pas (particularly those terilled 'independent') ment ioned in this con­
text. LJtp. i s here primari l y cOllcerned with underl in ing what contrasts with what is
comillonly accepted in this case claiming the u l t i mate internal ity of what is con­
sidered external {J0l' (,X(,C//CII(,(, (the object o r {J/'(/ (yaksa) whereas the internal ity
of the I'ika/{Jas is generally taken for granted and thus it is not worth expressly stat­
ing it. On the contrary, what has to he demonstrated and t h i s once again conrt icts
with the general opinion is preci sely the real external ity of the l'ika/{!(ls and this
is donc in the fol lowing slnnza. Later this externality ultimately comes to rest on a
fundamental intertllll ity, which is coml11on to every real ity. But pra/yak,w/I'('/w in the
1'l'lIi may also have another funct ion : this expression may re" er to all types of ahll(l.I'a
whether sensory or mental be ing directly present to the consciollsness, and thus
to their indiscrim inate sa/Vi/ta.
[ 50
knowin g slll�;ect (pramatraikatmyam), externality is separation from I 8.8
him t 4 .
- The mental representation o f the jar etc. i n the sphere o f d iscur­
sive thought, though not the object of the senses such as sight, is non­
etheless external insofar as it is manifested as separate [from the sub­
jec t] . Indeed, intemality is the reflective awareness 'I' (ahal?lVimarSab),
,
externality is the reflective awareness 'this 1 5. Thus for things - such as
the jar and so on - there are two k i nds of externality, that is, they are
the object o f cognition through both the external and internal senses; for
pleasure and so on there is one, i n that they are cognised only by the
internal senses. 8
-
9. Owing to tlze will (�( the Lord mental representations and pleasllre
etc. are mal1l/ested to consciousness as external, in the same way as [also
owing to the will (�( the Lord) the mClnz(estation - in the form (�( direct
perception - o( what pertains to thc planes q( realities perceptible by the
eye etc. (ak;;yadibhuvam) is extcl'llal.
- The mani festation (prak(7.�ab) t 6 of mental representations and
pleasure, pain, shame etc. that takes place through the m i nd (ballddhaM 1 7
i s no different from that which, hav ing the form o f direct perception due
to the power of the Lord I x, concerns those realities that can be perceived
by the eye, such as shapes etc. 9
1 4 One must keep in m ind the background against which t h i s discussion of the
external ity of the aMasa i n direct perception and in l'ika/pa takes p l ace. I ndeed ex­
ternality has been declared the sill(, qua 11011 condition on which the existence of
causal elliciency depends (and i t cannot be denied that the l'ika/pas, too, are able to
produce e llects); and this dependence is invoked in order to refute the sa/yaW-ar­
/liakri W7kc7ri/l'(1II1 identification, upheld by the B uddhists. The 1'I'lIi distinguishes
between two forms of this general externality, accord ing to whether the ahhasa is
the ob ject of both the ex ternal and internal senses, or internal only.
1 5 Or to put it more clearly , becoming consciolls o f the object in terms of T
(ull ity, internal ity) or of 'this' (separation, externali ty).
1 6 Once aga in the problem arises of how to translate the term praka,\:(I , whilst
preserving its dens ity o f meaning ( l ight, man i festation, presence to consciousness and
therefore also coming to light, percept ion, knowledge etc.).
17 If this knowing i s cal led hallddlia - in spite of the fact, a hypothetical objec-
tor notes, the actual gralwka is in this case the /II(ll/as it is because it is concluded
by the act of the lIi.\'((I),o, which is pertinent to the hllddhi (IpVV II lpp. 430-3 1 ).
I � [svara is the u l t i mate sOllrce of a l l mani festations. This is so not only in the
case of those that arc the object of perception as external objects, w h ich appear more
lS[
1 8. 1 0 1 0. On the basis of what has been said (tad) without a unity (�f cogni-
tions ordinary worldly activity would not he possible. It is on the unity
(�f light that the unity (�f the variolls cognitio!ls is based and this III/italY
light is precisely the one knowing sll/Jject. This has becn (/(�flnitively es­
tablished.
Indeed, practical activity is based on the unificat ion (Oanlls(//!ldhii­
nella) of the variolls cognitions, which are in themselves separate from
one another, and the un ification of the cognitions is constituted by the
light-principle, which is unitary in itself. This unitary light is precisely
the knowing subject, one, called the Supreme Self. - to -
I I . And prccisely this k!lowing slIbject is Mahdva/'([, insofar as he
is characterized by indefectible ref7cctivc (/\I'([/ 'C I/CSS (vimrsattvena
niyatena) . In fact, ill God this awareness is pure knowledge a!ld actioll.
Mahcsvara is the supreme self, whose nature is consc iousncss, with
his own primary indcfectible nature constituted by reflective awareness.
In this consciousness-pri nciple, called S iva, whose essence is everything,
there is absolutely pure knowledge and act ion, bring none other than the
reflective awarencss T (ah(/f!ll'imar.I'anam cva). In Isvara, on the contrary,
knowledge and action, connected as they are w ith an object assumed to
be parlly di fferent iatcd (hlzi!lllahlzinnaO), are to be considered partially
pure (.I:uddha.\:wldhe). Referring then to an objcct ive real ity assumed to
bc di fferentiated, as happcns on the plane of the indiv idual subject,
knowledge ancl action, informed respectively by sattl'a and rajas, or in
othcr words by light and activity, contractcd by tamas, are callcd impure.
- I I
as independent frolll the l im ited subject, but also in the case of those that might
seem solely determi ned by the indiv idual's w i l l , such as mental representations, fan­
tasies etc. S im i larly, as Somiinanda says (see S f) I . 44 and !'!'lIi), the jar is produced
by the potter but only insofar as his creat ivity is containcd within the all-pcrvad ing
creat i v ity o f the Lord.
I S2
II 1.1
SECTION II. ACTION
CHAPTER I
1 . Therefore, also the ol�jection raised earlier 'an action that is both
unitary and slIccessive, belonging to a unitary subject is not admissible' l
- was rejected through the demonstration �f the existence of the unitary
[consciollsness1.
- Through the demonstration of the unitary consciousness-principle
the activity related to the unitary subject is proved unitary. Thus even
the objections against action are found to be confuted. - 1
2. Succcssion pertains to ordinary action, which is dependent on the
power (!f' Time; it is not, howe vel; admissible for divine eternal action,
as it is Ilot for the Lord.
- The action of entities that, due to the power of maya, appear dif­
ferentiated, is successive, being dependent on the power of Time2; but
that action, informed by the awareness of the self, w ithout beginning or
end, which is the very essence of the Lord, is not. - 2
3 . Time is the transit (�f the sun etc . , or the birth (�f this or that flower
and so 011 , or also heat (llld cold. Or time, in reality, is nothing but the
succession (krama eva) characterized by these elements.
I This is the B uddhist objection expressed in kiirikc7 I. 2.9.
2 O n the power of Time as the caLise of the passing from the One to the m any
the 'locus classicus' i s V P I. 3 and vrtti; c f. also I I I . 9. 46. The d istinc t ion between
the working of 1l/(7yc7/wkli (the d i fferentiation between things, and between things and
the subject) and k(7/a/wkli (the introduction of succession into acti v i ty) is found i n
almost t h e same terms i n Hclariija's commentary on V P I I I . 3 . 83 (akrame 'pi h,.a­
hmalli hhedavahhc7.1'ollalll (lvidyc7k(lalll / lalraiva kramc7vahhasallat!1 ka/c7khya­
svc7tanlrya.vaklikrtam); e f. A k l uj kar 1 970: 1 22 n. 39; lyer 1 969: 1 25-26. Abh. (Ipvv
I I I p . 1 0) synthetically defines the power of Time in the following words: hhagavala
eva c7hhc7sii1Ic7 blic7.1'apm 11/(/ //(Jsa ilia rll/(/ Iii.
153
II Time consists of various actions that are common knowledge i n
everyday experience) , o r of cold and so o n . Or rather, time i s the suc­
cession i tself - characterized by these - which is an accessory qualifica­
t ion (OUjJildlll' O) of all the various realities in their being manifested as
differentiated; time is nothing but this succession, because it is through
it thaI temporal differentiations are established. 3 -
4 . Successioll is based on d(f{erelltiation and this ill tllm derives limn
the existence or nOli-existence (�( a certain malllj'estation (abhasasadasat­
tvatal)). The existence or lIoll-existence (�( mall(jcstations depends 011 the
Lord, who is he who determines their flIlIlt(j'orm appearance.
- The cause of succession in th ings is the very action of the Lord,
directed to the multiform appearance of the manifestations di fferentiated
in their nature and mutually exc1usive4 . 4 -
5 . Through the variety (�( physical forms he callses spatial sllccession
to appeal'; throllgh the man((estatioll (�j' the variery ()( actiolls the Lord
also callses temporal sllccession to appear5.
In the case of many enti ties, there is spat ial succession through the
man i festation of mutual diversity and temporal succession through actions.
However, with reference to a single entity there is only temporal succes­
sion due to different actions such as birth, existence, change etc.6 - 5
.1 The same idea (that the name 'time' is g iven to those realities able to act as
a reference point, or 'measure' for the others) is found e xpressed i n VP I l l . 9.77
I Il irjllcllaparilllcl(lcl s ci hila ity ahhi­
kriY(llltawparicchcdapr(i \,!,IIc7 y c7 kriy<7I!1 prati
dh7yalcII. 'That (act ivity), the measure (of t i me) of which is well-known and which
is employed in measuring (the duration (1) any oyhcr activity, with regard to (any
other) activity, is cal led t ime' (trans ! . Sharma 1 972: 10 I ).
<\ This is my translation of the expression °anyollyc7hlulsaHinyao . guided also by
a passage in IPY ( I I p. 1 6) , which recurs in almost the same terms in IPVV. D i f­
ferent man i festations may i mpl icate each other. referring to a single substratum, such
as 'red', 'jar' etc. or may be completcly distinct from each other such as 'jar', 'cloth':
obviously not i n the first case, but not even in the second where the two things,
though unrelated, may coex ist in a single cogn i tive act (Yllgapad cvaikajHancna
.I'p hUra(lclt Bh I I p. 1 6) is there succession. On the contrary, succession is only
possible i f the man i festations arc such that the presence o f the one necessarily ex­
cludes that o f the other, as i n the case o f autumn and w i nter.
S On kilfa I kriyc7 and deli([ I lIliirti sec VP 1 . 1 Vrlli pp. 2, 9 (and Paddhafi pp.
5, 9); sec also VP IIl .7. 1 53 and Helaraja's commentary; Prakir(wkapraka.l:a I p. 1 1 7 .
(, Together with growth, dec l i ne and d isappearence they consti tute the s i x
mod i fications o r e x istence (hhcil'Cl l'ikc7ra; cr. Nil'llkta 1 .2.X-9).
1 54
6. In all things (sarvatra) the diversity of the manifestations is the I I 1 . 6
source of temporal sllccession for those knowing subjects such as the void
etc., whose light is discontinuous (vicchinnabhasal)}, but not for the
knovving subject who shines once and for ever (salq·t) .
- In every object diversified man i festation determi nes the appearance
of temporal succession [exclusively] for the knowing subject who iden­
tifies himself w ith the void, the body and so on. Indeed, apart from
memory, what was mani fested i n the past (prakkalalJ) does not shine i n
the same manner a t the present momenC, and i t is w ith reference to his
own present (svavartamanapek,wya) that the subject may use the notions
of past and future in everyday experience. On the contrary, for the [true]
knowing subject who shines uninterruptedly once and for ever (sakrdvi­
bhatasyai\ there is no temporal differentiation, neither in h imself nor as
regards objects, since, as the shining is never interrupted, i t i s not pos­
sible to speak of repetition. - 6 -
7 . Also spatial succession in things is manifested {only] to the limited
knowing slll�iect; on the contrary, to the unlimited subject things appear
full (�( his own self, like his own self.
- With reference to the limited subject [only] things appear differen­
tiated from the subject and from each other, and they are said to be far
away etc . , for the Lord, on the contrary - his essence being solely light
- cannot be non-light (afJraka,�asal!lbhavat) with respect to anything, not
even to an atom. The separation or distance from h imself, or between
thi ngs, does not appear to him who is light and only l i ght9. - 7 -
7 That is, connected with preceding man i festations of the l i m i ted s u bject ( c f. text
note 1 7) . Only through memory can the former shining o f the object be rev ived, i n
some way; but this i s a totally d ifferent question, already dealt w ith a t lenght above
(h1c7mldhikc7ra, c7hnikas III - IV).
H Thi s i s a reference through a J'aiva text (Sarasvatasar!lgraha according to
Ipvv III p. 33, Sivasatra according to SpandaSar!ldoha p. 25) to sakrdvibhc7ta i n
Challdogya Up. V I I I .4.2, later taken u p again b y Gauc.lapada i n Mc7wjakyakarika
I I I. 36, I V . X I ; sec also PTV p. 1 99 . Consciousness shines 'once only' (this i s the
primary meaning o f sakrt ) , but as this shining is never i n terrupted the expression
may also be taken i n its secondary meaning o f 'constantly, always, once and for ever
(cL Abh.'s explanation in Ipvv III pp. 2 1 -22; see also Ipv v II p. 262
sakrcchahdcna til ckavc7ravacina sadcirtlwparyilYe(lCl va vicchcda.�arika niv<7ritii).
Sankara s i m ilarly glosses sakr! i n the passages q �oted above with satatarn.
<) Lit. 'a compact mass of l i ght' (prak(7!;aghanasya) .
1 55
II 1.8 8. Nevertheless, the manzfestation of sllch a d{fferentiation between I I 2.1
subject and ol�iect of knowledge is the very creative power
(nirmfuJasaktil:U of the Lord (iS itul)), who knows thus.
The fact that the various entities existing as subject and object of
knowledge are detemlined as differentiated from each other and from CHAPTER II
Paramdvara (or from the self) , is [due to] the creative power of
Paramesvara, who, yet, thus shines i n absolute ful lness, neither does his 1.The ideas of action, relation, universal, substance, space and time l ,
own permanent form ever i n any way cease to ex ist as a consequence of which are hased 011 unity and multiplicity, are to be considered real
this determination. 8 - (satya!)), because of their permctnence and efficacy (sthairyopayogabhyam).

- The ideas of relation etc. are also real manifestations, j us t like

action2 , even if they regard both unity and mUltiplicity [at the same
time] 3 . They can, in fact, be employed permanently w i th determinate
practical results, and as such they are undeniable4 . - 1 -

I This second (lhnika aims at estab l i shing that the categories acknowledged by
the hahya\'(ldins (the reference is part icularly to the Nyaya-V a ise�ka) are acceptable
only i f seen from the Saiva v iewpoint. Otherw i se they do not stand u p to criticism
(and the criticism par excellence i s that o f the B uddhi s t logicians). Cf. Torella 1 992:
328-29.
2 The demonstration o f the reality o f action was i m p l i c i t in that o f the power

of act ion d i sc u ssed earl ier. In the (ikel ( c f. Ipvv III p p . 36-37) U t p . refers to
three d i fferent interpretations o f the compound satyahhasa as karmadharaya,
,W,�fh7tatpl/ru,\"(/ and Iwh l/I'r7hi.
J The principal object ion the Buddhists make to these categories, which they

place in the sphere of relative truth, is precisely that of viruddhadharmc7dhyasa.

4 The truth of a cognition is establ ished here precisely by i t s not bein g con­

tradicted by a subsequent cognition (sthairya) and by its leading to expected practi­

cal results (l/{Jayoga); see Ahh.'s l uc i d formulat ion (Ipvv III p. 29), satya eva yatab
sthiro hadhakenalll/nmt7tyall/an(/\'iflwr,I'al, S(l/11VCldavcII11,1' ca ahhisal!lhitayclf!l grclma­
praptitak,W1(Ic7yaf(l kriyayam l/payog7, The key-term sw?mlda may be applied both to
stlwirya and to IIpayoga (cf. ihid. p. 69, asyc7/!l vyc7khyc7yaf!/ bhal'asya arthakriycI/?1
kllrvata ekc7neka/'//patc7 . . . iti kartal'ya((/, it)' evambll1/ta l/payoga IIktab, sthairym!l
til .\·w!/wldab: IItta/'(/ I'yaklzyc7ne til stlzair),W!1 bc7dhakc7hhc7vab, IIpayogas til ,I'(II!/vcldall
iti hheda iti). This may be compared with one o f the c lassical explanat ions o f the
term, that given by Dharmottara ( N BT p. 1 7, avis(II!l\'(/dakw!1 jiiallw?/ ,I'w!lyagjIliJnam
/ toke co parvam IIpadar,vitaf/1 arthW!1 prapayan s(/f?/wldaka IIcyate, tadvat jiic7nam
a{Ji sl'ayw!/ pradar.<iitam artlzW!1 prapayat sW?/1'(7dakam IIcyate (behind which l ies
Dharmaklrt i , PV I I . 1 . . . artlzakriyc7stlzitib / (/l'i,I'(/f!mldallam . . . ) . On s{/f!/vc7da and
related terms, such as avi,I'w!l\'(7din etc. (and thei r d ifferent accept ions i n the Buddhist
exegelical tradi tion) see Katsura 1 984: 222-24, Dreyfus 1 992, Franco 1 992: 49-50,
van B ijlert 1 989: 1 22-28.

1 56 1 57
II 2. In action etc. (tatra)5 there is one internal reality (antararp tat­
tvam ) ; this, once it has become the object (�f sensory knowledge, becomes
manifold depending all place, time and the specific shapes it assumes.
The essential reali ty (tattwu!l) - which is by nature absolutely un­
divided (abhinflam eva) - becomes one and m anifold because of the
division into internal and external man i festation6. [It becomes manifold]
because of the multiplic ity of the manifestations of the individual real ities
(Osvalak,W1�la°), constitued as they are by the different combinations of
external manifestations such as place, time, shape . 2 man(fested separately (vivikmbhal)), possess a unity in the sense of
3 . The mind (manas) , po:{orming the function (�f determination fol­
lowing [the direct perceptionj (anuvyavasayi )7 , brings abollt conceptllal
5 The l'rlli docs not indicate the interpretation to be given of the word talra.
Abh. in h i s two commentaries suggests three interpretations that he considers equal­
ly possiblc: 'in action etc.', 'given the real ity of action etc.', 'as regards thc u n ity anc!
multipl i city of action etc.'. The (lka, from which Abh. quotes the express ion l'l'([I?1
sali (prol�ably referring to lalra) glossed w i th l'ic/yalllallc kriyadall ladgall' ca
satyat\'l' ( I PY Y I I I p. 45), seems to indicate the second interpretation.
(, A reality. when i t is completely ident i fied with consciousness. i n other words,
when i t is only consciousness (cillll/(llratayii), may not even strictly be referred to
as one s ince the unity-multi plicity oppos ition only arises at a later stage. This i s seen
from the vrlli, from its paraphrase in Ipyy (sec text note 36) and from what Abh.
statcs a few l i ncs earlier in Ipyy III p . 45 117/adifulm hhaWlllclffl !)(/r(l/l/arthikat!1 yac/
clfllarW?1 sat!ll'illfll(llraiak,I'a(l(lf!1 lat/I'am, lilli'll 11(/ ka/alla kacid ahhcdag/wllall'ad
ckalc7ya api lalra ah/I(ll'cll. The karika and the I'rlli become c learer once various
level s o f mcaning have been recognized in the word (intarofl/. The primary mean­
ing of ({lIlarafll is the absolute real ity ident i fied with the I; it coinc ides with the first
of the two types of ilflla/'{/fII spoken of in TpVY II p. 4 1 6 (iilllaratl'{/!!1 (iI'idha (/h(/II­
wya .1'{/f!lskawI(/ya ca ) , later articulated (pp. 4 1 6-4 1 7 ) and dislocated along the scale
of the princi ples (the h ighest al/laratl '(/fl/ corrcsponds to the plane of Paramesvara);
it is cal led ahhinllalll in the I'rlli. Th is absolute alltarall'am constitutes the ult imate
foundat ion from which un ity and multiplicity come i nto being on the phenomenal
leve l . U n ity is understood as a relative illltamll'aff/, which may be taken i n morc
than one way (sec Tpy V III p . 45 yal III 17I1Wrwl/ ahhiis(/fllarafl(/mi:irwl/ (lfllarwigwl/,
(1II Iar(/f!l ('({ allla(lkara(wlfI(71m l'cdyw!1 lall l'afl/ £'kalil, lad dam ) , and multiplicity i s
knowab i l i ty 01\ the part of the external senscs, tempora l i ty , spat ial ity etc, Thus it be­
comes one-many ( {'kiil/£'kall l ) .
-, Th is is apparently the meaning ind icated by TpV II pp. 43-44, aifldri)'akc I/ir­
;
l'ika/pake . . . / pa,vC(ldhhal'iIlW!1 l'ym·a.w7yw!1 fl i.I,(,(lyilllflakw!1 I'ika/pak(//I/ alll/l') (/\'a,\'(7ya­
.\·ahda\'(7cyatll. According to I PVV I II p. 46 (lf11/l'Y(/\ 'ilsaya is the mental operation
that occurs after the determ i nate awareness of the direct experience (alll/ l'ya \,asaY(//!1
.1'I7k,l'(llk17ral'iflwr.\'asya pa.I'('(ldhlll.il'il/{If!I I'iff/ar.\:affl . . ). In any case, the term is not
.
used here i n the part icular sense attributcd to it in the Nyaya.
1 58
elaborations sllch as action and so Oil, which are based on these twoS II 2.3
and sllbstantiated by the activity �f the knowing subject9•
- The conceptual elaborations such as action etc . , carried out by the
mind (nulnasyab) and regarding both the external and internal p lane -
the m ind being half way between them - are essentially the activity of
the knowing subject (pramiitrvyiipiirarilpiib). - 3 -
4. Things that are se(f-contained (svatmani��hal:l) 1 O and are
mutllal connection with ill the lInitary knowing subject. This is the basis
of the ideas (�f relation.
The various ideas of relation (sm!lbandhaO) such as that expressed
in the phrase 'the king's servant', rest on the unity which derives from
the connection on the internal plane (antab smnanvayiit) and the differen­
tiation of the two related terms externally I I . - 4
5 . The concept1lal elaborations (�f the man(festatiolls (�f 'universal'
and 'individllal slIbstance' also rest extemally 011 unity, as well as on the
dzf/crclltiatioll (�t' the individllal realities and parts.
- The notions of 'cows' and 'Caitra' have as object, externally too,
both the unity of man i festation represented respectively by the general
x I.e. 'on the external and internal p lane' (according to the Vrtfi) , 'on u nity and
multiplicity' (according to A bh . ) . The two i nterpretations arc equi v alent in the l ight
of the preceding karikii.
<) As Abh. c lari fies very well i n the i ntroduction to this stanza i n his commen­
taries, Utp.'s intention here is to reply to the objection that m i ght be raised by a
Buddh ist: these cOllceptual elaborations - which is what they arc do not take place
at the time of the d i rect perception but later, when any contact with reality is
precl uded; therefore they are, i n the absolute sense, unreal. I n U t p.'s reply it is the
continuity and dynam ism of the I that guarantees the contact between these two mo­
ments or time, thus legitimating the working of the mind.
10
The absolute d i fTerence and sel f-containment of things, which is one of the
p ivots of Buddhist doctrine and the school of D ignaga in particular, finds its most
wcll-known and rigorous ex pression i n PY I 40ab ( later taken lip again in PY in; see
Steinkel lner 1 97 3 : I, 40-4 1 ) san'c h//(II'({�1 sl'ahli(lI'c//{/ svas\,ahlic7I'(/l'yaw/slhitcb . . .
II
The two terms of the servant-king relation have an autonomous real i ty on the
external leve l, but they cease to be separate once they arc l inked i n the consc ious­
ness of thc knowing subject. This docs not mean that they become one, because i n
that case it would n o longer b e a relation: there is u n i fication i n separation
(hh ec/ahheda ) .
1 59
II configuration of cow and by the configuration of a particular man seen
as a whole, and the multiplicity of manifestations typical of the individual
realities (svalak�W/(lO) and the various parts l 2 . - 5 -
6 . The cOllnection existing betweell the factors (�{ the action
(karakal)am) is based 0/1 the awareness ()( the action (kriyaO) ; the no­
tions (){ spacc etc . rest 011 the cOllnection hetwecn limit and limited.
The notion of action is based on unity-multiplicity, insofar as the
various factors that contribute to carrying out the action - wood,
saucepan, Devadatla, rice - are internally linked each other by the verb
'he cooks' and external ly differentiated. Also spatial and temporal succes­
sion given the mutual involvement of the objects which act as the l i mit­
ing and lim ited element is merely a particular case of relation charac­
terized in the same way by un ity and multiplicity. The notions of
univcrsal, indiv idual substance, act ion, number etc. all rest 011 inherence
(OS([II/(/ \'(lyaO ) , wh ich is a particu lar type of relation. 6 -
7.Thus the knowing suhject who aspires to the productioll (){ deter­
minate reslllts fIlay obtain them with (/1/ entity that is at the same time
hoth differclltiated and llfldUferclltiatcd. Thlls onc may not s{leak (�{ error
(bhranlib) as rcgards thcm.
With the not ions that have been di scussed so far, that is, action and
so on, which are both one and many, the know ing subject has the
capacity to obtain the determinate effects he desired (which demonstrates
their congruence with real ity), accompanied by the continu ity and
homogeneity (Oilllllgll�l V([O) of thcir manifestations. Therefore sLlch no-
tions arc not erroneous 1.1. 7 with mcan ing and untranslatable i n a s inglc word I have kept in m i nd Abh.'s gloss
I : The unitY-lllll l l i p t ieity tcnsion. which charactcrizcs thc scrics o f conccpts cx­
amincd ill this ahll ika. is not rcduccd, as i l m ight havc sccmcd so far, to that o f in­
tCrllal-cxtcrllal. I n actllal fact , for thc concepts of jali (un iversal) and of i!ral'va (un­
dcrstood as indiv idual cntity constituted by a complex o f parts) the doublc pole o f
unity-multiplicity is also t o b e found at I h e level o f external reality, a s thc kdrika
and I'rlfi indicatc.
1 .\ The notions o f act ion etc., do 1101 , that is, beeomc subscqucntly contradicted
by other cognitions: thus onc has the requisite o f .I'II/(/iryo which, togcther with 01'­
Ilwkriy<7.\'iII!l\·ada (already ment ioned) . determ ines the empi rical val idity of a cogn i ­
lion.
1 60
I I 3.1-2
CHAPTER III
1 -2 . The means (){ knowledge (pramuQam) is that thanks to which the
object is situated within its own confilles (vyavati(>thate) ! 'this thing, with
these characteristics' . This means of knowledge is an ever freshly aris­
ing light related to a sul�ject (svabhuso 'bhinavodayal)p' This light, whose
essence is the innCl' reflective awareness of that which is thus mam/ested,
becomes as regards the ol�ject without spatio- temporal differentiations
etc. and expressed by a singlc name knowledge (mitil)), [provided it
is) not invalidated.
- The means of knowledge is that on which the setting of the object
within its confines depends (vyavasthiipyamiinatii) , both as regards its
mere being and the various possible qual ifications such as permanence
and so on. It consists precisely in the manifestation to a knowing sub­
ject of a new object (aplirvavastuO) as related to him (svatvena). And this
very manifestation 'this' or 'permanent'), which thu s appears to the sub­
ject as separate and new, becomes the object of reflective awareness and
finally valid knowledge (prami(i�I), whose stability is not undermined by
1 In tbe i nterprctation of the notion of vyavosil/(/- vyavasthc7p- (which refers to
thc defin itive establ ishmcnt o f somcthing, both as regards its i ntrin s i c naturc and the
other realities in whose contcxt i t is s ituated; 'establish separately') so pregnant
(lPY II p. 6R lIiyalal!1 praka,{:alllarw/dlllli lIa alil'artote) .
2 S Wlhhasa (togcthcr with vi,wyahlJ(lsa) charaetcrizes the prallla�/(/ also i n the
opin ion o f Dignaga and his school (ef. PSY 1 .9a, PS I . l l ah and \'rtfi, PS 1 . 1 0 i n
particular). Howcvcr in Dignaga, and i n the Yogacara v iew i n gcneral , svao refcrs
to knowlcdge itsel f seen as thc subject, whcreas in the IPK it refers to the knowing
subject and its ccntrality (d. lPY II p . 7 3 .\'\'(/t\'(,I1(/ (,bhasall/clIIO ya clhMso . . ; Bh
.
ibid. .\'l'al\'(,lIa grahaka,inlyalllwllaWvi,wyatl'(,lIa; Utp: s vrtti pramcltllb svatvellapilrva-
1'(Isf\'(/\'ahha.l'a(r). On pl'illllii!/(/ as rcvcal ing a previously unknown object, d. thc sccond
(and probably complementary) definit ion of f!rama�/(/ in PY 1 1.5c ajiliilclrthaprakcl.I'o
I'a (Katsura 1 9X4: 220, Dreyfus 1 992: 25 IT., Franco 1 992, van B ij lert 1 989: 1 50-53).
.1 According to Abh. (sce text note 55), Utp. chooses to make thesc two terms
masc u l i ne (in the karikii they wcrc ncuter), thus making them agree w ith aMn/sa, to
state implicitly thc s inglc nature of thc mcans of knowlcdge and of its objects (both
being ahhii.l'a.l') .
161
another means of knowledge4 . The object of such knowledge - which i s
a n activ i ty o f the subject (pramatrvyiipiirab) is that entity which is
4 According to t h e Pratyabhijfia, therefore, there i s n o d i fferentiation between
the means of knowledge and its result (pramc1(W-prafllcl), as abo the Buddhists but
not only them (cf. B andyopaclhyay 1 (79) - maintain (see for example PS \ .8b- l l
and I'{,fli, PV Ill . 30 1 -3 1 9 , N B T pp. 79-86, 90- 1 , TS 1 343-(0). The Buddhist posi­
tion on this point i s substantially u nitary, w ith a distinction between Sautrantika and
Yogacara resu lting from the admission or non-admission of the reality of the exter­
nal ob ject. Thus, according to the Sautrantikas, pmfllcya is the external object,
pral1lel(/(/ the assumption by knowledge o f the form o f the object ( vi,ww7k (7ra I Cl ,
sc1n7pva ) , pralllel the obtained knowledge of the object (l'i,wyc7dh igali). According to
the Yogiicara. prafllc\'a is the appearance of the object to consciousness understood
as the appearance of consc iousncss itself in the form of object ( l 'i,l'(/yc7hhc7.I'll ,
l'i,l'(lwlkaralii), /i1'llfllllnO knowledge i n the form of subject (s\'(lbhiisa) or. in other
words. the capac ity (yogyata) of knowledge to know itse l f; pratnii, finally, the sel f­
awareness of knowledge (.I'I'asWlll'illi: on sms(lllll'illi as the final outcome the two
doctrines would agree); sec e.g. PV HI. 366-7 , TP 1 346 w ith the relative p(//7cikcl
and espec i a l ly PS Ukd- I O and 1'{'lIi, w ith the notes of H attori; sec also Iwata 1 99 1 :
1 -20. The d istinction between {IIWI/<I(/(/ and {Jmmel - the Buddhists say -- is only the
outcome of the analyt ic cons ideration of a real ity, cogn i t ion, which is in itse l f one,
The two terms which are thus foregrounded cannot i n any case represent a relation­
ship o f cause and efl'eet because this would require the actual alterity of the two
terms - but at most a relation o f I'wl\'oslhiipya- I'Yal'ilsll/(/paka, with a cliv ision of
roles w i th i n the same real ity (NBT p, 82 /10 ('(7/I'a janyaju/lilkahhiim/libil/ll/ha/lU(l,
YC/laik(/slIlill 1 '((.I'I I I II i 1'irodlwh syiil iI{Ji III l'ym'uslhilpym'w/\'(/Slhiiplllluhhiil'clla lal
ckasya 1'(/,1'//11/(/11 kililcid n7pwil p/'(/mt7(lWII kililcit P/'(/lIlcl(Wplw/WII /1(1 l'imdhyali').
And u p to this point Saivas and Buddhists are mainly i n agreement (except that the
Saivas adm it a relat ion of the type hl'ill-pha/a). A proof of this is the fact that Abh.
i n concluding his argulllentat ion (I PV \I pp. 73-5, IPVV I I I pp. 7 1 -2) -- which
develops lI tp.'s above-lllentioned posit i on quotes part of a verse from Dharmak'j rl i
( PV l l Umk 10d\'I1,\:(// (lIdl)'(/\'a,l{hiillill ) . On the contrary, the two posi t ions di ller 01 1
the concept of ' function, activ ity' ( \ , w/piiro ) . performed by the clements occurring i n
cogn ition, \Ivi/pc7m is completely dcnied b y t h e Buddhists, w h o consider every di s­
tinction 0 1 1 this has is completely i maginary ( 1 I IPl'cksilll) , so l11uch so that, \(11' ex­
ample, an act such as piercing w ith an arrow may be analy!.ed i n various ways, all
equa lly legiti mate, attributing to thc bow the function ( vyi/pi/ra) e ither o f karl{" or
kll/'(/I/a, or IIpodill/a (TS 1 346 1111/ IIlprck,I'i/o hhcdo vidyalc dhwl/lriidiml I I Ilpeldyo/­
pildaka/l'cl/a v\'{/\'aslheY(//!l III /1(",1'),011' II and relative Pafi;ik(7 ) . But, above all, the
impossi b i l ity or I'yilptl/'il is the direct cOllsequenee of the aeceptHnee o f the doctrine
of momentariness (TSP I p. 4XX k,I'i/(likal1'CIIII lIin'yc7pa/'(/lw71 ,\'or1'Cldl/(/rmc7I1c1I11).
Know ledge, therefore, ollly 'appears' to he endowed w i th a fu nction ( PV 1I 1. 30Xa
,I'{/\ 'yiipllmll/ i1'l/bhelli). The reply o r Abh. who, as we have seen, had just quoted
with approval the third piida of the sallie verse - impl icitly refers to this statement
by Dhartl1ak l rt i ( who in turn depends Oil PS I .Xcd s([\'ydpc7m{Jl'llfilall'l/1 pUII/U/I,IWII
p/W/illlI Cl'a sal ) : 1')'tI{J<I/'a!lI/akal1l Cl'a h i k(//'(/lIasya {)/'(}I/wlI/(/,l'(idliYOI\'cil p/W/1l1I/
1 62
manifested to the consciousness, taken separately 5 , as a universa16, II 3.1-2
devoid of spatial d ifferentiations etc" denoted by a s ingle word in con-
formity with the specific reflect ive awareness (vimarSabhediinusiiriO) and
endowed with its own causal efficiency (svakiirthakriyiipriipte), - 1 -2 -
3.In an object, though its unity is established by the unifying power
of the mind (anusarpdhanaO ) , variolls manifestations may be distinguished
according to the inclinations, practical requirements alld specific ex­
perience [of the slll�iectJ .
- For the object, though It IS u nitary, having been assumed as such
thanks to a single [unifying] reflective awareness (ekapratyavamadaof,
vyc7pa/'a.� ca vyc7pl'iyumc7I,ic71 karl/ll' vyap<lryamell,lill I'el karat,iacj ananyatmalm cva
YlIkla iIi f///lkhya/v('/la pralllil(wplw/ayor ahheda cva nyel)'yab (IPVV I I I p. 72; see
�lso Tpv I I p. 75), Vyilpc7ra not only exists but constitutes the very essence of pramil,
and according to the S aivas the non-di fferentiation of pralll(l(lCI and prall/a h ingcs
on this: I'yc/pii!'(l is not a d iffcrent reality from the subject that acts and from the in­
strument that i s set in action. All this had already becn essentially containcd in the
laconic pra/lla!rvyc7pc7rab that fol lows pramili!l i n the v{,lIi . B u t Abh. (TpV II p, 75)
goes o n to say that this docs not mean that pl'am(}(w and pralllc7 are simply two
ways of saying the same thing (paryiiyatvam); thc cogni tive l ight (bodhc7tmli libhlisab)
which is the essential nature of both i s turned towards the external object i n the
prall/ii(/(!, whercas in the pralllcl i t is turned inwards as pure dctermi n ate awareness,
contracted due to the i nfluence o f the o bject assumed in it, havi n g as i ts essence the
word,
S P{'llwk prlhak, in the sense that the prall/(/(Ia works only on the s ingle abhasa
( in the form o f S<lllll/ /I)'a) . The knowledge o f the particular i s the result o f the sub­
sequent u n i fication of the group of s ingle ahhasas, among which those of time and
space have a particular individualizing power. As Abh. notes, the same I'imada,
which is prakcl.l'ap!'(llllci(l(l, sometimes rests on the s i ngle cib/l(/sa - and we have a
sc7I11(/llya -, sometimes combines several (7hh(l.I'as - and we have a sva/ak,w(w; i n the
lattcr case it takes the name of (JIIIIS(Jf!ldhcl/la.
(, On thc basi s of the interconnection and in the final analys i s of the identity
between villlar,l'a and ,\:a/Jda/l(J, Utp, is led to state the sel/ll(7nya character o f the
object of the /)/'{lIl1c7(/(/ , in that it is precisely the scl/l/clllya that is c xpressed by the
'
w(ml (obviously in the Saiva v iew).
7 The particular real i ties, i n themselves completely d ifferent from one another,
form an apparent u n ity on the strength of the same judgment that they are able to
determine because of their very nature. This concept, even in its formulation, refers
back to Dharmaklrti (sec e.g, PV I. 1 09 , already quoted, and the v{,lIi tad api
pralidral'yal(l bltidyal/u/lwlIl api prak{'lyaikapralyavalllar,\Ylsy(7bhcc!c/vaska/ldino hetllr
hlw\'ac! ahhilllwIl1 khyc7ti). This may be appl ied, /II II la/is IIllllalldis, both to account
I for the formation of the idea of e 1ass or u niversal which embraces a plura l i ty of dis-
1 63
II 3.3 there are different manifestations depending on the will, practical require-
ment, and experience of the subjects. 3 general fonD (dhilmamatram eva); on the contrary, those who are familiar
To elaborate:
4 - 5 . Jilst as the l'arious mal/lj'estations are d(fferentiated as 'long',
'rouna, 'tall', 'man' , 'smoke', 'made (?l sandalwood' and so on , without this
entailing a spatial-temporal d(fferentiation , so one also has mriol/S dis­
tinct malll/estatiofls sllch as 'being', �iar', 'individual substance', 'made (�l
gold', 'shining' and so on ; each has its own separate effIciency. They are
the ol�iect ()l the word.
- Given an object unitary in i tself), for example a j ar, depending on
how a subject regards it (a vadhitsclva.Mt) what appears to him may be
the lenght, or the triangular, circular etc. shape. What appears of a man
may only be his 'being erected' if the subject i s only looking for a
reference point, or a shelter, or shade. 'Man' as such, however, appears
to those who regard him entirely ( llyak,\'e�/(f)9a, seeking the services that
crcte realities that may not be strictly reduced to anything other than temsclves (as
in the context of Dharmaktrti's argumentat ion) , and to account for the synthesization
o f a group o f dist inct (IMiisas in the apparent unity of the object which confronts
us i n practical reality (as i n the context o f Utp.'s argumentation). The expression
ckapralyo wllllal'.I'(f may be understood either as ' s i ngle, same reflective awareness'
conccrning di ffcrcnt things, which, owing to this, are assumed as being one (cL
PVSV p, 4 1 ckam ckakal'm!l pralyahhijihillam commenting on ckapmlya l'llmar,I'ao v .
73a); and a s 'reflective awareness o f things a s being one' (ckal l'clw /Iratym·a/l/ar.l'all).
The mean ing is basical l y the same. Utp, and Abh. lise this e x pression in both senses.
H Here. too, there is an evident reference to a remark made by Dhannaktrti ( P V
1 .5X and l'rlli). accord ing to whom a thing that appears to perception as an und i f­
ferentiatcd entity is in fact grasped at the moment o f determ i nate knowledge, depend­
ing on which o f its cOIllPonents the subject is incl ined to foreground (a female body
may be seen as an object of des ire, a corpse, something to eat; a person may at
times be seen as a rather and at times as a teacher). A s i m i lar remark had already
been made by Bhartrhari ( V P I I I . X.04 (/('il/'yo 1II(/lII/a!. ('cli yalhaiko l'yapadi.i'yalc I
.I'(//!I!Jalldhihhediid auhalllla sa vidhi!l paklihhclvayoh II). See also PVSV p, 4 1 I' I '(//!I
,<:iI!I,i'apadayo' pi !Jheclah 1 . . . 1 ja//ayallii {/lIyiil!1 va .\'allu7pmlyaym!l dahallagrluidikcllll
kiislha,wldhviilll arihakriyalll,
" '
(II.e. ,; sva/ak..I'([(ta (see the previous k(//'ikcl). The Illult iplicity of man i festat ions
does not entail the loss o f the object's individual ity, the object being a col lection of
iihhiisas, distingu ished by a part icular col location i n space and time and by a speci fic
form (ilkiim),
(i" On the meaning o f this uncommon word c f. Vr�abhadeva's Paddhali on VP
1.3 (p. 20) lI .I'ak,I'£'1I11 iii iihhilllllkhyclI!I karl.l'II),(,lIa \'(1 (Ahhyankar-Limaye 1 965: V I I
£1 , 4).
1 64
are pecul i ar to him. To some [smoke] appears as merely smoke, i n its I I 3.4-5
with it (tadvidas tu) grasp its speci fic aspect, for example, that i t i s the
smoke from burning leaves, just as an expert i s able to grasp the par-
ticular features of stones, s ilver etc. (ma�lil'llpyadivi.�e$a) and so on 10.
However, the object that is manifested w ith these distinctions is not dif­
ferentiated as regards space and time. Thus for the object 'jar' there i s
the manifestation 'being' which i s i n i tself differen t [from the specific
manifestation 'jar' etc . ] common to all the countless other objects such
as cloth etc. and the cause of specific effects such as the detelTI1inate
awareness 'is, exists' which is produced by the mere fact of exist i ng; still,
as regards the j ar, there may be the manifestation 'jar' known by the inner
and outer senses and common to every object w i th a broad base and bul-
bous shape, and different from the other manifestations, i.e. absent i n
cloth etc . ; o r yet another, 'made o f gold', absent i n clay jars etc. This
manifestation becomes the object of sensory experience depending on the
subject's practical requ irement and so on I I . Each of these manifestations
is referred to for the practical purposes of communication, by those who
aim at obtaining this or that determinate result, with a single word: the
word 'jar' refers to the manifestation 'jar' and not to 'being' or 'made of
gold> l 2 . The manifestation 'Caitra' common to the different stages of
\0 This is an explicit reference to the ahhyasikapratyak,w in B hartrhari's for­
mulation ( V P I. 35 parc,�alll asamc7khycyam aMyc7sc7d eva .iayare I ma�lirfipyadi­
v!i,m'WI!1 ladl'idal!1 IIclllllll1(llIikam II).
II
For i nstance, Abh. explains (fpV II p. 98), he who on seeing a jar thinks o f
i t s price w i l l b e aware o f the man i festation 'made o f gold'. This does n o t occur a t
a later stage, a s a result o f mental elaboration, but a t the moment o f the d i rect
perception itself (ailldriyaka cva); see also below I'rlli on 1 1 .3 . 7 .
12
Cf. the posi tion of Bhartrhari, according to whom a thing, in its i ntrinsic unity,
cannot be expressed by a word (except the pronoun); it may be the object o f many
words, each referring to one aspect o r power Uakli) among the many it i s composed
o f ( lirlli p, 1 3 1 apara aha - yady api vaslll 11(/ Minl/W!l /whdc7rthas III hhinlla(i I
,{:ahdo lIy ckal'(/Sllll'i,\'CIya�lam api .\:akflll(Jm a l'acchcdellopagrahe vartate; on the
meaning o f apara in B hartrhari ' s work sec Prakll'(wkaprakcl,\:a I I p. 267, quoted i n
Aklujkar 1 970: 1 1 6 n . 5 . ) . This theme i s taken u p again and developed b y D ignaga
and Dharmaktrt i . The thing, because o f its lTJany aspects, cannot be ful ly expressed
by one word ( PS V . 1 2 balluc/(7py abhidheyasya flO /wbelm sarvatha galib I
sl'a.\'at!lballdhallllrt7pye�1(l vyavacchcdarthakiiry asall II; cf. Hattori 1 980: 70 n . 3 ,
where a relevant passage from .linendrabuddhi's PS(lkc7 i s also referred t o ; see also
the parallel passage, not extant i n Sanskrit, concerning cognition through logical mark,
in Frauwallner 1 959: 1 (2). The function o f the word i s only to denote a certain part
o f the thing through the exclusion of what is other than that (arlhc7l1laravyiivrttya
1 65
childhood etc. is devoid of place and so on; and what has been said
above applies to this, too. Thus causal efficiency is differentiated [for
every iib}ulsa] . - 4-5
6 . Things possess a determinate causal efficiency (niyatarthakriya)
depending 011 the variety (�f the manifestatiolls they are composed �f; and,
011 the contrary (punal)), (a different] one based 011 their appearing as
1Illit(ll), realities owing to a common sllbstratum (samanadhikaraI)yena) 1 3 .
- In the unitary particular entity there is a specific effect for every
single manifestation detennined by the power of Necessity (niyati.i:aktyii)
and lequally determined by Necessity] a single substratum of the dif­
ferent manifestations, which produce as we have said - manifold ef­
fects. The concrete ent ity ( l'(lstll) is such because of the manifestation of
this sameness of substratum (.wlnliimldhikarWlyiiblulsava.i:ii t). Tn fact, this
sameness of substratum constitutes the unity of what is manifold
(anckasyaikatd) 1 4 . - 6 -
tasya l'aslll//(/(1 k(/.\'cid hhc7go gall/yale , quoted i n PVSV p. 62). As Dharmaklrti points
out i n a subsequent passage, this does not mean that a thing has 'parts' (PV 1 . 1 35ab
('katwld vasllI/'i/pasya hhiflfla/'l/pii l/Iali!1 kwab) , but only that i t appears as associated
with various causes or crror concerning its nature; a word serves to remove one o f
these causes (PVS V p. 6 4 (al/'aiva c a I e .\:a/Jdas tais tail' bhrclfllikara(/(/i(l
.1'(JI!ISr,l'{an/pa iWlhliiili yatl/(I.I'(//!Iketmll vicchedaya vyc7priyallle; cf. PV 1 .50-5 1 ).
Dignaga's statement quoted above i s closely related, also i ll its formulation, to the
one found at the beginning of the PS ( l. 5ab); dlwrmi"o 'nekan/p(/.\ya I/el/driyilt
sarmlh(l galih. They are l i ke the two faccs of a coin. And s i m ilarly Dharmaklrti
explains the right way i n which this assumed multiplicity of aspects and propert ies
i s to be understood ( PV 1 1 1 .23 1 ; cf. Hattori 1 97 7 ; 52). Sec also Torella 1 992; 333-
35.
I J The kiirika h inges on the ambiguity of the e xpression lI iyatarthakriyc7, which
belongs simultaneously to both parts of the sentence, w i th a d i fferent orientation o f
meani n g. A t least this is t h e i n terpretation that A b h . g ives i n IPV a n d Ipvv; things
have a m u l t i pl icity of arllwkriy(].I', each one of which is i nherent i n every c7iJhii.l'a
that composes them; things, however (pllflab ) , also have a unity (and also a u nitary
art/wkriyii), due to the predominance of one (lbhclsa over the others and therefore
to their appearing according to a sameness of substratum.
14 The u l timate intention of this stanza i s therefore, as [ understand it, to res­
tate the real ity of the unity of the thing which the analysis carried out in the prev ious
stanzas had, in a sense, denied. The meaning of the sentence seems to coincide with
that of Abh.'s (Jl'atara(likii to the stanza (Ipv II p. 1 0 1 !WI/It ('I'{/!l' pratyahhasam
('va vostllll'e cko gho{c7ll11ii //(/ 1'(/.1'111 syc7t; Ipvv !II p. 1 1 3 I/al/II 1' 1'01/1 cko 'rtho gha­
(atvaiohilat l'c7dy{71I1/(] 110 1'(/.1'111 hhavet. b/wl'{/ti).
1 66
7.As in the case �f the distinct rays of light in a torch and of the II 3.7
Cllrrents in the sea, so in manifestations that are not in contrast with
each other the notion �f unity (aikyadhll)) is produced by their appear-
ing as llllitary entities (ekakarya) .
- The individual rays o f l ight i n a torch appear as an undifferentiated
whole and the same holds for the currents of rivers in the notion of the
sea and for the various flavours in the pclllaka. Similarly, manifestations
such as 'white', 'big', 'cloth', capable as they are of interpenetrating, lend
themselves to the manifestation, in the direct experience i tself, of the
various unitary things hav i ng a single, unitary , effect (tattadeka­
kiiryaikadravyaO) 1 5 . The same does not happen i n the case of other
1 5 The very e l l i p tical expression used i n the kc7/'ikii (ekakiirya, l i te rally 'produced
by one') is analyzed by Abh. (Tp V II pp. 1 06-7, Ipvv I I I pp. 1 1 6- 7 ) i n its various
possible i mplications, which are substantially analogous to those succinctly i n d icated
in the 1'{'lIi. When one sees a u n itary effect that cannot be traced back to the in­
dividual components of a given aggregate, this proves that they form a new com­
plex u nity (ckam \'(/.1'11/, sl'aiak,I'a(w). The vrlli says that certain manifestations,
characterized by mutual compat i b i l i ty , may g ive rise to ekakiirya ( ekakriyc7) -
=
namely to a u n itary effect - and to ekadral'ya ( ekavastl/, svaiak$a(w) namely to
=
their appearing as a unitary and individual reality; the notion of their u nity i s
produced by this. O n e must, however, remember that the i n di v i dual c7bhc7sas con­
t inue to keep their own speci fi c identity and causal effic iency i n tact, ready to come
to the fore again depending on the attitude of the knowi n g subject . Ekakc7ryaO may
also be understood as internal ballll\'l'ihi referring to °ekadravyao: 'of a unitary sub­
stance with a u n itary e ffect'. In this way the expression would be used i n the same
sense in which it is understood, i n an analogous context, by the B u ddhist logicians
(to attribute unity to d ifferent entities on the grounds that they produce the same
s ingle effect). Dharmaklrti , too, - as we have seen makes the ( il l usory) non-dif­
ference of determ inate entit ies derive from their producing a s i ngle effect - hence
the concept of scllllcillya (PVSV p. 57 ekakaryataiva bhc7l'anam ahheda�l) . (A
somewhat paral lel question is to be found in the capacity o f a causal complex
(hell/.wlmagr/) to produce a single effect though being composed o f many d i fferen t
causes t o which Dharmakirti docs n o t acknowledge a common sl'abhiiva; see Stein­
kellner 1 97 1 ; 1 84-88). Cf. also TS 20 I ab ekakaryopayogitvad ekasabdosya gocarab.
The reference to TS P p. 59 seems even more pertinent. Here KamalaSila (probably
bearing i n m i nd PVSV p. 68) states that ordinary experience groups together data
that arc completely heterogeneous and separate, such as a certain shape, colour etc. ,
on the basis of their concurring t o carry o u t a s i ngle fun c t ion (e.g. that of contain­
ing water), constructing in this way the unity o f a 'thing' (e.g. the jar) ; la eva
l'I/pc7dayab saiitadidhara(larlhakriyakari(wb samucliiyo ghara iti vyapadi.l;yante, Return­
i n g to ollr text, it may be added that ekaki7ryaO in the vrtti defi nitely has a d ifferent
meaning from ekaklirya i n the karika: the expression is to be u nderstood as a par­
tial comment on ekao alone.
1 67
II 3.7 manifestations such as 'blue', 'yellow' etc. This is what we call 'having
the same substratum'. - 7 -
8 . Faced with a non-specific manifestation of 'fire' etc., a single
means of knowledge knows what the outcome or cause of it is, its being
hot, its being able to be denoted by this or that word and so onl6.
_ On a particular occasion (kadiicit)17 , when faced with the bare
manifestation 'fire' in which only the universal 'fire' is present, without
its particular features consisting in the single individuality (Osvalak$a1JaO)
delimited by the association with a particuIar space etc. I S , there is
through the means of knowledge operating at that moment - and through
that means only - and in a way that embraces the three worlds and the
three times, the establishment of the various specific features of its own
nature, such as its effect, its cause, its heat, the fact that it goes upwards
and is denoted by the word. 'fire' etc.19• - 8 -
9. On the contrarlO, it happens differently in the case of the activity
that starts at that moment21 in the subject who aims at producing cer- II 3.9
tain effects, as regards a particula1� individual object, differentiated by
various, specific sensations of place etc. (desadikadhyak�antarabhinneP2,
and also [in the case of that activity promoted] by inference.
- On the contrary, the bodily activity of a person (kiiyapravrttil:t?3,
that may concern only the particular object in association with a whole
variety of perceptions (of place, time etc.), necessarily depends on the
concourse of several cognitive acts (pramiilJasamahiid eva). This activity
may also be promoted by inference, qualified, of course, by the direct
perception of the property-possessor (dharmiO). - 9 -
10- 1 1 . Though the particular forms of the manifestation of the ob­
jects may be differentiated (bhinnavabhasacchayanam) - in that they are
far or nea1� directly or indirectly perceived by the senses, external or inter­
nal, faulty in what is needed to make them known or for other reasons -,
their unity is not affected by this thanks to the main manifestation

for the knowledge of the same svalak$alJa a single means (with svasal?lvedana) is
t: (PV I. 43, 45ab) sufficient. This distinction corresponds to that between mere knowing and vyavahlira.
16
Cf. Dharmak1rti's analogous statement, in a different contex
/ ko 'nyo na dr$t!!
bhligah syad �Pramli�Ja, as I have . already pointed out, may be translated here as 'cognitive act';
ekasyarthasvabhlivasya pratyak$asya satah svayam .
It ,:ould be I?lsleadmg to say 'various means of knowing', as they may also be
ya bhava sya dma evakhz.lo gUlJah : . .
yah pramalJaih par7k$yate II . . . II tasmad dmas vanous operatIOns of the same means - even if every pramli�Ja is essentially new -).
1
7 I .e., following lPVV III p.
121 (kadacit iti jijfiasavasare), 'at the moment 1ll
The apparent contradiction is pointed out in IpV II p. 1 14, where three different
which the desire to know appears'. ways of explaining it are proposed. As regards inference in particular, Abh. (IpVV
18
The pramalJa, in fact, works on the individ ual abhasa, which, as we have
. III p. 148) notes that the difference of the object, introducing a temporal differen­
seen, is a samanya. . . �iation, �e?essarily also brillgs about a difference ill the nature of the pramlilJas;
19 The statement that a means
of knowledge (pramalJa, which may be genen-
ual manifestation may mdeed, It IS not possible to say that the direct perception through which the dhar­
c�lly understood here as a 'cognitive a�t') acts on the �ndivid es on these grounds min is known is one with the inference itself, which knows the fire, in the classical
give rise to some difficulties: e.g. (cf. IPV II p. 107) It becom
elem nts bemg. the example, only indirectly through the liliga.
impossible to detennine the relation of cause and effect, whoseother �m kno ledg . 21
At the moment when the cognition of the svalaksana occurs
a
object of distinct pramalJas would remain isolated from one � same prama � �
(m 22
�bh. puts forwar� three distinct interpretations of the compo�nd. In the first
this object ion as follow s: thIS lJa
This stanza and the vrtti reply to (followmg the order in IPVV) taking bhinne as a neuter substantivized adjective (
a - for example the
this case a visual perception) that knows the individual abhas other abhlisas which
=

all those bhede), one gets 'there being a variety of perceptions', where the locative is taken
bright fonn of fire - at the same time implicitly knows
ble concomita?ce with �t; to mean cause (nimittasaptam7); the need for a plurality of pramlinas stated in the
are set by the power .of Necessity (niyatisakti) in invari� com�entaries depends on this. As Abh. notes, the second 'the sval�k$alJa being dif­
the concomItance, valid
there is therefore no need for another pramalJa to ascertam ferentiated by perceptions of time etc.' coincides basically with the first; this is also
fonn with heat etc. This in;tplicit
for every space and time, of that particular bright the meaning attributed to it by the vrtti. As regards the third interpretation 'the
ic proper ties, such as heat, the fact of havmg as
knowledge regards not only intrins . d from svalak$WlG constituting - though combined with perceptions of space etc. an un­
also those denve
its cause wood and as its effect smoke and so on but differentiated reality withill the knowing subject' (adhyak$a-antar-abhinne) - this
so on.
convention ' such as the connection with a certain word and that the activity set seems traceable only to Abh..
20
The difference from what was said earlier lies in the fact 23
particular object requires And, one understands, also the other two types of activity, that of the mind
in motion in the subject by the perception of a determinate, lJasamilha), where as and of the word.
the combined operation of several means of knowl edge (prama

1 68 1 69
3.10-11 (mukhyavabhasatal)) conslstlllg ill a single reflective awareness (eka­
pratyavamarsakhyatp4 .
Even if there may be a differentiation in the particular forms of the
manifestation (i.e . as regards whether the objects are near or far etc . , evi­
dent or not ev ident etc . , external or internal) , the unity of the objects i s
n o t contrad icted, because there i s a single reflective awareness forming
the primary nature of the various particular manifestations 25 . 1 0- 1 1 -
J 2 . Causal e.t/i"c·iency itse(l is /lot inlrinsic to things, sillce it is deter­
milled hy Ihc will (�l lhc Lord. Thlls a thing lIIay /lot he said 10 be dzf­
feren( hccause il docs /lot posscss a certain (:tth·ic/lcy.
Objects, such as the jar etc . , when imagined do not lose their na­
ture as a jar etc . , even if they lack the ability to produce external effects,
because this capacity is not intrinsic to their being (asI'(7hh{ivika{l'Clt),
since it is detennined by the Lord for every single manifestation26. 12
2 ·\ Cf. again PY l . I 09 ckaf!rat\'(/\'(//IIor,�asy(/ ilellllw7d dlnr ohhed;1/1 I eka­
dhlhcllIhhc/l'cl/(J vWlktlni!1/I apy ahhin//ali! II (on this peculiar statcment by Dharmakirti
sec thc crit ical rcmarks i n Prabhacandra"s PrafllcYilkwlla/allliirtall(/a pp, 469-70; Shah
1 967: 1 4:1). Abh . i nterprets °iikhyaO i n the compound !'kapralwl l'illI/ar,Wkhyad as
pral/wl/a, but thc general meaning docs not changc much,
;5 Titus the (Jl'ahhiisacchiiv(is. or the various direct perceptions. the pralihl/(/sas
of the B uddhists � which cannot but c1i ffer fmm one another even i f they concern
the samc object, depcnding O il whcther i t is ncar or far. frontal or lateral etc. arc
contrasted with thc IIIlIkl/l'l/\'a/l//(/so or the man i festat ion not div idcd li p and d is­
cont i llllouS. seen. as it \� ere. from a morc clevated vantage point. and of a more
gelleral charactcr (sc//Iliinwm7pa) having as its csscnce the ckapraIY(/ \'(/l/wr,\'(/ . that is
a s i ngle reflect ivc awareness. recogn izes and sanct ions tltc basic unity o f the thing
through its Illan i festat ions; ckal)f"(ll\'(/\'CIIII(/r,�(I , for its part, is contrasted w ith the in­
d i v idual l'ill/ar:ias correspond ing to thc indiv idual {lralihhiisas (or l/I'ahhasacchil wis) ,
Th is point is dealt with by J\ bh. i n his two commentaries.
2 (, Utp, is aware that thc prc v i ous ki(riki! is bound to arouse the Buddhists' op­
position: what is particu larly unacceptable is that the nature of an external and in­
ternal manifestation of an object is basical l y identical . The B uddhists would say that
the reality o f an object cons i sts i n its cfTicicncy and only the external man i fcstat ion
is efficient; therct'ore thc two cannot be put on the same plane. I n his reply Utp,
den ies. as he has donc earlier. that elTic iellcy constitutes the essential nature or a
reality; it pertains to it only under certai n cond it ions primari ly external ity ( sec
abovc L X.SfL) depending solely on thc Lord's powcr of Nccess ity, In an earl ier
passage o f the IPVV (I I I pp, :10-:1 1 ) J\bh . . fol lowing i n the steps of the (lkei, had
denied that arll/(/kriyii m ight he c i ther sl'(/r17p(/ , /(/ks(/(/(/. or IIpa/ak,wlI/iI o f the real
thing, On the concept or (/rlliakriya (alrcady round in the Nyiiyahlu/sya) and its place
1 70
1 3 . Even if the re.flective mvarelless of silver is one, this awareness II 3 . 1
'silver' re.le,.ri/lg to mother-oFpearl is not valid, since there is incongru-
ence27 as regards the place, which has a qualifying function [in the
cognition} (upadhidesasan;lVadat ) ; also in the case of the double moon
the ether appears differe ntly.
Even i f the cognitions as 'silver' of real s ilver and of mother-of­
pearl are in themselves equally real, insofar as i n them the reflective
awareness 'silver' [on which i ts validity i s based] i s the same, however
the cognition 'this is (here there is) silver' referring to mother-of-pearl i s
t o be considered erroneous because o f i ts impermanence (asthairyat),
s ince it is not congruent as regards the accessory quality - place -, as
its connection with the place occupied by mother-of-pearl is later found
to be contradicted. Also in the case of seeing a double moon there i s no
congruence as regards the place, occupied in this instance by the ether 28 .
- 13
and acception i n Dharmaklrti's work ( i t i s apparently absent i n Dignaga) see
Nagatorni 1 967- 1 968, M ikogami 1 979, Kano 1 992.
27 Abh . . as he did for c7khya i n the previous karikii, makes sCII!lviida derive from
a root vad- 'to shine'. Thus s(/f!l \'(lda is taken to mean 'to be correctly and eomplete­
ly (sall/yak) mani fest' or 'to be man i fest combined with a lasting determinate aware­
ness' (vill/ar,WIIIIVl'lli) (eL Ipy II p. 1 26). In translating sCII!lviida in the vl'lti I have,
however. kept to the current mean i ng ,
2 H The extremely laconic style of the vl'lti, which I have tried as far as possible
to preserve i n translation, makes a few addi tional comments neeessary. Firstly, the
relationsh i p this return to the subject o f error, already dealt w ith above, has with the
preceding stanzas. J\bh. says i t is a reply to those who contest the role o f the vi/l/ar,I'a
in the establishment of reality, object ing that thus the notion of erroneous knowledge
ends up by being denied , If a thing is such in that it is recogn i zed as such by an
act of determinate retketive awareness ( I'i/l/areia) remember the maxim so frequent­
ly cited by Abh. hhal'arcl,vir yalhii I';/l/I"-I'yal(' IOlhci asli
� which fol lows its appear­
ing to consciousness (al'ah/u/sa , prakc7.l'a) , then the mother-of-pearl that is m istaken
for silver is no less s i l ver than real si lver. The stanza in question, contain i ng Utp.'s
reply, is i nserted at this point. I t is true that a vimada is in itself valid, but it is not
meant to be something momentary, i t tends to last, unless that tendency to last i s
blocked by a further l'ill/(/r,I'a . And t h i s is prec isely what happens i n the cognition
examined here 'this is s i lver, there is s i l ver here'. A later viII/ada ascertains that the
place that qual i fied the object o f the earlier viII/ada ( the 'here') i s d ifferent from the
one that had been understood: the place that ought to contain the s i l ver i s occupied
by the mother-of-pearl , the place � i n the case of seeing two moons of the second
�
moon is occupied by the ether. This reason ing rests on the assumption that every
concrete object of knowledge (.lwilak,I'(/!w) is m ixed w ith space and time and that
therefore the viII/ada must embrace them, too,
171
II 1 4. Thus, both the differentiation of things - due to qualities sllch as
sound and so on - and their llOn-d(fferentiation - due to universals etc.
(jatyadibhibl 9 - are possible 011 the basis (�f the ullity (if the knowing
subject.
- It is a fact of direct experience that qualities such as sound, form,
configuration and so on, suggest3 0 the d i fferentiation of things and
un iversals etc. their unity: this is admissible only if the unity of the sub­
ject i s assumed . The determination of mutual d i fferentiation also depends
on the unifying function [of the know ing subjec t l . - 1 4
l 5- 1 6. What filllction call the means (�f knowledge pel/om! - heing
a new light (navabhasal)) as regards the knowing suhiect, he who ex­
ists in the ahsolute sense , the Lord like a smooth wall that is the sllh­
strafllfll for the painting of the llIliltiform IIniverse --, whose associatioll
with nOl!-heillg would he a contradiction ill terms, the Anciellt One3 1 ,
whose nature is perellnially I/lUlllfest (sarvadabhataO), inherellt in every
cogn itioll ?
- The means of knowledge since It IS an ever-new l ight which es­
tabl ishes the still not establi shed real ity of the object can do nothing
as regards the knowing subject , who is uninterruptedl y luminous. Since
it i s the various ever-ne\v man ifestat ions that consti tute the variolls means
of know ledge, this l ight (manifestation) will be, of course, the means of
knowledge for what i s other, but not the se lf, which i s always establ i shed;
the Lord is, on the contrary, the knowing subject becallse he acts freely
as regards knowledge . All the various multiform man i festations are pos-
2 ') The doctrine of d i fferentiation and non-di fferential ion is restated yet again .
Ob jects share both conditions: they arc d i fferent iated i f one looks a t the distinctive
qua l i t ies of each of them, non-di fferent iated i f one looks at the un iversal. similarity
etc. ("ildihhih refers to .w7dr!;Yil and hltedagmha//(/ according to IPV I I p. 1 32). These
two aspects Ill ay co-ex ist w ithout excluding one another only on the basis of the
unity of consciousness .
.10
IPVV III p. 1 60, following i n the steps of the aka, considers at lenght why
the word c7k,I'I'/1il 'allusion, suggestion' is used; and concludes yaf(/!/ sphufilll/ al'i/­
li/ta.I'(///mll lIaslv al(/k.I·(/fWIII, Ii/t(/I'(/Ii ('(/
' ' /11/(1.\'(1//(/1/1 , lala ilv arllwh.
31 P ;,ril(/(/ ( I i teral ly 'the Anc ient One') to be understoo �l here , ; s meaning 'he who
e x i sted before (pun!)', before every other thing, beyond t i me , the eternal etc . This
is also how Abh. explains the term (IPVV I I I p. 1 (2), rclat ing it to the impossibil ity
o f attri buting any form o f non-e x istence to the subject, which ( non-ex istence) is in
effect the soul o f time.
1 72
sible in their multiformi ty insofar as the subject i s stable. His volition II 3.15-
makes the various objects that are manifest i n reality, w i thout lapsing
from their own nature of which he is the u l timate essence ( tatsara­
svari7pahhral?z/ie), appear and d isappear by v irtue of the power of maya.
I n reality he alone possesses perpetual existence (satta) independently of
every other thing, s ince it woul d be contradictory to associate any fOlm
of non-existence (previous non-existence, nOB-existence due to destruc-
tion etc. ) w ith him. Even if he is taught in terms of being and non-be-
ing, nonetheless his nature as subj€ct remains unaltered, s ince the teach-
ing would be impossible there not being he who w ishes to teach3 2 • - 1 5-
16 -
1 7 . [What in reality Jzappens] is ollly that the use in practical reality
of notions alld expressions tvyavaharal)) like 'Lord' etc . , which due to
the conditioll (�f objllscatioll was not brought abollt earlier (apravar­
titapCirval)), is promoted through the bringing to light of the powers33 .
32 I .e. there not being the subject.
33 Utp. says yet again here that what is the true reality, the sovereignty o f con­
sciousness, is not something that has to he proved (sad/zya), brought to l ight; it is
constantly luminous, i t is, i n fact, l ight i tself, i t i s unfading. I f anything, it i s rather
a quest ion of removing that state of obfuscation which prevents the l im ited subject
from recognizing that he and the Lord are basically one and the same. Or, in other
words, to call consciousness by its real name, thus making it enter the sphere o f
everyday e xistence; discourse and everyday reality are both included i n the seman­
tic field o f the term I'yal'al/(/r(l . (It has even been supposed that this extension o f
meaning derives from the coalescence o f two d i fferent words vyaltara 'noun, verbal
designation' and I'yav(/ltara 'practical transactions', both being represented in Pali by
the same word vo/tiira; c f. B apat 1 97 5 . I t is also to be noted that vyiiltc/ra and
vyal'altara arc usual l y both translated into Tibetan w ith the same word tlta sHad). I t
i s therefore a question not o f demonstrating somethi n g new, but o f pointing out
(pradar:i'al/a; e f. IPYY I p . 87) a reality that has always ex isted, o f call in g man's
attention to this and thus inducing him to fil l the void that fol l owed awareness and
to usc this latent notion i n practical l i fe ( l'yavalt(lrab pravartyate). And this is in­
tended to exclude, in the case of such vyavaltilras(ldhana referring to the sovereignty
of the I , any nuance of aparva, which is, on the contrary, admitted as being s t i l l
subtly present i n t h e \'j'ava}/(lras(/dltan(J referring to a n i n sentient object ( e f. ihid).
Recognit ion, which is in fact vyawll/c7rasiid/tanan7pam (ihid. p. 39), concerns an en­
tity which, invested from the outset with a val i d means of knowledge, i s already
man i fest (mal/Iikad!4I/(/prama(/{fprahhc7vaprak(7.�amc7l/ati1yog ini vast/llli); the process
that leads to the identi fication of the I with S iva - which is the specific function of
the .\'astra - is therefore essentially an i n ference based o n the svahhavahefu, which
(as Abh. says, ibid. p. 1 06) vyavahara.wJdhaka eva ahhidhlyate I/a tv aprasiddhapra-
1 73
II 3 . 1 7 - Only, the use i n practical reali ty of notions and expressions l ike
' S iva', 'Lord' etc. referring to our self which i s the knowing subject -
which was not brought about due to the total obfuscation caused by maya
- is established (siidhyate) for the purpose of teaching, meditation etc.
through bringing to light the reasons that justify it, i.e. the presence in
the I of the pure power of freedom etc. - 1 7
thus leav ing the bas ic sel f-i l luminating qual ity o f h i s o bjeet intact.
.l'itdhanartlpa(l.
Th i s is what the sacred texts on the k now ledge of the Sel f - the Vedanta, the Sid­
dhnnta and the secret tantms aim at (Ipyy I I I p. 1 79 yi/l'(lIlli hi (/flllajiliilla:iaslr(I(1i
.<TlIlyanlasiddll(/lIlara/tasyal(lIlIf'(//'llpi/(li, liilli (jIll/ani ,wi\'(/ .I'iddhil(1 (1[1l1Iwlrilpt7/11
m('(Jyallli / IaSf/1(1t l'ym'al/1//'{//I/(/Irast7dlwl/ap/w/al/i (' \'(I tal/IIi hhiil'ab).
1 74
II 4. 1
CHAPTER I V
1 . And tilliS, his power being illfillite, he makes those things ' man(fest
thanks to his volition; and this constitutes his activity, his being creator
(nirmatrta).
- The knowing subject, that is essentially consciousness, having in­
finite power, the Lord, by means of his volition makes those entities
manifest in this way. And it is precisely i n this power of volition
(icc/z{j.\�aktifl) that his activ ity, that is, his being creator, consists. 1 -
2. B lit 2 an insentient reality does not have this power namely, to
COI(/er existellce 011 something that is /lot "'. Therefore, the relation of
calise alld efleet (karyakarat)ata) is essentially reduced to that of agent
and o/�iect qf the action (kartrkarmatvaD).
- But an insentient real ity - whether i t is primordial matter (pra­
dlu/llaD) or atoms or seed - is incapable of producing something that does
not exist. Being cause and effect, therefore, is merely being agent and
object of the action and nothing more. - 2 -
3-4. What is lIofl-existent is flOlI-existent and that is that. One can-
1I0t predicate the existeflce (�l what is nOli-existent, 11O'� on the other hand,
I By 'thos(' things' Utp., according to Abh. (IPY II p. 1 52), means that the Lord
makes mani fest what he had already prev iously manifested. H i s work of m an i festa­
tion is therefore conti nuous: it does not take place only once and it is uninterrupted
(al'i('Chillll(,/w pra/JallllheIW).
2 The examination of the relation of cause and effect begi n s with the statement
of the Saiva posi t ion and the whole chapter is devoted to j us t i fying this.
J I n the IPY (and s i m i larly i n the IPYY) Abh. proposes three dist i nc t i nterpreta­
tions of (/.\·(/Iab .I'alab. Aecording to the one at the beginning of the Vi/lwr,,;ini (Tpy
I I p. 1 53) we have alikll ra.l'ya .I'alo '.I'alo )'(1, w ith reference therefore to the mrkika
( Y aise�ika) and Saq1khya posi ti ons regardi ng the existence of the effect i n the cause,
which is denied by the fonner and accepted by thc lattcr ( i n the IPYY III p. 1 86
b7ja.l'yaim seems to have to bc correctcd to (l/ikurasyaiva). The seeond i s asad/'llpa­
.I'ya .I'aw(I (mikura.l'ya), which may thcrefore be traced to the interpretation i n the
I'l'lIi. The third is asalo mikllrasya solo 1'1/ b7jasya.
1 75
would the existent gain allY adval/tage limn obtaining existence [which
it already possesses} . rt one thell points out that in practical reality there
is gencral COIlSCIlSltS Oil thc existcllcc (�( thc relatioll (?( calise and efleet,
[then olle replies that) it consists in the fact that a t/iillg, that is inter­
llally prcscllt 4 (antarv iparivartinai)) , /Jccollles, hy virtue ol the power of
that illchj/l/oble Bcing (tasya kasyapi) , thc ol�iect ()( kllowledge for both
SCflSCS.
Attributing the nature of existent to what does not exist is con­
trad ictory, and it is already established in what exists. I The relation o f
cause and effect consists in thi s : J a thing, already present within [the I ] ,
i s 'created' by t h e Lord, o r in other words, is caused by h i m t o become
the object of knowledge for the internal and external senses. - 3-4
actioll
S . TlII/S , which has so far heen the s llhject o( disCllssioll
(sai �a) characterized by sltccessiol/ alld mani(estillg itself' both inter­
-,
I/ally and extemally (antarbah ibsthitil) ) , being related to all entity that is
IIllitary (ekasya)5 alld capah/c o( showing both aspects, is pr01 ,(,(/ to he
one.
This action, though taking place in succession, being both internal
and cxternal6, is conncctcd with a unitary real ity, the agent, establishcd
as such through inner awareness, and with an objece that is also un itary,
<I Tn bc morc prcc isc: 'that movcs about intcrnal ly'. Viparil'!'l- oftcn recurs in
Bhartrhari's work.
5' In say i ng this. Utp. is rcfcrring both to thc sub jcct and thc objcct o f the ac­
tion (this is the intcrprctation in thc vrlli whieh all thc othcr cOlllmentarics also ac­
cept. cr. IPY Y I I I p. I X9 i'kasya iii kar/lI(1 k(//'/II(I//(/.'; ca) . Each is unitary in itsc l f
and un itary i n that it is inserted i n a supcrior unity. that of the cogn izer that asslImes
thcsc two forms (cr. IPYY I I I p. 25X alllliil/Olll cl'a pralllc7tr.\·(/I!lj!l({!!1 kOl'l/whl/(IVCII(/
karlrhhc7vCI/Il ca (/Vu/afll/JWI/IlIIcl kriyii karmaslhal\'clla korlrSllwll'el/a 1'(/ \'il'icyolII(/l/(/
i'kii:imyaim hha\'(/lIli vaslllia i'kail'(/).
(, i .e. the two internal and external levels o f the action. Both the subjcct and the
object . Abh. explains (ihid. p. I X9), can be invol ved in these two d i mensions without
losing their unity (i'ka!; ca O.l'i/\' d.<;rayoh .\·w!I\'idrfi[>o hliagl/viill s l'(lccIWllda(v{/.\'\'{/('­
Cliall'dhhyiil(1 .whille ('I'(I IIhhaywl/ (II/Wr/Ja/{lnlpam . . . k(/f'II/(/(1II 'pi (//I(ar/whim­
hhayakii/'(/.1'(II/(/I vaI!I po railiar.W/llie(I<7/) .
'I A l l actions primari ly rcst upon the agent and are therdore cal led karlrsllia;
however, some aetions may be particularly connected with the object and they are
therefore called karlll(l.l'llw (ct'. ihid, p. 1 (0). This d i v i s ion goes back (but from a
di fferent angle) to the fourfold one karlrsllwkriya, kar/rsI1whl/(lvaka, karmaslha­
kl'iYIi and k(//'Illasllw/Jha\'aka - mcntioned in the MBh (on Pflni n i i l L I . X7, W/I'II. 3).
1 76
since i t is recognized as being one by reflective awareness (aikyena I I 4.5
pratyavamr.fyasya), despite the manifold changeable forms of the
manifestation. And i t i s preci sely on the basis of this fac t - i.e. that its
substratum is unitary that its unity is proved. 5 -
6. The entity which is [first} intel'llal with respect to anothel� once it
has become extemal is to be understood as the eflect of that other. The
two planes of extemality and internality are such in relation to the know­
ing s/ll�ject.
For an object the condi tion of effect is merely its having been made
external (bdhyatdpddanam); thus both being external and being an effect
are such only in relation to a s ingle reality, and, indeed, it i s depending
on the knowing subject that one may speak in practical reality of inter­
nal and external (antarbahirvyavahdrab). [Therefore effect is produced
by the knowing subject and none otherf". - 6 -
7 . Calise, therefore , is only the knowing sul�ject, and he in the two
modes (�f malll/estation qf the e.tfect remains unchanged in his uniti . It
is therefore appropriate to say that action belongs to a llnitary entity.
Thus cause is solely the knowing subject, who remains one even
if there is succession in the external and internal manifestation of the ef­
fect. On the basi s o f what has been said action i s therefore proved to
belong to a unitary (and s ingle)') subject. - 7 -
8 . PreciselY .for this reaSOll Paramdvara is taken as efficient cause
as regards the shoot; [however} it is not possible to also cOf/sider en-
tities (Ii!lerent .fi'om him sitch (/.1' the seed etc. as callses.
- Considering the fact that producing something (lltpddanam) means
making it manifest cxternal ly (bc7hyc7bhc7satdpc7danam), the status of
The action o f creating (nirnlil(lakriya) Abh. explains (Ipyy III p. 1 90) concerning
-
an objeet which has the cognizer as its u l ti m ate essence, i s at the same time kartrslha
and karm(l.l'llia.
7 " See text note 1 70.
H Abh. gives a di fferent interpretation (Tpy II p. 1 62): « . . . s ince the knowing
subject is the cause o f the twofold, cxternal and internal, mani festation o f the e ffect . .. » .
' J Here and elsewhere eka means both 'unitary' and 'one, single'.
1 77
4.8 cause may be exclusively attribued to the conscious being. For this
reason some consider the Lord efficient cause l (), but in so doing they be­
come inconsistent i n considering inert and insentient realities - such as
the seed etc. which have no i ntentionality (niral//lS(lf!ldllCll/asya) I 1 also
causes. - 8
9. In fact, the potter prodllces the jar throllgh a whole series (�f
operations to which he subjects the clay etc . , following the rule deter­
mined by the Lord (aisvaryaiva vyavasthayi.i) 1 2 .
- Even when it has been ascertained that the cause i s a knowing sub­
ject, i .e . in this case the potter, nevertheless, for the jar to be produced
it is necessary to carry out determined operations on the materials, such
as clay, following a criterion that does not automat ically derive from the
nature of the thing (I/a svabl/(ll'ena) but which is dictated by the restric­
,
tive order (maryadaya) created by the Lord, called 'necessity I J , - 9 -
10
The allusion is to the fol lowers of the Nyaya- Vaise�ika, as Abh. and Bhaskara
con firm (IPV II p. 1 63). They eonsider the Lord solely as effic ient cause, which
would be i n itsel f adm issible i f i t did not necessar i l y also entail the adm ission of a
series of othcr causcs from whose cooperat ion only effect finally derives. Material
cause, au x i l iary causes etc. - i.e. i n the case of the shoot, seed, water, earth are
all insentient real i t ies from which, in the Saiva v iew, the causal function is
precl uded.
I I
The term (/IIII.\·wWlhiiIW is used in this school w i th various mean ings. Some­
t imes i t means 'un i rication, connection', orten referring to the uni fying function o f
thought which establ ishes relations between things ( i t is then glossed a s ('k7k(l/'{lI/a),
pervad ing them w ith its own dynam ism. I n other cases as i n the whole of this
chapter -- it has the mean ing of 'intent ional ity, stra i n i ng towards a part icular objec­
t ive'. These two levels of mean ing may also coex ist simu ltaneously.
12
I n the Try Abh. devotes qu ite a long cOlllmentary to this stanza, putti n g for­
ward d ifferent possible i nterpretat ions; these reflect the doubts that the establishment
of causality as outl ined may give rise to. I n the case of the potter, who is here used
as an example: there i s a knowing subject who as such may legi t imately assume the
role of cause, but how ean one then say that cause is always and everywhere the
supreme Lord, and, on the other hand, if one accepts this thesis at the outset, what
room is there in it for the potter? The stanza may be i nterpreted in both of these
ways, depending on the meaning one chooses to give to the expression ai.I'\'(I/)'ail'(/
I'w/ I 'a.l'tlw\'il; and also in a third (or even fOUrlh) way, if one takes the optat ive
'
j;l/Illyet a� be ing 'interrogative' (.\·III!lpm,I'/I(/) and not i n the sense of 'obl i gation'
(lIiyoga ) .
Ll
This means that the potter's kartrta i s not absolute, but made possible by the
higher kartrta of the Lord, on whom the order of things - the operations the pottcr
to. The various things (tattat), jar etc., - lasting and able to fUlfil II 4.1 0
the functions that are natural to them (sthirasvarthakriyakara m) 1 4 may -
also be prodllced by virtue of the volition �f the yogin� alone 1 S , without
the need for clay or seed.
- By virtue of the volition of the yogins alone, without recourse to
clay etc . , things such as the j ar may be produced, that endure and are
capable of ful fi l ling the functions of the jar and so on. 10 -
-
I I . It is precisely because (if this that all effe c t (karyam) or all es­
sential property (svabhaval)) which comes into being from that root
which is the arising [/;'0111 a calise] (utpattimUlajai))'6 - may legitimate­
ly constitute the logical reason of an inference only provided that another
valid means (�l knowledge has established that it is not the creation of a
yogin.
Preci sely because of this, an effect or an essential property - that
implicitly contains a relationship of causality t 7 are only i llusory
has to carry out etc. - dcpends. The potter's creativIty must necessarily be seen
within the creativity of the Lord, otherwise one would not understand how c lay ete.,
insentient as they are, can obey the craftsman's will. See also S D I . 44-45ab and vrtti.
14
My translation conforms to the I'rtti. Abh., though aware of the preeise i n ­
dications i n the 1'!'t1i (IPYY III p p . 1 94-5 sth irm!1 c a arthakriY(lkarw!1 ceti ),oja/l(/
vrttikrta krtll) takes tattat sthirasvarthakriY(lkaf'{/1II as a s i ngle eompound ( w hieh thus
comes to mean 'able to earry out lastingly the various forms of efficiency that are
natural to them'), claiming that h i s interpretation must also be eonsidered admissible
( . . . iti samiis(' 'pi II([ ka,<cid do,wfl ); we do not know if the (ikei authorized this type
of construction. On the contrary, according to the I'rtti, lattat is separate and refers
to gha!adi and sthirarthakriyc7karalll is to be understood as a karmadh(7raya express­
ing two qual i fications of gha!ddi.
is
The example of the yog i n [ wh ich oecurs frequently in Indian phi losophical
l iterature I was already to be found i n the SD (see III. 34b-36a and U tp.'s vrtti, ete.).
See also above I. 5 . 7 .
16
The translation goes back to Abh.'s gloss (IpyV III p. 1 97 svabhiil'o 'pi sva­
bhiil'{llIial'{llliya/(l yo Fitas tatra IIlpattir ('va karyakara(wbhal'(ltlllikc7 1Illllam. Cf. the
well-known passage from Dharmaklrti ( PVSV p. 1 7) siddhas til kc7ryak(ll'{I(w/Jhavab
svabhc7mlll lIiyalll([yati.
17
DI ; arn� aklrt ; , as we know, admits only two types of 'essential conneetion'
(s vabI1i7l'apratihalldha; see S te inkel lner 1 984) between things o r rather between
concepts -: identity ( tc7d(ltlllya) and causali ty ( tadlltpatti) . Therefore the only in­
ferenee he considers valid i s the one based on svahhava (Steinkellner 1 974, 1 992)
- allllpalahdhi also enters into its ambit (ef. Iwata 1 992: 86-88) -, e.g. 'th i s is a tree,
because it is a .vil?l.\:apii ' where the concepts are co-extensive, in that the one im-
1 79
II reasons, i f the certainty that this i s not the creation of a yogin is lack­
ing. However, even when this certainty exists, the status of logical reason
(hell/ta) still depends on the necessity instituted by the Lord. I I - - which, thollgh not directly perceived at that moment, is its determining
plicitly cmbraces the other and refers to the same thing; or on kiirya. 'there is fire
there, because there is smoke'. Vtp. points out that the sl'abh(/l'ahelll, too, in the final
analysis emerges as being based on causality ( Iadllipattigarhha), given that the na­
ture of a thing i s that which i s due to the causes that produced it (cf. above note).
O harmaklrti had already expressed h imself i n s i m i lar terms (PVSV p. 99
,l:ali/Jijadillcllll api sa sl'abl/{ll'a�l sl'iIhelor iii yo If([ laddhelll(l so 'lalsl'ahl/{/\'(/(l svat;
PV I. 38 all\'ilwll'}'(/lirekad
:
VO vasva drslo 'Illll'ariakah
' I ;
,ITahhal'Os I(/s\'(/ laddh 'llIr
alo Millllall /l 1 .,m!lhhm'(/! 1/ ,: c { S t � i r; kel l ner 1 97 1 :
� ; 1 88 notes 35 �nd 36). The
causal impl ication. as Abh. observes following the (ika (lPVV III pp. 1 97 fT.), may
be ev ident to a greater or lesser degree. I t is obv ious when by v irtue of the .1'1'(/­
blu/l'(Jhelll 'to be endowed with smoke' one goes back to 'to be endowed with fire'.
It is less cvident, but cqual ly prcscnt, in the case of 'this is a tree, because it is a
,�illl,I'(/f1(/ '; here i t is, i n fact, the cause o[ the .<:itl/,I'apcl i .e. its seed - which infuses
it with the nature of tree (ihid, p. 202 ,(;i!!l.<:apahljasya vi.I'is!(/sya .va .<:il!l,<:{I{)(II!l prali
h7jata ,Vil!LI'apakilm(w{(/, ,W/il'a I,!,k,mll'{//!l lalra llil'c.\:ayal7li: see also TPV I I p. 1 75
sl'ahelllla cl'a hi ,1'il!l,I'apa l,!,k,WlSl'ahhc7l'(ll'yahhicarilll jella; and this cause that
produces the .('il!l,\'([pa as always un ited with I'rk,\'(/II'([ depends i n turn on
Paramesvara's power of Necessity, Ipvv III p. 2(0). I t is therefore essential i n each
case to establish at the outset that the smoke or the ,Vi,!I.I'Clpii in question are not
yogin creat ions. The i n fe rence based on s l'ahlull'a/icllI as conceived by B uddhists
and Saivas d iffers i n that for the former it cloes not give rise, strictly speak ing, to a
new and real knowledge, Accord i ng to the B uddhist {)f'(ffIl([(W tradi t ion, the very
relationship of galllva-galllaka between two essential properties is ulti mately unreal ,
just a s is the dist i nct ion of a plurality o f propcrt ies within one thing, 'All this
question o f i n ference and object to be i n ferred' Oignaga says i n a famous passage
often quoted, in s l ightly d i fferent forms, by later authors ( Randle 1 9262: 5 1 -54; see
also PVSV pp, 2-l, Ipvv I I I p. 200) 'depends on a di fferentiation between
property and property-possessor i mposed by the m i n d , and does not concern the
actual ex ternal e x istcnce'. The d i fference between the two k inds of inference
besides the operat ing of two concepts belonging to the sallle thing in the one case,
and to two distinct things in the other would seem to l i e in the faet that the
sl'ahliavohclll can establ ish only I'YIII'oha/'(/ and not Wlsfl/ ( N UT p. 1 06 tad oyalll
al'lhah l'!'k,I'(/ \'y(/\'oha/"li 'yalll, :iilll.vap([I'Y(fl'aharayogycilI'ill) . Abh., commenting on
the (ika (IPVV I I I p. 2 1 3 ) , distinguishes between I'(/Sfllo, I'(/SIIlI' }'(f I'ahcimo and
,v{l/Jd(fl'Y(fl'ahiimsc7dh{/l/a. [ n the ,<:ail'([ v iew vrk,l'(ft\'(/ and .vil!I,('{/!)(lll'a a ;'e two d i fferen t
and i n themselves completely autonomous c7hhasas, set b y the Lord i n a relationship
of Sclllliilladhikaral1. }'11 hut not necessarily present to consciousness at the same t ime.
Thus the status of the sl'a/)/l!7I'ahclI/, moving from i t real e n t i t y towards an equa l l y
real e n t i t y , comes t o h e , a s i t were, enhanced : as A bh. says (IPV I I p. 1 80)
referring to the Buddh ists, las/IIc7! sorl'e,1'lI sl'ahh([wdlCIIl,IV ahliasahhcd(//!l I'i/l(/
v\,({\'alu/rallli.ilrasadllilll(/I/l ( vyal'a/iarmlliilra, that i s , ,<'ahda l'yal'ahdra; IPVV I I I p,
2 1 3) ,
1 80
1 2- 1 3 . t 8A new (nUtanam) man(festation of smoke etc. derives from a I I 4.12-
man(festatiol1 (�f fire etc. common to variolls other knowing subjects,
condition (adhipatel)) I <J . The effect, which is invariably concomitant with
I� These two stanzas respond to a twofold need. The first is the need to suc­
ceed in explaining causa li ty whilst rem a i n i ng faithful to the equation abhasa=vastll
(how can one through i nference determine the reality of a fire that is anabhata being
the cause of smoke present here and now?). The second need is to obtain this resu l t
by d istanci n g onesel f from t h e V ijflllnavadins, who, i n maintaining that the aMasas
of the cause and effect must belong to the same individual sontclna, risk removi n g
every general value a n d there fore all practical importance from causality. The solu­
t ion proposed by Vip., according to how Abh. develops it, i s the following. Some
subjects present in a certai n place (e.g. the k itchen) grasp the rel at ion of i n v ariable
concomi tance ( I'yaptigraha(w) between fire and smoke, in genera l , but through the
observation of particular cases. Namely, they become one as regards these two
ahhdsas, or, i n other words, there is a s ingle ahhasa 'fire' and a single aMasa 'smoke'
for all the subjects present. This ident i fication is provided by the action of the Lord
h imself through the power of Necessity (lIiyali,�akli), and here l ies the fundamental
d i fference from the V ijflanavadins. Later, one or more of these subjects finds him­
self faccd with a particular ahhc7sa 'smoke' thus present on h i s own mental con­
t inuum (SI'(fSallliillal'artill) and, remembering the previously establ ished vyclpti,
goes back to a generic aMasa 'fire', which is immediately present to other subjects
(para.I'(flllclllal'arlill): therefore at the moment of the i n ference the subjects i nvolved
are found to he, by the very wi II of the Lord, u n i fied as regards a particular smoke
and a generic fire. In the karikci hllllya!l, understood in the vl'lti as an adjective
referring to °pralllc7tro (cf. I'rtli °pratl/{llrallfaraO), may also be taken separately as
an adverb. I n this case it would mean 'also later on', i .e. also at a t ime s ubsequent
to the grasping of the i nvariable concomitanee between smoke and fire, that is, at
the time when the i n ference is made ( B h II p. 1 85 hIlayo 'pi /la kCl'([lml1 l'yc7pligra­
hW,wkala em api III ([/lIlIIlelllaka/£' 'pi). This double i n terpretation of hllllyab goes
back to the (ik(1 itsel f (cf. IPVV I I I p. 2 1 6) .
I f) Of t h e four pralyayas 'causal conditions' i n the Sautrantika conception ( a s out­
l ined in SOS p. 85 Ie mll'eIrab pratyavab prasiddh(1 c7imllballaSml/allalltarasaha­
karyadhi{)(ilinlpa(l , .. ) the adhipalipratyaya is the one most directly responsible for
the production and the speci fic nature of the effect (ef. Madhyalllakal'rlti p. 33 yas­
mill sali yad hhal'ali tal lasyadhipalcyam ify adhipalipratyaya {ak,I'a(wlIl); for in­
stance, it i s the organ o r sight that is the adhipalipratyaya of the v isual sensation,
in thc presence o f a determi nate object also able to arouse the sensations of taste,
smell etc. (SOS p. 86 ('akslI,,\'() 'dhipali{iratyaY{ld l'i,l'(fyagraha(w{i/'{/filliywlla(l I
udilasya jt7c7lwsya }'(fseIdisc7dhara(lye prc/ple lIiyal/lakw!1 cak,wr adhipalir hhavilum
arhasi /oke Iliyallwka.l'yadhipatill'opalalllhhal). In the AK the adhipaliprafyaya i s
included i n a system (sec I I . 49-55a, 6 I b-73) formed h y s i x hcws a n d four prafyayas
- the other pWlyayas are there helllo, ,I'(//llallalllarao alld alalllhallao (ct'. de La
Vallee Pouss i n 1 923-3 1 : I pp. 299-308; for d ifferent class i fications i n side the
181
II the cause, is indicative (lillgam) of the latter being there. 011 the con­
trary, a manifestation of smoke dUferenf from the one we have spoken of
derives solely f/"Ofll the maf1lfestation 'smoke' perceived by other sll!�iects,
which takes on ill tliis case the role of determining condition.
- The manifestation 'smoke' (in the distance etc.), which, though not
preceded by the direct presence of the manifestati on 'fire', arises from the
manifestation ' fire' comlllon to the v arious other knowing subjects in that
place and endowed w ith such causal power by the power of Necessity;
this m an i festation 'smoke' is that which invariably m akes known the ex­
istence o f this man i festation 'fire'. On the contrary, that smoke which
derives from other smoke that already exists20 - the manifestation ' fire'
now being completely extinct -, arises prec isely from the man i festat ion
'smoke' present to the consciousness of various other subjects, which,
though not being d irectly perceived at that moment 2 1 [by the subject who
makes the inference], is invested [by the Lord ] with the role of deter-
m ining cond it ion 22 , as we saw in the prev ious case. 1 2- 1 3 -
B uddh i st trad i t i on , id.: I p. 299 n. I : sec also id. I 92X-49: 44X IT. for the hetll­
pmtvav(/ theory i n the V ijfiapt imfitrata). The first hctll i n the series (kilr{//wO) is
identi fied with the (/dhipatipratyaya. All dharmas can be kara(lIIhctlis (but not with
regard to themselves) i n the general sense, i n that they do not make obstacle to the
causal process: but there is a princ ipal (prwlhiillll) kiil'{{lIllitclll which is that
respons i ble for the effective product ion o f the effect - for example, sight or form for
the v isual sensat ion or food for the body ( A K Bh p. X 3 : sec also de La Val lee Poussin
1 923-3 1 : I pp. 247-24X). The (ldhipalipml."a .\'(/ i n the k!lrih7 therefore would
correspond to the ()((u/hiillaka/'{/(I(t/II'III. Actually, nei ther Utp. nO!' /\bh. explain what
they e xactly mean by {/(/hip([lipl'ilt\·O\'a. I n particular /\bh. l i m i ts h i mse l f to poi n t ­
i n g o u t t h e character o f 'be ing remote, out o f sight' ( I P V I I p. I X5 I([SIIIi/1 kdryr71
so '1I1I1I(ivl/lc Y(lIIi/I fi(/roks() 'sa\' lIilhipillitl 'iid (,Vii, jPVY 1II p. 2 1 5 IIII' I 'll
l'aitllyilhhd.w7di valo '1Il11/II11 l11t paroks(/I/I , IiIlo 'dhif!lllip/'{/lyum ily IIn'alc. etc . ) . See
also n. 2 1 .
}O The reference is to the smoke the shepherd puts i nto a leather bottle and lets
out l ater. The e x amplc, known as the gopa/agha!ik(/ , al ready occurred i n S f) Y.67 :
see also Karnakagomin's eomment ary on the PYSY p. 99.
7 1 The adltipalipl'iIl.\'awl must necessarily belong to a di fferent (earlier) time
from that o f the effect (cL /\ K Bh p. X Lt . where there is an exposition of the
Saut rfin tika criticism of the Sarvfistivfldins, supporters of the relation of causality bet­
ween co-existcnt d//(/mws: sce also PY 1 11 .246). /\ nd, on the other hand, if it were
not {}(lrok,Wl. it would be the object of direct percept ion and there would be no need
to resort to i n ference.
22
Each o f the elcments that enter into the relat ion o f causal ity plays a role, that
docs not directly derive from or coincide with its own nature ( as in thc Buddhist
1 82
1 4. A lso the relation of cause alld effect conceived as 'there being II 4 . 1 4
this, this other is produced (asm i n satldam astip3 is not admissible for
realities that are insentient and as such incapable of 'requiring'
(apek�aO) 24 .
A fixed temporal succession of antecedent-consequent, which i s ex­
pressed i n the formulation 'there being this, this other is produced', also
occurs between things that have no causal connections, such as for in­
stance the rising in the firmament o f the conste llations o f the Krttikas
and RohiQ1 2 5 . The rel ation of cause and effect shoul d therefore be fOl'l1lll­
lated thus: 'there being the causal power of the thing that precedes , there
is the ex istence of the one that follows'. B u t this is not possible for in­
sentient realities incapable of requiring2 6. And even if we understand the
meaning of the formula as 'the causal power of the precedent constitutes
the existence of the consequent', in this way, too, v irtually nothing i s
said; neither can the own nature, characterized b y the causal power, o f
the preceding clement appear as the existence of the following one. 14 -
*eoneeption), but i s . so to speak, superimposed upon i t by the power o f Necessity
o f the Lord, who remains the only true causal agent, the agent par excellellce. Thi s
i s also generally valid for t h e whole sphere o f pract ical reality.
2 3 The Buddh ists i n general are referred to here. The relation o f causality is
resolved, i n the final analysis, i n a fixed temporal concomitance as being the onl y
ascertainable th i ng ( e f. Torella 1 979: 397-9X, n . 32).
2,1
To thc same object i on put forward in TS 52 1 and relative Paiijikc7 «If-
causal ity is explained i n t h i s way, namely w ithout the intervention o f an operation,
how can one explain expressions such as 'the e ffect depends on (requires) a cause',?»
- the Buddhist rep l ies that i t is only a question o f turns o f phrase: what is called
'dependcnce, need' (apck,l'(/) is Illerely an invariable i mmedi ate succession (va
c11/(/ Illa/'yoll i V(/lI/a(1 sail'i1pck,w7hlt idhtyal c ) .
j) The Pleiades and Taurus. This argument i s commonly used by thc various
critics of thc Buddhist conception o f causal ity. The invariable concomitance between
the rising of these two constellations, a Buddhi st wou ld reply ( e f. TS 1 423-4), rests
anyway upon a causal connection, w h ich l inks the two terms not d i rectly but through
their COlllillon dependence on a s ingle complex of causes ( e f. PV I. X); in this case,
in fact, it would be the same wind (pmhlt(1I7iallavi.vc,w) that pushes both constella­
t ions consecutively (sail (a(ya) .
26 I.c. in the sense that the ex istence of one thing 'requires' (apck,w7) the ex is­
tence of anothcr. The concept o f apck,1'(7 - which is the mean ing o f the locative case
here - contains on the one hand this in tentional dynami sm (ml/ls(//!ldhc7l1a i n the fol­
lowing karika; c L SSVr p. 2 ja</asya lI irahhi,I'(//!ldhcb . ) , on the other the rest ing
. .
o r one thing upon another: IPVY I I I p . 228 pa/'{/lIi,l'{/lilnlpcI (1III1.1'w!ldh(llI(fn7pc7 WI
.I'(fplwlIY 1I11/Ulpilel (directly commenting upon ahhipr(7)'a and OIlYcll111,Wligilc7 in the
(ikc7) , and yet agai n i/Jid. p. 229 llllyollyaiagll(ftc7ll1lika apck \'(7 and abhiprc7yak!'tc7.
..
1 83
II 1 5 . In fact the meaning of the locative case fIIay 1I0t be applied to
selrcontained enlitlCS. incapablc ()l intentionality (anusaITIdhanaO),
whether [cause and etreet} arc considered existent or non-existent.
- Effect and also cause may be understood as existent or as non-exis ­
tent; but, whatever the case, they still remain insentient real i ties, self-con­
tained and lacking intentionality, whose being is independent of other en­
tities. And it is for this reason that the meaning expressed by the endings
of the subordinate casesn , whose essence is prec isely its dependence on
a predominant element, is not appl icable to them . - 1 5 -
1 6. On the hasis (�r what has been said the ollly logically admissible
relatioll between things is to be fOllnd ill the meaning of" the case en­
dings. which consists ill (/ relation betwccn the action (lnd the factors (�l
the action (kriyakarakaO) and has as its only fO llnclatioll the kllowillg sllb­
iec/2g.
2 7 A l l the cases are subordinate excluding, o f coursc, thc nominative wh ich i s
b y defi n i t ion S \,{/({/I/(ra (lPVV III p. 23 1 dl'ifiyadayo): the k{/rlr presieles over and
promotes the carrying out of the indiv idual functions of thc various karaka.l' and they
all bring about the main action expressed by the verb. But subordi nation itsclf
presupposes a conscious dynam ism, an i ntent ionality which everything that is con­
ccivcd as ja(/a , as confined i n itse l f, cannot possess, as well as a capacity for unifica­
t ion, for establishing rclations, which is all ex pressed in thc single word,
aI/IiSilIlldlullI(/ , in all its concentration of meani ngs. However olle w ishes to conceive
this dependence ( we have seen that, following the (lka, Abh. has distinguished two
types. al/yollyu/(/gl/arariipa and (/hhipulyanlpc7), it is precluded from inert and insen­
ticnt real it ies, Utp, returns to this subject and devclops it further i n the S S Vr (p. 2 ) :
I/O hi ja(/(/),oli siI/!Ihafldliil/or ilpekwlr/lio gllil!iI(c pilrolafllryar(ho \'ii I allIClflY (//ikllra
C\,iI /J7j(/1/I lipck,WIC hlj(' I'(i /1(/ra((/1I11"O hl1u\'(/li, ((/daya(( I'ae/es /adatllw/ahliilsycly ctad
([pi 1/(/ s(/I/Iy(/k ; IIP(/(,(lro Ii)' a V(/1I/ apck,\'(/((/ im p(//'{/Iafl(/'{/ i\'cli syi/(, 1/(/ III j(/dusya
I/Il1khyail'(lkatik,1'{1 prarrlwl/ii c('cc/wi l'll \'i,i'i,l'!a {/flck,l'{i fliirolal/(IJ(//il \'(1 parapr(/ \'(//I-
, ala / lu/'{/k7 wII 'iI/ i v()g17kalik,1'I1 sl'cccliilcll/'{/(11111 iro(/I/(//IIk,\'(/I/(/1i Saf!lka /P{/ I 'i:ic,\'(/ CI 'a
slII!lg(le('I/(//(', (//ahdhc71milfl(/.<- cilfll/a/ahhiirllwm apckl'lldi ka(l1.\'a((', If the Buddhist
prem ises arc accepted Abh, concludes (IPVV I I I p. 23 1 ) the rclation of cause
and effect therefore remains inexpl ieable, seeing that however one puts i t hl.ic s{//i
(//iklll'O, hijad wiklll'O 'Iiklll'llsya hijalll etc. no formulat ion stands LI p to a logical
exam i nati(; n , as there is no room for assu m i ng thc role itsel f of kal'llk(/.
2X
This concept is already formulated i n substantially thc same terms i n SD I V .
32ab l'il/oikall'(I/!1 ('(J 1/(/ hl/(/\'cl kiiraka(\,w!1 k(/e/aeal/Ii; Utp. gives a very succinct com­
mentary on this, referring the reader to the IPK (and commentaries) for a more ex­
tensive treatmcnt of the suhjcct: glll/fadc.\' C(/ vae/ c((f( s \,akaryaka/'{/fI(//!1 h//(/I'(ldhliir
i,IYiI(C (ae cie/ek{/rtlflal\'(II!1 )'illa I/(/ s viti I jadasya lIil'llhhis(//!ldlich ka/'{/!/(7yogiid i(y
('((fd api 7.\I'al'llpratmhhijiiilyillll (')'okllllll.
I X4
- The connection between earth, seed, water and so on i s correctly II 4.16
understood as the meaning of the case endings consisting i n a relation
between verbal action and the factors of the action, depending on a single
subject, and is not to be identified with some other type of 'dry' (su$ka) 29
connection such as that of cause and effect. 16 - -
1 7 . Even if it is maintained that cause and effec t have one another's
very natllre, merely the unity of the two is obtained, for (f there were any
distinction it could not be said that they have the same nature 3 0 .
- Even if it i s maintained that cause and effect have one another's
form, the only result would be that they are a single thing and not that
they constitute a relation. - 1 7
1 8 . The dzfferentiatioll of a unitary entity is action , occurring in tem­
poret! slIccessioll . In this way we necessarily return to our thesis of an
agent su'�ject. as being that which becomes mod(lied in the various
forms3 ' ,
- The presentation of a single real ity i n differentiated ways, change,
impelled (or 'measured') by time, is precisely action. Therefore for an en­
tity free to modify itself, endowed with energy, being a cause means
being the agent of the action. - 1 8 -
1 9. But this is not possible for an insentient reality, because differen­
tiatioll would conflict with unity, given the manifold forms �l manifesta-
29 The meaning of ,�lI,I'ka is explained in Ipvv I I I p. 234 /ilI,�kab kar(r(ii(ma­
svi/lalllrya/ak,I'(f(lOblwymnclaniilllwkarasa,Wllyafl ; i .e. w ithout the 'juice' that is repre­
sented by conscious dynamism.
3 0 The prev ious kc7rikii concluded the argumentations put forward by U tp ,
against t h e Buddhist conception of causal ity, based on t h e absolute alterity a n d isola­
tion of s ingle entities. A di fferent argument must be addressed to the followers of
SaIl1khya who, i n admitting the pre-existence o f the effect in the cause, mainta i n the
continuity anel substantial unity of things. But the thesi s of the Saq1khya (also
criticized in the IS), as the fol lowing karikc7 points out, cannot figure as a real al­
ternative to the Saiva thesis,
J I The Saq1khya conception of causality as the continual modi fication of a
primordial nature (prakr(i , pradhc7na) to forms that are constantly new and already
i m p l icitly contained in it, in the end, enters into the Saiva scheme of the kar/rla:
the modi fication of the prakr(i is precisely its being the agent of the action of
mod i fication, The S aivas would have no objection were it not for the fact that the
prakr(i as conceived by the San1khya i .e, ja</a has no right to assume this role,
-
which is the exclusive prerogative of the conscious being (cL the fol lowing k(/rikii).
1 85
n 4 . 1 9 tion. On the contrary, it is possible in the case of a conscious unitary
reality.
- This is not possible for an i nsentient reality, because its nature
which is s ingle woul d conflict with i ts appearing in differentiated forms.
On the contrary, it is possible for an absolutely l impid (svacche), unitary,
conscious reality, because there is no conflict here between its unity and
i ts capacity to receive manifold ret1ections 32 . - t 9 -
20.Even if the IIllity (�f consciollsness is mailltained33 to be the only
ultimate reality, there cannot be action , for two entities divided as regards
the nature (�f their fllClIl(festation (abhasabhinnayol)), withollt a prelimi­
I/ary act of thought which grasps and establishes the Ilnity (eka­
tvaparamarsaq1) , characterized by the desire to act.
- Even if one posits the conscious principle as the only reality, a dif­
fcrentiation of the manifestations conceived of as random (Le. without a
cause) is not adrnissible34 , and on the other hand there is no action i n
. 1 The I , according t o a s i m i le which is very dear t o these schools, i s l i ke a
'
c lear m i rror serv ing as substratum for the m an i festation o f objeetive real ity. Owing
to its absolute transparency i t remains unmodified by the apparition o f these forms ,
w h i c h are i n a sense d i fferent from it. It is this very purity that causes what i s
actually n o t separate from i t to appear, i nstead, as separate (Ipvv III p. 243 ('tad
eva hi (al/llirll/alat\'(Jf!1 yat sl'i1tmall(/tiriktasya api (]tirikt(Jsya iva a l'ahhasallam). See
also S Pr l.54-.')5 atyalltacchasl'abhal'([tvclt spharikasya yatha s\'akam I rfipar!1
paroparaktasya lIitym!1 lIail'opalahhyate II tatha hhcII'OSamaYllkt(lf!1 bhagal'(Jf!ls
<dust as due to its
tcll'akm!/ 1'(/[111(1 I (/tyalllallinllalatayc7 P!'lhak tair nopalabhyate II
absolute transparency, the intrinsic nature o f crystal , that is continually coloured by
other things, i s not perce ived, so indeed, 0 B lessed One, your body, that is u nited
w ith the various beings, due to its absolute limpidity is not perceived without them».
J \ Utp, now turns his criticism to the ,<:cllllahrahlll(Jl'Cida , which m ight avail it­
sel f o f what i s stated in the preceding kc7rika to propose itself as the defin itive truth,
able to overcome all the contrad ictions pointed out i n the theories o f causal i ty ex­
amined so far.
.14 The multiplicity and d iversity of manifestations cannot be coneeived of as
being purely random, because the order and regul arity of real ity would remain in­
expl icable. The multiplicity must therefore have a cause and this cause cannot he
anything but action. However, i n the conscious principle as understood by the
Vedantins Uclllt(Jhrahmoll) action i s by defi nition absent, and as the vrtti explains
every i nsentient real i ty i s incapable o f action. Action, as the bridge between the
one and the many, must necessari l y contain as a precondition an awareness o f the
not absolute alterity o f the two terms, i n order that these may play the roles which
are d istinct yet i n timately coord inated -, for example, o f karlr and karma. As Abh.
1 86
this conscious principle. If, however, i t renders extemally manifest II 4.21
through an act of detenninate thought combined with a desire to act i n
this way, then action i s possible35 . O n the other hand, a n insentient reali ty
cannot even be the agent of the action of being - ' i t exists, is' - since i t
does not possess the freedom that i s manifested through 'wanting to be'
(bubha�iiyogena)3 6 . Thus the u ltimate truth i n this regard i s that the
knowing subject, and he alone, 'causes' the insentient reality 'to be'
(bhiivayati), or, in other words, appears in various fOlms such as mount
Himacala and so on. - 20 -
Therefore causality, agency, action are nothing but the will of him
21.
who wishes to appear in the form of the universe, in the various
man(festations of jar, cloth and so on.
- The very will of him who i s free and has consciousness as his na­
ture to appear as universe constitutes his being cause as regards the
universe, in the form of agency; and this is the power of Action. I n this
way action i n the primary sense (mukhyii) i.e. the desire to act -
belongs uniquely to the agent, one, whose essence i s consciousness .
says (fpV II p. 205) , action, which is s i ngle, could not be the svabhc7va of two things,
if these were utterly d ifferen t form one another. This moment o f u nity occurs in the
first attempt towards action ( cikir,�cl), when the object i s still completely immersed
in the I. It must be pointed out that Abh.'s commentaries g ive three or four d i fferen t
interpretations o f the karikcl, according t o whether ahhasahhilll1ayob i s made t o
depend o n cik7r,�cl, paramada or kriya respectively; however, these i nterpretations
are not incompati bl e and, o n the contrary, broaden the i m p lications of the meaning
as a whole .
.15 Action, Abh. explains, following the (ikc7 (see text note 207) , is the 'rendering
manifest' (libhasallcl) , whose essential feature is constituted by the very first impulse
o f thought and w i l l to act (par(llIIar/w cik7r,�cl or iccha) which already contains i n
embryo the future manifestation and externalization (cf. S O I . 1 9- 20a and I'r((i).
36 A certain action may be attributed to an insentient reali ty (SOVr p. 1 59 gharo
'rt/wkriyc7111 IIdakc7hara!lc1dikc71!1 karoti), only in a figurative sense; strictly speaki n g
i t would n o t b e perm issible even to say that i t ' is', u nless o n e takes i n to account that
this satt(l that practical experience aseribes to i t i s in real ity ,<:ivatakhyc7; see above,
Introduction pp. X V- X V I , This point is developed by Dtp. in the vrtli o n S O I V .
32b-33a, where Somananda solves i n the same tel1l1S the probl e m o f t h e attribution
in d iscourse o f the quali fication o f karaka (and thus o f case endings) to entit ies that
are by defi n i t ion non-existent, such as the antelope's horn etc. B hartrhari would have
faced the problem by refe rring to the d istinction between fllllkhyasatla and vastvartha,
on the one hand, and IIpacc7rasatt(/ and ,�abdartha, on the other. On the related
question whether (kc7rakas ' ) agency presupposes animation see Cardona 1 974.
1 87
There i s n o object of action w ithout an agent; action, i n fact, i s attributed
to the object etc. only in a figurative sense, through the agene7. 21 - -
J7 A l l the other kc7rakas may even be absent from the sentence, but the presence
of the subject is enough to ensure the carry ing out of the verbal action, and, v ice
versa, evcn if all the other karokos arc present the abscnee o f the subject alone makes
the action i mpossi ble (lpv v III p. 253; c f. YP I I I . 7 . 1 0 1 -2 and Helaraja's commen­
tary). Cf. S Pr I I . 54 prak{l,\'ate s(If!lvid I'M tac/(lIIyat tll prakii,<'yatc I pmk(/,<'Y(lf!l co
"havet karma tal' ca kartrel villa kat/lClIll II «Consciousness alone shines; that which
is other from i t i s i l lum inated. What i s i l l u m inated i s the object, and how can the
object subsist without a subject?».
I RR
III 1.1
S ECTION III. REVELATION
CHAPTER I
1 . On the basis of the preceding argumentations (evam) 1 , action,
which consists of an intel'llal and external level, subject to temporal suc­
cession, pertains to the knowing slIbject alone2 : therefore cognition and
actiOi/ are inseparable fiYJm one another.
I This i s the sense that i s expressly indicated by Abh. (IpVV I I I p . 257).
2 This knowing subject is, first and foremost, the supreme knowing subject,
ParameSvara, but also every l i mited subject, i n sofar as S iv a is h i s model ,Ind ul­
timate essence. What thc kcirikci expounds i s therefore the sivatattva (IpVV III p .
2 5 8 ,(;i\'(Jtattl'alak,m!l(Isya parapram{i(lIr); all the tattvas, from SadMiva a n d Isvara
(see the fol lowing kcirik(i) are h is modes of bei ng , or so-to-speak internal modifica­
tions, he is the sole real ity (ibid. p. 257 ,(;ivatattV(If!1 hi sarvapadelrthana/?l vapuf/, p .
263 .\'t'l'ataltl'wll c\'(/ ekalll \'(Jstllsat). U t p . does n o t place thi s supreme reality (called
HitI' in the fol lowing kcirikc7) beyond the scale of the tattvas, but at the top o f it, as
the u n ion between ,viva and ,(;akti. His powers are absolutely pure (cf. above I , 8. 1 1 )
i n that they are w ithout object. I f at the pati level the subject sees the world as his
own body (1II . 2.3, I Y . l .4), at the paramapati level we cannot even speak o f the
knowable (Ipyy III p. 367 pClramapatali til hhagavati prameyakathaiva Ila asti, ihid.
p. 266 11([ ca ,<:iVCl pade vi,<:I'(l!!l kilkit). A l l the universe is completely dissolved into
the I ; .I'iv(/W i s preci sely the plane where only the 'I' exists. A t various points i n the
SDVr a (not constant) distinction is made between S iva o n the one hand and
Paramasiva (or Paramesvara) on thc other seen as the all-inclusive form (p. 3); el­
sewhere (p. 27) the God is e xpressly said to assume the form o f the thirty-six prin­
ciples, all indistinctly understood as 1((lrya ( ... taltl'Cll'llpCllIl ,w(trilll,<:attattvasCllilkhyw!1
kc/ryCilil I'lIPC!/(/ hihharti). It must be borne in mind, however, that what Utp. primm'i­
Iy intends to do in this work is to render explicit the teaching o f his master
Somananda. Bhaskara (Bh II p. 2 1 1 ff.) distinguishes between prakriyc/,<:c/stra (IPK
is one of these), whose aim is to describe the nature of the tattvas ( tattl'a­
SI'Cll'llpakat/lCIlla), and sc7ra,<:(/stm (e.g. the Malinlv!iaya) , devoted to the teaching o f
t h e supreme non-duality. Accordi ng to t h e latter, within Sadasiva since i t h a s the
nature of ,1'c/n tahraliIllCiIl there is not a full contact with Sakti; thus Sakti is posi ted
as a separate prin c i ple (the thirty-fifth) above Sadasiva and is to be united w i th Siva
(the thirty-si xth) d istinct from Sadasiva. Though i n reality S iva and Paramasiva are
one si ngle thing, A n asritasiva refers to his speci fic nature (sl'al'lipanirc!e.<:a) and
Parasiva refers to h i s pervading the whole scale of principles. However i t is not
1 89
III 1 . 1 - Action, subject to temporal succession, is nothing but externaliza-
tion; i t pertains to the knowing subject, the self, which resides within.
Thus cognition and action are mutually inseparable in him. - I
2. B ll t by virtue qf the pre-eminence of the internal state there is, at
the beginning, the Siidiikhya principle :'. ; theil, with the predominallce of
externality, the Piirmndvara principle.
- But when in the Lord (iSifllb), between the planes of internality and
externality, internality has pre-eminence, there is the Sadakhya4 principle;
then, w ith the increase in externality, there is the principle of Isvara5.
2 -
3.l.<-vara is opening outwards (unme�ah), Sadii,fiva is closing ill wards
(nime�abf) ; True Science (sadvidy�i) is tlze state (�f the Ilotiolls (d" '/' alld
'this' havillg (Ill identica! suhstratunt.
leg i t imate Bhuskara continues to make it i nto a thirty-seventh principle, because
vw7pra and l'yc7paka cannot be placed on the same plane, namely, l)'iipaka cannot
be collocated i n the same series as the l'yapya. though higher u p (the same appl ies
to those who posi t a further thirty-eight principle). The fact that the description given
by the prakriyc7.\'c7slra stops at the Jimla((m may be explained, again aceording to
Bhuskara, i n two ways: either they were only a i m i n g at g i v ing a di fferentiated
description o f the lallms, w i thout intending to proc laim the supreme non-dual ity (to
wh ich i n any case they constitute a way o f access); or they do not mention a reality
beyond the loll vas i n order not to expose i t to objeeti v i zation.
J 'Prineiple' (Ialll'o), according to Abh.'s definition (IPVV TIl p. 264. IpV I T P.
2 1 9 ) , is a real ity that extends, as a u ni fying clement . to a set o f dist inct entities,
slich as earth for h i l ls, mOllntains, countries etc. , or water for lakes, rivers, seas. See
as regards this M Pl\ , l'iilyapiida , V. 3-4 and Rumakan\ha's commentary. Cr. also the
( im p l icit) etymological i nterpreta t ion that li tp. g ives o f it ( S DV)" p. 27) v/,\' \'(/fira­
{iaiimlill/lIl/ak,wlI/(I 'capable of extend ing the deployment of everything'; there is yet
another def i n i t ion in TP 7 3 . The laltva refers to the object ive d imension of a cer­
tain plane o f real ity, that is, to the content and qual ity of the experience o f the sub­
jects who pertain to those levels (lPVV I I I p. 274 l'cilyahhc7 wlllisrl/(/ da.va lall\'{/­
s I'a rafill Iada l'iI lilta.wy i I1"-1'IIdd1/(/I/Ii/I ITCdY(/I'(/SI IIsadIli/lu7).
,I Abh . (ipv II pp. 2 1 7- X ) gives more than one ex planation of the word Sudflkhya:
the derivative with l'rdillii has here the mean ing o f 'that is i n sadakltya' (cL PUr) i n i
IV. 3 . 5 3 ) , where s{I(lakllya means the plane on which the notion o f 'being' (sal) first
appears; or of 'what is the meaning of Sadakltya (understood as a synonym o f
Sadnsiva)'. The word Sadnsiva, again according t o Abh. (IpVV [(( p . 2M), means
that the nature of Siva does not cease to be present, even if the object begins to arise.
:; PararneSvara, as the vrlli makes c lear, stands for 1 :ivara here.
6 Nilllc,W refers to the moment in which the 'th is', which in Suddhavidyu be­
comes fu l l y evident and faces the I (st i l l , of course, in the sphere of consc iollsness
1 90
- lsvara and S adasiva are respectively opening outwards and closing TIl 1 .3
inwards, the condition of externality and internality. Pure Science (sud­
dhavidyii) is the plane of him who, having all things as h i s essence,
thinks '1 am this universe', where the two telms have the same substratum
(siimaniidhikara�lyella)7 , without any differentiation between external and
internal, cognizable object and cognizing subject, both resting on the sole
reality which is pure consciousness. - 3 -
4, [The latter principle is called sadvidya) for in this things, having
reached the plane (�f ol�iec( qf cognition and the level of 'this', are known
by what is their tl'lle reality, as their essence is consciollsness.
- Things, though they have become cognizable object in the form of
'this' on the plane of cognizable reality differentiated [from the subject] ,
are known by their true reality in the terms of ' this is 1' , insofar as their
essence is none other than consciousness; this is the sense conveyed by
the adjective 'pure' [in Pure Science] 8 , - 4 -
and non-di fferentiation), is s t i l l evanescent and veiled by the I which completely
overcomes it, as at the dawn of creation or the t w i light of cosmic d issolution. The
I-this relation is reversed in the lsvara principle; the 'this' in Sadnsiva and in Isvara
are related to one another in the same way as a sketch is related to a fin ished paint­
ing. There i s no real d i ffere n t i ation between the Sadasiva, Isvara and S u ddhavi ­
d y u principles; the ' identical substratum' which, accordi n g to U t p . , characterizes Sud­
dhavidyu i s also an essential element for the first two, which show the disequi l ibrium
between subject and object though they have unity as their common bas i s ( i n the
one case c f. IPVV I[[ p. 266 i t is idwII that i s projected i n aha!!1 and v ice versa).
-
The texts seem to be qu ite i n agreement on this, though there are certai n d i screpan­
c ies in the description (IpVV III p. 266 asau I'Yclpc7ro vidyc7khyab I IIMav api co
ladvyiiparalllayall {)(Irama,viv(/nillhasya ekaghanal1l adl'aryalll; IpV II p. 222 lada­
dhi,\'rhalrdmyagaIW!1 kam!/(//!l l'idyillaltl'alll aha; PTV p. 224 bhagal'a!sadc7.\'ive,vada,<:a
,\'l/ddltavidVclll/(f\,7; etc.).
7 Sci//;aI/(7dil ikara(lya is, i n grammatical terms, 'co-referentiality', hav i n g the same
case, such as the subject and nominal predicate of a proposition. The plane of maya i s
characterized b y the opposite condition, prllwgadhikara(l)'a: subject and object ap­
pear as two rea l ities unrelated to one another: 'they have a d ifferent substratum'.
H Abh. (lPVV I I I p. 273) refers to the MPA to define the nature of Suddhavidya.
Indeed, the tenth para/a o f MPl\ ' s vidyc7pc7da (with RumakaQ\ha's vrlti) i s devoted
to the vidyc7talll'{1. V idyu is the basi c component of human knowledge, w h ich takes
place through the various forms assumed by the Imddhi (determination, memory,
intuition and so on) ( l 'rlli p. 3 1 1 adhY(fvasaya,\'III!"lljJra!ihln7dipratyayaiJhedaiJhillncl
!Jl/ddhir api yayd l'edyale sci l'idyc7 tat pm'w!1 kam!wlII); V idyu embraces i t entirely ,
191
III 1.5 Here9 there is impeliectioll (aparatvam) 011 the olle hand because
5.
things are manzf'esfed as other than the se(f' -, pe/ieetion (pm'aUi) Oil the
other - because they are veiled by the 1. This is in fact the peliect-imper­
feet state (paraparadasa).
- Here there is imperfection because there is the notion of 'this', per­
fection because all the cognizable is veiled by the I ' 0 : this is therefore
the perfect-imperfect condition. 5 beyond the flow of existence, the Mantresvaras and the Vidyesvaras
6. Others " maintain that Vidya is the idea of' differentiation with
respect to things, present in the one who is, howevel; for his part, {{idly]
i n the sense that i t ' knows ' , is aware of, all forms of cognit ion ( X . 5 S(IS(lnlliJfil'G
salalm!l sar\'(lliga/iligalle /;:,WlIlcl I n(l 1IIIIIa priikrfi /!/Iddllir hahirmigfi yalas III sci
However, Vidya is bound to the limited human cond i tion (X.20a P(lllrIl,I'(//!1 hlle/mlll
(Hritya) , and, as such, it illuminates the ordinary cogni zable real ity ( X . 1 5b I'cdyc7r­
lliapralipiidikii) but it cannot reveal the h ighest principles ( X . 20d 11(1 ,1'i\'(7rlli(lpra­
dc7yikc7). This task pertains to S ueld havidya, which transcends the plan e of maya
but acts on the plane of the l imited subject, since it i s only in him - not i n the
a/;:ala subject and sti l l less i n the IIIl1k{(l , i n his consciousness. that the whole
-
universal deployment. from the lowest plane, is the object of knowledge (X.23
,viW7dYal'lIlliparYlillto y o ' yal/l adlt\'(llil'istrlab / sa sarl'wi c a cilall jiieyo 1lc7:iil'aIWld
l'ifllllC)'ale (1).
'J ' Or in other words, as Ahh. comments (IPV II p. 227), 'in thc two principles
(Hh: Sadtlsiva and [svara)'.
10
C r. IPVV f[[ p, 274 aparal \'(//Il {/f1l7r�w/(/ allwikc7lik,I'i(\'{/1I/ idam iIi, paratl '(J!!1
[1I1I'1l(l(\'(/1I/ lIhalll iti.
I I According to a conception that Utp. docs not present as h i s own (Abh" [PV
I I p. 22!\, attributes it to the Rallral'c7gwlla), S ucldhavidYii is the principle in which
d i fferentiation appears, rest rictcd , however, only to the sphere o f the ob ject: the
'
s u bject, in other words, w ithout dec l i n ing from its own total absorption in pure
consciousness (therefore no iden t i fication with a mind, body etc , ) regards thc ob­
ject as other than h imsc l f. I t is the cond ition of the Vidyesvaras which we will
return to later - who, omniscient and omnipotent, face a reality considered other
than themselves. It may be added, again on the basis of Abh" that what d i fTeren­
tiates this conception from that of the preced ing karika is that there Viclya
represents in the sphere of the consc iousness ' I -this' the predomi nance of the I
which veils the 'th is'; whereas here it is the predomi nance of 'this' vei led by the
L The i ntroduction of d i fferent iation dcterm i nes a certain ass imi lation with maya
([he Rall/'{/ \'a and other texts i n fact call S uddhavidya also by the name of
Mahamayu) ; cL Rau/'(/l'(igallla, \,idyiipc7da, [V. 2!\b lIlilyop(/ri lIIa/ulmc7ya sar­
l'ak(7ra�l{[kc7rall(JlI/ , a miiyii, however, which is not fu l l y developed (a{Jrartl(lIw ) be­
cause the 'this' in it is incapable of devcloping in the sense of ru l l duality, veilecl
as it is by the [ (the 'purity' o f Suddhavidyn cOll s ists precisely in this). Mahtlmaya
1 92
an agent having consciousness as his essence, as in the case of the HI 1,6
VidyeSvaras: this idea of d(fferelltiation is similar to that caused by the
power of maya,
- Some consider Vidya as the v iew of everything as differenti ated
[from the I ] , pertaining however to a subject [fully] endowed with con­
sciousness and agency. This V idya is also the power of maya. Being
reside there t 2. 6-
_
7 . The power of' Vidya reveals in the state of 'beast' (pasubhave) the
true natllre as Sovereignty; the power of maya, on the contrary, conceals
it D .
II).
is sometimes (cf. e,g, PTV p. 225) considered a distinct lattva between Maya anel
Suddhav idya - in the need to assign an abode to the vijl7anakeva/as, which on the
h ierarchical scale o f subjects occupy an i n termediate posi t i o n between the
pmlayc7kalas and the \'idycS\'aras etc . , located respectively i n Maya and Sud­
dhavidya; in other texts it is, on the contrary, included in S uddhavidya or in Maya,
depending on which of its aspects - mentioned above one w ishes to refer to (see
,SalaralllaSClI!lgraha I I. 24-27 and comm . , S DV r p, 25; see also Dvivedi 1 983:
Upodg/u7ta, 1 39- 1 4 1 ) .
12
Ipvv III p, 277 explains, fol lowing the (I/;:c7. the co-presence in this principle
of the Mantresvaras and V idyesvaras on the basis of the essential u nity of Mantras
and V idyas (,\:lIddh(lllc7dipar(IIIWr,l:(1sc7ra,(:ahdariJ,{:ikalc7,(:ar7ratvena); the d i fference is
that in the ronner filII/ai, ,\'(//�l\'edalla and ,l:aktil1lal predominate, w h i le in the latter
siclclhi, w7cya and ,I'akli predominate.
1.1 The concept ion expressed in this k(lrika (attributed by Abh . , IpV II p. 23 1 ,
to the Sa</ardhasc7/'a, a text of the Trika school) seems to be that favoured by Vtp.,
since i t is not introduced as pertaining to 'others' (ibid. allye ity allllktefl). Abh,
formulates i t i n the a \'(/Iara!lika to the IPV as fol lows: in Sadasiva the d ifferentia­
tion i s not evident, iccha!wkti i s in action; in Isvara the d i fferentiat ion i s eviclent,
the ,I:akti is jllcllla; in Suddhavidya ( l i terally 'in the V idYcSvaras') the d i fferentiation
is not only evident, but also ful l y developed (pran7<lha) - but only as regards the
plane o r the knowable, subjectiv ity i s untouched kriy(7/;akli i s in action. After that,
w ith the d i fferentiation which also embraces the sphere o f the I, one enters the sam­
sarie world, the realm of lIliiyc7,I'akli. \lidy(7.I'akli is also in action on this plane, having
the opposite function from that of maya, that is, it discloses true reality to the yogins
and the jiiallillS i n whom the error o f d i fferentiation has been overcome and survives
only i n the state of karmic impulse, The parallel (/\'al(//,(I�likt7 i n IPVV contains some
variants and seems more in line with Utp,: jllalla,vakli in Sadasiva and kriy(7/;akli i n
Isvara (as i n S D [ I . I ); a residual trace o f kriya.l:akli constitutes, on t h e contrary, the
power of Suddhavidya, also cal led Mahamaya,
1 93
III 1.7 - In beings in the flow of existence there is the recognition of the
self as Sovereignty thanks to Vidya 1 4 and the state of 'beast' through the
action of maya. - 7
8.On the contrary, when absolute d(fferelltiation appears, and the
void, the intellect or the body - which are other than the self - are con­
sidered as '1', it is then that the power (?f maya displays itself
When things appear exclusively as 'this', as differentiated [from the
SUbject], and entities such as the body and so on appear as the cogniz­
ing subject the T , then the power of maya called 'obfuscating' I S , which
-
I S the cause of these two errors, displays itself in the Lord. - 8 -
9. That cognlZlllg slIhject idenl{jied with the void elc. who faces a
cognizahle reality asslImed to he separate {lImn himse(t7, such a suhject
who is ill fact himse(f an ol�ject l 6 is enveloped by the pentad COI/-
stituted hy Time ctc.
14 On l'idyil.I'akti and its degrees c f. S D Y " pp. 3 1 -32, 25; sce also below III .
2. 3 .
I,
A bh. (lPYY III p. 285) quotes a passage from the Rlidraviimalasiira (milWI .
to which the l'rlti prol�ahly alludes.
vimollinl I/(/I/Ia kalilyc7(J kalal/at!1 stllilal/l ) ,
1 6 A l l t h e variolls planes - from the body to t h e mind and finally t h e void
with which a person believes he can identify his own subjeetivity and which he op­
poses to an objective reality cons idered 'other', arc on the contrary, in the final
analysis, part of it, as they too are objeets compared to the authentic subjcctivity
constituted by conscioLlsness (cil). But i f in one way they arc not identical to con­
sciousness they arc howcver an ex pression of it, thcrc not being anything subslHn­
tially other than consciousness and that docs not ultimate ly merge with it. The error
is therefore a double error, paradox ical li ke the nature of milyil which l ies at its basis:
identifying consciousness, the I, with what i s not consciousness is rnilyil, but it i s
mfiyfi too w h i c h causes what in reality is n o t di fferent from consciousness to appear
as other than it. I n order tltat the reality of the object may be conceived as be ing
di fferentiated from the 1 a degradation of the 1 is necessary. Without this identity
crisis thc I, in its fu ll ness, cou ld only embrace the whole as his own sci I' and the
word 'th is' could not be uttered.
1 7 The man i festation of the present, c haracterized by vividness and clarity, is
the point of refcrence for conceiving a past and a fUllire. The scat of the experience
of t ime, Abh. adds (lPYY I I I p. 2X7), is primarily the empirical subjcct and only
secondarily things, which receive their temporal colour from the time of the subject
with whom they arc associated.
IX
Utp. hi msel f, according to what Abh. reports (ibid. pp. 290- 1 . sec text note
3 1 ), ackllowledgcs two intcrpretatiolls of the expression kal'l/wpl/(Jla: 'the act ion and
1 94
- That cognizing subject identified with the void etc. who faces the III 1.9
whole of cognizable reality conceived as separate [from the self), is, i n
fact, himself the object o f cogn ition as 'this' and i s conditioned b y the
five prici p les, Time and so on. From Time he derives, through the
manifestation of the present, the existence of the past and of the future1 7 ;
from Necessity the strict concatenation of [cause with] effect and o f ac-
tion with its frui t (karmaphalaniyamaf1) 1 8 ; from Attachment the yeaming
for fruition; from W isdom and Force this subject - who, however, is not
identified w i th consciousness nor is he free - derives a partial knowledge
and activity, essentially constituted by consciousness and freedom. - 9 -
1 0- 1 1 . Cognizable reality, distinct in products and instruments, ap­
pears in twenty-three forms,' it has a single, lIndivided, radical cause, the
pradhana. The series of intemal and external instruments has thirteen
aspects,' the class (�f products, divided into gross and subtle, has ten.
The products are div ided into two groups. Five are constituted by
sound, tangible shape, colour, taste and smell and are called tanmatra be­
cause of their subtle nature t 9 ; by combining them one has the gross ele-
its result ( i .e. the karmic impulse that derives from it)' or 'the karma and its frui t
( i .e. the heaven etc . )'. The principle o f Necessity i s therefore that w hich ensures i n
the subject the apparent validity and fixi ty o f the cause-effect rel ation i n everyday
experience, so that what is essentially the Lord's creativity may appear as the
capacity of one thing invariably to produce another.
1 9 The relation between the series of subtle elements (tal/lI1li1ra) and that of the
gross clements (hllala. //Ialli/hlillfa) is referred to in both the Saq1khya and Agama
texts as the relation between universal and particular. The lal/melfra represents the
archetypal, q u intessential form of the relative lIIallc7bllllla of which it constitutes the
primary quality (sound-ether, tactile sensation-air, etc.), though not the only one, as
all the schools arc forced to admit. I n fact experience shows that - w it h the excep­
tion of ether all the gross clements also have some of the qualities that are not
cons idered co-essential to them; sound, for example says the MfA., vidyc7pc7da, XII.
1 7 and relative vrlli - is present not only in ether, but also in air, fire, water and
earth. Thus two distinct conceptions emerge. According to the first every gross ele­
ment possesses only one s ingle quality and, if we perceive others, this is due to its
combining or connecting (.I'(Jf!I/wrka, s(//I/lil'e.�a) w ith other clements. Abh. (Ipyy III
p. 299) quotes, w ith reference to this, a l ine from the M PA, k,\'lIhhitclt s/Hlr.I'afan­
flUlfrad d\'igll(1O vyl7lwlO //Ial'lll (not found in the published text; but c f. vidyapc7da ,
X X . I cd-2ab yal lal prak spar.<ialal/llli11ralll fe/ma.I'(Jf(l SClllllldclllrlClm / lafk,l'Obllcld
ahha\'ad vc7Yllr dvigll(1O vyl7l1alak,I'(I(wb), which he glosses with p l7rvahlullc7nlara­
FVtl/WYOgat. This is the thesis of the ancient Sfil1,1khya, which w i l l be later supplanted
1 95
III 1.10· 1 1 ments called earth etc . , of which there are also five, and they are essen­
tially no different from the former (fany eva) 20 . The ear, the skin, the
eye, the tongue and the nose are the five i nstruments of cogni tion; the
voice, the hands, the feet, the excretory and genital organs are the five
i nstruments of action. The internal organ is threefold: the mind, the in­
tel lect and the sense of the 1 . This cognizable reality, composed of
products and instruments and divided into twenty-three forms, has a
s ingle and undivided plane called pradhana, which constitutes its radical
foundation. 1 0 1 1- - -
in the elassical Saqlkhya by the thesis of the accumulation of qual ities (ether has
sound, air has sound and tactile sensation, and so on, until one reaches earth which
possesses all five), which i s that generall y accepted i n the theoretical section of the
A.gamHs (e.g. Kc7lol/am, Pall,I'ka/'(/ etc.) and presupposed by ritual . Furthermore this
accllmulat ion is generally explained as deriving from the fact that the individual
1mIII/iUra generates the relative lIlahabha/a not in i solation, but by associating itse l f
with the other /all/ll1l1ms i n various ways (sec Pall,I'k(mlgall/a, JlIIIII.I·/altmpa!a/a, n .
243-4. c i t . i n ,S'llil'lI{Jllribl/(I,W/ p . 1 25 ; MPA., l'idyilp(lda, X V I II . 1 02- 1 04ab, ete.).
20
This seems to mean that the gross clements do not have a d i fferent real i ty
froIll the essential qual i t ies that compose them, combined and separate (cL the frag­
mentary quotat ions frolll the !7kci on this point in the 1 '!'lIi , c i ted by Abh . , IPVV I I I
p p . 299-3()O, '/(/1/.1' ('1'0' iii 1'/'llil!1 l'ycim,I'{c 'lallY e m 1'(1' itwidillli 'lIalil l'os/\'(lIIla/'{//II'),
This principle is clcarly fOIllulated i n TA I X . 2X9: « I n this rcgard the earth ete., as
is attested by direct perception, arc noth ing but an aggregate of qual i t ies, neither,
separate or d i fferent from them, docs any subject appear that Illay be cal led earth
and so on».
1 96
111 2.1
CHAPTER I I
1 . Such being the structure of reality l , Rudra is the deity that presides
over the state in which this2 subjectivity exclusively subsists; Brahma and
Vi,s�1U3 reside in the flowing of the differentiated cognizable reality.
- Rudra i s he who presides over the condition of pure [limited] sub­
jectivity represented by the void or by an extremely subtle body formed
by the purya,sraka4 i n other words, over the condition i n which there
-
is a reabsorption of every other cognizable reality. Brahma and Vi�l)u
preside over the manifestation of differentiated cognizable reali ty, the
former causing creation and the latter continuity. - 1 -
2. This cognizer blinded by maya, bOllnd by the karma, is immersed
in the Saf?lSara; but once Science (vidya) has made him recognize his
011'11 nature as Lord, then , his essence being solely consciousness, he is
called 'liberated'.
The mayic cognizer who is identified with the void and so on,
depending on the karma because of the law of necessity 5 , is i n the power
I Thi s is how I understand talra - not glossed by Utp. in conformity w i th
Abh,'s i nterpretation,
2 'This', i.e. the l im i ted subjectivity described in I I I. I . 9,
3 Brahma, V i � I,lu and Rudra along w i th Isvara, Sadasiva and Anasrita are the
so-called KaraI,las 01' KaraI,lesvaras, the hypostases of S iva s ituated on the various
p l anes of real ity in an order of increasi n g ontological d ignity , Each of these deities
presides over (adh i,I'!lul-) a plane of reality, brings his devotees to this p l an e and,
v ice versa, becomes d irectly present to those who are absorbed i nto the contempla­
tion of that level of reality (IpVV I I I p. 3(5), Abh., commenting on the !7k(l, connects
them with forms of knowledge, levels of the word and locations in the human body.
Brahma is assoeiated w ith the first moment of cognition and manifestation (prarha­
maka/piki sr,I'!ib), w i th the first effusion of pa,{:yallll i n the form of pratibha and h i s
locus is t h e heart; V i � I,lu is associated w i t h t h e continuing o f cog n ition, a s i n memory
and dream, with l/IadhY(ll/ul and vaikhar7, h i s locus is the throat; Rudra w ith the
reabsorption of al l discourses, the first step i n to the supreme word and his locus i s
t h e palate.
4 On the purya,l'{aka sec below pp. 204-205.
5 That the prin c i pl e of 'necessity' is at the root of the karma is stated in the !7M
1 97
HI 2.2 of the saqlsara. With the recognition of the true reality of the self at­
tained thanks to Science he is free. - 2
3. The cognizer is called 'lord' (pati\:l) when things appear to him as
constituting his own hody. When they appear to him differentiated due to
mc7yc7, the slll�iect, polluted by the various contaminations, by the karma
etc . , is called 'heast ' (pasul:l ).
On the plane of sovereignty (aisvaryaO) the cognizer who sees the
u niverse as his body is 'lord' (patifl) . On the plane of limited individuality
(pW!lstvaO) the subject, enveloped by contaminations attachment and so
on6 -, by actions, by the ripening of the fruits that derive from them and
the latent impulses determined by them, is a 'beast' (pa/;ufz). - 3 -
4. Consciousness that is devoid (�ffreedom and, vice versa, freedom
del'oid q/ consciousness: these are the two forms (?{ maculation - so
('(died hecause it obliterates one's own true nature called aIWVa7 .
- The absolute real ity is free consciousness; only inso far as this is
its essence is it in perfect fu llness. S ince it thus wills, i n v irtue of its
very freedom [there is the alJawl maculation which is twofold ] : 'macula­
tion' insofar as it involves error as regards the self's real nature and
'twofold atomicity ' i nsofar as consciousness becomes limited with the
loss of its full nes, creating a subjectivity in which only the light of con­
sciollsness subsists without freedom, or only freedom without conscious­
ness . - 4 -
5 . There being the uI)ava 8 maculation (atraiva) , the appantLOIl (�{ a
cognizable reality d�trerelltiated fJhml the s/(l�iectl constitutes the macula­
tion called maya; that, then , which if! a sul�iect endowed with agency,
hut lacking the ftdl light (?{ consciousness, determines hirths and ex-
on the fol l owing kc7rikc7. as may be gathered from IPYY III p. 3 1 2 aha 'niyatYel ' iii
nivalir }'alah karmano lIlt7iahhamih,' sec also vrtti on I I I . I . 9 .
.
(, A l l t h ese cle ;nents, i . c . th � contami nat i ons (klda) - ([l'idYel, raRa, asmitc7,
dvc,1'{l and abhin ivc/w and so on, arc listed in YORasiUra I I . 3 ff.
7 The fundamcntal maculation, 'concerning thc a�lII' (a�W\'a), or the reduction o f
consciousness to a m in imal, 'atomic', state (a�lII ) .
R The maculat ion cI(WVa, which i s often simply cal led 'maculation', i s necessari­
ly the basis of the other two and is, in the course of recovering consciousness in its
ful l ness, the last to disappear.
1 98
periences is the karmic maculation. All three are solely the work of the III 2.5
power of mc7yc7.
- When, there being this twofold c7� zava macul ation, cognizable
reality, though in reality not separated from the subject, appears differen­
tiated from him, there i s , on the basis of this other error, the maculation
known as mayic. The karmic maculation, which pertains to the agent
devoid of the light of consciousness, is due to the error of considering
the cause of births and so on the actions, which on the contrary - as has
been estab l ished - are not causes9. The Lord's will to create these three
maculations is called the power of maya. 5 - -
6. Those who do possess pure consciollsness but not the agency to
the highest degree (uttam akartrta) are created by the Lord as separate,
distinct from the se({, due to their being devoid �f agency LO.
- Some SUbjects, though having a consciousness not stained by the
cognizable, are created by the Lord as different from what is their true
nature, because they are devoid of the ful l agency. - 6 -
7 . Though having the same characteristics - consciousness etc. -
these su�iects are differentiated from one another because of a particular
will of the Lord: they are the VUilc7l1akeva/as l l .
'I The error on which the karmic maculation is based i s there fore that of attribut­
ing to the actions and karmic impulses determined by them the status of cause as
regards birth, length of l i fe, quality of fruitions etc. Actions, being insentient reali ties
(ja�Ja), cannot, according to the conception expounded i n the Kriyadhikara, be the
cause of any thing whatsoever; the sole real cause i s the agen t , the Lord.
1 0 This is, in particular, a reference to the Sall1khya conception o f the puru�a
i n the state of kaivalya (cf. IPYY III p . 3 1 9). The usc o f the expression 'are created
(nirlllita) by the Lord' points out how all these various maculations and levels o f
subjectivity arc merely a 'construct' created by the free dynamism o f Consciousness.
I I
Here begins the description of the various categories of subjects. Dtp. ex­
pressly mentions the Y ijnanakevalins, the Pralayakevalins, the Y idyesvaras and the
Sakalas, implicitly referring to the more classical division (see MY I . 1 5 ff.) which
l ists seven levels of subject i v i ty - S iva, Mantramahesvara, Mantresvara, Mantra,
Y ij fi anakala, Pralayakala and Sakala (see e.g. TP, MfA, TA, P H etc . ) . There are
variations in the tcxts as regards the attribution and location in the scale of the prin­
c iples; in the latter case this ambiguity is often due to the confusion between on­
tological p l ane and field of action. B esides this there are other divisions, based on
d i fferent criteria (e.g. the well-known one of the Svayambhuvc7gama i n kevala, sakala
and amala; sec S'ataratllas([f!lgraha l . 34); ef. Dvivedi 1 98 3 : Upodghc7ta, 1 34-35. A s
1 99
III 2.7 - These subjects characterized by the pure light of consciousness are
differentiated from one another, though there is no differentiation as
regards their attributes of consciousness, permanence etc. This occurs be­
cause they are created thus by the Lord and for no other reason. This
class of subjects, corresponding more or less to the p llru,5Os of the
Sarnkhya, has the name of Vijfianakevala l2. - 7 -
8 . The agents that are identified with realities other than consciolls­
ness, sllch as the void etc., are the Pralayakalas 1 3. Karmic maculation
also pertains to tliem,' 011 the contrary, mayic maculation may or may
not he present (v ikalpital)) .
- The Pralayakevalins assume as I the void, the pra�1Cl etc . , not grasp­
ing their having consciousness as true nature. In these l imited souls the
karmic impul ses are also present; on the contrary, the Ilulyic maeulation
regards the SO, first (I. 3 1 ) vir/yd, vidyda, manlra and malllrc,I'vara are mentioned,
then ( I . 4 1 c-43) [7(/.\'11, ,Wnla, kCl'alda kCl'ala,�al/lhhll , pralayakcl'alill and
l' Ziiiallakcvalin. The div ision of the subjects mostly, as has been said, into seven
c lasses may be considered the common heritage of Shaivism in the broad sense,
whilst keeping in mind the remark of Jayaratha (TA V vol. V II pp. 7-R), according
to which this d i fferentiation between subjects is particul arly appropriate to the dualist
schools such as the S iddhanla (siddhc7l1 ladadalll7disafllllcitafll) .
1 2 The state of V i j nanakevala (or V ijnanakalas), A bh . explains (fpvv III p. 322),
may be attained through a special i nitiation aimed only at going beyond the path of
mayil w ithout there being any conjunction with the supreme reality, or through the
creative meditation (hhl7l'anli) o f the PlIl'lI,W i n the state o f isolation, w ithout the kar­
mic bond, according to what is expounded in the Gild; or through concentration
(dhilra/la), contem plation (dhwllla) and absorption (.I'([f/uldhi) that have as their ob­
ject the path of mnya as far as this point of deployment. The attainment of this state
is therefore a special kind of experience (/Jhoga l'i.l;c,I'Cl) . It i s for this reason that one
may speak of i ts being similar to the state of the Sar11khya PIII'II,\'{[S but not absolute­
ly identical to it.
IJ 'Devoid of kala because of d issolution' where 'dissolution' is general ly the
state of total absorption pertaining to deep s leep, and 'ka!c7' stands for the various
principles that constitute the faculties and products (Tpv II p. 1 52), l isted above, I I I .
I . 1 0- 1 1 . The mayic maculation i s present i n the state of .I'{/l'cdya.l·all,l·lIpla, in the
state of deep sleep in which the traces of objective reality still remain; this is the
level of identification w ith the mind ( bllddhi). [ n the state of (JpaI'cdya.l·all,l'lIpla, to
wh ieh the ident i fication with the void and the prc7�/(I corresponds, every cognizable
real i ty is completely swall owed up and with it the mayic maculation, which just COI1-
sists in the apparition of a cogni zable object d i fferentiated from the subject . These
states arc analyzed in the fol lowing karika.l'.
200
may or may not be present, depending on whether there i s cOID1ection III 2.8
w i th cognizable reality or not. - 8 -
9. A class of sllbjects ident(fled with consciousness and endowed with
agency c.\periences cognizable rcality as differentiated; the karmic mac­
IIlatioll having disappeared, the mayic maculation is present in them.
They are the Vidye,fvaras 1 4 .
- There are subjects who have transcended the kam1a and are iden­
tified with consciousness, being also endowed w ith agency 1 5 . These,
though having the nature of VidyeSvara 1 6 , continue to be affected by the
maculation of maya, being in relation with a differentiated cognizable
1 ·\ The V idydvaras are a group of eight deities headed by A n anta, whom S iva
i nvests with determinate functions; i n particular, they are called to cooperate in the
l iberation of the lim ited souls, acting as i n termediaries in the revelation of the teach­
ing of S iva, etc. They employ another c lass of subjects as their inst ruments, the
scventy m i llion Mantras; they are ident i fied, as some texts ind icate explicitly (see
MrV, l'idyc7p(lda . p . 46, TAv vol. VI p. 55; c f. also Ipvv I I p. 405 ) , w i th the class
of the Mantramahdvaras. It may be useful to mention the c lear description given
by the Mok,wkc7rika of Sadyojyotil} and the relative I'rtli of Ramakar}\ha (particular­
ly I I 73-94), obviously w ithout wanting to impose it in every detail as the norm for
the whole ,I'ail'o tradition. I n this the terms l'idyil and manlra - and consequently
Vidyesvara and Mantresvara are interchangeable; the V idyesvara-Mantresvaras are
however divided into a higher group of eight headed by Ananta (which we can there­
fore call Mantramahesvaras) and a lower group (apradhc7l/a) of a hundred and
eighteen , composed of the hundred Rudras etc . The higher Mantresvaras arc s ituated
ontologically bclow kriyil.I'akli. A fter them, but still above lIIaY(I, come the seventy
m i l l ion Mantras, they too are div ided into two parts, one hal f impelled directly by
Siva and the other by the Mantresvaras. Then follow the hundred and eighteen
Mantrdvaras which arc lIIal/lrap,.ay(�iak([s but have an i n ferior status, as they are
s ituated within maya and are consequently sakatas, just as the first two groups are
l/ i,I'kalas . Regarding their functions, the h i gher Mantresvaras are distinguished from
the lower ones since only they perform the five activities of creation etc. in the
mayic world. A l l the Mantresvaras and the Mantras together attain supreme l i bera­
tion once Ananta ceases to ex ist, wh ich happens after he has completed the five ac­
tivities, at the beginning of the lIIahapralaya. As regards the discrepancies between
the texts it may be remembered, for example, that the PH places the Mantrama­
hdvaras in the sadc7.l;i\'(/talll'a, SvT X. 1 060 and TP I. 1 0 vrlli place the Vidyesvaras
i n the l.\:\'aralallm, etc.
15 Unlike the V ij nanakalas.
1 6 The term Vidyesvara expresses, according to Abh. (IpVV III p. 325), the con­
tact w ith knowledge and sovereignty ( l'idyc7-hodha and l.I'vaf'(l lva-kartrtva). These
subjects however - unlike the nature of Saeias iva and [svara, on which level dif-
20 1
III 2.9 reality. They do not possess the ful l faculty of action and are therefore
distinct from the Lord and one another 1 7 , as has been previously seen;
therefore, they too must be considered l imited souls (a�llItvafll ) . - 9 -
1 0.A ll the beings that arc imlllersed in the flowing ()l existellce, start­
ing fimll the gods, arc ((ffeeted by the three maculations: but ol these it
is prccisely the karmic maculation that constitutes the sole direct cause
(�f the s([f!lsara.
- The beings in the power of the saqlsara, from the gods to immobile
things, have all three maculat ions: but it is only the karmic maculation
that is responsible for setting in motion the saqlsara. 10
I I . And this consciousncss-principlc constituted by agcncy (kartrtaO) ,
reinforccd hy kala, hcing limited, cOllies to be - ill lhe individual who is
idcntified lIot with consciousness b llt with the void etc. in a subordinate
po.l·il lon l !'. .
- In the beings i mmersed in the flowing o f saqlsara this conscious­
ness-principle, constituted by agency, in the sphere of insentient real ities
[ assumed as subject] such as the void, the p"il�/{[ and so on, corroborated
t'erent iation is not yet man i fested conceive the objects of thei r knowledge and ac­
tion as di fferent from themselves due to the mayic maculation; they arc, rather,
simi lar to the Lord o f the dual ist doctrines.
II
Sec MrA, l'ii/yc7pai/a , IV. 5.
IX
The consciousness-principle (cillall\'am) , supremc consciousness , in its ful l ­
ness is consti tuted by t h e interpcnetration o f hod/III ( l um i nous, cognitive principle)
and o f karlrla or I'j/lwr/w (dynam ic pri nciple which is cxpresscd in the activity of
the I ) . The maculation cal led cI/WI'a is respons ible ror the fragmentation of this unity
by supprcssing either one or the other of these two components (cL above karikc7
4). I n the samsaric world cillall\'(/m is found devoid o f the hoc/ha aspect and reduced
to only karlrlil. but no longer a ful l karlrld (and not even an 'al most' fu l l one, as i t
was for example in the V idyesvaras). It has now become a shadow of its fonner self.
alld i s oilly partially rev ital i zed by the eontri bution of the kafa principle, 'the partial
agenc y ' . The eonsc iousness-prineiple, thus l i m ited, i n thc indi vidual is therefore
found i ll 1I dec ided ly secondary position, superseded by thc whole eoncretion of i nert
realitics with which the I is erroneously iden t i fied. In the verse (ka/oi//}(/lilalll . . . cit­
{all Willi) there is an obvious echo of passages form the scriptures; cr. v. I. I () of the
SW/ \,illllh/lim/gmllo (Government Oriental MSS Li brary, Madras, MS. 1 67(7) ka/od­
/Ja/il(l('aitaIlYo vidyadar,I'ilagocara(1 I rr7gc/w rmljila,( capi l){(ddhyc7�likaral/(/ir laillb
and the subsWntially ident ical one of the TIIII{f'{fslldh/u/\'(/ cit. i n S S V p. 37 (ad I l l.
3); c f. also Kira(lclgall/o I . 1 6.
202
by the power of kaM pertaining to the Lord, i s l imited, b eing p l aced i n HI 2.1 1
a subordinate state. And therefore the status of l i mited soul occupies here
a pre-eminent position . 1 1 -
1 2. The pre-eminence, in the conscious se/j, of agency and consciolls­
ness, with the conseqllent subordination of insentient realities such as the
void, constitlltes knowledge whose distinctive feature is the absOIption in
it (tatsmnavesaO) 1 9 .
- On the contrary, when this same void etc. comes to be i n a state
of subordination as regards the consciousness whose essence is agency,
then in the subject thus substantiated by this consciousness there is a
knowledge characterized by the absorption in the power of that. - 1 2 -
1 3 . When the seat ql agency 'f - is the void, understood as the ab­
sence q{ llze mind etc . ., where only the karmic impulses exist (Osaq1skara­
matriI�i) withollt any evidence or form, there is the state of the absence
(�{ the knowable 20 .
- When there is a subjectivity characterized by the identification of
the I solely with the negation of the mind, the p},(l�za and so on2 1 , then
in the state of deep sleep, which means residing exclusively in the above-
19
On S(II II(/I'(':i(l see Introduction pp. X XXII-X X X I V .
20
Th is verse describes the state o f apal'edyasall,l'IIpla 'deep sleep devoid o f the
knowable' which represents the plane o f the iden t i fication o f the I w i t h the void. The
void is here the negation of every reality that is the object of knowledge including
the m ind and the pra(/([, which is experienced, apart from in deep sleep in the strict
sense o f the word, also i n the state o f eosmle d issolution, stupefaction, or i n the
deepest states o f samadhi. However, one can only speak metaphorieall y o f there not
being the knowable: i n faet i t does not entirely disappear (the .\:(/il'a texts o ften
rem ind us that there can never be the complete ann i h ilation of what exists) but it i s
rather redueed t o t h e shadowy a n d vae i l lating state o f S(///Is/((Im.
21
Abh. explains (TpVV I II p. 333) that the negation (ni,l'edha ) already appears
on the plane of allam-idalll which extends as far as lsvara (.I'i1'ataltl'c 7:I1'ar(/l1te); i t
is caused b y the introduct i on o f the idalll, which pree isely entai l s negation a s d i f­
ferentiation (hhcdaIlOI'l7palll) from the eonsci ousness and between objects. While
consciousness remains predomi nant and negation performs only a subordi nate role,
we have as subjects the Mantramahesas and the V ijfianakalas, whieh are d ifferen­
II tiated on the grounds of possessing or not possessi n g Villl(//·,I'a. On the contrary, when
negation predominates there i s the .l:tIllyaprmllatr, which the present .\:/Okcl is refer­
ring to; final l y, when the objects predom inate, there is the subject Sakala.
203
III 2.13 mentioned state, there i s the absence of the knowable, i n the sense that
the kanni c impulses, though they exist, are imperceptible s ince they are
devoid of fonn . The difference from the Salllkhya pllrll,W lies precisely
111 this. 13 -
It is the inner activity (antatl vrttibp2 of tlie sensory facIlIties, it
1 4.
is that which sets in motion the various breaths, the pral)a alld so Oil; it
is cal/ed '/(fe', whose essellce is the eigh(fold body. Or the sulJjectivity
identified with the breath of I(fe (pral)e) has as its ess('nce the eigh(fold
body (purya�!akatmika).
- Prec isely this knowing subject identified w i t h the void - in which
there exists an inner dynamism, the driving force of all the various
breaths, fJ],(I�/({ and so on, which is cal led ' li fe' and is common to all the
sensory powers - i s called ' liv ing' (jI l'a O )2 3 . These sensory powers com­
bined with the I constitute the eightfold body. Or it is formed by the sub-
ject inasmuch as it is identified with the pra�/(/ 2 4 . 14
22
The ki7rikci ident i fies ellltarl vrlfi with ,1'i1l1yapral/u7lr (TP Y Y explains that the
identificat ion i s only mctaphorical. in actual fact the real relationsh ip is one of cause
and effect); the l'rlli places (/1I1({rl ITlli (alll!/I'ITlli) in a /Jall lll'rihi referring to
,1:i1llyaprlllll1ita, The IIka and Ipyy explain that this /Jaliul'rilii may be understood in
two ways, [ n t he first, alll(JITrlli is the very dynamism of subjectivity present i n
the ,l:allvapI'Wnall' - that sets in Illotion t h e vital dynam ism (//1'(///(/) common t o the
sensory powers, a dynamism which is that of the five functions of the breaths of
l i fe of whosc di fferent iation it is the cause. In the second, with a subtle distinction,
it directly denotes the vital energy that is common to all the sensory powers and
sets in motion the various breaths. The ment ion of alllWTrlli in /wlllll'I'7I1i (depend­
ing on :ifill vapr(Jf!l(ita) is part icu larly pregnant; Abh. remarks that it aims at remov­
ing the role or calise from the sensory powers and leading them back to their total
dependence on the agent who is the sole true source of their dynamism, The classi­
cal passage on this in S f( I. 6, which the [PVY does not fail to quote.
2.l Cf. Ipy y III p. 334 talll "rllilll ,fil'(lIla{(/k,I'a�It711/ . . . 1I11hc7payall I\'(I ify I/cyale.
J posed of five lalllllatras plus the three components o f the alltabkara(w, s ince the
2,\ The l im i ted i nd ividual ity, the ' l i v i ng' (//\'(1), t he transmigrat ing nucleus, there­
fore corresponds to the plane of the identificat ion of the [ with the void (.\'fillyc7l1anla)
or the prii(/(f (pI'ii(lal/(/nW). It consists in a body called 'eightfold' (purya,I'!([ka ) , or,
accord ing to another traditonal etymology, the 'ogdoade that is in the body', a kind
of subtle body that forms the deep structure of the person and determines his con­
tinuity as the vehicle of the I ill transmigration and the depository of the karma etc.
There arc various opin ions on its composition; from eight clements - five IWlllliilras,
mallOS, hllddhi and ahw!IW/,(/ (see Ka{OIl(/f'(ig([III([ X V II 4ed-5ab, S f( 11 1 . 1 7; see also
Sdlllkhyakiirikii I. 40 and Gall({apadahhil,I')'(/) -, wh ich is probably the most widely
204
1 5 . When the sul�iect rests e):elusively on these planes, this is the state III 2.15
of deep sleep - similar to cosmic dissolution - which may or may not
be affected by the maculation of maya, depending on 'whether the know-
able is present or absent (savedyam apavedyaQ1 cay.
On the plane of the identification with the void, since there i s no
knowable reality, the maculation of maya i s absent. On the p lane of the
identification w ith the pra�/(l etc. the state of deep s leep, which is similar
to cosmic d issolution25 , i s affected by the maculation of maya, since in
credited conception, to thirty (Ramakal).,t ha's Kiilotlaravrtti p. 1 26; see Torella 1 979:
376, notes 35, 36); some texts are collected i n D vivedi 1 98 3 : Upodghiita, J 32- 1 33,
note 3 , I n Utp,'s opinion, as gathered from Ipyy I I I pp. 334-336, the pII/,ya$(aka
referring to the subjectivity identified with the void UlIllyiihantii) i s constituted by
the 'pentad' - the inner group of powers common to all the senses, w hich gives rise
to the five particular breaths and makes the body's machine function; it therefore in­
c ludes the class o f breaths (as what i s impelled), the class o f the sensory fac u lties
(as what impels) and the c�lIl1yiillClnf{i (as that presi d i ng over the whole) (sa p/'el}'mll
p/'eI�ladil'arg(/f!1 prerakw!1 ca indriyava/'gam adhi,\'/hal/'11!1 ca slIlIyalial/tiilll t7k,�ipya
I'arlamiilla(i pllrya,�!aka(i ity uklab). But, as is noted, the current conception i s that
of the {i/Il')'a,�!aka as connected w i t h the prcl(lahalll(7 (prcl�lahalltclpak,ve sarvasya
ahhimalw�1 pllrya,�!ak{jl'asihallalll), I n this case one has: the pentad o f breaths, com­
b ined w i th the three classes of faculties (those of knowledge, of action and the
allta(lkara(w) impell ed by the ahal!lkclm w hich, however, i s not included in the num­
ber s ince i t presides over i t (prcll,l(7dipmlcakalll ahwllkc7raparalll ahm!lkarqlCl
prcryalll(7�1(lf1l , Ila leila Salll(lf!1 ga�lCIl/arham api til telladhi,�rhilalll .. , kara�lellmana var­
galraye�/{/ .I'ahilW!1 paTlCakal!1 ,\'(//!lvedallopadl/(7I1afvella adh i,�!heyalll prli�ladil'l/pam
ahalll ily eV{//!1 pramiitrhh(1vel/a adh i,l'!hitw!1 pllrya,I'!akam) , However, the picture that
emerges from Abh.'s remarks i s not completely clear. In concl usion Abh. , still guided
by t he (lka, says that there is a 'most subtle' body (slIk,\'lIWlama; i s it the one con­
nected with ,�1111')'(7hallta ? ) , which is merely the rough sketch of the subtle body
(pe{al'a,�ar7ra,I')'a hi tad aSlllra�/(/III(ltralll) ; and a body sllll/{alallla (the physical body).
The transmigrating body i s only the intermediary one between the two (madhyallla),
i n which there are also the lalll1/(71ras, Nevertheless, there i s no real d i fference bet­
ween the above-mentioned conception and the conception of the purya,\'/aka com­
spar,�alallmatra also embraces the five breaths (spar.'iatallll1atre(W prli(lt7disv7karat) .
2 5 The similarity consists i n t h e fact that both i n t h e state of cosmic dissolution
and in deep sleep the constituent clements of the person (the body and so on), l ike
those of external real ity, no longer exist. B u t this non-existence is real i n the case
of cosmic d issolution, whereas in deep sleep there is merely the loss of the con­
sciousness of them, which may come about through an effort of w ill in the case of
the samadhi, through ingesting a certain substance as in drunkennes, through e xhaus­
tion as in sleep. The state of deep sleep is also distinguished from dissolution by its
brevi ty (cL IPY II p. 265).
205
III 2.15 this state there is relation with the knowable, such as the contact w ith
pleasure and so 0112 6. - 1 5 -
1 6. The clearly mallifested (spa�\uvabhusu) creation (�f things in the
mental sphere alone which are mistaken for ()/�jects (�f tlze senses, is
ca!!ed the dream stale.
- The dream state [or the l i mited soul is the creation of objects -
which appear in the sphere of consciousness as if they were really being
seen, etc. -, a creation that occurs through the power of the m i nd alone
without the action of the powers of the senses such as sight etc.; this crea­
tion is the work of the Lord2 7 . And this is an illusion inasmuch as this
perception, e.g. of a form, common to other subjects, after having lasted
as such [for the length of the dream ] , does not continue later 2 R. - 1 6 -
The creation which is stahle, in that it is the o/�ject (�f (/11 the
1 7.
senscs alld external, cO/wI/on to al1 knowing suhjects, is the waking state.
The creation which occurs thanks to the powers of all the internal
and external senses is the waking state. Here too, as in the dream state,
il lusion may occur, in the form of seeing two moons etc. 29 - 1 7 -
1 8 . This triad is to he abandoned, since, as the pruJ)a etc.
predominate and, consequently, [authentic. FeeI agency becomes subor­
dinated in it, there is union with pleasure and pain , essclltia!!y consist­
ing in tlze a{fenuation or intcns!fication (�f this.
- These waking, sleeping and dream states are to be abandoned since
in them the p/'(7�/([ etc. presumed to be the self - are pre-eminent and
26
As the memory, for example, of having slept 'well' shows.
27
It is Ilot the l im ited subject who is responsible for thcsc images, s i nce some
arc unwelcome and others, that would be welcome, arc l i nked with other t imes and
places (sec fpv II p. 226).
2H
In l i ne with the conception of i l l usion as apfir(wldlytlli the i l lusion of the
dream docs not lie in the perception itself but in its lack of permanence.
2 '1
According to Abh. (IpVV III p. 340, ([((I I'\'(I tlgall/i',\'11 avaslliill/alll api
anyollyallllPl'llve!;o /Jalill.l'akha uklab), this is a h i n t at the conception accord ing to
which there ex ist w i t h i n every single state various planes and aspects correspond­
ing to its merg i ng w i th other states. I n the waking state as perception the dream
slate as i l l usion is present etc. (cf. S S V pp. I I 1 2, MV I I ; in particular sec TA
X .227bc ff. and TS I X where both IPK Il l . 2 . 1 6- 1 7 and M V I I arc eommentecl
on).
206
freedom is reduced. A sligh t (matrayii) inerease i n freedom means III 2.18
pleasure, joy etc . , and thus a decrease i n freedom i s pain , aversion and
so on. The saqlsara constituted by all the frui tions is the bond. - 1 8 -
1 9. The vital breath, constituted by rising and .falling breath, is
present ill everyone in the dreaming and waking state. In deep sleep the
breath cal1ed samana is preselll, consisting in the interruption of those,
in a way similar to what occurs dl/ring the equinoxes.
And that self identified with the v ital breath, i n the form of in­
halation and exhalation, or rising and fall ing breath (pral.1 apanaO), is
present in the waking and s leeping states 30. When these two breaths
become equal (samye) J I , like day and night at the equ inox (vi$lIvatf-
3D The prtl(W i n the broad sense of the word (breath, v ital energy, l i fe) i s a func­
tion, a mode of consciousness i tself (cidl'!'lIi; prak SaI!ll'il prel(le pari(lCllcl, said the
Tal/l'tlrlhacil/{(/fl/a(li, c i t in S S V p. 68 etc . ) , capable of transm itting l i fe to reali ties
such as the body, which are in themselves inert and i n sentient (;O(/a) . This undif­
ferentiated v ibration (stlfl/anyaparispallda) is mani fested i n five fundamental forms
which inclnde the whole range of states of consciousness. R i si n g and fal l i ng breath
(prc7(/(1 in the narrow sense of the word and al)(llIa) characterize the state of ordi­
nary consciollsness (waking and sleeping). They incessantly travel from the heart to
the dwu/a,\:(lllla in opposite directions: the pra(w , flowing towards the exterior (is
'day', 'sun'), represents the tension towards the object, the opal/a ('night', 'moon')
represents the tension towards the subject (cf. Ipvv III pp. 342-343). The dualistic
opposition between prc7(w and apal/a is the same as that which pervades ordi n ary
consciousness. Now one now the other predominates, just as in the days of the year
night prevails over clay and v ice versa. This perpetual play of oppos i t ion is
suspended i n the state of deep sleep: i n the sal'l'dyasall,l'lIpla when in the i nterval
between prc7(w and api/lla there is a momentary rest i n the place of the heart, in the
apal'!'dyasall,l'lIpla throughout the duration of deep states o f obnubi lation, torpor etc.
If this suspens ion of the pra(W-apiinCl flow is immediately p lausible for the
apal'l'dyasall,l'lIpta where by defi n i t ion the pole of objective reality d isappears, i t is
l egitimate, however, to ask onesel f as does Abh. (IpVV III p. 346), following the
{lkc7 - how this happens for the savedyasall,l'lIpla, too. The flowing of the pra(W
is the reply does not depend on the mere presence of the cognizable ( vedyallu7Ira)
but on its appearing as separate from the subject, and the cogni zable that is present
in this state (sensations of pleasure etc.) is such that it appears, so to speak, to be
one with the subject (grc7!wkc7d (ll'iecliil/Il(llll iva).
.1 1 In the kc7rikc7 ('heda therefore has the double meani n g of ' interruption' (vic­
eheda) of the breaths as opposites and 'equality'. At this point which con'esponds
to the plan e of the Pralayakalas - the breath is precisely referred to as 'equal'
(samell/a). I t does not, however, represent the defi n i tive ecl ipse of prc7(w and apc7I1Cl
which would entail going beyond phenomenal existence - but only a momentary
207
III 2.19 va ) 3 2 , due to their increasing and decreasing being blocked, the breath
is called samlina ('equal'). 19
20. Flowing lI/Hvards through the middle path, the breath is called
udana; it is ill the fourth state alld is made ()/'fire, it corre.l]Joflds to the
VUiIilllakalas, the Mal/tras al/d the Lord 33 . The supreme breath is the
vyana, whose esselice is all.
stasIS III which they remain in the state o f saI!/shlra, ready to man i fest themselves
once more. They s t i l l have to be truly surpassed.
12
I n h i s eon1l11l'ntaries Abh. expounds two distinet trad itional etymologies of
,·i.l·uv(/l: 'eapable (mt) of pervading ( l'i,I'U) , and 'that sets i n {11otion (slll'at) the d is­
t inction (vi=: vi.l:c,l·a) or the imbalanee of duration hetween day and n ight'. Bh. finds
this second i nterpretation obviously eontradietory, seeing that he insists against all
l ikelihood on glossing prcrayali (with whieh Abh . explains s/ll'ali) w ith lIiw/rayali.
The d ifficulty may perhaps be overcome by understanding that vi,I'lIwll sets in mo­
t ion the i mbalance only i nsofar as, there being a momentary balanee, the imbalanee
must nceessari ly follow. The passage from the Kalapada (another name for the
Kalollara) cit. i n Ipvv I I I p. 343 may be understood in this sense: siilllym!l
\'(/i,I'aflly(�;aflak{/f!l vi,l'Ilvm salllalw!/ .I'fllrtalll (this ardha.l:/oka, not ineluded in the
Sardholri.<:alikil/ollara, probably comes from another of i ts many versions). The
image of the "(I'!l \'(/t is not merely i neidental but is taken from the Saiva seriptures,
where the systemat ic projection of external t ime, with all its subdivisions ( i ncluding
the "i,I'lII'(/() i n the i ndiv idual dimension, is frequently found, with the consequent
ident i fication of cosmie t ime with ' prfil) ic' time; in partieular see Ka/ollarclgallla
(s(irdlwlri.I'IIIi) X I . I 1 0 and X. 22-23 w ith the relative " Uli, SvT V I I . 1 68 ff.; for
another use of vi,I'uvlll see for example SvT I I . 3 1 6-334a; d. S S P III pp. 358 II.,
,<'ai,'aga/llo/wrihhaSiilluI/7;ar7 (tran s ! . ) p. 276. Similar conceptions are to be found i n
t h e Buddhist Knlacakra school; Viflw/aprahha, passim, Nadapfida's Sckodde,I'a(fkil pp,
42-44; on " i,I'l/\'(/1 but understood as taking place /agnodayahhi,I'(///U/hall see
lIill1a/aprahlu/ p. 1 78.
,.1 It appears from the fragmentary indications i n the IPVV that the (lkcl sug­
gests two interpretations of the eompound " ijl/a1/(7ka/(JI//(/l/trc.l'o a karfl/adhclraya,
as is expl icitly said, and not a d\'(I//(/\'a (whieh would have required the plural). The
most obvious one i s 'the V ijflfinnkalas and the Lords of the Mantras'; the other,
adopted by Ahh., is 'the Vijfiilnnkalas, the Mantras in the broad sense of the word
( i .e . Mantras, Lords of the Mantras and Great Lords of the Mantras) and the Lord
(Abh . : the Lord Sa(Wsiva)" From the (lkc7 quotations one would obtain, more precise­
ly, ' V ijfifinfikalas, the Mantras, the Lords of the Mantras and Isvara', where
Mantrdvara ( Lord o f the Mantras) derives, according to the lal/lra method, from
mal/Ira and 7.\'a, to which, however, an indiv idual mean i n g is also assigned (ef. IPVV
I I I p. 352, nallll alra " .},(ikhyclIlC malllrc.vvcmi(1 kClla .1·(I/11grliftab I f}wl/lrapadcll{/
lajj[ifiyat\'cld cUapadellil .I'(JII1(/II{[,'t/{,)'alcikrtclI(l lalll railyil)'cllcl i).
208
- [The breath i s refelTed to as] udana because - after accomplishing III 2.20
the unification of the pra�1(l and the apana through the intelTuption of
their flow along the two sides and transversely - it rises (udgamanat)
flowing upwards through the middle path34 , This breath - which fl ows i n
the fourth state 3 5 similar to the middle eye, has the quality o f fire be-
_ ,
cause it rises upwards. The breath ceases to flow i n the state beyond the
fourth - this being the state of fullness and as such devoid of spatio-tem-
poral delimitations _3 6 and entering a state of absolute fullness takes the
name of vyalla. These two states are to be attained since in them the
energy of the pr(7�1(l appears as essentially constituted by the supreme
Lord3 ? - 20 -
34 The middle path is the SII,WfIllla; the two side paths are i4cl and piliga/a.
35 The breath IIdt/na rises, therefore, along the Sll,W lIlllcl b u rn in g every dua lity
(Ip V V I I I pp. 350- 1 e ites some of them : creation and reabsorption, pr(/(w and ap(/110,
day and n ight, birth and death, aversion and attaehment). The fourth state - together
with the state beyond the fourth const itutes going beyond ordinary e x istenee. I n
this state d ifferentiat ion d issolves l i ke melting butter, the idantcl i s veiled b y the I
as on the Sadnsiva and lsvara level s . The objeetive real ities w i t h whieh the I had
identified h imse l f are themselves transformed on eontaet w i th the I whieh is finally
reeognized as endowed w i th the divine qualities of sovereignty, permanenee etc., so
that they eontinue to subsist, but as though they have ceased to be objeets; they are
compared to eopper w hieh on contact w ith mereury i s transformed i nto gold. In the
state beyond the fourth state the d ifferenee is only one of i n tensity; the quali ty leap
has already been aehieved. The state beyond the fourth state, in whieh only the
'pervading' breath ( v)'c7no) subsists, i s the stabil i zation of the fourth, the differentia­
tion i s now eompletely dissolved , the idonla dispelled; remaining w ithin the terms
of the simile suggested by Abh., even the gold into whieh the various levels of sub­
jeetiv i ty have been transformed from the body to the void as it is i n creasingly
permeated by the mercury wears away and finally dissolves, these realities o n!y sur­
vlvmg i n the residual form o f ,1'(//11Skc7ra (ef. IPVV 1Il pp. 327-8, 33 1 , 350; IPV I I
pp. 257-8, 270- 1 , 275-6).
36 In faet the flowing presupposes spatial and temporal ehange,
whereas the
transfollrth i s the state of absolute simultaneous ful l ness.
.17 Literall y 'similar to the supreme Lord', But my translation
i s in confo rmity
with Abh.'s gloss (see I.cx t note 1 08), w hieh in turn appears to foliow Utp.'s i ndiea­
t ions.
209
IV 1
S ECTION IV. S UM MARY OF THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES
1. The very Se(( (�( all creatures is Mahdvara, Ol/e, whose form is
all, fill! q( the undivided consciousness 'I-this, [ .
The one, full of the 'savouring' (Ocamatkc7raO) o f the undivided per­
ceiving subjeet, of the undiv ided perceptible object and of the fusion of
the tw02 , in the fourth state which is to be sought first], the Sel f com-
mon to all living beings, whose form is all, is Mahdvara. 1 m ind, the breath and so on6, is called absence of the perfect knowledge
2.There (taint), realities such as the mil/d etc. , which arc included
ill the sphere (I( the 'this' Feely created [hy the Lordi (svasr�\edaq1bhage) ,
are caused hy him to be cOl/sidered as the fictitious I (ahaq1karaO) as
heillg the perceiving slt/�iect.
This universe springing forth as constituted by the free expansion
(i(lIlbhc7°) o f the supreme Lord4 , realities that are created as the object
I The translation refers to the most immediate and general meaning of the text
of the kiirika. The far more complex explanation given by the )'rlfi depends on con­
sidering the two terms of the expression alialll idalll first separately and then
together.
L 2 The above note has already mentioned how this i nterpretation has been arrived
at. As Abh. explains (sce text note 2), we have here the reflective awareness of the
perceiving sub ject as not distinct from the other subjects, i.e. of the fundamental
ull ity of the subject beneath the apparent fragmentation: the same appl ies to the ob­
ject: and finally the awareness of the ult imate Ilon-otherness (IIII'/alla) of subject and
object.
,
J Because starting from this the maculation begins to d issolve (sec text note I ).
4 The text, wh ich remains doubtful, seems to contain a double interpretation
(Ialllra) of latm in the kiirikii (which I have t ranslated in a deliberately vague man­
ner) : lIIahe,vl'ari/sya jrmhhiill/ayc 'slIIill lIirgaiC and taslllillll iciall taparc7/1wr,\:c. This
would coincide with the brief refercnees in Ipvv 1/1 p. 358 to the (lkii , which evi­
dently gave this type of interpretation: lalra iii vaiyadhikarw.lYc//{/ l'i l'rrya siil/lcl­
lIc7dhikaml/Yl'lIa l'i)'!'!Ioli ( i .e, lalra taken alone or agreeing w ith °hhiigc) , Abh, in h i s
t w o commentaries a l s o fol lows the l ine of t h e simultaneous double function of lalra,
which he refers in both cases to Mahesvara: 'MaheSvara bcing the self, the part 'this'
is created by h i m upon a substratum constituted by h imself' (thus in the first case
2 10
of perception the mind, the breath, the void - i n the sphere of the IV 2
reflective awareness 'this', precisely these realities, which represent a
part of the knowable, are caused to be considered as the fictitious I and
are, on the strength of this, transfOlmed into the l imited percei ving sub-
ject. - 2 -
3. The individllal sul�iects considered as being mallY are the fruit of
the nOll-recognition (if their true natllre. In them action and beatitude are
created, that is, the fruition characterized by pleasure and painS .
- It i s precisely the rendering l i mited of that whose essence i s all
which is called 'non-recognition'. And thus the awareness of a limited
subjectivity attributed to mUltiple and fragmented realities, such as the
of the supreme SUbjectivity. The individual selves are many; i n them
who are man i fested as know ing subjects - Mahesvara creates his own
beat itude and activity, which are themselves inherent in the only real
agency. This is precisely the frui tion which is called pleasure, since i t
consists i n a particle of [div ine] beatitude, and pain, since i t i s an in­
finitesimal fragment of [divine] activity. The fact that activity is pain will
be explained later. - 3 -
4. In the limited su/�iect sattva, rajas and tamas correspond to
knowledge, activity alld, thirdly, milyil 7 , in the Lord - for whom things
represent his own body (svangarupe�u) .
lalra i s a locative absolute w ith sali understood, i n the second, i t i s a locative
depending on S1'aSr,I'(aO ) .
5 The capacity for frui t ion that the Lord i nstils i n the various l i mited souls i s
therc!'ore a reflection created by h i m of t h e powers of beatitude a n d aetivi ty , which
are, on the contrary, innate in him, They are therefore hi/pila, Beatitude and activity
arc not a d ifferent th ing from jiic7l1aO and kriylLl'akli, prahHa and vimada (IpVV I I I
p. 359),
(, Abh, explains this point (ihid, p. 360) by using the example of a long serpent
(gomlsa) , whose body is pervaded by a single l i fe (jivatva), capable, however, of
being divided into many distinct partial v italities which animate the individual parts
of the same serpent when it is cut i n to pieces; and also capable of becoming one
again.
7 The power o f maya i s that which on the Sadasiva-Isvara p lane determines the
appearance of idal/Iii within the consciousness (IPVV I I I p. 36 1 ). It is a further ex­
pansion of kriyc7/;akli; indeed, in Abh.'s words (ihid, p. 366), it is the kriyclsakti i t­
self in which, however, instead of ,1'([J?lhara�/(/ predominating (sr,v(i predominates i n
jilc7na,\'lIkli) ,I't/I/yalil o r I/ i,vl'dha predominates, i.e. the mutual deli mi tation of subject
211
IV 4 The know ledge and activity of the Lord, together with maya, be-
come sattva, rajas and tamas in the l i mited subject. 4 -
5 . Owing to the state (�t' differelltiatioll, these qllalities (gUI)anam),
which are trall,l/onl/ed ill the facilIties and ill tlie products, canllot be
considered as powers inherent in a sll/�iect who is the possessor of them 8 .
- Si nce sattva, /'(�ias and tamas are manifested as distinct [ from the
subject] , the term powers may not be applied to them, in that there is no
differentiation between the power and the possessor of the power. I n ac­
tual fact everything is an expansion of the power(s) 9 . - 5 -
6. In the Lord tlierc is being , beatitude, activity. In the limited slIhiect
there is that, the ahsellce (!f tliat alld tlie two together l O. The latter cons­
titute rajas. which is pain and is composed (�f sattva and tamas inter­
mixed.
In the Lord, thc infinite agency, whose essence is 'savouring' (ca­
f}wtkaraO), is called activity and consists of supreme light and beatitude I I ,
and ohject. Th is power docs belong to Siva but, as the formulat ion of the kc7rikc7
points out, i t is not on the same plane as the powers of knowledge and action, s ince
it is connected w ith differentiation (cL ihid. p. 36 1 ).
H This karika is intended to be a reply to those who want to take the parallel
betwecn knowledge, activity, and maya, on the one hand, and .\'(/((\'(/, mjas. and
talllos on the other. too far, by considering the latter 'powers' of the l imited subject
just as the former arc powers of S iva. Utp. replies that this cannot be so, bec[; use
the l i m ited wbject looks on them - and on all the deployment o f phenomena that
evolves from them and i s imbued with them as other than himself, whereas the
power is by def i n i t ion not separate from the subject who possesses it. I n the lim ited
sub ject knowledge (pmka,\:a) etc. arc not spontaneous (I/aisargikya) and autonomous
functions, but require the contribution of other factors e.g. the senses in order
to be performed, which arc all penetrated by and derived from the gl/l/as. This is
why they arc cid led gl/(/aS, i.e. 'qual ities, components', but also 'sL\l](mli .llate, aux i l iary
elements' (cL IPYY I I I p. 362).
l) What has been said so far is only valid, however, within the l im its of the
world of d i fferentiation. Once the subject recognizes his own true nature, the objec­
tive world ceases to appear in the guise of ,ilterity and it is then that all the prin­
c iples become what they cI'fcctively are, his 'powers'.
1 0 What is referred to here, as the I'rtti makes clear, is the g l/(W rajas. COIl­
stituted by the presence of sattli as {JI'akaJa-cll/af/da (the g ll(W sattva) and by i ts
(their) absence (the gl/(W tall/as) .
I I These qualit ies of t h e Lord arc involved with o n e another and in t h e final
analysis arc identified with one another (cf. Ipy I I p. 289 ya satta hha l'al/akarlrlc7
212
On the contrary, in the individual self this ligh t and beatitude, which have IV 6
become knowable realities, constitute sattva. Their absence is tamas. Sat-
tva and tamas or l ight-beatitude and their absence - though two dis-
-
tinct entities, are mutually united to form rajas. In the limited subject ac­
tivity and pain are called rajas. - 6 -
7 . Those realities which ill the Lord are the o/�ject of an unconven­
tional ref7ective awareness in terms (�f 'this', those, mixed and separated,
are thus manifested ill various ways l 2 .
- The things that constitute this universe (ye caite) , which are to
Mahesvara - as in the case of the child indicated by the meaning of
the word 'this' (reflective awareness being the very essence of the l ight),
without the connection with [or: the consideration of1 the conventional
l inguistic expression 'this' coming into play 1 3 , those very things appear -
since they were created thus by God as particular realities (svalak,m�1(lO)
thanks to several mani festations having the same substratum (Osamanadhi­
kara�lyena) and in many forms insofar as they are universals each taken
singly l 4. 7 -
8. On the contrary, in the individual sll/�iect I 5, those entities that are
mall(j'es{ec/ separately become the o/�iect (�f mental elaboration ill the
sp/l/lrattiln7pa . . . sail'o . . . callwtkc7raf'l7pc7 san kriy(Haktir IIcyate . . . Sl'atll1([\'i,�r(/l/ti/'l7-
patwlc ca sail'a c7l/al/dab). I n the pa/i{i the gll�/(/ sativa corresponds to the satta and
al/al/da aspect in the Lord.
12
'On the plane of the l imited subject' is understood.
Ll Some form of parc7l11ar:ia is i nseparable from the pure l ight of cognition, as
reflective awareness reactive to it, an act of appropriation on the part of the I . On
this level, on which the 'th is' is conceived purely and s i mply as a negation of the I
(Ipyy p. 367), things are the object of I)(/rilll/ada only in terms of 'this', w i thout
any other d i fferentiations. And furthermore it i s specified that this parc7l11ar.<:a i s also
free from any contact with the conventional l inguistic expression 'this', s inee the
word which is, as we know, i nseparable from it - i s still at a level transcending
every articulated language, similar rather to a s ilent nod of the head. A n example
that clarifies this is the dim and undifferentiated awareness of (and reaction to) what
is other than itsel f and that surrounds it, that the newborn ehild i s presumed to have.
14 See the fol lowing kc7rikc7.
1 5 Karika 7 has defined the status of the object in relation to the Lord. But Abh.
(Ipyy III p. 367) makes it c lear that it is not the supreme Lord i n this case, since
at the level of Paramasiva one cannot speak of any objectiv ity whatsoever, this only
begin n ing to emerge when he assumes the nature of Saciasiva and Isvara ( indeed the
213
IV 8 sphere of memory, imagination alld so on, and have a variety of distinct
names.
- The entities that are manifested separately, that is, the universals I G
are shown b y the limited subjects thanks t o the power o f mental
elaboration (vikalpafl(daktya) 1 7 - as the object of inner retlective aware­
ness through various names such as 'jar', 'silvery', 'white', 'cloth', 'cart' and
so on. The limited sUbjccts, conditioned by the experie nce of these ob­
jects, then also make themselves the object of various denotations such
as 'I am thin', 'I am happy or unhappy'. In memory this function of men­
tal elaboration takes place in the wake of the previous direct experience;
in the various forms of imagination etc. it is, on the contrary, auton­
omous l R . It is precisely this manifestation of a d i fferentiation between
perceiving subject and object perceived, substantiated by the word 1 9 ,
which constitutes the bond of the saqlsara in the limited soul. - 8
9- 1 0.Tlte creatioll (hat pertains to him is 1l0( also com mOil {(o other
slll�icctsl and is dependcfIf 011 the creation of' the Lord. It occurs ill the
limited suhiect essentially identical to the Lord ill virtue (Jf' the very
plan e or the Lord (patiO, 7.l'l'arada.W) corresponds to these) . Kc7ri/;:(7 8 expounds how
the object appears on the plane of l i mited subjeetivity.
1 (, Of the two k inds of object, part icular (sl'II/ak,w(lII) and universal (,wllllrlllva ) ,
only the latter (cr. text note 1 6) is taken into eonsidcration here, beeause the w� rd,
which in this kilrika is shown as that which accompanies and renders possible dis­
curs ive thought, has as its content precisely the .I'illI/(IIIY(I. i.e. the ilhlic7sa taken
separately (see above I I . 3 . 2).
17 Vika/p(/llo is, as has been seen , that chara<:teristic function of discursive
thought that proceeds to define the object through the evocation and negation of
what is other than it. In this the essential role is played by the word, as the Bud­
dhists show by the conception of the aflo/w,
I g Sec above I . X. I IT.
l 'l
Many ,\'ail'lI texts insist on the fundamental ambivalence of the word, which
permeates every level of human activity. The powers of the word, often conceived
as the powers that preside Over the various Itl p habetiea l c 111sses, nwy lead man to
freedom or enmesh him even more in the saqlsara, To remain within the terms of
the discourse of the 1'!'lIi, they may i ncrease the dichotomies of the I'ika/pa but they
may also, if correctly polarized, gradually re-absorb the I'ika/pa in pure reflective
awareness -- pure i nsofar as it is not dualizing (the two possible ways of overcom­
ing the I'ika/pa w i l l be dealt with at some length later). Ipvv 1 I I pp. 379-3XO refers
to some of the classical passages of these speculations w i th quotations from the S K ,
the Tilllimdgltilla (the expl icit attribution to t h i s text is contained in S S V p. 7 ) and
the MV, to which the SS, at least, can be added.
2 14
power of the Lord, ignored, howevel� as such 20 , which aims at prevent- IV 9-10
ing the resting 011 the self, unstable, yvhose nature is vital energy, diver-
s(f'ied ill the Illultiplicity of the variolls phonemes, coinciding with the ac-
tivity of mental elaboration (vikalpakriyaya) .
- The individual subject - whose nature is identical to that of the
Lord - creates, thanks to the power of the Lord not recognized as such,
objects in the form of the various universals2 1 , not perceptible on the part
of the other subjects and modelled on the direct experience of objects
that may be experienced by everyone. And this power of the Lord, aimed
at obstructing the resting on authentic subjectivity, takes the name of
maya; it contains the infinite number of all the various phonemes K -
etc. -, it is continuously in motion in the form of vital energy, i t carries
out the function called 'mental elaboration'. In this way it creates the ob­
jects intemally. 9- 1 0 -
I I . The creation of' the Lord may be common or /lot common to all
slll�iects (sadharal)O 'nyatha caY, man(f'esting itself {in both cases} il1 all
clarity, With the sllPpression (�l the mental constructs, reslIlting from con­
centration on a single point, the plane (�f' the Lord is gradually reached22 .
20
As we saw earlier, also the l imited subject possesses an i nnate power of crea­
t ion which is in essence no d ifferent from that of the Lord, since the individual him­
sel f is essentially identical to the Lord although he ignores or has forgotten t his iden­
tity. This power of creation, l imited by non-awareness, remains restricted to the i n ­
div idual sphere: what i s created arc images, feel ings, ideas etc . , w h i c h depend more
(as in the case of memory) or less (as in fantasy) on the objeets in the phenomenal
world created by the Lord. These two k inds of objects and of creations arc distin­
gu ished by being the last 'common to all subjects', the others arc 'not common' i.e.
not able to be experienced except by the l i mited subject who creates them. But the
power of creation is essentially the same.
2
1 The object of the mental elaboration ( \'ika/pa etc.) is not the sl'a/ak,I'CI(lCI, but
the "'(/II/(III \,a, which is not attached to a defi n ite time and place.
22 '
Or: ' . . . becomes the object of the reflective awareness [ ' I am this u niverse']
pecu liar to the condition of l�vara'. The creation of the Lord is therct'ore twofold.
On the one hand it constitutes the world o r Objective ex istence, regarding which a l l
subjects arc coord inated; on t h e other restrieted to a single individual i t con­
stitutes the sphere of dream and error, such as the m istaken sight of two moons,
wh ich as far as c l arity and immediacy arc concerned is on the same plane as the
other (ct'. I l l . 2. 1 6) ; c f. IPVV 1lI p. 386 ai.I'I'CII·(Jsya sargasya spa,l'{clvahhc7sa{v o/ll,
ala eva {I\'l'ka/pyateti nlpmll. This interpretation of the first part of the kc7rikc7 and i n
particular of the expression sc7d//(lrw,lo 'nyatha ca i s that suggested b y the v!'tli, but
not the only possible one. For instance, one may understand, as appears from the
215
IV 1 1 - On the contrary, the creation of the Lord is common to all cogniz- the emergence of the state of the Lord i n all its fullness , the d issolution IV 1 1
ing subjects - since they are born within it2J - or also limited to only of the state of limited individuality. - 1 1 -
one subject like that which is manifested in dream, in error and so on,
where it concerns a s ingle subject. Permeated only by the reflective 1 2. He who, having all as his essence, thus knows: «All this multi­
awareness of ' I am this universe', this creation of the Lord is free from form deployment is mine», he, evell ill the flow of mental constructs, at­
mental constructs ( l'ikolp(�i.ihitc7) - since no different iation arises within tains the state �f Mahda 27 .
it24 - and it is manifested in all clarity (spa,sravabhasa CO) 2 5. On this
- Also the individual subject who - though continuing to produce
plane, by applying oneself and intensely cultivating those moments when
mental constructs deriving precisely from the power of the Lord - has
the mental construct becomes attenuated, which occur sporadically (all­
become fully aware of his own nature as Lord - 'Mine is this multiform
tarc7!1tctr(i) while thc activity2() pcrtaining to thc limitcd subject is taking
deployment of the saq1sara' - this subject, too, who permeates the
place, the beings in thc power of the saqlsara gradually attain, through
ulli verse without any d i ffcrcntiation and transforms all the mental
constructs into pure reflective awareness, attains the state of Mahdvara.
12
(ike7, 'the creation of the Lord, common or not common, is d i fferent (from the erea­
tion of the lim ited subject)', in which asadllilm(/(/ ('not common') is impl ied by the
1 3 . The liberated so1l1 looks at the 'coil/ilion' cognizable reality as
� () n j llncti()n CII. To this Abh. adds an interpretation o f his own (fPYY I I I p. 386 and
TPY I I pp. 30 1 -2): i f the creation pertaining to the l imited subject. or the creation being IIndifferentiated .from hinzse(f: like Mahdvara; the hOllnd sOIlI, 011
of the Fika/pas, assumes ful l v ividncss being experienced differently - i.e. recogniz­ the contrary, looks at it as absollitely dztlerentiated.
i ng the power of the Lord in it -, then it too beeomes common, i.e. able to be ex­
perienced by everyone, as in the case of he who, being imbued with the energy o f Cognizable reality 2 8 is the samc for thc bound and the l iberated
t h e mantras, becomes able to trans form h i s representations and intentions into reality; soul; however, the bound soul knows it as absolutely differentiated and
in this case the p(HaFab sarga(l, too, can lead to the condition of the Lord (7:iF([­ the liberated soul as the body of his very self. - 1 3 -
rah/Ill asya dadali). As he h imself explains, the ai.<:ab sargab of the karika may be
understood as {}(I.\:(/W/(1 .I'orga!1, insofar as also this latter form of creation rests, i n 1 4. Blit whell he is completely fllfl (){ the il(t'inite series �f principles
i t s ultimate essence, o n the former: i r t h i s interpretation is not d i rectly referred t o i n
dissolved in him, he is Siva, solely consciollsness and bliss, having as
the vrlli and (lkc7 Abh. adds - it is o n l y because t h e ultimate identity of t h e {lil.I'am .
and ai.I'Fara creation is too obvious to be stated overtly. his body the s lIpreme syllahle2 9.
,2 .1
I n the sense that the creation o f the object i s parallel t o that o f the subjeet.
- But when the cognizable is entirely dissolved within him and there
Real ity, in effeet, is constituted by the interaction of determinate levels of subjec­
tiv ity with the corresponding levels of objectivity (see e.g. PH pp. 6-7). is the full consciousness of the I, the state of S iva is attained. - 1 4 -
2·1
'
Thc absenee of the spl it bctween s ubjeet and ob jective real ity constitutes the
card inal d ifference between Isvara's creation and the pa/ill's creation (IPV V III p. 388
'hhcdiill llt!ayc/( iii I al l el la ai.<:l'arasya .I'argaS,l'a pa.VO WII saJ'g(/! l'oi!ak,lwlym!1 2 7 This is an alternative path to that expounded in the previous kc7rikc7 ; both are

daJ',I'iwlI/; sec also I I p. 329): and it is precisely for this reason that the creation of d irected to the same aim which is to free from the bond of the l'ika/pas. I n the first
the Lord docs not represent a bond. However, it Illust be cons idered, Abh . continues the I'ika/pas were gradually suppressed by fix i n g the nirl'ika/pa (cL P H pp. 39-40;
(ihid. ) , that in the pa.vlI's creation two levels may be distinguished, and whereas the Ipyy III p. 386 avika/paka{Jarigrh7la.I,{)(I,v!avaslu l'i,l'(/yaik(7gralc7l'a/ambanc f1a); here,
first only shows the emergence of di fferentiation, with the mayic and cl(/(/ \'O macula­ on the contrary, their inclusion and transfiguration in the sphere of the totality
tions, it is the second, presided over by Brahma (cf. I I I . 2. I ) and consisting i n the o f consciousness is taught.
2H
various psychic and mental activ ities (p/'{/Iyaya) , that directly causes the karmic I .e. the so-cal led objeetive reality (eL I V . I I ) fac ing both the l iberated soul
maculation and binds to the samsara. and the bound soul.
' cognizable
25 Dharmak-lrt i defines the type of knowledge that pertains to the yogins i n 2 <) Unlike the s ituation expounded i n the previous k(7riJ.:.a, where the

similar terms: P V II I . 28 1 pragukl(ff!l YOgilldl!1 jlWI/(I/!1 IC,WII!I ladhhiil'afl(/fIlayall/ I subsisted though in a state of non-differentia tion with the I a state that Abh. com­
I'idllllwka/paflcija/W!I .l'p(f,l'(all/ l'l'cl mhhcl.l'alc; see also PVin I . 28 and the following pares to that of the plane of Sadasiva-Isvara -, here one cannot even speak of cog­
passage in prose (Steinkellner 1 972: 2m). n i zablc real ity, as it has now been dIssolved and absorbed in the I w i thout a traee.
26
I .e. the l'ika/pa. This is the state of the supreme S iva.

216 217
IV 15 1 5 . Thlls seeing the true reality (�f what is his own se(f alld the
knowledge and action that pertain to him , he knows and creates objects
as he wishes.
Having thus recognized as Lord his own self full of the infinite
powers of knowledge and action once the signs of recognition
represented by the powers have come to l ight, he sees and creates all
things at w i l L 15 -
1 8. In orda that the ordinary mall too can attain pel/ection (OsiddhiO) I V 1 8
effortlessly, Utpala, son of Udayakara, has exp lained with argumenta-
tions (upapadita) this recognition of the Lord.
- This easy path to perfection has thus been shown. - 1 8 -
Here ends the l,�varapratyabhijiiiivrtti .

* * *

1 6. Titus {his lIew. eosy path has hcclI explailled by IllC as thc great
master cxpoulldcd it in thc S ivadp;l i . Thlls he who, plitting Itis fect Oil it,
brings to light ill thc selj' thc I/(/tl/I'C oj' Cl'cator (�j' thc IIIlil'CI'SC whosc es­
sencc is the lIaturc q( ,�i\,(l. alld is ullilltCl'mptcdly absorhcd in it, attaills
pCI/cctioll .

- Within thc coursc of ordinary rcality, in its various forms , solely

i n virtuc of an act of rccognition (pratyabhUilall/(Urdt) is the statc of S iva
attai ncd . This ncw path, dcvoid of tortuosity. was ind icatcd in thc trcatise
that bears the name of ,� il'(ldr,\'!i by the vcnerable S om�inanda, who had
d i rect expcricnce of the form of the blesscd ParamcSvara; I havc here
furnished a logical justification of this path , thus causing it to entcr the
hcarts of mcn. He ,vho hy apply ing himse lf i ntense ly to this enters into
the nature of S i va, becomcs in this very lifc a li berated sou l . 16

1 7 . JIISt like the hclol'cd, wlto, ({ftcr fllllch insistel/cc finally stands ill
thc prcsellce (!/, thc maid ill love, though hc is therc "(fc)l'c her Itc docs
lIot gil'c ha any pleasure IIlItil shc recognizcs who he is - as hc se(,lIls
jllst likc other /lien IIl1til that moment -, so for mankind the scI/: who is
yct the Lord (�l thc world, cal/not manilcst his OWIl glory IIlltil his
qualities have "cell /Jmllght to light. For this rcasoll the doctrine I)l thc
rccogllitiol/ (�l the Lord has herc bccn expollnded.
The example of the beloved shows that the recognition of the Lord
must be awakcnecl J() and that its fru it is extraord inary. 17 -

.\0 Utp. uses the causative form of the root IIpa{iad-. as he has done before, in

his osci llation between the meanings of 'awaken', 'render possible', and 'j ustify logi­
cal ly' (cf. also the fol lowing karika).

218 2 19
 ABBREVIATIONS

Abh. Abhinavagupta
AK Abhidhannakosa
AKBh Abhidharmakosabha�ya
APS Aja<;lapramatrsiddhi
Bh B haskarI
HB Hetubindll
IPK Isvarapratyabh�j fi akarika
Ipy Isvarapratyab h ijfiavimarsinl
Ipyy Isvarapratyabhijfiavivrt i vimarsinl
Is Isvarasiddhi
KSTS Kashm i r Series of Texts and Studies
MMP Maharthamafijarlparimala
M PA MataIigaparamesvaragama
M rA M rgendragama
MrY M rgcndravrtt i
MY M a l i nlvijaya
MYY M a l i nlv ijayavarttika
NB Nyayabinclu
NBT N yayabindlllIka
NM NyayamafijarI
PH Pratyabhijfiahrdaya
PS Pramal)<lsamuccaya
PTLY Paratri 1115 i ka lagh u vrtt i
PTY Paratrill15ikavivanu,HI
PY Pramal)avarttika ( PY I Svarthanumana, PY I I
= PramaDasiddhi , P Y I I I =

Pratyak�a, PY I Y Pararthanllmana)
=

PYSY PramaDavarttikasvavrtti
PYin Pramal)avi niscaya
SO S ivadr�\i
SOYI' S ivadn;(ivrtti
SS S ivasiHra
SSY S ivasulravimarsinI
SY S l okavarll ika
SK Spandakarika
SN Spanclanin)aya
SS Safllbandhasiddhi
SSYr Sal11bandhasidclhi vrlli
SP SaI11 banclhaparlk�a
S Pr Sal11Vitprakasa
SOS Sarvadarsanasal11graha

22 1
SSP Somasambhupaddhati
SvT Svacchandatantra
TA Tantraloka
TA V Tantralokaviveka
TBh Tarkabha�a
TP Tattvaprakasa B I BLIOGRAPHY
TS Tattvasaqlgraha
TSP Tattvasaqlgrahapanjika
TSa Tanlrasara TEXTS
Utp. Utpaladeva
VBh Vijnanabhairava Abhinavagupta, l�l'arapratyabhijl7avillladillf (see B haskarakatJtha, Bhaskar!).
VP Vakyapadlya (the k(/rikas are quoted according t o Rau's edition) Abhinavagupta, l�varapratyabhU!lal'il'rtil'illlarSinl, edited by Madhusudan Kaul Sha­
stri, vols. I - I I I , KSTS LX L X I I LXV, B ombay 1 938-43.
Abhinavagupta, Tantraloka with CO/llmentary by Rajanaka Jayaratha, edited w i th
notes by Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, vols. I-XII , KSTS X X I I I , X X V I I I , X X X ,
X X X V I , X XX V , X X I X , X L I , X L V I I , L I X , L I I , L V I I , L V I I I , Allahabad-Srinagar­
Bombay 1 9 1 8- 1 938.
Abhinavagupta, M(/linlvUayaw!rttikalll, edited w ith notes by Madhusudan Kaul Shastri,
KSTS X X X I , Srinagar 1 92 1 .
Abhinavagupta, Par(!tril!l.l'ikal'ivara(/(/ (see Gnoli 1 985).
Abhinavagupta, Tant/'{/s(//'{/, edited by Mukunda Ram Shastri, KSTS, X V I I , 1 9 1 8.
Abhinavagupta, Talltroccaya edited by R. Gnoli and R . Torella, i n Inc/o-Sillo-Tibetica.
,

Studi ill onore di Luciano Petech, a cum di P. Daffina, U n i versita di Roma ' La
Sapienza', Studi Orientali I X , Roma 1 990.
( Bhalla) Arca\a, Hctuhindu/lke! with thc Suh-Collllllentary entitled A loka (�f DlIrvcka
Mi.I'ra, edited by Pandit Sukh lalji Sanghavi and M u n i Shri Jinavij ayaj i , B aroda
Oriental I nstitute, 1 949.
Bharlrhari, Mahahha,I'yadfpika, A hnika I (see B ronkhorst 1 987).
Bhartrhari. Vakyapadfya with the CO/lllllentaries Vrlli and Paddhati (Jf' Vr,whhadeva,
{((/(I(la I, edited by K . A . S . Iyer, Deccan College, Poona 1 966.
B hartrhari, Vakyapadfya, containing the Tika of PII(lyw'ilja and tlie Ancicnt Vrtti,
{((/(/(Ia If, edited by K . A.S. lyeI', w ith a Foreword by A. A k l ujkar, Delhi 1 98 3 .
Bhartrhari, Vakyapadfya with the COII//Ilentary of Hc/araja, {(c7(I(la III part I, edited
by K .A . S . lyeI', Deccan College, Poona 1 963.
Bhartrhari, Vakyapadfya with the Prakfr(wkaprak(7.I'a (Jf' HeWraja, {((/(14a III part II,
edited by K . A . S . lyeI', Deeean College, Poona 1 97 3 .
Bhartrhari, Vakyapadl}'a (1I1l7Iakarikas), Bhartr1wris Vrikyapadfya, edited by W . Rau,
Abhandlungen fiir die Kunde des Morgenlandes, 42, W iesbaden 1 97 7 .
Bhasarvajna, Nyayabllll,I'W1WIl, edited b y Svaml Yoglndrananda, Sa�ldarsanaprakasa­
naprati�\hana-granthamala No. 1 , Varanasi 1 968.
Bhaskarakar)!ha, Bhc7skarl. A CO/llflle ntary 011 the 1.� \'(/rapratyabhijI7(/vimadilll of Ab­
hillavagupta, vols. I - I I , edited by K.A.S. Iyer and K .C. Pandey, The Princess of
Wales Sarasvati B havana Texts Nos. 70 and 83, A l l ahabad 1 93 8- 1 950.
Dhannaklrti , Vc7dally(7yaprakara(w with the COII/lllentary Vipw/citc7rtha of A chc7rya
,5'c7l1tarak,l'ita alld Sal7l/wndhaparlksc7 with the COII/II/cNtary of A charya
Prabhacandra, Dharmaklrt i nibandhaval il:t (2), Bauddhabharatlgranthama1a No. 8,
Varanasi 1 972.

222 223
Dharmaklrli, Prallulzwviirttika-kiirikii (Sanskrit and Tibetan ), edited by Y . M iyasaka,
Acta Indologica, 2, 1 97 1 -72.
Dharmaklrt i , PraIllZi(I(II'iirffika with the CO/llll/elllary ' Vrtti' or A c/wrya Manorathall(Jl/­
dill, critically edited by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Varanasi 1 968.
Dharmakirt i , Prallliiz/(/w/rttikmn. The First Chapter Il'ilh Ihe A llfocommelliary, text and
critical notes by R.Gnoli , Serie Orientale Roma X X I I I , Is MEO, Roma 1 960.
Dhannaklrti, PrwllclWII'inis'caya Il (see Steinkellner 1 973).
Dharmaklrt i , Helubilldu (see Steinkellner 1 9(7).
Dharmottara, Nyiiyabilldu{Tkcl (see Durveka Misra, D/wr/l/ottarapradTpa).
Dignaga, Nyc7yalllllk/w (see Tueci 1 930).
Dignaga, Pramcl(/(/sa/l/lIccava (see Hattori 1 968).
Durveka Misra, D lwrlll(lt/a/'{/pradTp(f / beillg a stlli-coll/mentary 011 Dharmoftara's
NW7yahindll!Tka, a cOll//l/el/tary on DlwnllakTrli's Nyc7yahindtl! , edited by Par.l dita
Dalsukhbhai Malvania, Kashi prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Revised II Ed.,
Patna 1 97 1 .
Helarnja, PrakTr(/(/kapraki7,I'a (see Bhartrhari, VakvapadTm, Ka(I(/a III paris I-II ) .
layanta, Nyav(JlllwljarT, edited by PI. Surya Ni\rnyana S Ukla. parts I-II, Kashi Sanskrit
Series 1 06, Varanasi 1 969-7 1 .
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kur, Tibetan Sanskrit Work Series 5, Patna 1 959.
KaUl)(.la B halla, Vycikaf'{/!wli/IlI,\'(/(/(lsc7f '{/ wilh Ihe [)mj)([!/(l Comll/elltary hy SrThari\'([{­
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. . .
S iistri Joshi, I-laricl i\s Sanskrit Granthamnln 1 33 , Benares 1 939.
Kim(liigoflla (Vidw7pilc!a) (sec V ivanti 1 (85)
K0emarnja, P/ '(/tyahhijl7ahrdaya/ll, eelited by M llkll nda Ram Shastri, KSTS III , Srinagar
1 9 1 8.
Kscmarnja, Spallc!ill/inwWl, cdited by Madhllsudan Kaul Shastri, KSTS XLII, S rinagar
1 92 5 .
K�elllari\ja, ,\'il'(fstil/'(/l'illlar,l:iIlT, edited by J.C.CIHlttelj i , KSTS I , S rinagar 1 9 1 1.
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Mndltaviiciirya, SllIwu/ar.Valla,\'(ff!lgmha, edited b y Uma Shankar Sharma, Vidyab­
hawaII Sanskrit Granthamala 1 1 3 , Varallasi 1 97 X .
Madhyiillta l'ih//(Iga,{iislm, cOlllainillg I h e Karik17s of Maitreya , B ha,vya of Iiasllhafldllll
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224
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232 233
 INDEX OF IMPORTANT WORDS IN THE TEXT:
(k karika; v 1'l'tti)
= =

akartrtva IlA.20 (v); anatman III. 1 .8 (k);

ak�a 1 . S . 1 (k); III.2. 1 4 (k); anityatva II1.2.6 (v);
III.2. 1 6 (k); aniyantritaprabha-
ak�agocaratva m.2. 1 7 (k); vata 1 .5 . 1 5 (v);
ak�i 1.S.9 (k); III. l . lO- 1 1 ani�edhya I . 7 . l l (k);
(v); anupalak�yatva III.2. 1 3 (v);
aIlga III.2.3 (k); IVA (k); anupalabdhi 1.2. 1 -2 (v);
acit III. l .9 (v); III.2. 1 1 anupalambha 1.2.9 (v); 1.2. 1 0 (v);
(k); I.7.4 (k,v);
acchurita I.7 . 1 (v); anupravesa II.3.7 (v);
aja<,latman 1. 1 .2 (k); anubhava 1.2. 1 -2 (v); 1.2.3
aja<,lya I.3.5 (k); 1.5. 1 1 (v); (k,v); I.2A (k,v);
ajfiana I.7. 1 4 (v); I.2.5 (k,v); 1.2. 1 0
ajfieya 1.5. 1 5 (v); (v); 1 . 3 . 1 (k,v); 1.3.2
aIW III.2.5 (v); III.2.S (v); (v); 1.3.3 (v); 1.30 4
II1.2. 1 6 (v); (k,v); 1.4.3 (v); 1.40 4
aI,lutva III.2A (v); Il1.2.9 (v); (k,v); 1.4.6 (v); 1.5. [ 7
III.2. l l (v); (v); 1 .6.9 (k,v); I.7.5
atinirbharavastha III. 2.20 (v); (k,v); I .7 . 1 2 (v);
a tirikta 1.2.9 (v); I.3.7 (v); 1.7. 1 4 (v); I.8. [ (v);
1.5.20 (v); I.7.9 (v); IV.S (v);
atHatva I.S.3 (v); anubhavitr 1.2.3 (v);
adp;ya I . 7 . 1 1 (k); anubhavitrtva 104. 1 (v);
adrsyatva I . 7 . 1 1 (v); anubhavaka 1.2.3 (k); I.4.S (v);
adr��i 1.2.9 (k); anubhavya I.4.S (v);
adhikaral)a II.3.6 (v); anu"" bhO I .7 . 1 O (v) I.7.1 4 (k);
adhidaivata IlL2. 1 (k); anubhOta I.3. 1 (v); I . 3 A (v);
adh ipati IIA. 1 2 (k); IA. l (k,v); 1.4.2 (v);
adhi(>�hatf !IL2. 1 (v); 1.4.3 (v); I A A (v);
adhyak�a 1.5. I S (v); 1.8.9 (k); 1.5. 1 7 (v); II.3 . 1 4 (v);
II.3.9 (k); anubhatatva 1.6. 1 0 (v);
adhyavasa 1.5 .20 (k); anu""m a I.5A (k); 1.5.S (v);
adhyavasaya I.3A (v); I.3.5 (v); anum[ma 1.5.S (k,v); 1.5.9 (k,v);
1.5. 1 8 (k,v); 1.5.20 I.7 . 1 3 (k,v); II.3.9
(v); (k,v);
adhyava""so I.3.3 (v); anuvedha 1.4.S (v);
adhyasa 1.5.6 (v); anusalTldhana I.3.6 (k); 1 . 3 . 7 (v);
anavacchcda !I1.2.20 (v); 1.5. 1 9 (v); 1.S. 1 O (v);
anatmatva lIL I .5 (k); II.3.3 (k); II.3 . 1 4 (v);

235
 Ir.4.8 (v); II.4. 1 5 abodhata III.2.4 (k); arthita 1.4.2 (v); I I .3 .4-S (v); avasatr I.4.7 (k);
(k,v); I V . 7 (v); abhnva 1.3.2 (v); 1 . 5 . 1 1 (v); II.3.9 (v); avasaya 1.3.3 (k); 1.3.5 (k);
anekata n.2.2 (k); 1.5. 1 4 (v); I.7.S (v); arthitva I.4.2 (v); 11.3.3 (v); 1 . 5. 2 1 (k); 11. 1 .8 (v);
anekatva II.2.2 (v); I.7.7 (k,v); 1.7.8 (k); arthi n II.2.7 (k,v); 11.3.4-S aVHsay i n 1.2.2 (k);
anekarupatva 1.2. 1 1 (k); 1 . 7 .9 (k,v); 1 . 7 . 1 0 (v); 1 1 .3 .9 (k); ava,l so 1 . 5 .6 (k); 1 1 . 1 .8 (v);
antarbahi0kanu)a II.3 .4-S (v); (v); 1 . 7 . 1 1 (v); 1 . 7 . 1 2 avakra IV. 1 6 (v); avastha III.2.3 (v);
ant arlin a T.S. I (v); 1.6.3 (v); (k,v); I.8.3 (v); 1 . 8 . S avagahita I.2.5 (v); avasthana I I I .2 . 1 1 (v); I I I. 2.20
I V . 1 4 (k,v); ( v ) ; 1l. 1 .6 ( v ) ; II.3. 1 3 avaechinna II.3.8 (v); (v);
alllarv i parivarli n lI.4.4 (k); (v); TI.3. I S- 1 6 (k,v); ava,ldhr I.2. 1 -2 (v); avasthita 1.8.2 (v); I V . 1 6 (v);
antarvrtti IIl.2. 1 4 (v); II.4. 1 1 (k,v); TT.4.20 avadhyavadhimat 11.2.6 (v); avasthi t i 1.2. 1 1 (v); II.4. 1 9 (v);
antal)karar)a 1.8.8 (v); (v); TII.2.4 (v); T I 1 .2.9 avadhyavadhima- I I I .2 . 1 3 (v);
antal)krta 1.3.7 (k); (v); 1II.2. 1 3 (k,v); dbhava 1 1.2.6 (k); avahita 1.4.2 (v);
antal)slhita I.S. 1 (k); LS.7 (k); Ill.2 . I S (v); IV.6 ava,l bha 1.6.4 (k); aviccheda 11. 1 .6 (v);
L S . 8 (v); 1.6.7 (v); (k,v); avabhata I.S.8 (v); avim arsana 1 .6. 1 0 (v);
1 .7 . 1 (v); ITL I . I (v); abhijna III.2.2 (v); ava Y bhns 1.2.2 (k); 1.4.3 (v); aviruclclha II.3.7 (k);
anyallapek�;al)a 1 . 2. 1 1 (k); abhijflana I . 1 . 3 (v); I V . 1 5 (v); 1 .4.5 (v); I.S .20 (v); avirodha 1 1 .4 . 1 9 (v);
anyonyarlipatva 1 1 .4. 1 7 (v); ahhijilapita I 1 1.2.2 (k); 1 1. 1 .3 (v); 11. 1 .8 ( k); avirodhi n I . 7 .6 (k);
Hnyonyavi�ayavc- abhi ,ldhn II.3 .4-S (v); 1 1 .3 . 7 (v); 11.3 . I S- 1 6 avyabhicarin 1.8. 1 1 (v);
dana 1 .3 . 2 (v); abhidha m. 1 .7 (k); (v); avyaprti 1.2.6 (v);
anyonyavedana 1 .3.2 (v); abh idhan<l I . S . 1 7 (v); n.3.2 (k); avabhasa 1.2. 1 -2 (v); 1.4.2 (v); asat 11.4.2 (k,v); 11.4.3-4
anyonyasvabha- abhinavatva 1 1 . 3 . 1 -2 (v); 1 .4.8 (v); 1 . 5 . 1 (k,v); (k,v); 1I.4. 1 5 (v);
yam 11.4. 1 7 (k); abhini Y vis 1 .6.7 (v); I.S.4 (v); I.S.6 (k); asatta 11.4. IS (k);
anyonyapck�a 1.2. 1 [ (v); 1 . 7 .4 (v); abhinna 1 .4.3 (v); I.S.4 (k); I . S . 1 1 (k); 1 .6.2 (k); asattva 1 1 . 1 .4 (k);
anvaya 1 1.2.4 (k); 1 1.2.6 (k); 1.7.3 (v); 1 1 .2.2 (v); 1 .6.S (k); 1 .6.6 (k); asamanv i ta 1.7.4 (v);
apa,ldis 1 .4. [ (k); IV.S (k); IT.4.S (v); 1 1.4. 1 9 (v); 1.6.8 (v); 1.6.9 (v); asalllprarnO�at)a 1 .4 . 1 (v);
aparatva III. I . S (k,v); I 1 1. 2 . S (v); I.7 . 1 4 (k,v); I.8.2 asaq1Vada I I. 3 . 1 3 ( k ,v);
aparaspariHmat va 1 . 7 . 7 (v); abhi nnam 1 1 .3 . 1 4 (k); ( k,v); 1 .8.3 (k); 1 .8 .5 asadharar)l (sr�\i ) IV.9 (k);
aparijnana IV.3 (k,v); abhimata T.6. I O (k); (k); 1 . 8 .7 (k); II. I .2 asthi t i 1.8.3 ( k) ;
apariharaniyatva 1 1.2. 1 (v); abhi,l rnan III . 2. 18 (v); (v); n. l .4 (v); 1 1 . 1 . 6 asthairya II.3 . 1 3 (v);
apana 11 1 .2. 1 9 (k,v); 1 1 1 .2.20 abh imnna I I 1 . 2 . 1 3 (v); (v); II.2.S (k); 1 1.3. 1 asparsa 1 . 3 .4 (v); 1 .5 . 1 4 (v);
(v); abhi�vatiga l I I . l .9 (v); 2 (v); 1 1 .3 . 3 (v); asvabhavikatva II.3 . 1 2 (v);
1.3.4 (k); 1 1.4. 6 (k,v); abheda 1.."i. I O (v); I.S .20 (v); 1 1.3.4 (k); 1 1 .3.7 (k,v); ahanta 1 .4.4 (v); 1 . 5 . 1 7 (k);
[ 1 .4.9 (v); 1 1 .4. 1 4 1 1 1 . 1 . 3 (v); IV.S (v); 1 1 . 3 . 1 1 (k); 1 1 . 3. 1 5- m. 1 .5 (k,v); m. I . S
(k,v); abhraqlsa 1I.3. I S- 1 6 (v); 1 6 (v); lll. 2 . 1 6 (k); (k); II1.2.8 (v);
apohana 1 . 3 .7 ( k ,v); 1 .6.3 (v); arlipatva 1 1 1 .2. 1 3 (v); IV.8 (k,v); IV. I I (v); II1.2. 1 3 (k,v); III.2. 1 4
1.6.4-S (v); 1.6.8 (k); artha 1 . 1 .2 (v); 1 .2 . 7 (k); avabhasana 1 . S . 1 (k); 1.6.2 ( k,v); (k,v);
apraklisa 1 .3.4 (v); 1.2.8 (k); 1 . 3 .4 (k); 1 . 6. 1 1 (k); 1 . 7 . 3 (v); aham 1. 1 . 1 (v); I . l .5 (v);
apratyabh i j nanH IV.3 (v); 1 .3.5 (k);I.S.7 (k,v); IV.S (v); [ V . I I (k); 1 .4 .4 ( k,v); 1 .4 .7 ( k);
apramnl)ya 1 .7 . 1 2 (k,v); [ 1 .2. 1 (v); 1 1 .2.7 (k); avabhas in 1 .6.4-S (v); I.6.6 (k); I.S . 1 7 (v); 1.6. 1 (v);
apmmatva 1.7.7 (k); arthakaritii 1.8.6 (v); 1 1 . 3 . 1 5- 1 6 (v); [ V . 7 1 .6.4-5 (k,v); 1.6.7
apravartita 1 1 . 3 . 1 7 (k); arthakliri n [ 1 .3.S (k); (k); (v); II1. 1 .3 (k,v);
apravrtti I!I.2. 1 () (v); arthakriya 1.8.6 (k,v); 1 1.2.7 avamarsa I 1 . 3 . 1 3 (v); llI. l .4 (v); IIL I .S (v);
abndhita [ 1 . 3.2 (k); 1 1 .3. 1 -2 (k,v); [ 1 . 3 . 1 -2 (v); avamrsyata [ V . 2 (v); IV. I (k); IV. I I (v);
(v); 1 1 .3. 1 0- 1 1 (v); II.3 .4-S (v); 1 1 .3.6 avayava 1 .2 . 9 (v); I . S .6 (v); ahaq1knra 1 .6.6 (v); m. I . I O- 1 1
abodha 1 Il . 2 . S (k,v); 1 1 1.2.8 (k); 11.3 . 1 2 (k,v); [ 1 .2.S (v); (v); I V . 2 (k,v); I V . 3
(k); [ 1 .4. 1 0 (k,v); avasa 1 .4.7 (k); (v);

236 237
ahaqlparamarsa £.5. 1 7 (v); atmavadi n 1.2.5 (v); I I .4.7 (k,v); I I .4. 1 1 III. 1 .3 (k,v); III. l .4
ahaq1pranti £,2.2 (k); atmavi m arsa 11. 1 .2 (v); (v); II.4 . 1 2- 1 3 (k,v); (v); III. 1 .9 (v); IV. 1
ahaq1pratyaya 1.2. 1 -2 (v) ; atmasaq1Vcdya 1 . 1 .5 (v); II.4. 1 9 (k); I I.4.20 (k); IV.2 (k); I V . 7
ahaqlpratyava- atlllasthairya 1.2.5 (v); (k,v); I I . 4. 2 1 (k); ( v ) ; I V. I I (v);
marsa 1.6. I (k); adisarga 1.6.7 (v); III. 1.9 (v); II1.2. 1 idambhava m . l .4 (k);
ahaqlpratyavam- adisiddha I , 1 .2 (k); (v); III.2. 1 6 (v); I V . 7 i ndriya 1.3.2 (v); 1.5.4 (v);
rsya 1.5. [7 (v); adhara 1.7.8 (v); (v); 1.5.8 (k,v); 11.2.2 (k);
aha1l1pratyeya 1.4.4 (v); adhipatya 1 1.4. 1 2- 1 3 (v); abhasana 1.5.7 ( v ) ; 1 . 6 . 7 (v); 1 1 .4.4 (k); III.2 . 1 4
ahalWl1ati I V . 1 4 (v); ananda IV .3 (k,v); IV.6 (k,v); 1.6.9 (k,v); 1 .6. 1 0 (k); (v); I I I .2 . 1 6 (v);
ahaq1mrsyata 1.5. 1 7 (k); abhasamanata 1.5.4 (v); Isa I . 5J 6 (k); II.3 . 17 (k);
IV. 1 4 (k);
ahaq1V imarsa 1.8.8 (v); anuglll�ya n.2.7 (v); abhasatmata 1.5.4 (v); III.2.20 (k); I V .9- 1 O
ahal11Vimarsana 1 . 8. 1 1 (v); antaratva 1.8.6 (k); £.8.7 (v); abhiisita 1.4.2 (k); 1.5.8 (v); (k,v);
ahaq1Vcdya 1.4.4 (v) abhata 1.5.8 (k); 1.5. 1 8 (v); Isitr 11. 1 .8 (k); III. 1 .2 (v);
I , 8 . 8 (v);
ahrdaYaJlgamatva I . 1 .3 (v); antarya 1.8.8 (k); 11. 1 .7 (v);)1.3. 1 -2 (v); Isvara 1 . 1 .2 (v); 1 . 1 .3 (v);
ahctu 1 1 1 .2.5 (v); abha n.2.4 (k); II.3.4- (v); 1I.3 . 1 6 (k); I . l .5 (v); 1.2. 1 1 (v);
akasmikabhasa 1.5.4 (k); a'-'bhas 1.2.5 (v); 1.3 .5 (v); amarsa 1 .5 . 1 0 (k); IV . l (k); 1 .5 . 1 0 (v); I .5 . 1 6 (v);
akara 1 .5 . 1 [ (v); 1 1.2.5 (v); 1.4.2 (v); 1.5.6 (v); a'-'mrs 1.4.2 (k); 1.4.8 (k); I . 5 . 1 7 (v); I.6.4-5
II.3.4-5 (v); U.4.5 (k); a�la ;nb II.2.4 (v); II.2.5 (k); (v); 1.8.9 (v); I.8. 1 1
1.5. 1 6 (v); 1.5 . 1 8 (v);
akasa a1ambanata 1.3.3 (k); (v); 11. 1 . 5 (k); IL l .7
1 .6.4-5 (v); 1.5.2 1 (v); I , 6.4-5
ak�i pta 1 .8 . 1 (v); a10ka 1.7 . 1 0 (k,v); 1 . 7 . 1 1 (v); II.3 . 1 2 (k,v);
(v); 1 .6- 1 0 (v); 1.8.7
ak�cpa (k,v); II.3. 1 5 (k); II. 3 . l 7
1 1. 3 . [4 (v); (k); 11. 1 .5 (k); 1 1 .3.4-
agama a'-'vi s 1.6.7 (k); I V . 1 6 (k); (v); H .4. 1 (v); II.4.3-
1.5. 1 4 (v); 5 (v): H.4. 1 (k,v);
acchada II!. 1 .5 (k); II.4.20 (v); av i�!a 1 . 6. 7 (v); 4 (v); II.4.8 (v);
acchadana avi�karana 1 . 1 .3 (k); I I .4.9 (v); 11.4. 1 1 (v);
III. 1 .5 (v); abhasa I,2. 1 (k); 1.2.4 (v);
HI.2.4 (k); IIL2.5 (v); avi0krta I V . 1 5 (v); III. 1 .3 (k,v); m.2.7
aI)lIVa (mala) 1 . 3 .2 (k); 1.4.2 (k,v);
avrtli 1 1 . 1 .6 (v); (k,v); III.2.9 (v);
atIII an 1 . 1 .5 (v); 1.2. 1 -2 (v); 1 .5.4 (k); !.5.5 (v);
avesa 1 .2 .7 (v); 1 . 3 . 1 (v); IIl.2. 1 6 (v); I V .4 (v);
1.2.3 (k,v); 1.2.4 1 .5 .6 (v); 1.5.8 (k,v);
I V. I I (v); IV. 1 6 (v); IV.6 (v); IV.9- 1 O (v);
(k,v); 1 .2.5 (k); 1.2.6 1.5.9 (k,v); 1.5. 1 7 (v);
asaya m. 2.3 (v); I V. I I (v); IV. 1 2 (v);
(v); 1.2.7 (k,v); 1.2.8 1.6.2 (v); 1.6.3 (v);
asraya I . 1 .4 (k); 1 . 2.9 (v); IV. 1 5 (v); IV. 1 7
(k,v): 1.2. 1 1 (v); I,6.6 (k,v); I .6.8 (k);
1 . 3 . 1 (k,v); 1 . 3 . 1 (v); asrayatva I.2.6 (v); IT.4.5 (v); (k,v);
1.7. 1 (v); 1.7.3 (v);
ahlada 1.8.3 (v); lsvarata IV. I I (k);
1 .4.3 (v); 1 .4.4 (k,v); 1.7.5 (v); 1.7.6 (v);
iccha 1.5.7 (k,v); 1.5. 1 0 lsvaratva 1.5.7 (v);
1.5.2 (k); 1.5. 1 0 1.7.9 (v); I X I (k,v);
(k,v); 1 .5 . 1 1 (v); 1 . 8 .3 (v); 1.8.5 (v); (k,v); 1.6.7 (k); 1.8.9 lsvarapratyabhijfia IV. 1 8 (k,v);
(k); 11.3.3 (v); H.3. 1 2 lsvarabhava IV. 1 2 (v);
I.5 . 1 2 (k,v); 1.5. 1 5 1.8.6 (k,v); I.8.7 (v);
(k, v); 1.5. 1 6 (k); (k); 11.3. 1 5- 1 6 (v); lIcchcda 1.2.4 (v);
1.8.8 (v); I I . l .4 (k,v);
1 1 .4. 1 (k,v); II.4. I O lItpatli 11.4. 1 1 (k,v);
1 . 5 . 1 7 (k,v); 1 .5.20 11. 1 .5 (v); 11. 1 .6 (k,v);
(k,v); 1 1 .4 .2 1 (k,v); U tpala IV. 1 8 (k);
(k,v); 1 .6 . 1 (v); 1 .7 . 1 1 1 .2 . 1 (v); 1 1 .2.2 (v);
1 1 1.2.4 (v); 1 1 1 .2.5 utpada IV. I I (v);
(v); 1.8.5 (k); 11. 1 .6 1 1 . 2 . 5 (v); 11.2.7
(v); m.2.7 (k); lItpadana 1 .6.7 (v); II.4.3-4 (v);
(v); 1 1 . 1 .7 (v); ( v ) ; 1 1 . 3 . 1 -2 (k,v);
icchasakti 1 I .4. 1 (v); !l.4.8 (v);
I I . 3 . l 7 (v); 1 1.4. [ 8 1 1 .3.3 (k); 1 1 . 3 .4-5
idanta 1.5. 1 7 (v); I.5.20 (k); lIlprck�n 1.2. 1 -2 (v); 1 .8 .2 (v);
(k); III. 1 . 1 (v); (k,v); 1 1 . 3 . 6 (k,v);
1 1 1 . 1 .4 (v); 111. 1 .5 (v); IV.8 (k,v);
111.2.2 (v); I I I . 2. 1 9 1 1 . 3 . 7 (v); 1 1 . 3 . 8
III. 1 . 8 (v); IV.2 (v); lIclaya II.3. 1 (k); 11.4. 1 4 (v);
(v); I V . I (v); IV. 1 5 ( v ) ; 1 1 .3. 10- 1 1 (v);
IV.7 (k); Uclayakara IV. 1 8 (k);
(k,v); IV. 1 6 (k); 1 1 . 3 . 1 2 (v); 1 1 . 3 . 1 5-
1 .6.7 (v); 1.8.8 (v); lIclana 111.2.20 (k,v);
atnwparyavasita 1 1 .4 . 1 5 (v); 1 6 (k,v); 11 .4.5 (v); idam

238 239
ud.,lbal III.2. 1 1 (v); ekadesa III.2.5 (v); IIl.2.S karyalingata I.7.5 (v);
I .7 . 1 3 (v); 1 1.2.5 (k);
udbal ita III.2. I I (k); IV.2 (v); (v); III.2.9 (v); hila I.2.3 (v); I.2.7 (v);
lIdyama 1 . 1 .2 (v); ekarupata 11.2.5 (k); kannendriya III. l . l O- l i (v); 1.2.9 (v); I.4.2 (k,v);
udreka IlI. ! .2 (k,v); rn .2 . 1 R eklbhava kala III . l .9 (v); UI.2. 1 1 1.4.3 (k); I.4A (v);
1 . 5 . 1 6 (v);
(v); (k); I.5.2 (v); I.5.8 (v);
a ikagrya IV. I I (k);
1II.2. 1 1 (v); 1 .5 . 1 4 (k,v); I . 5 . 2 1
unmajjana II.3. 1 5- 1 6 (v); aikatmya I.8.S (k); kaIasakti
II.4. 1 S (v); (k,v); 1 .7 . 1 (v); 1 . 7 . 3
unme�a III . ! .3 (k,v); a ikya I.2.9 (v); 1.4.3 (k,v); kali ta
Il1. 2.20 (v); (k); I.7 . 1 3 (v); I.8.2
upakara I . ! . I (k); 1.6.6 (v); I.S.6 (k); kalpatva
I,2.6 (v); I.6.6 (k,v); (v); 1 1 . 1 .3 (k,v);
upacaya III.2. I S (k, v); I.S. I O (k); II.2A (k,v); kalpana
II.2.3 (k,v); I L ! .5 (k,v); 1l. 1 .6
upadidik�ll II.3 . 1 5 - 1 6 (v); 11.2.5 (v); II.3.7 (k);
1 . 1 .5 (k,v); 1.2.9 (k,v); (k,v); II.2. 1 (k);
upa.,ldis II.3. 1 5- 1 6 (v); n.3. 1 0- [ I (v); II.3. 1 3 kaya
n . 3 .9 (v); I l .2.2 (k,v); II.2.6
lIpa.,ldrs 1 . 1 .3 (k,v); (v); II.3 . 1 4 (v); IIA.5
I,2.9 (v); 1.2. 1 0 (v); (v); I I . 3 . 2 (k); 11.3.4-
upadesa I.3.6 (v); 1I. 3 . 1 5- 1 6 (v); III .2.7 (k); karaka
I I .2.6 (k); 5 (k,v); I I . 3 . 9 (v);
(v); II.3. 1 7 (v); aindriyaka 1 1 .3 04-5 (v);
1.5.7 (v); I.8.6 (v); II.4. I S (k,v); III. I . l
upabpphila IV. I (v); aisa I V. I I (k);
1I.4.7 (k,v); lI.4.9 (k); III. \ .9 (k,v);
llpayoga II. 1 . 3 (v); II.2. 1 (k); a isvarya 1 . 1 .2 (v); I.5. 1 3 (k,v);
(v); II.4. 1 4 (v); III.2. 1 6 (v); I I l.2.20
II.3. 1 5- 1 6 (v); 1I.4.9 (k); lII. l .2 (v);
IIA. 1 5 (v); I I .4. 17 (v);
lIpayogi n IT.2. 1 (v); lII. l .7 (k,v); III.2.2
(k,v); III.2. 1 0 (k); kalasakti II. ! .2 (k,v);
lIparakla 1.5 . 1 1 (k); 1lI . 2.6 (v); (k); I l I.2.3 (v); IV . I I
IlA.S (v); I lA.2 1 (v); Krttika 1 1 .4. 1 4 (v);
uparodha IV. I O (k); (v); karal)atil
1I.4.2 (v); krama I.2.9 (v); L 5 .4 (v);
upa�lak� ! . I .5 (k); aunmukhya 1 . 5 . 1 5 (k); kuraI)atva
III.2.5 (k,v); III.2. 1 0 L6.7 (v); I . 7 . 1 (k);
lIpalak�al)a 1 . 7 .4 (v); I.S.4 (k); karar�a 1.6A-5 (v); m. I . I O­ karma
(k,v); I .7 .3 (k); IL l . l (k);
lIpalak�ila 1 . 1 .3 (k); II . 1.3 (v); I I (k,v); IV.5 (k);
III.2.S (k); III.2.9 (k); II. I .2 (v); II. I .3 (k,v);
upalabdha 1.4. 1 (k); kanuwsakti IT1.2. 1 7 (v); krll'ln amaia
1 . 5 .6 (v); 1 .7 .9 (v); 11. ! .4 (k,v); II. ! .5
upalabdhiyogya I.7.S (k); kartr 1 . 1 .2 (k); 1 .2. 1 1 (k); karya
I.S.6 (v); I . S . l l (v); (k,v); II. I .6 (k,v);
upalabdhr 1 .4. I (k); 1.4. 1 (v); 1.6.7 (v);
II.3A-5 (v); 1 1 . 3 .6 II. I .7 (k); 11.2.6 (v);
llpa�labh I.7 A (v); l I A.5 (v); 1 1.4.7 (v);
(k,v); II.4.5 (k,v); 11.4.7
llpalambha [ .4.5 (v); 11 04.2 1 (v); I ll . 1 .6 (k); (v); 11.3.7
I I A.6 (k,v); ITA.7 (v); IL4.9 (k); II.4. 1 S
upa�n 1.7.2 (v); 11 1.2.5 (k,v); 1I1.2.S
(k,v); ! l .4. 1 1 (k,v); (k); III. 1 . 1 (k, v ) ;
lIpasaqlhara 1Il .2. 1 (v); (k);
1 1.4. 1 3 (k); 11.4. 1 4 kriya I . ! .2 ( v ) ; I . l A (k,v);
llpasarjanatva 1 I1 .2. l l (v); lTl.2. 1 2 karlrkarmat va 1 1 .4.2 (k);
(v); 1 1 .4. 1 5 (v); 1. 1 .5 (k,v); I.2.S (v);
( v); kartrta 1 1 .4. I S (k,v); [ 1 .4.2 1
[ 1.4. 1 7 (k,v); lII. l . l O­ 1.2.9 (k,v); I .2. 1 0 (v);
llpadana 1 .5 . 7 (k); (k,v); 1 1 1 . 1 .6 (v);
I I (k,v); 1 .5. 1 7 (v); I.5. 1 9 (v);
llpudcya III .2.20 (v); [ V . I (v); 1 1 1.2.6 (k); Il1.2.9 (v);
1.6. 1 1 (k); I.S. 1 1 (k,v);
lIpflrO(,lha 1 1 . 3 . 1 -2 (v); l I 1.2. 1 1 (k,v); 1 1 1.2. 1 2 kuryakarmaphalani-
! l l. l .9 (v); 1 1 . 1 . 1 (k,v); n. l .2
u l l ikhita I.SA (k,v); (k,v); 1 1 1 .2 . 1 3 (k); yama
karyakanu�ata I.7.2 (v); I.7.4 (k); (k,v); 1 1 . 1 .3 (v); II. l .4
ul lckha 1.3.5 (k, v); I.S.S IIl.2. I S (k); [V.3 (v);
II.3.S (k,v); [ I.4.2 (v); I1. l .5 (k,v); II. ! .
(k,v); I.S.9 (k,v); IV.6 (v); IV. 1 6 (k) ;
(k); IIAA (k); II A. 1 4 6 (v); 11.2. 1 (k,v);
[ 1 . 3 . 1 2 (v); kartrtva 1.2. 1 1 ( v); 1 1 .4.2 (v);
(k); 11.2.3 (v); II.2.6 (k,v);
�[jh 1 . 1 .5 (k); 1 . 5 .4 (v); 11 1 .2.6 (v); 1I1 .2.9
karyakanll�abhava 1.2. 1 0 (k,v); 1 . 7 .4 n.2.7 (v); II.3 . 1 2 (k);
ckata [ 1.3.4-5 (v); 11.3.6 (v); (k,v);
(v); I.7.5 (v); 1 1.4. 1 4 Il.4. 1 (k, v); IL4.5
11 .3 . 1 4 (v); 1 1.4. 1 7 karmata 1 1.4.2 (v);
(v); 1 1.4. 1 6 (v); (k,v); I lA.7 (k,v);
(v); 1 1 1 .2.20 (v); karman 1.5. 1 7 (k); 1 1.2.3 (k);
11.4.6 (v); IIA. 1 8 (k,v); II.4.20
ckalva I.S. I O (k); [1.3. 1 1 (k ); 1 1 .4.5 (v); IIA.2 1 (v); kuryatil
11.4. 2 (v); I l.4.6 (v); (k,v); IIA.2 1 (k,v);
11.4.5 (v); [ 1 .4. 1 7 (k); 1 1 1 . 1 . 1 (k); 1I1 .2.2 karyatva
IV.5 (k); IlL ! . I (k,v); III. \ .9
1 1 .4.20 (k); (k,v); [ [ 1 .2.3 (v);

240 24 1
 (v); I V . 3 (k,v); IV.4 citikartrta I . S . 1 2 (k,v); jlvattva 1 . l .4 (v); tirahkrta II.3 . 1 -2 (v);
'
(k,v); IV.6 (k,v); citikriyasakti 1 . 5 . 1 4 (v); jlvana 1 . l .4 (Ie,v); III.2. 1 4 tiro �dh a I I . l .8 (v);
IV. 1 0 (k); IV. I S (k); citisakti 1 .5 .20 (v); (Ie,v); tirodhana U .S (v); III. 1 .7 (Ie);
kriyakarakabhava I1.4. 1 6 (k,v); citkriya I.S. 1 2 (k); jPllbha IV.2 (v); tiryafic III.2.20 (v);
kriyalva II.4.20 (v); c ittattva 1.3.7 (v); I.S.7 (v); jfiapti 1 . 3 . 2 (v); 1 . 7 . 1 2 (k); t i��hasu I I . 4. 2 1 (Ie);
kriyasak t i [ 1 .4.2 1 (v); IV. I S (v); 1 .5 . 2 1 (v); 1 .6.4-S I II . 1 .4 (v); turyadasa III.2.20 (v); I V . 1 (v);
klesa m.2.3 (k,v); (k,v); 1.6.S (v); L6.9 -ljfia I V . 1 5 (k); t uryafita II1.2.20 (v);
k�at)a 1 . 5 . 1 9 (k); (v); I . 8 . 1 1 (v); n . Ll jnatr 1 . 1 .2 (Ie); I L I .S (v); traikalya I I . 3 . S (v);
k�elrajfia IV.S (v); I V.9- 1 O (v); (v); 11.4.20 (v); jfiatrtva 1.2. 1 1 (v): trailokya I I . 3 . 8 (v);
IV. I I (v); I V . 1 2 (v); III. 2. I I (k,v); jfiateya 1 . 2 . 1 0 (v); 1.7.2 (k); darsana L4.S (Ie); 1.4.6 (v);
k�etrajfiata IV . I I (v); citra II.3. I S ( Ie ) ; jnana I . 1 .2 (v); 1 . 1 .4 (Ie,v); 1 .4.7 (k,v); I . S . 8 (v) ;
gandha IlL I . I 0- 1 1 (v); cidatman TI.4. 1 9 (k, v); II.4.20 I . l .S (k,v); I.2. 1 -2 1 . 7 . 9 (v); IV.9- 1 0 (v);
gam aka [ 1.4. 1 2- 1 3 (v); (v); II1.2. 1 2 (k); (k,v); 1.2.6 (v); 1 .2.7 darsanayogya I .7 . S (v);
glll)a 1.5. 1 7 (v); II.3. 1 4 (k); c idghana III.2.2 (k); (Ie,v); I.2.S (v); 1 .3. 1 dasa 1.2.7 (v); I I I . I .2 (k);
lII.2. 1 2 (k); III.2. I S cidvapus 1.3.7 (Ie); 1 1.4.2 1 (v); (Ie); 1.3.2 (v); 1 . 3 .6 III. 1 .3 (v); III.2.20
(k); IV.S (k); IV. 1 7 cetanakriya I.S. 1 2 (v); (k,v); 1.3.7 (Ie,v); L S . 2 (v); IV.7 (v); I V . 1 2
(k); cetas 1.4.2 (v); (v); I . S . I S (Ie,v); (v);
gUl)ata 1II.2. 1 1 ( k); caitanya 1 .2.8 (Ie,v); I.S. 1 2 L S . 1 9 (v); 1.S.2 1 dasya 1 . 1 . 1 (Ie,v);
glll)av ibhakti I T A . I S (v); (k,v); (k,v); 1 .6.S (k); 1 .6.9 dig I .S .6 (v); n .2 . 1 (k);
grahaka 1.4.S (k); IV. I (v); chaya 1.2.S (v); 11.3 .4-S (k,v); 1 .6. 1 1 (k,v); II.2.6 (Ie); III.2.20
IV.2 (k); IV.S (v); (v); 1 1. 3 . 1 0- 1 1 (k,v); L7.6 (k,v); 1 . 7 . 7 (k,v); (v);
grahak1krta IV.2 (v); 1 1 .4.5 (v); I.7.S (k,v); 1.7.9 (k,v); dul)kha 1.2.6 (v); 1 . 8 . 3 (v);
grahya I.4.S (k); IV. I (v); cheda 1 . 7 . 1 0 (Ie); 1 .7 . 1 2 (v); 1 . 8 . 9 (v); III.2. I S
II1.2. 1 9 (k);
IV.2 (v); IV.6 (v); 1 .7 . 1 3 (v); I . S. l l (k,v); I V . 3 (Ie,v) ; ·
jagat 1 1.4. 2 1 (k, v);
(k,v); III. 1 . l (k,v); IV.6 (k,v);
IV.S (v); jac.la 1 . 1 .2 (v); 1 . 1 .4 (k,v);
ghana 1 1. 1 .7 (v); II.2.S (v); I I L I .9 (v); III.2. 1 2 durantikata I I . 3 . 1 0 (k);
I.S.4 (v); I.5. 1 1 (k);
IV. 1 4 (k); (k,v); IV.4 (k,v); du�m)a 1 1 . 1.1 (v);
I.S. 1 2 (k,v); 1 1 .4.2
cak�us 1 . 6 . 1 0 (v); I.S.S (v); IV. 1 5 (k); drdha 1 . 1 .3 (v);
(k.v); 1 1 .4.S (v);
Il1.2. 1 6 (v): 1 1 .4. 1 4 (k,v); Il.4. 1 5 jfianakartrta L 5 . I S (v); -ld s� 1 . 2 . 1 0 (k); 1 .4 . 8 (k);
caficalata I V .9- I O (v); jfianasakti I V . I S (v); I .S . 1 9 (v);
(v); II.4. 1 9 (k,v);
camatkara jfianin 1 . 7 . 1 4 (v); L2.4 (k); 1 . 3 .2 (Ie);
IV. I (v); IV.6 (v); ' 1 1 .4.20 (v); l f l . 2. 1 1
carnatkrti j fiapana 1 .7.4 (v); 1 .4.S (Ie); 1.4.7 (k,v);
I.S . I I (v); (v);
caya 1 .7 . 1 0 (k): jfieya I . S . I S (k); 1 . 8 . 1 1 (v); I.4.S (v); 1II.2.3 (v);
ja�latva 1 .2.7 (v);
II. I . S (v); IL3 .4-S IV. I S (k,v);
ciklr�a 1 1 .4.20 (k,v): 1 I .4.2 1 janaslh iti 1 .3.6 (k);
(v); IlI.2. 1 3 (k); drsisalet i I . 5 . 1 2 (v);
(v); jagara 1I1 .2. 1 7 (k,v); III. 2. I S
jfieyl-lkr I .S . I S (k,v); drsyata III. 1 .4 (v);
cit 1 .2.7 (k,v); I.2.S (v); (v); II 1.2. 1 9 (v);
tattva 1.4.5 (v); I.S.4 (v); dr�\a 1. 1 . 3 (k); 1 . 2 . 4 (k);
I.3.S (v); 1 .3.7 (k); jagrat 1 l 1 .2 . 1 9 (k);
I .S.7 (v); I I .2.2 (k,v); 1 . 3 . 3 (k); 1.4.2 (v);
1 . 5 . 1 0 (v); 1 .5 . 1 3 (v); jaclya 1 .2.S (k);
1 1.2.3 (v); llI. l .2 1 .4.6 (Ie,v); III.2. 1 6
1.5. 1 9 (v); 1 . 7 . 1 (k,v); jati 1 .5 . 1 7 (v); 1 1.2.5 (k);
(k,v); !I L I . 4 (v); (v);
I.S.7 (k,v); I.S . 1 1 (v); 1 1 .2.6 (v); 1 1 .3 . 1 4
II 1.2.2 (v); IV. 1 4 (k); deva I .S . 7 (Ie); I .S . 1 1 (Ie);
11 04 . 1 (v); 1 1 .4 . S (v); (k,v);
tanmalra III. U O- i l (v); II1.2. 1 0 (k,v); II1.2. 1 1
1 1 .4.20 (k); 1 1 .4.2 1 (v); j ihasa 1 .5 . 1 9 (v);
tamas 1 .7 . 10 (v); I . S . 1 1 (v); (v);
11 1 . 1 .3 (v); I 1 1 .1 .4 (v); -ljlV 1 . 1 .4 (k,v); 1 . 1 .5 (v);
IV.4 (Ie,v); IV.5 (v); desa 1.2.7 (v); 1.2.9 (k,v);
1 1 1 . 1 .9 (v); IV. 1 4 (k); IV. 1 6 (v);
IV.6 (Ie,v); I.S.8 (v); I . S . 1 4 (Ie,v);
citi 1 . 5 . 1 2 (v); I.S. 1 3 (k); jlva L6. 1 1 (k); [IL2. 1 4
t ill 1 . 5 . 1 7 (k); I.S. 1 9 (v); I.S . 2 1 (Ie,v);
1 . 5 . I S (v); (v);

242 243
 1 . 7 . 3 (k); II. I .S ( k,v); (k); IIA. 1 4 (v); I V . I I paratantr1krta III. 1 .9 (v); pasu m.2.3 (k,v); IVA
I l. 1 .7 (k); n.2.2 (k,v); (v); parata IIL l . S (k,v); (k,v ) ; I V . 6 ( k ,v ) ;
II.2.6 (v); II.3. I -2 (v); n i yati 11.4.9 (v); IIA. l l (v); paratva IIl. l .2 (k); pasubhava m. l .7 (k,v); IV.S (v);
II.3.2 (k); II. 3 A (k); IlI. 1 .9 (v); 1II.2.2 (v); paramak�ara I V . 1 4 (k); para tan try a 1 . 2. 1 1 (k,v);
n.3A-S (v); 1T.3.S (v); n i yatisakti 11.3.6 (v); [ 1.4. 1 2- 1 3 paramal)U IL l .7 (v); IlA.2 (v); pisaca I . 7 . I I (k,v );
1I.3.9 (k,v); II.3 . 1 3 (v); paramatman l . S . 1 3 (k); 1 . S . l O (v); P 1ll11S IV.3 (k);
(k,v); II.4. 1 2- 1 3 (v); n iyama 1.3.2 (v); LS.3 (v); 1 . S . 1 1 (v); PllQlstva m.2.3 (v);
deha 1 .604 (k); 1.6.6 (v); n iyam i la Il.3.6 (v); 11.3. 1 2 (v); paramartha 1 . 1 . 1 (v); 1 .3 . 6 (v); pllral)sthi ta 1.4.7 (v);
1.6.7 (k,v); II. 1 .6 (v); n irakarar)a I . 1.2 (v); II.3. I S (k); IIA.20 pUlUsa m.2.7 (v); IIL2. I 3
II1. I .S (v); n irdda L4.6 (v); 1.4.S (v); (v); III.2A (v); (v);
dehatva IV. 1 3 (v); n i rbhasa IT. I .S (k); paramesa 1 . S .20 (k); purya�taka lII.2. 1 (v); II1.2. 1 4
do�a I I. 3 . I O (k); nir�ma 1.S . 1 6 (k); IV.9- I O (v); paramesvara L 1 . 1 (v); 1 .S . 1 4 (v); (k);
dravya 1 .S . 1 2 (v); n.2. 1 (k); n irl11al)a 1.6. 1 1 (v); IIA.2 (v); 1.S. I S (v); I1. I . S (v); purya�!akata III.2 . 1 4 (v);
n.2.S (k); II.2.6 (v); III.2A (v); JIL2.S (v); IIA.S (k); III.2.20 (v); puryastakatva 1II.2. 1 4 (v);
II.3.S (k); II.3.7 (v); I1I.2.6 (v); Il1.2.7 (v); IV. 1 6 (v); pOI'l)a II. I .7 (k); II1.2.4 (v);
dra�!f 1 .2.2 (k); 1.2.6 (k,v); IV.7 (v); parame�thi n l.S. 14 (k); II1.2.6 (v); III.2.9 (v);
dvayak�epin 1.6. I (k); n i rmanata ITA. I I (k); parasparasvabha- III.2.20 (v); IV. 1 4 (v);
dvi0!ha 1.2. 1 1 (k,v); n i rmal)asakli II. I .S (k); vatva II.4 . 1 7 (k); pOrl)ata IL L S (v);
dvesa 11 1.2. I S (v); n i rmatrta 1 . 5 . 1 0 (v); I.7. 1 (v) ; paratman 1 .4.S (v); pOmatva Ill.2 .4 (v);
dharma 1.2.6 (k,v); 1 .2.7 (v); 1 1 04. 1 (k,v); paraparadasa III. I .S (k); pOrvasi ddha 1 . 1 .2 (v);
I.S.6 (v); III.2.20 (v); n irm ita 1 1 1 .2.6 (k); IV.2 (v); paraparavastha I II. I . S (v); pOrvaparlbhuta 1 .2.9 (v);
dhannin 1.7. 1 3 (k,v); 1T.3.9 (v); IV.3 (v); paramarsa 1 .4.2 (v); 1.4.6 (v); prthaksthiti L5. I S (k);
dhanu)a 1 1 .4. 1 9 (v); n i rmitatva ! l A. 1 1 (v); 1.4.S (v); I.S. 1 7 (k); prthagbhata 1 .404 (v);
dhl n.2A (k,v); II.2.6 (k); n irv i kalpaka 1.2. 1 -2 (v); II.3A-5 (v); 1 1.4.20 prthivI II1. l . I 0- 1 1 (v);
1 1.3.7 (k); III. 1 .3 (k); n i rvftti 1I.4. I O (v); (k); IV.2 (k,v); IV.3 paurvaparya 1 1.4. 1 4 (v);
IlL 1 .6 (k); nirhrasa IV. I I (v); (v); IV.7 (k,v); IV. I I prakaral)a IV. 1 6 (v);
dhlllll[\ II.3A-S (k,v); 1 l ,4. 1 2- niscaya 1. 1 ..'\ (v); 1.6. 1 (v); (v); IV. 1 2 (v); pra.ykas 1.4.8 (v); I . S .4 (v);
1 3 (k,v); para.y mrs 1 .4.2 (v); 1 . S . 1 7 (v); 1.S.7 (k,v); L S.20 (v);
1 .6.3 (v); 1 1 .4. 1 1 (v);
clhvan i ILl.S (k); n i scayana II.2.S (v); 1 1.4.20 (v); I.S.2 1 (v); 1.6.S (v);
I.(d (k);
nabhas 1.6.4 (k); n.3. 1 3 (k,v); n iscita paravac 1 . 5 . 1 3 (k); 1.6. 1 (v); I.S.7 (v); Il. I .S (v);
1.6.S (k); 1I.4. l l (k);
�nas 1 .:'\ .6 (k); ni�cdha pari �chid 1.7.9 (v); prakasa 1.2.7 (v); 1 . 2 . S (v);
l . 1 .2 (k); 1.6. 1 (v);
nas!a 1.4.2 (v); paricchinna IV.2 (v); UII S (v); 1.4. 1 (v);
1.7. 1 1 (v); 1 1 1.2. 1 3
n£lmanlpa I.S .20 (k,v); parijflflla IV. 1 2 (v); IV. 1 7 (k); 1 .4.3 (v); I.S.2 (k,v);
(v);
nasa 1.2.3 (v); 1. 204 (k,v); n isarga paril)ama 1.2.9 (v); !lA. l iI (v); I.S.3 (k,v); l.S . l O (v);
I. I .S (v);
n i tyata 1.2.7 (v); 11.3. 1 -2 (v); n isthiti 1.7.9 (k); paril)amatta IIA. I S (k); 1.5. 1 1 (k,v); 1 . S . 1 8
n ityatva 11 1.2.7 (v); nai plll)a 1 1 .3.3 (v); pari I)am i n IV.S (k); (v); 1 .6 . 1 (k,v); 1.6.2
n idhana 1 1 . 1 .2 (v); nyOnata 1 I 1.2. I S (v); 1IL2. 1 9 parini�thita 1 . 3 . 6 (v); 1.7.3 (v); (k,v); 1 .6.7 (v); l.S.7
n i bandhana I.S.3 (v); I.S.S (k); (v); 1.7.9 (v); (v); I.S.9 (k,v); I.S. l O
1 .7.3 (v); I.S.6 (k); pari ni�!hi t i 1.7.6 (k); (k,v); LS. I I (v); 1 1 . 1 .7
pal i 111.2.3 (k,v); IV.6 (k);
IV. 1 6 (v); pad a parimita II. 1 .7 (v); II 1.2. I 1 (v); (v); 1 1 .3 .7 (k); 11.3 . 1 7
104. S (k); 1 1 .204 (k);
nirnajjana 1 1. 3 . I S- 1 6 (v); parim itatva 111.204 (v); (k); IV.6 (v); IV.7
II.3.S (k); 1 1 .4. I S (k);
n imitla I.S.S (v); [ 1 .4.S (k,v); parimitatvakaral) a IV.3 (v); (v);
1 I I .2. I S (v); 1 1 1.2. 1 6
n imi ttakaral,l al va parisIiana IV. I I (v); IV. 1 6 (v); prakasata 1 .2.7 (k); L2.S (k);
1 1 .4.S (v); (k,v); IV.2 (k); I V. I I
n i mc�a 1 1 1 . 1 . 3 (k,v); parispanda I. I . S (v); I.S.2 (k);
(k); IV. 1 6 (k);
n i yala IX I I (k); [I.3A- S parcSasakt i I.S.20 (k); prakasamanata 1 .4.3 (v); 1.5.2 (v);
padartha 1 .3.7 (v); 1.7. 1 (k,v);
( v ) ; 1 1 . 3 .6 (k); 1 1 . 3. 1 2 parok0adhyak0ata 11. 3 . 1 0 (k); prakasatmata 1 . S . 3 (v);
1 .7.9 (v);

244 245
prakasi t a 1.4.2 (v); prabha n . 3 . 7 (v); prameya 1 .4.5 (v); I .7 . 1 (v); bahyata 1.8 . 5 (k); I . S . S (k,v);
pra,",klp IT.4. 1 5 (k); IV.S (k); prabhava 1. t .3 (v); III. 1 .9 (k,v); I II . L l O­ II.4.6 (v); ill. 2. 17 (k);
prakasya 1.5.3 (k); prabhu 1.5. 16 (k); 1.6.7 (k); I l (v); m .2 . ! ( k ,v ) ; bahyatva 1 . 5 .7 (v); 1 .8 .5 (v);
pratipatti IlL 1 .4 (v); II. 1 .2 (k,v); II. 1 .4 I V . 1 4 (v); I . S .6 (Ie); I . S . 7 (k);
pratibimba II.4. 1 9 (v); (k,v); III.2.5 (v); prameyatva 1 .5 . 1 7 (v); bahyantal)karaI)a I.S.S (v); II.4.3-4 (v);
prati,",bha II.3.4-5 (v); prayatna I.S.4 (v); I 1 I. 1 . 1 1 (k);
III.2.6 (v); IV.7 (k);
pratibha 1.6.3 (k); 1 .7 . 1 (k); pramaI)a prayojaka III.2. 1 0 (v); bahyantarata I I . 3 . 1 O (k);
1.5.6 (v); 1.7.5 (k,v);
prati,",bhas I.5. 1 0 (v); 1.5.2 1 (k); pralaya IlI.2. I S (k,v); bahyabhasata lI.4.S (v);
1 . 7 . 1 3 ( v ) ; I L t .7
prat ibhasa II.3.6 (k); Pralayakevalin III.2.S (v); bucldhi I.2.S (k,v); I .5 . 1 S (v);
( v ) ; lI.3 . 1 -2 (k,v);
pratiyoga I .6 . 1 (v); Pralayakala m .2.S (k); I .6. 4-5 (k,v); I .6. 1 0
II.3.S (k,v); II.3.9
pravartita II.3 . 1 7 (v); (k,v); n.2. 1 (k);
pratiyogin 1.6. 1 (v); 1.6.2 (v); (v); II.3 . 1 5- 1 6 (k,v);
pravaha 11.3.7 (v); III.2.20 (v); I I .2 . 7 (v); II.3.7 (v);
l .6 .4-5 (v); 1 .6.5 (k); I I .4 . I I (k);
pra,",vrt 1.5. 1 0 (k); II.3 . 1 7 (k); n . 3 . 1 3 (v); III. l . S
prati�\ha I. 1 .4 (k); prama!)atva II.3 . 1 5- 1 6 (k,v);
pravrtti L S. I I (v); II.3.9 (k,v); (k); I I! . l . l O- l l (v);
pratisaqldhana 1 . S . 1 9 (k); pramatr 1 . 1 .2 (v); 1 .4.5 (v);
prasvasa II I. 2. 19 (v); II1.2. 1 3 (k,v); IV.2
pratHi 1 . S . 1 7 (v); 1.7.9 (v); 1 .4.6 (v); 1 .4.7 (v);
prasariga 1.2.7 (v); 1 . 7. 1 1 (v); (k,v); IV.3 (v);
pratyak�a I. t .S (v); I.S. I (v); 1.4.S (k,v); 1.5. I (v);
prasara III. 2. I (k); IV . 1 2 (k); buddhlndriya IlI. ! . I O- 1 l (v);
I.7.4 (k,v); 1.7.7 (v); 1.5.2 (v); 1.5. 17 (v);
prasada l . l . l (v); bubha�a 1 1.4.20 (v);
1 . 7 . 1 3 (v); 1 . S . 1 (v); 1.6.3 (v); 1.6.6 (v);
prasiddha 1 1 . 1 .3 (v); brl11hita I V . I (k);
I.S.2 (v); 11.3.7 (v); 1 .6.7 (v); 1.6.S (v);
pra,",sidh ! . l .S (v); bodha 1.2. 1 -2 (v); 1 . 2 . 3 (v);
II.3.9 (v); I.7. I (k,v); 1.7.2 (k,v);
pral)a I .6.4 (k); !I1.2.S (v); 1 . 2 . 4 (v); 1.4.5 (v);
pratyak�,ltva I.S.7 (v); 1.7.3 (v); 1 .7.4 (k,v);
III.2. 1 1 (v); III.2. 1 3 1 . 5 . 4 (k,v); I.5.5 (v);
pratyak�ikara 1 .4.2 (v); 1.7.5 (v); 1.7.6 (k,v);
(v); IIL2. 1 4 (k,v); III. l .4 (k); III. 1 .6
pratyagatman IV.3 (v); I V .6 (v); 1 .7 . 1 3 (k,v); I.S.6
II1.2. 1 5 (v); III.2. I S (k,v); m.2.4 (k,v);
IV.S (k); (k,v); 1 . S . I O (v);
( k ,v); III .2 ' ! 9 ( k ,v); III.2.6 (k,v); III.2.7
pratyabhijfia 1 . 1 . I (v); IV. I S (v); 1 1 . 1 .6 (v); 1 1 . 1 .7 (v);
IIL2.20 (v); IV.2 (v); (k,v); III.2.S (v);
pratyabhi,",jrUi 1 . 1 . 1 (k); 1 . 1 .3 (k); 11.2.3 (v); 1 1.2.4 (k);
IV.3 (v); IV.9- 1 O II1.2.9 (k,v); III.2. 1 2
1.6.6 (v); IV. 1 6 (v); 11.2.7 (v); 11.3. 1 -2 (v);
(k,v); (k,v);
IV. 1 7 (k,v); II.3. 14 (k,v); 1 1 . 3 . 1 5 -
pral)asakti III.2.20 (v); bodhata I I 1.2.4 (v);
pratyabhUfiana I. t .3 (v); III. 1 .7 (v); 1 6 (k,v); 1 1 . 3 . 1 7 (v);
pradhanya IIL I .2 (v); III.2. I S boclhatva III.2.7 (v);
pratyavamarsa 1 .4. I (v); I.S. I I (v); 1 1.4. 1 (v); 1 1 .4.6
(k); bauclclha I.S.9 (v);
I.S. 1 3 (k); I.S . 1 4 (v); (k,v); 11.4.7 (v); 1 1.4.9
prcra!)a II1.2. 1 4 (v); Brahman III.2. 1 (k,v);
I.S. 1 9 (v); 1.6. 1 (v); (v); 11.4. 1 2- 1 3 (k,v);
prcrika l l L 2 . 1 4 (k); bhagavat 1.7. 1 4 (v);
1 1 . 3 .3 (v); 11.3. 1 0- I I 1 1 .4. 1 6 (k,v); II.4.20
phala I V . ! 7 (v); bhartr I.S.9 (k); III.2.6 (k);
(k,v); IV.S (v); (v); I! I. I . I (v); III. 1 .9
baddha IV. 1 3 (k,v); bhavatta . 1 . 5 . 1 4 (v);
pratyavaYmrS 1 .4.7 (v); (k,v); III.2. I (v);
bandha !IL2. 1 S (v); IV.S (v); bhavanakartrta L S . 1 4 (v);
pralyavamp;ya 1 1 .4.5 (v); II1 .2.2 (k ,v); I I 1 .2.3
bandhana IIL2.2 (k); bhavin 1I1.2. 1 0 (k);
yprath I V .7 (v); (k,v); I l 1 .2. 1 2 (v);
III. 1 .2 (k,v); bhavi�yat III . 1 .9 (v);
prathana 1 .4.4 (v); 1 1 1 .2 . 1 4 (v); 1 1 1 .2 . 1 6 bahirbhava
bahi �kara III. I . I (v); bhavi�yat!a II. 1 .6 (v);
pratha 1I1.2.S (k); (v); m.2. 1 7 (k); IV.3
baclhaka 1.7.7 (v); ,",bha 1 .4.4 (k,v); 1.4.5 (k);
pradarsana 1 1 . 3 . 1 7 (v); (v); IV. I I (v);
badha 1 1 .3 . 1 3 (v); 1.6.7 (k); II. I .7 (k);
pradarsila IV. I S (v); pramatna 11.3. I S - 1 6 (v); 1 1 1 .2. 1 3
baclha 1 .7 . 1 3 (k,v); II1.2.5 (v);
pra,",drs IV.S (v); (v);
baclhita I.S.6 (v); bhata 1.4.S (k); II. l .6 (k);
pradhanH [ 1 .4.2 (v); 1 1.4. 1 5 (v); pramatrtva 1.6.5 (k); 1 I 1. 1 .S (v);
baclhyabaclhakatva 1.7.6 (v); IIL I . S (k);
111 . 1 . 1 0- 1 1 (k,v); II1.2. 1 4 (v);
badhyabadhaka- bhava I.5 . 1 (k); I .5 . 1 O (k);
pradhvaqlsa 1 1. 3 . I S- 1 6 (v); pramatrbhava I.S. 1 7 (v); 1 .6.4-5 (v);
bhava 1.7.6 (k); 1 . 5 . 1 2 (v); 1 . 5 . 1 3 (v);
prabodha 1.3. I (v); I.S.S (k,v); prami l i II. 3. I S- 1 6 (k,v);

247
246
 1.7.2 (v); 1.7.3 (v); (k,v); III. 2.6 (k); mantresvara III. 1 .6 (v); mukta 1II . 2.2 (k,v ) ; I V . 1 3
I.7.9 (k); I.8.7 (v); lII.2.9 (k,v); IV.8 (k); maryacla II.4.9 (v); (k); I V . 1 6 (v);
II. 1 .2 (v); II. 1.3 (v); bhi n nata III.2.7 (k); mala m.2.4 (k); III.2.5 mukti I V . 1 3 (v);
II. 1 o4 (v); IL ! .5 (v); bhllvana IV. 1 6 (k); (v); m.2. 1 0 (k,v); mukhyatva I1I.2. 1 2 (k);
II. I .7 (k,v); 11. 1 . 8 bheda 1.4.3 (k); 1.4.6 (k, v); malatva III. 2.4 (v); mukhyasvabMva II.3 . 10- 1 1 (v);
(v); 1 1.2.4 (k); 11.2.6 1.5. 1 (v); 1.5. 1 7 (k,v); mahaguru IV. 1 6 (k); mliQhata I I . 3 . 1 7 (k);
(v); II.3. 1 4 (k,v); 1.5. 1 8 (v); 1 . 5. 2 1 (v); mahasatta 1.5. 1 4 (k); mlirtivaicitrya IL l .5 (k);
TI.4. 1 (k,v); I I.4. 1 6 I.6.6 (v); 1.7.2 (v); mahesata IV. 1 2 (k); meya 1.4.5 (k); I II . 1 .9 (k);
(k); 11.4. 1 7 (v); IIl. 1 .4 1.7. 1 4 (v); I.R.6 (k,v); mahesvara 1. 1 . I (k); 1 . 1 .2 (k); III. l . l O (k); I V. l 3
(k,v); III. 1 .5 (k); L8.R (k); I I. I o4 (k); 1.3.7 (k); 1.6.7 (v); (k);
TII . l .6 (k); IIl. 1 .R (v); 11. 1 .5 (v); n. 1 .6 (k,v); I .7 . 1 (k,v); L R. I I melana I V. I (v);
IIL2.3 (k); III.2. 1 6 II. I . R (k); 1 1 .2.2 (v); (k,v); IV. I (k,v); IV.2 molm 1 . 1 .3 (k);
(k); IV.4 (k); IV.7 11.2.4 (v); II.2.5 (k); (v); IV.3 (v); IV.7 yukti I V . I 6 (v);
(v); Il.2.6 (v); 1I.3. 1 -2 (v); (v); IV. 1 3 (k); yogin 1.4.5 (k,v); 1.5.7 (k);
bhavana 1 .5 . 1 6 (v); I1.3 . 1 7 (v); ILD (v); 11.3.4-5 (v); mahesvarata I V . 1 2 (v); II.4. 1 0 (k,v); H.4. 1 1
bhavabhilva LR.5 (k,v); 1 1 . 3 . 1 5- II.3.5 (k); II.3.6 (k, v); mat, 1.6.3 (k); 1.8. 1 0 (k); (k,v);
1 6 (v); 1I.3.9 (v); lI.3 . 1 0- 1 1 II . ! .6 (k); 1 1 . 1 .7 (k); yojana 1.5.8 (v); 1.6.6 (k,v);
'-' bhils 1.4.2 (k); 1.4.5 (k,v); (v); 11 ..1 1 4 (k,v); 11.2.3 (k); II.2.7 (k); rajas 1.8. 1 1 (v); IV.4
1 .5.20 (k); I.6.7 (k,v); 1 1.4.5 (v); 1 1.4. 1 7 (k); 1 1 .4.7 (k); III. ! . I (k); (k,v); IV.5 (v); IV.6
n . 1 .6 (v); IlI I .R (v); [1.4. I R (v); I1.4.20 (v); III . ! .9 (k); (k,v);
bhas II. 1 .6 (k); III. I . 6 (k,v); 1lL 1 . R matrta III. 2. I (k); rasa 1.3.2 (k,v); II.3.7 (v);
bhasana 1 .4.3 (k); 1.4.4 (k); (k); III. I . I I (k); IV.5 mana 1.4.5 (k); III. I . I O- I l (v);
1 . 5 . 1 0 (k); 1.7. 1 3 (v); (k,v); [V.R (v); IV .9- manasya 11.2. 3 (v); raga m . I .9 (v); m.2.3
TI. 1 .6 (v); III. 1 .5 (k); 10 (v); IV. I I (v); maya 1. 1 .3 (v); 1.4. 8 (v); (v);
bhi l l i n . 3 . 1 5 (k); bheclakatil 1.5. 1 2 (v); l .6.4 (k); 1.8.7 (k); rasi 1.5.7 (v);
Ybhid I.R.6 (v); 1 1 .3.3 (k); bhcdilbhccla 11.4. 1 9 (k); Il. 3 . 1 7 (v); IlI. 1 .7 RlIdra II1.2. 1 (k,v);
1I.3.4-5 (v); bhcdilbhedavat II .2. 7 (k); (k, v); III.2.2 (k); rlipa 1.2.8 (k); 1 . 3 . 2 (k,v);
bhinna 1.2.6 (v); 1 .2. 1 0 (v); bhccl ita [ . 5 . 1 1 (v); III.2.3 (k); III.2.5 I.7.9 (v); 1.8.6 (v);
1.3.4 (v); 1.3.6 (k); bhoga I l l . 1 .9 (v); rn.2.5 (k); (k) ; IV.4 (k,v); IV.9- 1.8.9 (v); 1 I. 3 . 8 (v);
1.4.3 (k,v); 1.4.R (k); 1II. 2 . I R (v); IV.3 1 0 (v); m. I . I O- 1 1 (v);
1.5.2 (k,v); 1.5.3 (k,v); (k,v); mayilmala IlI.2.R (v); II1.2.9 III.2. 1 6 (v);
1.5.5 (v); 1.5. 1 5 (v); bhriln ta 11.2.7 (v); 11.3. 1 3 (v); (k,v); III.2. 1 5 (k,v); rodha 1 I I. 2. 1 9 (v);
1.5. I R (k,v); 1 .5 .20 bhrfmti l.3.3 (k,v); 1.3.4 (k,v); mayflsakli l . l .5 (v); 1.5. 1 8 Rohi l)1 II.4. 1 4 (v);
(v); 1 .5.2 1 (k,v); 1 .6.2 1 .3.5 (v); 1 1 .2.7 (k); (k,v); I.5.2 1 (v); l ir'lga 1 1 .4 . 1 3 (k);
(k, v); 1.6.4 (k); 1.6.6 lII.2. 1 6 (v); lII.2. 1 7 l.604-5 (v); 1.6.7 (v); I1na 1.4.8 (v);
(k); 1 .7.4 (k); 1.7.6 (v); IV. I I (v); 1 .7 . 1 4 (v); I,8.7 (v); IInatfl 1.7.3 (v);
(v); I.7.R (v); 1.7.9 bhrilntitva 1.3.5 (k); I l. l .2 (v); 1 1 . 3 . 1 5- 1 6 loka 1 . 2 . 1 -2 (v); I . 3 .6 (v);
(k,v); 1 .7 . 1 2 (v); mati 1.7.7 (k); 1.7. 1 2 (k); (v); IlL 1 . 6 (k,v); Ilo4.4 (k); I V . 1 7 (k);
1 .7 . 1 4 (k,v); I.R.6 (k); 1 1 .2.5 (v); 1 1 .2.6 (v); !I1. 1 . 8 (k,v); !Il.2.5 lokapaclclhati l.8. 1 0 (k);
I . R . I I (v); 1 1 . 1 .2 (v); 111. 1 .3 (v); 11 1 . 1 .5 (v); (k,v); lokayatril 1.5.6 (v);
1 1 . 1 .3 (v); [ 1 . 1 .4 (v); madhyamflrga 1 1 1 .2.20 ( v); IV. 1 6 (k,v); IV. I R van:m IV.9- 1 O (k,v);
marga
[ 1 . 1 .7 (v); 1 1 .3.5 (k); Yman 1 .4.7 (k); I V . 1 3 (k); (v); vartamana 1 .5 . 1 (k); 1.5. 1 7 (v);
[1.304-5 (v); [1.3.7 (v); manas 1 . 5 . 1 R (v); 1 1 . 2 . 3 II. I .7 (k); III.2. 1 1 11. 1 . 6 (v); III. 1 .9 (v);
m ita
1 1 . 3 .9 (k); 11.3. 1 1 (k); ( k ) ; 1 1 1 . 1 . 1 0- 1 1 (v); (k); vastll 1. 1 .4 (v); 1.2. 1 -2 (v);
[ 1 .4.20 (k); 1Il. 1 .4 (v); 1 1 1.2. 1 6 (k,v); 1 1 . 3 . 2 (k); 1.2.4 (k); 1.2. 1 0 (v);
miti
1 1 1.2. 1 (k,v); III.2.5 mantra [ [ 1. 2.20 (k); 1 1 . 3 . 1 3 (v); 1.5. 1 5 (v); 1.7.9 (v);
m i lhyil

248 249
 v i �aya 1 .2.4 (v) ; I . 2 . 5 (v); vyavastha 1 . 3 . 5 (v); II.3. 1 4 (v);
LS.3 (k); II.3. 1 -2 v i bhakti II.4. 1 6 (k,v);
I.2.S (v); 1 .3 . 3 (v); I I .4.9 (k);
(k,v); II.3.3 (v); v iYbha 1 .6.7 (v);
1 . 3 .4 (v); 1 . 3 . 5 (v) ; vyavasthapaka 1 . 3 . 1 (v); 1 . 3 . 5 (v);
II.3.6 (k,v); II.3. 1 5- vibhava IV. 1 2 (k,v);
1 . 3 . 6 ( v ) ; 1 . 5 . 3 (k,v); vyavasthapana 1 . 3 .4 (v);
1 6 (v); vi�bhid II.3.4 (k);
1 . 5 . 1 0 (v); 1 . 7 .4 (v) : vyavasthita III.2. 1 (k);
vae 1 . 5 . 1 3 (v); 1.6. 1 (k); vibhinna 1 .7.2 (k); I .8 . 1 0 (v);
1 . 7 . 1 4 (v); 1 . S . 2 (v); vyavahara 1 .2.4 (v); 1 . 3 .6 (v);
m. l . I O- 1 1 (v); IV.7 (k); IV.8 (k,v);
I . S . 5 (v); 1 . 8. 1 1 (v); 1 . 5 . 6 (k,v); 1 . 5 . 1 6
vaeya 1 . 5 . 1 3 (v); 1 . 5 . 1 7 v ibheda 1 1.4. I S (k);
1 1 .3 .2 (k); (v); 1 . 6 . 7 (k,v ) ; 1 . 7 . 2
(k,v ) ; II .3 . 1 -2 (v); vibhu 1.4. 1 (v); 1 . 5 . 1 8 (k);
v i�ayata l,6. 1 0 (v); ( v ) ; 1.7. 1 4 (k,v);
vaeyata II.3.S (v); 1 .7 . 1 4 (k); II.3. 1 5- 1 6
v i�ayatva 1 . 3 . 3 (k); III.2. 1 6 (k); 1 . S . 1 (v); 1 .S . 1 0 (v);
vasana I.5.5 (k,v); (v); III. 1 .8 (v);
1 . 3 . 5 (k); II.3.4-5 (v); I I .3 . 1 7
vikalpa 1 . 2 . 1 -2 (k,v); I.4.S v ibhrama III.2. 1 6 (k); vi�ayasthiti
III.2. 1 9 (k,v); (k,v); II.4.6 (v);
(v); 1.5. 1 6 (v); 1.6. 1 vimati I. I .5 (v); v i�llvat
V i�lJu JI1.2. 1 (k,v); I V . 1 6 (v);
(k,v); l ,6.3 (k,v); vimarsa l ,5 . 1 0 (v); l , 5 . 1 1 (k); 1 . 5 . 1 6 (k); 1 .7 . 1 0 (v);
vrlti 1 . 5 . 1 8 (v); 1 .S . 1 1 (v); vyava�hr
I.6.4-5 (k,v); l,6.8 l,5 . 1 2 (v); 1 . 5 . 1 7 (v); II. l .6 (v);
II1. 1 . 1 (k); III.2. 1 4
(k); 1.6. 1 0 (k,v); l ,5 . 1 9 (k); l,6.4-5 III.2.20 (k,v);
(k); IV. 1 8 (v); vyana
l,6. 1 1 (v); I.S.2 (k,v); 1 .8 . 1 1 (k,v); I .2.9 (v); 1 .4 . 1 (v);
vedaka 1 . 3 . 1 (k); 1 .4.3 (v); vyapara
(k,v); I.S.4 (k,v); II.2.6 (k); 1 1 .3 . 1 -2 1 . 6 . 3 (v); I.6.6 (v);
1.5. 1 6 (v); Il1 . 1 . 3
I.8.S (k,v); IV.9- \ 0 (k,v); II.3. 1 3 (k); II. I . I (v); 1 1.2.3
(v);
(k,v); IV . I I (k,v); vimarsana 1.5.8 (v); (k,v); 1 1 . 3 . 1 -2 (v);
IV. 1 2 (k,v); vimala vedayitr 1 . 2 . 1 -2 (v);
1.7. 1 4 (k); I V.9- 1 0 (v); IV. 1 1
veditr 1 .4.3 (k); I.5 . 1 6 (v);
v ikalpata 1.6.2 (v); vimllkta IV. 1 3 (v); (v);
-vedi n 1 . 3 . 6 (k);
v ikalpana 1 .4.7 (v); 11.2.5 (k); v irnukti IV. I I (v); I.2.9 (v); 1 . 5 . 1 4 (v);
vcdya I.2. 1 -2 (v); 1 . 3.2 vyapin
IV.8 (v); v i�mfs 1 .4. 1 (k); 1 .7. 1 (v);
(k,v); 1 .4.4 (v); I.4.5
vikasa 1.8.4 (v); IV.5 (v); vimrsattva l,8. 1 1 (k); 1 .6.2 (v); l, 6.3 (k);
(v); 1 .5. 1 6 (v); vyapohana
vi�k! p 1 .6.4-5 (v); III.2.S v imohinl III. I .8 (v); I.6.5 (k);
I II . 1 .3 (v); IIl. 1 .4
(k,v); virllddha 1.5.6 (v); II.3. 1 5 (k); I. 1 .3 (v); n . 3 . 1 7 (v);
(k,v); III. 1 .5 (v); vyamoha
vicchinna 1 .4.8 (v); 1 .6.6 (v); II.3 . 1 5- 1 6 (v); II.4.3- III. l . l O- 1 1 (v);
III. 1 .9 (v); III.2.5 vyuha
1 1 . 1 .6 (k); 4 (v); I . l .3 (k); 1 . 3 .7 (v);
(k,v); I1I.2.6 (v); sakti
viccheda III . 2.20 (v); virodha l,7.6 (v); II.4. 1 9 1 .4 .2 (v); I.6.7 (v);
III.2.8 (v); III.2.9
viYj flnbh III. 1 .8 (k,v); (k,v); IV.9- I O (v); I.S.9 (v); II. l .8 (v);
(k,v); III.2. 1 3 (v);
vijiHHr II . [ .8 (k); visc�a 1.2.6 (k,v); 1 . 5 .4 (v); Il.3. 1 7 (k); n.4. 1
III.2. 1 5 (k,v); IV.2
Vijiianakevala II1.2.7 (k,v); 1.8.2 (k); 1.8.4 (v); (v); II.4.2 (k); 1 1 .4.4
(v); IV. 1 3 (v);
Vijiianakala III.2.20 (k); 1 1 . 3 .4-5 (v); III. 2 . 1 3 (k); 1II.2. 1 2 (v);
vedyata I.S.8 (v); 1I.2.2 (k);
vijiicya 1 1 . 1 .8 (k); (v); III.2. 1 4 (v); II1.2. 1 6
II.4.3-4 (v);
vidya IlI. 1 .6 (k,v); 1I1. 1 .7 v isranti 1.7.6 (v); III . 1 .3 (v); (v); IV.5 (v); IV.S
vedyatva II.4 .4 (k);
(v); III. 1 .9 (v); IV.9- 1 0 (v); (v); IV.9- 1 0 (k,v);
vaicitrya 1 . 5 . 5 (k,v); II. I .5 (k);
H1.2.2 (k,v); v isva 1.3.7 (k,v); 1.5. [ 4 IV. 1 2 (v); IV. 1 5 (v);
II. 3. 1 5- 1 6 (k,v);
vidyasakti III. 1 .7 (k); (v); 1.5. 1 8 (v); 1 . 8. 1 1 1 .5.7 (v); II.4. 1 (k);
IV. l O (k); saktitva
v idyesvara HI. l . 6 (k, v); II1.2.9 (v); II.3. [ 5- 1 6 (k,v); IV.5 (k);
vyakti II.2. 5 (k);
(k); 1 1 .4.2 1 (v); III. 1 .3 saktimat 1 .3 .7 (k); II.4. I S (v);
vyafljaka II.3. 1 0 (k);
vidycsvaratva III. 2.9 (v); (v); III. 1 .6 (v); IV.5 (k,v);
vyatirikta l,S.7 (v); Ill, 1 .9 (v);
viniseaya 1.6. 1 (k); III.2.3 (v); I 1 1 .2.20 I.2. 1 -2 (v); I .4.S (v);
vyavadhana 1 . 5 . 1 7 (v); 1.7.9 (v); sabda
v iparir)ama II. I .5 (v); (k); IV. I (k,v); IV.3 l,5. 1 7 (v); II.3. 1 -2
II. 3.4-5 (v);
viparyaya III. 1 .8 (v); (v); IV.5 (v); IV. 1 2 (v); II.3.4-5 (v);
II.3 . 1 (k); Il. 3. 1 -2
viparyasa lII.2.4 (v); Il1.2.5 (v); (k,v); IV. [ 7 (k); II.3.S (k,v); II. 3 . 1 4
(v);
v ipaka II1.2.3 (v); visvatrnan III. I . 3 (v);

25 1
250
 (k,v); IlL 1 . 1 0- 1 1 (v); sattva I.S.6 (v); I. S . 1 1 (v); 1.7.2 (v); I .S . 1 0 (k,v); I V. l l (k,v); IV. 1 3
IV.7 (v); IV.S (v); IV.4 (k,v); IV.S (v); samvitti 1.7.2 (k); (k);
sarIra I.2. 1 -2 (k,v); 1.6.4-S IV.6 (k,v); �
sa ,",vid I.3.3 (v); sadhita I I . 3 . 3 (k); I I .4.S (v);
(v); I II . l .S (k); satsvabhavata 11.4.3-4 (v); salllvedya I . 3 . 6 (v); I .S . 1 8 (k); sadhya 1.7.3 (k); I I . 3 .4-S
sarIrata m.2.3 (v); salsvarupata II.4.3 (k); I.S.2 1 (k,v); (v);
sastra IV. 1 6 (k); Sadasiva III. 1 .3 (k,v); salllvedyata U .S (v); sapek�atva I . S . I S (v);
S iva l,S . 1 6 (v); 1.S. 1 1 (v); sadbhava 1.7.5 (k); I.S.3 (k); smw;aya I.2. 1 -2 (v); sabhilapa 1.2. 1 -2 (k,v); 1.6. 1
II.3. l 7 (v); IV. 1 4 sadvidya m. I .3 (k); sarnsarga 1.7.9 (v); (v);
(k); saptamI II.4. 1 S (k); salll sara I II . 1 .6 (v); III.2. 1 0 samak(>ya I . S . 1 (k);
s ivata IV. 1 4 (v); IV. 1 6 samanvaya 1.7.2 (v); I.7.3 (k,v); (k,v); II1.2 . I S (v); samarthya 1.6. 1 1 (v); II.3.3 (v);
(k,v); I.7.4 (v); n.2.4 (v); IV.S (v); IV. 1 2 (v); 11.4. 1 2- 1 3 (v);
Sivadr�!i IV. 1 6 (k,v); II.2.6 (k,v); II.4. 1 6 salllsarin 111. 1 .7 (v); III.2.2 I I.4. 1 4 (v);
suddha I .4.S (v); l,S. 1 3 (v); (k,v); (k,v); III.2. 1 0 (v); samanadhikaraI)ya II.3.6 (k,v); II.3.7
I.5. I S (v); I.7.S (k); samarthana II. I . I (k,v); 111.2. 1 1 (v); IV. 1 l (v); I II . 1 .3 (k,v);
1.7. 1 4 (v); I,S. I I samala 1.7. 1 4 (k); (v); IV.7 (v);
(k,v); II.3 . 1 7 (v); samavapti L l . l (k); I .2.S (k,v); l,2.6 (k); samanya II.2. 1 (k); I I .3 . 1 -2
suddhata III. 1 .4 (v); samaveta 1.4.7 (k); 1.3 . 1 (v); I . 3 . 2 (k,v); (v); IV.S (v); IV.9-
suddhavidya II L 1 .3 (v); samana III.2. 1 9 (k,v); 1.3.4 (k,v); l,6.6 (k,v); 10 (v);
sunya L6.4-S (v); 1.6.6 (v); samaveSa III.2. 1 2 (k,v); 1.6.9 (v); I I .4.9 (k,v); samanyarupata IV.7 (v);
1.7.7 (v); II. l .4 (v); samasraya 1 . 1 .2 (v); 1I.4. 1 6 (k); III.2.S (v); IIl,2. 1 3 Salllkhya m.2.7 (v); m.2' ! 3
11. 1 .6 (k,v); m. I .S samullekha 1.6. 1 1 (k); (k,v); (v);
(k); III. 1 .9 (k,v); samuha lI.3.9 (v); salllskrta IV.9- 1 O (v); samya m.2. 1 9 (v);
III.2 . 1 (v); III.2.2 (v); s alllkara 1.5.3 (k); salllskrti 1 .3 . 1 (k); IV.S (v); sara 1I.3. I S- 1 6 (v);
IIL2.S (k,v); III.2. 1 1 salllkaipa LS. 1 6 (k); I.S. 1 S sal11sthana 1.6. 1 0 (k); II.3. 1 4 sarata l ,S . 1 4 (k);
(k,v); III.2. 1 2 (k,v); (k,v); (v); saratva III. 1 .4 (v); IV.7 (v);
!II.2. 1 3 (k); III.2. 1 4 salll k ucita L S. I I (v); salllsparsa I1.3 . I S (k); sahitya 1.7.9 (v); II.3.9 (v);
(v); IV.2 (v); salllkcta IV. 7 (v); sarga III.2 . 1 (v); IV. I I (k); ,",sidh I . S . 3 (k); I.7.S (k,v);
sunyata III.2. 1 3 (k); III.2. 1 5 salllkhya II.2.6 (v); sarvakartrlva 1.6. 1 1 (v); 1 .7 . 1 2 (v); IV. 1 6 (k);
(v); sar!lghaHana I.3.6 (v); sarvajna 1.4.5 (v); siddha I. 1 .2 (k,v); U .3 (v);
sunyatva IIL2.6 (v); sallllliveSa l ,6. 1 0 (v); sarvajnatva 1.6. 1 1 (v); U .S (k,v); 1.2. 1 1
svasa I1I.2. 1 9 (v); sal11pramO$a I.3.4 (v); sahabhava II.3.S (v); (k,v); l,S.3 (k); 1.6. 1 1
sakrdabhasa 1. 7.3 (k); sarnbandha l,2. 1 0 (k,v); I,2. 1 1 sahilata 1.7.9 (v); (k); I.7.S (k,v); I .7 . 1 2
sakrdvibhiita 11. 1 .6 (v); (v); l,S. 1 7 (v); 1.7. 1 3 sak�atkara l,5. 1 9 (k,v); (v); I.7. 1 3 (k,v);
sakramatva II. 1 .2 (k); (v); 11.2. 1 (k,v); 11.2.4 sak�atkarm)a I.S.9 (v); 1I. 3. I S- 1 6 (v); II.4.3-
sat 1.2.S (v); 11. 1 .4 (k); (k,v); 11.2.6 (v); sadakhya III. 1 .2 (k,v); 4 (v); II.4.S (v);
II.3.4-5 (k,v); 11.4.2 Sal11bandhita 1.2. 1 -2 (v); I.2.S (v); sadp\ya I . 3 .2 (v); II.4.7 (v); IV. 1 6 (k);
(k); II.4.3 (k); II.4. I S salllbandhi n 1.2.8 (v); 11. 1 . 1 (v); ,",sadh 1.7.9 (v); l ,7 . 1 0 (k); siddhi l , 1 .2 (k,v); l, 1 .4 (v);
(k,v); II.2.4 (v); II.4.5 (v); lI.3 . 1 7 (v); I.2.S (v); l ,2.6 (k);
satta 1.2.9 (v); 1.2. 1 0 (v); smnbhinna 1.2.6 (v); sadhana l , 1 .2 (v); I.7.S (k); l,S.3 (v); l,S.4 (v);
1.4.2 (v); 1.5.4 (v); smnbheda 11.2.2 (v); 1.7.9 (k); l,S.3 (v); I.S.9 (k,v); 1.7.4 (k,v);
I.S. 1 4 (v); I.S.2 (k); sal11lagna II.4. 1 6 (v); II.3 . 1 5 - 1 6 (v); I.7.S (v); 1.7.9 (v);
I,S.S (k,v); II. I .S (v); salllHna 1.6.8 (v); sadharaI)a I.S.3 (v); II.3.4-S I.7 . 1 1 (v); II.2.7 (k);
1I.3.4-5 (v); II.3 . 1 5- salnvada 1.7. 1 3 (v); 11.2.7 (v); (v); II.4. 1 2- 1 3 (v); II.3.S (v); IV. I S (k,v);
1 6 (v); II.4.2 (k); II.3 . 1 3 (v); III . 2 . 1 4 (v); III.2. 1 6 s isrk�a I.S.7 (v);
1I.4.3 (k); II.4. 1 4 (v); I . 3 .2 (v); 1.4.3 (k,v); (v); III.2. 1 7 (k); IV. I sukha l ,2.6 (v); l,S.3 (k,v);
1I.4.20 (v); 1V.6 (k); l,6.8 (v); I.7 . 1 (v); (v); IV.9- 1 O (v); l,S.4 (k,v); l,S.6 (v);

252 253
 II.3. 1 5- 1 6 (v); II.3. l? svamin I . 1 . 1 (v); 1 . 5 . 1 0 (k);
1.8.8 (v); 1.8.9 (k,v); sphuratta I . S . 1 4 (k);
(v); IIA.20 (v); IIl. t .9 svairacarin 1 .6. 1 0 (k);
III.2. 1 5 (v); III.2. 1 S sphuradrupata 1 . 5 . 1 4 (v);
(v); III.2A (k,v); har�a III.2. 1 S (v);
(k,v); IV.3 (k,v); smarar)a 1 .4.2 (v); 1.6.9 (k);
III.2. I S (v); IV.S (v); Himacala IIA.20 (v);
supta III.2. 1 9 (k,v); smartr' 1.2.6 (k,v);
svatman 1 . 1 .2 (k,v); 1.2.9 (v); hrdaya 1 . 5 . 1 4 (k,v);
su�upta III.2. I S (v); '-ismr 1 04. 1 (k); 1.4.3 (k);
1 . 2. 1 1 (v); 1.3.5 (v); hrdayarl1gamlkrta IV. 1 6 (v);
silk�matva m. l . I O- i l (v); 1 0404 (v); 1 .4.6 (k);
1 . 3 .6 (v); 1.7.3 (v); hetu I . l . l (k); 1.3.5 (v);
silksmadeha III . 2 . t (v); smrti 1.2. 1 -2 (v); I.2.3 (k,v);
' 1.7.5 (k); 1 .7.9 (k,v); 1.5.S (v); I .S . 1 (v);
'-is )j IV.9- t a (v); I.2A (k,v); I.2.5 (k,v);
1 1 . 1 .7 (k); Il.3 . l 5 - 1 6 I.S.3 (k); I . S A (v);
sr�\a 1 . 5 . 1 7 (v); [V.2 (k); 1.2.6 (k,v); 1.3. 1 (k,v);
(v); IIA. 1 4 (k); III. I .? II. l A (v); II. 1 .6 (v);
IV.3 (k); 1.3.3 (k,v); I.3.? (k,v);
(v); 1II.2.6 (k); IV. l II.3 . 1 ? (v); IIA. l l
L 5 . 1 7 (k); IL l .S (v); lA, I (v); 1 .4.2 (v);
(k); I V.9- 1 0 (v); (k,v); III. l . S (v);
IU,2. 1 6 (k,v); Ill.2. t 7 I.4.3 (k,v); 10404 (k,v);
IV. 1 3 (k,v); IV. 1 7 III.2. 1 (v);
(k,v); IV.9 (k); IV. I I 1 .4.6 (k,v); 1 .4.S (v);
(k); hetuta 1.504 (k,v); 1 . 5 . 5 (k);
(v); 1 . 5 . 1 7 (v); I.S. I S (v);
svatmani�!ha 1 .7 . 6 (k); I I .II4 (k); I.7 A (k); IIA.8 (k) ;
Somananda IV. 1 6 (v); 1.5.2 1 (k,v); 1 .6.8 (k);
1 . 5 . 1 4 (v); IIA. l l (v); IIA. l S
saukhya 1 . S . 3 (k); 1 .6.9 (v); 1.7.5 (k,v); svatmaprati�!ha
svabhasa 1 . 3 . 2 (k); II.3. 1 -2 (v); I IA.2 1 (k);
sau�upta III.2. 1 5 (k,v); I.S.2 (v); u . s (v);
(k,v); hetubhava III.2.S (v).
sau�upti m.2. 1 3 (v); m.2. 1 9 II. I .6 (v); IV.S (k,v);
(k); smrtita 1.304 (k);
sthayin 1.2.3 (v); I.2.S (k); smrt itva 1 . 3 04 (v);
1 1 . 3 . 1 5- 1 6 (v); svacchata I.S. I I (v);
sthavara III.2. I O (v); svalantrata 1 . 5 . 1 5 (k);
slhiti 1 . 3 04 (k); 1.3.5 (k); svapna III . 2. 16 (k,v); III.2. I S
1.6.6 (v); I.S.3 (v); (v); IV . I I (v);
I.SA (k); I.S.7 (k,v); svaprakasa 1. 1 .2 (v);
II. I .S (v); 1 1.3. 1 3 (k); svabhava 1.2.9 (v); 1.4.5 (v);
1 1 .4.S (k,v); 11.4.6 (k); 11.3.8 (v); [ 1 .4.9 (v);
!lA.7 (k); IIA. I S (v); IIA. l l (k,v); II.4. 1 4
m. I .2 (v); III. 1 .3 (v); (v); IrA. I S (v); 1 1.4. I S
1I1.2. 1 (k,v); IlI.2. 1 5 (v); III. 1 .7 (k);
(k.v); IV.S (k); svarasodita 1 . 5 . 1 3 (k);
sthillas(ik�matva 1 I 1 . 1 . 1 1 (k); sv alak�ar)a 1.2. 1 -2 (k,v); 1.4.2
sthairya 1I.2. 1 (k); 11.3. 1 -2 (v); (k,v); II.2.2 (v); II.2.S
sparsa I.2.9 (v); 1 . 6A-S (v); (v); 1 1 . 3 .6 (v); [ 1 .3.S
1 . 7 . 1 0 (k,v); \1 1. 1 . 1 0- (v); [ 1 . 3 .9 (k,v); IV.7
I I (v); ! l I.2. 1 5 (v); (v);
spa�!a Il1.2. 1 6 (k); [V. I I svavisranti IV. I O (k);
(k,v); svasamapin 1.7.3 (k);
'-i S Pfs 1 1 . 3 04-5 (v); svasarllvit I.3.S (v); 1.3.6 (v);
spha\ika I.S. 1 1 (k); 1.4.5 (k,v); 1 1 .4.5 (v);
sphu!a 1.2. 1 -2 (v); 1 .4.2 (v); svasarl1vitti 1.7.5 (k);
1.6. 1 1 (k, v); I.SA svasal11Vcdana 1 . 1 .2 (v); 1 . 1 .3 (v);
(k,v); m.2. 1 3 (k); 1. 1 .5 (v); 1.3.2 (v);
sphu!asphu!at va 1 1 . 3 . 1 0- 1 1 (v); I.7.S (v); 1.7. 1 3 (k,v);
sphunu)a 1 1 .4 . 1 2- 1 3 (v); svatantrya I.S. 1 3 (k,v); I.5. I S
sphurar)akartrta 1 . 5 . 1 4 (v); (v); I.S. 1 6 (k,v);

255
254
 INDEX

abhasanikul'lImbatmakavada: 90n; kal'trsakti: 1 3 3 and n ;

abhava (non-being, absence) : 1 2 1 n; 1 22; aham ( ' I ' ) : xxviii; xxix; x x x i i ; xxxiv; xxxv;
1 39 ; 1 40 and n ; 1 4 1 and n; 1 72 and n; 86n; 88; 90n; 9 1n ; 95n; lOOn; 1 06n; 1 07
1 73 ; tiidatmyao : 1 4 1 n; 1 44n; vyatil'ekao: and n; 1 09n; l I On; 1 1 8n; 1 2 1 n; 1 23n;
1 4 1 n; 1 44n; °vyavahara: 1 40n; 1 43n; 1 27n; 1 28n; 1 3 1 n; 1 33n; 1 35n; 1 36n;
Abhidharl1lako,\'a : 1 1 5n; 1 8 1 n; 1 42n; 1 48n; 1 5 1 n; 1 58n; 1 74 ; 1 76; 1 86n;
Abhidharmakosabha,vya: 1 1 5n; 1 82n; 1 87n; 1 89n; 1 90n; 1 9 1 and n ; 1 92 and
Abhinavagupta: xiii n; xiv and n; xx; x x i n; 1 93 and n; 1 94 and n; 200; 202n; 203
and n; x x i i and n; x x i i i ; x x v ; xxvi i i ; xxx and n; 204 and n; 209n; 2 1 On; 2 1 3n ; 2 1 7
n; xxxi and n; xxxiii; xxxiv and n; xxxv and n ; - -this relation: 1 9 1 n; notion o f -
n; xxxvi; xxxv i i and n; xxxix and n; xl (ahaf!lpratUi): 90 and n; 1 07 ; 1 23 ; 1 32n;
and n; xli and n; xlii; x l i i i; xliv and n; 1 90; reflective awareness - : xxix; 1 23
xlv i i n; xlix; 85n; 86n; 87n; 88n; 89n; and n; 1 24 and n; 1 28 ; 1 3 1 ; 1 32 and n;
9 1 n; 93n; 96n; 97n; 99n; l OOn; 1 04n; 1 5 1 ; 1 52 ; complete dissolution i n the -:
1 05n; 1 06n; 1 07n; 1 08n; l i On; I l l n; xxxix; continuity and dynamism of the -:
1 1 4n; 1 1 6n; 1 1 8n; 1 20n; 1 2 1 n; 1 22n; 1 59n; identification o f the - with the
1 24n; 1 25n; 1 26n; 1 27n; 1 28n; 1 30n; fJl'a(w: 204n; identification of the - with
1 3 l n; 1 32n; 1 33n; 1 34n; 1 35n; 1 36n; the void: 204n; the plane of - -idam:
1 37n; 1 3 8n; 1 39n; 1 42n; 1 43n; 1 44n; 203n; powers of the -: xxxv; sovereignty
1 45n; 1 46n; 1 50n; 1 53n; 1 55n; 1 57n; of the - : 1 73n; the Supreme - : 1 08n;
1 5 8n; 1 59n; 1 6 1 n; 1 62n; 1 63n; 1 64n; ahaf!lkara (fictitious I, the sense of the I):
1 65n; 1 66n; 1 67n; 1 69n; 1 70n; 1 7 1 n; xxxii; xxxiv n; 1 32n; 204n; 205n; 2 1 0;
1 72n; 1 73n; 1 75n; 1 76n; 1 77n; 1 78n; 2\1;
1 79n; 1 80n; 1 8 1 n; 1 82n; 1 84n; 1 86n; a/wnW: xxxvi; 1 23n;
1 87n; 1 89n; 1 90n; 1 9 1 n; 1 92n; 1 93n; Ahil'budllllyasal?lilita: xxxv i ;
1 94n; 1 95n; 1 96n; 1 97n; 200n; 20 1 n; Aja(iapramatrsiddhi: x xv i i i ; xxix; xli;
203n; 204n; 205n; 206n; 207n; 208n; 1 36n;
209n; 2 1 On; 2 1 1 n; 2 1 3n; 2 1 6n; 2 1 7n; iik,vepa: I nn;
ab/zyc1sikapratyak,w: 1 65n; Alambanapal'fk,vii: 1 1 5n; 1 1 6n;
absorption (samiidhi): 200n; 203n; 205n; iinaflda (beatitude, bliss): xxix: xxxi; 1 1 9n;
abstract (bhava): 1 1 9 and n; the - nominal 1 26n; 2 \ 1 ; 2 1 2 and n; 2 1 3 and n ; 2 1 7;
suffixes (bhavapl'atyaya) : 1 1 9n; 1 20n; the conscious - (cidriipiih1c7da) : x v i i ;
adar.Vc/Ilamatra: 1 40n; Ananta: 2 0 I n;
aesthetics: Indian - : ix; Anasrita: 1 97n;
(lgama: xi; xxxiv; 1 22; 1 95n; 1 96n; Anasritasiva: 1 89n;
Bhairavao-s: xi; Saivao-s: x i ; cllltaratvam: 1 58 n ;
agent (kartr): 8 5 ; 9 6 ; 97; 1 04; 1 50n; 1 62n; anupalabdlli: 1 40n; 1 4 1 n; 1 42n; 1 44n;
1 7 5; 1 76 and n; 1 83n; 1 84n; 1 85 ; 1 86n; 1 79n; the validity of - : 90n;
1 87 ; 1 88 ; 1 93 ; 1 99n; 200; 204n; anupiiya: xxxvii and n; xxxviii; xxxix;

257
a(lUSaI!lcayaviida: 1 1 5n ;
anlls(II!ldhiina, etc. (connection, unifica­
tion, etc.): xvi n; 90n; 1 26n; 1 32 and n;
1 3 3 and n; 1 34n; 1 37 ; 1 3 8n; 1 59; 1 60;
1 63; 1 7 1 ; 1 83n; 1 84n; 1 85 ; 20 1 ; the two
levels o f meaning o f the tenn - : l 78n;
apadc/na: 1 62n;
opek,w/, apek,Wl(la (requirement, expecta­
tion, dependence, etc.): 96 and n; 97 and
n; 101; 1 83 and n; reciprocal
(anyollyiipek$ii) : 97 and n;
Apohasiddlli: 1 30n;
Arca!a: 1 37n;
association (slihitya, saI!lsarga, sahitata):
1 42 and n; 1 43n;
aswlda : 1 1 9n ;
lifmal'ildin: 89n; 9 1 n; 92n; 93n;
atom: 1 1 5n; I SS ; 1 75; agglomeration of
s: 1 1 5n;
Attachment: 1 95; 1 98;
avi.l·allIVadifl: 1 57n;
A vyayavinirakara(w: 1 1 5n;
awareness: xviii; 9 1 ; 1 25n; 1 3 l n; 1 52; 1 7 1 ;
1 73n; 1 86n; - o f a lim ited subjectivity:
2 1 1 ; - o f the action: 1 60; - o f the self:
1 53; determinate - (pratisarrnlhiina, (lfIlI­
sarwlhiifla, etc . ) : 1 25 ; 1 26; 1 5 811; 1 63n;
1 65; 1 7 1 n ; dim and und i fferentiated - :
2 1 3n; immediate and mediated - : 1 32n;
inner -: 86; 88; 1 76; interconnection
(identity) between reflective - and ,I'abda­
na: 1 63n; introspective -: 1 08n; non- -:
2 1 5n; pure -: 1 08; retlective - T (ah(lfll­
parcImar,l'a): xxix; 1 23 and n; 1 24 and n;
128; 1 3 1 ; 1 32 and n; 1 5 1 ; 1 52 ; retlcctive
- ' this' (idarrlparamar,l'a): 1 23n; 1 5 1 ; 2 1 1 ;
reflective - (vimar.va, paramada, etc.):
xxiv and n; xxv; xxviii; xl; 86n; 87n; 1 04
and n; 1 05 and n; 1 06n; 1 07n; 1 09; 1 1 0;
1 1 8 and n; 1 1 9 and n; 1 20; 1 22; 1 23n;
1 25 and n; 1 26n; 1 27n; 1 28 ; 1 52 ; 1 6 1 ;
1 63 and n ; 1 64n; 1 70; 1 7 1 and n ; 1 77 ;
1 87n; 202n; 203n; 2 1 On; 2 1 1 n; 2 1 3 and
n; 2 1 4n; 2 1 6; 2 1 7; self- -, self-con­
sciousness (sva.I'(If!lvit, .l'vas(II!lvedana,
etc.): xxiii; 92n; 99n; 1 02 and n; 1 08;
1 38 and n; 1 39n; 1 45 ; 1 46; 1 62n; 1 69n; breath: energy o f the - : 209; equal -
single retlective - (ekapratyavamar.va) : (samalla): 207 and n; 208; falling -
1 70n; the object o f a n unconventional (aplina) : 207n; 209n; five -s:
retleetive - : 2 1 3 ; the object of inner re­ pervad ing (vyalla): xxxiv; 208; 209 and
flective - : 2 1 4; the object of retleetive -: n; physical -: 1 32n; prli(w (rising breath,
2 1 5n; vital -): xxxii; xxxiii; xxxiv; xxxix; 1 04n;
Badhanta Subhagupta: 1 1 3n; 1 3 1 ; 1 32n; 200 and n; 203 and n; 204;
hahyarlhallufIleyavada: 1 1 3n; 206; 207 and n; 209n; 2 1 1 ; supreme -:
biihyarlhawldin : 1 1 4n; 1 1 6n; 1 1 7n; 208; suspension of the pra(w-apana:
- biihyavildill: xviii; 1 57n; 207n; the dualistic opposition between
beast (pa,vu): xxxi; xxxix; 1 98 ; 200n; 2 1 3n ; pra(/(/ and apana: xxxiv; 207n; the five
- ' s creation: 2 1 6n; state o f - : 1 93 ; 1 94; functions of the -s: 204n; identification
see also l i mited subject; o f the I w i th the - (pril(llihanta): 204 and
Bhagal'adglla: 1 03n; 200n; n; 205 and n; uni fication o f prli(w and
Bhagavan: 1 23n; apal/a : 209; udal/a -: xxxiv; 208; 209
BIn/mali: 1 1 4n; and n;
Bhartrhari: ix; xix; xxiii n; xxiv; xxv and B rhaspati: xiii n;
n; xxvi and n; 1 08n; 1 20n; 1 2 1 n ; 1 25n; Brhatparihha,I'ill'rlli: 1 20n;
1 26n; 1 50n; 1 64n; 1 65n; 1 76n; 1 87n; lJllddhi (intellect, mind): xxxii; xxxiv n;
Bhasarvajfia: ix; xxxv; 93 and n ; 94; 97n; l O i n; 1 06;
Bhaskara (the author o f the Sivasl7tra­ 1 09n; 1 1 I n; 1 23n; 1 24 and n; 1 26n; 1 3 1 ;
wlrttika): xxx n; 1 32 and n ; 1 35n; 1 5 1 and n ; 1 5 8 ; 1 59
BhaskarakarHha: xliii; xliv; xlv n; 1 78n; and n; 1 80n; 1 89n; 1 9 1 n; 1 92n; 1 94 and
1 89n; 1 90n; n; 1 96; 200n; 203 and n; 204n; 2 1 0; 2 1 1 ;
Bhliskarf: x l i i i ; 10 1 n; 1 1 7n; 1 30n; 1 3 1 11 ; object o f the - : 1 35 ;
1 35n; 1 37n; 1 4311; 1 48n; 1 54n; 1 6 1 n; Buddhism: x x i ; x x i i ;
1 8 1 n; 1 89n; 1 92n; 208n; Buddhist logic (Buddhist pran/(i(lCl
Bhalla: 93n; dition) : ix; xxii and n; xxvii; 1 39n; 1 44n;
Bha\!araka Sundara: xliv n; Buddhist logician: xxii; xxiii and n; xxv;
Bhavopah(lral'ivara(w: xli n; xxix; 89n; 90n; 1 37n; 1 39n; 1 67n;
hhlllijana: 1 1 8n; ('(Imalhim: xxiv n; xxxvi; 1 1 8 and n; 1 1 9n;
bimha : 1 1 3n; 2 1 0; 2 1 2;
body: xxxii; xxxiv n; xxxv; 87; 88n; 90; calWl(la: 1 1 9n;
94; 95; 1 0411; 1 1 1 n; 1 3 1 ; 1 32 and II; 1 3 3 case, factor of the action (karaka): 94 and
and II; 1 34; 1 36; 1 5 5; 1 82n; 1 86n; 1 89n; n; 97n; 1 60; 1 84n; 1 87n;
1 92n; 1 94 and n; 1 98 ; 205n; 207n; 209n; endings: 1 85; 1 87n; subordinate -s: 1 84
21 1; 2 1 7; -Iy activity (kayapravrtli): and n; the meaning of the locative -: 1 84;
1 69 ; -Iy movement: 87 and n; slhiilalama the nominative - is sl'alanlra: 1 84n;
(the physical -): 205n; the p(lIi's -: xxxi; causal conditions (pralyayas: adhipalio,
the series o f distinct moments of - heillo, .1'an/(lflClnlarao and liIambanaO):
(.I:arfrasan/(/na): 90n; 1 8 1 and n; 1 82 and n;
bond: xvii; xviii; 207; 2 1 4; 2 1 6n; karmic - : causality: 1 3 8n; 1 78n; 1 79 and n; 1 80n;
200n; 1 8 1 n; 1 83n; 1 86n; 1 87 ; relation of -
Brahman: ix; xviii; xxvi n; 1 2 1 n; 1 97 and between co-existent dharmas: 1 82n; the
n; 2 1 6n; - devoid of consciousness: xviii; Buddhist conception of -: 1 85n;
the supreme - : xix; causative: form o f the root upapad-:
258
2 1 8n; the meaning of the -: 1 50n; the
primary subject o f the - (hetu): 1 50n;
205n; cause (heW, klira(w) : xix; x x x i i ; 95 and 11;
96n; 97n; 1 1 2 and n; 1 1 3 and n ; 1 1 4;
1 1 5n; 1 1 6; 1 1 7 and n ; BOn; 1 37 and n ;
1 38 and n; 1 4011; 1 45n; 1 47 ; 1 48n; 1 49 ;
1 65 ; 1 67n; 1 68 a n d n ; 1 69n; 1 75 ; 1 77 ;
1 7 8 and n; 1 79 ; 1 80n; 1 8 1 n; 1 82 a n d n ;
1 83n; 1 84; 1 85 ; 1 86 and n ; 1 99 and n ;
204n; - -effect relation: 9 3 n ; 9 5 ; 96n;
1 37 and n; 1 38 and n ; 1 49 ; 1 62n; 1 68 n ;
1 75 and n ; 1 76; 1 83 and n ; 1 8411; 1 95n;
204n; aux i liary -s: 1 78n; causal complex
(heluslimagrf) : 1 67n; efficient - : 1 77 ;
1 7 8 and n ; material - : 1 1 6; 1 78n; rad­
ical - : 1 95 ; the ahMsas o f the - and
effect: 1 8 1 n; the pre-existence o f the
effect i n the - : 1 75n; 1 85n;
Chandogya Upani,wd: 1 55n;
cognition, knowledge (jillin a) : xv; XV11l;
xxviii n; xxx n; xxxii; xxxv; 86; 87 and
n; 88n; 89n; 90 and n; 92 and n; 93 and
n; 94 and n; 95n; 97n; 98n; 99 and n;
1 00; 1 0 I n; 1 02; 1 03 and n; 1 06n; 1 07n;
1 08 and n; 1 09 and n; I 1 1 n; 1 1 2 ; 1 1 3n ;
1 1 4n; 1 1 5n; 1 1 9n; 1 22 ; 1 23n; 1 24 and
tra­ n; 1 25n; 1 26n; 1 27 ; 1 29n; 1 3 1 n; 1 34 and
n; 1 35 and n; 1 37n; 1 3 8n; 1 39 and n;
1 40 and n; 1 4 1 and n; 1 42 and n; 1 43
and n; 1 44n; 1 4 5 ; 1 46 and n; 1 47 ; 1 5 1 n;
1 60n; 1 6 1 and n; 1 62 and n; 1 68n; 1 7 1
and n; 1 72; 1 80n; 1 89; 1 90; 1 92n; 1 9311;
1 97n; 202n; 203 and n; 205n; 2 1 1 ; 2 1 2
and n ; 2 1 3n ; 2 1 8 ; - devoid o f mental
1 88n; - elaboration (al'ikalpajiWna): 1 25n; - of
the svalak,vO(w: 1 63n; 1 69n; - that
pertains to the yogins: 2 1 6n; Brahma is
associated with the first moment o f -:
1 97n; contlict between -s: 1 39; 1 46n;
erroneous - : xv i ; 1 7 1 n; indistinct - : 1 26n;
interconnection between objects of -:
1 03; invalidatin g - : 141; invalidatio n
(hMlla) o f - : 1 42n; 1 45 and n ; 1 46n;
non-valid ity of the - : 1 39 ; 1 45 ; partial -
and activity: 1 95 ; power of - (jilli­
na.vakli): xvii; x i x ; xx; 87n; 93n; 1 03 ;
259

1 26n; 2 1 I n ; 2 1 2n; 2 1 8; pure -: 1 52; the
a priori condition of -: 86n;
hodhart/pala of - : 1 09n; the capacity
(vogyalii) of -: 1 62n; the principle of the
non-objectifiability of - : 1 09n; the series
of distinct moments of - (j!lallaSalllana):
90n; unification of -s: xx; 1 02; 1 03 and
n; 1 07; 1 27n; 1 52; unifier of -5:
the truth of a - : 1 5 7n; V i�l)u is associated
with the continuity of - : 1 97n;
cognizer, knowing subject, etc. (pmmalr) :
xxxii; 85; 86 and n, 7; 90; 97; 98n; 1 04:
1 07; 1 09; 1 1 0; I I I and n; 1 1 2 ; 1 1 8n;
1 22; 1 23 and n; 1 28n; 1 30n; 1 3 1 and n;
1 32; 1 3 3 : 134 and n; 1 36; 1 37; 1 3 8 and
n; 1 39 and n; 1 40n; 1 45 ; 1 46 and n; 1 49;
1 5 1 and n; 1 52; 1 55 ; 1 59; 1 60; 1 6 1 and
n; 1 67n; 1 69n; 1 72: 1 74; 1 75 ; 1 76n; 1 77
and n; 1 7 8 and n; 1 8 1 and n; 1 82; 1 84;
1 87 ; 1 89 and n; 1 90; 1 94; 1 95 ; 1 97; 1 98 ;
204; 206; 21 1; 2 1 6; the absolute
(paramlirihapralllillr) : I I I n; the mayic -:
I I I n ; 1 97 ;
concentration (diliimlla): 200n; 2 1 5 ;
congruence (sill!/vada): 1 46; 1 57n;
1 7 1 and n;
conjecture (lllprek,I'll! IiJ): 1 35n; 1 47;
consciousness: xxiv; xxv; xxvii;
xxix; xxxii; xxxiv n; xxxviii; xlii; 87n;
90; 1 03 and n; I 07n; 1 08 ; I I In; 1 1 2 ;
1 1 3 and n; 1 1 4 and n; 1 1 6 and n; 1 1 7 ;
1 1 8 and n; 1 1 9n; 1 20 and n; 1 2 1 and n;
1 23n; 1 24 and n; 125; 1 26n; 1 27 and n;
1 28n; 1 30n; 1 3 1 ; 1 34 and n; 1 36 and n;
1 48n; 1 49; 1 50n; 1 5 1 and n; 1 52 ; 1 5 3;
1 5 8n; 1 59n; 1 62n; 1 63 ; 1 7 1 n;
1 7 3n; 1 7 5; 1 80n; 1 82; 1 86; 1 87 ; 1 88n;
1 9 1 ; 1 92n; 1 93 ; 1 94n; 1 95; 1 97; 1 98 and
n; 1 99; 200; 20 I ; 202; 203 and n; 206;
2 1 1 n; 2 1 7 and n; - as receptacle of
everything that is gradually manifested:
xxvii; individual -: xxxi; - as synthesis
of prakil.I'a - villlal'.l'a: xxxvi; - devoid o f
11 subject: xx i,x; - principle (ciliaI I\'(/m):
1 0 3 and n; 1 1 6 and n; 1 32; 1 34; 1 52;
1 5 3 ; 1 86; 1 87; 202 and n; activity of - :
1 1 9; power of -: xxxi; 1 1 9 ; 1 27 and n;
the supreme - : xxxvii; 1 04n; I I I n ; 1 46n;
202n; free dynamism of - : 1 99n; the grad­
ual elevation of -: 1 46n; the light of - :
1 1 4n; 1 27n; 1 9 8 ; 1 99; 200; - ' I-thi s ' : 2 1 0;
manifestation of - (cidvyakli): xv; xvi;
power of the activity of - : 1 22; the praWI
1 38n; is a mode o f - (citl'rlti): 207n; the sphere
of - ' I- this ' : 1 92n; the sphere of -: 1 90n;
206; unitary -: 9 1 ;
contamination (k/c.'i a): 1 98 and n;
contemplation (dhyalla): 200n;
convention: 1 68n;
cosmic dissolution (praiaya): 1 9 1 n; 203n;
205 and n; mahapraiaya: 20 I n;
creation: xvii; xix; 1 33n; 1 97 ; 20 I n; 2 1 1 n;
- of amll1gemcnts: 1 35n; - of the objcct
is parallcl to that of the subject: 2 1 6n;
of things in the mcntal sphere: 206; also
the limi ted subject possesses an innatc
- power of -: 2 1 5n; impure leVels of -:
1 3 3n; mixed - : 1 3 3n; original - : 1 33 ;
pure -: 1 3 3n; the action of creating
(ll irmli!wkriyii): 1 77n;
1 60; creative meditation (/Jh(ll'(Incl): 200n;
crcator: 1 23n; 1 36; 1 75; of the universe:
2 1 8; state of -: 1 1 8;
xxviii; deep sleep: state of - : xxxii; xxxix; 200n;
204; 205 and n; 207; statc of apal'cdya­
.I'(/II,wpla: 200n; 203n; 207n; state of sa­
l'cdya,l'all,l'IIpla: 200n; 207n;
delimitation: spatio-tcmporal -s: 209; thc
mutual - of subject and object: 2 1 1 n;
delusion: 86; 87;
determination, dcterminate cognition, etc.
1 72n; (adhyavasc7ya): 1 00; 1 0 1 and n; 1 02 and
n; 1 09 and n; l I On; 1 24 and n; 1 26 and
n; 1 27 and n; 1 35n; 1 40n; 1 48n; 156;
1 58; 1 64n; 1 9 1 n; - of mutual
fercntiation: 1 72; - of the absence: 1 43 ;
the absolutc otherncss o f direct sensa­
tion from - : xxv;
DevasOri: 95n; 96n;
Del'lp(l//ca,l'alika: xiv; xxx n;
devotion: xxxvi; the state of: xxi n;
Del'yciY(llI/a/a: xii;
260
DhannakTrti: ix; x x i i n; 88n; 89n; 95n; 96n;
97n; 98n; 1 08n; 1 1 5n ; 1 25n; 1 28n; 1 29n;
1 37n; 1 40n; 1 4 1 n; 1 43n; 1 45n; 1 57n;
1 62n; 1 63n; 1 64n; 1 65n; 1 66n; 1 67n;
1 68n; 1 70n; 1 7 1 n; 1 79n; 1 80n; 2 1 6n;
dhal1nin: 92n; 1 1 9n; 1 45n; 1 69n;
'
Dhannottara: ix; 89n; 1 28n; 1 37n; 1 40n;
1 57n;
dharmyasiddhi: 1 45n;
dhiitu: the six -s: xxvii n;
d ifferentiation, distinction: xvi; xvii; x x i ;
xlii; 89n; 1 27n; 1 29n; 1 46; 1 47 ; 1 49;
1 54; 1 59n; 1 62n; 1 65 ; 1 70; 1 72 ; 1 85 ;
1 92 and n; 1 93 and n; 200; 20 1 -202n;
203n; 2 1 2n; 2 1 3n; 2 1 6 and n; - between
external and internal: 1 9 1 ; - between
perceiving subject and object perceived:
2 1 4; - between subject and object of
_
knowledge: xxxviii; 1 56; 1 9 1 ; - between
the power and the possessor of the
power: 2 1 2; - of the two related terms:
1 59 ; absolute - : 1 94; spatial - :
spatio-temporal -s: 1 27n; 161;
temporal -: 1 55 ; 1 69n; the doctrine of -
and non-differentiation: 1 72n; the error
of -: 1 93n; the idea of -: xxxix n; the
state of - : 2 1 2;
Dignuga: ix; 89n; 1 1 5n; 1 1 6n; 1 28n; 1 29n;
1 59n; 1 6 1 n ; 1 65n; 1 66n; 1 7 1 n; 1 80n;
discourse (abhilapa) : 90; 1 28 ;
discoursive thought, mental elaboration,
etc. (vika/pa, etc. ) : xvii; xviii; xxxii;
xxxv; xxxix; 89n; 90; 9 1 n; 92; 96; 97
and n; 98n; 1 04n; 1 05n; 1 1 0;
1 1 3n; 1 1 6; 1 27n; 1 28 and n; 1 29n; 1 30n;
1 3 1 ; 1 32 and n; 1 33 and n; 1 34 and n ;
1 3 5 and n; 1 42n; 1 47 ; 1 48 and n; 1 50
and n; 1 5 1 and n; 1 52n ; 1 59 and n; 1 65n;
2 1 4n; 2 1 5n; 2 1 6n; 2 1 7 and n; exempt
dif­
from - : xxxviii; xxxix and n; 90; 2 1 6; for
the Buddhist: 1 3 1 n; the activity of - : 1 86;
1 87 ; 2 1 5 ; the definition of - : 1 28n; the
main characteristic of - : 1 28n; object of
the - : 1 35n; 2 1 3 ; power of -: 2 1 4; pro­
gressive purification of -: xxxix and n;
suppression o f the - : 2 1 5;
doubt: 89n; 90;
dream: - state: xxxii; xxxiv; 1 97n; 206 and
n ; 207 and n ; 2 1 6;
drsyallupa/abdhi: 90n;
Durvasas: xiv;
dvadasanta: 207n;
effect (karya) : xviii; 95; 96n; 97n; 1 25n;
1 29n; 1 30n; 1 37 ; 1 38 and n ; 1 49n; 1 5 1 n;
1 60; 1 67 and n; 1 68 and n; 1 69 and n ;
1 75 ; 1 77 ; 1 78n; 1 79 ; 1 80n; 1 8 1 and n ;
1 82n; 1 83n; 1 84; 1 89n; absence o f the -:
1 43 ; specific - : 1 66; ability t o produce
external -s: 1 70; two modes of mani­
festation of the - : 1 77 ;
efficiency (arthakriyci): xxvii; 1 49 and n ;
1 5 1 n ; 1 63 ; 1 66; 1 67n; 1 70 and n; 1 79
and n; - capable of -: 89n; °sm.nvada:
1 60n; separate -: 1 64; reality of an object
consist in its - : 1 70n; the things have a
multiplicity of arlhakriyas: 1 66n;
ekatvaparilmada: 1 86;
1 63 ; endings: personal - (tili): 1 23 ;
1 64; energy: 1 85; vital - : 204n; 207n; 2 1 5; path
of the expansion of consciousness and - :
x v ; see also sakti;
error: 1 0 1 and n; 1 02n; 1 60; 2 1 6; 8 8 n ;
causes of -: 1 66n; t h e sphere of dream
and -: 2 1 5n; the subject of -: 1 7 1 n;
theories of -: liv;
exclusion (apolla, apohana, vyapohana,
etc. ) : xix; xxii n; 1 28n; 1 29n; 1 30n; 1 3 1 ;
1 32n; 1 33n; 1 34; 1 65n; 2 1 4n ; power
of - : 1 03 ; - theory: 1 29n;
existence: 1 05; 1 54; external -: 1 48;
1 1 1 n;
perpetual - : 1 73 ; states of - : 95; the s i x
modifications of - (bhiivavikilra): 1 54n;
expectation (IInmllkhatil): 97n;
externality: 1 5 1 and n ; 1 77 ; 1 90; 1 9 1 ;
fantasy (manoriljya): 90; 1 35n; 1 52n; 2 1 5n;
fonn (n/pa, akara): xxvii; xxix; 87n; 89n;
90n; 94; 1 03 ; 1 1 3n ; 1 29n; 1 44; 1 49; 1 54;
1 64n; 1 65 ; 1 85n; 203; 204; 206;
fourth state: xxxii; xxxiv; xxxviii; xxxix;
208; 209 and n; 2 1 0;
88n;
freedom (sViltanflya) : xxiii; xxxii;
1 20; 1 2 1 ; 1 22 and n; 1 23n; 1 39n; 1 46n;
26 1
 1 50n; 1 87 ; 1 95; 1 98; 207; 2 1 4n; power intuition: 1 36n; 1 9 1 n;
1 95n; 1 96n; 1 97n; 1 98n; 1 99n; 200n; Kaul)<;la Bha\ta: 1 20n;
of -: 1 22n; 1 23n; 1 74; invalidation: 1 39n;
20 1 n; 203n; 204n; 205n; 206n; 207n; kel'alasambhll: 200n;
fru ition: 207; 2 1 1 ; capacity for - : 2 1 1 n; invariable concomitance: 1 6Rn; 1 8 1 n;
208n; 209n; 2 1 0n; 2 1 1 n; 2 1 2n ; 2 1 3n; Kira(lagama : x x i n; 202n;
function (vyapara): 1 62n; 1 63n; 1 7 1 ; 1 79 ; I R3n;
2 1 4n; 2 1 5n, 2 1 6n; 2 1 7n; knowable, cognizable reality, etc, (pra­
future: 1 95 ; notions o f past a n d - : 1 55 ; {sa: xxx; xxxii; 1 22; 1.�\'{/rapratyahhijMl'yakhya: xliv; lIIeya) : xxviii n; x x i x ; x x x i i ; x x x iv and
Gau<;lapada: 1 55n; lsitr: xxxi; 1 89n;
ISvarasena: 1 40n; n; xxxviii; 87n; 90; 1 08n; 1 22 ; 1 24; 1 27 ;
Gal/(/apiidabha,l'ya: 204n; {svara: xvii; xxx; 95n; 1 22; 1 23 and n; 1 24; j,�l'arasiddhi: x x i ; xxii; xl; 1 85n; 1 30n; 1 36; 1 40n; 1 9 1 ; 1 92n; 1 94; 1 95 ;
God: xxix; x x x ; xxxiii; 1 1 6; 1 52; 1 8911; 1 5 1 n; 1 52 ; I R9n; 1 90 and n; 1 9 1 and n; I.l:1'arasiddhivrtti: x l ; 1 97 ; 1 98 ; 1 99; 200n; 20 1 ; 202; 203n;
2 1 3; 1 92n; 1 93n; 1 97n; 20 I n; 203n; 20Rn;
Jaina: x i x ; 205; 207n; 2 1 1 ; 2 1 3 ; 2 1 7 and n ; relation
Goddess: xii; 209n; 2 1 3n; 2 1 5n; -'s creation: 2 1 6n ;
Jatisal7lllddda: 1 08n; with the - : 206; the - according to the
gods: 202; h varapratyahhijlliiffka ( o r °vivr/i): x x v ;
Jayadral!wyal7lala: xiv n; Yogacrtra and the Sautrantika: 1 62n; the
gopa/aglia!ika: 1 82n; x x x n; x li; x l i i ; x l i i i and n; x l iv n; x l i x ;
Jayanta Bhalla: i x ; xxvi n ; 1 1 7n; plane of the -: 1 93n; the state o f the ab­
Govindaraja: xiv; h l'arapralyah!i(jlWkalllnlldf: xliv n;
Jayapl<;la: King -: ix; sence o f the - : 203 ; 204; see also object;
Grammarians (Vaiyakaral)as): xix; xxv; h \'(/rapralyabh(jiicln vayadlpiUi: xliv;
Jayaratha: xiv and n; x x x n ; xxxii n; x x xvii Krama: xii; xiv and n; xxxvi; xl and n; -
1 20n; 1 2 1 n; the theories o f the - : xv; see 1.�l'arapralyah!i(jliiil'illlars'illl: x x n; xxviii;
n; xxxviii; xxxix and n; xliv n; 200n; cult: x x x n; the - doctrine: x x x n;
also VaiyukanU)a; x x x and n; xxxv n; xxxix n; x l i i ; xliii
Jinendrabuddhi: 1 29n; Kramakeli: xiv;
Haribhrtskarrtgn ihotri: 1 20n; and n; xliv; xlv and n; xlvii and n; xlix
Jfiunasrlmitra: 1 30n; 1 37n; kriya (action, act, activity): xviii; xxix;
Harivr�abha: x xv n; and n; I n; I i ; I ii; R5n; R9n; 92n; 93n;
jl1allill: xxxiv n; 1 93n; xxxii; xxxv; 86; 87 and n; 94; 95 and n;
heart (hrdaya) : xlii; 87n; 1 22 and n; 1 97n; 95n; 99n; l OOn; 10 1 n; 1 05n; 1 06n; 1 07n;
joy (iillloda, l'iUisa) : xvii; xxvii; 1 1 9n; 1 4 R 97n; 98n; 1 03n; 1 23 ; 1 24; 1 25 and n ;
207n; - o f the supreme Lord: 1 2 1 ; l ORn; 1 09n; l l l n ; 1 1 9n; 1 20n; 1 23n;
and n; 207; 1 3 5; 1 50n; 1 52; 1 5 3 and n ; 1 54 and n ;
Helarrtja: xxvi n; l ORn; 1 1 9n; 1 20n; 1 53n; 1 26n; 1 29n; 1 30n; 1 3 1 n; 1 33n; 1 3811;
kail'alya : 1 99n; 200n; 1 57 and n; 1 5 8 and n; 1 59; 1 60 ; 1 75 ;
1 54n; I RRn; 1 3911; 1 4 1 n; 1 43n; 1 4411; 1 46n; 1 47n;
kala (Force): 1 3 3n; 1 9 5 ; 200n; 202 and n; 1 76 and n; 1 77 ; 1 84n; 1 85 ; 1 86 and n;
l1ellihilldll: 1 3 7n; 1 40n; 1 4 1 n; 1 43n; 1 4Rn; 1 54n; 1 5Rn; 1 6 1 n; 1 6211; 1 63n;
power of -: 203 ; 1 87 and n; 1 88 ; 1 89; 1 90; 1 93n; 1 98 ;
l1etllhilldu(ikii: 1 1 7n; 1 65n; 1 66n; 1 67n; 1 68n; 1 69n; 1 7 1 n;
Krtlacakra: 208n; 1 99 and n; 202n; 205n; 2 1 1 ; 2 1 2 and n ;
i(lli: 209n; 1 72n; 1 75n; 1 77n; 1 78n; I ROn; 1 82n;
Ka/apiida : 20Rn; 2 1 3 ; 2 1 8; - of the powers o f the senses:
idalltii: 1 1 8n; 1 23 and n; 209n ; 2 1 1 n; 1 87n; 1 9(hl; 1 9 1 n; 1 92n; 1 93n; 200n;
KalI: - cult: xiv n; the doctrine o f the -s: 206; faculty o f - : 202; notion of -: 1 60
il lusion: 1 0 I n; 206 and n; 203n; 205n; 206n; 209n; 2 1 2n; 2 1 611;
xiv; the twelve - 5: xxx n; and n; partial knowledge and -: 1 95 ;
imagination (,I'Wllko/pa) : R9n; 1 24; 1 3 5n; j,\:l'arllpratyahh(jlliil'illlar.l' illll'yakhya: xliv;
Kiilikc7krallla: xxviii n; power of - (kriy(7.I'akti): xvii; 87n; 93n;
2 1 4; h l'arllpralyahh(jIii!l'ilT/ivimar,I'illf: x x n;
Kalla\a: xiii; xiv; 1 26n; 1 57n; 1 87 ; 1 93n; 20 1 n; 2 1 1 n ;
impurity: the basic -: xvii; xxii n; xxv; xxxi; x xxiii; x xxv; xxxix n;
K/7/olfar(lgallla: xxx n; 1 96n; 204n; 208n; 2 1 2n; 2 1 8; the S aiva conception o f - :
incongruence: 1 7 1 ; xl n; xli; xlii n; xliii and n; xliv and n;
Kclloltill'lll'rtli: 205n; 94n; verbal - : 1 8 8n;
individuality: 1 33 ; limited - (plIf!ISll'a) : xlv; xlvii n; xlviii; x l i x ; Iii; R5n; R6n;
KamalasTla: xxvi n; 1 29n; 1 43n; 1 67n; Kriyc7samllddda: 94n;
1 9R ; dissolution of the state of - : 2 1 7 ; 87n; RRn; R9n; 90n; 9 I n; 92n; 93n; 94n;
Kapalika5: xi; xxxiii n; - rites: xxxiii; Krsnadasa: xliv n;
inference (allllllliilla): xxii n; RRn; I I I n; 95n; 96n; 97n; 9Rn; 99n; l OOn; 1 0 I n;
kt7ra(whelll : I R2n; ;; ;
k, / ( ika/l'll (instantaneity, momentariness):
1 1 3 and n; 1 1 4n; 1 1 6 and n; 1 1 7 and n; I 02n; l 03n; I 04n; 1 06n; 1 07n; l ORn; xxii n; the doctrine o f -: 1 62n;
Krtrar)as (or Krtrar)esvaras): 1 97n;
1 3 Rn; 1 43n; 1 45 and n; 1 46n; 1 69 and 109n; l i On; I I I n ; 1 1 2n; 1 1 4n; 1 1 61l;
karma: 1 95n; 1 97 and n; 1 9R ; 20 I ; the k,I'C/(l ikaw/din: 1 1 2n;
n; 1 7Jn; 1 79 and n; I ROn; I R l n; I R2 and I I Rn; 1 1 911; 1 201l; 1 2 1n; 1 22n; 1 23 n ; K�emaraja: xiv and n; xxx n ; xxxiii n;
depository o f the - : 204n;
n; definition of -: 1 1 7n; 1 24n; 1 25n; 1 26n; 1 28n; 1 30n; 1 3 1 n ; Karr)akagomin: 1 37n; 1 82n; xxxix; xl and n; xliv n ; liv n ; 1 1 9n;
inherence (,I'(lI/I/l\'{lya): 1 60; 1 32n; 1 3 3n; 1 34n; 1 35n; 1 37n; 1 39n; KlIlayukli: 1 1 9n;
karlrlcJ (agency, agent subjectivity): 98n;
initiation: 1 46n; 200n; 1 4 1 n; 1 42n; 1 43n; 1 44n; 1 45n; 1 46n; Kumrtri la: 1 1 2n; 1 40n; 1 4 1 n;
l 7Hn; I R5n; I R7 ; 1 93 ; 1 98 ; 1 99; 20 1 ;
instrument (karll(w) : x i x ; 1 62n; 1 63n; 1 95 ; 1 47n; 1 4RI1; 1 5011; 1 5 3n; 1 541l; 1 5 5n;
202 and n; 203; 206; 2 1 1 ; infinite - : 2 1 2; kll(ll,/agolaka: x i i ;
2 0 I n ; - 5 o f cognition: 1 96; the five -s o f 1 5711; 1 5Rn; 1 6211; 1 63n; 1 66n; 1 6711; Karyakl7ra(w!Jh(lI'asiddhi: 1 37n; Lak�mar)agupta: x x x n ;
action: 1 96; 1 6Rn; 1 69n; 1 701l; 1 72n; 1 73n; 1 74n; Lak�mlrrtma: x l n ;
kiirY(/lIl1palahdhi: 1 43n;
intentionality (allll,wuw/Mlla): 1 7R ; I R4 1 75n; 1 76n; 1 77n; 1 79n; I ROn; I R l n; Laksmflantra: xvii n; x x x v i ;
Kalhc7l71l1khalilaka: xxii;
and n; I R2n; I R3n; I R4n; I R5n; I R6n; I R8n;
Kalyrtyana: 1 1 9n; 1 20n; �
lan uage: xxvi; 97n; 9 8 n ; t h e lowest level
internality: 1 5 1 and n; 1 77 ; 1 90; 1 9 I ; 1 8911; 1 9011; 1 9 1 n , 1 9211; 1 93n; 1 94n; o f - : 1 27n; the articulated -: 2 1 3n; lin-
kall/aprakriyt7: xii;

262 263
 guistic articolation, - expression: 1 25n;
1 27n; see also word;
latent impression, - trace (sar!lskara) : 9 1
and n; 92n; 99 and n ; 1 00 and n ; 1 0 1
and n ; 1 32 ; 1 33 ; 1 34; 1 47n; karmic
impulse: 1 93n; 1 95n; 1 99n; 20 1 ; 203;
204; see also vasanel;
laya: 1 1 9n;
liberation: xvii; x v i i i ; x x x i i ; x x x i i i n; xxxv;
xxxvii; xxxv i i i ; 20 1 n; - i n life : xxxv;
xxxix; two fonns o f - i n life: x x x i i i ;
light (praka,�a, etc .): x v i i i ; xxiv; xxv; xxvii;
xxviii; xxix; xxxi; 86n; l O I n;
1 05n; 1 06n; 1 07 and n ; 1 08n; 1 1 1 ; 1 1 2
and n; 1 1 7 ; 1 1 8 and n; 1 2 1 n ; 1 24; 1 25n;
1 27n; 1 28 ; 1 30 and n ; 1 3 1 ; 1 36 and n;
1 44 and 11; 1 49 ; 1 50n; 1 5 1 n ; 1 52; 1 52;
1 55 and n; 1 63n; 1 67 ; 1 7 1 n; 1 72; 1 73n;
2 1 1 n; 2 1 2 and n; 2 1 3 ;
lim ited subject (bound, etc.): x x i x ; xxxi;
x x x i i ; x x x i v ; xxxv; 1 24n; 1 3 3n; 1 46n;
1 5 2n; 1 5 5 and n; 1 73 n ; 1 89n;
200; 20 I n; 202; 203; 206n; 2 1 1 ; 2 1 2
and n ; 2 1 3 and n ; 2 1 4; 2 1 5n; 2 1 6; 2 1 7
and n ; creation o f thc - : 2 1 6n; see also
beast;
liliga (logical reason): 1 3 8n;
Lord: xvi; xviii; xxvii; xxxviii; xl; 86 and
n; 87 and n; 88n; 98; 1 04 and n; 1 1 8;
1 22 and n; 1 24 and n; 1 27n; 1 32; 1 33 ;
1 34n; 1 46; 1 47n; 1 53 ; 1 54; 1 55; 1 56;
1 70 and n ; 1 72 ; 1 7 3 and n; 1 74 ; 1 75
and n; 1 76; 1 7 8 and n; 1 80 and n; 1 8 1 n ;
1 82 ; 1 8 3n; 1 90; 1 94; 1 97 ; 1 98 ; 1 99 and
n; 200; 202 and n; 203; 206; 208; 2 1 0;
2 1 I and n; 2 1 2; 2 1 3 and n; 2 1 4 and n;
2 1 5 and n; 2 1 7 ; 2 1 8 ; condition of the - :
2 1 6n; qualities o f the -: 2 1 2n; supreme - :
8 5 ; 1 22; 1 7811; 209 and n; 2 1 3n ; creation
of the - : xxxix n; 2 1 4; 2 1 5 and n; 2 1 6
and n ; creativity o f the - : 1 52n; 1 79n;
1 95n; free expansion of the supreme -:
2 1 0; power of the - : 1 5 1 ; 2 1 5 ; 2 1 6n; 2 1 7 ;
power of t h e supreme - : 1 26; recognition
of the - : xxxv; 85; 86; 8 7 ; 2 1 8 ; 2 1 9;
recognition of the identity of - and indi-
v idual self: x x x ix n; the will of the - :
xxxii; 1 1 811; 1 5 1 ; 1 70 ; 1 8 1 11; 1 99 ;
lysis (nirvrti): 1 1 9n; power o f : xxxi; su­
preme - : xvii;
maculation: xxxi; 1 9911; 2 1 On; eI(IGl'a -:
xxxi; 1 98 and n; 1 99; 202n;
karmic -: x x x i ; x x x i i ; 1 99 and n; 200;
20 I ; 202; 2 1 6n ; mayic - : xxxi; x x x i i ;
1 9 8 ; 1 99; 200 al1d n; 20 1 ; 202 a n d n;
205; 2 1 6n; three -s: xxxii; 202;
Madhava: xxxvi; 1 37n;
Madhyamakavrtti: 1 8 1 n;
1 04n; Madhyamika: x x i i i n;
MadhYellltavibhclga{fkcl: 1 1 5n ;
Mahelbhc7,�ya : xv n; 94n; 1 2 1 n; 1 76n;
Mahclbhel,�ya{fkcl: 1 20n;
Mahclhhc7syoddyota : 1 2 1 n;
lIIaMb/Hlta: 1 96n;
MaMnayaprakcl,� a: xxxix n; xli n;
Mal/(lrthamwljarfparimala: xxv i i i ; xl; xli n;
liv n;
1 92n; lIIahasaftii: 121; the concept of -
Bhartrhari: 1 2 1 n ;
Mahesvara: xxx; 8 5 ; 1 0 3 ; 1 33 ; 1 36; 2 1 0
and n ; 2 1 1 ; 2 1 3 ; 2 1 7 ; state o f - : xxxix;
2 1 7;
Mahesvarananda: xl; xliv n;
Mc7lill fvijaya: x i i ; xiv n; x x i ; x x i i n; xxxi
n; xxxvii; xxxix; 1 89n; 1 99n; 206n;
2 1 4n;
Malillfl'ijaYCII'c7rftika: xxxvi;
manas: 1 24n; 1 5 1 n; 204n;
MCI(I(lakyakclrikcl: 1 5 5n;
MClliga1c7: (or Sarvammigalel): xxx n;
manifcstation (iibMsa): xxvii; xxviii and n;
xxxvi; xxxv i i i ; 90n; 9 1 ; 1 05 and n; 1 06n;
1 1 2 ; 1 1 3 ; 1 1 4; 1 1 7n; 1 27n; 1 29 ; 1 30n;
1 3 1 ; 1 32 ; 1 33 and n ; 1 35n; 1 36n; 1 37 ;
1 38n; 1 39 and n; 1 42 ; 1 46; 1 47 and n ;
1 48 ; 1 49 and n; 1 50n; 1 5 1 and n; 1 54
and n; 1 55 ; 1 56; 1 57 ; 1 59; 1 60; 1 6 1 and
n; 1 63 and n ; 1 64 and n; 1 65 and n; 1 66
and n; 1 67n; 1 68 and n; 1 69 ; 1 70n; 1 72 ;
1 77 ; 1 80n; 1 8 1 and n; 1 82; 1 85 ; 1 86 and
n; 1 87n; 1 97 ; 2 1 3 ; 2 1 4n;
Manorathanandin: 1 1 5n ;
264
Mantra: x x x i i ; 1 99n; 200n; 20 1 n; 208 and Nagesa: 1 2 1 n;
n; 2 1 6n; °prayojaka: 20 1 n; the essential Naiyayika: x x i ; x x i i ; x l ;
unity of -s and Vidyas: 1 93n; nelmanlpa: 1 26;
Mantramahesa: 203n; N arayaI)llkal)\ha : x x i i ;
Mantramahesvara: 1 99n; 201 n ; 208n; NareSvaraparfk$a: x x i i ;
2 1 6n ; MantrapHha: xii n; Navyanyaya: 1 4 1 n;
Mantraselra: xli n; necessity: xxvii; 1 78 ; 1 80; 1 95 ; 1 97 ; power
Mantresvara: xxxii; 1 93 and n ; 1 99n; 200n; of - (lIiyatisakti): 1 66; 1 68n; 1 70n; 1 80n;
20 1 n; 208n; 1 8 1 n; 1 82; 1 83n; the principle of - : 1 95n;
Matarigaparamesvarelgama: xxx n; 1 90n; 1 97n;
1 9 1 n; 1 95n; 1 96n; negation (ni,vedha): 1 29n; 1 30n; 1 3 1 n;
maya: ix; xvii; 87; 1 1 0; 1 30n; 1 3 1 ; 1 74; 1 4 1 n; 1 43n; 1 44 and n; 1 45n; 203n;
1 9 1 n; 1 92n; 1 93n; 194 and n; 1 97 ; 1 9 8 ; 2 1 1 n; 2 1 4n; - of the opposite: 1 28 ; object
200n; 20 1 n; 2 1 1 ; 2 1 2 a n d n; 2 1 5 ; Mahao: of -: 1 40n;
192n; 1 93n; power of - (lIIayc7,�akti): xxxii; nescience (avidyc7) : ix; xviii; xix; 1 46;
88; 1 07n; 1 24 and n; 1 27 ; 1 32 ; 1 33 and notions of - and vivarta: x x v i n;
n; 1 46; 1 49 ; 1 50 and n; 1 53 and n; 1 73 ; lIiral!l,�asvalak,w(/(/vada: 90n;
1 93 and n; 1 94; 1 99; 2 1 1 11 ; Ni1'llkta: 1 54n;
meditation: 1 46n; 1 74; creative - : 1 22; lIi,�caya (ascertainment, certainty): 87; 1 28 ;
object of - : 1 23n; 1 3 1 ; 1 37n; 1 5 1 n;
memory: 8911; 90; 91 and n; 92 and n; 99 Ni,I'isar!lcelra: x i i ;
in and n; 1 00; 1 0 1 and n; 1 02n; 1 04 and n; lIi,�kala: 2 0 I n;
1 05 and n; 1 06 and n; 1 07 and n; 1 09 notion: 1 23n; 1 24n; 1 40n; 1 73 ; 1 74; - of
and n; 1 1 0; I I I n ; 1 2 4 and n; 1 27 ; 1 34; ' this ' : 1 92;
1 35n; 1 3 8 and n; 1 39n; 1 47; 1 48n; 1 49; Nyaya: xxii; x x i i i ; 1 29n; 1 5 8n;
1 5 5 and n; 1 9 1 n; 1 97n; 206n; 2 1 4; 2 1 5n; Nyc7yahhc7,�ya: 1 70n;
dcfinition of - : 1 0611 ; power of -: 1 03 ; Nyclyabindll: 89n; 1 1 7n; 1 28n; 1 40n; 1 43n;
l OS ; criticism of - : 1 09n; essential quality 1 45n;
of - : 9 1 ; Nyclyahilldll!fkc7: 89n; 1 1 7n; 1 28n; 1 40n;
Milil/(lapaiiha: 1 1 5n; 1 42n; 1 43n; 1 57n; 1 62n; 1 80n;
MTmaq1sa: xl; 1 29n; Nyc7yall/mljarf: ix; 1 1 7n;
MTmal11saka: 93n; - schools: ix; Nyayamukha: 1 29n;
MJIIIC1f!lSclsatra: 1 1 7n; Nyclya/'(Jtllclka/'C/: 1 4 1 n;
Mok�akaragupta: 89n; 1 1 3n; 1 1 5n; 1 30n; Nyaya-Vaise�ika: xviii; 1 57n; 1 78n;
Moksak(lrikcl: x i i i n; 20 1 n; obfuscation: condition of - : 1 7 3 and n;
Mothers: xi; object: xv; xviii; xix; xxii; xxiv; xxviii and
Mrgelldrclgama: 1 95n; 1 99n; 202n; n; xxxii; xli; xlii; 86 and n; 87n; 88n;
Mrgend/,cIgamavrtti: 20 I n; 89n; 91 and n; 92n; 93 and n; 94n; 99
mukhyasattc7: 1 87n; and n; 1 00 and n; 10 I and n ; 1 02 and n;
IIIl1khyc7l'ablulsa: 1 70n; 1 03 ; 1 04 and n ; 1 05 and n; 1 06 and n;
IIIl1kta: xxxv; 1 92n; 1 9 7 ; 2 1 7 and n; 2 1 8; 1 07 and n; 1 0 8 and n ; 1 09n; 1 1 0; I I I
mUltiplicity: 1 57 ; 1 5 8n; 1 59n; 1 60; - of and n; 1 1 2 and n; 1 1 3 and n; 1 1 4 and n;
manifestations: 1 86n; unity- tension: 1 1 5n; 1 1 6 and n; 1 1 7 and n; 1 1 8 and n;
1 60n; 1 1 9n; 1 2 1 n; 1 22; 1 23 ; 1 24 and n; 1 25;
NaQapada: 208n; 1 26n; 1 27n; 1 28n; 1 30n; 1 3 1 and n ; 1 33 ;
Nagananda: xliv n; 1 34 and n; 1 35 and n ; 1 3 6 and n; 1 37n;
265
 PratyabhUiilihrdaya: x x x ; xxxiii n ; x x xix;
1 3 8; 1 39n; 1 40n; 1 4 1 and n; 1 4211; 1 4 3 ; Pariblu/,vabhfiskara: 1 20n; Prabhaeandra: 9Sn; 96n; 1 70n;
1 4411; 1 4511; 1 46; 1 47 ; 1 4811; 1 50n; 1 5 1 Paribhfi,l'{/saqlgraha: 1 20n; Prabhakara: 93n; xl and n ; 1 33n; 1 99 n ; 20 1 n ; 2 1 6n ;
and n; I S S and n; I S6; 1 58 ; I S9; 1 60; Parthasarathimisra: 1 4 1 n; Prabhu : xxx; 2 1 7n ;
1 6 1 and n ; 1 62 and 11; 1 63 and n; 1 64 particularization: process o f - : 90n; pradllfilla (primordial matter): 1 7S ; 1 8S n ; pratyak$atod{'$(a: 1 1 7n ; concept o f - : 1 1 6n;
and n; 1 6S and n; 1 68n; 1 69 and n; 1 70 Paryalllapw/c(Hikc/: x x x v i ; pratyaya: 2 1 6n;
1 9S ; 1 96;
and n; 1 7 1 n ; 1 72 and n ; 1 73 and n ; 1 74n; P(dpa,�a: 1 2 1 n ; pratyayavaicitrya: Sautrantika's -: 1 1411;
praC/hill/akclra(/(/llet/(: 1 82 n ;
1 7S ; 1 76 and n; 1 77 and n ; 1 80n; 1 8 1 n ; past: notions o f - a n d future: I SS ; 1 9411; Pradyumna Bha(!a: x i v ; present: manifestation of the -: 1 94n; 1 9S ;
1 87n; 1 88 and n; 1 89n; 1 90n; 1 9 1 and 1 9S ; Praj fi akaragupta: I I I n; principle (taffl'a): x x i x ; x x x ; x x x i ; xxxvi i ;
n; 1 92n; 1 94 and n; 1 95 ; 200n; 202n; Patafij a l i : 9411; I S8n; 1 89n; 1 90n; 1 92n; 1 93 n ; 1 95;
Praklr(/(/kaprakfi,� a: x x v i n; 1 09n; 1 1 9n;
203n; 206; 207n; 209n; 2 1 () and n ; 2 1 4 pali: the - level : 1 89n; the par(//llao - : 1 89n; 1 20n; 1 2 1 n; I S4n; 1 6S n ; 1 99n; 200n; 2 1 2n ; 2 1 7 ; a thirty-eight - :
and n ; 2 1 5 and n ; 2 1 8 ; - o f direct Pall,l'karligal/lo: 1 96n; Pralayakala: 1 46n; 1 93 n ; 1 99n; 200; 207n; 1 90n; a thirty-seventh -: 1 90n; supreme -:
p�rception: 1 0 I n ; I SO; 1 82n; - o f mem­ perceptib i l i ty: conditions of - : 1 42n; Pralayakeval i n : 1 99n; 200 and n; x x x i ; the highest -s: 1 92n;
ory: 1 24; of the mind: 1 35 ; determinate perception, sensation, etc, (allllhhm'il, prallla: 1 62n; product: 1 9S ; 2 1 2;
cognition of th� - : 1 09; estab l i shmcnt of pratyak,w): x v i i ; x v i i i ; x x i v ; xxv; x x x i i ; pral1lcl(W (criteria of right cognition, mean property: 89n; - -possessor (dhanllin): 1 69;
the - (arllwslhili, °siddhi): 1 0 1 ; 1 02; 1 1 2 ; 8 6 n ; 8 9 n ; 90 and n; 9 1 and n ; 92 a n d n ; of knowledge): xix; 90n; 1 1 4- I I S ; 1 40n; d iffcrentiation between - and property­
t h e form of t h c -: 9 4 ; status of - : 86n; 99 a n d n; 1 00 a n d n; 1 0 1 a n d n; 1 02n; 1 6 1 and n; 1 62 and n ; 1 63n; 1 68 and n; possessor: 1 80n; essential - (svahll(ll'a):
1 0711; 2 1 3n; unity of thc - : l 64n; 1 04; I OS n ; 1 06n: 1 07 and n; 1 09 and n; 1 69n; 1 72; 1 7 3n; 1 79; 1 80n; °Silllli/lla: 1 79 and n; see also quality;
objecti ficat ion: 86n; 87n; 88I1; I l 0 and n; I I I and n; 1 1 3n; 1 1 5 n ; 1 1 6 ; 1 68n; non-di ffercntiation between the -s p!'lliagadllikal'Wlya: 1 9 1 n ;
objcctivity: 2 1 3n ; Icvcls of -: 2 1 6n ; 1 1 7 and n; 1 20n; 1 23 ; 1 24; 1 2S a n d n ; and its resu l t (pralll(/): 1 62n; {iilja: x v i i i ;
Padaswigali: x l ; 1 26n; 1 32 a n d n; 1 34 a n d n; 1 3Sn; 1 36n; Pralll(/(/(/,I'all//(('('aya: I I Sn; 1 2S n ; 1 28n; Pure Science (,�lIddhal'idycl) : 1 9 1 ;
pain: x v i n; x x i ; 92 a n d n ; 1 48 ; 1 5 1 ; 206; 1 37 and n; 1 3 8 and 11; 1 40n; 1 4 1 and n ; 1 29n; 1 6 1 n; 1 62n; 1 65 n ; 1 66n; Pllrtl,W: 93n; 1 99n; 200 and n ; 204;
207; 2 1 1 ; 2 1 2 ; 2 1 3 ; 1 42n; 1 43 ; 1 44 and n ; 1 4S and n; 1 46 Pram(/(/(/s(//I//(('caya(ikil: 1 6Sn; plIl'ya,I'(aka (the eightfold body): 1 04n; 1 97
palate: 1 97 n ; and n; 1 47 and n; 1 48n; I SO; l S I and 11; Prall/(/(/(/,I'mllliccaym'!,ffi: 1 6 1 n ; and n; 204 and n; 20Sn;
Paficaratra: x ; x i ; x v i i n; x i x ; I S8 and n; I S9n; 1 64n; 1 6Sn; 1 67 ; 1 68n; Pralll(/(/(/ w/rttika: x x i i n; 89n; 9Sn; 96n; qual i ty (dhal'lI/a) : 92 and n ; 1 1 9n ; 1 24;
Pal,l�l ita Asoka: I I Sn; 1 69 and n; 1 70n; 1 72; 1 8 1 n; 1 82n; 1 96n; I I Sn; 1 1 9n: 1 2S n ; 1 29n; 1 40n; 1 43n; 1 26n; 1 7l ; 1 72 and n; 2 1 2 and n ; 2 1 8 ;
Piil,l i n i : 1 1 9n; 1 2011; 1 76n; 1 90n; 206 and n; 2 1 1 ; 2 1 4; 2 1 5 : 2 1 8 ; I S 7n; I S9n; 1 6 1 n; 1 62n; 1 63 n ; 1 64n; substratum of -: 92; acc u m ulation of -s:
{!(l/wl/iiilmila: x x i ; permanence: 1 1 9n; I S7 ; 1 6 1 ; 200; 209n; 1 66n; 1 68n; 1 70n; 1 80n; 1 82n; 1 83n; 1 96n; see also property;
Parwl/(/lagillll//afijll,\'(7: 1 2 1 11 ; pi(lgaW: 209n; 2 1 6n ; rc(;as: I S2 ; 2 1 1 ; 2 1 2 and 11; 2 1 3 ;
Paramcsvara ( o r Paramasiva): x x x ; 1 2 1 n; place, space (c/da): x x v i i : 89n; 9011; 93; Prml/c/(/(/\'(/rt/ika/m!lkr7ra: I I I n ; fWjalal'migil//: i x ;
1 22n; 1 23n; 1 24; 1 56; 1 77 ; 1 80n; 1 89n; 94; 9S; 1 04n; 1 0SI1; l i S ; 1 1 7 and n; 1 2 1 ; Pralllc/(/(/\'c7rffika,I'I'{/\'!'t/i: 1 29n; 1 37 n ; Ramakat)\ha ( t h e d i s c i p l e o f Utpaladeva):
1 9011; 2 1 3n; 2 1 8 ; thc planc o f - : 1 5 8n; 1 22 ; 1 26; 1 27; 1 3011; 1 3S n ; 1 4 1 n ; 1 42n; 1 40n; 1 64n; 1 66n; 1 67n; 1 79n; 1 80n; xxvi;
P(//'(/lI/ok,lwI ira,\'(lkariktl: x x x i i i n; 1 43 ; 1 4411; 1 48n; I S4n; I S7 ; I S 8; 1 60; 1 82n; RamakatHha ( t h e s o n o f Narayat:1akal,l(ha):
Pa/'(/l//ok,l'iIl/iriisakllrikii!iktl: x x x i i i 11 ; 1 66; 1 63 n ; 1 64n; 1 6S ; 1 68 and n; 1 69 Pralllii(I(/\'illi/;c(/ya: I I I n; 1 37 n ; I S9n; x i i i n; x x i i ; x x x i i i n ; 1 90n; 1 9 1 n; 20 1 n;
pardl/II/I/dl/a: x x i i n; and n; 1 7 1 and n; 206n; 2 1 S n; 2 1 6n; 20S n;
Pariipwlctl,vikii : xli n ; pleasure: 92 and n; 1 47 ; 1 48 and n; l S I ; Pralllii(wl'ill i,l'caya!ikc7: 1 37 n ; rasal/(I: I 1 9n ;
poriiparw/a,vii: 1 92 ; 206; 207; 2 1 1 ; Prall/('yakall/a/alll(/r((I(I(/a: 9Sn; 1 70n; RatnakTrt i : 1 30n;
p(m7p/'(/k{,li: 1 2 1 n ; power (,Vakli): x v i ; 1 22 ; 1 6Sn; 1 89n; 1 93n; pratihlla: 1 36 and n; 1 97n; !?allra\'(lgallla: xxx n; 1 92n;
ptl/'(/Iallirya (dependence, heteronomy, 20S n; 2 1 2; 2 1 8 ; - of beatitude: 21 1 n ; - p/'(/tihl/(Isa: 1 70n; Real ists: 1 29n;
subord inat ion): 96 and n; 97 and n; 1 0 1 ; to know and create: 1 35 ; -s of a l l the prailli: 1 1 9n; reason: logical - : 1 38 ; 1 79; the status of
1 22n; 1 50n; mutual -: 1 3 8; two types of internal and external senses: 206; -s of {iratiyogill (counterpart, opposite entity): logical - (lie/II/(/): 1 80;
(aIlY(!/Iya/agllaliiriiptl, ahhiprayarilpii): knowledge, memory and exclusion: 1 03 ; 1 22 ; 1 28; 1 29; 1 30n; 1 3 1 ; 1 32 ; recognition: 1 33 ; 1 73n; - o f the true reality
1 84n; -s of the Lord: xxxv; 86; causal - : 1 82 ; Pratyabhijfia: x i v ; xx; x x i n; x x i i ; x x i i i and of the self: 1 98 ; act o f - : x x x i x ; 87n; 2 1 8;
Pariilr;'!I,I'ika: xiv; x l n; 1 83 ; creative - : I S6; expansion o f the -s: n ; x x i v; xxv; xxvi n; x x v i i ; x x i x ; xxx n; non- -: 2 1 1 ; sign of -: 87; 2 1 8 ; see also
Paratr"'!I,vikalaglllll'{,lIi: xli n; 2 1 2 ; sensory -s: 204 and n ; the bringing xxxvi; xxx v i i i ; x x x i x ; xl; x l i i ; x l i i i ; 1 2S n ; Lord;
Paralril!I,i'ika/allmviwl/'(l(/(/f1/: xxxvi; 1 20n; to l ight of the -s: 1 7 3 ; the three -s: xvii 1 30n; 1 62n; tex ts: x x x v i i n; t h e teach­ rcflection (pratibilllba): 93n; 94; 1 1 3n ;
1 34n; 1 50n; I SSn; 1 9 1 11; 1 93 n ; and n; ing of thc -: x l ; 1 86 ; 2 1 1 n ;

266 267
relation: xv; x x i i ; x x i i i ; x l ; 95 and n; 96n; Saktisatra : x l n; Sautrantika: 89n; 1 1 2n; 1 1 3n; 1 1 5n; 1 62n; xviii; x x x i ; 1 89n; 1 90n; identificatio n of
97 and n; 98n; 1 20n; 1 24; 1 36; 1 40n; Saktivadin: x v i i i ; 1 8 1 n; - criticism o f the Sarvastivadins: the I with -: 1 7 3n; the absolute I of -:
1 46; 1 49n; 1 59n; 1 60; 1 84 and n; 1 85 ; - Sakyamati : 1 37n; 1 82n; xxxii; the distinction between the I and -:
between a real thing and a unreal one: sdlllal/adhikara�lya: 1 9 1 n; relationship o f - : Sayana: 1 2 1 n; xxxv; the nature of - (sivata): x v i i ; x x x v ;
x i x ; - between tanmatro and mahahlll7ta: 1 80n; Science ( I'idya) : 1 97 ; 198; 1 89n; 2 1 7; 2 1 8; t h e supreme -: x i ; x x v i i i
[ 95n; - between universal and partieu[ar: sdllldnyalod!,,�!a: [ 1 7n; the concept o f -: scriptures (,Mstra): xvii; XV11l; xxiii; n; 2 1 7n; the supreme condition o f - :
1 95n; - o f action and factors: 95; 1 84; 1 [ 6n; revelation o f the - : 1 06n; Vai�Qava - s : xxxiv;
[ 85 ; - of agent and object o f the action: s(///l(ll'da (penetration, etc,): x x x i i ; x x x i i i xxxvi; ,�il'admi: i x n; x i i i and n; x i v ; x v ; xviii;
[ 75; - of gamya-gamaka: 1 80n; - o f liliga­ n; x x x v ; x x x v i i ; x x x v i i i and n; x x x i x ; Sekoddda!fkcl: 208n; xx; x x i ; xxi n; xxiv; x x v n; xxvi; xxvii;
liligin: 1 40n; - of l'yal'oshapya- I'Y0l'a­ 203n; self (atmall) : xvi; xvii; x x i x ; xxxiv n; x x x i x x x x i ; xxxiii; x xx v i i i ; 1 1 6n ; 1 1 8n; 1 1 9n;
slh(lpaka: 1 62n; idea of -: 1 57 ; 1 59; inva­ S(//!Ibal/d//(/pal'fk,�il: 95n; 96n; 97n; and n; 85; 8 6 ; 87 and n; 88 and n; 92 1 20n; 1 26n; 1 39n; 1 49n; 1 52n; 1 79n;
lidating-invalidated between cognitions: SGf!llwl/dhaparfk,sallllsara: 95n; and n; 93 and n; 94; 95n; 98; 1 02n; l 03n; 1 82n; 1 84n; 1 87n; 1 93n; 200n; 2 1 8 ;
[ 39 and n; 1 40n; 1 45n; reciprocal S(//!II)(llldhaparfk,�il!fkil: 95n; 1 07 ; 1 1 6n; 1 1 8n; 1 1 9 and n; 1 23 and n; ,�ivad!"sril'!'tti: xvi n; x v i i ; x x v i ; x x v i i n ; x x x
between antecedent and consequent SGf!lhalld/wsiddhi: xl; 95n; 1 2 4 and n; 1 26; 1 27 and n ; 1 2 8 ; 1 33 ; n; x x x i ; xxxiv; x l ; x l i i i n; 1 26n; 1 49n;
parts: 94n; see also cause-effect relation; SGfIIi}(llldhasiddhil'!,lIi: xl; 97n; 98n; 1 83n; 1 36; 1 38n; 1 56; 1 72; 1 74n; 1 90; 1 92; 1 87n; 1 89n; 1 90n; 1 93n; 1 94n;
�gl'edabhli,I'ya: 1 2 1 n; 1 84n; 1 94; 1 95 ; 1 98 ; 1 99; 206; 207; 2 1 0 and Sivadr,\'{ydlocalla: 1 50n;
Rudra: [ 97 and n ; the hundrcd -s: 20 [ n ; Sambhunatha: x x i ; n; 2 1 3 ; 2 1 5 ; 2 1 8 ; awareness of the -: 1 5 3 ; S ivagrayogin: x x x i i i n;
Rlidrayamalasara : [ 94n; s(//!Ikalpa: 1 24n; conscious - : 203 ; permanent - : 9 0 ; 9 1 and Sivastotrdvalf: x x i and n ; x xv i i i ; x x x n;
,�iII}{/rahhasya: I [ 7n; Saqlkhya: xix; xl; 93n; 1 75n; 1 85n; 1 99n; n; supreme -: 1 20; 1 52; the - of others: x x x i ; xxxvi; xli and n;
,I'abdahhaval/(I: [ 25n; 1 26n; 200 and n; 204; - texts: 1 95n; ancient -: 1 08; the of the Lord: 1 1 X; the - of the .Sivasfitra: xxxiii; x iv n; x x x i n; 1 1 9n;
Sal){ladhatlisamfk,�d: xxvii n; [ 95n; classical - : 1 96n; supreme Lord: 1 22; identification with 1 55n; 2 1 4n;
,�{/hda/'Ih(/: 1 87n; S([I!lkhyaklirikcl: 204n; the - o f others: 1 08n; priority of the - : 86n; Sivasfitravdrttika : xxx n;
:Iabilalalll'a: xix; xxvi; ,I'({Illsara: x x x i i ; [ 97 ; 1 98; 202; 207; 2 1 4 sense: 1 1 2n; 1 1 3 and n; 1 1 6; 1 1 7 ; 1 24n; Sivasl7travimadinf: xiv n; xxviii n ; 86n;
,<'obdal'ym'ahd/'{J,l'(ldhana: 1 80n; and n ; 2 1 6 and n ; 2 1 7 ; 1 32n; 1 35 ; 1 44 and n; 1 5 8n; 2 1 2n; - of 1 1 1 n; 1 1 9n; 1 33n; 202n; 206n; 207n;
Sadakhya: [ 90 and n; s({l!lskiira: sce also latent impression and the I: 1 96; activity of the individual -s: 2 1 4n;
,)a(/a/'dhasara: xxx n; 1 93n; \'(1,1'(111([; [ 00; external and internal -s: 1 5 1 ; 1 65 ; S'ivataI/IIMstra: x i i i n;
Sadilsiva: xvi; xvii; xxx; 1 3 3 n; I X9n; 1 90n; SOl!lvitprak(7.\'a: 1 1 2n; 1 86n; 1 8Xn; 1 69 ; [ 76; 206; individual - ; [ 00; internal S ivopadhyaya: xl;
191 and n; 1 92n; 1 93n; 1 97n; 20 1 n ; SalllYllttonikaya: [ 1 5n; - (mallos): 1 24 and n; internal -s (al/tabka­ Siokal'tirttika: 93n; 1 4 1 n;
209n; 2 1 3n; the plane of -: x i x ; Sal1kara: ix; 1 5 5n; ra�/(/): 1 32n; [ 35n; 205n; objcct of the - Somananda: x i i i and n; x iv ; x v i ; xvii; xviii;
Sadasiva-Isvara: the plane o f -: 1 34n; 2 1 1 n; SaI1karanandana: 95n; [ 2 1 n; s: 1 5 1 and n; 206; powers of the -s: 205n; x i x ; x x ; x x i ; x x i i n; x x i i i ; xxv n ; x x v i
2 1 7n; :ic7I1Ia: 200n; 206; and n; xxvii; xxviii; x x i x ; x x x n; xxxvii;
Sa(ldlu/(lisamfk,l'Il: xxvi; xxvii n; ,Wlllahrahlllal'ada: 1 86n; senticnce (coitallya) : xxviii; 93; 94; 1 1 9; xxxviii; 1 20n; 1 52n; 1 89n; 2 1 8;
Sadhananda: xliv; sal/tiilla: 92n; 1 X 1 n; separation: xxxv; 1 42; 1 50; 1 5 1 n; see also Soma,\'alllbhllpaddhati: 208n;
SadhallaslIIlIlIdde,va: xxvi n; Sal//(/IIc1l1ta/'(/siddhi: 88n; I 08n; di ffcrentiation; sovereignty (ai,(:varya): xxxviii; 86; 93n;
Sadyojyotis: xiii n; xxii; 20 1 n; Santarak�ita: xxvi n; 1 29n; Siddhalllakallll1l1df: 1 20n; 1 20; 1 2 1 ; 1 73n; 1 93 ; 1 94; 1 98; 209n;
sa/wl'il'Clk,vii (the principle): l i On; Stirasvalasw!lgro/w: 1 55n; Siddhayogdvarrmala: x i i ; spal/da : 1 2 1 n; school: xiv and n; slimal/ya­
sahopalall/hhalliyanw: [ I I n ; Sarvododal/o,I'(//!lgraha: 1 1 3 n; 1 1 4n; 1 1 5n; ,�ik,I'c7samllc('aya: x x v i i n ; pario: 207n; concept of - : xiv n; doctrine
,�ail '(lgamapal'ibhcl,wllIlalljal'r: 20Xn; 1 37n; l X l n; similarity (sc7dr.{ya) : 99n; 1 00 and n; l O i n ; o f the -: x i i i ; x x i i i n;
,\'ail'(lparibhc7,I'a: xxxiii n; [ 96n; ,I'on'{J,\'aklivilolaW: xxv n; 1 02n; Spal/dakdrikd: x i i i ; 1 24n; 204n; 2 1 4n;
Saivasiddhanta: xi; xii n; xiii and n; xix; S(//'\'(/,\'(I/'\'(llmo \'(lda: the doctrinc o f - : xv; Slradeva: 1 20n; Spal/dak(lrikaviv!'ti: x x v i ;
x x i ; x x x n; xxxi; [ 74n; 200n; Sarl'asiddl/(llIta,I'(//!lgraho: xxxvi; 1 1 2n; SitikaI)\ha: xli n; Spalldanir�/(/ya : xiv n ;
Saivasiddhantin: xxi; xxxiii n; the un­ ,I'aslra: prakriyao : 1 89n; 1 90n; sc7ra o : Siva: x ; xv; xvi; xvii and n; xviii; x x i ; xxiii; Spal/dapradfpikcI: x x v i n; x x v i i n;
declared alliance with the -s: x x i i ; I X9n; x x x ; xxxi; xxxiii; x x x iv n; x l i i ; 86n; Spalldas(l/!lCloha: 1 5 5n;
Saka1a: 1 46n; 1 99n; 20 I n; 203n; .�(lslraparc7l11ar,vo: xli n; 1 04n; [ 22 ; 1 23n; 1 52; 1 74; 1 89n; 1 90n; sphora: x i x ;
Sakti (Power): x i ; x v i i ; x v i i i ; x x x ; 1 75 ; ,S'ota/'(/llIa,I'(//!lgra//(/: 1 93n; 1 99n; 1 97n; 20 1 n; 2 1 2n; 2 1 7 ; °riipaW: xxvii; sphllmttd (luminous vibrating): 1 2 1 a n d n ;
1 76; °prasara: x x v i ; the highest - : [ 2 [ n; sOlyaW: xxvii; 1 50n; 1 5 1 n; Self-: xxix; °c7hlulsa: xxviii; ,(:imtattl'a : 1 22;

268 269
SrTka!lrhfsaf!lhila: x x x n ;
SrflllGligaliWistra: xxx n ;
sthairya: 1 57n; 1 60n;
Sthiramati: 1 1 4n; 1 1 5 n ;
s u bject: xvi n; x v i i i ; xix; xxiv n ; x x v i i i and
n; xxix; xxxiii n; xxxiv n; xxxvii; 86n;
87; 88n; 90 and n ; 9 I ; 92; 94 and n; 97n;
98n; 1 00n; 1 04n; 1 05; 1 06; 1 08; 1 09;
1 1 0 and n ; 1 1 2 n ; 1 1 8 and n ; 1 1 9 ; 1 20n;
1 22 and n; 1 2 7 and n ; 1 29n; 1 3 3 and n;
1 34n; 1 3 8n; 1 39n; 1 40n; 1 42n;
1 46n; 1 47n; 1 48 and n; 1 50n; 1 5 1 ; 1 52 ;
1 53 and n; 1 55 ; 1 56; 1 59 ; 1 6 1 and n ;
1 62; 1 63n; 1 64 and n ; 1 68n; 1 69; 1 72
and n; 1 73 and n; 1 76n; 1 77; 1 8 1 n; 1 82;
1 85 ; 1 8 8n; 1 89n; 1 90n; 1 9 1 and n; 1 9211;
1 93; 1 94 and n ; 1 95 and n; 1 96n; 1 98 ;
1 99; 2 0 0 and n ; 20 I and n; 2 0 3 and n;
204; 205; 206; 207n; 2 10 and n; 2 I I ;
2 1 2 and n; 2 1 3 ; 2 1 4 ; 2 1 5 and n; 2 1 6;
2 I 7; aka/a - : 1 92n; consciousncss of the
knowing -: 1 59n; cxpcrienee of the - :
1 63 ; I M; hierarchy o f -s: xxxi; condition
of -: 1 08n; description of thc various
categorics of -s: 1 99n; the divine - (pali):
xxxi; the knowing s u bject is thc cause of
the twofold manifestation of the cffeet:
l 7 7n; thc supreme knowing - : xxx; 1 89n;
true -: xxviii; u l t imate - : 1 04n; u n i fy i ng
function of the knowing -: 1 72 ; see also
cognizer and agent;
subjectivity (pralllillrW): xxxii; x l i ; 1 93n;
1 94n; 1 97; 1 98 ; 203 ; 204;
authentic - : 2 1 5 ; dynamism of - : 204n;
fragmcnted -: xxviii; leve l s of - : 1 99n;
209n; 2 1 6n; l i m ited - : 1 97 n ; 2 1 1 ; 2 1 4n;
supreme -: 2 I I ; four levels of the limit­
ed -: x x x v i ;
substance (drm'ya) : 1 05; 1 1 5n; 1 1 9 a n d n;
1 20n; 1 2 1 n; 1 26n; 1 5 7; 1 59; 1 60 and n;
1 M; 1 67 n ;
succession: xxxvi i i ; 9 4 ; 95; 1 36; 1 53 and
n; 1 54 and n; 1 76 ; 1 77 ; 1 83n; spatial -:
1 54; 1 55 ; 1 60; spatio-temporal - : 1 37 ;
temporal -: 1 54; 1 5 5; 1 60; 1 83 ; 1 85; 1 89;
1 90;
S uddhavidya: 1 90n; 1 9 1 n; 1 92n; 1 93 n ; 1 53 ; 1 54 and n ; 1 58 ; 1 59n; 1 63 n ; 1 64n; IIpalabdhilak,w(wprapta: 1 4 1 n ; 144n;
sll,wlllfla (the m i d d l e path): 2 0 8 ; 209 and 1 65 ; 1 68n: 1 69 and n ; 1 7 1 n; 1 72 n ; 1 85 ; IIpc7ya: xxxviii n ; c/(wl'ao : x x x v i i and n;
11; 1 94 and n ; 1 95 ; 206n; 2 1 5n ; cosmic - : Mklao: xxxvii and n ; x x x i x ; Mmbhava
sl'i/hili/sa: 1 39n; 1 6 1 n; 208n: idea of -: 1 57 ; power of - (the divine means): xxxvii and n;
s\'ahhc/mhelll: 88n; 1 73 n ; 1 80n; (kala,�akli): 1 53 and n; praI)ic -: 208n; x x x v i i i ; x x x i x ; the doctrine o f -s: x i v n ;
sl'abl/(7l'iiflllpa/ahdhi: 1 43n; the three -s: 1 47 ; 1 68; xxxv i i ;
s\'(/hilc7l'apralihalldha: 1 79n; Timirodghiila: 2 1 4n; IIpayoga: 1 57;
SI'(/cchal/(/alantra: xii; 20 I n; 208n ; Trika: x i i and n ; xiv; xvii; xxi; xxii and n; Utpalavai�I)ava: x ;
s\'(f/ak,w(/(/ (particular reality, individual -, x x x and n ; x x x i i i ; xxxvi; xxxvii; xl; Vacaspatimisra: 1 1 4n;
particular entity, single individuality): x lv i i i ; 1 93n; t h e Abhinavagupta's - : xiv; vacuity (.vl7nyalil) : 1 32n; 2 1 1 n ;
1 44n; xxii n; 89; 90 and n; 1 04 and n; 1 05 and Trikahrdaya (or °sc/ra): x i i ; x x x n : 86n; Vaibha�ika: 1 1 3n; 1 1 5n ;
n; 1 5 8; 1 60; 1 63n; 1 64n; 1 67n; 1 68 ; Trikasadbhiil'a: x i i ; Vaise�ika: 92n; 93n; 1 1 5 n ; 1 75n; the s i x -
1 7 1 n; 2 1 3 ; 2 1 4n; 2 1 5 n ; - according t o Irika\'(ldin : 1 37 n ; categories: xxvii n ;
B uddhist logicians: 89n; - according t o Tril!I,�ikc7: 1 1 5 n ; VaiyakaraJ)a: tradition: xxvii; s e e also
,\'aim au thors : 89n-90n; cognition o f Tripura: x x x v i ; x l ; Grammarians;
t h e - : 1 69n; Tripllrc7rahasya: x x x v i ; Vakyapadfya: x i x ; x x i v ; xxv n; x x v i and
s\'(/rlhilllll/lu/Ila: xxii n; True Science (.I'adl'idya): 1 90; 1 9 1 ; n; 94n; 1 08 11 ; 1 20 n ; 1 2 1 n; 1 24 n ;
S \'(/yalllbhll\'(lgallla: 1 99n; 202n; truth: relative - : 1 57n; 1 25n; 1 50n; 1 53 n ; 1 54n; 1 64n; 1 65n;
Syildl'l/da/"(/Iflakara: 95n: Tryamhhaka (or Termnbha) : xiv: 1 88n;
sy l l abc: the supreme - : 2 1 7 : IlIryaWa (the state beyond the fourth): Vakyapadlyapaddhali: 1 25 n ; 1 26n; 1 64n;
liI(/aIIllYIl : 1 79n; x x x i i ; xxxiv; xxxix; 209 and n; the two Vt7kyapadfyavrtti: xix; xxv; xxvi n; 1 20n;
ladllllWlti: 1 7911; IlIlyc7Was del ineated by Abhinavagupta: 1 2511; 1 53 n ; 1 65 n ; authorship: xxv n;
lall/as: 1 52 : 2 1 1 ; 2 1 2 and n; 2 1 3 ; xxxiv n; Vamanadatta: x;
-1\'(/, -Ia/: the meaning o f - : 1 2 1 n; \'(/.I'al/(/ (karmic residual traces): x l i i ; xxxiv;
lall/I/ii!ra: 1 95; 1 96n; 204n; 205n:
Ucclill,l'mahhairam: xxviii n; I I I n; 1 07n; 1 1 3 ; 1 1 4; 203n; 208n; 209n; see
tantra: Bhairava -s: x i : xii and n; xxx n: the
Udayakara: 2 1 9; also latent impression;
secret -s: 1 7411: Trika -s: xii; Yamala -s:
unity, non di fferentiation, etc. (aikya, )'{/sancll'aicilrya: V ijfianavadi n ' s -: 1 1 4n;
xii;
ahlieda, etc.): 1 3 3 and n; 1 37 ; 1 57 ; 1 58n; \'(/.1'111: 1 29n; 1 43 n ; 1 80n;
Tanlrii/oka: xiii n; xiv a n d II ; xxii n; xxviii;
xxxi n; xxxii n ; x x x v i ; xxxvii and 11 ;
1 59 and n; 1 60; 1 63 ; 1 65 n ; 1 66 and n: \'(/slv(lrilla: 1 87 n ;
1 69; 1 72 ; 1 76n; 1 77 ; 1 84n; 1 85 ; 1 86; Vasugllpta: x i i i ; x i v ;
xxxviii; xxxix; 1 50n; 1 96n: 1 99n; 206n;
1 87n; 202n; 206; - - m u ltiplicity tension: Vatsyayana: I 1 7n;
Tanlri)/oka \'il'cka: xiv and n; xxx n : xxxvii
1 60n: - between subject and object: 1 9 1 n; Vedanta: xxix; 1 74n;
11; xxxviii; xxxix and n; 20011: 20 1 n ;
- in separation (hhedt7/Jheda) : 1 59n; of Vedantic schoo l s : ix; xv; xxvii; cilra­
205n; Tanlrasadhhc7l'a: xii and n; 202n:
light: 1 52; - of the objects: 1 70; - of f!rt7!/(/ brahmav(/din: ix n; sphll/i1igc7tmaw/din:
'/'anlrtl.w/ra : xxxviii and n;
and apana: 209; - of the thing: 1 66n; ix n ;
'/'an ll'lJecaya: xxxvii n ; xxxviii;
1 67n; 1 70n; 1 85n; notion of - : 167 and n; Vedanti n : xviii; xxvi n; 1 86n;
Tarkilhha,I'i/: 8911; I I I n ; I 1 3 11 ; 1 1 5n;
universal (j{/Ii, sall/(/nya) : x i x ; xxvii; 90n; verbalization (abhidhclna): 97n;
'/'all)'{/bodhifll: 1 20n;
1 05n; 1 06n; 1 1 3n; 1 2 1 n ; 1 24; 1 29n; 1 57 ; Vidya: 1 33n; 1 9 1 n ; 1 92 and n ; 1 93 ; 1 94;
Talt\'(/prakt7,I'(I: 1 90n; 1 99n; 20 I n ;
1 59; 1 60 and n; 1 63 and n ; 1 67 n ; 1 68 1 95 ; 200n; the -s: 20 I n; the l ight o f - -
Talll't7rllwcinlt7l11a!li: 20711;
and n; 1 72 and n; 2 1 3 ; 2 1 4 and n; 2 1 5 ,\'akli: 1 3311; power of ( vidYcl,vakli): 1 93
Talll'a.l'm!lgraha : 94n; I I I n; 1 1 3n; 1 1 5n;
-
and n; hierarchy o f -s: xxvii; the - as the and n; 1 94n; vidyc7tattva: 1 9 1 n;
1 1 7n; 1 3011; 1 62n; 1 67n; 1 83n; 206n;
exc l u sion of the other: xxii n ; universals' Vidyapl\ha: x i i n ;
Talfl'a,\w!lgrahapafijika: 1 4311; 1 6211; 1 67 n ;
- (maln/st7mal/ya) : 1 2 1 n; Vidyesa: 200n;
throat: 1 97n;
1II){/cilrasa(((/: 1 87 n ; Vidyesvara: 1 92n; 1 93 and n ; 1 99 n ; 20 1
time (killa ) : xxvii; 89n; 90n; 9 1 ; 93 and n;
IIpt7dhi (accessory condition, - q u a l i fica­ and n; 202n;
95; I 04n; 1 05 n ; 1 07n; 1 1 7 and n; 1 2 1 ;
lion): 1 48; 1 49; 1 54; Vijfianabhairava: xiv; xxv n ; x l ;
1 22; 1 27; 1 30n: 1 3 5n; 1 36; 1 4 1 n ; 1 48 n ;
270 27 1
Vijfianakevala (Vijfianakala, Vijfianakeva­ Vr�abhadeva: 1 25n; 1 26n; 1 64n;
lin): xxxii; 1 46n; 1 93n; 1 99 and n; 200 Vydkara(wbh17,w(wsdra: 1 20n;
and n; 203n; 208 and n; state of -: 200n; Vyakhyani: x i i i n;
Vijfianavada: ix; xv; xxviii; xxix; I I I n; I'ydpaka: 1 90n;
1 1 5n; vyapya: 1 90n;
CONTENTS
V!illallavildill : xviii; x x i i i n ; xxvii; 89n; I'yalireka: 1 1 3n ;
I l l n ; 1 1 3n; 1 1 4n; 1 1 5n; 1 8 1 n; I'yavahara: x v i ; xxi ii; 87n; 9 1 ; 97n; 1 46n;
Vijfiaptimatrata: 1 82n; 1 69n; 1 73n; 1 80n; 2 1 4n; the dimension
vikiisa (expansion): 1 1 9n; 1 48n; of human activity and behaviour (iokoO): Aknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pag. vii
Vimaiaprahh(7: 208n; 1 0 3 ; vyal'aharasMhalla: 87n;
vinlar,va: its various translations: xxiv n; waking: state: xxxii; xxxiv; 206 and n; Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............................................................... » ix
sec reflective awareness; 207 and n;
Vil!LI'alikli: 1 1 4n; 1 1 5n; 1 1 6n; word: xix; xxvii; 87n; 89n; 90; 1 2 1 n; 1 25n;
About this Edition ....................................................................... » xlvi
Vinttadeva: 95n; 1 26n; 1 27n; 1 29n; 1 30n; 1 64; 1 65 and
viruddhadharmadhyasa: 1 57n; n; 1 66n; 1 68 and n; each abhaS([ i s
l'i,wyilbhdsa: 1 06; I I I and n; 1 1 2n; 1 1 3 ; connected w i t h a - : x x v i i ; Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
» 1
1 1 7 ; 1 34 and n; 1 3 5; 1 3 8; 1 47; 1 6 1 n ; Word: x x i v ; 1 28; 1 63n; 2 1 3n; 2 1 4 and n;
1 62n; 1 69; activity of the - : [ 69n; First (MY(I I'ac): Translation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
» 83
l'i,(:e,I,)'o: relationship of - -vi,(:e,l'o(w: 1 29n; 1 20 and n; II/adhyallla: xlii; [ 97n;
vismoya: 1 1 9n; pa,(:yalllf: xix; xx; xxvi; xlii; supreme -
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . » 221
Vi�DU: x ; 1 97 and n; (para\'(7c) : x i x ; xxv; xxvi; xlii; 1 20; 1 2 8 ;
.

l'i,(:r(llIli: 1 1 9n; 1 97n; all-pervasive power of t h e -: xxv;

l'i,I'f'(llllisl//(llIa: 86n; 1 23n; criticism of the tripartition of the - : xxv; Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
» 223
1'i,\'II\'(/I : 207; 208n; the first effusion of pa,(valltf: 1 97n;
vil'arla: ix; xviii; xix; xxvi n; xxviii; fourth [ever of the - : xxvi; the funda­ Index of important words in the Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
» 235
Sabdadvayavadi ns' - : xxvi; mental ambivalence of the -: 2 1 4n; the
void (,(:iillya): xxxii; 1 32 and n; 1 55 ; 1 94 levels of the -: 1 2 1 n; 1 97n; the supreme
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . » 257
and n; 1 95 ; 1 97 ; 200 and n; 202; 203 form of Pasyant1: xxvi; 1 20n; l'CIikhari:
.

and n; 204; 209n; 2 1 1 ; - identified with xlii; 1 97n; see also language;
the subjectivity (,I'tlllyc7hallld): 205n; yoga: xi;
°prall/cllr: 203n; 204n; identification Yogacara: 1 6 [ n ; 1 62n;
with the - : 205; Yogas[ilra: 1 04n; 1 2 [ n ; 1 98n;
volition, will (iccl/(J): xv; xxvii; 1 1 6; 1 1 8 yogin: xxxiv n; 1 08 and n; 1 1 6; 1 79n;
and n; 1 26n; 1 3 3 and n; 1 64; 1 73 ; 1 75; 1 93n; creation of a - : 1 79; 1 80 and n;
power of - (icc/u7,I'akli): xvii; xxxviii; 1 26n; vol ition of the -s: 1 79 ;
1 75; 1 93n; the of the subject: 1 35n; the Yogillihrdaya : xxxvi;
act of - : 1 26n; 1 87n; the first moment of Yogillihrdayadipiki7: xli n;
the -: xvii; the individual 's - : 1 52n; Yoginihrdayaseluband/w: xl n,

273
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