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 Definition as an argumentative strategy
in parliamentary discourse
A cross-cultural and comparative approach

Liliana Hoinărescu
“Iorgu Iordan – Al. Rosetti” Institute of Linguistics of the Romanian
Academy

The present paper aims to investigate the main argumentative uses of defini-
tions in various communicative contexts of the parliamentary discourse, on
the basis of two sets of data, selected from the British and the Romanian
Parliaments. Relevant categories of argumentative definitions are identified
and described, by taking into consideration their linguistic structure and
rhetorical features, as well as their current association with other types of
arguments and pragmatic strategies. The cross-cultural and comparative
perspective allows us to grasp to what extent the institutional forms, proce-
dural rules and cultural models can actually influence the argumentative
choices and reasoning patterns in the specific cases of the British and the
Romanian Parliamentary discourse.

Keywords: definition, argumentative strategy, descriptive and emotional

meanings, parliamentary discourse, cross-cultural research

1. Introduction

1.1 Theoretical framework

The persuasive value of definition has been acknowledged since Antiquity. As a

practical discipline, oriented toward the efficiency of language, rhetoric was obvi-
ously not interested in the metalinguistic operation itself and in the perfect suit-
ability between sign and referent. The profound interrogation on the relationship
between language and reality preoccupied, as it is well known, the philosophers
(see, among others, Charles 2010, Hestir 2016). However, the potential of defini-
tion to circumscribe the specific qualities of the object captured the orator’s atten-
tion. The concision and the representational closure fulfilled by definition enabled

https://doi.org/10.1075/ld.00013.hoi
Language and Dialogue 8:2 (2018), pp. 209–234. issn 2210-4119 | e-issn 2210-4127
© John Benjamins Publishing Company
210 Liliana Hoinărescu

the orator to fix the speech orientation and to guarantee the worldview or ideo-
logical perspective proposed.1 The act of defining creates the illusion of a previous
agreement between interlocutors, which is essential for the argumentative con-
struction, allowing also a subtle shift of accent on the mutually accepted reference
system. Definition could be used as a sophism any time, revealing the very falla-
cious nature of rhetoric, its intrinsic contradiction between appearance and truth,
knowledge and belief which philosophers like Plato did not cease to denounce.
Nevertheless, Aristotle linked rhetoric to philosophy by describing the former as a
branch of dialectic, and dialectic as a method of philosophical reasoning. He also
described the relationship between ethics and rhetoric, as practical disciplines (see
Aristotle, Rhetoric I, 1, 1354a 1–6; I, 2, 1355b 25–26; 1356a 22–35; for a critical discus-
sion, see also Hohmann 2000).
The nature of definition is thus dual: following Plato’s philosophical tradition,
continued nowadays by the philosophy of language, semiotics and semantics, def-
inition is a cognitive instrument that helps to capture the essence of the object, to
represent and describe the reality; following Aristotle’s rhetorical and dialectical
tradition, nowadays’ theory of argumentation, definition is a persuasive instru-
ment, used to convince or even to deceive the public.
Given these two broad orientations, as well as their division into disciplines
and sub-disciplines, each of them with its own implicit assumptions and hypothe-
ses, there are overlaps and intersections that affect the methodology and theoreti-
cal description of the definitions in a specific communicative context.2 According
to the current taxonomies, there are several types of definitions, grouped together
on several criteria: purpose, structure, mechanism of reasoning, relation between
definiendum and definiens. In the argumentation theory (informal logic), the most
common classification encompasses lexical (or normative), stipulative and persua-
sive definitions (Walton 2006, 245–256).
The class of persuasive definitions seems particularly important to the present
analysis. The concept was firstly described by the American logician Charles L.
Stevenson (1938). He observed that words used in argumentation have both an
emotive and a descriptive meaning. A persuasive definition appears whenever
the speaker redefines the descriptive meaning of the word, while preserving its
old familiar emotional meanings.3 Accordingly, ethical words like “peace”, “war”,

1. “Definitions can be conceived as endoxa, namely commonly accepted opinions” (Macagno

2008, 444).
2. For the relationship between the (modern theory of) argumentation and the (theory of) def-
inition, see especially Kublikowski (2009).
3. See Stevenson (1938, 331): “A “PERSUASIVE” definition is one which gives a new conceptual
meaning to a familiar word without substantially changing its emotive meaning, and which is

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 Definition as an argumentative strategy 211

“culture”, “justice” can be connoted either positively or negatively through defi-

nition, in order to serve the speaker’s discursive interests. By manipulating the
emotive and descriptive meaning of the ethical terms, the use of persuasive de-
finition is highly deceptive in law and politics. Stevenson’s theory on persuasive
definition has been widely accepted within the Anglo-Saxon space and included
in the contemporary conceptual achievements of informal logic and argumen-
tation (see Schiappa 1993, 1996, 2003; Zarefsky 1998, 2004, 2006, 2014; Walton
2001, 2006, 245–251; Macagno 2008, 2014; Macagno and Walton 2008). Contem-
porary studies have provided both a theoretical and an analytical framework of
definitions as part of the public discourse (in law and politics especially) and have
emphasised “the ethical and normative ramification of the act of defining” (Schi-
appa 2003, 3). Definitions contribute to rhetorically induce the social knowledge
and to support the authoritative discourse, so that they might be studied not only
as empirical or philosophical issues, but also as socio-political issues. Schiappa’s
assumption according to which “a rhetorical analysis is not at odds at philosoph-
ical analysis”, but a part of “practical philosophy” in fact links the ancient philo-
sophical and rhetorical tradition with modern perspectives on argumentative or
rhetorical uses of definitions (Schiappa’s 2003, 4).
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s Treatise on Argumentation (1971) remains
very influential, too. Starting from Aristotle’s deductive model of enthymeme, the
authors include definitions in the class of quasi-logical arguments, which are con-
structed on the logical or mathematical patterns of reasoning (1971, 193–195). All
definitions can be used argumentatively, in fact they represent the class of quasi-
logical arguments par excellence (1971, 214). Stevenson’s distinction between emo-
tive and descriptive meaning is considered questionable, the alteration of meaning
proper to persuasive definitions being the mere result of a dissociation technique
(1971, 446–447). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca also discuss about oratorical defi-
nitions, viewed as rhetorical figures with argumentative effect, which are not con-
ceived “to give the meaning of a word, but to bring to the fore certain aspects of
the facts which might otherwise remain in the background of our consciousness”
(1971, 172).
Finally, following The New Rhetoric, Philippe Breton reorganizes the typology
of arguments proposed by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca and includes defi-
nitions among “the framing arguments” (fr. “les arguments de cadrage”), along-
side presentation, association, dissociation and quasi-logical arguments (cf. Breton
2003, 45, 79–95). This class of arguments is related to the construction of the
speakers’ word reference: they advanced a subjective description of reality, by

used with the conscious or unconscious purpose of changing, by this means, the directions of
people’s interests.”

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212 Liliana Hoinărescu

insisting on certain aspects and by ignoring or minimizing the others, in order

to create the premises to defend an opinion, a thesis (cf. Breton 2003, 44). There-
fore, the common characteristic of “framing arguments” consists in introducing
an element of novelty; the framework of reference is the same, but its components
are differently configured. The manipulative use of an argumentative definition
occurs whenever the speaker tries to present his own perspective on the referent
as a lexical, normative description (Breton 2003, 82).
After this brief presentation, one can conclude that modern theories of argu-
mentation include definition both in the class of (quasi-)logical arguments, fol-
lowing Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971, 193–195; 210–214), and in the class
of fallacies, as it implies a new configuration of the semantic elements in order to
emphasise the emotional meanings (Stevenson 1938; Zarefsky 1998, 2004, 2006;
Walton 2001; Breton 2003, 79–83; Macagno and Walton 2008).

1.2 Aim, method, corpus

In what follows, we aim to analyse the most relevant types of argumentative de-
finitions in various communicative contexts of parliamentary discourse, by taking
into consideration their linguistic structure and rhetorical features as well as their
current association with other types of arguments and pragmatic strategies. The
term argumentative definition will encompass all situations in which definition
acquires a rhetorical and dialectical function. We consider that definitions could
be used to persuade both by means of logical reasoning (logos) and in a fallacious
way by reconfiguring the descriptive meaning and stimulating the emotions and
affectivity (ethos and pathos). In order to ensure a multi-level examination, the
theoretical and analytical background includes concepts of argumentation theory,
(cognitive) pragmatics and (critical) discourse analysis. The parliamentary dis-
course is understood as the most formal and institutionalised sub-type of political
discourse, which displays recurrent communication patterns and requires a con-
textual approach of analysis (see the theoretical descriptions of Bayley 2004; van
Dijk 2004, 340; Ilie 2003, 2006, 2010a and also the synthesis of Treimane 2011, 79).
The corpus consists in a series of transcriptions selected from Hansard
records, namely official transcripts of the oral proceedings in the House of Com-
mons of the UK Parliament (September 2015 – September 2016), and records from
the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Romanian Parliament (joint ses-
sions of two chambers from 2012 and 2014). Some excerpts taken from the old
Romanian Parliament (1866–1938) were also considered to be relevant. The com-
parative and cross-cultural analysis allows us to grasp to what extent the insti-
tutional rules and cultural models could actually influence the argumentative
choices and reasoning patterns in these two national Parliaments.

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 Definition as an argumentative strategy 213

2. Definition in the UK Parliamentary discourse

Formed in 1707 by the unification of the English and the Scottish Parliaments, the
UK Parliament is the continuator of the oldest parliaments in Europe. It represents
an institutional form which has lasted since the Middle Ages up to the present,
providing a pattern for many other democracies. The seniority and respectability
of the British Parliament are reflected in the quality of the debates, aiming at a
substantive analysis and clarification of public issues. The British MPs’ (members
of Parliament = MPs) discursive communicative competence, their rhetorical and
oratorical skills are essential for this purpose. Such an old and effective democra-
tic practice shaped rhetorical devices and deliberative schemas so that they might
serve as classical instances of parliamentary speech.

2.1 Conceptual dissociative definitions. Definition as an authoritative

argument

(1) Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood: My Lords, […] I want to use my three

minutes to express the fervent hope that we never again get ourselves into the
position that we are in now. We have held a referendum requiring a decision
by a simple majority on a question of the most profound importance, suppos-
edly offering a simple binary choice. Parliament having, by a large majority in
both Houses, commissioned the referendum, realistically it is now bound, in
the interests of the public continuing to trust us at all, to accept the result and
embark on the process of leaving […]
Referendums generally, I suggest, are to be discouraged. In a compelling arti-
cle, which is imminently to be published in Prospect magazine, Anatole Kalet-
sky explains why that is so. Margaret Thatcher, he records, called them “a
device for dictators and demagogues”. Their very character, said one of the
draftsmen of the original United States constitution, was tyrannous. The so-
called “will of the people” is often, the author suggests, “inconsistent or ill-
informed and sometimes dangerously repressive”.
Minority interests are simply ignored or overridden. Small wonder that, for
example, in Germany’s post-war constitution referendums were deliberately
excluded. Representative democracy should not be compromised. In short, we
must never again allow ourselves to get into this intolerable position.
(Hansard Debates, 07 July 2016: Column 2164)

Example (1) is interesting since it captures the overlapping between lexical and
argumentative definitions, as well as the cognitive and emotive components of
the act of defining. The topic of the parliamentary session concerns the impact of
Brexit on the United Kingdom and the following political decisions which must

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214 Liliana Hoinărescu

be reached. The orator’s goal is to convince the audience of the negative and dan-
gerous nature of the practice of “referendum”, and of the necessity to discourage it
accordingly. The normative definition of the word “referendum” viewed in a broad
sense is neutral: “a public vote on a particular issue“, but it entails the positive con-
notative value of a democratic practice since it directly expresses the “will of the
people”. In any political framework, it is not recommendable for a politician to
reject or criticize one of its most representative practices. Therefore, the speaker
appeals to other authoritative sources that could support his discursive premise.
His polyphonic argumentative movement includes two levels, firstly the voice of a
political analyst, Anatole Kaletsky, who quotes, secondly, other influential politi-
cal voices. Kaletsky provides Margaret Thatcher’s definition of the referendum: “a
device for dictators and demagogues” and goes on quoting one of the draftsmen
of the original United States constitutions, who claimed that: « The very charac-
ter of referendums was tyrannous. The so-called “will of the people” is often […]
“inconsistent or ill-informed and sometimes dangerously repressive ». As one can
see, the orator’s strategy consists in attacking the positive emotive meanings of the
word “referendum”, which are related to “democracy”, by using words that con-
note the opposite emotive meanings, related to “dictatorship, tyranny, repression”.
Specifically, he tries to change the positive perception of the word “referendum”
into a negative one, in order to convince the audience to avoid the use of this prac-
tice as a political instrument, which can compromise the “representative democ-
racy” by its effects. The persuasive definition can also be seen here as a dissociative
definition, the concept being split into two antithetic meanings (see Perelman and
Olbrecht-Tyteca 1971, 447–448).
Nevertheless, beyond the emotional argumentative component, the interro-
gation on the real nature and effects of political practices remains important. The
example proves that, in a crisis situation, politicians and society need to reexa-
mine and redefine the basic political concepts, in order to better understand their
nature and to prevent potential wrong political decisions. As mentioned before,
redefining is considered a specific argumentative method in philosophical and sci-
entific investigation. Definition is regarded as a hypothesis, which is attentively
scrutinized before being accepted or rejected (see Schiappa 2003, 6–7; Walton
2006, 251–256). Transposed in parliamentary/political discourse, often by means
of intertextuality, like in our case (the orator refers to an influent analyst’s article),
this interrogation may render a debate more critical and objective, even if it is
always susceptible to be politically biased.

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 Definition as an argumentative strategy 215

2.2 Defining ethical words. Negative (implicit) definition

(2) Lord Low of Dalston (CB): My Lords, perhaps I might be permitted to say a
word about the Commons rejection of my amendment. Despite the Minister’s
best efforts to soften the impact of the £30 cut in the incomes of disabled peo-
ple in the employment and support allowance WRAG, which I readily
acknowledge, this is a black day for disabled people. The Commons have spo-
ken decisively and we must bow to their wishes, but we do so under protest.
Do not let anyone kid you that this is democracy in action. There is more to
democracy than just being elected. Questions of representativeness, accessibility,
openness and responsiveness all come into it as well. From these standpoints, this
House, though unelected, is much more democratic.
(Hansard Debates, 7 Mar 2016: Column 1072)

Ethical words can also be described by negative means (see Macagno 2010, 205).
In Example (2), a member of the House of Lords comments on the decision to cut
the incomes of disabled people in the employment and support allowance WRAG.
Although the orator declares to accept the decision adopted by the House of Com-
mons, he protests against it, by questioning even its democratic essence. The cri-
ticism is enhanced by the negative exhortation: “Do not let anyone kid you that
this is democracy in action”, which draws attention to the distinction between the
appearance and the true nature of a political decision. The term “democracy” is
redefined in a more specific sense, in order to include not only the generic, lexi-
cal meaning, namely “popular election of the leaders”, but also meanings such as
“representativeness, accessibility, openness and responsiveness”. The orator sug-
gests that a political decision which prejudices the rights of a vulnerable minority
cannot be defined as a democratic decision. It is also important to notice that the
negative and exclamative structure of the utterance enhances the emotional mean-
ing and also allows for the refutation of “an implicitly presumed assumption” (Ilie
2009, 43). The rejected meaning is implicitly conveyed by the verb to kid which
functions as a trigger for a counter-factual presupposition: “this is not democracy
in action” (for a description of the main types of presuppositions and their trig-
gers, see Yule 1996, 26–30). The reasoning mechanism of this negative definition
goes from particular to general, namely a specific case is excluded as a defining
attribute for the concept under scrutiny.

2.3 Defining in interaction (Adjacency pairs Questions-Answers)

The Questions time session typical of the British Parliament offers dialogical exam-
ples of the argumentative use of definitions. Definitions can occur within both
questions and answers. The examples below are extracted from the same session of

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216 Liliana Hoinărescu

23 March 2016. Argumentative definitions have various linguistic structures and

exhibit different rhetorical functions.

2.3.1 Defining as a part of the act of refutation. Polemical quotations,

reformulation
As an agonistic discourse, parliamentary discourse displays many instances in
which the same referent is described differently by government parties and oppo-
sition parties. In fact, a positive or a negative evaluation is obtained by the use
of “framing arguments” among which definitions. The principle which lays at the
basis of this class of arguments is always the same: amplifying certain aspects of
the reality and minimizing others, in order to defend a thesis (Breton 2003, 80).
This twofold axiological perspective can be observed in Example (3), taken from a
Question Time session.
(3) Jeremy Corbyn: My question was actually about the poverty of people with dis-
abilities, which the Prime Minister did not answer. In his failure to explain how
he would fill the hole in his Budget left by the change of heart on personal
independence payments, the Chancellor said: “We can afford to absorb such
changes”. – [Official Report, 22 March 2016; Vol. 607, c. 1394.] If it is so easy to
absorb changes of this nature, why did the Chancellor and the Prime Minister
ever announce them in the first place? […]
[…]
The Prime Minister: I believe that after seven or eight years of economic
growth it is right to be targeting a surplus, because a responsible Govern-
ment put aside money for a rainy day. I do not want to be part of a Govern-
ment that do not have the courage to pay off our debts and leave them instead
to our children and grandchildren. That is the truth. What is dressed up as
compassion from the party opposite just means putting off difficult decisions
and asking our children to pay the debts that we were not prepared to pay our-
selves. [Interruption.] (Hansard Debates, 23 Mar 2016: Column 1564)

The Prime Minister answers a critical remark made by the leader of the opposition
with reference to the Government’s social policy, more precisely to the cuts of
incomes and allowance for disabled people. The criticism implied is that Govern-
ment deliberately ignores the most vulnerable social categories. The lack of com-
passion is not used by the opponent as an emotional premise of his critique, but it
is entailed since the care for the disadvantaged people is considered to be a prio-
rity task of any democratic government.
The Prime Minister’s strategy to refute the opponent’s thesis and to defend
the governmental policy refers precisely to this alluded emotional component.
The term “compassion” is redefined by the Prime Minister as a rational policy,

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 Definition as an argumentative strategy 217

which does not lack a humanitarian component, but, in fact, is based on it, since
it involves the future of the children. If compassion implies that children pay the
debts of the parents, the term “compassion” acquires a negative connotation and
becomes inappropriate. The claimed compassion is in fact described as irrespon-
sible egoism, even if the speaker does not use the word itself. In this example,
the speaker borrows the argumentative technique of his opponent and uses it in
his discursive benefit. The definition makes the act of refutation very efficient and
convincing, since the orator counterarguments by rejecting the very premise of
opposite reasoning, namely the social policies are compassionless, and denounces
them as simply demagogic policies.

2.3.2 Defining identity. Ironical turns

Political discourse provides a special discursive framework for negotiating iden-
tities. In the parliamentary setting, replies have multiple purposes, ranging from
simply informative to polemical. Interlocutors’ identities or public faces are
dynamically reshaped through dialogue.
(4) Jeremy Corbyn: Let me invite the Prime Minister to leave the theatre and return
to reality. The reality is that he has presided over a Budget that unravelled in
two days and now contains a £4.4 billion black hole. He may wish to consult
the Chancellor on yet another change of heart on this matter. Will he now con-
sult the Chancellor and tell the country who is going to pay for the black hole?
[…]
The Prime Minister: Suddenly the king of fiscal rectitude speaks. The right hon.
Gentleman may have noticed that the Budget passed last night. It is a Budget
that cuts the deficit in every year of this Parliament. It is a Budget that delivers
a surplus by the end of this Parliament. None of that is going to change. […]
[Interruption.] (Hansard Debates, 23 Mar 2016: Column 1565)

In Example (4), Jeremy Corbyn continues to express his disagreement with the
Prime Minister’s explanation related to the Governmental fiscal policy. His ironic
invitation addressed to the Prime Minister “to leave the theatre and return to real-
ity” implies an unrealistic and insincere or even incompetent Prime Minister’s
stance. The reply is ironic too, attesting to the spontaneous accommodation of the
answer to the rhetorical means of the question. If the first speaker implies that
the Prime Minister is an “actor”, i. e. unrealistic and insincere, the Prime Minis-
ter rejects the criticism by ironically contesting the skills of his opponent in fis-
cal policies: “Suddenly the king of fiscal rectitude speaks”. Both interventions aim
at defining the political opponent’s identity in negative terms and therefore they
function as ad hominem fallacies (personal attacks).

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218 Liliana Hoinărescu

2.3.3 Metaphorical definitions. Amplifying the agreement

(5) Mike Freer (Finchley and Golders Green) (Con): I am sure the Prime Minis-
ter is as appalled as I am that incidents involving anti-Semitism are on the rise.
Does he agree that all organisations, public and private, should root out anti-
Semitism, without hesitation?
The Prime Minister: I completely agree with my hon. Friend; anti-Semitism is
an absolute cancer in our societies and we should know that when it grows it is
the signal of many even worse things happening to ethnic groups and different
groups all over our country. There is, sadly, a growth of anti-Semitism in our
country and we see it in terms of attacks on Jewish people and Jewish stu-
dents – it absolutely has to be stamped out. We should all, whatever organisa-
tion we are responsible for, make sure that happens.
(Hansard Debates, 23 Mar 2016: Column 1566)

The same rhetorical symmetry can be observed in Example (5). The question per-
tains to the rise of anti-Semitism and the society’s need to root it out. The phrasal
verb root out is etymologically metaphorical. It refers primarily to the root of a
plant, but also analogically to the root of an organ that is attached to the body.
The use of the verb is related to a cognitive schema according to which society
is represented as a biological body and the evil elements as diseases. The Prime
Minister tacitly accepts this metaphorical representation and enhances it. In his
answer, anti-Semitism is precisely represented as a cancer: “anti-Semitism is an
absolute cancer in our societies”. The representation of the society as a body is very
ancient and cross-linguistic in political philosophy (it appears in Plato’s Repub-
lic, but also in the Middle Ages and in modern and contemporary political dis-
course). Metaphorical definitions, by their universal cognitive patterns, are easily
understandable by everyone and present the advantage of concisely capturing
both cognitive and emotional meanings of the notion (see Lakoff and Johnson
1980; Kövecses 2005). Scholars have outlined the ideological function of concep-
tual metaphors in political discourse. Political actors massively reiterate and dis-
seminate conceptual metaphors, since they have the potential to create the prior
basic agreement, to establish a common ground between politicians and people at
the psychological and cognitive level (see also Semino 2008, 81–123).

2.3.4 Definition as a discursive premise. The framing argument

(6) Angus Robertson: A defining characteristic of a democratic society is our trust
in our institutions and democratic oversight by parliamentarians of those who
work so hard to keep us safe. We have that oversight with our police and with
our security services, but we do not yet have it with UK special forces under

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 Definition as an argumentative strategy 219

the Intelligence and Security Committee or the Defence Committee. Will the
Prime Minister address that?
The Prime Minister: I am afraid that I just part company with the right hon.
Gentleman on that one. We have put in place some of the most extensive over-
sight arrangements for our intelligence and security services. Our services do a
remarkable job, and the police are regularly called to account both locally and
nationally. The work that our special forces do is vital for our country. […]
(Hansard Debates, 23 Mar 2016: Column 1567)

In the example above, the definition precedes the question as a discursive premise.
Beginning with a generally accepted statement, the orator outlines the values
shared with his interlocutor and this preliminary agreement, which is essential
for the argumentative construction, has also the role to mitigate the directive
aspect of the act of questioning. Arising from the discursive premises, the ques-
tion takes on a rational and necessary character and compels the opponent to give
an explicit, rational answer. Scholars named this kind of definition, which dis-
play the meaning of a key word, “arguments from definitions” (Schiappa 1993, 404;
Zarefsky 2014, 120–123; Kublikowski 2009, 235). It takes a normative or simply
uncontroversial expression, which may function as a political cliché. Definitions
are viewed here as endoxa, namely “commonly accepted opinions” (Macagno
2008, 444).
As shown by the three examples above, the manner of questioning induces
the manner of answering, an ironical question is followed by an ironical answer, a
rational question by a rational answer and so on. This rhetorical mimicry between
an initiative act and the consecutive reactive speech act seems to be peculiar to
parliamentary discourse, as a particular expression of a universal dialogic princi-
ple of language (see Weigand 2009; 2010).

2.4 Legal definitions. Metadiscourse. Stipulative/statutory definitions

As it has been emphasized, Parliament is not only a place of confrontation, but

also an institutional setting where elected members should cooperate with each
other. As legislators, the MPs must collaborate especially in order to achieve the
best form of a law. This activity implies complex metalinguistic operations for
clarifying the legal meanings of the words. The discussions are technical and nor-
mally every participant tries to bring the highest degree of precision which may
cover a lack in the legal definition. Leaving aside the cases where legislators for-
mulate the law to serve certain political or economic interests (characteristic to
transitory democracies), one may admit that legislators do their best to improve
the legal definitions. The example below is taken from the House of Commons
records.

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220 Liliana Hoinărescu

(7) Justin Madders: Our first two amendments relate to the introductory com-
ments in clause 1, which sets out the purpose of the Bill. […]
“Treatment” is defined in clause 5 to include “inaction”. For example, a patient
might suffer from complications after bowel surgery. The patient having a fever
and abdominal pain, the surgeon decides not to return them to theatre, but to
continue with treatment of antibiotics and monitoring. In fact, the patient has
a bowel perforation caused by the surgery and sadly dies. Under the current
law, the court would find that no responsible body of surgeons would have
delayed taking the patient to surgery within 24 hours. Had the surgeon done
so, the patient’s perforated bowel could have been repaired and they would
have survived. The court would find that the surgeon was negligent and that
the negligence caused the patient’s death. The patient’s family would in those
circumstances be compensated.
(Hansard Debates, 16 December 2015: Column 5)

These legal redefinitions, which are called “stipulative” or “statutory” definitions,

are used to “introduce a new meaning of a word in order to build an artificial
and unambiguous lexicon with a view to prevent potential ambiguities” (Macagno
and Damele 2015, 226). The act of defining is characteristic to lawmakers, among
which the members of Parliament. The redefinition of a specific term, like in
Example (7) “treatment”, occurs whenever a legal meaning of a word is too
restricted and does not cover all the extensions of the referent. Unlike the lexical
definitions, which tend to display a general description of the referent, the legal
definition must take into consideration and comprise all specific cases with their
particularities. Consequently, in order to propose a new legal definition, the orator
adopts the argumentation by example. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca, the example belongs to the class of arguments based on the “structure of
the real” and reveals an inductive reasoning (1971, 350–357). In such legal argu-
mentation, a general rule is defined on the basis of the prototypical cases; if a
counter-example is found, the exemplum in contrarium, as it is the case in the frag-
ment cited, the legislator should redefine the general rule accordingly (see Perel-
man and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 355).
To conclude this section, the UK Parliament displays various instances of de-
finitional arguments, which are being used as logical, normative or legal as well as
emotional instruments, in monological and dialogical discursive contexts, some
of them belonging to the same session. Having analysed the definitional argu-
ments in the UK Parliament, we next turn to examine the main uses of definition
in the Romanian Parliament.

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 Definition as an argumentative strategy 221

3. Definition in the Romanian Parliamentary discourse

The use of argumentative definitions depends on the organisational structures

and the conventional norms specific to each Parliament. The deliberative aspect
also has to do with the tradition and the continuity of Parliamentary activities, as
well as with the socio-cultural and historical context (see Bayley 2004, Ilie 2006;
2010a). In contrast to the UK Parliament, the Romanian Parliament does not have
a long history. It was founded in 1866, when Romania became a parliamentary
(constitutional) monarchy. Its activity was interrupted in the 1940’s by the his-
torical events that shaped the European geopolitical map: the second Word War
and the division of Europe into two influential political spheres. Romania became
a communist state, with a totalitarian regime. After 1989, Romania reloaded its
democratic road and a new Parliament was elected. The members of this new
Parliament needed to adapt to the deliberative practice and to learn rhetorical
devices, which were completely neglected in the former totalitarian regime, where
the decisions were taken by the leaders and would never be submitted to pub-
lic deliberation. All these historical and socio-cultural factors have influenced the
communicative competence of present-day Romanian MPs.
The description of the present-day Romanian Parliament, often in contrast
with the British Parliament, has already been made in extensive studies (see espe-
cially Ilie 2010b, Săftoiu 2015). Besides differences related to spatial arrangement
(namely face-to-face seating in the UK Parliament versus semi-circular seating,
having in front the presiding members in the Romanian Parliament), and verbal
activity regulations (the dialogue between the orator at the rostrum and other
members of Parliament from the audience is strictly banned in the Roman-
ian Parliament), there are also different institutional forms that make difficult
or prevent a symmetrical comparison between the British and the Romanian
Parliaments. The Romanian Parliament has a hierarchical organisation, which
involves specialised commissions for debating particular issues related to econ-
omy, defence, culture and education. Since the legislative proposals are pre-
viously discussed in the Parliamentary Commissions (these debates are not
recorded and transcribed, only a report is published), plenary discussions are
considered superfluous. In the plenary, the “legislative proposals or the law pro-
jects” are submitted to final vote, preliminary discussions referring not to sub-
stantive issues, but to procedural issues. Therefore, we cannot discuss about legal,
stipulative definitions. Furthermore, the Romanian Parliament does not actu-
ally provide a dialogical, spontaneous framework for checking the work of the
government equivalent to Question time in the UK Parliament. Each minister is
obliged to respond MPs’ questions especially in writing. Romanian MPs get the
opportunity to control the government’s activity mainly by means of motions

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222 Liliana Hoinărescu

of censure. Consequently, to illustrate the deliberative activity in the Romanian

Parliament, the most representative sessions are the Joint sittings of the Chamber
of Deputies and the Senate, which are attended by the members of the govern-
ment, too. These common sessions concern the most important issues, such as
the vote of investing a new government, motions of censure, celebrating impor-
tant events, and so on. There are instances where the Prime Minister defends
his public policies and answers the questions formulated by the members of the
opposition party, or other cases where the MPs interact with each other, after
having been given the right to reply. Generally speaking, these are occasions for
Romanian politicians to exhibit their rhetorical skills.
We chose to analyse two sessions, in which the argumentative use of definition
is characteristic: The Joint sittings of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate from
27 April 2012, and The Joint sittings of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate from
4 March 2014. The former dealt with the motion of censure that the opposition
formed by the Social Liberal Union (USL) filed against the government led by
Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu, while the latter registered The Changing of the Structure
and Political Composition of Ponta government after the breaking of the Social Li-
beral Union (USL) in February 2014, which brought about the return of the Lib-
eral Party to Opposition.

3.1 Polemical conceptual definition. Im/politeness strategy

A very common argumentative scheme used in the Romanian parliamentary dis-

course involves two mental representations of the discursive object, one proposed
as valid and the other rejected (p, but not q). This both adversative and polyphonic
structure (see Ducrot 1984, 213–233) allows the speaker to bring forward his view-
point on a certain situation or fact as a normative, objective one, and to reject a
certain manifestation as invalid or incorrect. The distinction implies usually moral
evaluations, attacking MPs’ institutional image. In the example below, the Prime
Minister defines the role of the opposition in democracy in contrast to the con-
crete opposition made by the USL.
(8) Domnul Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu – prim-ministrul Guvernului României:
Opoziţia are, în esenţă, un rol pozitiv, prin critica pe care o formulează la
adresa actului de guvernare, dar ceea ce faceţi dumneavoastră este să distrugeţi
însăşi ideea de opoziţie. Opoziţia înseamnă contribuţie la bunul mers al ţării şi
opoziţia înseamnă responsabilitate faţă de interesul naţional. Regret că în faţa
mea şi în faţa cetăţenilor acestei ţări se află mai mulţi politicieni şi prea puţini
oameni de stat.
(Ședința comună a Camerei Deputaților și a Senatului, 27 aprilie 2012)

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 Definition as an argumentative strategy 223

Mr. Ungureanu – Prime Minister of the Romanian Government: The opposi-

tion has essentially a positive role by its criticism toward the act of governing,
but what you are doing is tantamount to destroying the very idea of opposi-
tion. Opposition means contributing to the smooth run of the country and
opposition means responsibility to the national interest. I regret that in front
of me and of the citizens of this country are more politicians and very few
statesmen.
(The Joint sittings of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, 27 April 2012)

The argumentative scheme in which the logical connector “but” (which infers the
opposition)4 links two explicit antagonistic assessments allows the Prime Minister
to express his critical view, without actually using any negative linguistic structure.
All utterances are affirmatively constructed, and the negative assessment is con-
veyed by the word meaning (via the verb to destroy) as well as by means of impli-
citation: the factive verb I regret is a trigger for the presupposition “in front of me
and of the citizens of this country are more politicians and very few statesmen”.
The impersonal form of referring to the members of the opposition, alongside the
implicit manner of negatively defining the political adversaries’ identity (the word
“politicians” often takes a pejorative connotation in Romanian) function as miti-
gation devices, associated with formal expression (a negative politeness strategy).
Conversely, the same argumentative scheme through which one logically
associates a locus of political responsibility and legitimacy (the prior agreement)
with an unacceptable particular case is used by one of the leaders of the opposition
in order to justify the USL motion of censure:
(9) George-Crin-Laurenţiu Antonescu: Există, în mod evident, domnule prim-
ministru, şcoli pe care nu le-aţi făcut sau pe care le-aţi făcut prost. Una dintre
ele este aceea care ne spune, ne învaţă pe noi, liberalii, cel puţin – cred că şi pe
social-democraţi – că originea adevărată a puterii în democraţie este la
cetăţean, este la cetăţeni, nu la telefon. […]
Scopurile puterii, domnule prim-ministru, nu sunt, într-o democraţie – se învaţă
şi asta la şcoală (şi teoretic, şi practic), dacă facem politică – acelea de a apăra
partide, de a salva partide sau de a naşte partide.
(Ședința comună a Camerei Deputaților și a Senatului, 27 aprilie 2012)

George Crin Laurenţiu Antonescu: […] There are, obviously, honourable

Prime Minister, schools that you have not graduated or that you have gradu-
ated in a rather unsatisfactory way. One of them is the school that tells us, or

4. For an enonciative perspective on argumentation, which focuses on the logical properties of

language structures, see Anscombre and Ducrot (1983).

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224 Liliana Hoinărescu

teaches us, the liberals, at least – the social-democrats, too, I believe – that the
true origin of power in democracy is to be found in the citizen, in the citizens, not
on the telephone. […]
The goals of the Power in democracy, Honourable Prime Minister, are not – one
can learn that in school (both theoretically and practically), if we make poli-
tics – those of defending parties, or saving parties or giving birth to new parties.
(The Joint sittings of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, 27 April 2012)

Crin Antonescu defines the concept of democracy as the power of citizens who
elect their leaders, in order to contest the Prime Minister’s political legitimacy (the
orator refers to the fact that the Prime Minister was appointed by the President in
office, Traian Băsescu, who was very unpopular at the time, and was not directly
validated by the people). Antonescu justifies his didactic excursus hinting at the
Prime Minister’s political ignorance; consequently, the definition acquires a more
pronounced polemical aspect, which is also emphasised by the negative linguis-
tic structures. The motion of censure is described as a necessary democratic exer-
cise to counter-balance the present gap between people’s will and the Government
in function. Nevertheless, the entire rhetorical movement takes the appearance of
an invalid argument, more precisely of an ignorantio elenchi fallacy, since actually,
according to the Romanian Constitution, the Prime Minister is proposed by the
majority party or coalition and appointed by the President, so he is not directly
elected. In contrast to the previous speech (Example 8), this one is more provoca-
tive, the definitions having two argumentative functions: to legitimate the Opposi-
tion’s initiative and to directly attack the interlocutor’s public image (ad hominem
fallacy). In socio-discursive terms, the clear-cut distinction between we and you,
the explicit association of the others with negative aspects reveals rather a strategy
of negative impoliteness (Culpeper 1996, 356–357; 2016).

3.2 Defining identity. Argument by polemical quotation of a (metaphorical)

definition

The recorded session from 2014 displays some instances of defining identities
through quoted definitions. The quotation of the opponent to support a thesis is
a current argumentative tactic in political debates. A statement made by a politi-
cian is quoted by another in order to attack his/her ethos, i. e. political image,
and to discredit him/her, by disclosing him/her as an inconsequent and dishon-
est person. Definition is thus related to ad hominem arguments (see Walton and
Macagno 2011, 33). The excerpt below represents a classical sample of polemical
quotation. Puiu Hașotti, a PNL member, delivered a speech in which he quoted

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 Definition as an argumentative strategy 225

prior statements of some politicians disclosing a contradiction with their current

political positioning.
(10) Puiu Haşotti: Una tare, citez: “Tumoarea canceroasă a politicii româneşti este
fondatorul Partidului Conservator, Dan Voiculescu” (Kelemen Hunor).
(Ședința comună a Camerei Deputaților și a Senatului, 4 martie 2014)

Puiu Hașotti: A tough one, I am quoting: “The cancerous tumor of the

Romanian politics is the founder of the Conservative Party, Dan Voiculescu.”
(Kelemen Hunor).
(The Joint sittings of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, 4 March 2014)

The metaphorical definition ascribed to Kelemen Hunor, who characterised the

Founder of the Consevative Party, Dan Voiculescu, in this manner, is polemically
quoted, since the party led by Kelemen Hunor (UDMR) had decided at that
moment to support a coalition made of PSD-PC, that is a coalition which involved
Dan Voiculescu’s Party. The argumentative technique of quotation interplays with
mechanisms of intertextual or polyphonic irony (see Sperber and Wilson 1981;
Ducrot 1984), and therefore the rhetorical effect is enhanced. Ironical/polemical
quotation establishes a critical distance, while preserving the speaker’s seriousness
and objectivity and thus remains a very effective and elegant form of criticism. It
is worth mentioning the same use of the metaphorical definition in the quoted
reply (cancer as the pure, absolute evil), as in the example extracted from the UK
Parliament, where anti-Semitism is metaphorically defined as a cancer (see above,
2.3.3.), attesting thus to a transcultural cognitive pattern and the same rhetorical
use in both the UK and the Romanian political discourses.

3.3 Defining identity. Metaphorical definition. Definition as a dissociation

strategy

Other forms of defining identities are related to pejorative terms and political
labels, from which the speaker wants to dissociate himself. Definition and dis-
sociation are related argumentative techniques (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
(1971, 444–450; Breton 2003, 79–95). Dissociation may be used to reject criticism
by redefining a situation from a standpoint that is favourable to the speaker, like
in the example below:

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226 Liliana Hoinărescu

(11) Tudor Barbu (PNL, fost PPDD): Ştiu ce înseamnă traseismul pentru că l-am
mediatizat. M-am opus acestui fenomen care tinde să devină un flagel (râsete,
rumoare). N-am să încerc să explic de ce am plecat de la un partid care se
dovedeşte acum a fi muribund, iar când am plecat nu arătam decât maturitate
şi premoniţie politică justificate.
(Ședința comună a Camerei Deputaților și a Senatului, 4 martie 2014)

Tudor Barbu (PNL, former PPDD): I know what Party switching is, because I
discussed it as a journalist. I opposed this phenomenon which tends to
become a scourge (laughter, clamour). I shall not try to explain why I left a
party which proves to be dying now, so when I left it I proved nothing else but
maturity and justified political premonition.
(The Joint sittings of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, 4 March 2014)

The Romanian word traseism (engl. Party switching) is a pejorative political new
term, which refers to changes in party affiliation of a Member of Parliament.5
The speaker, a journalist who was elected as a member of the PPDD Party (a po-
pulist and anti-system party, lacking a specific ideology, whose members migrated
very quickly from other traditional parliamentary parties, especially PSD and
PNL) begins by expressing his negative opinion about this phenomenon, which
he defines metaphorically as a scourge, a calamity. Thus, he establishes an agree-
ment at the conceptual level with his audience. In the next step of his argumenta-
tive movement, he rejects the derogatory label “traseist” and justifies his defection
from PPDD by ideological reasons and external constraints. Therefore, in his
interpretation, the pejorative term traseism could not encompass the morally jus-
tified party switching. The concept is dissociated and redefined, allowing the
speaker to present himself in a more favorable light. Despite the theoretical effec-
tiveness of this argumentative strategy, the speech remains unconvincing, since
the audience reacted by laughter and clamour and thus reinforced speaker’s nega-
tive public image.

3.4 Defining identity. Ironical response. Implicit definition

Another rhetorical and argumentative device used for defining the opponent’s
identity consists of pragmatic presuppositions. Such implicit definitions are able
to modify the dialogical rapports between interlocutors and to oblige the oppo-
nent to accept the information presupposed as a discursive premise (see Ducrot

5. The political term is related to the argotic word traseistă, which means “prostitute who
trades sex on route”. Thus, the Romanian equivalent of Party switching is pejoratively defined as
political prostitution.

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 Definition as an argumentative strategy 227

1991, 91). By manipulating common ground, the implicit act of defining is insidi-
ously directive and thus it becomes “extremely effective from a dialectical perspec-
tive” (see Macagno, Damele 2015, 236).
(12) Victor Viorel Ponta – Prim-Ministru
Doamnelor şi domnilor deputaţi şi senatori,
În primul rând apreciez foarte mult bătălia pentru cine este liderul opoziţiei. A
fost extrem de interesantă. Am venit să vă spun: pe noi nu vă bazaţi. Noi
rămânem la guvernare. Dumneavoastră certaţi-vă care-i mai bun în opoziţie.
E-n regulă acest lucru (Aplauze) Cred, totuşi, că trebuie cineva să şi guverneze
România, în timp ce dumneavoastră stabiliţi cine este liderul opoziţiei.
(Ședința comună a Camerei Deputaților și a Senatului, 4 martie 2014)

Victor Viorel Ponta – Prime Minister

Honorable Deputies and Senators,
Firstly, I highly appreciate the battle for who should be the opposition leader. It
has been extremely interesting. I came to tell you: do not count on us. We
remain in power. You may as well keep arguing on who is the best in opposi-
tion. This is okay (Applause). Yet, I believe that someone should govern Roma-
nia, while you decide who the leader of the opposition is.
(The Joint sittings of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, 4 March 2014)

Presupposing is also a technique used to create ironical effects, when the presup-
position conveys some absurd or counterfactual information. In Example (12), the
Prime Minister ironically defines his opponents as “leaders of the opposition”, and
defines his party as the party in power, whose ambition is to lead and govern the
country. The act of defining involves two triggers: I appreciate for the ironic eva-
luation of the status of “the leader of the opposition”, and the definite expression
that triggers the existential presupposition “there is a battle for being the leader
of the opposition”. The force of this implicit definition consists in the fact that its
content is taken for granted and thus it allows the speaker to avoid any prelimi-
nary explanation. A subjective derogatory assessment is presented as a mutually
accepted definition, which enhances its argumentative and critical force (see also
Macagno 2014).
Defining identity is the most frequent form of definition in present-day
Romanian Parliament. It takes various rhetorical forms, ranging from metaphor
and polemical quotation to irony. Purely conceptual definitions are rather rare
(even though one cannot say that they are completely lacking), which indicates
that personal, relational confrontations prevail over the ideological, conceptual
debates.

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228 Liliana Hoinărescu

However, a comparative analysis regarding the frequency of the argumenta-

tive definition in the old Romanian Parliament and in present-day Romanian Par-
liament is significant for the importance of cultural and historical factors, since
this kind of arguments entails reasoning mechanisms and critical judgement. In
the old Romanian Parliament, conceptual argumentative definition is very com-
mon, as it is in nowadays’ UK Parliament. A very specific type of definition is
the speculative definition or the so-called “real” definition in philosophy.6 Usually
preceded by the rhetorical question What is X?, this kind of redefinition involves
a substantial investigation of the real nature of the object. As mentioned before
(see 2.1.), in critical and speculative philosophy, redefinition of the object is con-
sidered a particular method of argumentation, thus related to the dialectic and
valid argumentation. This use may also be related to the beginning of the democ-
racy in Romania, when important politicians, members of cultural elites, want to
debate and explain the essential modern political concepts. In political discourse,
the speculative aspect may hide a persuasive use of definition:

3.5 Speculative/persuasive definitions. Didactic/deductive use of definitions

(13) Ce înţelegem noi prin democraţie? […] prin democraţie înţelegem ca fiecare
să-şi aibă locul lui în această ţara, care îl merită prin munca lui.
(Carp, 566, quoted by Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2012, 200)
What do we mean by democracy? […] by democracy we mean that everyone
should have his place in this country, to which he is entitled by his work.
(Carp, 566, quoted by Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2012, 200)
(14) Ce este libertatea, domnilor? Este ea oare facultatea absolută de a face ce voim?
(Carp, 161, quoted by Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2012, 203)
What is freedom, gentlemen? Is it really the absolute faculty of doing whatever
we want? (Carp, 161, quoted by Ionescu-Ruxăndoiu 2012, 203)

The speeches delivered by the salient members of the old Parliament reflect not
only a speculative but often a doctoral (didactic) practice, as proved by the exam-
ples below, where the explanations of the terms represent a stage in the argu-
mentative movement (scholars named this kind of argument “argument from
definition”, see supra 2.3.4. the example commented from the British Parliament):

6. See Schiappa (2003, 6): “[…] anytime someone posits a question of the form “What is X?”
or attempts to offer a definition based on what he or she believes X really or truly is, the result
is an effort toward a fact of essence, or what also is called a “real” definition.”

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 Definition as an argumentative strategy 229

(15) Şi apoi spune acest domn Coquelin toate primejdiile, ce se întâmplă într-un
stat, care are centralizarea. Ce este însă descentralizarea? Descentralizarea
voieşte lăsarea în mâna autorităţii locale a unei părţi din atributele puterii pub-
lice. Nu ministerul, nu prefectul să se amestece în lucrările comunei, ci ea
însăşi să exerciteze câteva lucrări esenţiale. (Maiorescu, 468)
And then this Mr. Coquelin talks about all dangers that happen in a State
which has centralization. But what is decentralization? Decentralization means
leaving some of the attributes of the public power in the hands of the local
authority. It is neither the ministry, nor the prefect who should interfere in the
affairs of the commune, but the commune itself should fulfil some essential
duties. (Maiorescu, 468)

The apostrophe and the rhetorical question associated with real definitions are
also effective oratorical devices, “figures relating to communion”, through which
the speaker creates the impression of solidarity with his audience, by inviting it
to participate at the argumentative act and to accept the proposed resolution (see
Perelman şi Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 178).
To conclude, the difference between an argumentative choice and another
could reveal the role played by individual, psychological factors as well as by exter-
nal factors within the institutional discourse, and more specifically within the Par-
liamentary discourse.

4. Concluding remarks

The present study dealt with definition in political discourse, with special refer-
ence to parliamentary discourse. It was conceived as a cross-cultural and com-
parative inquiry, based on examples taken from the British and the Romanian
Parliaments. The main objective was to identify and to describe the argumentative
definitions, by considering their linguistic structure and rhetorical features as well
as their current association with other types of arguments and pragmatic strate-
gies. We also tried to grasp to what extent the internal, procedural norms, along
with socio-cultural models could actually influence their concrete manifestations
in specific discursive contexts. This particular type of argument entails cognitive
(metalinguistic) ability as well as rhetorical skills, consequently speaker’s educa-
tion, culture and deliberative practice are very important factors that affect its
choice. The two sets of data are complementary, enabling us to present a large vari-
ety of definitional arguments in a particular institutional discourse, and to reveal
the similarities and the differences between them.

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230 Liliana Hoinărescu

The UK Parliament displays many instances of argumentative definitions,

often found within the same session. A specific sub-type of British parliamentary
discourse, namely Question time, provided illustrations of argumentative defi-
nitions in a dialogical frame. We identified the following types of definitions:
conceptual, dissociative and authoritative quotational definitions, negative and
implicit definitions, definitions as discursive premises, (witty, ironical) definitions
of identity, (cognitive) metaphorical definitions, legal and stipulative definitions.
In our examples, the major argumentative movement is oriented towards clari-
fying conceptual disagreements or practical controversial matters, even if affec-
tive, interpersonal conflicts may occur in relation with the dialogical negotiation
of identity. This fact demonstrates real debating skill exercise, on the one hand,
and a real effort to collaborate in order to establish the normative, legal sense of
the words, on the other hand.
In present-day Romanian Parliament, proper argumentative definitions pre-
dominantly occur in extraordinary sessions, namely in Joint sittings of the Cham-
ber of Deputies and the Senate. Defining identity is the most frequent form of argu-
mentative definition in this highly competitive context. It takes various rhetorical
aspects, ranging from conceptual (polemical) definitions, presupposed (negative)
definitions, (cognitive) metaphorical definitions and (polemical) quotational de-
finitions, dissociative definitions to ironical definitions of identity. Conceptual de-
finitions are rather rare in our Romanian corpus and their role is to support a
broader rhetorical movement oriented to attack the identity of another MP or the
global image of the opposite party. Confrontation between parties, defending or
attacking the public image of the adversary seem to prevail over the conceptual
and ideological debate in present-day Romanian Parliament, and this conflictive
attitude might have a negative impact on the concrete practical matters and public
issues.
It is also important to notice some common traits, which can be regarded as
general characteristics of the act of defining in Parliamentary discourse, despite
the differences related to institutional procedures and socio-cultural models.
As proved by each particular case analysed, the argumentative uses combine
with each other, and also with pragmatic strategies and rhetorical devices. Defin-
ing is an important reasoning pattern and each of its concrete occurrences can be
actualised if the conditions are met. That is the case of speculative or real defi-
nitions, which are very common in the old Romanian Parliament and absent in
our data concerning present-day Parliament. Furthermore, metaphorical defini-
tions from both British and Romanian Parliaments confirm the same rhetorical
use, related to common cognitive patterns. The spontaneous accommodation of
the speaker to the discursive rhetorical devices previously used by his interlocutor
could also be regarded as a universal discursive tendency.

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 Definition as an argumentative strategy 231

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Author’s address

Liliana Hoinărescu
“Iorgu Iordan – Al. Rosetti” Institute of Linguistics of the Romanian Academy
Calea 13 Septembrie, no. 13
Bucharest
Romania
lilianahoinarescu@gmail.com

Biographical notes

Liliana Hoinărescu is a researcher at the “Iorgu Iordan – Al. Rosetti” Institute of Linguistics of
the Romanian Academy, Department of Lexicology and Lexicography. Her research interests
concern linguistic and literary pragmatics; discourse and conversation analysis; rhetoric and

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All rights reserved
234 Liliana Hoinărescu

argumentation; semiotics; lexicology and lexicography. Among her main publications, there is
Structures and Strategies of Irony in the Romanian Postmodern Fiction [Structuri şi strategii ale
ironiei în proza postmodernă românească], Bucureşti (2006), studies and articles, book reviews
in academic journals of linguistics and in collective volumes. She is also co-editor of the vo-
lumes Cooperation and Conflict in Ingroup and Intergroup Communication. Selected papers from
the 10th Biennial Congress of the IADA, Bucureşti (2006) and Dialogue, Discourse, Utterance. In
memoriam Sorin Stati [Dialog, discurs, enunţ. In memoriam Sorin Stati], Bucureşti (2010).

© 2018. John Benjamins Publishing Company

All rights reserved