People v Solayao
Tasked with verifying the
Facts: SPO3 Jose Niño, narrated that at about 9:00
o’clock in the evening of July 9, 1992, with CAFGU
members, they were to conduct an intelligence
patrol as required of them by their intelligence
officer to verify reports on the presence of armed
persons roaming around the barangays. The team
of Police Officer Niño proceeded to Barangay Onion
where they met the group of accused-appellant
Nilo Solayao numbering five. The former became
suspicious when they observed that the latter were
drunk and that accused-appellant himself was
wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit.
Accused-appellant’s companions, upon seeing the
government agents, fled. Police Officer Niño told
accused-appellant not to run away and introduced
himself as “PC,” after which he seized the dried
coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and
found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade
firearm locally know as “latong.” When he asked
accused-appellant who issued him a license to
carry said firearm or whether he was connected
with the military or any intelligence group, the
latter answered that he had no permission to
possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Niño
confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the
custody of the policemen of Caibiran who
subsequently investigated him and charged him
with illegal possession of firearm. The trial court
found accused-appellant guilty of illegal possession
of firearm. Hence the Appeal.
Issue: Whether the court erred in admitting the
confiscated firearm as evidence against the
accused with no valid search and arrest warrant
Held: The court ruled that the search and seizure
brought about by the suspicious conduct of the
accused himself can be likened to a “stop and frisk”
situation. There was probable cause to conduct a
search even before an arrest could be made. In the
present case, after SPO3 Niño told accused-
appellant not to run away, the former identified
himself as a government agents. The peace officers
did not know that he had committed, or was
actually committing, the offense of illegal
possession of firearm.
report that there were armed men roaming in the
barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention
was understandably drawn to the group that had
aroused their suspicion. They could not have
known that the object wrapped in coconut leaves
which accused-appellant was carrying hid a
firearm. The case at bar constitutes an instance
where a search and seizure may be effected
without first making an arrest. There was justifiable
cause to “stop and frisk” accused-appellant when
his companions filed upon seeing the government
agents. Under the circumstances, the government
agents could not possibly have procured a search
warrant first. Thus, there was no violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Nor was there error on the
part of the trial court when it admitted the
homemade firearm as evidence.
Republic vs CA, 277 SCRA 633, 641 (1997)
”Judicial notice will be taken of the record, pleading
or judgment of a case in another court between the
same parties or involving one of the same parties
as well as of the record of another case between
different parties in the same court. Judicial notice
will also be taken of court personnel.”
Facts:
Josefa Gacot claimed a parcel of land, the area of
which is not indicated, in Palawan. Gacot claims
that she has been in actual possession of the
property for more than 30 year and bought the
land from Cipriana Dantic-Llanera by virtue of a
deed of sale and introduced improvement thereon
and paid taxes for the land in her name. It appears
that a certain Ceferino Sabenacio is a co-owner of
the land who later waived his claim in favor of
Gacot and admitted that he was only a boundary
owner of the land and it was Gacot who is in actual
possession of it. Prior to the hearing, the Land
Registration Authority intervened, calling the
attention of the court on the decision made by
Judge Lorenzo Garlitos declaring the property as
owned by the Republic. However, it did not bar
Gacos from filing her answer, presenting evidence
of her actual possession of the said property and
tax declaration and payment made in her name.
The counsel of the petitioner did not present
evidence and submitted the case for resolution.
The court rendered a decision in favor of Gacot
thus the Solicitor General elevated the case to the
CA and filed a motion for the court to reopen and
remand the case back to the trial court to allow the
Republic to present the decision of Judge Garlitos
which motion was granted by the court. The
hearing was set several times and Gacot was able
to submit her memorandum while the Republic
was unable to submit any evidence to support the
claim of the government in court. For failure of the
government to refute and to present their
evidence contrary to Gacot’s claim, the court
decided not to disturb its former decision.
The Republic assailed the decision of the court
invoking 2061 that set the time limit of filing an
application for the reopening of judicial
proceedings on certain lands declared as public
land, a provision thereof provides that the
application for judicial proceeding should not
extend beyond Dec. 31, 1968. Gacot only filed her
claim on June 7, 1971 thus the court did not
acquired jurisdiction on her claim as she did not file
her answer within the period fixed by RA 2061.
Issue: Whether or not the court has acquired
jurisdiction over the case?
Ruling:
The Court held that what the Solicitor General
claims would have been operative if it were able to
present evidence during the rehearing of the case
proving the alleged decision of Judge Garlitos
declaring the property as public land. However
they failed to offer evidence on their claim and the
court cannot take judicial notice of such claim in
the absence of any proof presented before the
court. The appellate court remanded the case back
to the trial court to allow the Republic to present
evidence which they failed to do.
It is a settled rule that the court shall not consider
evidence that has not been formally offered before
it. The court cannot take judicial knowledge of the
contents of the record of other cases, in the
adjudication of the cases pending before them
even if the trial judge knows or remember the
contents thereof. While the case is on trial, Josefa
Gacot passed away and her heirs were impleaded
to substitute her as the party to the case. The court
held to lax on the technical rules of procedure in
the case and to expedite the proceeding take a
liberal construction on the laws to meet advance
the cause of substantial justice. Because the lot
area awarded to Gacot was not specified in the
records and based on the certification of the Forest
Management Services of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, some of the
lots in the area are classified as alienable and
disposable land, while some portion are timber
land that forms part of the Mangrove Swamp
Forest Reserve. The court decided to remand back
to the trial court the case for proper disposition of
the conflicting claims of the parties. 
EOPLE v. JAILON KULAIS, GR Nos. 100901-08, 1998-
07-16
Facts:
five Informations for kidnapping for ransom... and
three Informations for kidnapping... were filed[1]
before the
Regional Trial Court... against Carlos Falcasantos,
Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de
Kulais, Jalina Hassan de Kamming,[2] Salvador
Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan,
Imam[3] Taruk Alah, Freddie
Manuel alias "Ajid," and several John and Jane
Does.
The three Informations for kidnapping, also under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, likewise
alleged identical facts and circumstances
Of the twelve accused, only nine were
apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais, Jumatiya
Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Salvador
Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassan, Imam
Taruk Alah, Jalina Hassan and Freddie Manuel.
all the accused pleaded not guilty.
The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five
counts of kidnapping for ransom and one count of
kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which
offenses it imposed upon him six terms of "life
imprisonment." It also found him guilty of two
counts of slight illegal... detention for the
kidnapping of Monico Saavedra and Calixto
Francisco.
Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due
process when the trial court took judicial notice of
the testimony given in another case by one Lt.
Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team leader of
the government troops that captured him and his
purported cohorts.[16] Because he was allegedly
deprived of his right to cross-examine a material
witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he
contends that the latter's testimony should not be
used against him.
Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as
shown by the latter's testimony
Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarro's
testimony pointing to appellant as one of the
culprits
Issues:
(1) judicial notice of other pending cases, (2)
sufficiency of the prosecution evidence
, and (3) denial as a defense.
Ruling:
The appeal is bereft of merit.
as a general rule, courts should not take judicial
notice of the evidence presented in other
proceedings, even if these have been tried or are
pending in the same court, or have been heard and
are actually pending before the same judge.[18]
This is... especially true in criminal cases, where the
accused has the constitutional right to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him.
Having said that, we note, however, that even if
the court a quo did take judicial notice of the
testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use
such testimony in deciding the cases against the
appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied
due process. His conviction was... based mainly on
the positive identification made by some of the
kidnap victims, namely, Jessica Calunod, Armando
Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were
subjected to meticulous cross-examinations
conducted by appellant's counsel. At best, then,
the trial court's... mention of Lieutenant Feliciano's
testimony is a decisional surplusage which neither
affected the outcome of the case nor substantially
prejudiced Appellant Kulais.
It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of
Calunod, Bacarro and Perez that kidnapping or
detention did take place: the five victims were
held, against their will, for fifty-three days from
December 12, 1988 to February 2, 1989. It is also
evident that Appellant Kulais was a... member of
the group of armed men who staged the
kidnapping, and that he was one of those who
guarded the victims during the entire period of
their captivity. His participation gives credence to
the conclusion of the trial court that he was a
conspirator.
The appellant's bare denial is a weak defense that
becomes even weaker in the face of the
prosecution witnesses' positive identification of
him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the
positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to
the negative testimonies of the... defense.[39]
Between positive and categorical testimony which
has a ring of truth to it on the one hand, and a bare
denial on the other, the former generally prevails.
[40] Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and
Edilberto Perez testified... in a clear,
straightforward and frank manner; and their
testimonies were compatible on material points.
Moreover, no ill motive was attributed to the
kidnap victims and none was found by this Court.
We agree with the trial court's observation that the
appellant did not meet the charges against him
head on. His testimony dwelt on what happened to
him on the day he was arrested and on subsequent
days thereafter. Appellant did not explain where he
was during the questioned... dates (December 12,
1988 to February 3, 1989); neither did he rebut
Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, when they identified
him as one of their kidnappers.
Principles:
The trial court's erroneous taking of judicial notice
of a witness' testimony in another case, also
pending before it, does not affect the conviction of
the appellant, whose guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and
overwhelming... evidence, both testimonial and
documentary. The Court takes this occasion also to
remind the bench and the bar that reclusion
perpetua is not synonymous with life
imprisonment.
Laureano vs CA
[G.R. No. 114776 February 2, 2000]
MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES
LIMITED, respondents.
FACTS: Plaintiff was employed by the Singapore
Airlines Limited as an expatriate captain. Sometime
in 1982 or prior to the expiration of the five-year
employment contract however defendant, hit by a
recession, initiated cost-cutting measures.
Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the Airbus
fleet were found in excess of the defendant’s
requirement. Consequently, defendant informed
its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the
situation and advised them to take advance leaves.
Realizing that the recession would not be for a
short time, defendant decided to terminate its
excess personnel. It did not, however, immediately
terminate it’s A-300 pilots. It reviewed their
qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747
fleet. Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed,
twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately,
plaintiff was not one of the twelve.
Plaintiff instituted a case for illegal dismissal before
the Labor Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on
jurisdictional grounds. Before said motion was
resolved, the complaint was withdrawn.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for
damages due to illegal termination of contract of
services before the court a quo.
Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a
motion to dismiss alleging inter alia: (1) that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case, and (2) that Philippine courts have no
jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant
contends that the complaint is for illegal dismissal
together with a money claim arising out of and in
the course of plaintiff’s employment “thus it is the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have the
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor
Code” and that, since plaintiff was employed in
Singapore, all other aspects of his employment
contract and/or documents executed in Singapore.
Thus, defendant postulates that Singapore laws
should apply and courts thereat shall have
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: W/N Singaporean laws should apply in the
instant case
HELD: NO. The trial court rightly ruled on the
application of Philippine law, thus:
Neither can the Court determine whether the
termination of the plaintiff is legal under the
Singapore Laws because of the defendant’s failure
to show which specific laws of Singapore Laws
apply to this case. The Philippine Courts do not
take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The In determining the valuation of the land, the trial
defendant that claims the applicability of the court based the same on the facts established in
Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of another case pending before it.
proof. The defendant has failed to do so.
Therefore, the Philippine law should be applied. ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in taking judicial
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction notice of the average production figures in another
when defendant filed its appeal before said court. case pending before it and applying the same to
On this matter, respondent court was correct when the present case without conducting a hearing and
it barred defendant-appellant below from raising without the knowledge or consent of the parties
further the issue of jurisdiction. HELD: Well-settled is the rule that courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of
NO DIGEST FOR REPUBLIC CORP GLASS the records of other cases even when said cases
have been tried or are pending in the same court or
before the same judge. They may only do so “in
Landbank of the Philippines vs Banal the absence of objection” and “with the
knowledge of the opposing party,” which are not
[G.R. No. 143276.  July 20, 2004]
obtaining here.
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court
SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-
shall apply to all proceedings before the Special
BANAL, respondents.
Agrarian Courts.  In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129
FACTS: Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal,
of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the
respondents, are the registered owners of
necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial
agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud,
notice of a certain matter, thus:
Camarines Norte.   A portion of the land was
compulsorily acquired by the Department of
“SEC. 3.  Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. –
Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act
During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or
(R.A.) No. 6657,[1] as amended, otherwise known
on request of a party, may announce its intention
as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the
1988.
parties to be heard thereon.
Respondents rejected the valuation of petitioner
“After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal,
hence a summary administrative proceeding was
the proper court, on its own initiative or on request
conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform
of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter
Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of
and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such
the land.  Eventually, the PARAD rendered its
matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.” 
Decision affirming the Landbank’s valuation.
(emphasis added)
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD,
respondents filed with the RTC a petition for
determination of just compensation.
NO HABAGAL GRILL
CLARION PRINTING HOUSE, INC., and YUTINGCO
vs. NLRC and MICLAT
G.R. No. 148372
June 27, 2005
FACTS: Respondent Miclat was employed on a
probationary basis as marketing assistant by
petitioner Clarion which is owned by Yutingco.
The EYCO Group of Companies of which CLARION
formed part filed with the SEC a “Petition for the
Declaration of Suspension of Payment, Formation
and Appointment of Rehabilitation Receiver/
Committee, Approval of Rehabilitation Plan with
Alternative Prayer for Liquidation and Dissolution
of Corporation.” The SEC issued an Order approving
the creation of an interim receiver for the EYCO
Group of Companies.
The Assistant Personnel Manager of CLARION
informed Miclat by telephone that her
employment contract had been terminated. No
reason was given for the termination.
In her Position Paper filed before the labor arbiter,
Miclat claimed that assuming that her termination
was necessary, the manner in which it was carried
out was illegal, no written notice thereof having
been served on her, and she merely learned of it
only a day before it became effective.
On the other hand, petitioners claimed that they
could not be faulted for retrenching some of its
employees including Miclat, they drawing attention
to the EYCO Group of Companies’ being placed
under receivership, notice of which was sent to its
supervisors and rank and file employees via a
Memorandum.
The Labor arbiter found that Miclat was illegally
dismissed and directed her reinstatement. The
NLRC affirmed the labor arbiter’s decision. The CA
sustained the resolutions of the NLRC; it also
denied petitioner’s MR of the decision.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the CA Decision, together
(sustaining NLRC) is SET ASIDE and another
rendered declaring the legality of the dismissal of
respondent Miclat. Petitioners are ORDERED,
however, to PAY her the following in accordance
with the foregoing discussions: nominal, separation
pay; and 13th month pay. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the SEC Hearing Panel
charged with the liquidation and dissolution of
petitioner corporation for inclusion, in the list of
claims of its creditors, respondent Miclat’s claims..
On Miclat’s termination:
According to P.D. No. 902-A, as amended, the
appointment of a receiver or management
committee by the SEC presupposes a finding that,
inter alia, a company possesses sufficient property
to cover all its debts but “foresees the impossibility
of meeting them when they respectively fall due”
and “there is imminent danger of dissipation, loss,
wastage or destruction of assets of other
properties or paralization of business operations.”
However, ART. 283 of the Labor Code states:
CLOSURE OF ESTABLISHMENT AND REDUCTION OF
PERSONNEL. – The employer may also terminate
the employment of any employee due to the
installation of labor saving devices,
redundancy,retrenchment to prevent losses or the
closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking unless the closing is
for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of
this Title, by serving a written notice on the worker
and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least
one (1) month before the intended date thereof. x
x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
CLARION [however] failed to comply with the
notice requirement provided for in Article 283 of
the Labor Code.
Stated differently, Miclat’s termination is justified,
because of financial difficulties of the company, but
failure to give the required notice by Clarion is
sufficient to entitle her to payment of 13th month
pay, separation pay and others.
**
With the appointment of a management receiver,
all claims and proceedings against CLARION,
including labor claims, were deemed suspended
during the existence of the receivership. The labor
arbiter, the NLRC, as well as the CA should not have
proceeded to resolve respondent’s complaint for
illegal dismissal and should instead have directed
respondent to lodge her claim before the then
duly-appointed receiver of CLARION. To still require
respondent, however, at this time to refile her
labor claim against CLARION under the peculiar
circumstances of the case — that 8 years have
lapsed since her termination and that all the
arguments and defenses of both parties were
already ventilated before the labor arbiter, NLRC
and the CA; and that CLARION is already in the
course of liquidation — this Court deems it most
expedient and advantageous for both parties that
CLARION’s liability be determined with finality,
instead of still requiring respondent to lodge her
claim at this time before the liquidators of CLARION
which would just entail a mere reiteration of what
has been already argued and pleaded.
Furthermore, it would be in the best interest of the
other creditors of CLARION that claims against the
company be finally settled and determined so as to
further expedite the liquidation proceedings. For
the lesser number of claims to be proved, the
sooner the claims of all creditors of CLARION are
processed and settled.
NOTES:
Sections 5 and 6 of P.D. 902-A (“reorganization of
the SEC with additional powers and placing said
agency under the administrative supervision of the
office of the president”), as amended, read:
SEC. 5 In addition to the regulatory and
adjudicative functions of THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION over corporations,
partnerships and other forms of associations
registered with it as expressly granted under
existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
involving:
xxx
(d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or
associations declared in the state of suspension of
payments in cases where the corporation,
partnership or association possesses sufficient
property to cover all debts but foresees the
impossibility of meeting them when they
respectively fall due or in cases where the
corporation, partnership, association has no
sufficient assets to cover its liabilities, but is under
the management of a Rehabilitation Receiver or
Management Committee created pursuant to this
Decree.
SEC. 6. In order to effectively exercise such
jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the
following powers:
xxx
(c) To appoint one or more receivers of the
property, real and personal, which is the subject of
the action pending before the Commission in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court in such other cases whenever necessary in
order to preserve the rights of the parties-litigants
and/or protect the interest of the investing public
and creditors: Provided, however, That the
Commission may in appropriate cases, appoint a
rehabilitation receiver of corporations,
partnerships or other associations not supervised
or regulated by other government agencies who
shall have, in addition to powers of the regular
receiver under the provisions of the Rules of Court,
such functions and powers as are provided for in
the succeeding paragraph (d) hereof: x x x
(d) To create and appoint a management
committee, board or body upon petition or motu
propio to undertake the management of
corporations, partnership or other associations not
supervised or regulated by other government
agencies in appropriate cases when there is
imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or
destruction of assets or other properties or
paralization of business operations of such
corporations or entities which may be prejudicial to
the interest of minority stockholders, parties-
litigants of the general public: x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 89114,  December 2, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. was included as
defendant in civil case entitled "Republic of the
Philippines vs. Benjamin Romualdez, et al." for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution
and damages on the theory that: (1) he acted in
unlawful concert with the principal defendants in
the misappropriation and theft of public funds,
plunder of the nation's wealth, extortion,
blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of
corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen
abuse of power;  (2) he acted as dummy, nominee
or agent, by allowing himself to be incorporator,
director, board member and/or stockholder of
corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by
the principal defendants;  (3) he acted singly or
collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one
another, in flagrant breach of public trust and of
their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with
gross and scandalous abuse of right and power and
in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of
the Philippines, embarked upon a systematic plan
to accumulate ill-gotten wealth ;  (4) he (petitioner)
taking undue advantage of his position as Chairman
of the Commission on Audit and with grave failure
to perform his constitutional duties as such
Chairman, acting in concert with defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos,
facilitated and made possible the withdrawals,
disbursements and questionable use of
government funds;  and (5) he acted as dummy,
nominee and/or agent by allowing himself to be
used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten
wealth through government concessions, orders
and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff, or to be
incorporator, director, or member of corporations
beneficially held and/or controlled by defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin
Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez in order
to conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally
obtained. 
On 11 April 1988, after his motion for production
and inspection of documents  was denied by
respondent court in its resolution dated 9 March
1988, petitioner filed a Motion for a Bill of
Particulars,  alleging inter alia that he is sued for
acts allegedly committed by him as (a) a public
officer-Chairman of the Commission on Audit, (b)
as a private individual, and (c) in both capacities, in
a complaint couched in too general terms and
shorn of particulars that would inform him of the
factual and legal basis thereof, and that to enable
him to understand and know with certainty the
particular acts allegedly committed by him and
which he is now charged with culpability, it is
necessary that plaintiff furnish him the particulars
sought therein.
In his petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order,
the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan, dated 21 April
1989, denying his motion for a bill of particulars as
well as its resolution, dated 29 May 1989, which
denied his motion for reconsideration; to compel
the respondent PCGG to prepare and file a bill of
particulars, or that said respondent be ordered to
exclude petitioner as defendant in Civil Case No.
0035 should they fail to submit the said bill of
particulars; and to enjoin the respondent
Sandiganbayan from further proceeding against
petitioner until the bill of particulars is submitted,
claiming that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in promulgating the aforesaid
resolutions and that there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy for him in the
ordinary course of law other than the present
petition.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan
acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
disputed resolutions.
HELD:
Ultimate facts are conclusions drawn from
intermediate and evidentiary facts, or allegations of
mixed law and fact; they are conclusions from
reflection and natural reasoning on evidentiary
fact. The ultimate facts which are to be pleaded are
the issuable, constitutive, or traversible facts
essential to the statement of the cause of action;
the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove,
and not the evidence which will be required to
prove the existence of those facts.
The complaint does not contain any allegation as to
how petitioner became, or why he is perceived to
be, a dummy, nominee or agent. There is no
averment in the complaint how petitioner allowed
himself to be used as instrument in the
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, what the
concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to
plaintiff are, why they are prejudicial, and what
petitioner had to do with the granting, issuance,
and or formulation of such concessions, orders,
and/or policies. Moreover, the complaint does not
state which corporations petitioner is supposed to
be a stockholder, director, member, dummy,
nominee and/or agent. More significantly, the
petitioner's name does not even appear in annex of
the complaint, which is a listing of the alleged
"Positions and Participations of Some Defendants".
The allegations in the complaint, above-referred to,
pertaining to petitioner are, therefore, deficient in
that they merely articulate conclusions of law and
presumptions unsupported by factual premises.
Hence, without the particulars prayed for in
petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars, it can be
said the petitioner can not intelligently prepare his
responsive pleading and for trial.
Furthermore, the particulars prayed for such as
names of persons, names of corporations, dates,
amounts involved, a specification of property for
identification purposes, the particular transactions
involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a
statement of other material facts as would support
the conclusions and inferences in the complaint,
are not evidentiary in nature. On the contrary,
those particulars are material facts that should be
clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in
order that the defendant may, in fairness, be
informed of the claims made against him to the
end that he may be prepared to meet the issues at
the trial.
The Supreme Court ruled that respondent
Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in promulgating the questioned
resolutions. The petition is granted and the
resolutions in question are annulled and set aside.
The respondents are ordered to prepare and file a
Bill of Particulars containing the facts prayed for by
petitioner, or otherwise, respondent
Sandiganbayan is ordered to exclude the herein
petitioner as defendant in the above-mentioned
civil case.
Fareast Marble, Inc v CA (Civil Procedure)
Fareast Marble, Inc., and Tabuenas v. CA,  BPI
Facts:
       In 1976, petitioner Fareast Marble received from
private respondent (the former Commercial Trust
Bank Company which was absorbed by BPI) the
following, viz:
(1)  several loans evidenced by promissory notes; AND
(2)  the former was extended by the latter credit
facilities in the form of Trust Receipts;
       Petitioner Tabuenas (Ramon and Luis) executed in
favor of BPI a “continuing guaranty” whereby they
bound themselves, jointly and severally, to answer
for the loan obligations of Far East to the bank;
       Far East failed to pay its obligations (both the
promissory note and the trust receipts) and Ramon
and Luis Tabuenas also did not comply with their
solidary liability under the “continuing guaranty”;
       As a result, in 1987, private respondent BPI filed a
complaint for foreclosure of chattel mortgage with
replevin against petitioners;
       Far East filed a compulsory counterclaim where it
admitted the genuineness and due execution of the
promissory notes but alleged further that it has
already prescribed, so it raised the defense of
 prescription and lack of cause of action; it also
denied that BPI made prior demands for payment;
       BPI filed an opposition to the motion to hear
affirmative defenses, alleging that its cause of
action against Far East have not prescribed, since
within 10  year from the time its cause of action
accued, various written extrajudicial demands were
made by BPI to Far East;
Lower court rulings:
RTC:
       dismissed the complaint based on prescription
and lack of cause of action
ratio: Apart from the fact that the complaint
failed to allege that the period of prescription was
interrupted, the phrase “repeated requests and
demands for payment” is vague and incomplete so
as to establish in the minds of defendant, or to
enable the court to draw a conclusion, that
demands or acknowledgments of debt were made
that could have interrupted the period of
prescription.
CA: Reversed the RTC and remanded the case for
further proceedings
Issue: WON the claim in the allegation in the
complaint of private respondent has already
prescribed and has no sufficient cause of action
because the phrase “repeated requests and
demands for payment” is not sufficient to state a
cause of action
Ruling: No, the claim in petitioner’s complaint has
not prescribed and petitioner has a valid cause of
action.
Complaint is a concise statement of the ultimate
facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause or causes of
action.
What then are the ultimate facts which BPI had to
allege in its complaint so as to sufficiently establish
its cause of action?
A cause of action consists of three elements:
(1)  the legal right of plaintiff;
(2)  the correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(3)  the act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right.
These elements are manifest in BPI’s complaint,
where it alleged that:
(1)  for valuable consideration, BPI granted several
loans, evidenced by promissory notes, and
extended credit facilities in the form of trust
receipts to Far East;
(2)  Said promissory notes and trust receipts had
matured; and
(3)  Despite repeated demands, Far East failed and
refused to pay.
Clearly then, the general allegation of BPI that
“despite repeated requests and demands for
payment, Far East has failed to pay” is sufficient to
establish BPI’s cause of action. Besides,
prescription is not a cause of action; it is a defense,
which having been raised should be supported by
competent evidence.
A complaint is sufficient if it contains sufficient
notice of the cause of action even though the
allegation may be vague or indefinite, for in such
case, the recourse of the defendant would be to
file a motion for a bill of particulars.
The circumstances of BPI extending loans and
credits to Far East and the failure of the latter to
pay and discharge the same upon maturity are the
only ultimate facts which have to be pleaded,
although the facts necessary to make the mortgage
validly enforceable must be proven during the trial.
In fine, the finding of the trial court that
prescription has set in is primarily premised on a
misappreciation of the sufficiency of BPI’s
allegation as discussed. The records will show that
the hearing conducted by the trial court was
merely pro forma and the trial judge did not
sufficiently address the issue whether or not a
demand for payment in fact made by BPI and duly
received by herein petitioner Far east.
OSELITA SALITA vs. HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS
G.R. No. 106429,  June 13, 1994
FACTS:
Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita were married at
the Roman Catholic Church in Ermita, Manila. A
year later, their union turned sour. They separated
in fact. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on
the ground of Joselita’s psychological incapacity
which incapacity existed at the time of the
marriage although the same became manifest only
thereafter. Dissatisfied with the allegation in the
petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars
which the trial court granted. Subsequently, in his
Bill of Particulars, Edwin specified that  at the time
of their marriage, Joselita was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of their marriage in that she was unable
to understand and accept the demands made by
his profession — that of a newly qualified Doctor of
Medicine — upon his time and efforts so that she
frequently complained of his lack of attention to
her even to her mother, whose intervention caused
petitioner to lose his job.
Still petitioner was not contented with the Bill of
Particulars. She insists that the allegations in the
Bill of Particulars constitute a legal conclusion, not
an averment of ultimate facts, and fail to point out
the specific essential marital obligations she
allegedly was not able to perform, and thus render
the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not irrelevant to
her husband’s cause of action. She rationalizes that
her insistence on the specification of her particular
conduct or behavior with the corresponding
circumstances of time, place and person does not
call for information on evidentiary matters because
without these details she cannot adequately and
intelligently prepare her answer to the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations in the petition for
annulment of marriage and the subsequent bill of
particulars filed in amplification of the petition is
sufficient.
HELD:
Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts
which either directly from the basis of the primary
right and duty, or which directly make up the
wrongful acts or omission of the defendant. It
refers to acts which the evidence on trial will prove,
and not the evidence which will be required to
prove the existence of those facts. The Supreme
Court ruled that on the basis of the allegations, it is
evident that petitioner can already prepare her
responsive pleading or for trial. Private respondent
has already alleged that petitioner was unable to
understand and accept the demands made by his
profession. To demand for more details would
indeed be asking for information on evidentiary
facts — facts necessary to prove essential or
ultimate facts. The additional facts called for by
petitioner regarding her particular acts or
omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain
evidentiary matters is not the function of a motion
for bill of particulars.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error, the
instant petition is DENIED and the questioned
Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
NO BALITAAN V CFI
G.R. No. 111538 February 26, 1997
PARAÑAQUE KINGS ENTERPRISES,
INCORPORATED, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CATALINA L. SANTOS,
represented by her attorney-in-fact, LUZ B.
PROTACIO, and DAVID A.
RAYMUNDO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Do allegations in a complaint showing violation of a
contractual right of "first option or priority to buy
the properties subject of the lease" constitute a
valid cause of action? Is the grantee of such right
entitled to be offered the same terms and
conditions as those given to a third party who
eventually bought such properties? In short, is such
right of first refusal enforceable by an action for
specific performance?
These questions are answered in the affirmative by
this Court in resolving this petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 promulgated on
March 29, 1993, in CA-G.R. CV No. 34987 entitled
"Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. vs. Catalina L.
Santos, et al.," which affirmed the order 3 of
September 2, 1991, of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 57, 4 dismissing Civil Case No. 91-
786 for lack of a valid cause of action.
Facts of the Case
On March 19, 1991, herein petitioner filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati a
complaint, 5 which is reproduced in full below:
Plaintiff, by counsel, respectfully
states that:
1. Plaintiff is a private corporation
organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of the Philippines,
with principal place of business of
(sic) Dr. A. Santos Avenue,
Parañaque, Metro Manila, while
defendant Catalina L. Santos, is of
legal age, widow, with residence and
postal address at 444 Plato Street,
Ct., Stockton, California, USA,
represented in this action by her
attorney-in-fact, Luz B. Protacio,
with residence and postal address at
No, 12, San Antonio Street,
Magallanes Village, Makati, Metro
Manila, by virtue of a general power
of attorney. Defendant David A.
Raymundo, is of legal age, single,
with residence and postal address at
1918 Kamias Street, Damariñas
Village, Makati, Metro Manila,
where they (sic) may be served with
summons and other court
processes. Xerox copy of the general
power of attorney is hereto attached
as Annex "A".
2. Defendant Catalina L. Santos is
the owner of eight (8) parcels of
land located at (sic) Parañaque,
Metro Manila with transfer
certificate of title nos. S-19637, S-
19638 and S-19643 to S-19648.
Xerox copies of the said title (sic) are
hereto attached as Annexes "B" to
"I", respectively.
3. On November 28, 1977, a certain
Frederick Chua leased the above-
described property from defendant
Catalina L. Santos, the said lease was
registered in the Register of Deeds.
Xerox copy of the lease is hereto
attached as Annex "J".
4. On February 12, 1979, Frederick
Chua assigned all his rights and
interest and participation in the
leased property to Lee Ching Bing,
by virtue of a deed of assignment
and with the conformity of
defendant Santos, the said
assignment was also registered.
Xerox copy of the deed of
assignment is hereto attached as
Annex "K".
5. On August 6, 1979, Lee Ching Bing
also assigned all his rights and
interest in the leased property to
Parañaque Kings Enterprises,
Incorporated by virtue of a deed of
assignment and with the conformity
of defendant Santos, the same was
duly registered, Xerox copy of the
deed of assignment is hereto
attached as Annex "L".
6. Paragraph 9 of the assigned
leased (sic) contract provides among
others that:
"9. That in case the
properties subject of
the lease agreement
are sold or
encumbered, Lessors
shall impose as a
condition that the
buyer or mortgagee
thereof shall
recognize and be
bound by all the
 terms and conditions
of this lease
agreement and shall
respect this Contract
of Lease as if they are
the LESSORS thereof
and in case of sale,
LESSEE shall have the
first option or priority
to buy the properties
subject of the lease;"
7. On September 21, 1988,
defendant Santos sold the eight
parcels of land subject of the lease
to defendant David Raymundo for a
consideration of FIVE MILLION
(P5,000,000.00) PESOS. The said sale
was in contravention of the contract
of lease, for the first option or
priority to buy was not offered by
defendant Santos to the plaintiff.
Xerox copy of the deed of sale is
hereto attached as Annex "M".
8. On March 5, 1989, defendant
Santos wrote a letter to the plaintiff
informing the same of the sale of
the properties to defendant
Raymundo, the said letter was
personally handed by the attorney-
in-fact of defendant Santos, Xerox
copy of the letter is hereto attached
as Annex "N".
9. Upon learning of this fact
plaintiff's representative wrote a
letter to defendant Santos,
requesting her to rectify the error
and consequently realizing the error,
she had it reconveyed to her for the
same consideration of FIVE MILLION
(P5,000,000.00) PESOS. Xerox copies
of the letter and the deed of
reconveyance are hereto attached
as Annexes "O" and "P".
10. Subsequently the property was
offered for sale to plaintiff by the
defendant for the sum of FIFTEEN
MILLION (P15,000,000.00) PESOS.
Plaintiff was given ten (10) days to
make good of the offer, but
therefore (sic) the said period
expired another letter came from
the counsel of defendant Santos,
containing the same tenor of (sic)
the former letter. Xerox copies of
the letters are hereto attached as
Annexes "Q" and "R".
11. On May 8, 1989, before the
period given in the letter offering
the properties for sale expired,
plaintiff's counsel wrote counsel of
defendant Santos offering to buy the
properties for FIVE MILLION
(P5,000,000.00) PESOS. Xerox copy
of the letter is hereto attached as
Annex "S".
12. On May 15, 1989, before they
replied to the offer to purchase,
another deed of sale was executed
by defendant Santos (in favor of)
defendant Raymundo for a
consideration of NINE MILLION
(P9,000,000.00) PESOS. Xerox copy
of the second deed of sale is hereto
attached as Annex "T".
13. Defendant Santos violated again
paragraph 9 of the contract of lease
by executing a second deed of sale
to defendant Raymundo.
14. It was only on May 17, 1989,
that defendant Santos replied to the
letter of the plaintiff's offer to buy or
two days after she sold her
properties. In her reply she stated
among others that the period has
lapsed and the plaintiff is not a privy
(sic) to the contract. Xerox copy of
the letter is hereto attached as
Annex "U".
15. On June 28, 1989, counsel for
plaintiff informed counsel of
defendant Santos of the fact that
plaintiff is the assignee of all rights
and interest of the former lessor.
Xerox copy of the letter is hereto
attached as Annex "V".
16. On July 6, 1989, counsel for
defendant Santos informed the
plaintiff that the new owner is
defendant Raymundo. Xerox copy of
the letter is hereto attached as
Annex "W".
17. From the preceding facts it is
clear that the sale was simulated
and that there was a collusion
between the defendants in the sales
of the leased properties, on the
ground that when plaintiff wrote a
letter to defendant Santos to rectify
the error, she immediately have (sic)
the property reconveyed it (sic) to
her in a matter of twelve (12) days.
18. Defendants have the same
counsel who represented both of
them in their exchange of
communication with plaintiff's
counsel, a fact that led to the
conclusion that a collusion exist (sic)
between the defendants.
19. When the property was still
registered in the name of defendant
Santos, her collector of the rental of
the leased properties was her
brother-in-law David Santos and
when it was transferred to
defendant Raymundo the collector
was still David Santos up to the
month of June, 1990. Xerox copies
of cash vouchers are hereto
attached as Annexes "X" to "HH",
respectively.
20. The purpose of this unholy
alliance between defendants Santos
and Raymundo is to mislead the
plaintiff and make it appear that the
price of the leased property is much
higher than its actual value of FIVE
MILLION (P5,000,000.00) PESOS, so
that plaintiff would purchase the
properties at a higher price.
21. Plaintiff has made considerable
investments in the said leased
property by erecting a two (2)
storey, six (6) doors commercial
building amounting to THREE
MILLION (P3,000,000.00) PESOS.
This considerable improvement was
made on the belief that eventually
the said premises shall be sold to the
plaintiff.
22. As a consequence of this
unlawful act of the defendants,
plaintiff will incurr (sic) total loss of
THREE MILLION (P3,000,000.00)
PESOS as the actual cost of the
building and as such defendants
should be charged of the same
amount for actual damages.
23. As a consequence of the
collusion, evil design and illegal acts
of the defendants, plaintiff in the
process suffered mental anguish,
sleepless nights, bismirched (sic)
reputation which entitles plaintiff to
moral damages in the amount of
FIVE MILLION (P5,000,000.00)
PESOS.
24. The defendants acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner
and as a deterrent to the
commission of similar acts, they
should be made to answer for
exemplary damages, the amount left
to the discretion of the Court.
25. Plaintiff demanded from the
defendants to rectify their unlawful
acts that they committed, but amoun
defendants refused and failed to t of
comply with plaintiffs just and valid P5,000
and (sic) demands. Xerox copies of ,000.0
the demand letters are hereto 0;
attached as Annexes "KK" to "LL",
respectively. b.
Depen
26. Despite repeated demands, dants
defendants failed and refused (sic)
without justifiable cause to satisfy pay
plaintiff's claim, and was constrained plainti
to engaged (sic) the services of ff the
undersigned counsel to institute this sum of
action at a contract fee of P3,000
P200,000.00, as and for attorney's ,000.0
fees, exclusive of cost and expenses 0 as
of litigation. actual
damag
PRAYER es;

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully c.
prayed, that judgment be rendered Defend
in favor of the plaintiff and against ants
defendants and ordering that: pay
the
a. The sum of
Deed P5,000
of Sale ,000.0
betwe 0 as
en moral
defend damag
ants es;
dated
May d.
15, Defend
1989, ants
be pay
annulle exempl
d and ary
the damag
leased es left
proper to the
ties be discreti
sold to on of
the the
plainti Court;
ff in
the
 e. the plaintiff which scorned the said
Defend offer as "RIDICULOUS". There was
ants therefore a definite refusal on the
pay part of the plaintiff to accept the
the offer of defendant Santos. For in
sum of acquiring the said properties back to
not her name, and in so making the
less offers to sell both by herself
than (attorney-in-fact) and through her
P200,0 counsel, defendant Santos was
00.00 indeed conscientiously complying
as with her obligation under paragraph
attorne 9 of the Lease Agreement. . . . .
y's
fees. xxx xxx xxx

Plainti This is indeed one instance where a

ff
further
prays
for
other
just
and
equita
ble
reliefs
plus
cost of
suit.
Instead of filing their respective answers,
respondents filed motions to dismiss anchored on
the grounds of lack of cause of action, estoppel and
laches.
On September 2, 1991, the trial court issued the
order dismissing the complaint for lack of a valid
cause of action. It ratiocinated thus:
Upon the very face of the plaintiff's
Complaint itself, it therefore
indubitably appears that the
defendant Santos had verily
complied with paragraph 9 of the
Lease Agreement by twice offering
the properties for sale to the
plaintiff for ~1 5 M. The said offers,
however, were plainly rejected by
Complaint, after barely commencing
to create a cause of action,
neutralized itself by its subsequent
averments which erased or
extinguished its earlier allegations of
an impending wrong. Consequently,
absent any actionable wrong in the
very face of the Complaint itself, the
plaintiffs subsequent protestations
of collusion is bereft or devoid of
any meaning or purpose. . . . .
The inescapable result of the
foregoing considerations point to no
other conclusion than that the
Complaint actually does not contain
any valid cause of action and should
therefore be as it is hereby ordered
DISMISSED. The Court finds no
further need to consider the other
grounds of estoppel and laches
inasmuch as this resolution is
sufficient to dispose the matter. 6
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the ruling of the trial court, and
further reasoned that:
. . . . Appellant's protestations that
the P15 million price quoted by
appellee Santos was reduced to P9
million when she later resold the
 leased properties to Raymundo has
no valid legal moorings because
appellant, as a prospective buyer,
cannot dictate its own price and
forcibly ram it against appellee
Santos, as owner, to buy off her
leased properties considering the
total absence of any stipulation or
agreement as to the price or as to
how the price should be computed
under paragraph 9 of the lease
contract, . . . . 7
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was
denied in an order dated August 20, 1993. 8
Hence this petition. Subsequently, petitioner filed
an "Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to
Hold Respondent David A. Raymundo in Contempt
of Court." 9 The motion sought to enjoin
respondent Raymundo and his counsel from
pursuing the ejectment complaint filed before the
barangay captain of San Isidro, Parañaque, Metro
Manila; to direct the dismissal of said ejectment
complaint or of any similar action that may have
been filed; and to require respondent Raymundo to
explain why he should not be held in contempt of
court for forum-shopping. The ejectment suit
initiated by respondent Raymundo against
petitioner arose from the expiration of the lease
contract covering the property subject of this case.
The ejectment suit was decided in favor of
Raymundo, and the entry of final judgment in
respect thereof renders the said motion moot and
academic.
Issue
The principal legal issue presented before us for
resolution is whether the aforequoted complaint
alleging breach of the contractual right of "first
option or priority to buy" states a valid cause of
action.
Petitioner contends that the trial court as well as
the appellate tribunal erred in dismissing the
complaint because it in fact had not just one but at
least three (3) valid causes of action, to wit: (1)
breach of contract, (2) its right of first refusal
founded in law, and (3) damages.
Respondents Santos and Raymundo, in their
separate comments, aver that the petition should
be denied for not raising a question of law as the
issue involved is purely factual — whether
respondent Santos complied with paragraph 9 of
the lease agreement — and for not having
complied with Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, requiring the filing of twelve (12) copies of
the petitioner's brief. Both maintain that the
complaint filed by petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati stated no valid cause of action
and that petitioner failed to substantiate its claim
that the lower courts decided the same "in a way
not in accord with law and applicable decisions of
the Supreme Court"; or that the Court of Appeals
has "sanctioned departure by a trial court from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings"
so as to merit the exercise by this Court of the
power of review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Furthermore, they reiterate estoppel and
laches as grounds for dismissal, claiming that
petitioner's payment of rentals of the leased
property to respondent Raymundo from June 15,
1989, to June 30, 1990, was an acknowledgment of
the latter's status as new owner-lessor of said
property, by virtue of which petitioner is deemed
to have waived or abandoned its first option to
purchase.
Private respondents likewise contend that the deed
of assignment of the lease agreement did not
include the assignment of the option to purchase.
Respondent Raymundo further avers that he was
not privy to the contract of lease, being neither the
lessor nor lessee adverted to therein, hence he
could not be held liable for violation thereof.
The Court's Ruling
Preliminary Issue: Failure to File
Sufficient Copies of Brief
We first dispose of the procedural issue raised by
respondents, particularly petitioner's failure to file
twelve (12) copies of its brief. We have ruled that
when non-compliance with the Rules was not
intended for delay or did not result in prejudice to
the adverse party, dismissal of appeal on mere
technicalities — in cases where appeal is a matter
of right — may be stayed, in the exercise of the
court's equity jurisdiction. 10 It does not appear that
respondents were unduly prejudiced by
petitioner's nonfeasance. Neither has it been
shown that such failure was intentional.
Main Issue: Validity of Cause of Action
We do not agree with respondents' contention that
the issue involved is purely factual. The principal
legal question, as stated earlier, is whether the
complaint filed by herein petitioner in the lower
court states a valid cause of action. Since such
question assumes the facts alleged in the complaint
as true, it follows that the determination thereof is
one of law, and not of facts. There is a question of
law in a given case when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, and there is a question of fact when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the
falsehood of alleged facts. 11
At the outset, petitioner concedes that when the
ground for a motion to dismiss is lack of cause of
action, such ground must appear on the face of the
complaint; that to determine the sufficiency of a
cause of action, only the facts alleged in the
complaint and no others should be considered; and
that the test of sufficiency of the facts alleged in a
petition or complaint to constitute a cause of
action is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the
court could render a valid judgment upon the same
in accordance with the prayer of the petition or
complaint.
A cause of action exists if the following elements
are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises
or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right, and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant
to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages. 12
In determining whether allegations of a complaint
are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must
be borne in mind that the complaint does not have
to establish or allege facts proving the existence of
a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be
done at the trial on the merits of the case. To
sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of
action, the complaint must show that the claim for
relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has
been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite
or uncertain. 13
Equally important, a defendant moving to dismiss a
complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action
is regarded as having hypothetically admitted all
the averments thereof. 14
A careful examination of the complaint reveals that
it sufficiently alleges an actionable contractual
breach on the part of private respondents. Under
paragraph 9 of the contract of lease between
respondent Santos and petitioner, the latter was
granted the "first option or priority" to purchase
the leased properties in case Santos decided to sell.
If Santos never decided to sell at all, there can
never be a breach, much less an enforcement of
such "right." But on September 21, 1988, Santos
sold said properties to Respondent Raymundo
without first offering these to petitioner. Santos
indeed realized her error, since she repurchased
the properties after petitioner complained.
Thereafter, she offered to sell the properties to
petitioner for P15 million, which petitioner,
however, rejected because of the "ridiculous"
price. But Santos again appeared to have violated
the same provision of the lease contract when she
finally resold the properties to respondent
Raymundo for only P9 million without first offering
them to petitioner at such price. Whether there
was actual breach which entitled petitioner to
damages and/or other just or equitable relief, is a
question which can better be resolved after trial on
the merits where each party can present evidence
to prove their respective allegations and
defenses. 15
The trial and appellate courts based their decision
to sustain respondents' motion to dismiss on the
allegations of Parañaque Kings Enterprises that
Santos had actually offered the subject properties
for sale to it prior to the final sale in favor of
Raymundo, but that the offer was rejected.
According to said courts, with such offer, Santos
had verily complied with her obligation to grant the
right of first refusal to petitioner.
We hold, however, that in order to have full
compliance with the contractual right granting
petitioner the first option to purchase, the sale of
the properties for the amount of P9 million, the
price for which they were finally sold to respondent
Raymundo, should have likewise been first offered
to petitioner.
The Court has made an extensive and lengthy
discourse on the concept of, and obligations under,
a right of first refusal in the case of Guzman,
Bocaling & Co. vs. Bonnevie. 16 In that case, under a
contract of lease, the lessees (Raul and Christopher
Bonnevie) were given a "right of first priority" to
purchase the leased property in case the lessor
(Reynoso) decided to sell. The selling price quoted
to the Bonnevies was 600,000.00 to be fully paid in
cash, less a mortgage lien of P100,000.00. On the
other hand, the selling price offered by Reynoso to
and accepted by Guzman was only P400,000.00 of
which P137,500.00 was to be paid in cash while the
balance was to be paid only when the property was
cleared of occupants. We held that even if the
Bonnevies could not buy it at the price quoted
(P600,000.00), nonetheless, Reynoso could not sell
it to another for a lower price and under more
favorable terms and conditions without first
offering said favorable terms and price to the
Bonnevies as well. Only if the Bonnevies failed to
exercise their right of first priority could Reynoso
thereafter lawfully sell the subject property to
others, and only under the same terms and
conditions previously offered to the Bonnevies.
Of course, under their contract, they specifically
stipulated that the Bonnevies could exercise the
right of first priority, "all things and conditions
being equal." This Court interpreted this proviso to
mean that there should be identity of terms and
conditions to be offered to the Bonnevies and all
other prospective buyers, with the Bonnevies to
enjoy the right of first priority. We hold that the
same rule applies even without the same proviso if
the right of first refusal (or the first option to buy)
is not to be rendered illusory.
From the foregoing, the basis of the right of first
refusal* must be the current offer to sell of the
seller or offer to purchase of any prospective
buyer. Only after the optionee fails to exercise its
right of first priority under the same terms and
within the period contemplated, could the owner
validly offer to sell the property to a third person,
again, under the same terms as offered to the
optionee.
This principle was reiterated in the very recent case
of Equatorial Realty vs. Mayfair
17
Theater, Inc.   which was decided en banc. This
Court upheld the right of first refusal of the lessee
Mayfair, and rescinded the sale of the property by
the lessor Carmelo to Equatorial Realty
"considering that Mayfair, which had substantial
interest over the subject property, was prejudiced
by its sale to Equatorial without Carmelo conferring
to Mayfair every opportunity to negotiate within
the 30-day stipulated period" (emphasis supplied).
In that case, two contracts of lease between
Carmelo and Mayfair provided "that if the LESSOR
should desire to sell the leased premises, the
LESSEE shall be given 30 days exclusive option to
purchase the same." Carmelo initially offered to sell
the leased property to Mayfair for six to seven
million pesos. Mayfair indicated interest in
purchasing the property though it invoked the 30-
day period. Nothing was heard thereafter from
Carmelo. Four years later, the latter sold its entire
Recto Avenue property, including the leased
premises, to Equatorial for P11,300,000.00 without
priorly informing Mayfair. The Court held that both
Carmelo and Equatorial acted in bad faith: Carmelo
for knowingly violating the right of first option of
Mayfair, and Equatorial for purchasing the property
despite being aware of the contract stipulation. In
addition to rescission of the contract of sale, the
Court ordered Carmelo to allow Mayfair to buy the
subject property at the same price of
P11,300,000.00.
 No cause of action
under P.D. 1517
Petitioner also invokes Presidential Decree No.
1517, or the Urban Land Reform Law, as another
source of its right of first refusal. It claims to be
covered under said law, being the "rightful
occupant of the land and its structures" since it is
the lawful lessee thereof by reason of contract.
Under the lease contract, petitioner would have
occupied the property for fourteen (14) years at
the end of the contractual period.
Without probing into whether petitioner is
rightfully a beneficiary under said law, suffice it to
say that this Court has previously ruled that under
Section 6 18 of P.D. 1517, "the terms and conditions
of the sale in the exercise of the lessee's right of
first refusal to purchase shall be determined by the
Urban Zone Expropriation and Land Management
Committee. Hence, . . . . certain prerequisites must
be complied with by anyone who wishes to avail
himself of the benefits of the decree." 19 There
being no allegation in its complaint that the
prerequisites were complied with, it is clear that
the complaint did fail to state a cause of action on
this ground.
Deed of Assignment included
the option to purchase
Neither do we find merit in the contention of
respondent Santos that the assignment of the lease
contract to petitioner did not include the option to
purchase. The provisions of the deeds of
assignment with regard to matters assigned were
very clear. Under the first assignment between
Frederick Chua as assignor and Lee Ching Bing as
assignee, it was expressly stated that:
. . . . the ASSIGNOR hereby CEDES,
TRANSFERS and ASSIGNS to herein
ASSIGNEE, all his rights, interest and
participation over said premises
afore-described, . . . . 20 (emphasis
supplied)
And under the subsequent assignment executed
between Lee Ching Bing as assignor and the
petitioner, represented by its Vice President
Vicenta Lo Chiong, as assignee, it was likewise
expressly stipulated that;
. . . . the ASSIGNOR hereby sells,
transfers and assigns all his rights,
interest and participation over said
leased premises, . . . . 21 (emphasis
supplied)
One of such rights included in the contract of lease
and, therefore, in the assignments of rights was the
lessee's right of first option or priority to buy the
properties subject of the lease, as provided in
paragraph 9 of the assigned lease contract. The
deed of assignment need not be very specific as to
which rights and obligations were passed on to the
assignee. It is understood in the general provision
aforequoted that all specific rights
and obligations contained in the contract of lease
are those referred to as being assigned. Needless
to state, respondent Santos gave her unqualified
conformity to both assignments of rights.
Respondent Raymundo privy
to the Contract of Lease
With respect to the contention of respondent
Raymundo that he is not privy to the lease
contract, not being the lessor nor the lessee
referred to therein, he could thus not have violated
its provisions, but he is nevertheless a proper party.
Clearly, he stepped into the shoes of the owner-
lessor of the land as, by virtue of his purchase, he
assumed all the obligations of the lessor under the
lease contract. Moreover, he received benefits in
the form of rental payments. Furthermore, the
complaint, as well as the petition, prayed for the
annulment of the sale of the properties to him.
Both pleadings also alleged collusion between him
and respondent Santos which defeated the
exercise by petitioner of its right of first refusal.
In order then to accord complete relief to
petitioner, respondent Raymundo was a necessary,
if not indispensable, party to the case. 22 A
favorable judgment for the petitioner will
necessarily affect the rights of respondent
Raymundo as the buyer of the property over which
petitioner would like to assert its right of first
option to buy.
Having come to the conclusion that the complaint
states a valid cause of action for breach of the right
of first refusal and that the trial court should thus
not have dismissed the complaint, we find no more
need to pass upon the question of whether the
complaint states a cause of action for damages or
whether the complaint is barred by estoppel or
laches. As these matters require presentation
and/or determination of facts, they can be best
resolved after trial on the merits.
While the lower courts erred in dismissing the
complaint, private respondents, however, cannot
be denied their day in court. While, in the
resolution of a motion to dismiss, the truth of the
facts alleged in the complaint are theoretically
admitted, such admission is merely hypothetical
and only for the purpose of resolving the motion. In
case of denial, the movant is not to be deprived of
the right to submit its own case and to submit
evidence to rebut the allegations in the complaint.
Neither will the grant of the motion by a trial court
and the ultimate reversal thereof by an appellate
court have the effect of stifling such right. 23 So too,
the trial court should be given the opportunity to
evaluate the evidence, apply the law and decree
the proper remedy. Hence, we remand the instant
case to the trial court to allow private respondents
to have their day in court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati
for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. vs Court of
Appeals 268 SCRA 727. February 26, 1997
Facts:
                Defendant Catalina Santos is the owner of
8 parcels of land located in Parañaque. Frederick
Chua leased the property of defendant and
assigned all rights and interest and participation in
the leased property to Lee Ching Bing by deed of
assignment. Lee Ching Bing also assigned all his
rights and interest in the leased property to
Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. All of these
contracts/deeds were registered.
Paragraph 9 of the assigned leased (sic) contract
provides among others that:
9. That in case the properties subject of the lease
agreement are sold or encumbered, Lessors shall
impose as a condition that the buyer or mortgagee
thereof shall recognize and be bound by all the
terms and conditions of this lease agreement and
shall respect this Contract of Lease as if they are
the LESSORS thereof and in case of sale, LESSEE
shall have the first option or priority to buy the
properties subject of the lease;
                Defendant Santos sold the eight parcels of
land subject of the lease to Defendant David
Raymundo, for a consideration of P5Million, in
contravention of the contract of lease, for the first
option or priority to buy was not offered by
defendant Santos to the plaintiff. Santos, realizing
the error, she had it reconveyed to her for the
same consideration of P5Million and subsequently
the property was offered for sale to plaintiff for the
sum of P15Million, however the period of 10 days
to make good of the offer expired. Another deed of
sale was executed by Santos in favor of Raymundo
for consideration of P9Million. Hence, the
petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC.
                RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a
valid cause of action. It ratiocinated that Santos
complied with the lease agreement by offering the
properties for sale to the plaintiff and there was a
definite refusal on the part of the plaintiff to accept
the offer.
                CA affirmed in toto the ruling of RTC.
Issue:
                Whether or not there is valid cause of
action.
Ruling:
                Yes.
The principal legal question, as stated
earlier, is whether the complaint filed by herein
petitioner in the lower court states a valid cause of
action. Since such question assumes the facts
alleged in the complaint as true, it follows that the
determination thereof is one of law, and not of
facts. There is a question of law in a given case
when the doubt or difference arises as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts, and there is a
question of fact when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged
facts.
A cause of action exists if the following
elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever
law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the
part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right, and (3) an act or omission on the
part of such defendant violative of the right of
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages.
A careful examination of the complaint
reveals that it sufficiently alleges an actionable
contractual breach on the part of private
respondents. Under paragraph 9 of the contract of
lease between respondent Santos and petitioner,
the latter was granted the first option or priority to
purchase the leased properties in case Santos
decided to sell. If Santos never decided to sell at all,
there can never be a breach, much less an
enforcement of such right. But on September 21,
1988, Santos sold said properties to Respondent
Raymundo without first offering these to
petitioner. Santos indeed realized her error, since
she repurchased the properties after petitioner
complained. Thereafter, she offered to sell the
properties to petitioner for P15 million, which
petitioner, however, rejected because of the
ridiculous price. But Santos again appeared to have
violated the same provision of the lease contract
when she finally resold the properties to
respondent Raymundo for only P9 million without
first offering them to petitioner at such price.
Whether there was actual breach which entitled
petitioner to damages and/or other just or
equitable relief, is a question which can better be
resolved after trial on the merits where each party
can present evidence to prove their respective
allegations and defenses.
The decision of the RTC and CA are reversed and
set aside. The case is remanded to the RTC for
further proceedings.
NO DE GALA V DE GALA
People v. Taneo (CASE DIGEST)
G.R. No. L-37673
March 31, 1933
TOPICS: Criminal Law, Somnambulism, Sleep
Walking, Legal Medicine
FACTS:
Potenciano Tadeo lived with his wife in his parent’s
house. In January 1932, a fiesta was being
celebrated, and visitors were entertained in the
house including Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao.
Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to
sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left
the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife
who tried to stop him, he wounded her in the
abdomen. Taneo attacked Tanner and Malinao and
tried to attack his father after which he wounded
himself. Potenciano’s wife who was then seven
months pregnant, died five days later as a result of
her wound, and also the foetus which was
asphyxiated in the mother’s womb.
Taneo was charged with parricide. From this
sentence, the defendant appealed.
It appears from the evidence that the day before
the commission of the crime the defendant had a
quarrel over a glass of “tuba” with Enrique
Collantes and Valentin Abadilla. On the day of the
commission of the crime, it was noted that the
defendant was sad and weak, and early in the
afternoon he had severe stomachache. The
defendant states that when he fell asleep, he
dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him with
a bolo while Abadilla held his feet, by reason of
which he got up; and as it seemed to him that his
enemies were inviting him to come down, he
armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At the
door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him
that she was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his
wife really wounded and in desperation wounded
himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply around
him, he attacked everybody that came his way.
The evidence shows that the defendant not only
did not have any trouble with his wife, but that he
loved her dearly. Neither did he have any dispute
with Tanner and Malinao, or have any motive for
assaulting them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Taneo is criminally liable.
RULING:
No. The Court concluded that the defendant acted
while in a dream. His acts were not voluntary in the
sense of entailing criminal liability.
The Court took the special circumstances of the
case, in which the victim was the defendant’s own
wife whom he dearly loved, and taking into
consideration the fact that the defendant tried to
attack also his father, in whose house and under
whose protection he lived, besides attacking
Tanner and Malinao, his guests, whom he himself
invited as may be inferred from the evidence
presented, the Court found not only a lack of
motive for the defendant to voluntarily commit the
acts complained of, but also motives for not
committing said acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is
also of the same opinion. The doctor stated that
considering the circumstances of the case, the
defendant acted while in a dream, under the
influence of a hallucination and not in his right
mind.
The Court found that the defendant is not
criminally liable for the offense with which he is
charged, and it is ordered that he be confined in
the Government insane asylum, whence he shall
not be released until the director thereof finds that
his liberty would no longer constitute a menace.
No people v balanon
People of the Philippines vs. Baid (2000)
June 30, 2015 markerwins Remedial
Lawevidence, witness
G.R. No. 129667. July 31, 2000
Facts: That on or about the 22nd day of December
1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused
by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then
and there [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously
undressing one NIEVA GARCIA y SABAN, a mental
patient suffering [from] schizophrenia and put
himself on top of her, and thereafter have carnal
knowledge with the undersigned complainant
against her will and without her consent.
When arraigned, accused-appellant entered a plea
of not guilty, whereupon trial of the case on the
merits proceeded. The prosecution presented
three witnesses, namely, the complainant, Dr.
Herminigilda Salangad, the complainant’s attending
psychiatrist, and Dr. Emmanuel Reyes, the medico-
legal officer who examined the
complainant. Complainant was brought later during
the day before Dr. Emmanuel Reyes for medico-
legal examination. She told him what happened.
Dr. Reyes reduced her narration of the incident into
writing and then gave her a physical examination.
Accused-appellant testified in his behalf. He stated
that he had been a nurse-aide of the Holy Spirit
Clinic since September 18, 1995.
He denied the allegations against him. He testified
that, on the date and time referred to by the
complainant, he was asleep in the nurse-aide
quarters located about ten meters from the room
where complainant was staying.
On cross-examination, accused-appellant admitted
that he knew it was prohibited to give cigarettes to
patients. He further admitted that, as a nurse-aide,
he could enter the patients’ room anytime to check
their condition and see to it that the lights were
turned off when they were not needed. He further
stated that he was not investigated by the police
when he was invited to their headquarters. The
trial court rendered its decision finding the accused
Eric Baid y Ominta GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court
erred in convicting him of rape. Dr. Herminigilda
Salangad, the complainant’s attending psychiatrist
and consultant at the Medical Center in
Muntinlupa, the Perpetual Help Medical Center,
the Philippine National Police, and the Holy Spirit
Clinic, was presented as an expert witness.
According to her, complainant was, at the time of
the incident, suffering from an undifferentiated
type of schizophrenia, described as having the
characteristic symptoms of schizophrenia but does
not fit the profile for paranoid, disorganized, or
catatonic schizophrenia. Dr. Salangad stated that
complainant seemed to shift from one type of
schizophrenia to another.
It is contended that as complainant is a
schizophrenic, her testimony should not have been
given credence by the trial court. It is argued that:
(1) there were serious inconsistencies between her
sworn statement and her testimony in court; (2)
the prosecution failed to present witnesses to
corroborate her testimony; (3) complainant failed
to identify accused-appellant; (4) the results of the
medico-legal examination were negative for
spermatozoa; (5) the healed lacerations showed
that complainant had sexual intercourse seven
days before the alleged incident; and (6) the
probability was that her allegations of rape were
merely a product of her fantasy.
Issue: Whether or not the complainant, who is
suffering from schizophrenia, can be qualified as a
witness?
Held: Yes. Notwithstanding her mental illness,
complainant showed that she was qualified to be a
witness, i.e., she could perceive and was capable of
making known her perceptions to others
Her testimony indicates that she could understand
questions particularly relating to the incident and
could give responsive answers to them. Though she
may have exhibited emotions inconsistent with
that of a rape victim (“inappropriate affect”) during
her testimony, such as by smiling when answering
questions, her behavior was such as could be
expected from a person suffering from
schizophrenia. Otherwise, complainant was candid,
straightforward, and coherent.
It has long been settled that a person should not be
disqualified on the basis of mental handicap alone.
Whatever may be the inconsistencies in her
testimony, they are minor and inconsequential.
They show that complainant’s testimony was
unrehearsed, and rather than diminish the
probative value of her testimony, they reinforce it.
In the case at bar, the rape of complainant
occurred in a room where other patients were
sleeping. This circumstance, it is argued, is
antithetical to the possibility of the commission of
rape. As this Court has repeatedly said, lust is no
respecter of time and place and the crime of rape
can be consummated even when the malefactor
and the victim are not alone. The plausibility of an
allegation of rape does not depend on the number
of witnesses presented during the trial, so much so
that, if the testimonies so far presented clearly and
credibly established the commission of the crime,
corroborative evidence would only be a mere
surplusage.27 In this case, the trial court gave
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses on the basis of which it adjudged
accused-appellant guilty. In the absence of bias,
partiality, and grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the presiding judge, his findings as to their
credibility are entitled to utmost respect as he had
the opportunity to observe their demeanor on the
witness stand.
No republic v ca

People v. Lagarto y Petilla, G.R. Nos. 118828 &
119371, February 29, 2000
FACTS: At 5:10 p.m. on 2 August 1994, PO3
Edgardo E. Ko of the Western Police District
Command, Directorate for Investigation, Crimes
Against Persons Division, Philippine National Police,
Manila, received an information from PO3
Mabilisan of Station 11 that a dead body in a sack
was found at around 4:30 p.m. floating in the
flooded street of Del Pan near the corner of
Lavizares St., Binondo, Manila. Residents
discovered the corpse wrapped in a round yellow
tablecloth tied with a nylon cord inside a sack. The
responding policemen — PO3 Ko, SPO1 Edgardo
Manuel, and PO3 Rosalie Fernandez — noticed the
victim’s feet and left hand protruding from the sack
and round yellow tablecloth. They untied the sack
and nylon cord and saw the victim, a young girl,
wearing nothing but her duster, with gaping
wounds on the left ear and chin, her genitals
lacerated, her eyes missing, and her head bashed
in. They immediately brought the body to the
police morgue at Tres Amigos Memorial Chapel.
A certain Romezen Alquiza called the police station,
inquiring about the body recovered from Del Pan,
Tondo, Manila, whose description matched his
sister Angel who had been missing since the night
of 1 August 1994. He was advised to proceed to the
Tres Amigos Memorial Chapel. Together with his
mother Zenaida and some family members,
Romezen went to said mortuary to look at the
body. Indeed, it was Angel Alquiza. He then
requested the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) Medico-Legal Officer to
autopsy Angel’s body. Said office also issued a
Certificate of Identification of Dead Body, which
was signed by Romezen. The autopsy was
conducted by NBI Medico-Legal Officer Ludivino J.
Lagat, who concluded that Angel Alquiza died due
to multiple stab wounds and traumatic injuries.
The prosecution relied mainly on the statements
and testimonies of, among others, Herminia
Barlam. During the trial, prosecution witness
Herminia Barlam categorically pointed to accused-
appellants as among the three men (the other one
being the deceased Lagunday) she saw in the
warehouse at Kagitingan St. at around 2:00 a.m. on
2 August 1994. She narrated how accused-
appellants stabbed the face and genitals of Angel,
hit her with a piece of wood, raped her as she bled,
and eventually killed her. She saw how they tied
her hands and feet, wrapped her lifeless form in a
yellow tablecloth, and put her inside a sack.
Because of her hearing impairment, the defense
sought to disqualify Barlam on the ground of
incompetence. She was referred to the National
Center for Mental Health (NCMH) upon repeated
motion of defense counsels to determine if she was
competent to testify.
ISSUE: wether or not Barlam is qualified to be a
witness.
HELD: Yes. Herminia Barlam adequately met the
minimum requirements for qualifying as a witness
under the Rules. She could certainly perceive and
make known her perception to others. Even if she
is deaf, she saw what happened on 2 August 1994.
She related what she saw to the police, to the
psychiatrists who examined her at NCMH, and to
the trial court.
The Supreme Court opined that Barlam’s testimony
adequately established the liability of accused-
appellants for raping and killing the victim. She not
only proved to be competent but also truthful in
her narration of what transpired on 2 August 1994.
Her sworn statement might not entirely jibe with
her oral testimony, but the Court has ruled that in
case of conflict between the contents of a sworn
statement and testimony in open court, the latter
generally prevails since ex parte affidavits are often
incomplete and inaccurate because by their nature,
they are ordinarily prepared by a person other than
the affiant. She repeatedly pointed to accused-
appellants as she spoke, and slapped, boxed, and
glowered at them when she was asked by the court
to identify the malefactors. Neither can the Court
discount the psychiatric report, which gave Barlam
a clean bill of mental health. For three days, testify as to matters in which they are interested,
professional psychiatrists examined her, but her
directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated:
story remained the same. It was the same story she
narrated in court, albeit with some minor
inconsistencies. It must also be noted that Barlam
absolutely had no motive to falsely testify against
accused-appellants. Furthermore, accused- xxx xxx xxx
appellants’ denial and alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification and assertions of Barlam. The
Court, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the trial (b) A husband cannot be examined for or against
court with modification as to the damages awarded his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or
to the heirs of the victim. against her husband without his consent, except in
a civil case by one against the other or in a criminal
No people v salomon case for a crime committed by one against the
other;
Icutanim v Hernandez is a short case paki read na
lang mehehehehe

xxx xxx xxx

No carandang v cabatuando

Counsel claimed that Avelino had not consented

No addenbrook v people
expressly or impliedly to his wife's testifying against
him. The trial court overruled the objection.
Ordoño vs. Daquigan Case Digest Avelino's MR was denied; hence, he filed the
 0
instant action for certiorari and prohibition.

Facts:

Issue:

In 1970, Avelino Ordoño was charged with having

raped his daughter, Leonora. The Fiscal presented
Whether the rape committed by the husband
the wife, Catalina Ordoño as the second
against his daughter is a crime committed by him
prosecution witness. After she had stated her
against his wife within the meaning of the
personal circumstances, the defense counsel
exception found in the marital disqualification rule.
objected to her competency, invoking the marital
disqualification rule found in Rule 130 of the Rules
Should the phrase "in a criminal case for a crime
of Court which then provides:
committed by one against the other" be restricted
to crimes committed by one spouse against the
other, such as physical injuries, bigamy, adultery or
Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or concubinage, or should it be given a latitudinarian
relationship. — The following persons cannot
interpretation as referring to any offense causing
marital discord?
Held:
Yes. When an offense directly attack or directly and
vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes
within the exception to the statute that one shall
not be a witness against the other except in a
criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one
against the other. Using this criterion, it can be
concluded that in the law of evidence the rape
perpetrated by the father against his daughter is a
crime committed by him against his wife. (Ordoño
vs. Daquigan, G.R. No. L-39012, January 31, 1975)
NO PEOPLE V FRANCISCO
ARROYO, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 96602, 19 November 1991
FACTS:
A criminal complaint for adultery was filed by Dr.
Neri (husband) against Ruby (wife) and Arroyo
(petitioner). After trial, the Regional Trial Court
convicted the petitioner and the wife, based,
among others on the wife's admission to her
husband that she sex with petitioner Arroyo. This
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
wife later filed a motion for reconsideration or new
trial contending that a pardon had been extended
by her husband. The husband filed a manifestation
praying for the dismissal of the case as he had
"tacitly consented" to his wife's infidelity.
ISSUES/RULINGS:
1. Whether the admission of adulterous conduct by
the wife to her husband without the presence of
her counsel is admissible in evidence.
YES. The husband's testimony relating to the
admission of adulterous conduct made by the wife
to her husband is admissible in evidence. The
husband was neither a peace officer nor an
investigating officer conducting a custodial
investigation. Neither was said testimony rendered
inadmissible by the constitutional provision on the
right to remain silent and the right to counsel of a
"person under investigation for the commission of
an offense."
The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of
an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer
starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or
confession or admissions from respondent-
accused.
2. Whether the husband is a competent witness
against his wife
Yes. The husband is not precluded under the Rules
of Court from testifying against his wife in criminal
cases for a crime committed by one against the
other (Section 22, Rule 129, Revised Rules of
Court). In short, the trial court and the Court of
Appeals did not err in admitting Dr. Neri's
testimony as he was a competent witness.
Lacurom v. Jacoba, A.C. No. 5921, March 10, 2006
Facts: 
The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for
plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion (Veneracion) in a
civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant
Federico Barrientos (Barrientos). In the motion for
Reconsideration filed by the counsel, it was stated
that the resolution of the court is “an abhorrent
nullity. And that there is a legal monstrosity on the
part of the RTC;that the mistakes are very patent
and glaring. Thus, it was Horrible and Terrible.” 
 On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered
Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and
explain why she should not be held in contempt of
court for the very disrespectful, insulting and
humiliating contents of the 30 July 2001 motion. In
her Explanation, Comments and Answer, Velasco-
Jacoba claimed that His Honor knows beforehand
who actually prepared the subject Motion; records
will show that the undersigned counsel did not
actually or actively participate in this case. 
On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found
Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized
her with imprisonment for five days and a fine of
P1,000.
Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the
13 September 2001 order. She recounted that on
her way out of the house for an afternoon hearing,
Atty. Ellis Jacoba (Jacoba) stopped her and said O,
pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli.
(Sign this as it is due today, or it might not be filed
on time.) She signed the pleading handed to her
without reading it, in trusting blind faith on her
husband of 35 years with whom she entrusted her
whole life and future.[17] This pleading turned out
to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted
but could not sign because of his then suspension
from the practice of law.   An administrative case
was filed against the spouses Jacoba. 
IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and
Recommendation of 10 October 2002,
recommended the suspension of respondents from
the practice of law for six months.
The IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) adopted
IBP Commissioner Navarros Report and
Recommendation, except for the length of
suspension which the IBP Board reduced to three
months.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Atty. Velasco-Jacoba is
administratively liable for the signing of the motion
which she did not prepare.
2. Whether or not the  marriage privilege rule in
evidence applies in this case.
Ruling:
1) There is no dispute that the genuine signature of
Velasco-Jacoba appears on the 30 July 2001
motion. Velasco-Jacobas responsibility as counsel is
governed by Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Signature and address.Every pleading must
be signed by the party or counsel representing him
x x x.
By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba
in effect certified that she had read it, she knew it
to be meritorious, and it was not for the purpose of
delaying the case. Her signature supplied the
motion with legal effect and elevated its status
from a mere scrap of paper to that of a court
document. 
Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed
the 30 July 2001 motion only because of her
husband’s request but she did not know its
contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice of
signing each others pleadings is a long-standing
arrangement between the spouses. According to
Velasco-Jacoba, [s]o implicit is [their] trust for each
other that this happens all the time. Through the
years, [she] already lost count of the number of
pleadings prepared by one that is signed by the
other.  By Velasco-Jacobas own admission,
therefore, she violated Section 3 of Rule 7. This
violation is an act of falsehood before the courts,
which in itself is a ground for subjecting her to
disciplinary action, independent of any other
ground arising from the contents of the 30 July
2001 motion. 
2) The marital privilege rule does not apply in this
case. Despite the fact that his name in  does not
appear in the 30 July 2001 motion, his Answer with
Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a
denial of his wife’s account. Instead, Jacoba
impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by
stating that he trained his guns and fired at the
errors which he perceived and believed to be
gigantic and monumental.  testify. It asked the court to issue a subpoena to
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence,
may be waived by failure of the claimant to object
timely to its presentation or by any conduct that
may be construed as implied consent. This waiver
applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted
authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba is suspended from
the practice of law for two (2) years effective upon
finality of this Decision. Likewise,  Atty. Olivia
Velasco-Jacobais suspended from the practice of
law for two (2) months.  of P150,000.
NO PEOPLE V CARLOS
NO US V CONCEPCION
LEZAMA vs. RODRIGUEZ
Ah this is an
all too different case compared to the Castaneda
case and all the others. Because, take note, in this
case it’s the other way around. There never was a
move to disqualify an adverse party’s wife nor
husband in invoking the marital disqualification
rule. Here the respondents even want the wife to
the adverse party’s wife to testify as a hostile
witness.
Here’s what happened. La Paz Ice Plant Inc. in
Iloilo, led by its president Jose Manuel Lezama was
going bankrupt and so the company was placed
under receivership. During the pendency of the
receivership Marciano Roque being a resident of
Manila brought an action against the company in
the CFI of Manila for the collection of a sum he
supposedly had lent to the company in the amount
 
So what
happened was, Jose Dineros who was acting as
receiver of the La Paz Ice Plant after receiving
unfavorable judgment in the CFI of Manila upon
the collection case, filed an action in the CFI of
Iloilo for the annulment of the judgment of the CFI
of Manila. So here we have two venues. The case in
CFI of Manila who rendered the judgment in favor
of Marciano Roque for the collection of the lent
money. And the case in CFI of Iloilo filed by Jose
Dineros seeking the annulment of judgment of the
former.
 Court says NO.  She may not be examined as a
hostile witness.
And take note, in his filed action he named
Marciano Roque and the spouses JOSE MANUEL &
PAQUITA LEZAMA as defendants alleging that  1.
The Supreme Court ruling here was worth
because of the mismanagement of the Lezamas the
pondering. I think the court held it beautifully.
La Paz Ice Plant was placed under receivership. 2.
Court said the Marital Disqualification Rule is two
That through the collusion of the Lezamas, Roque
edged. 1. The disqualification of husband and wife
obtained a favored judgment against the company.
to testify in each other’s behalf. 2. AS WELL AS THE
And 3. that summons by the CFI of Manila was
PRIVILEGE NOT TO TESTIFY AGAINST EACH OTHER.
served not on him who is the receiver but on the
In the former, the disqualification is extrinsic, the
spouses Lezamas. Claiming that by doing so, the CFI
compelling reason is coming from the outside,
of Manila acquired no jurisdiction of the case and
which is the law itself. In the latter, it becomes a
therefore the court decision was void.
privilege. Intrinsic. A decision not to testify. 

Defendant spouses which are herein petitioners

We must understand the essence of this law. And it
(before the SC) while admitting the company’s
is not pecuniary interest. The basis of the Marital
placement on receivership maintained that 1. Jose
Disqualification Rule is the RELATIONSHIP of the
Manuel Lezama nevertheless remained president
spouses.  I mean you know, who in his/her right
even while on receivership and as such he had the
mind would say to the other spouse “I’m going to
authority to receive court summons in behalf of the
testify against you. You might want to give me your
company.  And 2. Denied entering into collusion
consent” whatdfu-k. If we continue tolerating that
with Roque and averred they did not contest
in court we might end up seeing hundreds of
Roque’s claim because they knew it to be
couples with crooked reasoning minds.
legitimate pursuant to a board of director’s
resolution.

Here’s the exact words of the Supreme Court:

Now, here comes the controversial issue. Case was
heard in the CFI of Iloilo. And at the hearing,
“It is a natural repugnance in every fair-minded
Dineros asked the court to
person to compel a wife or a husband to be the
subpoena testificandum Paquita Lezama wife of
means of the other’s condemnation. And subjecting
Jose Manuel Lezama to testify as a hostile witness.
the culprit to the humiliation of being condemned
The request was granted by the court over the
by the words of his intimate life partner” Beautiful
objection of the petitioners invoking the Marital
isn’t it?
Disqualification Rule.

Even if her testimony will support the adverse

Question, can a wife who is a co-defendant of her
party’s charges, the more the reason that
husband in an action may be examined as a hostile
compelling Paquita Lezama to testify against her
witness by the adverse party without infringing on
husband would be tantamount to a violation Sec.
her marital privilege not to testify against her
20 of Rule 130. 
husband even concerning alleged fraud?
 As we just have said, the essence of that law is the
relationship between both spouses. Not anything
else.
Posted by chip at 1:35 PM  
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People vs. Castaneda Case Digest
 0
Facts:

Victoria filed a complaint for Falsification of Public
Document against her husband, Benjamin. Victoria
alleged that Benjamin falsified her signature in a
deed of sale of a house belonging to the conjugal
partnership, making it appear that she gave her
marital consent to said sale. At the trial, the
prosecution called to the witness stand Victoria,
but the defense moved to disqualify her as a
witness, invoking the rule that a spouse cannot be
examined without the consent of the other spouse,
except in a civil case by one against the other or in
a criminal case for a crime committed by one
against another. The prosecution opposed the
motion on the ground that the case falls under the
exception, contending that it is a criminal case
committed by one against the other. The trial court
granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria from
testifying against Benjamin. Their motion for
reconsideration denied, the prosecution elevated
the case to the Supreme Court on pure question of
law
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of
Public Document may be considered as a criminal
case for a crime committed by a husband against
his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on
marital disqualification.
Held:
Yes. The case is an exception to the marital
disqualification rule, as a criminal case for a crime
committed by the accused-husband against the
witness-wife.
The act complained of as constituting the crime of
Falsification of Public Document is the forgery by
the accused of his wife's signature in a deed of sale,
thereby making it appear therein that said wife
consented to the sale of a house and lot belonging
to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in
truth she did not. It must be noted that had the
sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of
the wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale,
been made with the consent of the wife, no crime
could have been charged against said husband
Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his
wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense
charged. And it is this same breach of trust which
prompted the wife to make the necessary
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal
case. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is
not one for a crime committed by one spouse
against the other is to advance a conclusion which
completely disregards the factual antecedents of
the instant case.
It is undeniable that the act complained of had the
effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal
relation. This is apparent not only in the act of the
wife in personally lodging her complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her
insistent efforts in connection with the instant
petition, which seeks to set aside the order
disqualified her from testifying against her
husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the
witness-wife underscore the fact that the martial
and domestic relations between her and the
accused-husband have become so strained that
there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor
peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. In
such a case, the "identity of interests disappears
and the consequent danger of perjury based on
that identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a
situation, the security and confidence of private life
which the law aims at protecting will be nothing
but Ideals which, through their absence, merely
leave a void in the unhappy home. Thus, there is no
reason to apply the martial disqualification
rule. (People vs. Castaneda, G.R. No. L-46306,
February 27, 1979)
G.R. No.
58164                                                                                    During trial, Laura Cervantes, a daughter
                                                                        
mber 2,
JOSE GUERRERO, MARIA
MAGDALENA GUERRERO ESPIRITU, assisted by her
husband CANDIDO ESPIRITU,
GUERRERO, CLARA GUERRERO,
Al., Petitioner,                                                                v
.                                                                                              written motion to disqualify on the same basis, the
                                                                        
               ST. CLARE’S REALTY CO., LTD., GUILLERMO
T. GUERRERO, CECILIA GUERRERO, assisted by
ANGELO CARDEÑO, PERLINDA GUERRERO, etc., Et
Al., Respondents.
FACTS
The disputed lot was formerly owned
by Andres Guerrero, father
the petitioners. Andres physically possessed and
cultivated the land through a tenancy agreement.
Shortly after the beginning of the Japanese
occupation, Andres entrusted the land to his sister,
Cristina Guerrero, who was to enjoy the owner’s
share in the produce of the land. After the death of
Andres in 1943, Cristina continued as trustee of the
deceased.
Petitioners alleged that the land was
surveyed by the Bureau of Lands for and in the
name of Andres Guerrero as early as 1957. Then, at
about 1971, the petitioners discovered that the
land was titled in the name of their cousin, Manuel
Guerrero, on the basis of a “Deed of Sale of Land”
dated 1948 purportedly executed by their Aunt
Cristina. They further alleged that notwithstanding
the opposition of the heirs of Cristina, Manuel was
successful in his application of the registration of
the land in his favor.
Manuel subsequently sold this lot in favor
of the defendants Guerreros, also cousins of the
petitioners. The defendants Guerreros later sold
the disputed lot to a St.Clare’s Realty, a partnership
constituted by them.
 According to the complaint, the Deed of
Sale in favor of Manuel was fraudulently obtained
and that the subsequent deeds of sale were
likewise fraudulent and ineffective since the
defendants allegedly knew that the property
L- belonged to Andres Guerrero.
        Septe of Cristina, was presented as witnesses for the
1983 petitioners. She testified that the money used for
the illness of her mother was obtained from
GUERRERO, Manuel by mortgaging the land as security for the
loans obtained. This was objected to by the counsel
GREGORIO of the defendants based on Sec. 20 (a), Rule
Et 130(now, Sec.23, Rule 130). Initially, the trial court
allowed the witness to continue, but upon a
                       trial court declared Laura and Jose Cervantes
disqualified from testifying in the case.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a “Motion
for the Judge to Inhibit and/or to Transfer the case
to another Branch.” This was denied. Petitioners
then failed to appear at the set schedule for trial,
and the trial court judge issued an order stating
of that petitioners “are deemed to have waived their
right to further present or formally offer their
evidence in court” as a consequence of their non-
appearance.
Petitioners filed a “Manifestation” that they
did not waive their rights to present
further evidence, to cross-examine defendants’
witnesses, and to present rebuttal evidence. They
added that they reserved such right upon the
decision of the CA in a petition for certiorari which
they were preparing to file.
Despite this, the trial court rendered
a decision in favor of the defendants Guerreros,
even ordering the petitioners to pay damages in
the amount of more than P2M. This was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES
Whether the witnesses Laura and Jose
Cervantes were correctly disqualified from
testifying in the case and their testimonies
excluded on the basis of the “dead man’s rule”?
Whether the exclusion of petitioners’
evidence and their preclusion from presenting
further proof was correctly sustained by the CA?
RULING
Laura and Jose Cervantes are not parties in
the present case, and neither is they assignors of
the parties nor persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted. They are mere witnesses by whose
testimonies the petitioners aimed to establish that
it was not Cristina who owned the disputed land at
the time of the alleged sale to Manuel, and that
Cristina merely mortgaged the property to Manuel.
The present case is not a claim or demand
against the estate of the deceased Manuel
Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the
executors or administrators or representatives of
such deceased. They are being sued as claimants of
ownership in their individual capacities of the
disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate
of Manuel Guerrero. Thus, the dead man’s rule is
clearly inapplicable.
Aside from the disqualified witnesses, other
witnesses testified and it was error to hold that the
testimonial evidence should have been formally
offered, or that without such offer, such evidence
was waived. The offer of testimonial evidence is
affected by calling the witness to the stand
and letting him testify before the court upon
appropriate questions.
The trial court rendered its decision solely
on the basis of defendants’ evidence and without
regard to the proofs that petitioner has presented.
Therefore, exclusion of petitioners’ evidence and
their preclusion from presenting further proof was
incorrect.
Genaro Guñi, et al  vs. CA
 
FACTS:
            The three haciendas owned by TABACALERA
were negotiated by the late Praxedes T. Villanueva,
predecessor-in – interest of petitioners ( Genaro
Guñi, et al.) sometime in 1949. However, having
insufficient funds to pay the price, Villanueva with
the consent of TABACALERA, offered to sell one of
the hacienda to Santiago Villegas. As alleged the
TABACALERA will only agree to the transaction
between Villanueva and Villegas only upon having a
guaranty by which Gaspar Vicente stood as a
guarantor, for Villegas in favor of TABACALERA. The
guarantee was embodied in a document.
ISSUE:
1.       May respondent Gaspar Vicente testify on
the matters of fact occurring before the death of
Praxedes T. Villanueva which contributes a claim of
demand upon his estate in violation of Rule 123,
Section 26 Par C, now Rule 130, Section 20
Paragraph (A)?
2.       May not a written promise to sell dated
October 24, 1949 be novated into a verbal
agreement of lease during the lifetime of the
promissorr, whose death occurred on November
12, 1951, by facts and circumstances substantiated
by competent oral evidence in this case?
3.       Should the promise in a promise to sell, who
paid Php. 12,460.24 which was to be accounted
and to be credited as rental after five (5) years of
lease, who in his original complaint did not allege
nor prove damages, except the sum of Php. 2,000
as attorney’s fees, receive a judgment for damages
in the amount of Php. 74, 056.35 which consists of
Php. 37, 121.26 plus legal interest for the crop
years 1950-51 to 1958-59 and for Php. 3, 624.18 to
Php. 4, 374.78 for every crop year subsequent to
1958 – 59 plus interes?
 
RULING:
 
1.       Yes. Gaspar Vicente can testify on matters of
fact occurring before the death of Praxedes
Villanueva which contribute a claim of demand
upon his estate in violation of Rule 130, Section 20,
Paragraph (A).
 
When Vicente took the witness stand, it was in a
dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery
of property and as defendant in the counterclaim
for accounting & surrender of fields nos. 4 &
13.  Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he
was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of
facts occurring before the death of Praxedes
Villanueva, said action not having been brought
against, but by the estate or representatives of the
estate / deceased person.  
 
2.        The novation of the written contract /
promise to sell into a verbal agreement lease was
clearly and conveniently proven not only by the
testimony of petitioner Goñi, but likewise by the
acts and conduct of the parties subsequent to the
execution of the contract/ promise to sell.
3.       The third issue no longer necessary for
discussion in said case for the petitioner have
clearly and sufficiently shown that the contract /
promise to sell was a subsequently novated in a
verbal lease agreement which follows that they are
entitled to a favorable decision on their
counterclaim.
Razon v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 74306, 16 March 1992
FACTS:
E. Razon, Inc. was organized by petitioner Enrique
Razon in 1962. However, it began operations only
in 1966 since the other incorporators withdrew
from the said corporation. The petitioner then
distributed the stocks previously placed in the
names of the withdrawing nominal incorporators
to some friends, among them the late Juan T.
Chuidian to whom he gave 1,500 shares. The
shares of stocks were registered in the name of
Chuidian only as nominal stockholder and with the
agreement that the said shares of stock were
owned and held by the petitioner but Chuidian
were given the option to buy the same. Chuidian
delivered to petitioner the stock certificate in 1966,
and since then petitioner had in his possession such
certificate, until the time, he delivered it for
deposit with PBCom under the parties’ joint
custody pursuant to their agreement embodied in
the trial court’s order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Razon is the rightful
owner of the shares.
RULING:
No. In the case of Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals:
For an effective, transfer of shares of stock the
mode and manner of transfer as prescribed by law
must be followed. Under Section 3 of the
Corporation Code, shares of stock may be
transferred by delivery to the transferee of the
certificate properly indorsed. Title may be vested in
the transferee by the delivery of the duly indorsed
certificate of stock. However, no transfer shall be
valid, except as between the parties until the
transfer is properly recorded in the books of the
corporation (Sec. 63, Corporation Code of the
Philippines; Section 35 of the Corporation Law)
In the instant case, there is no dispute that the
questioned shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. are in
the name of the late Juan Chuidian in the books of
the corporation. Moreover, the records show that
during his lifetime Chuidian was elected member of
the Board of Directors of the corporation which
clearly shows that he was a stockholder of the
corporation. (See Section 30, Corporation Code)
From the point of view of the corporation,
therefore, Chuidian was the owner of the 1,500
shares of stock. In such a case, the petitioner who
claims ownership over the questioned shares of
stock must show that the same were transferred to
him by proving that all the requirements for the
effective transfer of shares of stock.
The petitioner failed in both instances. The
petitioner did not present any by-laws which could
show that the 1,500 shares of stock were
effectively transferred to him. In the absence of the
corporation’s by-laws or rules governing effective
transfer of shares of stock, the provisions of the
Corporation Law are made applicable to the instant
case.
The law is clear that in order for a transfer of stock
certificate to be effective, the certificate must be
properly indorsed and that title to such certificate
of stock is vested in the transferee by the delivery on marital disqualification. The trial court issued
of the duly indorsed certificate of stock. (Section
the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza,
35, Corporation Code) Since the certificate of stock
covering the questioned 1,500 shares of stock prompting Susan to file a petition for Certiorari
registered in the name of the late Juan Chuidian before the CA. The CA nullified the order of the
was never indorsed to the petitioner, the inevitable RTC.
conclusion is that the questioned shares of stock
belong to Chuidian. The petitioner’s asseveration
that he did not require an indorsement of the
certificate of stock in view of his intimate friendship
with the late Juan Chuidian cannot overcome the
Issue:
failure to follow the procedure required by law or
the proper conduct of business even among
friends. To reiterate, indorsement of the certificate
of stock is a mandatory requirement of law for an Can Esperanza testify against her husband in the
effective transfer of a certificate of stock. arson case?

NO US V ANTIPOLO Held:

NO FORTICH V CA
Yes. The offense of arson attributed to petitioner,
LEZAMA V RODRIGUEZ AGAIN MEHEH directly impairs the conjugal relation between him
and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the
Information for arson filed against him, eradicates
Alvarez vs. Ramirez Case Digest
all the major aspects of marital life such as trust,
 0
confidence, respect and love by which virtues the
conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.
Facts:

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:

Susan Ramirez filed a criminal case for arson
against her brother-in-law Maximo Alvarez. The
The act of private respondent in setting fire to the
prosecution called to the witness stand its first
house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez, knowing
witness Esperanza Alvarez, sister of Susan and wife
fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with
of Maximo. Esperanza testified but when she
the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act
showed uncontrolled emotions, the trial judge to
totally alien to the harmony and confidences of
suspended the proceedings. Subsequently,
marital relation which the disqualification primarily
Maximo, through counsel, filed a motion to
seeks to protect. The criminal act complained of
disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him
had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the
pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the
marital and domestic relations between her and
the accused-husband have become so strained that
there is no more harmony, peace or tranquility to
be preserved. The Supreme Court has held that in
such a case, identity is non-existent. In such a
situation, the security and confidences of private
life which the law aims to protect are nothing but
ideals which through their absence, merely leave a
void in the unhappy home. (People v. Castaneda,
271 SCRA 504). Thus, there is no longer any reason
to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule.
It should be stressed that as shown by the records,
prior to the commission of the offense, the
relationship between petitioner and his wife was
already strained. In fact, they were separated de
facto almost six months before the incident.
Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal
that the preservation of the marriage between
petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest
the State aims to protect.
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State,
being interested in laying the truth before the
courts so that the guilty may be punished and the
innocent exonerated, must have the right to offer
the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the
objection of the accused, because it was the latter
himself who gave rise to its necessity (Alvarez vs.
Ramirez, G.R. No. 143439, October 14, 2005)
NO GENATO V SILAPAN
Nelly Lim vs Court of Appeals Case Digest
 0 denied the motion and allowed the witness to
In order that the disqualification by reason of
physician-patient privilege be successfully
claimed, the following requisites should concur:
(1) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (2) the
person against whom the privilege is claimed is
one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery
or obstetrics; (3) such person acquired the
information while he was attending to the patient
in his professional capacity; (4) the information
was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity; (5) the information was confidential and
if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of the
patient.
Facts:
Juan filed a petition for annulment of his marriage
with Nelly on the ground that the latter has been
allegedly suffering from a mental illness called
schizophrenia "before, during and after the
marriage and until the present." During trial, Juan's
counsel announced that he would present as his
next witness Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of
Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Said
counsel forthwith orally applied for the issuance of
a subpoena ad testificandum. Nelly's counsel
opposed the motion on the ground that the
testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is
privileged since the latter had examined the Nelly
in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to
be suffering from schizophrenia. Juan's counsel
contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would be
presented as an expert witness and would not
testify on any information acquired while attending
to Nelly in a professional capacity. The trial court
testify. Dr. Acampado thus took the witness stand,
was qualified as an expert witness and was asked
hypothetical questions related to her field of
expertise. She neither revealed the illness she
examined and treated Nelly for nor disclosed the
results of her examination and the medicines she
had prescribed.
Issues:
1. Was the information given by the physician in
her testimony in open court a privileged
communication?
2. Was there a waiver of the privilege?
Held:
1. No. The physician may be considered to be
acting in his professional capacity when he attends
to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative
treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would
have been made to the physician to enable him
"safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are
covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that
"it is the tenor only of the communication that is
privileged. The mere fact of making a
communication, as well as the date of a
consultation and the number of consultations, are
therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as
the subject communicated is not stated." One who
claims this privilege must prove the presence of
these aforementioned requisites.
Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an
expert witness. She did not disclose anything
obtained in the course of her examination,
interview and treatment of the petitioner;
moreover, the facts and conditions alleged in the
hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no
bearing on whatever information or findings the
doctor obtained while attending to the patient.
There is, as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado’s
answers to the questions propounded to her
relating to the hypothetical problem were
influenced by the information obtained from the
petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert opinion
excluded whatever information or knowledge she
had about the petitioner which was acquired by
reason of the physician-patient relationship
existing between them. As an expert witness, her
testimony before the trial court cannot then be
excluded.
2. Yes. While it may be true that counsel for the
petitioner opposed the oral request for the
issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr.
Acampado and filed a formal motion for the
quashal of the said subpoena a day before the
witness was to testify, the petitioner makes no
claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel had
objected to any question asked of the witness on
the ground that it elicited an answer that would
violate the privilege, despite the trial court’s advise
that said counsel may interpose his objection to the
testimony "once it becomes apparent that the
testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the
privileged communication rule." The particular
portions of the stenographic notes of the testimony
of Dr. Acampado quoted in the petitioner’s Petition
and Memorandum, and in the private respondent’s
Memorandum, do not at all show that any
objections were interposed. Even granting ex gratia
that the testimony of Dr. Acampado could be
covered by the privilege, the failure to seasonably
object thereto amounted to a waiver
thereof. (Nelly Lim vs. CA,  G.R. No. 91114.
September 25, 1992)
NO DIGEST KROHN V CA
NO PEOLE V VALERO
People v. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, 212 SCRA 547,
August 12, 1992
"Maid allowed entry into the house"
The right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right.  helper, allowed the authorities to enter. There was
The constitutional immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures, being personal one, cannot
be waived by anyone except 1) the person whose
rights are invaded or 2) one who is expressly
authorized to do so in his or her behalf.
 The group of Lt. Quijardo were sent to
verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in
Dagupan City.
 They put under surveillance the rented
apartment of Rosemarie, sister of someone whom
they earlier arrested.
 They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a
visitor of Rosemarie, who stated that she worked
with Bernie Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso, the
appellant.
 Together with Morados, they reached the
house of Damaso where they saw Luz Tanciangco, a
helper. Tanciangco then allowed the group to enter
inside the house.
 The group of Lt. Quijardo entered the
dwelling of Damaso without a valid warrant when
the latter was absent. They requested the persons
in the house to allow them to look around. In one
of the rooms, they saw subversive materials which
they confiscated. They likewise brought the
persons found in the house to the headquarters for
investigation and the persons revealed that
Damaso was the lessee of the house and owned
the items confiscated.
 Based on this, Damaso was charged with
illegal possession of firearms.
Whether the evidence is admissible? NO.
 The Court ruled that the law enforcers
failed to comply with the requirements of a valid
search and seizure. None of these exceptions for a
warrantless search is present in this case.
 Moreover, the constitutional immunity
from unreasonable searches and seizures, being
personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except
1) the person whose rights are invaded or 2) one
who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her
behalf.
 In this case, the records show that Damaso
was not in his house at that time Luz, his alleged
no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz
was indeed Damaso’s helper or if it was true that
she was his helper, that Damaso had given her
authority to open his house in his absence.
 Being a helper, she does not qualify as a
person authorized to waive such right in
representation of her employer.
 Thus, the search being invalid for lack of
warrant, the evidence obtained thereafter is
inadmissible.
NO AGCAOILI V MOLINA
NO PEOPLE V BRIOSO
NO PEOLE V MONGADO
PEOPLE v. QUIDATO
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. BERNARDO QUIDATO, JR., accused-
appellant.
Topic:  Disqualifications as a witness; when it
applies.
FACTS:
Accused Bernardo Quidato Jr was accused of
parricide.  He and two co-conspirators allegedly
attacked with a bolo and iron bars hack and stab
the victim, Bernardo Quidato Sr., appellant’s father
and namesake, which caused the victim’s untimely
demise.  in evidence against his co-accused when the latter
Among those presented as witness were accused’s
wife and brother.  Also presented were the
extrajudicial confessions of appellant’s two other
co-accused.  Appellant’s wife testified that while
the accused were drinking tuba she overheard
them saying that they were planning to go to the
victim’s house on the night of the incident in order
to “get money” and that she had no idea of what
later transpired. Appellant objected to his wife’s
testimony as it was prohibited by the rule on
marital disqualification.  Appellant likewise denies
the allegations of his co-accused who in their
extrajudicial confession pointed to the participation
of appellant.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions
should be given credence as they were obtained in
violation of the constitutional right of appellant to
confront witnesses.
2. Whether or not the testimony of appellant’s wife
is disqualified.
HELD:
1. NO. They should not be given credence, and
indeed, appellant should be acquitted.  The
prosecution relied heavily on appellant’s co-
accused’s affidavits.  However, the failure to
present the affiants in the witness stand gives
these affidavits the character of hearsay.  It is
hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants
themselves take the witness stand to affirm the
averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be
excluded from the judicial proceeding, being
inadmissible hearsay. “The voluntary admissions of
an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible
had not been given an opportunity to hear him
testify and cross-examine him.”
Section 30, Rule 130 is not applicable in this case
because it refers to confessions made during the
existence of the conspiracy.  In this case, the
conspiracy had clearly ended by the time the
confession was made.
2. YES.  The testimony of appellant’s wife must be
disregarded.  As correctly observed by the court a
quo, the disqualification is between husband and
wife, the law not precluding the wife from
testifying when it involves other parties or accused,
but not where the testimony will be used against
the accused-husband directly or indirectly.
DECISION: 
Given the inadmissibility of accused’s wife’s
testimony and the extrajudicial confession of co-
accused, the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED.
NO PEOPLE V CLOUD
Feria vs CA, GR No. 122954, February 15, 2000;
525 SCRA 525_digested
Posted by Pius Morados on April 29, 2012
(Special Proceedings –Habeas Corpus)
Facts: After discovering that his entire criminal
records, including the copy of the judgment, was
lost or destroyed, petitioner filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the SC
against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the
Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying
for his discharge from confinement on the ground
that his continued detention without any valid
judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional
right to due process.
The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the
mere loss of the records of the case does not
invalidate the judgment or commitment nor
authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the
proper remedy would be reconstitution of the
records of the case which should be filed with the
court which rendered the decision.
Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal
because there exists no copy of a valid judgment as
required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court, and that the evidence considered
by the trial court and Court of Appeals in
the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish
the contents of such judgment.
In a comment, OSG maintains that public
respondents have more than sufficiently shown the
existence of a legal ground for petitioner’s
continued incarceration, viz., his conviction by final
judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court, the discharge of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment is not
authorized.
Issue: WON there is legal basis to detain petitioner
after the destruction or loss of his criminal records.
Held: Yes. The writ of habeas corpus, was devised
and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the
best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. It secures to a prisoner the right to have
the cause of his detention examined and
determined by a court of justice, and to have the
issue ascertained as to whether he is held under
lawful authority. Consequently, the writ may also
be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial
proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose
the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been
imposed, as such sentence is void as to such
excess. Petitioner’s claim is anchored on the first
ground considering, as he claims, that his
continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a
copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is violative
of his constitutional right to due process.Based on
the records and the hearing conducted by the trial
court, there is sufficient evidence on record to
establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which
serves as the legal basis for his detention.
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal
restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner
who attacks such restraint. In other words, where
the return is not subject to exception, that is,
where it sets forth process which on its face shows
good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is
incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new
matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect
of such process. If the detention of the prisoner is
by reason of lawful public authority, the return is
considered prima facie evidence of the validity of
the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of
proof to show that the restraint is illegal.
When a court has jurisdiction of the offense
charged and of the party who is so charged, its
judgment, order, or decree is not subject to
collateral attack by habeas corpus.
NO PEOPLE V DEJOYA
NO PEOPLE V DUNIG
People vs. Amaca
GR No. 110129 August 11, 1997
Ponente: Panganiban, J.:
Offer of compromise in Criminal Cases; Res Gestae
 Facts:
1.    Accused Amaca and another known as “Ogang”
were charged for shooting Wilson Vergara. During
the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Edgar
Pialago, a resident physician on duty when the
victim was brought to the hospital after the
 shooting. The doctor testified that he was able to
attend to the victim who had undergone a surgical
operation conducted by another doctor. At that
time, the major organs of the victim were no longer
functioning normally, while his pancreas was
likewise injured due to the 2 gunshot wounds at his
back. The victim was admitted at 10:45PM but
expired the following evening at 10PM. According
to Dr. Pialago, even with immediate medical
attention, the victim could not survive the wounds
he sustained.
2.     Another witness testified, PO Mangubat,  a police
officer , who interviewed the victim (Wilson
Vergara) right after the shooting. Mangubat  indemnity. Hence, in effectively waiving her right to
testified that he saw the victim already on board a
Ford Fiera pick-up ready for transport to the
hospital. He inquired from the victim about the
incident, and the former answered he was shot by
CVO Amaca and Ogang. Upon query why he was
shot, the victim said he did not know the reason
why he was shot. Upon being asked as to his
condition, the victim said that he was about to die.
He was able to reduce into writing the declaration
of the victim and made latter affixed his thumb
mark with the use of his own blood in the presence
of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of the City
Mayor.  victim should be admitted
3.       Segundina Vergara, mother of the victim, and her
son-in-law Jose Lapera both desisted from further
prosecution of the case. the former because of the
"financial help" extended by the accused to her
family, and the latter because Segundina had
already "consented to the amicable settlement of
the case." Despite this, the Department of Justice
found the existence of a prima facie case based on
the victim's ante mortem statement.
4.       The lower court convicted Amaca on the basis of
the victim's ante mortem statement to Police
Officer Mangubat positively identifying accused.
The dying declaration was deemed sufficient to
overcome the accused’s  defense of alibi. However,
due to the voluntary desistance of the victim's
mother from further prosecuting the case, the
court a quo declined to make a finding on the civil
liability of the appellant.
Issue:  1) Whether or not offer of compromise is
admissible against the accused
YES. The "financial help" when viewed as an offer
of compromise may be deemed as additional proof
to demonstrate appellant's criminal liability. The
victim's mother desisted from prosecuting the case
in consideration of the "financial help" extended to
her family by the accused-appellant. 
It is a well-settled rule that that the desistance of
the victim's complaining mother does not bar the
People from prosecuting the criminal action, but it
does operate as a waiver of the right to pursue civil
institute an action to enforce the civil liability of
accused-appellant, she also waived her right to be
awarded any civil indemnity arising from the
criminal prosecution. This waiver is bolstered by
the fact that neither she nor any private prosecutor
in her behalf appealed the trial court's refusal to
include a finding of civil liability. But the heirs, if
there are any may file an independent civil action
to recover damages for the death of Wilson
Vergara.
Issue (2): Whether or not  the dying declaration of
YES.  The victim’s dying declaration is admissible.
A dying declaration is worthy of belief because it is
highly unthinkable for one who is aware of his
impending death to accuse, falsely or even
carelessly, anyone of being responsible for his
foreseeable demise. Indeed, "when a person is at
the point of death, every motive for falsehood is
silenced and the mind is induced by the most
powerful consideration to speak the
truth." This is the rationale for this exception to the
hearsay rule under Section 37, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. The elements of such exception are:
(1) the deceased made the declaration conscious of
his impending death; (2) the declarant would have
been a competent witness had he survived; (3) the
declaration concerns the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; (4) the
declaration is offered in a criminal case where the
declarant's death is the subject of inquiry; and (5)
the declaration is complete in itself. All these
concur in the present case.
Finally, Police Officer Mangubat is presumed under
the law to have regularly performed his duty. There
is nothing in the circumstances surrounding his
investigation of the crime which shows any
semblance of irregularity or bias, much less an
attempt to frame Amaca. Even the accused
testified that he had no previous misunderstanding
with Police Officer Mangubat and knew no reason
why the latter would falsely testify against him.
Declarant is a competent witness
The serious nature of the victim's injuries did not
affect his credibility as a witness since said injuries,
as previously mentioned, did not cause the
immediate loss of his ability to perceive and to
identify his shooter.  stone against Fernando. Felix Sion, Edong Sion and
Homicide only not murder
Appellant may be held liable only for homicide
since treachery was not alleged in the Information,
while evident premeditation and night time,
although duly alleged, were not satisfactorily
proven. The Information readily reveals that the
killing was qualified only by evident premeditation.
Treachery was not alleged in the information. It is
necessary to qualify the crime to murder.
Treachery is an element of the crime. The
Constitution requires that the accused must be
informed of the "nature and cause of the
accusation against him."The failure to allege
treachery in the Information is a major lapse of the
prosecution.
Moreover, treachery and night time may not be
considered even as generic aggravating
circumstances, because there is nothing in the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses to
convincingly show that the accused-appellant
consciously and purposely adopted (1) such means
of attack to render the victim defenseless and (2)
the darkness of night to facilitate the commission
of the crime, to prevent its discovery or even evade
capture.  attack, and the
People v. Sison
GR 109617 Aug. 1997
FACTS:
Cesar Abaoag was at the barangay road in front of
his house with his elder brother when all of a
sudden,
Ronnie Manuel arrived coming from the west
complaining that he was being chased by Felipe
Sion and
Johnny Juguilon. Seconds later, Felipe Sion and
Johnny Juguilon appeared and started throwing
stones.
Fernando Abaoag told them to stop throwing
stones but before they desisted and left. While
Abaoag was
inside his house, he heard the sound of stone
throwing at the nearby house of his brother
Fernando.
He saw his brother Fernando already outside his
house. He also saw Johnny Juguilon, one of the
members of the group of stone throwers, hurl a big
Miguel Disu who were also throwing stones
towards his direction. On the other hand, appellant
Felipe
Sion, who was near the victim, with a very sharp
double bladed dagger, stabbed Fernando multiple
times.
Cesar tried to extend help to his brother but he was
hit by a stone. He heard the assailants shouting
that
he will also be killed, so he desisted in helping
brother. He ran to his brother’s house to call his
brother’s
wife. When they got there the assailants were no
longer there and found her husband lying weak and
dying. The victim died after being rushed in the
hospital.
On June 1992, Sison was arrested. On June 1992,
RTC annulled and voided the bail. The case was
proceeded only against Sison and Disu because
they were the only ones arrested.
ISSUE: WON the appellants are guilty of murder-
qualified by treachery. WON there was conspiracy.
WON there is treachery?
RULING:
1. The witness in detail has narrated what
happened, and he was only 2 m away from the
place was well lit. The alibi of the accused was
given scant consideration.
2. There is conspiracy. Simultaneously throwing
stones and stabbing the victim connotes
conspiracy.
Direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a
crime is not necessary; The confluence of their acts
indubitably manifested a community of interest
and unity of purpose and design to take Fernando
Abaoag's life.
3. There is no clear and convincing evidence of
treachery. In light of the absence of clear details
showing
conclusively that the stabbing was inflicted from
behind or the victim was entirely helpless when
stabbed,
we are not prepared to conclude that the attack
was "so sudden and unexpected" as to render the
victim
entirely defenseless. Treachery cannot qualify the
killing to murder when the victim was forewarned
of the
attack by the assailant, or when the attack was
frontal, or the attack was not so sudden as to have
caught
the deceased completely unaware
PEOPLE v. THEODORE BERNAL, GR No. 113685,
1997-06-19
Facts:
Theodore Bernal, together with two other persons
whose identities and whereabouts are still
unknown, were charged with the crime of
kidnapping... one Bienvenido Openda, Jr.
A plea of not guilty having been entered by Bernal
during his arraignment, trial ensued. The
prosecution presented four witnesse
On the other hand, Theodore Bernal testified for
his defense.
around 11:30 in the morning, while Roberto Racasa
and Openda, Jr. were engaged in a drinking spree,
they invited Bernal, who was passing by, to join
them.
After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both
men, apparently because he was going to fetch his
child. Thereafter, two men arrived, approached
Openda, Jr., and asked the latter if he was
"Payat."[3] When he said yes, one of them
suddenly pulled out a... handgun while the other
handcuffed him and told him "not to run because
they were policemen" and because he had an
"atraso" or a score to settle with them. They then
hastily took him away. Racasa immediately went to
the house of Openda, Jr. and informed the latter's
mother of... the abduction.
theory of the prosecution, as culled from the
testimony of a certain Salito Enriquez, tends to
establish that Openda, Jr. had an illicit affair with
Bernal's wife Naty and this was the motive behind
the former's kidnapping. Until now, Openda, Jr. is
still missing.
defense asserts that Openda, Jr. was a drug-pusher
arrested by the police on August 5, 1991, and
hence, was never kidnapped... court a quo
rendered judgment[5] finding Bernal "guilty...
crime of kidnapping for the abduction and
disappearance of Bienvenido Openda, Jr...
important is the testimony of Roberto Racasa
He narrated that he and the victim were drinking at
"Tarsing's Store" on that fateful day when Bernal
passed by... and had a drink with them. After a few
minutes, Bernal decided to leave, after which, two
men came to the store and asked for "Payat."
When Openda, Jr. confirmed that he was indeed
"Payat," he was handcuffed and taken away by the
unidentified men
Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr.,
testified
Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and Bernal's
wife Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty
even gave Openda, Jr. money which they used to
pay for a motel... room. He advised Naty "not to do
it again because she (was) a married woman.[9]
Undoubtedly, his wife's infidelity was ample reason
for Bernal to contemplate revenge.
Issues:
Bernal assails the lower court for giving weight and
credence to the prosecution witnesses' allegedly
illusory testimonies and for convicting him when
his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Openda, Jr.'s revelation to Enriquez regarding his
illicit relationship with Bernal's wife is admissible in
evidence
Ruling:
We find no compelling reason to overturn the
decision of the lower court.
In the case at bar, Bernal indisputably acted in
conspiracy with the two other unknown individuals
"as shown by their concerted... acts evidentiary of
a unity of thought and community of purpose."[7]
Proof of conspiracy is perhaps most frequently
made by evidence of a chain of circumstances only.
[8] The circumstances present in this case
sufficiently indicate the... participation of Bernal in
the disappearance of Openda, Jr.
Openda, Jr.'s revelation to Enriquez regarding his
illicit relationship with Bernal's wife is admissible in
evidence
Openda, Jr., having been missing since his
abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His
confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration
against his own interest, since his affair with Naty
Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence[13]
because no... sane person will be presumed to tell
a falsehood to his own detriment.
Principles:
Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in
establishing the identity of the perpetrator.
Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence or
facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that
the accused was the malefactor, motive may be
sufficient to support a... conviction... pursuant to
Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, viz.:
"Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. -- The
declaration made by a person deceased, or unable
to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if
the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time
it was made so far contrary to declarant's own
interest,... that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence
against himself or his successors-in-interest and
against third persons."
With the deletion of the phrase "pecuniary or
moral interest" from the present provision, it is
safe to assume that "declaration against interest"
has been expanded to include all kinds of interest,
that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal
A statement may be admissible when it complies
with the following requisites, to wit: "(1) that the
declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it
relates to a fact against the interest of the
declarant; (3) that at the time he made said
declaration the declarant was aware... that the
same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4)
that the declarant had no motive to falsify and
believed such declaration to be true."
NO NDC V WORKMENS COMPENSATION
People vs. Tiozon [GR 89823, 19 June 1991] Third
Division, Davide Jr. (J): 4 concur Facts: At around
11:00 p.m. of 24 February 1989, Leonardo Bolima y
Mesia and his wife were awakened by the loud
knocks on their door. Leonardo opened the door
and they saw that the person who was knocking
was their "Pareng Troping", Eutropio Tiozon.
Leonardo invited Tiozon, who appeared to be very
drunk, to come inside their house. Once inside
their house, Tiozon sat down and the two
exchanged pleasantries. Tiozon showed a gun to
her husband and the latter even toyed with it. The
two left. 5 minutes later and or after Leonardo's
wife heard two successive gunshots, and heard
Tiozon knocking at their door and at the same time
informing her that he accidentally shot Leonardo,
"Mare, mare, nabaril ko si Pare, hindi ko
sinasadya." Leonardo's wife sought help to carry
Leonardo towards the main road. Some of the
neighbors arrived bringing Constitutional Law II,
2005 ( 23 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) with them
lights. Thereafter, Kalookan policemen arrived and
so she caused the arrest of Tiozon. In an
information filed by the Asst. City Prosecutor of
Caloocan City on 27 February 1989 with Branch 131
of the Regional Trial Court (Caloocan City) of the
National Capital Judicial Region, Eutropio Tiozon y
Acid was charged for violation of Presidential
Decree 1866, as amended. Tiozon pleaded not
guilty when arraigned on 15 March 1989. Pre-trial
was conducted and thereafter the trial court
received the evidence for the parties. In a decision
promulgated on 30 June 1989, the trial court found
Tiozon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of P.D. 1866 and Murder qualified by treachery and
sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment; to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Leonardo
Bolima the sum of P30,000.00; to reimburse the
heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as
reasonable expenses for the wake and burial
expenses and to pay the costs. According to the
trial court, were it not for its abolition, "the death
penalty, the sentence imposable under 2nd pa.,
Section 1 of PD 1866, as amended", should have
been imposed. On 5 July 1989 Tiozon filed a motion
to reconsider the decision which, however, was
denied by the court in its order of 16 August 1989.
On 17 August, Tiozon filed a Notice of Appeal.
Issue: Whether prosecution for violation of PD
1866, which is qualified by murder or homicide,
bars prosecution for murder or homicide, in light of
the right against double jeopardy. Held: Section 1
of PD 1866 imposes the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua "upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess
any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to
be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition." It goes further by providing that "if
homicide or murder is committed with the use of
an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be
imposed." It may be loosely said that homicide or
murder qualifies the offense penalized in Section 1
of PD 1866 because it is a circumstance which
increases the penalty. It does not, however, follow
that the homicide or murder is absorbed in the
offense; otherwise, an anomalous absurdity results
whereby a more serious crime defined and
penalized in the Revised Penal Code is absorbed by
a statutory offense, which is just a malum
prohibitum. The rationale for the qualification is to
effectively deter violations of the laws on firearms
and to stop the "upsurge of crimes vitally affecting
public order and safety due to the proliferation of
illegally possessed and manufactured firearms." In
fine then, the killing of a person with the use of an
unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate
prosecutions for (a) violation of Section 1 of PD
1866 and (b) violation of either Article 248
(Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised
Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one as a bar
to the other; or, stated otherwise, the rule against
double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the
first is punished by a special law while the second,
homicide or murder, is punished by the Revised
Penal Code.
NO PEOPLE V NARANJA
PEOPLE VS  PALMONES
G.R. No. 136303.  July 18, 2000
FACTS
The case evolved from a shooting incident
that happened in Kidapawan, Sultan Kudaratthat
involved a police officer AsimMamansal as the
victim who was killed later and the
brothers  AnthonyMelchor and Anthony
BaltazarPalmones as the accused-assailants.
That one night in April 27, 1997, the victim
was shot in a dark place, together with his
paramour, while riding home by an unidentified
person who later were known through the
prosecution’s witness testimony as the Palmones
brothers.
The identity of the two accused was raised
based on the testimony of Sony Boy Redovan, the
witness of the prosecution who was also a nephew
of the victim, who testified that before the death of
his uncle, the later was able to declare that the
accused-assailant were the Palmones brothers.
That the witness Redovan was able to talk with his
uncle nearly an hour before it dies, and that the
same declared who shot him.
 The same testimony was also testified by
Inspector Tagum who said that he was able to ask
the victim while in the emergency room, about the
identity of his perpetrator, and that were Juany and
Tony Palmones.
The two accused were convicted for a crime
of murder in the RTC based largely on the alleged
dying declaration of the victim through the
testimonies of the witnesses Sonny Boy Redovan
and Inspector Tagum and the apparent weakness
of their defense.
 Hence, this appeal by the accused- consciousness of impending death.  No proof to
appellants to the Supreme Court. this effect was ever presented by the
Issues:                                                                                   prosecution.  It was not shown whether Sonny Boy
                                                               Redovan or Inspector Alexander Tagum ever asked
            1. Whether the court a quo erred in the victim whether he believed that he was going
considering the alleged dying declaration of to die out of his injuries or any other similar
AsimMamansal as an exception to the hearsay rule. question.  Sonny Boy Redovan claimed that he was
            2. Whether the court a quo erred in able to talk with the victim for around an hour but
considering the alleged dying declaration of the only thing he revealed of their conversation
AsimMamansal as part of the Res Gestae Rule. was the alleged identification of the victim of his
two assailants. For his part, Inspector Tagum
Ruling: admitted that the only question he asked of the
1. Yes. There was an error in considering the victim was if the victim knew who had shot
alleged dying declaration of AsimMamansal for it him.From these points, there was no proved that
lacks some of the requirements to be an exceptions the victim was ever aware of the seriousness of his
to the rule of inadmissibility of hearsay evidence condition.
for it to be admissible as evidence to the court.
Section 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
2.         Yes. The alleged statements
to wit:
attributed to the victim cannot be admitted as part
Sec. 31.  Dying declaration. – The of the res gestae because it lacks the requisites of
declaration of a dying person, made under a spontaneity in order for it to be admitted as part of
consciousness of an impending death, may be the res gestae and be admissible as evidence to the
received in a criminal case wherein his death is the court.                                                                                   
subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and                                                               
surrounding circumstances of such death Res gestae refers to those exclamations and
As such, the requirements for the statements made by either the participants,
admissibility of an ante mortem statement are: (a) victims, or spectators to a crime immediately
it must concern the crime and the surrounding before, during, or immediately after the
circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) at the commission of a crime, when the circumstances are
time it was made, the declarant was under a such that the statements were made as a
consciousness of impending death; (c) the spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the excitement of the occasion and there was no
declaration was offered in a criminal case for opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
murder, homicide or parricide wherein which the fabricate a false statement.
decedent was the victim. In order to admit statements as evidence
In cases where an alleged dying declaration part of the res gestae, the element of spontaneity
is sought to be admitted, it must be proven that is critical.  The following factors have generally
that the declaration was made “under a been considered in determining whether
consciousness of impending death” which means statements offered in evidence as part of the res
simply that the declarant is fully aware that he is gestae have been made spontaneously:  (1) the
dying or going to die from his wounds or injuries time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act
soon or imminently, or shall have a complete or transaction and the making of the statement; (2)
conviction that death is at hand, or there must be the place where the statement was made; (3) the
“a settled hopeless expectation.” condition of the declarant when he made the
statement; (4) the presence or absence of
In this case, it was not established by the
intervening events between the occurrence and
prosecution that the statements of the declarant
the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature
concerning the cause and surrounding
and circumstances of the statement itself.
circumstances of his death were made under the
                                                
Premises considered, the judgment by the
RTC Kidapawan, Cotabato is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accused-appellants are ACQUITED AND
RELEASED from confinement.
(7)PEOPLE VS. RAQUEL
G.R. No. 119005 (December 2, 1996)
FACTS:
At midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the
peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and Agapito
Gambalan, Jr. Thinking of a neighbor in need,
Agapito attended to the person knocking at the
backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise,
heavily armed men emerged at the door, declared
a hold-up and fired their guns at him.
Juliet went out of their room after hearing
gunshots and saw her husband’s lifeless while a
man took her husband’s gun and left hurriedly. She
shouted for help at their window and saw a man
fall beside their water pump while two (2) other
men ran away but she did not seen their faces. The
police came and found one of the perpetrators of
the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters
from the victim’s house. He was identified as
Amado Ponce.
Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato
that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were
the perpetrators of the crime.
Upon arraignment thereafter, all the accused
pleaded not guilty. While trial was in progress,
however, and before he could give his testimony,
accused Amado Ponce escaped from jail. Upon the
other hand, appellants relied on alibi as their
defense and presented witnesses to support their
alibi.
The trial court rendered judgment finding all of the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced
them accordingly.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting
the appellants of the crime charged, despite
absence of evidence positively implicating them as
the perpetrators of the crime?
RULING:
A careful review and objective appraisal of the
evidence convinces us that the prosecution failed
to establish beyond reasonable doubt the real
identities of the perpetrators of, much less the
participation of herein appellants in, the crime
charged.
The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able
to identify the assailants of her husband as base
from his testimonies.
A thorough review of the records of this case
readily revealed that the identification of herein
appellants as the culprits was based chiefly on the
extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce
pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the
crime.  As earlier stated, the said accused escaped
from jail before he could testify in court and he has
been at large since then.
The extrajudicial statements of an accused
implicating a co-accused may not be utilized
against the latter, unless these are repeated in
open court. If the accused never had the
opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the
latter’s extrajudicial statements, it is elementary
that the same are hearsay as against said accused.
That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged
plight of appellants, in the case at bar.
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a
party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration,
or omission of another.  An extrajudicial confession
is binding only upon the confessant and is not
admissible against his co-accused.  The reason for
the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and
mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding
upon him, and are evidence against him.  So are his
conduct and declarations.  Yet it would not only be
rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust,
that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to
be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought
their acts or conduct be used as evidence against
him.
This extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon
as prosecution evidence, was made in violation of
the constitutional rights of accused Amado
Ponce. Extrajudicial statements made during
custodial investigation without the assistance of
counsel are inadmissible and cannot be considered
in the adjudication of the case. While the right to
counsel may be waived, such waiver must be made
with the assistance of counsel. These rights, both
constitutional and statutory in source and
foundation, were never observed.
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the appealed
judgment is REVERSED and accused-appellants
Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel are hereby
ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de
oficio.