The Burmese Way to Socialism beyond the Welfare State

Author(s): Mya Maung

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 6 (Jun., 1970), pp. 533-551
Published by: University of California Press
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THE BURMESE WAY

TO SOCIALISM BEYOND
THE WELFARE STATE
/ Mya Maung*

In some countries with a colonial heritage the option for socialism has
been made under the impact of nationalism and the demonstration effect
of the Sino-Soviet model of economic growth. The choice is made on grounds
of both equity in income distribution and the relative efficiency of a planned
socialist economy over the capitalist one. An ideological aversion to capital-
ism, born out of experiences under colonial rule and sociopolitical indig-
nation over the potential threat of alien economic intrusion, has been the
sin quo non for adopting socialism of the evolutionary and revolutionary
type. The statism of socialism not only seems to fit political nationalism but
also provides the psychic income derived from discrimination against aliens
in general.' The general preference for state enterprises and public owner-
ship of the means of production, a common phenomenon of development
planning in many underdeveloped countries, is an aspect of moderniza-
tion that cannot be dissected solely with respect to its economic or non-
economic aspects. This article, however, does not concern itself with the
political and ethical justification of "the Burmese Way to Socialism," but
rather with its economic effects.
At the outset it must be noted that the sources of statistical data and in-
formation on the functioning of the Burmese economy since 1962 are rather
limited and unreliable. It is essential, however, to record and analyze the
series of economic actions taken by the military government. With that
in mind, this study will scrutinize the economic effects of the Burmese ex-
periment with a command economy.
The main hypothesis of this study is that a "simple" transfer of owner-
ship and control of resources from the private to the public sector in the

*The author is indebted to Professors E. E. Hagen, E. Kane, H. Rosovosky and R.

Meagher for their comments and criticism. All views expressed in this paper, however
are the responsibility of the author alone. Thanks are also due to a number of Burmese
scholars and friends for providing what the Burmese call "mouth history" (pasat yaza-
win or thamhine.)
'Cf. Harry G. Johnson, "A Theoretical model of Economic Nationalism in New and
Developing States," in H. G. Johnson (ed.), Economic Nationalism in Old and New
States (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 3-4.

533

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 MYA MAUNG 534

name of equity and justice does not automatically create efficiency or ele-
vate technology, and that inefficiency may emerge due to the inflexibility of
large-scale public programs, bureaucratic delays, institutional disruption
of the market mechanism, inactions and conflicts among the governmental
agencies, loopholes and evasion associated with a system of direct controls
and the disincentive effects of socialization. Although on the functional level
all economic systems may be viewed as planned or deliberately organized
by the state, the ideals and methods of planning differ. While the controversy
over the relative efficiency of a planned economy versus an unplanned
economy is stale and confused.2 I would argue that the basic dilemma com-
mon to all underdeveloped countries is the issue of the type and extent of
state economic actions in the modernization process. This dilemma is crit-
ical for a country like Burma, whose aversion to capitalism has led to the
adoption of inappropriate economic policies which have totally abandoned
the functioning of market mechanism and private enterprise. Perhaps the
economics of socialism written by economists suffers from the defect of
"what economists take to be the end of economic life-the maximization of
output in terms of preferred products compared with satisfaction sacri-
ficed-and confined to the ways in which ownership of land and capital by
the state can facilitate this."3 Equally pronounced is the defect of the eco-
nomics of socialism advanced by the nationalist socialist leadership of de-
veloping countries in subjugating the principles of efficiency to those of
ideal equity. The Burmese experiment with socialism, particularly the re-
cent experiment with a command economy under "the Burmese Way to
Socialism, exemplifies a case of economic disaster generated by the neglect
of what economists consider to be the end of economic life.

THE PYIDAWTHA PLAN

The attempts at development in independent Burma have been character-

ized by two fundamental features: the incremental superstructuring of
governmental enterprises and controls, reaching its apex under the eco-
nomic policy of "the Burmese Way to Socialism," and the degeneration of
the economy from a relatively prosperous state to a depressed one, from
Pyidawtha to Pyidawcha.4 The dawn of independence brought such vision-
ary objectives as a planned socialist economy of self-sufficiency and justice,
a Burmanized economy, and a Pyidawtha of peace, prosperity and hap-

2See: W. A. Lewis, The Principles of Economic Planning (London: Allen and Unwin
and Dennis Dobson, 1949), p. 14. Also: Gunnar Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State
(New York: Yale University Press, 1960), Chap. I.
'Henry Smith, The Economics of Socialism Reconsidered (London: Oxford University
Press, 1962), p. 95.
'The term Pydawtha, associated with the Pyidawtha Plan (1952-60), means in
Burmese a happy and prosperous country, while its variant, Pyidawcha, connotes the
opposite. Even under the U Nu government, Pyidawcha was commonly used as a politi-
cal satire on the economic achievements of the Pyidawtha Plan.

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 535 THE BURMESE WAY TO SOCIALISM

piness. The choice of socialism was made on the grounds that it is not only
a desirable socioeconomic system compatible with the traditional Burmese
culture and Weltanschaung, but also the quickest road to development. From
the earliest Declaration of the Naythuyein Conference in 1945, through the
launching of the Pyidawtha Plan in 1952, to the proclamation of "the
Burmese Way to Socialism" in 1962, the abuses of the colonial heritage
and capitalism have been unshakable memories behind the social and eco-
nomic philosophy of development. In 1947, at the Sorrento-Villa Conference
in Rangoon under the leadership of the late General Aung San, a general
program for building a socialist economy laid down a policy of national
planning via large-scale state controls of the economy as the most effective
strategy for the development of the Burmese economy. Thus, with inde-
pendence in 1948, the Land Nationalization Act, a Two-Year Development
Plan, and the Constitution of the Union of Burma gave the state the right
to own and control resources and regulate the nation's economic life.5
The Two-Year Development Plan was formally launched in 1948 but
was not implemented until 1951 due to the chronic political crisis follow-
ing independence. The Plan called for the nationalization of land and the
socialization of industry, but this was only partially accomplished. The
Land Nationalization Act had to be extended into the 1950's and the so-
cialization of industry was not achieved either. By 1951, the planning
machinery of the Burmese government had been organized with the assis-
tance of foreign experts (a group of Oxford economists, United Nations'
specialists, and the American firm of Knappen, Tippets, Abbett, and Mac-
Carthy Engineering Company). The U Nu government's socialist economy
may be termed a welfare state with heavy emphasis on large-scale state
interferences and controls. By 1952 a host of governmental departments,
boards and corporations were created to run the Burmese economy. Al-
though most of the foreign firms were nationalized, private trade and in-
dustries were allowed to operate under the direct control of the government.
Tolerance of the private sector and recognition of its importance were
evident under the Pyidawtha Plan. For example, with respect to gross capital
formation the Plan anticipated that the relative shares of the public and
private sectors would be equal at K. 559 million each by the end of 1959.0
It declared that "to some extent, the rate of rise in total expenditures will
depend upon the degree to which the Government creates an environment
favorable to private investment."7 It was further anticipated that the rela-
tive share of the private sector in the gross capital formation would exceed

5See: The Constitution of the Union of Burma (Rangoon: Government Printing &
Stationery, 1948), p. 93. Also: The Land Nationalization Act, 1948 (Rangoon: Govern-
ment Printing and Stationery, 1950), pp. 33-39.
'Kanppen, Tippets, Abbett, and MacCarthy Engineering Co., Comprehensive Report,
Vol. I (London: Hazel Watson & Viney Ltd., 1953), p. 50. The official exchange rate
of Burmese kyats for dollars is K 4.763 to $1.00.
7ibid., p. 40.

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 MYA MAUNG 536

that of the public sector by more than 15% by the end of the planned period
in 1960. The anticipation proved wrong, however: by the end of 1960 the
government's share was more than 56% instead of 34%.8
The most conspicuous feature of development planning in Burma during
the 1950s was the congestion of governmental agencies and enterprises set
up to launch a massive state control of the economy (the catch words for
development were "the mass movement" -mass education, mass welfare
and mass cooperation). In the field of agriculture, for example, there were
the Department of Agriculture, the State Agricultural Marketing Board
(SAMB), the State Agricultural Bank (SAB), the Agricultural and Rural
Development Corporation (ARDC), the Land Development Corporation
(LDC), the Co-operative Societies Department (CSD), the District Com-
mission Office, and the Civil Supplies Department. All of these parallel
agencies directly or indirectly dispensed economic and technical aid to cul-
tivators, which produced not only functional conflict and tension but also
inefficiency and economic waste due to lack of managerial coordination.,
There was misallocation of both human and non-human resources, since
government officials in charge of various economic activities were usually
untrained for their specific functions. The role and power of each of these
agencies came also to depend upon the nation's changing power structure.
For example, the role of the CSD relative to the SAB diminished when U
Ba Swe became interim premier in 1956, while that of the ARDC grew by
leaps and bounds under the Caretaker Government (1958-60).
The economic philosophy and development strategy that underlay the
Pyidawtha Plan endorsed the balanced growth theory and the thesis that
large-scale state economic actions are not only necessary but also conducive
to the development of private incentives in saving and investment. But the
actual performance of the Burmese economy in the 1950s betrayed these
premised in terms of capital formation of the private sector. Massive state
controls and aid created a spirit of dependency among the cultivators, which
seems to confirm the case against the familiar infant industry argument in
economics. The net effect of large-scale but inept state interference with the
market mechanism was the misallocation of resources, sometimes in such
simple matters as price policy and marketing of products. One of the clearest
examples of inefficiency cited by Dr. Hla Mying was SAMB's uniform price
policy of offering a fixed price for rice throughout the year to all cultivators,
regardless of seasonal or regional differences. Government warehouses be-
came flooded with rice, and in the face of inadequate storage and marketing
the result was economic waste.10 U Hla Mying further states:

8The Economic Survey of Burma, 1960 (Rangoon: Government Printing & Stationery,
1960), p. 11.
9See: I. L. 0., Report to the Government of the Union of Burma on the Development
of Co-operatives (Geneva: 1. L. O., 1955). To. 12.
`0U Hila Mying, "Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Countries," The Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. LXXIII, No. 4 (1965), p. 486.

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 537 THE BURMESE WAY TO SOCIALISM

Many economists visiting Burma in the 1950s characteristically over-

looked this "simple" but extremely wasteful misallocation of resources
in their preoccupation with the more elaborate development plans, in-
cluding the expansion of investment in 'infra-structure.11

Although this assertion may be slightly overstated with respect to the process
of economic development, it is true that many government development
programs in less developed countries commit simple errors in the pursuit
of the dubious rather than the obvious under the fervor of economic na-
tionalism and socialism.
The high hopes of the Pyidawtha Plan were shattered by the mid-1950s
when the world price of rice began to drop and foreign exchange reserves
dwindled. A Four-Year Development Plan was launched in 1956 with new
outlooks and strategy. A more sober attitude toward private enterprise be-
gan to appear in the official policies of the government. Foreign sources of
capital and technology were given serious attention for the first time, and
by 1957 the government indicated its willingness to transfer certain non-
key industries back to the private sector. The Four-Year Plan professed
to follow the model of a true welfare state in its objectives of desocializa-
tion, establishing an investment law for stimulating private foreign and
indigenous investments and attracting foreign capital.12 In 1959 an In-
vestment Act was passed to indicate the change in economic policy but be-
cause of the rapid political deterioration following U. Nu's return to power
after the 1960 election, the liberal policies were never really implemented.
In spite of the magnificent superstructuring of governmental enterprises and
controls, Burma in the 1950s had a mixed economy that employed planning
through the market mechanism to a certain extent. In banking, agriculture,
trade, and industry, private property and enterprises were tolerated behind
the vanguard of the state. Burma's economic performance during the 1950s
was poor relative to the prewar period, of course, yet the limited achieve-
ments of the Pyidawtha Plan are impressive when compared to economic
progress since 1962 under the present Revolutionary Council Government.
The growth of the Burmese economy in the 1950s was recorded as 6.3%o
for "the average annual rate of real gross domestic product at factor cost"
and 2.7% for per capita output.'3 The real gross domestic product by the
send of 1960 was 11% higher than in 1938-39.14 The growth rate for the
Pyidawtha period (1952-60) was less than these rates-about 4% for the
real gross domestic product. With all the failures and defects of the Pyidaw-
tha Plan, roughly 80% of its physical targets were achieved, i.e., the gross

"Ibid.
"See: Premier U. NIu on the Four-Year Plan (Rangoon: Director of Information,
1957), pp. 24-29.
"3United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1966 (New York: United Nations, 1967), pp.
575-76.
"The Economic Survey of Burma 1962 (Rangoon: Government Printing & Stationery,
1962),p.5.

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 MYA MAUNG 538

domestic product of 1960 in terms of 1950-51 prices was about K. 5.6 bil-
lion, instead of the ex-ante target of K billion.'5 With respect to the rela-
tive growth of ex-post versus ex-ante output, however, less than 40% of the
targets were achieved. Evidence of a relatively sustained growth rate for
the economy in the 1950s can be discerned in the annual value and volume
of exports, particularly rice. In spite of the balance-of-payments deficit in
1953-54 and the latter part of the Pyidawtha Plan period, the value of
Burma's exports averaged around K. 1 billion throughout the fifties. The
annual volume of rice export averaged about 1.5 million tons. Considering
the rate of population growth, which accounted for a greater domestic con-
sumption of rice, these sustained rates of export indicate a relatively healthy
economy. Rice exports in the 1950s, however, remained 50% below prewar
levels.
Between 1960 and 1962, the Burmese economy continued to function on
the basis of the Four-Year Development Plan, with no significant changes
in the organization of the government agencies of development. The growth
of military economic establishments, the Defense Services Institute and the
Burma Economic Development Corporation, as profit-making organizations
during the military interregnum of 1958-60 further indicated the tendency
toward liberalization of trade and industry. Political splits and power
struggles among the civilian politicians, along with minority unrest, led to
the seizure of political power by the army in March 1962, which drastically
transformed the Burmese economy from a welfare state to a command econ-
omy. The major indictment of the economic policy of the civilian govern-
ment was summed up by the Revolutionary Council as follows:

The Union was dominated by the feudalists for over a thousand years,
by the foreign imperialists over a hundred years, and was dominated
by the landlords and capitalists after it had attained independence.'6

The Pyidawtha Government was charged with essentially the same abuses
that it had charged against the colonial heritage and capitalism. The new
regime found the U Nu government guilty of having betrayed socialism
by perpetuating capitalism and infecting the masses with a bourgeoise men-
tality. The official philosophy, labeled "the Burmese Way to Socialism,"
adopted extreme Marxist ideologies and policies of socioeconomic change
as the best strategy for economic development. The coexistence of private
and public enterprises or private and public ownership of the means of
production was construed as an economic and social evil and as a fraud
perpetuated by the civilian government in the name of a socialist economy.

:"Adjusted to conform to the base year of 1950-51 used by the KTA planners. The
gross domestic product in 1960, in terms of 1947-48 prices, was K 5.513 billion. The
1950-51 prices are about 6% higher than the 1947-48 prices.
"6The Burma Socialist Programme Party, Central Organization Committee, Party
Seminar 1965: Speeches of General Ne Win and Political Report of the General Secre-
tary (Rangoon: Sapay Beikman Press, 1966), p. 101.

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 539 THE BURMESE WAY TO SOCIALISM

THE ECONOMY SINCE 1962

With respect to its ideal form, the Revolutionary Council's "Burmese

Way to Socialism" may be deemed a formal adoption of a command econ-
omy of the Sino-Soviet type; it aspires to build "a socialist economy of the
planned proportional development of all national forces" via the vehicle
of state ownership and control of all means of production.17 Such an econ-
omy is considered to be the prerequisite of an ideal socialist society aimed
at "the participation of all for the general well-being of all, sharing the
benefits derived therefrom.""'

Socialist economy proportionally plans, on the basis of the population

and productive forces, for sufficiency and abundance of consumer goods.
While improving the standard of living and increasing the purchasing
power of the nation, it also expands production.19

The socialist economy which the military government has so far managed
to establish is far from this ideal form, except that total nationalization of
the economy has been achieved. For one thing, there is no planning ma-
chinery with respect to production other than the Socialist Planning Com-
mittee of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), which nominally
came into being only after 1965.20 Furthermore, there has been no drawing
up or launching of a development plan since 1962. What exists in reality
is an unplanned economy owned and run by the state-i.e., "an unplanned
socialized economy" with centralized decision-making under the direct com-
mand of the military wungis (ministers).
Thus, although the socialist economy has remained unplanned, the first
step toward a command economy in line with classical Marxist prescriptions
was taken during the first three years (1962-65) of the military regime.
With state ownership as the top priority, "such vital means of production
as agricultural and industrial production, distribution, transportation, com-
munications, external trade, etc."21 were nationalized. The year 1963 saw
nationwide propagation of the Burmese Way to Socialism through various
Peasants' Seminars and the promulgation of laws empowering the govern-
ment to eliminate private enterprises obstructing its socialist goals. At the
Duya Peasants' Seminar on January 31, 1963, General Ne Win declared
that:

We do not intend to permit private industry to set up new establish-

ments beyond those already in existence. Previously we had thought

"The Philosophy of the Burma Socialist Programme Party: The System of Correla-
tion of Man and His Environment (Rangoon: The Ministry of Information, 1963), p. 45.
"'Ibid.
"Party Seminar 1965, op. cit., p. 64.
"Ibid., p. 127.
21Ibid., p. 65.

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 MYA MAUNG 540

of permitting th
thing.22

In the same speec

prises as greedy ("insatiable ghosts") and sounded their death knell. Pri-
vate ownership was also deemed incompatible with the economic goals of
the Burmese Way to Socialism. In the Party Seminar of 1965, the Revolu-
tionary Council's change of attitude toward private enterprises, from leni-
ency to the harshness of nationalization, was attributed to "the inability of
the indigenous capitalists to restrain their greed."23
After the promulgation on March 13, 1963, of the Law to Protect the
Construction of the Socialist Economy, the first target of nationalization
was the banking system, primarily the twenty-two foreign banks. These
banks simply closed shop and were incorporated into a system of "People's
Banks" under the management of military officers. This nationalization was
rather simple since there was only a handful of indigenous private banks
in operation. The banking system of the Union of Burma was largely gov-
ernmental to begin with in that it had no organized private capital market
or financial institutions except for foreign banks and local moneylenders.
The major source of capital was always governmental, under the direct con-
trols of the Union Bank of Burma, the State Commercial Banks and the
State Agricultural Banks. The nationalization involved a simple transforma-
tion of the flow of capital from a system of public capital for public and
limited private enterprises to a system of public capital for public enter-
prises only. The modus operandi of the former governmental banks has
changed very little, except that the banks have been put under the direct
command of the military officers in the distribution of direct loans to culti-
vators and the allocation of funds to various governmental enterprises. In
conjunction with this, the Revolutionary Council proudly proclaimed that
compared to the previous government's direct loans to farmers of K 161.8
million in 1960-61, it was able to advance an average annual loan of about
K 450 million in the 1963-65 period.24
The Burmna Economic Development Corporation (BEDC) and the De-
fense Services Institute (DSi) were also nationalized in 1964. It should be
noted that both of these enterprises under the previous government were
military economic establishments originally designed to promote the wel-
fare of servicemen. During the 1958-1962 period, the BEDC, under the
management of an ousted member of the Revolutionary Council, Brigadier
Aung Gyi, had grown rapidly as a profit-making governmental enterprise.
The economic operations of both institutions under the civilian government
and the military Caretaker Government (1958-60) were quite extensive and

22Ibid., p. 66
23Ibid., p. 67
24Ibid., p. 68.

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 541 THE BURMESE WAY TO SOCIALISM

successful enough to impress many

marily to such special privileges as tax exemption and the procurement of
valuable import licenses. The delusive efficiency with which the Caretaker
Government managed these economic establishments enhanced the Revolu-
tionary Council Government's confidence that it could build and manage
a command economy. The nationalization of the DSI and the BEDC, of
course, was in line with the philosophy of "the Burmese Way to Socialism,"
which professed to destroy the pernicious economic system of self-seeking
and profit-motivation.
During 1964, in a sweeping move, the government nationalized the so-
called big business establishments, wholesale and retail stores, warehouses,
and consumers' co-operatives, instituting a complete state monopoly of
the nation's marketing and distribution system. Government shops, known
as People's Stores, were opened up under the direct command and manage-
ment of the People's Stores Corporation of the Ministry of Trade-formerly
the Ministry of Commerce and Development. The same ministry monopo-
lized all external trade by establishing the Myama Export-Import Corpora-
tion (MEIC), whereby all trade and industry was operated directly by
military officers and members of the BSPP. A system of rationing by quotas
and price control was introduced in the sale and distribution of all goods
and services. The People's Stores, with their central headquarter at Rangoon,
congested the entire economy. The Revolutionary Council Government was
put to the test of efficiency in managing such a system and had to admit later
its lack of knowledge and manpower. The economic waste in the allocation
of resources was due to a number of factors, of which bureaucratic delay
in decision-making, lack of coordination, and mismanagement were most
conspicuous. These were further complicated by a lack of facilities for the
preservation of highly perishable goods (fish paste and vegetables, for in-
stance) and by the pecuniary motives of storekeepers and consumers alike
in developing black markets throughout Burma. The People's Stores Cor-
poration (PSC) became the most notorious economic operation of the
state, and was widely criticized. The Chairman of the Revolutionary Coun-
cil Government admitted that:

The men from our Defense Services know only how to wage war. For-
merly they ate what the wife cooked for them. They did not know the
prices of the various commodities. The politicians too know hardly
more. Thus, we had to undertake a task we know so little about.26

"Cf. L. J. Walinsky, Economic Development in Burma (1951-60) (New York: The

Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), Chap. 15. Also, Moshe Lissak, "Social Change, Mobili-
zation and Exchange of Services between the Military Establishment and the Civil So-
ciety: The Burmese Case," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. XIIL No.
1, Part 1 (1964), pp. 12-16.
"6Party Seminar 1965, op. cit., p. 191.

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 MYA MAUNG 642

He further attr
who supported t
to the logical question of why the military elite introduced and resumed
management of such a deficient system with so little knowledge, the answer
was "we had to do so because we wished to establish a socialist economy."27
Indeed, the essence of the problem of development confronting Burma, un-
der the civilian and military governments alike, has been precisely the
matter of wishes out-running actual capacities. The problem is magnified
in the case of the military government, whose introduction of a completely
new and unfamiliar command economy system has augmented requirements
and created new pro-blems inherent in a system of direct controls.
The Revolutionary Council launched a direct attack on the purchasing
power in the hands of capitalists via the 1964 demonetization measure, but
without much success. In the name of the Law to Protect the Construction
of the Socialist Economy from Opposition, the government announced the
demonetization of currency notes K 100 and K 50 on the night of May 17,
1964. The notes were proclaimed "illegal tender" and ordered to be sur-
rendered to the government within a week. Exchange of surrendered notes
into smaller denominations was made by applying the progressive income
tax rates, which led to a phenomenal surrender of notes valuing under the
tax-exempt income bracket of K 1,500. The primary reason given for tak-
ing this action was "the fact that the money stock which could be used as
an instrument to attack the construction of the socialist economy"28 had
to be taken away from the opposition forces. The value of the notes sur-
rendered to the government was given as K. 930.8 million, out of the total
value of notes in circulation of K. 1.2022 billion, leaving about K. 270 mil-
lion in the hands of the people. Most of the notes surrendered were supposed
to have come from foreign capitalists who were held responsible for in-
flation, speculation and capitalist exploitation. The ineffectiveness of the
demonetization measure, as recognized explicitly by the government, came
from the evasion of direct personal surrender by the relatively wealthy
people, who worked through agents to take advantage of the government's
promise to redeem the notes of those who had saved the money honestly.
The government's restraint in taking action against these people was said
to be based on humanitarianism, but the real reason, of course, was the
impossibility of determining the source and type of earnings in an economy
in which accounting records and statistical information were poor.
The year 1965 witnessed the final stage of total nationalization. The last
remnants of imperialist capitalism were removed as the state took over the
two major joint ventures of the Burma Oil Company and the Burma Trade
Corporation, along with A. Scott Co., Unilever Co., and all other private
concerns. The Socialist Economy Construction Committee (SECC) had been

2"lbid., also, pp. 192-94.

28Ibid., p. 94.

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543 THE BURMESE WAY TO SOCIALISM

formed on April 19, 1964, soon after the nationalization of businesses and
stores, to manage the nationalized big businesses (e.g., the People's Pearl
and Fishery Board, BEDC, DSI, Cigarette Enterprises and the Pyilon-awba
Rice Mill). The SECC was also given the power to decide amounts of com-
pensation30 and matters of nationalization through a sub-committee, the
Nationalization Committee. The township SECCs were formed under the
auspices of the BSPP and the local administrative bodies, the Security Ad-
ministration Committees (SACS), to manage the nationalized shops and
procure and distribute goods in areas where the PSCs did not then function.
Unfortunately, the inefficiency and mismanagement that had proved dis-
astrous for the PSC also plagued the SECCs, and they had to be dissolved
after the reorganization of the PSC in 1965. The PSC was reorganized under
the new name of the Trade Council, with attendant local councils, but except
for the change in name the system remained essentially the same.
This congestion of committees, councils and corporations in the manage-
ment of the economy is not really a new phenomenon in the development
planning of independent Burma. The same problem of functional conflict
and lack of coordination among governmental agencies and enterprises
beset the former civilian government's economic operations. But the mili-
tary government of Burma has confronted greater problems of inefficiency
due to fear, delay and disincentive effect in dispensing with the market
mechanism. While the central SECC was nominally preserved with its major
organs of the Production Committee, the Transportation Committee, the
Internal Trade Committee and the Foreign Trade Committee, the Ministry
of Trade really managed the entire trading and distributive system of
Burma. From the Trade Councils to the Myama Export-Import Corporation,
the executive administrators were mainly army officers and ex-servicemen.
Ex-businessmen, employees of the former governmental agencies, and sym-
pathizers of the BSPP were recruited to run the nationalized businesses and
PSCs, with the net result that a nationwide black market system-Corpora-
tion "24"-emerged.31
The hoarding of money by relatively wealthy people and the shortage of
goods under a mismanaged rationing system naturally led to private deal-
ings with government store keepers and consumers alike. The system of
musical chairs and personal privileges in the sale of goods on the basis of
quota slips created many loopholes through which goods of all kinds flowed
into black markets. The artificial scarcity value created for the quota slips
under a system of rationing with no checking or policing of purchases from
the government stores gave rise to a concealed price inflation that was un-

29Ibid.
"0Up to the present, no compensation has generally been paid to owners of businesses.
"Corporation "24" is a popularized name for the black markets, since there are 23 gov-
ernmental corporations, numbered accordingly, to manage the trade and industry of
Burma. See: Robert Keatley, "Burma's Sticky Way to Socialism," The Wall Street
Journal, September 16, 1968, p. 16.

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 MYA MAUNG 54

precedented in independent Burma. Prices in the black markets soared

four to five times higher than the official prices set at the government stores.
The distortion of price patterns and misallocation of resources reached such
troublesome dimensions that the government had to denationalize 34 items,
mostly perishable consumers goods such as fish and their related products,
onions, chillies, etc., on September 27, 1966.82 The major consumer goods,
rice and cooking oil, . . . 356 other items, remained nationalized. Up to the
present, reports on price increases of nationalized and denationalized goods,
black marketeering, and arrests of private dealers are regular features in
the Burmese newspapers. Nevertheless, the Revolutionary Council Govern-
ment has remained steadfast in its relentless pursuit of the ideal socialist
economy. On October 18, 1965, it promulgated the redundant Law Investin
Powers to Construct the Socialist Economy, whereby the state was en-
powered to determine and fix sale prices, costs of production and a host of
other costs. The 1964 Law to Protect the Construction of the Socialist
Economy from Opposition and the 1963 People's Stores Corporation Law
were repealed.
As in the case of the civilian government, the Revolutionary Council's
first target for establishing political legitimacy and support has been the
rural population. In the absence of landed bourgeoisie and industrial work-
ers, the peasants have been the focus of attention of the successive socialist
governments in the dissemination of political ideologies via massive aid
and welfare programs. Under the civilian government, store agencies such
as the State Agricultural Marketing Board, the Agricultural and Rural De-
velopment Corporation, the Department of Agriculture, the Co-operative
Societies Department and the State Agricultural Banks all gave various
kinds of aid to cultivators. The military government pursued the same
policy of massive aid through these agencies, some of which have been re-
named Corporation No. 1, No. 2, etc. The Co-operative Societies Depart-
ment, however, was totally taken over by the government, and former volun-
tary co-operative societies were reorganized under the new name of Agri-
cultural Multipurpose Co-operatives (AMPCs). Direct agricultural loans
were also advanced at a rapid rate. In 1962, cultivation loans amounted to
K 358 million; in 1963 they rose to K 700 million, or one-third of the total
value of agricultural produce,38 and for the rest of the 1960s they have
averaged around K 500 million, a phenomenal increase of nearly 100% in
comparison to the annual loans advanced by the civilian governments in the
1950s. The annual repayment of these loans either in kind or cash has
been less than 80%o a year, so that the cumulative arrears of loans annu-
ally now average out to about the same amount as that of the new loans.34

82Kyay Mhoan, The Mirror Newspaper (Rangoon: Kyay Mhoan Press), Sept. 28, 1966,
p.1.
"3Newsletter on Party's Aflairs, No. 1, 1966 (In Burmese) (Rangoon: The Central
Party Organization Committee, BSPP, January 1966), p. 9.
34Ibid., p. 10.

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 545 THE BURMESE WAY TO SOCIALISM

The vicious circle of indebtedness that has historically plagued Burmese

cultivators has not disappeared under the Burmese Way to Socialism.
In fact, it is likely to get worse under a command economy in which the
disincentive effect of dispensing with the market mechanism and profit
motivation has been repressive of agricultural productivity. Massive gov-
ernmental aid has failed to generate an economic utopia of collective par-
ticaipation and endeavor.
In 1963 the government promulgated the Law to Protect the Rights
of Peasants and the Tenancy Act. The peasants were spared from land
nationalization and government seizure of the means of production, and
were also allowed to own and operate the land and sell their products or
means of production.35 While this was actually not a new measure, the
land having been formally nationalized with the same provisions in 1948,
it was lenient relative to the expropriation measures undertaken in the
fields of trade 'and industry. However, the private agricultural market was
superseded by the massive formation of government purchase boards
and depots through Agricultural Multipurpose Co-operatives (AMPCs),
village shops, Land Conunittees and Peasant Councils all over Burma. A
few state farms, livestock stations and cooperative villages were also
formed as experimental models. In 1965, there were 9 cooperative villages
constructed for the landless peasants as an experiment in collective farming
and communal living. Except for the massive economic and technical
help provided for these peasants, the experiment has not been successful
in attracting cultivators. The government has not yet introduced any
significant movement of collective farming on the societal level. In
1965-66, it was reported that the government owned and operated over
4,500 tractors through 100 or so tractor stations to help mechanize farm-
ing, but these stations have been operating at a substantial loss due to
under-utilization and depreciation costs.36 The deficit jumped from K 2.2
million in 1962-63 to K 17.677 million in 1964-65,37 and currently over
5,000 tractors are available for sale to farmers with no buyers in sight.
The most conspicuous feature of socialist construction in rural Burma
since independence has been the quantitative drive for cooperatives. In
an action reminiscent of the civilian government, the military regime soon
after the coup hurriedly organized political cadres to start a nationwide
cooperative movement. In three years (1962-65), over 11,000 AMPCs
and over 10,000 village shops were formed.38 But it must be pointed out
that these are not really new or revolutionary institutions since they are

3"Party Seminar, 1965, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

86Newsletter on Party's Affairs, No. 11, 1966 (In Burmese) (Rangoon: The Central
Party Organization Committee, BSPP, November 1966), p. 22.
87Report of the Revolutionary Council to the People on the Budget Estimates of the
Revolutionary Council Government of the Union of Burma for 1965-66 (Rangoon: Cen-
tral Press, 1965), p. 8.
"Party Seminar, 1965, op. cit., p. 80.

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 MYA MAUNG 546

the former Multipurpose Producers' Cooperatives renamed and reorgan-

ized directly by the government through the BSPP. The 21,000 AMPCs
and village shops formed by the Revolutionary Council represent more
than a 300% increase over the 6,731 agricultural cooperatives of 1960-61,
and if only the working cooperatives of 1960-61 are considered, they
represent a growth of more than 500%.39 Like the cooperative movement
of the civilian government, the formation of the AMPCs was made in
order to help farmers overcome the vicious circle of indebtedness and
eliminate capitalistic exploitation by merchants and moneylenders. And
as in the case'of 'the civilian government, the emphasis on quantity and
credit function rather than on quality and productivity has led so far to
a disastrous failure in solving the problems of indebtedness and the low
income trap in the rural economy. Private moneylenders and merchants
may be less able to advance loans openly but the substitution of govern-
ment for private credits has achieved very little in either instilling a co-
operative spirit or stimulating cooperative effort.
Despite the strong penalities imposed on the misuse of cultivation loans
and the failure to deliver agricultural produce to the government's depots
under the "advance purchase of paddy" system, private dealings and sales
have continued in rural and urban areas alike. Farmers have shown a
generally negative response to the advance purchase of paddy system,
which was introduced in the name of social justice and anti-capitalism
but which is actually an advanced purchase at a fixed price set arbitrarily
by the government. According to the Revolutionary Council:

The advance paddy purchase system of the Revolutionary Council had

no resemblance whatsoever to the pituang system of capitalists.... The
capitalists bought the standing crops at half of what they would be
worth at the time of harvest. The system of purchase employed by the
Revolutionary Council was procurement at the price which would
prevail at the time of harvesting.40

But there was no explanation of how the future price was determined, for,
under state monopsony and price control, without the free interplay of
market forces, the fair and equitable price becomes meaningless and
arbitrary. Indeed, the advance purchase system proved abortive as culti-
vators hoarded paddy and other agricultural produce. Throughout the
independent period the State Agricultural Marketing Board has been
confronted with a shortage of supply due to the unwillingness of the culti-
vators to sell their produce at the low purchase price set by the govern-
ment. Under the Burmese Way to Socialism, the problem has been

39For details, see, Mya Maung, "Agricultural Co-operation in Burma: A Study on th

Value-Orientation and Effects of Socio-Economic Action," Social and Economic Studies
(Jamaica: University of the West Indies) Vol. 14, No. 4 (1965), pp. 330-31. Also
Party Seminar, 1965, op. cit., p. 80.
"Party Seminar, 1965, op. cit., p. 80.

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 547 THE BURMESE WAY TO SOCIALISM

magnified because of total nationalization, which has not only had a

disincentive effect on the production and sale of products to the monopso-
nistic government but has also created a tremendous disparity between
the official and the black market price. The black market boom for paddy
and other basic necessities has stimulated acquisitiveness rather than a
socialist spirit among the cultivators. It has been observed, for instance,
that a price differential for paddy of about 500% between the government
and the black markets shattered the cultivators traditional habit of saving
part of their produce to feed their own families (wun-sah), since they
could sell rice at a high price on the black market and then buy it at
a lower price from the state stores.41 The net result, of course, was a run
on the already short supply at government shops, and an artificial scarcity
created by inappropriate economic policies.
Burma's economic performance since 1962 reflects these problems and
inefficiencies of management. For the first time in its history, this nation
with a relatively affluent factor-endowment has been plunged into the vicious
circle of low income-low output-low income with a demand-pulled inflation.
From food shortage, rice looting and massive smuggling to the economic
waste of perishable goods ruined in the government warehouses because of
mismanagement, these have been economically the most disastrous years
for Burma. Output since 1962-63 has shown more years of decline than
increase, so that for the first time since independence there has been a nega
tive rate of growth. From all available data, the gross national and gross
domestic product declined almost continuously during the 1963-68 period,
with the exception of 1964-65. During 1963-64, the real gross domestic
product fell from K 8.111 to K 7.962 billion,42 and during 1965-66 from
K 8.68 to K 8.05 billion.43 Though reliable statistics for 1967 and 1968
are not available, the government reported 'a decline of output which may
be estimated as from about K 8.20 to K 8.0 billion.44 This may be con-
firmed by the fact that 1967-68 did indeed witness a bad harvest and a
drastic decline in production because of bad weather, storm damage on
the Arakanese coast, increased black marketeering, and the Sino-Burmese
dispute. The estimates on rice export further indicated that in 1968 Burma
would be unable to export more than 300,000 tons of rice (compared to
about 500,000 tons the previous year).4- The growth in per capita output,
indeed, has been even worse, since a recent U.N. estimate indicates that

"1UPI Release: U Ba Than, "Rice Crisis Strikes Burma" (Rangoon: UPI, October
1967).
42Revolutionary Council Government of the Union of Burma, Central Statistical and
Economic Department, Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics, Four Quarters 1966 (Rangoon:
Central Press, 1968), p. 132.
4"From I.M.F., International Financial Statistics, October 1968 and Newsletter on
Party's Affairs, no. 11, 1966, op. cit.
44Report of the Revolutionary Council to the People on the Budget Estimates of the
Revolutionary Government of the Union of Burma for 1966-67. Also, see The Working
People's Daily (Rangoon) Vol. IV, No. 252 (September 20, 1967), p. 1.
'5Keatley, loc. cit.

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 MYA MAUNG 548

Burma's population growth is over 2% compared with 1.5%o in the 1950s.

With population pressure plus dwindling production and export, Burma
is suffering an economic disaster which may be attributed largely to the
pursuit of inappropriate policies.
The external sector of the Burmese economy has deteriorated the most
under the military government due to a combination of factors of which
the annual shortage of supply of primary products to the government ware-
houses seems most conspicuous. The state monopoly of the external sector
is not totally new, since the civilian government had more or less done the
same thing regarding the export of such major primary products as rice,
teak ;and cotton. What is new, however, is the total displacement of all
private enterprise by governmental trade corporations in both internal and
external trade, with the Myama Export-Import Corporation of the Trade
Ministry serving as the only agency for external trade. Furthermore, this
system of state capitalism has induced changes in the direction and types
of external trade but no significant changes in its composition. Though
the exact statistics on the types and distribution of Burma's external trade
among various countries are not available, it may be inferred that there
has been a relative shift of trade patterns due to a greater inflow of non-
Western goods and services, e. g., Czechoslovakian tractors and Chinese
capital goods. The severe restriction on imports from the West, along with
the nationalization of all foreign firms, banks and private enterprises, has
led to an expansion of trade with "socialist camp" economies on the one
hand and to the development of bilateral trade agreements on the other.
Burma's unfortunate experiences with bilateral trade agreements after the
end of the Korean War boom in rice export,46 however, do not seem to have
taught the present military government anything.
For the external financing of government expenditures, the major sources
of capital have been Japanese reparations (including technical and eco-
nomic cooperation) and foreign loans and aid (including credit purchases,
and aid from the U.S. and international organizations). More than two-
thirds of the major foreign loans came from Communist China, Czechoslo-
vakia, East Germany and Russia, the Chinese share being the largest since
1962. According to the government's 1967-68 Budget Estimates,47 foreign
loans and aid, including credit purchases, were K 51.4 million and K 128.7
million for 1966-67 and 1967-68. Of these, the Chinese share accounted
for roughly 20% and 10% respectively. The decline was due to the rapid
deterioration in economic relations between Burma and China following
the Sino-Burmese riot in Rangoon during the summer of 1967. China's
loans declined from K 15 million to K 13 million between 1967 and 1968,
while U.S. loans increased from K 4.2 million to K 10 million during the
same period. In 1967.68, Burma also obtained a loan of over K 13 million

"6For details see, R. L. Allen, "The Burmese Clearing Account Agreements," Pacific
Affairs, Vol. XXXI, No. 2 (1958).
7 Working People's Daily, loc. cit.

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 549 THE BURMESE WAY TO SOCIALISM

during the same period. In 1967-68, Burma also obtained a loan of over
K 13 million from West Germany.48 The Sino-Burmese rift in recent years
poses an interesting dilemma to the builders of Burma's command economy,
particularly in light of the continuing decline of exports and foreign ex-
change reserves and the limited inflow of technical and economic aid from
the West since 1962.
Since 1964 the Burmese economy has been suffering from a balance-of-
payments deficit, the worst part being a chronic trade deficit arising solely
from drastic declines in the value and volume of exports, mainly rice. Since
1962, the average annual value of exports has been around K 600 million,
or less than 60% of the 1962 value and less than 50% of the level in the
1950s. Similarly, the volume of exports has declined drastically, rice ex-
ports being the lowest since independence. Rice exports have been declining
since 1964, reaching its worst years in 1967 and 1968. The combination
of bad harvest and black marketeering has depressed the volume of rice
exports to 500,000 metric tons in 1967 and about 300,000 tons in 196849
or less than one-third of the average annual volume in the 1950s. The
deficit in the balance-of-payments averaged around K 80 million for the
1964-68 period, and foreign exchange reserves have therefore dwindled
seriously. There had been a sharp increase in foreign exchange reserves
between 1962 and 1964; this was proudly proclaimed 'by the Revolutionary
Council Government to be the result of its efficient management of the ex-
ternal sector, but was actually due to the pervasive carryover effect of favor-
able balance-of-payments under the previous government, the seizure of
all foreign exchanges and foreign banks, and direct controls of all inter-
national flow of goods and capital. In recent years, however, the large-
scale protection of the economy has resulted in reducing foreign exchange
reserves to below the average level of the late 1950s, and to a level of K
71.2 million in 1967.50 These unfavorable developments in the external
sector have led the government to pursue tighter foreign trade policies.
In fact, in 1967-68 higher duties were imposed on more than 30 items of
import withithe curious exception of golf equipment.
"The Burmese Way to Socialism beyond the Welfare State" has produced
a number of interesting results, the most pronounced of which is the gap
between the policy's pursuit of socialism and the individual's pursuit of
concrete personal ends.6' Although this gap has confounded the develop-
ment endeavor since independence, it has widened under the revolutionary
socialist economy as the military political elite proved more willing than

"Ibid., p. 8.
'91.M.F., International Financial Statistics, op. cit., pp. 64-65. Also, Keatley, loc. cit.
501.M.F., International Financial Statistics, loc. cit.
"1Max Weber termed these two processes wertrational and zweckrational. See his, The
Theory of Social and Economic Organization (Talcott Parsons, ed.) (Glencoe: The Free
Press, 1947), p. 115.

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 MYA MAUNG 550

the civilian gover

Paradoxically, such an ideational commitment to Marxian socialism has
not transformed itself into real patterns of socioeconomic organization and
development planning. A lack of pragmatic schemes, development plans
and planning machinery characterizes the command economy in Burma
today, making it uniquely different from the socialist economy of the civilian
government and most economies of the Sino-Soviet World. In this sense
the socialism of Burma today is truly "the Burmese Way to Socialism"
producing "an unplanned socialized economy of disproportional develop-
ment."
Most paradoxical of all is the present government's endorsement of the
Marxian thesis of development for a country like Burma where there has
been neither a large number of oppressed proletariat nor a sizable bourgeois
or landed class. The sweeping nationalization of the economy has had the
unfortunate effect of preserving what the Marxists consider to the retarding
institutions of 'social and economic development-a spirit of dependency,
a consciousness of privilege, and a misuse of capital for acquisitive pur-
poses. Managerial inefficiency under la system of congested ad hoc com-
mittees and short-run schemes has been magnified by economic waste in
the private sector. The stress on equity also remains an unconvincing ideal
in view of the poverty created for the mass of people on the one hand 'and
the maldistribution of social and economic privileges between the ruling
military elite and other social groups on the other. The unsuccessful, indeed
mythical, exchange of efficiency for equity has created an economic crisis.
It is worthwhile to 'bear in mind the observation of many objective
economists that the process of development in less developed countries is
different from that which took place earlier in the advanced economies.
It is also doubtless valuable to heed the suggestion that there should be a
new and objective "beam in our eyes"53 in the analysis of the poverty of
nations or the inapplicability to underdeveloped economies of therapies
based upon the model of an advanced economy.54 I would argue, however,
that because of a beam in their eyes as well, that is, their obsession with
the evils of capitalism and their pursuit'of a mythical classless society, the
socialist leadership of many ex-colonial countries have been equally blind
to the experiences of the developed ones.
Burma's recent experience demonstrates that in substance the so-called
old issues in economics -still persist and that the grand old alternatives of
"isms" still prevail in different forms.55 It may be that the old issue of

52See J. K. Galbraith, Economic Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

1964), pp. 68-69.
"3Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiiry into the Poverty of Nations (New York:
The Twentieth Century Fund, 1968), Chap. I.
54Cf. A. 0. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1958), pp. 11.14.
"5Cf. R. A. Dahl and C. E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare (New York:
Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 1-3.

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551 THE BURMESE WAY TO SOCIALISM

the state versus private ownership h

space. The counterarguments to the in
tion, the economic evils of trade barri
inefficiency of a highly complex syste
efficiency of the market mechanism in
costs of the psychic as compared to t
of economic nationalism, all seem to ap
ment with socialism. One might argue
has failed economically not because t
not been fully or effectively implemen
this argument, I would maintain tha
difficult to implement than others and
based on the economic experience of
the propensity of the social system to a
schemes of optimum allocation of resou
The social costs of a simple transfer
the public sector can be summed up as
distortion of price and income pattern
due to mismanagement and disincent
trained and Western-oriented social gro
of external sources of capital, 'and econ
short period of time. Of course econ
lasts longer than prosperity. The soc
derived from the assertion of political
crimination against aliens and certain W
for the ruling military elite and sympa
privileges. The social costs have heav
Inflation, general inefficiency, and loss
wide black market, have drastically r
arbitrary setting of prices and wages t
the continual increase of taxes and c
recurrence of incremental -loopholes t
a command economy. In brief, the i
to Socialism so far is out of reach an
seeable future.

MYA MAUNG is Associate Professor in the D

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