DAMODARAM SANJIVIYYA NATIONAL LAW

UNIVERSITY
SABBAVARAM, VISAKHAPATNAM, A.P,INDIA

PROJECT TITLE- FUNDAMNETAL RIGHTS ARE SUBJECT TO

REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS- A STUDY

SUBJECT- CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

NAME OF THE STUDENT: P MEGHNA SRINIVAS

ROLL NO.2019109

SEMESTER- IV

1
 ACKNOWLEDGEMNET

I w0uld like t0 express my gratitude and heartfelt appreciati0n t0 my teacher wh0 gave me the g0lden
0pp0rtunity t0 d0 this w0nderful pr0ject 0n the interesting t0pic “The fundamental rights are subject to
reasonable restrictions” which helped me learn, analyse and expl0re this specific field 0f subject by digging
deeper int0 the never ending mine 0f kn0wledge thr0ugh an extensive and th0r0ugh research.This topic has
helped me understand the subject better and has given me a sense of clarity on the subject.

Sec0ndly, I w0uld als0 like t0 thank my family wh0 helped me a l0t in c0mpleting this pr0ject successfully
within the given time frame.Lastly, the acknowledgement would be incomplete without appreciation to my
seniors who guided me and showed me the right path in finishing the task of completing the project
successfully.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

2. DEFINITON OF ARTICLE 19

3. RESTRICTIONS OF RIGHT TO FREEDOM

4. UNREASONABLE RESTRICTIONS

5. CASE ANALYSIS

6. CONCLUSION

7. BIBLIOGRAPHY
 INTRODUCTION

The freedom speech is one of the most important right that is secured through the fundamental rights in our
constitution. Freedom of speech gives the people of the country freedom to express their feelings and
opinions. It gives the people a sense of power and satisfaction to give their views in nay form. The freedom
speech covers every aspect of expressing their views and through any medium be it in writing, audio or
video form. This being an important power it also posses’ great threat to peace and tranquillity if it is left
ungoverned or unrestricted then it could lead to great chaos and unstability.
As the constitution states, Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India states that, “all citizens shall have the
right to freedom of speech and expression. The philosophy behind this Article lies in the Preamble of the
Constitution, where a solemn resolve is made to secure to all its citizen, liberty of thought and expression.
The exercise of this right is, however, subject to ‘reasonable restrictions’ for certain purposes being imposed
under Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India”.
The main elements of right to freedom of speech and expression are as under “This right is available only to
a citizen of India and not to foreign nationals. The freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) includes the
right to express one’s views and opinions at any issue through any medium, e.g., by words of mouth,
writing, printing, picture, film, movie etc.1
This right is, however, not absolute and it allows Government to frame laws to impose reasonable
restrictions in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the state, friendly relations with
foreign states, public order, decency and morality and contempt of court, defamation and incitement to an
offence. This restriction on the freedom of speech of any citizen may be imposed as much by an action of
the State as by its inaction. Thus, failure on the part of the State to guarantee to all its citizens the
fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression would also constitute a violation of Article 19(1)(a)”.

SCOPE OF THE STUDY:

The scope of the study is to analyze article 19(2) to (6) and their reasonable restrictions, and also observe
various real-life cases to find out its application.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:
The researcher has applied doctrinal method of research.

TYPES OF RESEARCH:
The researcher has used explanatory, analytical and historical method of research.

LITERATURE REVIEW:
1
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India
The researcher has taken information from various books journals, newspaper articles and various online
sources.
PRIMARY SOURCES: Primary sources that the researcher has relied upon include acts passed by the
government, judgements delivered by the judiciary. Judgements taken for reference in the project include:
Romesh Thappar v State of Madras
Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India
Maneka Gandhi v Union of India

SECONDARY SOURCES: Secondary sources that the researcher has relied upon include various books,
articles-
web resources like ipleaders,legal services India and papers.ssrn.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS:
1. WHETHER THERE ARE REASONABLE RESTRICTION ON ARTICLE 19?
2. WHETHER THE RESTRICTION TO ARTICLE 19 ARE HELPFUL IN MANTAINING PEACE
AND TRANQUILITY?
 INTRODUCTION
The fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Indian Constitution are not absolute, implying that they are
subject to certain restrictions, the conditions of which are set out in the Constitution. These restrictions are
known as "fair restrictions," and they are outlined in Article 19 of the Indian Constitution, clauses 2 to 6.By
rule, the state may limit the enjoyment of the freedoms guaranteed by Article 19(1). Executive intervention
is the use of the state's authority to restrict freedoms by legislation. Administrative authority is one of the
ways in which the executive will restrict the exercise of Indian citizens' fundamental freedoms.The modern
welfare state, in which the government is required to perform a vast number of tasks for the benefit of the
citizens, gave rise to the principle of discretion. Administrative authorities have come to possess enormous
discretionary powers in order to properly administer the law in order to carry out certain duties. The
presence of discretionary authority for the executive, according to traditional rule of law thinking, is a
breach of the rule of law. Providing administrative powers to the executive, on the other hand, has become
completely indispensable for the current welfare state to operate.
The Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India are not absolute. There are certain
restrictions which can be imposed by the state according to the procedure established by law. However,
these restrictions must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Article 19 covers these fundamental freedoms as well
as the restrictions which can be imposed on these rights. In this paper,all the six freedoms defined in Article
19 and the restrictions are highlighted. Also, all the landmark cases are covered in this paper while dealing
with the concept of Reasonable Restrictions. The main focus of this paper is to throw some light on the test
to determine the reasonabilility in the restrictions mentioned in Article 19 of the Constitution of India.
Further, in this paper, some light is also thrown as to what constitutes “unreasonable restrictions.”
 DEFINITION OF ARTICLE 19

The article 19 states that, “Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech etc
(1) All citizens shall have the right
(a) to freedom of speech and expression
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms
(c) to form associations or unions
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India and
(f) omitted
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business
(2) Nothing in sub clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State
from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right
conferred by the said sub clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the
State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of
court, defamation or incitement to an offence
(3) Nothing in sub clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it
imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity
of India or public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause
(4) Nothing in sub clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it
imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity
of India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said
sub clause
(5) Nothing in sub clauses (d) and (e) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so
far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise
of any of the rights conferred by the said sub clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the
protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe
(6) Nothing in sub clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it
imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public,
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause, and, in particular,
nothing in the said sub clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or
prevent the State from making any law relating to,
(i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any
occupation, trade or business, or
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business,
industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise”.
 RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM

The fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) are not absolute. They are subject to restrictions
placed in the subsequent clauses of Article 19.2 No restrictions by mere executive or departmental
instructions can be placed. They would not be ‘a law’ which the State is entitled to make under the relevant
clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 in order to regulate or curtail fundamental rights under Article 19 (1). 3
Clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 do not require the making of a law solely for the purpose of placing the
restrictions mentioned in them.4 The test of reasonableness mentioned in postulated of the restrictions in
clause (2) to (6) of Article 19 should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract
standard or general applicable to all cases. The reasonableness of the restraint would have to be judged by
the magnitude of the evil which it is the purpose of the restraint to curb or to eliminate.5 The expression “in
the interests of” in clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 makes the ambit of the protection very wide for a law may
not have been designed to directly maintain public order or to directly protect the general public against any
particular evil and yet it may have been enacted “in the interests of” public order of the general public, as the
case may be.The words ‘public order’ appearing in clauses (2) and (4) of Article 19 must have the same
meaning. In clause (2) ‘public order’ is virtually synonymous with public peace, safety and tranquility. The
denotation of the said words cannot be wider in clause (4). A restriction can be said to be in the interest of
public order only if the connection between the restriction and the public order as direct and proximate.
Indirect and unreal connection between the public order and restriction would not fall within the purview of
the expression “in the interest of public order”. The determination by the Legislature of what constitutes a
reasonable restriction is not final or conclusive; it is subject to supervision by the court.The test for
ascertaining the reasonableness of the restriction of the rights in Article 19 is of great importance. No
abstract standard reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged
to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and the urgency of the
evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition and the prevailing conditions at the
time, should all enter into the judicial verdict.6

RESTRICTION UNDER ARTICLE 19 i.e 19(2) to (6 )

(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State
from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right
conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the

2
Babul Parate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 884
3
Kharak Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1963 SC 1295
4
Babul Parate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 884
5
Collector of Customs v. Sampathu Chettty, AIR 1963 SC 316
6
Harakchand v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1453
State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of
court, defamation or incitement to an offence.

(3) Nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it
imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity
of India or public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause

(4) Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it
imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity
of India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said
sub-clause.
(5) Nothing in sub-clauses (d) and (e) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so
far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise
of any of the rights conferred by the said subclauses either in the interests of the general public or for the
protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.
(6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it
imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public,
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular,
nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or
prevent the State from making any law relating to,-
(i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practicing any profession or carrying on any
occupation, trade or business, or
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business,
industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.
The restriction which may be imposed under any of the clauses must be reasonable restriction. The
restrictions cannot be arbitrary. Hence a restriction to be constitutionally valid must satisfy the following
two tests
(i) The restriction must be for the purposes mentioned in clauses 2 to 6 of Art. 19.
(ii) The restriction must be a reasonable restriction.

Some of the principles which the Supreme Court has affirmed in ascertaining the reasonableness of
restrictions can be taken into consideration:
1. Reasonableness demands proper balancing: The phrase reasonable restrictions connotes that the
limitation imposed upon a person in the enjoyment of a right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive
nature. A legislation arbitrarily invading the right of a person cannot be regarded as reasonable. A restriction
to be valid must have a direct and proximate nexus with the object which the legislation seeks to achieve and
the restriction must not be in excess of that object i.e., a balance between the freedoms guaranteed under Art.
19(1)(a) to (g) and the social control permitted by clauses (2) to (6) of Art. 19. It is the substance of
legislation and not its appearance or form which is to be taken into consideration while assessing its validity.
This introduces the principle of ‘proportionality’. This means the court would consider whether the
restriction imposed by legislation on the Fundamental Rights are disproportionate to the situation and are
“not the least restrictive of the choices”. It is the direct, inevitable and the real, not the remote, effect of the
legislation on the Fundamental Right which is to considered.7A restriction to be reasonable must also be
consistent with Art. 14 of the Constitution since the restrictions cannot be arbitrary or excessive.

2. Reasonableness, both Substantive and Procedural: To determine the reasonableness of the restriction,
the Court should also consider the nature of the restriction and procedureprescribed by the Statute for
enforcing the restriction on the individual freedom. Not only substantive, but ‘procedural provisions of a
statute also enter into the verdict of its reasonableness’. 8Retrospectivity of a law may be also be a relevant
factor although retrospectivity of a law does not make it automatically unreasonable. A statute imposing a
restriction with retrospective effect is not prima facie unreasonable, but retrospectivity is an element to be
taken into consideration in determining whether the restriction is reasonable or not.
3. Reasonableness and objective concept: The reasonability of a restriction has to be determined in an
objective manner. It should be from the standpoint of the general public and not from the view of the
persons upon which the restrictions are imposed or upon abstract considerations. This concept of objectivity
prompted the Supreme Court to warn Judges from bringing their own personal predilections in ascertaining
the reasonableness of the restrictions.
4. Reasonableness of restriction and not of law: The Court is called upon to ascertain the reasonableness
of the restriction and not of the law which permits the restriction. A law may be reasonable, but the
restriction imposed by it on the exercise of freedom may not be reasonable.
5. Reasonableness and Directive Principles of State Policy: The Directive Priniciples of State Policy are
also relevant in considering whether a restriction on a Fundamental Right is reasonable or not. A restriction
which generally promotes a Directive Principle is regarded as reasonable. The Supreme Court observed in
Kasturi Lal v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, “Any action taken by the Government with the view to giving
effect to any one or more of the Directive Principles would ordinarily qualify for being regarded as
reasonable.”
6. It is the courts and not the Legislature which has to judge finally whether a restriction is reasonable or
not.
There is no exact standard or general pattern of reasonableness that can be laid down in all cases. Each
case is to be judged on its own merit. The standard varies with the nature of the right infringed, the
underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and the urgency of the evil sought to be remedied,

7
Express Newspapers v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578
8
Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643.
the disproportion, of the imposition, the prevailing condition at the time. These factors have to be taken into
consideration for any judicial verdict.
 UNREASONABLE RESTRICTIONS

Any law which does not strike a proper balance between the freedoms guaranteed and the social control
permitted by the clauses in Art. 19 is an unreasonable restriction. In Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P AIR
1951 SC 118, the Central Provinces and the Berar Regulation of Manufacture of Beedies (Agricultural
Purpose) Act of 1948 was questioned as unconstitutional. The Act provided that in the argicultural season no
one should engage in the manufacture of Beedies. The object of the legislation was to divert the labour
engaged in the manufacture of Beedies to the agricultural sector where there was a dearth of labour. It was
held by the Supreme Court that the legislation in question was not a reasonable restriction upon occupational
freedom. It was observed that even the persons who could not engage in the hard manual labour necessary in
agriculture such as children, the old and the infirm, were also prevented in the legislation from making their
livelihood in the manufacture of Beedies. No alternative provision was contemplated for providing them
with work during the period of their enforced idleness. The legislation not only compels those engaged in
agricultural work from taking other avocations but also prohibits persons in no connection with agriculture
to undertake agricultural operations. The legislature has thus failed to take into account the probable
repercussions of the restriction upon the persons affected by it. The restriction was, therefore, held to be
unreasonable. The legislation was accordingly struck down as unconstitutional. A prohibition on the
fundamental right to carry on occupation, trade or business is not regarded as reasonable if is it imposed not
in the interests of the general public but keeping in view the susceptibilities and sentiments of a section of a
community. In Mohd. Faruk v. State of M.P 1970 AIR SC 93, the M.P Municipal Corporation Act, 1956,
made it mandatory upon the Corporation to make adequate provisions for the construction, maintenance and
regulation of a slaughter house. Section 432 authorizes the Government to modify or repeal any bye-laws
made by the Corporation. Therefore acting under Section 432, the Government by a notification cancelled
the bye-laws made by the Jabalpur Municipality relating to bulls and bullocks which prohibited the slaughter
of such animals. It was held by the Supreme Court that such notification infringed the fundamental right of
the petitioner guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(g) as the power to cancel the bye-laws cannot be exercised in an
arbitrary manner. It was observed that the sentiments of a section of a community may be hurt by permitting
the slaughter of bulls and bullocks. However, a prohibition imposed on the exercise of a fundamental right
to carry on an occupation, trade or business will not be regarded as reasonable, if it is imposed not in the
interest of general public but merely to respect the susceptibilities and sentiments of a section of the people
whose way of life, belief or thought is not the same as that of the claimant.A law which confers arbitrary and
uncontrolled power upon the executive in the matter of regulating trade or business cannot be held
reasonable. This was held in Dwaraka Pd. V. State of U.P. AIR 1954 SC 224, “the licensing authority may
grant, refuse to grant, renew or refuse to renew a license and may sustain, cancel, revoke or modify any
license or any terms thereof granted by him under the Order for reasons to be recorded: provided that every
power which is under the Order exercisable by the State Coal Controller or any person authorized by him on
his behalf.” Section 4(3) of the U.P Coal Control Order, 1953, was declared void because it gave
unrestrained authority to a single individual to grant, withhold or cancel licenses in any way he chooses, and
there was nothing in the Order which could ensure a proper execution of the power or operate as a check on
the injustice that might result from the improper execution of the same. Therefore, where power is conferred
on the executive to regulate and control the exercise of the freedom conferred by Article 19(1)(g), it is
necessary that the law which does so should either lay down the circumstances or grounds on which the
power may be exercised. An Act which vests discretionary powers on an executive should also give
sufficient guidance in the matter of the exercise of discretionary powers in order to sustain reasonableness of
the restriction. However, it is not necessary that such guidance or policy should be expressly and specifically
stated. It is enough if such guidance can be found on a fair reading of the Act and other concerning
circumstances.
 CASE ANALYSIS

1. Romesh Thappar v State of Madras9

FACTS:
The facts of the case states that, “The petitioner Romesh Thappar was a well-known communist of his times.
He was the printer, publisher, and editor of a new English weekly journal known as ‘Crossroads’ in
Bombay. He had published a few articles that were suggestive of him being sceptical of Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru’s policies especially the ones about foreign policy. During that time, a communist
movement in western Madras had started to gather momentum. The Government of Madras feared that the
content propounded by the magazine would add to the disquiet in that region. In order to avoid such a
situation, the government of Madras on 1st March 1950, issued an order imposing a ban on the entry and
circulation of the weekly journal in that area. The order was issued pursuant to Section 9(1-A) of the Madras
Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949 (hereafter referred to as ‘Act’), which empowered the government to
prohibit the circulation, sale or distribution of the journal in the province of Madras for the purpose of
ensuring ‘public safety’ or preserving ‘public order.’ Thus, the petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme
Court arguing that the order passed by the government infringes upon his fundamental right to free speech
and expression”.10
ISSUES:
1. Whether Section 9(1-A) of the Act is violative of petitioner’s right to freedom of speech and
expression as conferred on him by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution or will it fall within the
reservation of Article 19(2)?

REASONING:
The judges in this case adopted the “intentionalism approach while dealing with the facts of the case
wherein they were required to discover the original intent of the drafters of the statute and use this intent
while interpreting it. Supporters of this theory assert that it is the original intention of the drafters of the
statute which should govern as the ‘true law’, and it is the job of the judge to retrieve that intent from the
statute itself.” They contend that the intention of the legislature is primary whereas the statute is the
secondary piece of evidence which leads the judges back to the legislature’s intent.11
In this case, the Advocate General, on behalf of the State of Madras, “first raised a preliminary objection
with respect to the petitioner’s application for claiming relief under Article 32 of the Constitution in the first

9
Romesh Thappar v State of Madras (AIR 1950 SC 124)
10
Global Freedom of Expression. 2020. Thappar V. Madras - Global Freedom Of Expression. [online] Available at:
https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/thappar-v-madras/ [Accessed 26 April 2020].
11
Harvard University Press, 1994. 'Just Do It! Escridge's Critical Pragmatic Theory Of Statutory Interpretation. [online] p.721.
Available at: https://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/wp-content/uploads/pdf/2840051-41.Michell.pdf [Accessed 2 June 2020].
instance. He argued that the petitioner should have exhausted his relief under Article 226 of the Constitution
by resorting to the High Court of Madras at first”.
Thus, it was clear that both the clauses differed in terms of degree. Essentially, a speech that has potential to
create a local disturbance could be one that affected the ‘public safety’ or ‘public order.’
JUDGEMENT:
The Court opined that “freedom of propagation of ideas which is guaranteed by freedom of circulation falls
well within the ambit of freedom of speech and expression. State can be allowed to regulate a newspaper
only if it is done with an intention to combat or prevent practices that could weaken or overthrow the
government.
However, Justice Saiyid Fazl Ali in his dissenting opinion concluded that “the maintenance of peace and
tranquillity was a part of maintaining state security. He propounded that the Act imposed reasonable
restrictions on freedom of speech and expression and that it must be held valid”.

Maneka Gandhi v Union of India12

FACTS:
The facts of the case states that, “Maneka Gandhi was issued a passport on the 1st of July 1976 under the
erstwhile Passport Act 1967. After three days of this issue, she received a letter dated 2nd of July, 1977,
from the Passport Officer regionally in charge in Delhi communicating to her that it was decided by the
Union government to impound her passport under Section 10(3) of the Passport Act 1967 ‘in public
interest’. The minister was told to surrender her passport within one week from the receipt of that letter.
A letter was addressed to the Regional Passport Officer by Maneka Gandhi with a request to furnish a copy
of the reasons for sending the order under the act. The reply was sent by the Union Government, by the
Ministry of Affairs on the 6th of July 1977 stating the reason for impounding the passport is ‘in the interest
of the general public’ and not to provide a copy of the list of reasons for the making of the order”. Maneka
Gandhi, therefore, filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India stating the seize of her
passport as the violation of her fundamental rights specifically, Article 14 (Right to Equality), Article 19
(Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression) and Article 21 (Right to Life and Liberty) guaranteed by the
Constitution of India.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the right to go abroad is a part of right to personal liberty under Article 21.
2. Whether section 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act is violative of Article 14,19(1) (a)(g) and 21 of the
constitution.

REASONING:

12
Maneka Gandhi v Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597
The right to go abroad is part of “personal liberty within the meaning of that expression as used in Article 21
and no one can be deprived of this right except according to the procedure prescribed by law. There is no
procedure prescribed by the Passport Act, for impounding or revoking a Passport. The impugned order is
made in contravention of the rules of natural justice and is, therefore, null and void”. The impugned order
has effect of placing an unreasonable restriction on the right of free speech and expression guaranteed to the
petitioner under Article 19(1) (a) as also on the right to carry on the profession of a journalist conferred
under Article 19 (1) (g).
The Attorney General of India argued that the “Right to Travel Abroad was never covered under any clauses
of article 19(1) and hence, Article 19 is independent of proving the reasonableness of the actions taken by
the Central Government.
The Passport Law was not made to blow away the Fundamental Rights in any manner. Also, the
Government should not be compelled to state its grounds for seizing or impounding someone’s passport for
the public good and national safety”. Therefore, the law should not be struck down even if it overflowed
Article 19.
JUDGEMENT:
The court overruled Gopalan by stating that there is a unique relationship between the provisions of Article
14, 19 & 21 and every law must pass the tests of the said provisions. Earlier in Gopalan case, the majority
held that these provisions in itself are mutually exclusive. Therefore, to correct its earlier mistake the court
held that these provisions are not mutually exclusive and dependent on each other.
Section 10(3)(c) of Passport Act 1967 is not violative of neither Article 21 nor Article 19(1)(a) or 19 (1)(g).
The court further held that the said 1967 provision also not in contradiction of Article 14. Since the said
provision provides for an opportunity to be heard. The court rejected the contention of the petitioner that the
phrase “in the interests of the general public” is not vague.

Overturning A.K. Gopalan's decision was widely praised, and the case became a watershed moment in
history since it expanded the scope of fundamental rights. Judges harshly condemned the respondent's
assertion that any law is legal and lawful until it is repealed. In addition, by giving Maneka Gandhi a liberal
interpretation, the courts set a precedent for future generations to seek their basic rights, whether or not they
are specifically listed in Part III of the constitution.

Today, courts have successfully interpreted various cases in order to establish socio-economic and cultural
rights under the umbrella of Article 21, such as the Right to Clean Air, Right to Clean Water, Right to
Freedom from Noise Pollution, Speedy Trial, Legal Aid, Right to Livelihood, Right to Food, Right to
Medical Care, Right to Clean Environment, and so on, as part of the Right to Life & Personal Liberty.
The decision ushered in a new era of judicial activism, with PILs being welcomed and judges taking an
interest in liberal interpretation wherever it was needed in the current justice system.
 Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India13
FACTS:
The petitioners, in this case, “were companies, employees, and shareholders thereof, as well as trusts locked
in within the distribution of newspapers. They challenged the purport obligation on newsprint under the
Customs Tax Act 1975 and the auxiliary duty under the Finance Act 1981, as altered by notices under the
Customs Act 1962 with impact from March 1, 1981. Earlier to this notice, newsprint had enjoyed an
exception from customs duty.
The petitioners contended that the imposition of this duty had an unfavorable impact on costs and circulation
and, so, had a devastating impact on freedom of expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution
and the flexibility to practice any trade or occupation under Article 19(1)(g). They assert that no open
interest justified such interference with these principal rights since the foreign trade position of India was
comfortable at the time. Finally, they submitted that the classification of newspapers into small, medium and
large newspapers damaged the rule of non-arbitrariness under Article 14 of the Constitution (equality before
law)”.
The government contended that the burden of the cost borne by the newspapers and the position of foreign
exchange reserves were unessential contemplations. The public interest included in taxation was to increase
the revenue of the government, a burden that’s borne by all citizens of the country. It declared that the
exemption granted to newsprint was not justified and, so, can be removed by the government.
ISSUES:
1. Whether it includes Freedom of press restrictions other than those in Article 19(2).
2. Whether reasonable interference in the name of public interest is justified.

JUDGEMENT:
The Supreme Court of India observed that “the govt. was undoubtedly engaged to need charges affecting the
publication of newspapers since such publication may be characterized as an industry and must be subject to
the same levies as other businesses. It too allowed the classification into little, medium, and largely based on
economic considerations, had a judicious nexus with the objective of taxation, and could not be considered
arbitrary. In any case, where the power of taxation encroaches upon the freedom of expression beneath
Article 19(1)(a), the limitation on the flexibility must be within reasonable limits”.
Reasonable limits have been outlined in Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution, wherein “public interest is
a ground that will be taken to confine freedom of expression. The Court concluded that two basic standards
must be borne in mind first, newspapers enjoy the benefits of government services like all other industries
and must accordingly contribute a reasonable share of government income through tax assessment and
second” the burden of taxation must not be excessive.

13
Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India 1985 2 SCC 434
In the context of the present request, “the Court observed that the excessive nature of the burden was neither
sufficiently proven by the petitioners nor adequately refuted by the respondents. It stated that a ‘strict burden
of proof’’ needs not to be discharged, considering the possibility of interference with fundamental rights. It
subsequently directed the government to re-examine the taxation policy by evaluating whether it constituted
an excessive burden on the newspapers. The government’s stance that such a consideration was irrelevant
was off base and therefore, the notification had to be revised by considering this factor”.
 CONCLUSION

Any restriction which to maintain public order, in the sense, public peace or safety are in the interests of the
general public. But the restrictions should be reasonable. The restrictions that put the rights guaranteed,
within the social controls permitted under clauses (2) to (6) are reasonable. The expression used in Art.
19(2) “in the interests of” give wide amplitude to the permissible law which can be enacted to impose
reasonable restrictions on the right guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(a) under one of the heads mentioned in Art. 19
(2). No restriction can be placed by the right to freedom of speech and expression on any ground other than
those specified in Art.19 (2). Every legislation is set with the aim of achieving an objective. In achieving
those objects, the legislations should not arbitrarily invade upon the rights of a citizen. The restriction should
look at the set objects that the legislation seeks to achieve and it should establish a close link with such
object of the legislation. If the close proximate effect of the law is that it abridges the fundamental rights of
the citizens and if the restriction prevents such abridgement, then the restriction is reasonable. On the other
hand, if the restriction goes too far in linking itself with the object of the legislation then such a restriction is
unreasonable. Another important test is, if a said provision or a right shows clear sign of danger or even
shows an apprehend danger then a restriction on such a law is reasonable.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. https://blog.ipleaders.in/reasonable-restrictions-article-19-administrative-discretion/
2. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2135681&download=yes
3. Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India
4. Romesh Thappar v State of Madras (AIR 1950 SC 124)
5. Global Freedom of Expression. 2020. Thappar V. Madras - Global Freedom Of Expression.
[online] Available at: https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/thappar-v-madras/
[Accessed 26 April 2020].
6.Harvard University Press, 1994. 'Just Do It! Escridge's Critical Pragmatic Theory Of Statutory
Interpretation. [online] p.721. Available at: https://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/2840051-41.Michell.pdf [Accessed 2 June 2020].
7.Maneka Gandhi v Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597
8.Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India 1985 2 SCC 434