Cognitive Biases in Negotiation Processes

International Journal of Conflict Management
A literature review of cognitive biases in negotiation processes

Andrea Caputo
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IJCMA
24,4 A literature review of cognitive
biases in negotiation processes
Andrea Caputo
374 Department of Economics, University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, Rome, Italy
Received 16 August 2012

Revised 14 November 2012 Abstract
Accepted 15 November 2012 Purpose – What is the discipline’s current grasp of cognitive biases in negotiation processes? What
lessons can be drawn from this body of literature? The purpose of this paper is to review and discuss
the limited research on cognitive biases in the context of negotiations.
Design/methodology/approach – This article reviews research from judgment and
decision-making, conflict management, psychology, and management literatures to systematize
what we already know about cognitive biases in negotiations.
Findings – Decision-making studies have mainly identified 21 biases that may lead to lower quality
decisions. Only five of those biases have been studied relating to negotiations: the anchoring, the
overconfidence, the framing, the status quo and the self-serving bias. Moreover, negotiation literature
has identified five additional biases that affect negotiation processes: the fixed-pie error, the
incompatibility error, the intergroup bias, the relationship bias and the toughness bias. Biased
behavior differs across cultures and emotional mood.
Research limitations/implications – Implications for future research include building
comprehensive models of how negotiators can overcome cognitive biases, studying interconnections
between different biases, and increasing complexity of the studies to provide practitioners with more
practical advice.
Originality/value – The literature reviewed in this paper spans diverse disciplines and perspectives.
This paper can be a starting point for researchers interested in understanding how cognitive biases
affect negotiations. Moreover, it could be a starting point for future research on this field.
Keywords Decision making, Negotiation, Bias, Cognition, Heuristic
Paper type Literature review
Introduction
Negotiations are essential and fundamental moments of life. Improving negotiation
skills, as well as increasing the ability to negotiate effectively, is crucial in managerial,
political, and business contexts. Simon’s (1957) bounded rationality acknowledges that
individuals, while attempting to make rational decisions, often lack important
information and the relevant criteria of problems, and prior literature in psychology
has demonstrated that negotiators do not always act rationally.
What is the discipline’s current grasp of cognitive biases in negotiation processes?
What lessons can be drawn from this body of literature? Decision-making studies
about cognitive biases have mainly focused on individual decision-making. However,
The author thanks James Bailey, Gianpaolo Abatecola, Matt Cronin, and the anonymous
International Journal of Conflict reviewers for helpful and valuable comments, Martina Dorigo for personal support, the Research
Management
Vol. 24 No. 4, 2013 Program in Social and Organizational Learning at The George Washington University School of
pp. 374-398 Business for hosting the research, and the University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, Roberto Cafferata
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
1044-4068
and Corrado Cerruti for having supported this research and granted his visiting at The George
DOI 10.1108/IJCMA-08-2012-0064 Washington University.
negotiation decisions are often made in conjunction with other parties, which may Cognitive biases
commonly have different interests (Bazerman and Carroll, 1987; Fisher et al., 1981; Lax in negotiation
and Sebenius, 1986; Lewicki et al., 2005; Pruitt, 1981; Raiffa, 1982; Thompson, 2001;
Walton and McKersie, 1965; Zartman, 1977). As individual decisions are often affected processes
by cognitive biases, which rarely make these decisions completely rational, the same
applies to negotiated decisions between several parties. In this paper the term
rationality refers to the decision-making process that is logically expected to lead to the 375
optimal result, given an accurate assessment of the negotiator’s values and risk
preferences (Bazerman and Moore, 2009, p. 4).
The topic of cognitive biases within negotiations has been analyzed in the
International Journal of Conflict Management on a few occasions with reference to the
perception of fairness (Paese and Yonker, 2001) and multilateral negotiations (Traavik,
2011). Some recent reviews of the literature on cognitive biases appeared in the
literature, but they focused only on biased decision-making processes (Bazerman and
Moore, 2009; Brooks, 2011; Eberlin and Tatum, 2005; Morgeson and Campion, 1997).
Although it is commonly seen as an important topic, the investigation of cognitive
biases in the field of negotiations is under-researched. A gap in the literature is
identified in journal articles systematizing the intersection of negotiation studies, from
the group decision-making literature, and cognitive biases studies, and from the
judgment and decision-making literature. While Thompson et al. (2006) critically
reviewed the implications of biased decision-making processes for negotiations, this
work intends to help to fill this gap through a systematic review of the literature that
bridges the two areas of research.
The aim of this study is to systematically review those studies in the management
literature that analyzed the concept of bias within the negotiations’ field, and to
suggest a series of new research trajectories that might emerge as a result. In fact,
cognitive misperceptions can highly bias human behavior when making judgments
and decisions in negotiations. In this paper I provide a theoretical background on
decision-makers’ cognition to introduce the research and provide context; then the
literature is systematically reviewed and its results are discussed. This leads me on to
conclude that limited research, with alternate results, has been done with reference to
the interaction between biases, on the role of culture, mood and personality, and on the
effects of learning and experience on negotiators’ judgment. Finally, I suggest that
further trajectories of research might be on integrative and multilateral negotiations,
on the role of third parties, and, finally, on a more deep understanding of how to
overcome biases in negotiations.
Theoretical framework
This section of the paper presents a brief introduction about the so-called negotiation
theory and about judgment and decision-making literature, which have been used
during the research as theoretical background. Among this literature, it is commonly
acknowledged that negotiation is a process through which two or more parties could
reach a needed joint decision, while having different preferences (Fisher et al., 1981;
Gulliver, 1977; Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Lewicki et al., 2005; Pruitt, 1981; Raiffa, 1982;
Rubin and Brown, 1975; Zartman, 1977). Due to the interdependence (Thompson, 1967)
that reigns over and inside multi-actor decision-making processes, negotiation
outcomes are affected by the decisions taken by all the parties involved. This can make
IJCMA decision-making in negotiation even more complicated than individual
24,4 decision-making (Bazerman and Moore, 2009). Thus, the quality of the negotiated
agreement is affected by the rationality of those decisions that led to the agreement:
this implies that the decisions and behaviors of each party matter.
Decision-making studies can most often be divided within three perspectives: the
normative, the descriptive, and the prescriptive (Bell et al., 1988). In particular, the
376 normative approach has tended to find the rules of individual behaviors. This
approach is founded on the economic concepts of absolute rationality and optimization,
and takes into account how decisions should be made. Economists, through the
so-called Game theory, were the first to provide normative advice to negotiators and
decision-makers. The primary advantage of those studies is that, given absolute
rationality, they provide the most precise prescriptive advice available to negotiators
(Bazerman and Moore, 2009). The descriptive approach, conversely, has tended to
study how decision are really made, basing its analysis on real observation and on the
concepts of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957). Descriptive studies have contradicted
Game theorists rely on two aspects: the human ability to be fully informed about all
options, combinations and associated outcomes, and the human ability to act in a fully
rational way. Finally, the prescriptive approach has tried to merge the former
approaches to study how decisions could be made better (Bell et al., 1988).
As an alternative to Game theory, Raiffa (1982) and Raiffa et al. (2002) was among
the first to develop a decision-analytic approach to negotiations, focusing on how
erring individuals actually behave. His goal was to provide guidance for negotiators
involved in real conflicts, given the most likely profile of the other parties’ expected
behavior. Thus, a prescriptive theory has been developed as he tried to give advice in
real situations. Other interdisciplinary studies have built the so-called negotiation
theory, in order to consider how a rational negotiator should behave in real
negotiations (Fisher et al., 1981; Komorita, 1985; Kramer, 1991; Lax and Sebenius, 1986;
Lewicki et al., 1992; Raiffa, 1982; Sheppard, 1984; Walton and McKersie, 1965; Zartman,
1977). The negotiation theory takes into account the negotiation’s structure and the
other negotiator (Hammond et al., 2001), as well as the common errors that negotiators
and their opponents make (Bazerman et al., 1992, 2000; Thompson, 2001).
This theory implies that humans are not perfectly rational, and have emotional and
cognitive limitations (Cyert and March, 1963; Simon, 1957). Furthermore, they lack a
perfect and common knowledge of a situation and of the possible interests and
behaviors of the counterpart (Lax and Sebenius, 1986). The negotiating structure is
composed of three basic elements:
(1) the parties involved;
(2) the subjects or issues under negotiation; and
(3) the preferences, and thus the interests and positions of the parties.
Consequently, a rational negotiator should assess the key information about each
party’s alternative to a negotiated agreement (Fisher et al., 1981), each party’s set of
interests, and the relative importance of each party’s interests (Lax and Sebenius, 1986;
Raiffa, 1982; Raiffa et al., 2002). Those studies have provided plenty of tools to increase
the negotiator’s performance in achieving satisfactory agreements, but are we so
rational to use it when we need it?
During the last four decades, bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) served as the Cognitive biases
integrating concept for the field of behavioral decision research. Simon’s (1957) in negotiation
bounded rationality acknowledges that individuals, while attempting to make rational
decisions, often lack important information and relevant criteria of problems. processes
Additionally, decision-makers have time and cost constraints that limit the quality and
quantity of information, and they retain only a relatively small amount of those.
Finally, decision-makers cannot calculate the optimal choice in a variety of 377
alternatives, due to perceptual errors and computational limitations. Consequently,
decision-makers simply search until they find a satisfactory solution that leads to an
acceptable level of performance. In addition, some studies have begun to relate
individual errors to motivational and emotional influences (Alloy and Abramson, 1979;
Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Park and Banaji, 2000).

Stemming from Herbert Simon’s studies on bounded rationality, the literature has
addressed the issue of cognitive biases affecting decision-making processes, trying to
explain why human misperceptions can occur. According to cognitive studies (Neale
and Bazerman, 1985; Thompson and Hastie, 1990), negotiation processes can be better
understood when they are viewed as cognitive decision-making tasks, where
individuals construct mental representations of the conflict situation, the issues, and
the other parties’ positions. This involves the examination of how negotiators’
information-processing capabilities influence negotiators’ judgment formation and
behavioral processes. In this regard, the aim is to identify the faulty assumptions of
negotiators’ cognition during negotiation processes (Bazerman and Carroll, 1987; Pruitt
and Carnevale, 1993; Thompson and Hastie, 1990).
Regarding human cognition, Stanovic and West (2000) have made a distinction
between Systems 1 and 2 within cognitive functioning. The first is intuitive, automatic,
effortless, implicit and emotional, while the second is reflective, slower, conscious,
determined and rational (Kahneman, 2003). On the one hand, the automatic system, or
gut feeling, is rapid and is or feels instinctive: when we duck because a ball is thrown at
us unexpectedly or we get nervous when our airplane shakes because of turbulence
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Gut feelings can be quite accurate, but people, even
executives, often make mistakes because they rely too much on the automatic system
(Chung, 2004). On the other hand, the reflective system is more deliberate and
self-conscious. We use it when deciding which route to take for a trip, or which course
to attend the following semester. Since System 1 is faster than System 2 in making
decisions, people have developed thousands of simplifying strategies or rules of thumb,
so-called heuristics.
We use rules of thumb to help us make judgments; although they can be very
helpful, their use can also lead to systematic biases (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
Heuristics are simplifying strategies to cope with complex issues and problems. Newell
and Simon (1972) defined the heuristics as those cognitive shortcuts that the human
brain tends to use when its decision-making process is limited, in terms of time and
availability of data. Heuristics produce correct or partially correct judgments and it
may be inevitable that people will adopt some of them (Bazerman and Moore, 2009).
Unfortunately, they often lead to systematic biases (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
The bias is the human tendency to make systematic errors in certain circumstances
based on cognitive factors rather than evidence (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). These
IJCMA errors, are much more likely to occur in System 1 thinking than in System 2 (Bazerman
24,4 and Moore, 2009).
The literature chiefly presents the following heuristics:
.
The availability heuristic exists when people assess the frequency, probability,
or likely causes of an event by the degree to which instances or occurrences of
that event are readily available in memory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973).
378 .
The representativeness heuristic exists when making a judgment about an
individual, an object, or an event, people tend to look for traits it may have that
correspond with previously formed stereotypes (Nisbett and Ross, 1980).
.
The confirmation heuristics appears when people use selective data when testing
hypothesis, such as instances in which the variable of interest is present (Baron

et al., 1988; Klayman and Ha, 1987).
.
The affect heuristics is based on the fact that judgments are mostly evoked by an
affective, or emotional, evaluation that occurs even before any higher-level
reasoning takes place (Kahneman, 2003).
.
The bounded awareness affects the information selection process of individuals;
in order to avoid information overload people often filter information
unconsciously and automatically. This could lead to ignore or neglect useful,
observable, and relevant data (Bazerman and Chung, 2005).
.
The risk aversion concerns the fact that individuals treat risks relating to
perceived gains differently from risks relating to perceived losses (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979).
.
Individuals emotions could lead to errors and biases in correlation with positive
and negative moods. In particular, a good mood and happiness increases the
reliance on heuristics (Alloy and Abramson, 1979; Bodenhausen et al., 1994),
while a negative mood decreases reliance on stereotypes or heuristics? (Park and
Banaji, 2000).
These heuristics not only concern particular individuals, they can be applied by almost
everyone, as research has demonstrated (Bazerman and Moore, 2009; Brooks, 2011;
Eberlin and Tatum, 2005; Plous, 1993; Wickham, 2003; Workman, 2012). According to
Bazerman and Moore (2009) common biases can be associated and categorized with the
“emanating” heuristic as shown in Table I.
In terms of these biases, one of the most straightforward interpretations was
provided by Hammond et al. (2001), who proposed the concept of hidden traps in
decision-making for considering all those situations in which the human brain
abnormally deviates from deciding rationally. In sum, cognitive misperceptions can
highly bias human behavior when making judgments and decisions, and this is true in
negotiations too (Thompson et al., 2006).
Method
This section of the article describes the method used to produce the systematic
literature review (Cook et al., 1997; Cooper, 1998; Denyer and Tranfield, 2008; Tranfield
et al., 2003), which is a method of conducting research that emerged within the UK
medical profession because of the need for better evidence-based research. Since then it
Bias Description Emanating heuristics
1. Ease of recall Individuals judge events that are more easily recalled from memory, based on Availability heuristics
vividness or recency, to be more numerous than events of equal frequent instances,
which are less easily recalled
2. Retrievability Individuals are biased in their assessments of the frequency of events based on Availability heuristics
how their memory structures affect the search process
3. Insensitivity to base rates When assessing the likelihood of events, individuals tend to ignore base rates if Representativeness heuristics
any other descriptive information is provided – even if it is irrelevant
4. Insensitivity to sample When assessing the reliability of sample information, individuals frequently fail to Representativeness heuristics
size appreciate the role of sample size
5. Misconceptions of chance Individuals expect that a sequence of data generated by a random process will Representativeness heuristics
look “random”, even when sequence is too short for those expectations to be
statistically valid
6. Regression to the mean Individuals tend to ignore the fact that extreme events tend to regress towards the Representativeness heuristics
mean on subsequent trials
7. The conjunction fallacy Individuals falsely judge that conjunctions – two events occurring – are more Representativeness heuristics
probable than a more global set of occurrences of which the conjunction is a subset
8. The confirmation trap Individuals tend to seek confirmatory information for what they think is true and Confirmation heuristics
fail to search for disconfirmatory evidence
9. Anchoring Individuals make estimates for values based upon an initial value – derived from Confirmation heuristics
past events, random assignment, or whatever information is available – and
typically make insufficient adjustments from that anchor when establishing a final
value
10. Conjunctive – and Individuals exhibit a bias toward overestimating the probability of conjunctive Confirmation heuristics
disjunctive – events bias events and underestimating the probability of disjunctive events
11. Overconfidence Individuals tend to be overconfident of the infallibility of their judgments when Confirmation heuristics
answering moderately to extremely difficult questions
12. Hindsight and the curse of After finding out whether or not an event occurred, individuals tend to Confirmation heuristics
knowledge overestimate the degree to which they would have predicted the correct outcome.
Furthermore, individuals fail to ignore information they have that others do not
when predicting others’ behavior
(continued)
processes
emanating heuristics
in negotiation
Common biases and

Cognitive biases
379
Table I.
24,4
380
Table I.
IJCMA
Bias Description Emanating heuristics
13. Information selection Individuals tend to ignore accessible, perceivable, and important information, Bounded awareness
while paying attention to other equally accessible but irrelevant information
14. Inattentional blindness Individuals fail to see the obvious because it violates common assumptions about Bounded awareness
our visual awareness. People have the tendency not to see what they are not
looking for, even when they are looking directly at it
15. Change blindness Individuals tend to fail to notice visual change in their physical environments Bounded awareness
16. Focalism Individuals tend to focus too much on a particular event and too little on other Bounded awareness
events that are just as likely to occur
17. Framing Individuals have different perceptions and different reactions based on how the Risk aversion
problem is posed to them. Alternative wordings of the same objective information
can significant alter the decisions that people typically make despite the fact that
differences between frames should have no effect on the rational decision
18. Status quo Individuals tend to maintain the status quo rather than acting to improve their Risk aversion
outcomes
19. Emotion and cognition Emotional response is often in disagreement with the decision that an individual Affect heuristics
collision would make after more thoughtful reasoning
20. Self-serving When presented with identical information, individuals perceive a situation in Affect heuristics
dramatically different ways, depending on their role in the situation
21. Emotional bias A good mood increases the reliance on heuristics and results in more biased Emotions
judgments
Source: Adapted and integrated from Bazerman and Moore (2009, p. 41)
has been used across many disciplines, including management research (Thorpe et al., Cognitive biases
2005). The aim is to collect and link together as many already existing studies as in negotiation
possible, relevant to the defined topic of research. The basic principles behind adopting
a systematic review method are (Thorpe et al., 2005): processes
.
transparency;
.
clarity;
381
.
focus;
.
unifies research and practitioner communities;
.
equality;
.
accessibility;
.
broad coverage; and
. synthesis.
This systematic review followed three stages: planning the review; conducting the
review; and finally reporting and dissemination (Tranfield et al., 2003). Thus,
consistent with several recent systematic assessments of the management literature
(Crossan and Apaydin, 2010; David and Han, 2004; Newbert, 2007), a set of criteria has
been established. A review panel was formed by some academics with the aim of
defining the field of research, choosing the keywords and the databases, and
developing the inclusion and exclusion criteria. The research string was developed
through the previous knowledge on the negotiation literature and through the advice of
experts’ panels in the field of study. The chosen root search string was set in order to
broaden the review’s scope.
As shown in Table II, the following set of criteria has been established. The review
comprises English peer reviewed journal articles only, by using “ProQuest” as the
research platform (the chosen databases were ABI/INFORM Complete, Accounting
and Tax, Banking Information Source, ProQuest Asian Business and Reference and
ProQuest European Business). The substantive relevance of the articles focusing on
negotiation theory was ensured by requiring all the selected articles to contain the
word “negotiation *”. In addition, in order to ensure the substantive relevance of the
articles’ focus on biases, it has been requirement was set for all the selected articles to
contain the word “bias *”. A total number of 84 results, after checking for duplicates,
was taken into consideration for a critical abstract reading to ensure substantive
context. Finally, a “snowballing” technique was adopted to support the results from the
previous phases.
Phase Description Total
3 All the articles containing the “bias *” and “negotiation *” search words in their 84
abstract
4 All the articles whose abstracts are substantively relevant 23
5 All the articles whose texts are relevant 19
6 Snowballing technique 25
Table II.
Source: Elaboration on the dataset Summary of the results
IJCMA The final number of articles for the research piece was 25, covering a time span
24,4 between 1985 and 2012. This size is consistent with the results of other reviews
published in management journals in the last decade (Abatecola et al., 2011; Brooks,
2011; Cafferata et al., 2009; Campbell-Hunt, 2000; Carpenter et al., 2004; Dalton et al.,
1998; Eberlin and Tatum, 2005; Ketchen et al., 1997; Stankovic and Luthans, 1997).
382 Results of literature review

This section shows the findings from the 25 relevant articles, on which some
recommendations, expressed in the next sections, are drawn from. Some statistics on the
articles time and journal distribution are provided too. Figure 1 lists the temporal trends of
the articles. One can see a consistent interest in the researched topic during the time period.
Table III categorizes the overall population per academic journal. Results show that
the works within the dataset are published in 16 different international journals. Many
Figure 1.
Articles’ distribution over
the time period
n Journal Articles
1 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 9

2 Group Decision and Negotiation 2
3 Academy of Management Journal 1
4 Accounting, Organizations and Society 1
5 Games and Economic Behavior 1
6 International Journal of Business and Social Science 1
7 International Journal of Conflict Management 1
8 Journal of Applied Psychology 1
9 Journal of Consumer Policy 1
10 Journal of Economics and Business 1
11 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1
12 Journal of World Business 1
13 Judgment and Decision Making 1
14 The American Economic Review 1
15 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1
16 Vanderbilt Law Review 1
Table III. Total 25
Articles’ distribution per
journal Source: Elaboration on the dataset
of these journals are classified as top journals by most of the existing international Cognitive biases
journal ratings. Results show a strong interest on the presented topic coming from in negotiation
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, as 36 percent (n ¼ 9) of the
articles have been published by this journal. processes
Within the population, most of the articles are laboratory experiments (76 percent,
n ¼ 19), four articles (16 percent) are surveys and two articles (8 percent) are
theoretical. Studies on laboratory experiments use all multiple dyad negotiation 383
simulations, while they are heterogeneous in regard to the size and nature of their
samples, thus warranting additional discussion. The number of samples used fall in a
range between 48 and 302 participants in the experiments (mean ¼ 174.26,
SD ¼ 70.42). The type of participants used for the experiments can be grouped in
three categories: 57.89 percent (n ¼ 11) of the population used undergraduate students,
36.83 percent (n ¼ 7) used graduate students, and 5.26 percent (n ¼ 1) used managers.
No significant correlations emerge between the type of participants and the bias
studied in the experiments.
Considering the distribution of the bias analyzed, a descriptive set of statistics is
presented below. From the articles, 11 biases have been studied, all of which are
presented below. In general, every study analyzed one bias, but the few of them that
analyzed two biases have been counted twice in order to provide normalized statistics,
as shown in Table IV.
Almost all the studies in the population dataset analyzed the bias in a dyadic
negotiation context, only one, very recent study undertook the experiment in a
multiparty negotiation context (Traavik, 2011).
Regarding integrative and distributive negotiations, 48 percent (n ¼ 12) of the
studies used a distributive negotiation context, 32 percent (n ¼ 8) of the studies used
an integrative negotiation context, while 12 percent (n ¼ 3) of the population used both
integrative and distributive contexts. However, 8 percent (n ¼ 2) of the studies have
been considered not applicable for these categories, but no significant correlations
emerge between these categories and the bias studied.
In term of the context of the negotiation used for the analysis of the bias, seven
different contexts have been found as shown in Table V.
n Bias Studies %
1 Fixed-pie error 5 17.86

2 Framing 5 17.86
3 Self-serving 5 17.86
4 Anchoring 4 14.29
5 Emotional bias 2 7.14
6 Overconfidence 2 7.14
7 Incompatibility error 1 3.57
8 Intergroup bias 1 3.57
9 Relationship bias 1 3.57
10 Status quo 1 3.57
11 Toughness bias 1 3.57
Total biases in the dataset 28 100.00
Table IV.
Source: Elaboration on the dataset Distribution of bias
IJCMA
n Negotiation’s context Studies %
24,4
1 Buyer-seller 13 52.00
2 Labor 5 20.00
3 Legal 2 8.00
4 Accounting 1 4.00
384 5 Crisis 1 4.00
6 Producer-director 1 4.00
7 Climate change 1 4.00
N/A 1 4.00
Total 25 100.00
Table V.
Negotiation’s context Source: Elaboration on the dataset
The buyer-seller context is the most used within these studies, and it has been used
mostly in those studies analyzing anchoring bias, fixed-pie error and framing effects.
Moreover, simulations regarding labor negotiations have been mainly used by those
analyzing the self-serving bias. While the emotional bias has only been analyzed
within negotiations on crisis and producer-director’s conflict on a movie project. The
main findings from these studies are taken into analysis in the following section of the
paper.
Discussion
In this section, the findings from the literature review are discussed in order to
systematize knowledge and to draw some recommendations and implications for future
research. According to the biases found in the articles, the articles are grouped within the
dataset into 11 clusters, as shown in Table VI, namely “fixed-pie error”, “framing”,
“self-serving”, “anchoring”, “emotional bias”, “overconfidence”, “incompatibility error”,
“intergroup bias”, “relationship bias”, “status quo” and “toughness bias”.
n Bias Study
1 Framing Neale and Bazerman (1985), Bazerman et al. (1985), Neale

et al. (1987), Bottom and Studt (1993), Chang et al. (2008)
2 Fixed-pie error Thompson and Hastie (1990), Gelfand and Christakopoulou
(1999), Mumpower et al. (2004), Larrick and Wu (2007)
Traavik (2011)
3 Self-serving Thompson and Loewenstein (1992), Babcock et al. (1995,
1996), Gelfand et al. (2002), Kriss et al. (2011)
4 Anchoring Ritov (1996), Whyte and Sebenius (1997), Kristensen and
Garling (2000), Wilson (2012)
5 Emotional bias Gladwin and Kumar (1987), Kramer et al. (1993)
6 Overconfidence Neale and Bazerman (1985), Kramer et al. (1993)
7 Incompatibility error Thompson and Hastie (1990)
8 Intergroup bias Lewis (2011)
9 Relationship bias Reb (2010)
10 Status quo Korobkin (1998)
11 Toughness bias Heifetz and Segev (2004)
Table VI.
Bias studied Source: Elaboration on the dataset
Framing Cognitive biases
The framing effect emerges as the starting point of the studies on cognitive biases in in negotiation
negotiation. According to it, individuals manifest varying perceptions and reactions
based on how the problem is posed to them. In particular, decision-makers treat the processes
prospect of gains differently than the prospect of losses, and this directly interacts with
their risk propensity (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). A variety of published literature
analyzed the sources of framing influences on negotiator behavior (Neale et al., 1987), 385
the impact of framing influence on negotiation outcome (Bazerman et al., 1985; Bottom
and Studt, 1993; Neale and Bazerman, 1985), and the effects of framing on perceptions
of fairness (Chang et al., 2008). Changing the frame of the situation results in a very
different predicted outcome. According to Neale and Bazerman (1985), when positive
frames exist, risk aversion dominates, and a negotiated settlement is predicted. Further
research (Bazerman et al., 1985) found that positively framed negotiators completed
significantly more transactions than negatively framed negotiators, consistent with
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory. Based on those studies, it appears
that both parties become risk-seekers when considering potential outcomes in terms of
what they have to lose (negative frame), while if they evaluate potential outcomes in
terms of gains (positive frame), they become risk-averse which increases the likelihood
of a negotiated settlement. Positively framed bargainers seem to be more cooperative,
more likely to settle, achieve greater profits, and achieve greater joint benefits than
negatively framed bargainers do (Bazerman et al., 1985; Neale and Bazerman, 1985;
Neale et al., 1987).
Neale et al. (1987) found that the rights, obligations, and expectations associated
with a role within the negotiation, frame the participants social interactions. In
addition, Bottom and Studt (1993), sought to develop a comprehensive explanation of
the role of framing and analyzed it in terms of the integrative and distributive aspects
of bargaining. Risk attitude and framing affects the approach negotiators take in
dealing with the dilemma between “claiming value” and “creating value” (Lax and
Sebenius, 1986). Negatively framed bargainers appear to perform better than their
positively framed counterparts in distributive situations, and appear to be more
affected by self-serving bias (Chang et al., 2008). Notwithstanding, the latter appears to
reach more integrative settlements than the formers (Bottom and Studt, 1993). This
implies further explanation. A risk-seeking negotiator should be more willing to
employ tactics that threaten both bargainers with the disagreement outcome, also
called “claiming tactics” (Lax and Sebenius, 1986). Because risk-averse negotiators
want to avoid disagreement, they should be unlikely to engage in these risky tactics
and should be susceptible to exploitation from those who do employ them.
Fixed-pie and incompatibility error

Scholars have been studying the fixed-pie error to answer the question on why do
negotiators frequently fail to reach integrative agreements, or win-win solutions
(Bazerman and Moore, 2009; Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Raiffa et al., 2002). Studies on the
fixed-pie error mainly focus on negotiators’ perceptions, specifically on the accuracy of
negotiators’ perceptions of both the negotiation process and the counterpart’s interests
and preferences (Gelfand and Christakopoulou, 1999; Thompson and Hastie, 1990). The
fixed-pie (or fixed-sum) judgmental error is defined as:
IJCMA [. . .] the tendency to assume that the other party places the same importance – or has the
same priorities as the self – on the to-be-negotiated issues when the potential for mutually
24,4 beneficial trades exists (Thompson and Hastie, 1990, p. 101).
This means that negotiators may fail to accurately understand their counterparts’
interests, judging that one’s own interests are diametrically opposed to one’s opponent
(Gelfand and Christakopoulou, 1999; Mumpower et al., 2004; Pruitt and Lewis, 1975).
386 The fixed-pie perception often concludes with a faulty decision because most situations
provide an opportunity for joint gain (Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Raiffa, 1982).
Incompatibility error occurs in integrative negotiations “when negotiators assume the
other party’s preferences for alternatives are incompatible with their own in cases in
which their preferences are perfectly compatible” (Thompson and Hastie, 1990, p. 113).
Thompson and Hastie (1990) found that this error is not related with the fixed-sum
error, even if the theory predicted it to be, and it affects a significant number of
negotiators.
Negotiators often demonstrate modest levels of interpersonal understanding, as
measured in terms of predictive accuracy regarding the other negotiator’s payoff.
However, research showed that an accurate interpersonal understanding was most
strongly associated with better payoffs (Mumpower et al., 2004; Thompson and Hastie,
1990; Traavik, 2011). Thus, the fixed-pie bias is erroneous and can reasonably be
expected to impede the achievement of integrative agreements (Gelfand and
Christakopoulou, 1999; Mumpower et al., 2004; Thompson and Hastie, 1990). The
fixed-pie bias can be considered a bias only within integrative negotiations. In fact, in
distributive problems the fixed-pie perception is not a bias, but reflects the accuracy of
the understanding of the problem structure (Mumpower et al., 2004).
Thompson and Hastie (1990) found that individuals enter negotiation situations
with fixed-pie perspectives and often fail to realize that their counterparts have
priorities opposite to theirs by the end of negotiations. This has been shown to be more
prevalent in the USA, because of the individualistic culture, as compared to Greece, a
collectivistic culture (Gelfand and Christakopoulou, 1999). Interestingly, this suggests
that cultural processes might be involved in the perpetuation of such biases.
Negotiators mainly seem to begin the negotiation with accurate perceptions and then
become less accurate as a result of the negotiation dynamic. One implication of these
biases is that negotiators, over time, may become overconfident about their negotiating
abilities (Gelfand and Christakopoulou, 1999; Larrick and Wu, 2007).
Another negotiation characteristic that could affect fixed-pie errors is the number of
parties involved. In this regard, Traavik (2011) demonstrated that the more the parties
the higher the fixed-pie bias, in addition, dyads outperform groups on both the
economic and subjective measures of outcomes. As a consequence of the fixed-pie bias,
in distributive negotiations, two related errors emerge: the small-pie bias and the
large-slice bias (Larrick and Wu, 2007). Negotiators consistently underestimate the size
of the bargaining zone – the small-pie bias – and, by implication, overestimate the
share of the surplus they claim – the large-slice bias (Larrick and Wu, 2007).
Self-serving and anchoring

Self-serving bias is commonly defined in literature as a judgmental error that effect
individual perception of a situation in a self-serving way. Drawing upon psychological
research documenting systematic biases in individual judgments of fairness, scholars
speculate that predictions of judicial decisions will be systematically biased in ways Cognitive biases
that favor the individuals’ position. In particular, this bias has been analyzed with in negotiation
regard to distributive negotiations (Babcock et al., 1995; Gelfand et al., 2002; Thompson
and Loewenstein, 1992). Self-serving has mainly been found as a predictive cause of processes
impasse during the negotiation process: high self-serving bias leads to rejecting a
counterpart’s offers, as they are perceived as unfair (Babcock et al., 1995; Gelfand et al.,
2002; Kriss et al., 2011; Thompson and Loewenstein, 1992). This is particularly true in 387
an individualistic culture, such as the USA (Gelfand et al., 2002). Based on Messick and
Sentis’ (1979) study on egocentric judgments of fairness, Thompson and Loewenstein
(1992) state that egocentric biases in negotiation may stem from biased encoding of
information, selective recall, or differential weighting of information. In sum, even
though negotiators were presented with identical, unbiased information about a

dispute, they recalled more information that favored their own position. This leads
them to come to different conclusions about what a fair settlement would be and base
their predictions and behavior on their own views of what is fair (Babcock et al., 1995;
Gelfand et al., 2002; Kriss et al., 2011; Thompson and Loewenstein, 1992).
The anchoring effect relates to the decision-making process when individuals make
estimates for values. Anchoring on unreliable information appears to pose a significant
risk to the quality of individual judgment, even when objectively appropriate anchors
are available, the recency effect wins (Whyte and Sebenius, 1997). In addition, the same
kind of anchoring effects have been observed among experienced managers and
students (Whyte and Sebenius, 1997). The anchoring effect in negotiations has been
typically analyzed through buyer-seller simulated experiments where participants
negotiated about a price settlement (Kristensen and Garling, 2000; Ritov, 1996; Whyte
and Sebenius, 1997). The so-called competitive market simulation (Bazerman et al.,
1985) has been mainly used to explore anchoring effects in negotiation. Research shows
also that the anchoring effect is related to the way the schedule of payoffs given to
participants is framed (Ritov, 1996). Anchoring could manifest itself in negotiation in a
variety of ways. For example, anchoring could affect the initial positions, aspirations,
or bottom lines of negotiators (Ritov, 1996; Whyte and Sebenius, 1997; Wilson, 2012).
Initial offers were found to significantly affect final profit, serving as anchors for both
parties during the negotiation process. This has been demonstrated in controlled
experiment (Ritov, 1996) as well as in real negotiations (Wilson, 2012). Even if an
anchor should not affect the reservation price, results support the hypothesis that
subjects anchor their reservation price on unreliable information (Kristensen and
Garling, 2000).
Emotional bias and overconfidence

Little attention has been given to understanding how emotional processes influence
negotiations, and the few studies that have been executed combine emotional bias with
negotiators’ overconfidence. Overconfidence is a bias emanated by confirmation
heuristics that lead to individuals tending to become overconfident in the infallibility of
their judgments (Bazerman and Moore, 2009; Kramer et al., 1993; Neale and Bazerman,
1985). This “reduces concessionary behavior and negotiator success in reaching
agreement” (Neale and Bazerman, 1985, p. 37).
Emotional bias is a bias that depends on the emotional mood in which an individual
is when he/she has to make a decision. In general, a good mood increases the reliance
IJCMA on heuristics and results in more biased judgments (Bazerman and Moore, 2009).
24,4 Gladwin and Kumar (1987), presented a contingency model of crisis negotiation,
stating that crisis perception induces strong negative affects within a bargaining unit,
and that this induced affect restricts and biases cognition by an increased reliance on
heuristics. This assumption was later demonstrated by Kramer et al. (1993) in an
experimental study. They found that positive mood contributed to negotiator
388 overconfidence and overly positive self-evaluation, in addition, positive mood
facilitates integrative behavior (Kramer et al., 1993).
Intergroup bias, relationship bias, status quo and toughness bias

An evolution within the studies leads, in the recent years, to the identification of new
biases affecting the negotiation process, such as the intergroup bias and the
relationship bias. Intergroup bias was analyzed by Lewis (2011) in a study based on a
survey that revealed how, in a negotiation context, performance expectations for group
members are unrealistically inflated and that evaluations of group performance might
be based on unrealistic expectations. Both could affect the counterpart’s selection
process, which is called relationship bias and has been found by Reb (2010). As
negotiation preparation also includes the searching and selection for potential
counterparts with whom to negotiate (Raiffa et al., 2002), an influence in this process by
situational determinants of past negotiations experience emerges.
Status quo bias meets little focus in the respective articles studied. Korobkin’s (1998)
evidence suggest that individuals negotiating contracts have a preference for inaction,
that exists in situations in which legal defaults and standard form contracts will
govern absent action. Which means a biased judgment against alternative solutions.
Finally, Heifetz and Segev (2004), in a theoretical study, found support for the existence
of a toughness bias, which is similar to the so-called “endowment effect” that affect
seller’s behavior (Kahneman et al., 1990). “In the course of bargaining a buyer with a
toughness bias believes the object is worth to him less than the objective worth”
(Heifetz and Segev, 2004).
Table VII shows a synthesis of prominent findings within the analyzed literature, by
relating each bias with those variables that have influence on it and the effect on the
negotiation. In the right section, interactions with other biases, as presented in the
literature or supposed from the systematization of the literature, are presented. For
example, the role played in the negotiation leads to different frames of the situation and
affects self-serving interpretation of information. Consequently, depending on which role
individuals are playing, even when presented with identical information set, this will
affect the probability of reaching a negotiated settlement (Thompson and Loewenstein,
1992), the final profit achieved (Bazerman et al., 1985; Bottom and Studt, 1993; Neale and
Bazerman, 1985), and finally the satisfaction over the negotiation experience (Babcock
et al., 1995; Gelfand et al., 2002; Thompson and Loewenstein, 1992).
Implications and conclusions

Cognitive biases were deeply addressed by decision-making literature. Prevalent
literature has implied that individuals are not perfectly rational and they have
emotional and cognitive limitations (Cyert and March, 1963; Simon, 1957). Cognitive
misperceptions mainly arise from the systematic biased judgment emanated by
heuristics, that are simplifying strategies to cope with complex issues and problems
Evidenced interactions with Supposed interactions with

Bias Influenced by Effect on other biases other biases
Framing How the problem is posed; role

Positive framing: likelihood for Anchoring; self-serving; Relationship bias; emotional
in the negotiation agreement (þ); performance in overconfidence; fixed-pie bias
integrative negotiations (þ );
performance in distributive
negotiations (2)
Negative framing: likelihood for
agreement (2); performance in
integrative negotiations (2 );
performance in distributive
negotiations (þ)
Fixed-pie Culture; number of parties; Performance in integrative Overconfidence; framing; self- Confirmation trap
learning and experience; negotiations (2); performance in serving; relationship bias
interpersonal understanding distributive negotiations (þ);
satisfaction (þ )
Self-serving Role in the negotiation; culture; Likelihood for agreement (2); Framing; fixed-pie Overconfidence; relationship
interpersonal understanding performance in distributive and bias; confirmation trap
integrative negotiations (2 );
satisfaction (2); impasse (þ );
perception of fairness (2)
Anchoring Learning and experience; Performance in distributive and Framing Self-serving
recency effect integrative negotiations (þ /2);
perception of fairness (þ/2 )
Overconfidence Mood; learning and experience; Likelihood for agreement (2) Emotional bias; framing; fixed- Relationship bias; self-serving
precedent negotiations pie
Emotional bias Mood Performance in integrative Overconfidence
negotiations (þ)
Relationship Precedent negotiations Counterpart selection (þ ) Fixed-pie Overconfidence; framing; self-
bias serving
Notes: (þ ) means a positive correlation with the variable, i.e. positive framing is associated with an increased likelihood for agreement; (2 ) means a
negative correlation with the variable, i.e. negative framing is associated with low performances in integrative negotiations; (þ/2 ) means the effect on the
variable depends, i.e. anchoring is associate with performance and depends on the anchor (low, high)
processes
in negotiation
effects in negotiations
Biases influences and
Cognitive biases
Table VII.
389
IJCMA (Newell and Simon, 1972; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Less was done with reference
24,4 to negotiating contexts. The present study found only 23 articles, which analyze how,
why, and when cognitive biases affect negotiations. We all negotiate in almost every
field of our life, managers also negotiate almost everywhere. As is known, negotiation
processes are affected by a strong interdependence that reign over them, thus
negotiation outcomes are affected by the decisions of all the bounded rational parties
390 involved. In sum, cognitive misperceptions can highly bias the human behavior when
making judgments and decisions, even in negotiations.
Decision-making studies have mainly identified 21 biases that may lead to lower
quality decisions, and not all of them have been analyzed within the negotiation
literature. Only five of those biases have been studied: the anchoring, the
overconfidence, the framing, the status quo and the self-serving bias. Moreover,
negotiation literature has identified five additional biases that affect negotiation
processes: the fixed-pie error, the incompatibility error, the intergroup bias, the
relationship bias and the toughness bias. These biases were studied in the last decade,
while the others have been studied mostly in the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, it can be
assumed an evolutionary process in the literature on bias in negotiation. A process that
may need additional efforts to be further developed. A systematic research program
grounded in the management literature can help provide additional insights and
knowledge. Additionally, a grounded theory could provide practical recommendations
for negotiators and managers. The following are some implications for future research,
and some suggestions for practitioners based on existing research.
By comparing the findings from the analyzed literature, it is possible to point to
some interactions between the studied biases, as shown in Table VII. The emotional
bias, which is affected by the mood and affects pre-negotiation expectations and
in-negotiation judgments, has influence on the level of negotiators’ overconfidence
(Kramer et al., 1993). In fact, positive mood leads to excessive optimism, which then
increases overconfidence. The latter is correlated with framing and fixed-pie error as
well. Negative frame induces negotiators to seek and take risk; this behavior increases
levels of overconfidence and leverages the negative correlation with the likelihood of
reaching an agreement (Neale and Bazerman, 1985).
Furthermore, the large-slice bias, as a consequence of the fixed-pie assumption,
leads negotiators to be overconfident with their abilities (Larrick and Wu, 2007). Thus,
in integrative negotiations the fixed-pie error not only can lead to a poorer outcome, but
can also decrease the likelihood of reaching an agreement. The fixed-pie error is also
related with framing, self-serving and relationship bias. Since negotiators start
negotiations with a fixed-pie assumption, this will interact with framing causes and
consequences (Bazerman et al., 1985). The fixed-pie error has an effect on the
perception of fairness and is affected by the level of interpersonal understanding
(Mumpower, 2004; Thompson and Hastie, 1990; Thompson and Loewenstein, 1992).
Consequently, the satisfaction over the negotiation experience is also affected, namely
the large-slice bias increases the level of satisfaction, and this will have a bearing on
the relationship bias about the future selection of counterparts (Reb, 2010).
Interactions between biases

Stemming from the above-mentioned interactions, it is also possible to hypothesize
relations between self-serving and anchoring, and overconfidence and self-serving
biases. In fact, high levels of self-serving bias should affect anchoring selection in a Cognitive biases
way that favors a negotiator’s position. In the same way, a high level of overconfidence in negotiation
should increase the reliability on information that favors the self. This topic needs
further studies on how these biases interact with each other. In addition, a non-studied processes
bias in negotiation context such as the confirmation trap should be related with
overconfidence, fixed-pie error and self-serving. In fact, the confirmation trap is related
to information selection, and individuals tend to choose information confirming their 391
idea over a situation (Bazerman and Moore, 2009). This bias should be studied within
negotiation contexts and in relation with the above mentioned studies.
Future research on under-researched biases

The same issue affects other biases, which should be studied in negotiation contexts
too. They are focalism (Bazerman and Moore, 2009), which has not been studied at all,
and status quo, which has been under-researched (Korobkin, 1998). Focalism should
have the same impact as anchoring on a negotiation. As anchoring affects numbers
within a negotiation, focalism affects concepts. Since negotiators enter the negotiation
with their positions and interests, they may be affected by focalism on those issues,
especially in negotiations that have concepts rather than numbers, i.e. price – as main
issues. Let us take as an example the negotiation for Chrysler’s bailout in 2009, where
as long as the parties were negotiating on the debt issue they were at an impasse and
the negotiation could have failed. Once they moved the topic and started taking into
account broader interests and externalities they finally solved the debt issue too
(Caputo, 2012). In fact, negotiations on international laws, or strategic alliances
involving companies in great crisis are for example, representative of contexts where
concepts can lead over numbers.
The role of culture

Culture is another variable affecting biases. As said, being in a collectivistic culture
rather than an individualistic one can dim the impact of fixed-pie and self-serving
biases (Gelfand and Christakopoulou, 1999; Gelfand et al., 2002). Thus, culture will
have impacts on the negotiated agreement and satisfaction over it and the process.
This could imply, for example, different reactions and behavior on implementation of
agreements in different cultures. As Gelfand et al. (2002) said, some biases, such as
self-serving, may be “rational” depending on the culture in which the negotiation is
taken. The majority of organizations, both business and political, operate globally, and
a fortiori evaluating biases in light of cultural perspectives is crucial for the success of
such global negotiations. Notwithstanding the wealth of literature on cultural
differences in negotiations, more needs to be done about how biases differ across
cultures. In addition, the need for a more global rather than Western approach on
cultural differences and biases in negotiation has been advocated in the literature
(Gelfand et al., 2002). The rise of China and India, and maybe Africa and South
America too will shift the field of the majority of negotiations from Western-culture
contexts to different contexts where tactics and behavior are different too. Managers,
negotiators, mediators as well as individuals and professionals could then benefit from
a body of literature advocating these issues.
IJCMA Learning and experience
24,4 Negotiators learn during the negotiation process. For example, they enter the
negotiation with a fixed-pie view and then learn about their counterpart; the faster they
learn the better the negotiated outcome they reach (Thompson and Hastie, 1990;
Thompson and Loewenstein, 1992). This learning effect is not relevant in diminishing
the anchoring bias; individuals are affected by it no matter what is their level of
392 education or experience (Whyte and Sebenius, 1997). Those studies prescribed that the
higher the level of interpersonal understanding the better the outcome, while the
analysis from Mumpower (2004) did not support this result. Although there were some
attempts to understand the role of learning and experience in handling the cognitive
misperceptions within negotiations, there are still contradictions among the studies.
Learning and experience have been considered to enhance negotiators’

decision-making process by some scholars (Bazerman et al., 1985; Ritov, 1996;
Thompson and Hastie, 1990). While others have stated that negotiators over time may
become overconfident about their negotiating abilities and may trust more in heuristics
(Gelfand and Christakopoulou, 1999; Larrick and Wu, 2007). A need for further studies
is advocated.
Mood and personality

Negotiators’ mood plays an important role too, impacting on overconfidence and
creating the so-called emotional biases (Reb, 2010). Mood and emotions can also be
affected by framing effect. Let us take an example of this; in a multilateral negotiation
presenting two different members on the opposite side with same information pitched
with a different emotional content can leave them confused, especially when the
negotiation is very time sensitive. On a talk with an experienced negotiator he told a
story of when he used this tactic in a competitive way:
I used this with a man and woman team, both of whom I knew didn’t care for each other
business wise. They spent their time arguing with each other while I made sure I was
sympathetic with their viewpoints, individually. They forgot about their company’s needs
and I got a great deal for our company. They may still be arguing.
Although this topic is researched in the decision-making literature (Bazerman and
Moore, 2009), it needs more understanding within negotiation contexts. In addition,
and partially related with that, there is the issue about personality factors, which is an
emergent topic of research in decision-making literature (Furnham and Boo, 2011).
How does personality influence the reliability on heuristics and biases in negotiation
contexts? This could be an additional research question that future research could
address.
Integrative and multilateral negotiations

Although most negotiations in business and political context have a potential for
creating value and are performed by more than two parties (Caputo, 2012; Lax and
Sebenius, 1986; Lewicki et al., 2005; Raiffa et al., 2002; Traavik, 2011), the role of biases
in integrative negotiations and multilateral negotiations was under-researched by the
literature. It is obvious that the complexities of such negotiations (Kramer, 1991) are an
obstacle for controlled experimental studies, but there is a need for a deep
understanding of this issue. Perhaps case study and qualitative research could help in
filling this gap. Additionally, the role of third parties (Lewicki et al., 1992) as helping to Cognitive biases
overcome cognitive biases in negotiations is under-researched too. in negotiation
Future research on cognitive biases in the context of negotiations should move
beyond the current state of the art, to build comprehensive models of how negotiators processes
can deal with cognitive biases. Negotiation theory is mainly built upon a prescriptive
approach. Current research on cognitive biases in negotiations seems to be based on a
descriptive approach. In fact, every study analyzed just one bias, only a few studies 393
analyzed two biases. Moreover, connections among biases seem to be under-researched
by the literature. What about situations where more than one bias at the time effects
the negotiation? Is it possible to understand connections among biases during a
negotiation process? Are there biases that can help overcome others? All those
questions seem to remain unanswered, and they deserve specific research attention.
Finally, it emerges that a lack of studies concerning a systemic governance model of
the negotiations that would take into account negotiators’ cognition and heuristics in
order to guide, or nudge (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) them through better decisions and
better agreements. In fact, heuristics as errors presupposes that the traditional
subjective maximization of utility thesis is correct in the main, but that these outliers
are errors or deviations. Why do not we look also at heuristics as shortcuts that work?
Mediators could benefit from such insights, instead of studying just the way they were
not rational. Eventually, a focused program of research on cognitive biases in
negotiations could help in systematizing knowledge and building a prescriptive theory
on it. This could provide more practical advice on how to overcome biases within
negotiations.
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About the author

Andrea Caputo is a PhD candidate at the University of Rome “Tor Vergata” School of
Economics, in Rome, Italy. Since July 2011, he also has been a Visiting Scholar at The George
Washington School of Business, in Washington DC, USA, where he has been undertaking
research on conflict management mentored by Professor James Bailey. His main research
interests are conflict management, negotiation and decision-making, business strategy and
organization, sustainability and automotive industry. He has a Master degree in Business
Economics with first-class honors degree summa cum laude, as well as experience as
management consultant, researcher and lecturer. Andrea Caputo can be contacted at: andrea.
caputo@uniroma2.it
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This article has been cited by:
1. Gianpaolo Abatecola. 2014. Untangling self-reinforcing processes in managerial decision making. Co-
evolving heuristics?. Management Decision 52:5, 934-949. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
2. Fabian Jasper, Tuulia M. Ortner. 2014. The Tendency to Fall for Distracting Information While Making
Judgments. European Journal of Psychological Assessment 30, 193-207. [CrossRef]

Cognitive Biases in Negotiation Processes

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International Journal of Conflict Management

A literature review of cognitive biases in negotiation processes

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Received 16 August 2012

Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Park and Banaji, 2000).

hypothesis, such as instances in which the variable of interest is present (Baron

Bias Description Emanating heuristics

Common biases and

Bias Description Emanating heuristics

Phase Description Total

382 Results of literature review

1 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 9

1 Fixed-pie error 5 17.86

Negotiation’s context Source: Elaboration on the dataset

1 Framing Neale and Bazerman (1985), Bazerman et al. (1985), Neale

Fixed-pie and incompatibility error

Self-serving and anchoring

though negotiators were presented with identical, unbiased information about a

Emotional bias and overconfidence

Intergroup bias, relationship bias, status quo and toughness bias

Implications and conclusions

Evidenced interactions with Supposed interactions with

Framing How the problem is posed; role

Interactions between biases

Future research on under-researched biases

The role of culture

Learning and experience have been considered to enhance negotiators’

Mood and personality

Integrative and multilateral negotiations

contingency model”, Journal of World Business, Vol. 22 No. 1, pp. 23-32.

About the author

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