Admin Law Case Digests

Creation and Abolition of Administrative Agencies
Crisostomo v. CA G.R. No. 106296

FACTS:
Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President of the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC),
having been appointed to that position by the President of the Philippines on July 17, 1974.
During his tenure as president of the PCC, two administrative cases were filed against petitioner
for illegal use of government vehicles, misappropriation of construction materials belonging to the
college, oppression and harassment, grave misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty. The
administrative cases, which were filed with the Office of the President, were subsequently referred
to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation.
Charges of violations of R.A. No. 3019, §3(e) and R.A. No. 992, §§20-21 and R.A. No. 733, §14
were likewise filed against him with the Office of Tanodbayan.
On June 14, 1976, three (3) informations for violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019, as amended) were filed against him. The informations alleged that
he appropriated for himself a bahay kubo, which was intended for the College, and construction
materials worth P250,000.00, more or less. Petitioner was also accused of using a driver of the
College as his personal and family driver.
On October 22, 1976, petitioner was preventively suspended from office pursuant to R.A. No.
3019, §13, as amended. In his place Dr. Pablo T. Mateo, Jr. was designated as officer-in-charge
on November 10, 1976, and then as Acting President on May 13, 1977.
On April 1, 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
CONVERTING THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF COMMERCE INTO A POLYTECHNIC
UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND
FUNCTIONS, AND EXPANDING ITS CURRICULAR OFFERINGS.
Mateo continued as the head of the new University. On April 3, 1979, he was appointed Acting
President and on March 28, 1980, as President for a term of six (6) years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine College of Commerce was abolished by the Polytechnic University
of the Philippines in virtue of P.D. No. 1341.
Admin Law | Atty Villostas | AY 2019-2020 |page 1

RULING:
P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish, but only changed, the former Philippine College of Commerce into
what is now the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, in the same way that earlier in 1952,
R.A. No. 778 had converted what was then the Philippine School of Commerce into the Philippine
College of Commerce. What took place was a change in academic status of the educational
institution, not in its corporate life. Hence the change in its name, the expansion of its curricular
offerings, and the changes in its structure and organization.
As petitioner correctly points out, when the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an
organization and to replace it with another one, the lawmaking authority says so.
The law does not state that the lands, buildings and equipment owned by the PCC were being
"transferred" to the PUP but only that they "stand transferred" to it. "Stand transferred" simply
means, for example, that lands transferred to the PCC were to be understood as transferred to
the PUP as the new name of the institution.
In this case, Dr. Pablo T. Mateo Jr., who had been acting president of the university since April 3,
1979, was appointed president of PUP for a term of six (6) years on March 28, 1980, with the
result that petitioner's term was cut short. In accordance with §7 of the law, therefore, petitioner
became entitled only to retirement benefits or the payment of separation pay. Petitioner must
have recognized this fact, that is why in 1992 he asked then President Aquino to consider him for
appointment to the same position after it had become vacant in consequence of the retirement of
Dr. Prudente.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by SETTING ASIDE the questioned orders of
the Regional Trial Court directing the reinstatement of the petitioner Isabelo T. Crisostomo to the
position of president of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines and the payment to him of
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during his suspension in so far as such payment
would include salaries accruing after March 28, 1980 when petitioner Crisostomo's term was
terminated. Further proceedings in accordance with this decision may be taken by the trial court
to determine the amount due and payable to petitioner by the university up to March 28, 1980.
Dario v. Mison G.R No. 81954

Facts:
In 1986, Cory Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3, which is the mandate of the people to
Completely reorganize the government.
Two years later, President Aquino promulgated EO 127, which provides for the reorganization of
the Ministry of Finance and along with it the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs and
prescribes a new staffing pattern for the abovementioned office.

Following the adoption of the new Constitution, On january 1988 the incumbent Commissioner of
Customs Salvador Mison issued a memorandum “Guidelines on the Implementation of
Reorganization Executive Orders which prescribes the procedure in personnel placement. Such
memorandum provides that by February of 1988, all of the employees covered by EO 127 shall
be informed of their re-appointment and also offered another position in the same department or
agency and to be informed of their termination.
Mison addressed several notices to various Customs officials stating that they shall continue to
perform their respective duties and responsibilities in a hold-over capacity, and that those
incumbents whose positions are not carried in the new reorganization pattern, or who are not re-
appointed, shall be deemed separated from the service. A total of 394 officials and employees of
the Bureau of Customs were given individual notices of separation. They filed appeals with the
CSC.
On June 1988, the CSC promulgated its ruling ordering the reinstatement of the 279 employees,
the 279 private respondents in G.R. No. 85310. Commissioner Mison, represented by the Solicitor
General, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Commissioner Mison instituted
certiorari proceedings.
On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6656, was signed into law and according to the provisions of
the aforementioned Act, the process in which terminated employees in violation of RA 6656 shall
be reinstated or reappointed.
On June 23, 1988, Benedicto Amasa and William Dionisio, customs examiners appointed by
Commissioner Mison pursuant to the ostensible reorganization subject of this controversy,
petitioned the Court to contest the validity of the statute. On October 21, 1988, thirty-five more
Customs officials whom the Civil Service Commission had ordered reinstated by its June 30, 1988
Resolution filed their own petition to compel the Commissioner of Customs to comply with the
said Resolution.
Cesar Dario was one of the Deputy Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs until his relief on
orders of Commissioner Mison on January 26, 1988. In essence, he questions the legality of his
dismissal, which he alleges was upon the authority of Section 59 of E.O. No. 127 He contends
that neither the E.O. nor the staffing pattern proposed by the Secretary of Finance abolished the
office of Deputy Commissioner of Customs, but, rather, increased it to three. Nor can it be said,
so he further maintains, that he had not been "reappointed" because "reappointment therein
presupposes that the position to which it refers is a new one in lieu of that which has been
abolished or although an existing one, has absorbed that which has been abolished." Lastly, he
claims, that under the Provisional Constitution, the power to dismiss public officials without cause
ended on February 25, 1987, and that thereafter, public officials enjoyed security of tenure under
the provisions of the 1987 Constitution.

Vicente Feria asserts his security of tenure and that he cannot be said to be covered by Section
59 of E.O. No. 127, having been appointed on April 22, 1986 - during the effectivity of the
Provisional Constitution. He adds that under E.O. No. 39, the Commissioner of Customs has the
power "to appoint all Bureau personnel, except those appointed by the President," and that his
position, which is that of a Presidential appointee, is beyond the control of Commissioner Mison
for purposes of reorganization.
Provisions of Section 16, Article XVIII explicitly authorize the removal of career civil service
employees "not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3
dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution. For this
reason, Mison posits, claims of violation of security of tenure are allegedly no defense. That
contrary to the employees' argument, Section 59 of E.O.no. 127 is applicable, in the sense that
retention in the Bureau, under the E.O., depends on either retention of the position in the new
staffing pattern or reappointment of the incumbent, and since the dismissed employees had not
been reappointed, they had been considered legally separated. Moreover, Mison proffers that
under Section 59 incumbents are considered on holdover status, "which means that all those
positions were considered vacant."
Issue:
WON Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a grant of a license upon the
Government to remove career public officials it could have validly done under an "automatic"-
vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason.
Held:
No. The Court held that the State can still carry out reorganizations provided that it is done in
good faith. Removal of career officials without cause cannot be done after the passing of the 1987
Constitution.
The above is a mere recognition of the right of the Government to reorganize its offices, bureaus,
and instrumentalities. Under Section 4, Article XVI, of the 1935 Constitution. Transition periods
are characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They are dictated by the need to hasten
the passage from the old to the new Constitution free from the "fetters" of due process and security
of tenure.
Since 1935, transition periods have been characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies.
We take the silence of the 1987 Constitution on this matter as a restraint upon the Government
to dismiss public servants at a moment's notice. If the present Charter envisioned an "automatic"
vacancy, it should have said so in clearer terms. Plainly the concern of Section 16 is to ensure
compensation for "victims" of constitutional revamps - whether under the Freedom or existing
Constitution - and only secondarily and impliedly, to allow reorganization.

In order to be entitled to the benefits granted under Section 16 of Article XVIII of the Constitution
of 1987, two requisites, one negative and the other positive, must concur, to wit: 1. The separation
must not be for cause, and 2. The separation must be due to any of the three situations mentioned.
By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the Provisional Constitution ended on
February 25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence to February 2, 1987. It can only mean, then, that
whatever reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of the present Charter, and
necessarily, upon the mantle of its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it cannot be legitimately
stated that we are merely continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of the Revolutionary
Government had started. We are through with reorganization under the Freedom Constitution -
the first stage. We are on the second stage - that inferred from the provisions of Section 16 of
Article XVIII of the permanent basic document.
After February 2, 1987, incumbent officials and employees have acquired security of tenure.
The present organic act requires that removals "not for cause" must be as a result of
reorganization. As we observed, the Constitution does not provide for "automatic" vacancies. It
must also pass the test of good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good
faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no
dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases
to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the
"abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or
purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes
place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where
there is merely change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by
the existence of ample funds.
The Court finds that Commissioner Mison did not act in good faith since after February 2, 1987
no perceptible restructuring of the Customs hierarchy - except for the change of personnel - has
occurred, which would have justified (all things being equal) the contested dismissals. There is
also no showing that legitimate structural changes have been made - or a reorganization actually
undertaken, for that matter - at the Bureau since Commissioner Mison assumed office, which
would have validly prompted him to hire and fire employees.
With respect to E.O. No. 127, Commissioner Mison submits that under Section 59 thereof, "Those
incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are not reappointed shall be deemed
separated from the service." He submits that because the 394 removed personnel have not been
"reappointed," they are considered terminated. To begin with, the Commissioner's appointing
power is subject to the provisions of Executive Order No. 39. Under E.O. No. 39, the
Commissioner of Customs may "appoint all Bureau personnels except those appointed by the
President." Thus, with respect to Deputy Commissioners Cesar Dario and Vicente Feria, Jr.,
Commissioner Mison could not have validly terminated them, they being Presidential appointees.
That Customs employees, under Section 59 of E.O. No. 127 had been on a mere holdover status
cannot mean that the positions held by them had become vacant. The occupancy of a position in

a holdover capacity was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have lapsed on 25
February 1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to February 2, 1987 when the
1987 Constitution became effective. After the said date the provisions of the latter on security of
tenure govern.
Hence the petition of the employees was granted while the petition of Mison was dismissed. The
court ordered the reinstatement of the Employees of the Bureau of Customs.
Dacudao v. Gonzales G.R No. 188056

Facts:
Petitioners - residents of Bacaca Road, Davao City - were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos
Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded
through the Legacy Group's "buy back agreement" that earned them check payments that were dishonored.
After their written demands for the return of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of
charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao
City on February 6, 2009. On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ)
Order No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City
Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ
Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action. Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were
forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City to the Secretariat of the Special Panel of the
DOJ. Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come to the Court via petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing
DO No. 182. They claim that DO No. 182 violated their right to due process, their right to the equal protection
of the laws, and their right to the speedy disposition of cases. They insist that DO No. 182 was an
obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of laws with retroactive effect.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO
No. 182? – No
Held: For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur, namely: (a) it
must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the
tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites. To start with, they merely alleged that the
Secretary of Justice had acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction. Also, the petition did not show that
the Secretary of Justice was an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Instead, the Secretary
of Justice would appear to be not exercising any judicial or quasi-judicial functions because his questioned
issuances were ostensibly intended to ensure his subordinates’ efficiency and economy in the

conduct of the preliminary investigation of all the cases involving the Legacy Group. The function
involved was purely executive or administrative. The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm
of the Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases
is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the
findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case. The prosecutor in a preliminary
investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication
nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare
his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a
quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
Characteristics of Administrative Agencies (a.)Size,

(b.) Specialization, (c.) Responsibility for results, (d.)
Administrative Duties
Padua v. Ranada G.R. No. 141949

Facts: On November 9, 2001, the Toll Regulatory Board (RTB) issued Resolution No. 2001-89
authorizing provisional toll rate adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway, effective January 1, 2002.
For its implementation starting January 1, 2002 after its publication once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation and that said Provisional Toll Rate
Increase shall remain in effect until such time that the TRB Board has determined otherwise:
On December 17, 24 and 31, 2001, the above Resolution approving provisional toll rate adjustments
was published in the newspapers of general circulation.
Tracing back the events that led to the issuance of the said Resolution, it appears that on February
27, 2001 the Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation (CITRA) filed with the TRB an application for an
interim adjustment of the toll rates at the Metro Manila Skyway Project – Stage 1. CITRA moored its
petition on the provisions of the "Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement" (STOA), authorizing it, as
the investor, to apply for and if warranted, to be granted an interim adjustment of toll rates in the event
of a "significant currency devaluation."
Claiming that the peso exchange rate to a U.S. dollar had devaluated from P26.1671 in 1995 to P48.00
in 2000, CITRA alleged that there was a compelling need for the increase of the toll rates to meet the
loan obligations of the Project and the substantial increase in debt-service burden.

On October 30, 2001, CITRA moved to withdraw its "Urgent Motion for Provisional Approval" without
prejudice to its right to seek or be granted provisional relief under the above-quoted provisions of the
TRB Rules of Procedure, obviously, referring to the power of the Board to act on its own initiative.
On November 9, 2001, TRB granted CITRA’s motion to withdraw the Urgent Motion for Provisional
Approval and, at the same time, issued Resolution No. 2001-89, earlier quoted.
Hence, petitioners Ceferino Padua and Eduardo Zialcita assail before this Court the validity and
legality of TRB Resolution No. 2001-89.
Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 2001-89 issued by the Toll Regulatory Board valid
Held: For one, it is not true that the provisional toll rate adjustments were not published prior to its
implementation on January 1, 2002. Records show that they were published on December 17, 24 and
31, 2001 in three newspapers of general circulation, particularly the Philippine Star, Philippine Daily
Inquirer and The Manila Bulletin. Surely, such publications sufficiently complied with Section 5 of P.D.
No. 1112 which mandates that "no new rates shall be collected unless published in a newspaper of
general publication at least once a week for three consecutive weeks." At any rate, it must be pointed
out that under Letter of Instruction No. 1334-A, the TRB may grant and issue ex-parte to any petitioner,
without need of notice, publication or hearing, provisional authority to collect, pending hearing and
decision on the merits of the petition, the increase in rates prayed for or such lesser amount as the
TRB may in its discretion provisionally grant. That LOI No. 1334-A has the force and effect of law finds
support in a catena of cases decreeing that "all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts
promulgated, issued, or done by the former President (Ferdinand E. Marcos) are part of the law of the
land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by
subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the President.
It may be recalled that Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1112 creating
the TRB on March 31, 1977. The end in view was to authorize the collection of toll fees for the use of
certain public improvements in order to attract private sector investment in the government
infrastructure projects. The TRB was tasked to supervise the collection of toll fees and the operation
of toll facilities. One of its powers is to "issue, modify and promulgate from time to time the rates of toll
that will be charged the direct users of toll facilities and upon notice and hearing, to approve or
disapprove petitions for the increase thereof.
To clarify the intent of P.D. No. 1112 as to the extent of the TRB’s power, Former President Marcos
further issued LOI No. 1334-A expressly allowing the TRB to grant ex-parte provisional or temporary
increase in toll rates.

Powers of Administrative Agencies
Express and Implied Powers
Globe Wireless v. Public Service Commission G.R No. L-27520

(5) G.R. No. L-27520 January 21, 1987 GLOBE WIRELESS LTD. vs.PSC
FACTS:
Globe Wireless, Ltd., a duly organized Philippines corporation engaged in international
telecommunication business under a franchise granted by Public Acts Nos. 3495, 3692 and 4150 as
amended by Republic Act No. 4630.
A message addressed to Maria Diaz, Monte Esquina 30, Madrid, Spain, filed by private respondent
Antonio B. Arnaiz with the telegraph office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Dumaguete City
was transmitted to the Bureau of Telecommunications in Manila. It was forwarded to petitioner Globe
Wireless Ltd. for transmission to Madrid. Petitioner sent the message to the American Cable and Radio
Corporation in New York, which, in turn, transmitted the same to the Empresa Nacional de
Telecommunicaciones in Madrid. The latter, however, mislaid said message, resulting in its non-
delivery to the addressee.
After being informed of said fact, private respondent Arnaiz, sent to then Public Service Commissioner
Enrique Medina an unverified letter-complaint relating the incident.
Hearing ensued, after which the PSC issued an order finding petitioner "responsible for the inadequate
and unsatisfactory service complained of, in violation of the Public Service Act" and ordering it "to pay
a fine of TWO HUNDRED [P200.00] PESOS under Sec. 21 of Com. Act 146, as amended." petitioner
was likewise required to refund the sum of P19.14 to the remitter of the undelivered message.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PSC exceeded to their jurisdiction to the franchisee.
RULING:
The basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that the jurisdiction and
powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted
or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without
or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective.
PRINCIPLES:
Commonwealth Act No. 146 Sec. 5. The Public Service Commission is hereby given jurisdiction over
the grantee only with respect to the rates which the grantee may charge the public subject to
international commitments made or adhered to by the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 21 of C.A. No. 146, as amended, the Commission was empowered to impose an
administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a Public service to comply with the terms and
conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission.
Globe Wireless Ltd. operated under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor conditions of
any certificate issued by the Commission to violate.
Chavez v National Housing Authority G.R No 164527

FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco Chavez in his capacity as taxpayer seeks to declare null and void the Joint
Venture Agreement between the NHA and R-II Builder’s, Inc (RBI) for being unconstitutional and
invalid, and to enjoin respondents — particularly respondent NHA – from implementing and/or
enforcing the said project and other agreements related thereto.
On March 1, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 161
approving and directing the implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan
Manila Waste Management Plan. Specifically, respondent NHA was ordered to “conduct
feasibility studies and develop low-cost housing projects at the dumpsite and absorb scavengers
in NHA resettlement/low-cost housing projects.” Pursuant to MO 161-A, NHA prepared the
feasibility studies which resulted in the formulation of the Smokey Mountain Development Plan
and Reclamation of the Area Across R-10 or the Smokey Mountain Development and
Reclamation Project.
SMDRP aimed to convert the Smokey Mountain dumpsite into a habitable housing project,
inclusive of the reclamation of the area across R-10, adjacent to the Smokey Mountain as the
enabling component of the project. Once finalized, the plan was submitted to President Aquino
for her approval. On January 17, 1992, President Aquino proclaimed MO 415, approving and
directing the implementation of the SMDRP through a private sector joint venture. Said MO
stipulated that the land area covered by the Smokey Mountain dumpsite is conveyed to the NHA
as well as the area to be reclaimed across R-10. In the same MO 415, President Aquino created
an Executive Committee to oversee the implementation of the plan and an inter-agency Technical
Committee was created composed of the technical representatives of the EXECOM.
Based on the evaluation of the pre-qualification documents, the EXECOM declared the New San
Jose Builders, Inc. and RBI as top two contractors. Thereafter, TECHCOM submitted its
recommendation to the EXECOM to approve the RBI proposal which garnered the highest score.
On October 7, 1992, President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a JVA with RBI. Afterwards,
President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 465 increasing the proposed area for reclamation
across R-10 from 40 hectares to 79 hectares. On September 1, 1994, pursuant to Proclamation
No. 39, the DENR issued Special Patent No. 3591 conveying in favor of NHA an area of 211,975
square meters covering the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite.

The land reclamation was completed in August 1996. Sometime later in 1996, pursuant likewise
to Proclamation No. 39, the DENR issued Special Patent No. 3598 conveying in favor of NHA an
additional 390,000 square meter area. After some time, the JVA was terminated. RBI demanded
the payment of just compensation for all accomplishments and costs incurred in developing the
SMDRP plus a reasonable rate of return. In a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed by
NHA and RBI, both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and other subsequent agreements, which
stipulated, among others, that unpaid balance may be paid in cash, bonds or through the
conveyance of properties or any combination thereof.
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed this Petition for Prohibition
and Mandamus seeking to declare null and void the Joint Venture Agreement and the Smokey
Mountain Development and Reclamation Project, and all other agreements in relation thereto, for
being Unconstitutional and Invalid. The petitioner challenges the authority of NHA to reclaim
lands. He claims that the power to reclaim lands of public domain is vested exclusively with the
Public Estates Authority. He also contends that NHA and RBI were not given the power and
authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands, as required and that there was no
proclamation officially classifying the reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NHA has the authority to reclaim lands
RULING:
Yes. While the authority of NHA to reclaim lands is challenged by petitioner, we find that the NHA
had more than enough authority to do so under existing laws. While PD 757, the charter of NHA,
does not explicitly mention “reclamation” in any of the listed powers of the agency, we rule that
the NHA has an implied power to reclaim land as this is vital or incidental to effectively, logically,
and successfully implement an urban land reform and housing program enunciated in Sec. 9 of
Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. Basic in administrative law is the doctrine that a government
agency or office has express and implied powers based on its charter and other pertinent statutes.
Express powers are those powers granted, allocated, and delegated to a government agency or
office by express provisions of law. On the other hand, implied powers are those that can be
inferred or are implicit in the wordings of the law or conferred by necessary or fair implication in
the enabling act. When a general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred by
necessary implication. when the statute does not specify the particular method to be followed or
used by a government agency in the exercise of the power vested in it by law, said agency has
the authority to adopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions. The power to reclaim on
the part of the NHA is implicit from PD 757, RA 7279, MO 415, RA 6957, and PD 3- A. Land
reclamation is an integral part of the development of resources for some of the housing
requirements of the NHA. Private participation in housing projects may also take the form of land
reclamation.
RATIO:

Express and implied powers. - The jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies are
measured and limited by the Constitution or law creating them or granting their powers, to those
conferred expressly or by necessary or fair implication.
Taule v. Santos G.R No. 89336

Facts:
On June 18,1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes,
composed of eleven (11) members convened with six members in attendance for the purpose of
holding the election of its officers. The election proceeded with petitioner Ruperto Taule declared
as president. The governor, Leandro Verceles sent a letter to Luis Santos, Secretary of DILG
protesting the election of the officers of the FABC on the ground of certain irregularities. Taule,
as president of FABC, filed his comment on the protest of Governor denying the alleged
irregularities and denouncing the governor’s acts of meddling and intervening in the election.
Secretary Santos nullified the election of the officers of FABC and ordered the conduct of a new
one. In the present petitioner for certiorari, petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions of the
respondent Secretary.
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over election contests involving the election of officers of
the FABC
Held:
No. Under Article IX, C, Section 2(2) of the 1987 Consti, the Comelec shall exercise "exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction." The 1987 Constitution expanded
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC by granting it appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over
contests involving elective barangay officials is limited to appellate jurisdiction from
decisions of the trial courts. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC is over popular elections, the
elected officials of which are determined through the will of the electorate. An election is the
embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. Specifically,
the term "election," in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting
of the votes which do not characterize the election of officers in the Katipunan ng mga barangay.
Issue:
WON the Secretary has jurisdiction over the elections contests involving the FABC elections
Held:

No. The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any protest
involving the election of officers of the FABC. There is no question that he is vested with the power
to promulgate rules and regulations as set forth in Section 222 of the LGC and the Administrative
Code. Now the question that arises is whether or not a violation of said circular vests jurisdiction
upon the respondent Secretary, as claimed by him, to hear a protest filed in relation thereto and
consequently declare an election null and void. It is a well-settled principle of administrative
law that unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of quasi- judicial
powers. The jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of
the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon themselves. Such jurisdiction is
essential to give validity to their determinations. There is neither a statutory nor a
constitutional provision expressly or even by necessary implication conferring upon the
Secretary of Local Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an election protest
involving officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay. Presidential power over local
governments is limited by the Constitution to the exercise of general supervision "to ensure that
local affairs are administered according to law." The general supervision is exercised by the
President through the Secretary of Local Government. Supervision vs Control: In administrative
law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that the
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The fundamental law
permits the Chief Executive to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local
government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments.
Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments so long as the same or its
officers act within the scope of their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with
control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any
restraining authority over such body. Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of
general supervision of the President over local governments, We hold that Secretary has no
authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of the officers of the katipunan. To
allow the Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It
will in effect give him control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a
purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic
component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved.
In fact, his order that the new elections to be conducted be presided by the Regional Director is
a clear and direct interference by the Department with the political affairs of the barangays which
is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to general supervision over local
governments. Indeed, it is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local governments.
To deny the Secretary of Local Government the power to review the regularity of the elections of
officers of the katipunan would be to enhance the avowed state policy of promoting the autonomy
of local governments. The RTCs have the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the protest

Radio Communication of the Philippines v. National
Telecommunications Commission G.R No. 93237
FACTS:
Petitioner has been operating a radio communications system since 1957 under its legislative
franchise granted by Republic Act No. 2036 which was enacted on June 23, 1957. In 1968, the
petitioner established a radio telegraph service in Sorsogon, Sorsogon. In 1971, another radio
telegraph service was put up in San Jose, Mindoro followed by another in Catarman, Samar in
1976. Private respondent Kayumanggi Radio Network Incorporated was authorized by the public
respondent to operate radio communications systems in Catarman, Samar and in San Jose,
Mindoro.
The private respondent filed a complaint with the NTC alleging that the petitioner was
operating in Catarman, Samar and in San Jose, Mindoro without a certificate of public
convenience and necessity. The petitioner, on the other hand, counter-alleged that its telephone
services in the places subject of the complaint are covered by the legislative franchise
recognized by both the public respondent and its predecessor, the Public Service Commission.
In its supplemental reply, the petitioner further stated that it has been in operation in the
questioned places long before private respondent Kayumanggi filed its application to operate in
the same places.
NTC ordered petitioner RCPI to immediately cease or desist from the operation of its radio
telephone services in Catarman Northern Samar; San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and Sorsogon,
Sorsogon stating that under Executive Order No. 546, a certificate of public convenience and
necessity is mandatory for the operation of communication utilities and services including radio
communications. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. The
petitioner's main argument states that the abolition of the Public Service Commission under
Presidential Decree No. 1 and the creation of the National Telecommunications Commission
under Executive Order No. 546 to replace the defunct Public Service Commission did not affect
sections 14 and 15 of the Public Service Law.
The provisions of the Public Service Law pertinent to the petitioner's allegation are as
follows: Section 13. (a) the Commission shall have jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all
public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties, and in the exercise of its
authority, it shall have the necessary powers and the aid of public force Section 14. The following
are exempted from the provisions of the preceding section: (d) Radio companies except with
respect to the fixing of rates; Section 15. With the exception of those enumerated in the
preceding section, no public service shall operate in the Philippines without possessing a
valid and subsisting certificate from the Public Service Commission, known as "certificate
of public convenience," or "certificate of convenience and public necessity," as the case
may be, to the effect that the operation of said service and the authorization to do business will
promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner
ISSUE:

Whether or not RCPI, a grantee of a legislative franchise to operate a radio company, is required
to secure a certificate of public convenience and necessity before it can validly operate its radio
stations including radio telephone services in the aforementioned areas
RULING: Yes. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 23,1972, reorganizing
the executive branch of the National Government, the Public Service Commission was abolished
and its functions were transferred to three specialized regulatory boards.
The functions so transferred were still subject to the limitations provided in sections 14 and 15 of
the Public Service Law, as amended. With the enactment of Executive Order No. 546 on July 23,
1979 implementing P.D. No.1, the Board of Communications and the Telecommunications
Control Bureau were abolished and their functions were transferred to the National
Telecommunications Commission.
It is clear from Executive Order No. 546, Section 15 provision that the exemption enjoyed by radio
companies from the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission and the Board of
Communications no longer exists because of the changes effected by the Reorganization Law
and implementing executive orders.
The petitioner's claim that its franchise cannot be affected by Executive Order No. 546 on the
ground that it has long been in operation since 1957 cannot be sustained. Executive Order No.
546, being an implementing measure of P.D. No. I insofar as it amends the Public Service Law
(CA No. 146, as amended) is applicable to the petitioner who must be bound by its provisions.
The petitioner cannot install and operate radio telephone services on the basis of its
legislative franchise alone. It was well within the powers of the public respondent to authorize
the installation by the private respondent network of radio communications systems in Catarman,
Samar and San Jose, Mindoro. Under the circumstances of this case, the mere fact that the
petitioner possesses a franchise to put up and operate a radio communications system in certain
areas is not an insuperable obstacle to the public respondent's issuing the proper certificate to an
applicant desiring to extend the same services to those areas. The Constitution mandates that a
franchise cannot be exclusive in nature nor can a franchise be granted except that it must be
subject to amendment, alteration, or even repeal by the legislature when the common good so
requires.
Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA G.R No. 110120

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. CA
GR No. 110120
March 16, 1994
RA 4850 - Laguna Lake Development Authority “LLDA“ (1966)

A specialized administrative agency, specifically mandated to carry out and make effective
the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and
balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal
and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan.
Under such a broad grant of power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special
charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna
Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge
of wastes from the surrounding areas.
FACTS:
Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish in Camarin Caloocan
filed a letter of complaint with the LLDA seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6 hectare
open garbage dumpsite in Camarin Caloocan due to its harmful effects on the health of
the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.
LLDA conducted an on site-investigation monitoring and test sampling from the dumpsite
to a nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River. They found out that the City
Government of Caloocan was maintaining a dumpsite without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate from the DENR. LLDA issued a cease and desist
order compelling the City Government to stop the dumpsite operations. However months
later they resumed their activity in the dumpsite. This time LLDA enforced the cease and
desist order prohibiting the entry of garbage trucks in the area.
Hence, the City Government of Caloocan filed a case before the RTC to restrain
LLDA further claiming the latter’s lack of jurisdiction. They also claim that the LLDA had
no power to order a cease and desist. In response, LLDA claimed that under RA 4850 and
its amendatory laws specifically grants them the jurisdiction and the power to issue a
cease and desist order.
ISSUE:
W/N LLDA has the power to issue a cease and desist order?
RULING:
YES. The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City
Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite
cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its
express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter
or modify order requiring the discontinuance or pollution." Sec. 4 Paragraph (d)
explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise
of its jurisdiction.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were
not expressly conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the
rule granting such authority need not necessarily be express. While it is a
fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative

agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its
express powers. In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake
region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied.
Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
Buenaseda v. Flavier G.R No. 106719

Facts:
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman directing the preventive
suspension of petitioners.
The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the
Ombudsman by the private respondents (NCMH Nurses Association) against the petitioners (Dra.
Brigida Buenaseda et. al.) for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On September 22, 1992, the Supreme Court required the respondent (Secretary Juan Flavier of
DOH) to maintain in the meantime, the status quo order.
The Solicitor General, in his comment, stated that (a) “The authority of the Ombudsman is only to
recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;” and (b) “Assuming the
Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there are
conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; and said conditions have not been
met in the instant case”.
In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend petitioners, respondents

invoke Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which provides:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend
any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the
evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charge
would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of
Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition
of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period
of suspension herein provided.
Respondents argue that the power of preventive suspension given the Ombudsman under
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 was contemplated by Section 13 (8) of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise such other power or perform
such functions or duties as may be provided by law."

Issue:
Whether the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working
in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative
complaints filed against said officials and employees.
Held:
YES. When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to recommend the
suspension" of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to "suspension," as a punitive
measure. All the words associated with the word "suspension" in said provision referred to
penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of
Noscitor a sociis, the word "suspension" should be given the same sense as the other words
with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings,
its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is
found or with which it is associated.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend
public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a
penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein
set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.

Inherent or Implied Powers
Masangcay v. COMELEC G..R No. L-13827
FACTS: On October 24, 1957, Benjamin Masangacay—then provincial treasurer of Aklan designated to
take charge of the receipt and custody of the official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of their
distribution, among the different municipalities of the province—with several others, was charged before
the COMELE with contempt for having opened three boxes containing official and sample ballots for the
municipalities of the province of Aklan, in violation of the instructions of said Commission embodied in its
resolution promulgated on September 2, 1957, and its unnumbered resolution dated March 5,1957,
inasmuch as he opened said boxes not in the presence of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan,
the province auditor, and the authorizeD representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and
the Citizens’ Party, as required, which are punishable under Sec. 5 of the Revised Election Code and Rule
64 of the Rules of Court.
Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue the constitutionality of Sec. 5 of
the Revised Election Code which grants the COMELEC as well as its members the power to punish acts
of contempt against said body under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided for in Rule
64 of the Rules of Court in that the portion of said section which grants the Commission and members the
power to punish for contempt is unconstitutional for it infringes the principle underlying the separation of
powers that exists among the three departments of our constitutional form of government.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC may punish Masangcay for contempt
RULING: No. COMELEC lacks power to impose the disciplinary penalty meted out to petitioner in the
decision subject of review. When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the
power to punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature. The power to punish for
contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in
the administration of justice.
Under the law and the constitution, the COMELEC has not only the duty to enforce and administer all laws
relative to the conduct of the elections. But also the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may
be submitted to it in connection with the elections. The Commission, although it cannot be classified as a
court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution for it is merely an administrative body, may however
exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provision of law come under its
jurisdiction.
RATIO: An administrative agency has no inherent powers, although implied powers may sometimes be
spoken of as “inherent.” Thus, in the absence of any provision to punish for contempt which has always
been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has
been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the exercise of that power by
an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid.

Globe Wireless v. Public Service Commission G.R No. L-27520
Facts:
A message was addressed to Maria Diaz in Spain which was filed by private respondent,
Antonio Arnaiz with Bureau of Telecommunication in Dumaguete city and was transmitted to
Bureau of Telecommunications Manila. It was forwarded to the petitioner, Globe Wireless and
transmitted it to Empresa Nacional de Telecommunicaciones in Madrid. The latter, however,
mislaid said message, resulting in its non-delivery to the addressee.
After knowing the fact, Arnaiz filed a complaint relating to the incident with Public Service
Commission. After hearings, PSC issued an order finding petitioner "responsible for the
inadequate and unsatisfactory service complained of, in violation of the Public Service Act" and
ordering it "to pay a fine of P200.00.
Through a certiorari, Globe Wireless questioned/challenged the jurisdiction of PSC or the Public
Service Commission under Section 21 of the Commonwealth Act 146, which is to discipline and
impose a fine over the petitioner.
Issue:
If PSC has jurisdiction over the matter, the imposition of find and to discipline the petitioner.
Ruling:
Under Sec 5 of the Commonwealth Act 146 states that, “The Public Service Commission is hereby
given jurisdiction over the grantee only with respect to the rates which the grantee may charge
the public subject to international commitments made or adhered to by the Republic of the
Philippines.”
Under Section 21 of C.A. No. 146, as amended, the Commission was empowered to impose an
administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a Public service to comply with the terms
and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission.
petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor conditions of any
certificate issued by the Commission to violate. Neither was there any order, decision or regulation
from the Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed,
defied or disregarded.
The jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies are limited to those expressly granted or
necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without
or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective.
Genuino v. De Lima G.R No. 197930

GENUINO VS. HON. LEILA M DE LIMA
G.R. NO. 197930, APRIL 17, 2018

FACTS: Acting Justice Secretary Alberto Agra issued the assailed DOJ Circular
No. 41 which governs the implementation and issuance of Hold Departure Orders,
Watch List Orders, and Allow Departure Order. Relying on this order, Secretary of
Justice Leila De Lima issued a watchlist order against Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
(GMA) and her husband Miguel Arroyo by reason of election fraud which is valid
for a period of 60 days. GMA applied for an allow departure order to seek medical
attention for her hypoparathyroidism and metabolic bone disorder to six different
countries but De Lima denied it. GMA sought relief by praying for the annulment
of the DOJ Circular No. 41 for which infringes the right to travel. Consolidated in
this petition also is Genuino, who is indicted for malversation, and seeks to assail
DOJ Circular No. 41 which infringes his right to travel.
ISSUE
Whether DOJ Circular No. 41 infringes the right to travel and therefore
unconstitutional.
HELD
The issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 has no legal basis. the Court is in quandary
of identifying the authority from which the DOJ believed its power to restrain the
right to travel emanates. To begin with, there is no law particularly providing
for the authority of the secretary of justice to curtail the exercise of the right
to travel, in the interest of national security, public safety or public health.
As it is, the only ground of the former DOJ Secretary in restraining the petitioners,
at that time, was the pendency of the preliminary investigation of the Joint DOJ-
COMELEC Preliminary Investigation Committee on the complaint for electoral
sabotage against them. In the same way, Section 3 does not authorize the
DOJ to issue WLOS and HDOs to restrict the constitutional right to travel.
There is even no mention of the exigencies stated in the Constitution that
will justify the impairment. The provision simply grants the DOJ the power
to investigate the commission of crimes and prosecute offenders, which are
basically the functions of the agency. However, it does not carry with it the
power to indiscriminately devise all means it deems proper in performing its
functions without regard to constitutionally-protected rights. Consistent with the
foregoing, there must be an enabling law from which DOJ Circular No. 41
must derive its life. Unfortunately, all of the supposed statutory authorities
relied upon by the DOJ did not pass the completeness test and sufficient

standard test. The DOJ miserably failed to establish the existence of the enabling
law that will justify the issuance of the questioned circular.
Quasi-legislative or Rule making Power
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association v. Defensor G.R. No. 163980

FACTS: The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction,
seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of
Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise known as the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing
and Land Utilization Act of 2003."
Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners association

from the West Side of the NGC.
Named respondents are the ex-officio members of the National Government Center
Administration Committee (Committee). At the filing of the instant petition, the Committee was
composed of Secretary Michael Defensor, Chairman of the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council (HUDCC), Atty. Edgardo Pamintuan, General Manager of the National
Housing Authority (NHA), Mr. Percival Chavez, Chairman of the Presidential Commission for
Urban Poor (PCUP), Mayor Feliciano Belmonte of Quezon City, Secretary Elisea Gozun of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and Secretary Florante Soriquez of
the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. In accordance with Section 5
of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee formulated the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
R.A. No. 9207 on June 29, 2004. Petitioners subsequently filed the instant petition questioning its
validity.
The OSG claims that the instant petition for prohibition is an improper remedy because the writ of
prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Since in issuing the
questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial function, which is the scope of a petition for prohibition under Section 2, Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the instant prohibition should be dismissed outright, the OSG
contends. For their part, respondent Mayor of Quezon City and respondent NHA contend that
petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing the instant petition with this Court
and not with the Court of Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued
in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function.
HELD: Yes.The court ruled that a petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail
an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ
directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further
proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity’s or person’s
jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against
judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally,
the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in
order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy
to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the
exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court
transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy
available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal
relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification,
an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case,
petitioners’ allegation that "respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without
or in excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of
injunction or a temporary restraining order.
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rulemaking powers and quasi-judicial or

administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make
rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the
granting statute and the doctrine of nondelegability and separability of powers.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative

agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle,
however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed
pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making
or quasi-legislative power.
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasilegislative power of the Committee expressly
authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued
by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the
statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function,
the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.

Republic v. Drugmakers Laboratories G.R. No. 190837
Facts: The FDA was created pursuant to RA 3720, otherwise known as the “Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act” primarily in order to establish safety or efficacy standards and quality measure of
foods, drugs and devices and cosmetics products. On March 15, 1989, the Department of Health,
thru then Secretary Alfredo RA Bengzon issued AO 67 s. 1989, entitled Revised Rules and
Regulations on Registration of Pharmaceutical products. Among others, it required drug
manufacturers to register certain drug and medicine products with FDA before they may release
the same to the market for sale. In this relation, a satisfactory bioavailability/bioequivalence
(BA/BE) test is needed for a manufacturer to secure a CPR for these products. However, the
implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement was put on hold because there was no local
facility capable of conducting the same. The issuance of circulars no. 1 s. of 1997 resumed the
FDA’s implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement with the establishment of BA/BE testing
facilities in the country. Thereafter, the FDA issued circular no. 8 s. of 1997 which provided
additional implementation details concerning the BA/BE testing requirement on drug products.
Issue: Whether or not the circular issued by FDA are valid.
Held: Yes. Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making power only if
there exist a law which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so promulgated
must be within the confines of the granting statutes and must not involve discretion as to what the
law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of the policy
set out in the law itself, so as to conform with the doctrine of separation of powers and as an
adjunct, the doctrine of non-delegability of legislative powers.
An administrative regulation may be classified as a legislative rule, an interpretative rule or a

contingent rule. Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation a d designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. They usually implement existing
law, imposing general, extra-statutory obligations pursuant to authority properly delegated by the
congress amd effect a change in existing law or policy which affect individual rights and
obligations. Meanwhile, interpretative rules are intended to interpret, clarify or explain existing
statutory regulations under which the administrative body operates. Their purpose or objective is
merely to construe the statue being administered and purpory to do no more than interpret the
statute. Simply, they try to say what the statute means and refer to no single person or party in
particular but concern all those belonging to the same class which may be covered by the said
rules. Finally, contingent rules are those issued by an administrative authority based on the
existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends.

In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the requirements laid down by EO
292 s. of 1988 otherwise known as the administrative code of 1987 on prior notice, hearing and
publication in order to be valid and binding except when the same is merely an interpretative rule.
This is because when an administrative rule is merely intepretative in nature its applicability needs
nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law
itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond
merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation
of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to
accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed
before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.
A careful scrutiny of the foregoing issuances would reveal that A0 67 is actually the rule that
originally introduced the BA/BE testing requirement as a component of applications for the
issuance of CPR covering certain pharmaceutical products as such, it is considered an
administrative regulation – a legislative rule to be exact – issued by the Secretary of Health in
consonance with the express authority granted to him by RA 3720 to implement the statutory
mandate that all drugs and devices should first be registered with the FDA prior to their
manufacture and sale. Considering that neither party contested the validity of its issuance, the
court deems that AO 67 complied with the requirements of prior hearing, notice and publication
pursuant to the presumption of regularity accorded to the govt in the exercise of its official duties.
On the other hand, circulars no. 1 and 8 s. of 1997 cannot be considered as administrative
regulations because they do not: a.) implement a primary legislation by providing the details
thereof; b.) Interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory regulation under which FDA operates
and/or; c.) Ascertain the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of RA
3720 depends. In fact, the only purpose of these is for FDA to administer and supervise the
implementation of the provisions of AO 67 s. of 1989 including those covering the BA/BE testing
requirement consistent with and pursuant to RA 3720. Therefore, the FDA has sufficient authority
to issue the said circulars and since theu would not affect the substantive rights of the parties that
they seek to govern – as they are not, strictly speaking, administrative regulations in the first place
– no prior hearing, consultation and publication are needed for their validity.
Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Torres G.R. No.

101279
PASEI vs. Torres
GR No. 101279

August 6, 1992
FACTS:
The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or POEA) issued implementing DOLE
Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and
37, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment
agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE,
through the facilities of the POEA, the task of processing and deploying such workers.
This was a result of the numerous abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in
Hong Kong.
Furthermore, the issuance will establish mechanisms that will enhance the
protection for Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. The recruitment of the
same by private employment agencies is hereby temporarily suspended effective 1 July
1991. As such, the DOLE through the facilities of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration shall take over the processing and deployment of household workers
bound for Hong Kong, subject to guidelines to be issued for said purpose.
PASEI (Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc.) is the largest national

organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and
authorized by the POEA, to engage in the business of obtaining overseas employment
for Filipino land based workers, including domestic helpers. On September 2, 1991, the
petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and
POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation. They allege that: (1) the respondent
acted with grave abuse of discretion or excess authority in their rule-making power, (2)
said issuances were unconstitutional and, (3) that they failed to comply with the
publication requirement.
ISSUE:
W/N the issuances by the DOLE was valid? (No)
RULING:

The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies
is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the
growing complexity of the modern society" (Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA
72, 79). More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of
society's ramified activities. "Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can
deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected
from the legislature or the courts of justice" The questioned circulars are therefore a valid
exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government.
HOWEVER, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of
proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as
required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and
4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987. Since, respondents failed to
comply with the proper publication the issuances may not be enforced or
implemented.
Land Bank v. CA G.R No. 118712 - Suplico

Facts: Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and
subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL, Republic Act No. 6657). They argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series
of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the
opening of trust accounts (refers to any type of financial account that is opened by an individual
and managed by a designated trustee, for the benefit of a third party in accordance with agreed-
upon terms) by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank
designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are
cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. Private respondents also assail the fact
that the DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the
compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking
possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds.
Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-
making power pursuant to RA 6657. Moreover, the DAR maintained that the issuance of the
"Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA
6657 and the ruling in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., et al.
vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform. They maintain that the word "deposit" as used in Section
16(e) of RA 6657 referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of

a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a trust account as the
acceptable form of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion since it merely exercised its power to promulgate rules and
regulations in implementing the declared policies of RA 6657.
Issue: Whether the DAR committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Administrative Order No.
9, Series of 1990, insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash
or in bonds?
Held: YES, it must be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be
legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The
power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect.
Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative
enactment, for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the law that prevails.
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands —
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection
or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated
by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act,
the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register
of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. . . . (emphasis supplied)
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds".
Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If
it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should
have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can
be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed (Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius). In sum,
there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term
"deposit".
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and
regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening
of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as
heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made
only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds".

Ople v. Torres G.R. No. 127685
DEFINITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
Facts:
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos entitled “ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL
COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM” and was subsequently published
in four newspaper of general circulation. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition
against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government
agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the
implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining its implementation.
Issues:
1. WON The Instant Petition is a Justiciable case that would warrant judicial review
2. WON A.O. 308 is unconstitutional for the usurpation of legislative power
3. WON A.O. 308 violates the right to privacy
Held:
1. It is ripe for adjudication, as even though the rules for its implementation has not yet been
published it is already being implemented.
Also that Petitioner Senator Ople, as a senator has a valid standing to bring the issue in
suit if A.O. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.
2. A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative
order. An administrative order is:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects
of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders.
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative
Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification
Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending
state policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against

dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr.
Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of
thought. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our
citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of
the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident
that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law because it
confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O.
No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic
services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse
to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with the government. It is thus
clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and
enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right
and imposes no duty cannot stand.
3. The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society.
The threats emanate from various sources — governments, journalists, employers, social
scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of
government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy
by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic
services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent fail to
perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a
devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-
worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live
burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is
that because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to forget."
Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in labelling the
right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right to privacy
was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.
Eastern Shipping Lines v. CA G.R. No. 116356
Facts
On September 25, 1989, plaintiff [herein private respondent] elevated a complaint against
defendant [herein petitioner] for sum of money and attorney's fees alleging that plaintiff had
rendered pilotage services to defendant between January 14, 1987 to July 22, 1989 with total

unpaid fees of P703,290.18. Despite repeated demands, defendant failed to pay and prays that
the latter be directed to pay.
On November 18, 1989 defendant answered vigorously disputing the claims of plaintiff. It assailed
the constitutionality of the Executive Order 1088 upon which plaintiff bases its claims; alleged that
there is a pending case before the Court of Appeals elevated by the United Harbor Pilots
Association of the Philippines of which plaintiff is a member[;] whereas defendant is a member of
the Chamber of Maritime Industries of the Philippine[s] which is an Intervenor in CA-G.R. SP No.
18072; that there therefore is lis pendens that Executive Order No. 1088 is an unwarranted
repeal or modification of the Philippine Ports Authority Charter. At the Pre-Trial Conference,
the only issue raised by plaintiff is whether the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for the money
claims alleged in the complaint.
After due trial, the trial court rendered its ruling. The factual antecedents of the controversy are
simple. Petitioner insists on paying pilotage fees prescribed under PPA circulars because
EO 1088 sets a higher rate, petitioner now assails its constitutionality.
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Respondent Court pointed out that petitioner,
during the pre-trial, limited the issues to whether: (1) EO C88 is unconstitutional; (2) EO 1088 is
illegal; (3) private respondent itself may enforce and collect fees under EO 1088; and (4) petitioner
is liable and, if EO 1088 is legal, to what extent. It then affirmed the factual findings and conclusion
of the trial court that petitioner "fail[ed] to show any proof" to support its position. Parenthetically,
Respondent Court also noted two other cases decided by the Court of Appeals, upholding the
constitutionality of EO 1088.
Issue
Whether Executive Order 1088 is unconstitutional.
Ruling
EO 1088 Is Valid
Petitioner contends that EO 1088 is unconstitutional, because (1) its interpretation and application
are left to private respondent, a private person, and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of
powers. Petitioner insists that it should pay pilotage fees in accordance with and on the
basis of the memorandum circulars issued by the PPA, the administrative body vested
under PD 857 with the power to regulate and prescribe pilotage fees.
In assailing the constitutionality of EO 1088, the petitioner repeatedly asks: "Is the private
respondent vested with power to interpret Executive Order No. 1088? The Court is not persuaded.
In Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court, through, upheld the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order 1088 in no uncertain
terms. We aptly iterate our pronouncement in said case.

What determines whether an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its form but its
nature. Here as we have already said, the power to fix the rates of charges for services, including
pilotage service, has always been regarded as legislative in character.
It is worthy to note that E.O. NO. 1088 provides for adjusted pilotage service rates without
withdrawing the power of the PPA to impose, prescribe, increase or decrease rates, charges or
fees. The reason is because E.O. No. 1088 is not meant simply to fix new pilotage rates. Its
legislative purpose is the "rationalization of pilotage service charges, through the imposition of
uniform and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports. We conclude
that E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty bound to comply with its
provisions. The PPA may increase the rates but it may not decrease them below those
mandated by E.O. No. 1088.
"Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are
not contrary to the laws or the Constitution." As stated by this Court in Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, "the conclusive effect of administrative construction is not
absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial
department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction, or grave
abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or spirit of the law. It is axiomatic that
an administrative agency, like the PPA, has no discretion whether to implement the law or
not. Its duty is to enforce it. Unarguably, therefore, if there is any conflict between the PPA
circular and a law, such as EO 1088, the latter prevails.
Based on the foregoing, petitioner has no legal basis to refuse payment of pilotage fees to private
respondent, as computed according to the rates set by EO 1088. Private respondent cannot be
faulted for relying on the clear and unmistakable provisions of EO 1088. In fact, EO 1088 leaves
no room for interpretation.
Tests for Valid Delegation
Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc v. POEA G.R. No. 114714

FACTS:
The Governing Board of the POEA enacted Governing Resolution No. 01 s. 1994 fixing
for the rates of workmen’s compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going
vessels.
Consequently, Memorandum Circular No. 05 was issued on 19 January 19942 by POEA

Administrator adjusting the rates of compensation and other benefits of Filipino seafarers.
Petitioners assailed both issuances on the following grounds:

1. The POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting
death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels;
only Congress can.
2. Even granting that the POEA has that power, it, nevertheless, violated the standards
for its exercise.
3. The resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional because they violate
the equal protection and non-impairment of obligation of contracts clauses of the
Constitution.
4. The resolution and the memorandum circular are not, valid acts of the Governing Board
because the private sector representative mandated by law has not been appointed by
the President since the creation of the POEA.
Public respondents contend that the petition is without merit and should de dismissed
because (a) the issuance of the challenged resolution and memorandum circular was a
valid exercise of the POEA's rule-making authority or power of subordinate legislation.
Issue: Does the POEA have the power to fix and promulgate rates of Filipino seamen.
Decision:
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order
No. 797:
“The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided, shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the
Administration (POEA).”
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.
What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the
law shall be.
But due to increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention, delegation of
legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies.
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by
"filling in" the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.

The power of the POEA is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in
the exercise of the said authority, that standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which
is "fair and equitable employment practices”.
The challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which merely further amended the previous
Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform to the sufficient and valid standard of "fair and
equitable employment practices" prescribed in E.O. No. 797 can no longer be disputed.
Osmena v. Orbos G.R. No. 99886

FACTS:
On October 10,1984, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in
the General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was designed
to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products
resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of crude
oil.
Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account," in virtue of E.O 1024,7
and ordered released from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy. The same Executive
Order also authorized the investment of the fund in government securities, with the earnings from
such placements accruing to the fund.
President Corazon C. Aquino, amended P.D. 1956. She promulgated Executive Order No. 137 on
February 27, 1987, expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost
under recovery incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the
amount of the under recovery being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance.
The petition avers that the creation of the trust fund violates § 29(3), Article VI of the Constitution.
The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to ** P.D. 1956, as amended, must be
treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is
collected for a specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall be treated as a special fund'
to be used only for the purpose indicated, and not channeled to another government objective."
Petitioner further points out that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies, collected through the
taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to
the special purpose/objective for which it was created."
He also contends that the "delegation of legislative authority" to the ERB violates § 28 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution and, inasmuch as the delegation relates to the exercise of the power of

taxation, "the limits, limitations and restrictions must be quantitative, that is, the law must not only
specify how to tax, who (shall) be taxed (and) what the tax is for, but also impose a specific limit
on how much to tax."
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the PD 1956 partakes the nature of the taxation power of the State?
(2) Whether or not there is an invalid delegation of legislative power under PD 1956, hence,
unconstitutional?
HELD:
(1) No. while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the
exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is plain
from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and
while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless
remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these
measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the
practice is not without precedent.
(2) No. For a valid delegation of power, it is essential that the law delegating the power
must be (1) complete in itself, that is it must set forth the policy to be executed by the
delegate and (2) it must fix a standard—limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable—to which the delegate must conform.
The proper exercise of the delegated power may be tested with ease. It seems obvious that
what the law intended was to permit the additional imposts for as long as there exists a
need to protect the general public and the petroleum industry from the adverse
consequences of pump rate fluctuations. "Where the standards set up for the guidance of
an administrative officer and the action taken are in fact recorded in the orders of such
officer, so that Congress, the courts and the public are assured that the orders in the
judgment of such officer conform to the legislative standard, there is no failure in the
performance of the legislative functions." This Court thus finds no serious impediment to
sustaining the validity of the legislation; the express purpose for which the imposts are
permitted and the general objectives and purposes of the fund are readily discernible, and
they constitute a sufficient standard upon which the delegation of power may be justified.
Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Garcia G.R. No. 115381

FACTS:

In 1990, DOTC Sec. Oscar Orbos issued Memo Circular to LTFRB Chair Remedios Fernando to
allow provincial bus to change passenger rates w/in a fare range of 15% above or below the
LTFRB official rate for a 1yr. period. This is in line with the liberalization of regulation in the
transport sector which the government intends to implement and to make progress towards
greater reliance on free market forces.
Fernando respectfully called attention of DOTC Sec. that the Public Service Act requires
publication and notice to concerned parties and public hearing. In Dec. 1990, Provincial Bus
Operators Assoc. of the Phils. (PBOAP) filed an application for across the board fare rate
increase, which was granted by LTFRB. In 1992, then DOTC Sec. Garcia issued a memo to
LTFRB suggesting a swift action on adoption of procedures to implement the Department Order
& to lay down deregulation policies. Pursuant to LTFRB Guideline, PBOAP, w/o benefit of public
hearing announced a 20% fare rate increase.
Petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) opposed the move and filed a petition before LTFRB w/c
was denied. Hence the instant petition for certiorari w/ urgent prayer for a TRO, w/c was readily
granted by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the authority granted by LTFB to provincial buses to set a fare range above existing
authorized fare range is unconstitutional and invalid.
HELD:
The grant of power by LTFRB of its delegated authority is unconstitutional. The doctrine of
Potestas delegate non delegari (what has been delegated cannot be delegated) is applicable
because a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate
thru instrumentality of his own judgment. To delegate this power is a negation of the duty in
violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge such duty. Also, to give
provincial buses the power to charge their fare rates will result to a chaotic state of affairs ad this
would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators who can increase their rates
arbitrarily whenever it pleases or when they deem it necessary.
Tabalarin v. Gutierrez G.R. No. 78164

Facts:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-
1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public
respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM).

On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational
Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and
passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from
proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as
scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of
preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was
conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for certiorari with this Court to set aside the
Order of the respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the Constitutional
guarantee for the accessibility of education to all, and whether such regulation is invalid and/or
unconstitutional.
Ruling:
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical
Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:
Section 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and
regulation of medical education (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the
supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines.
The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education “accessible
to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely
to make such education accessible to all who qualify under “fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements.”
The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to regulate and
control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
authorized to practice medicine. Legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who
wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been
recognized as valid exercises of governmental powers. Similarly, the establishment of minimum
medical educational requirements for admission to the medical profession, has also been
sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court
denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
Pelaez v. Auditor General G.R. No. L-23825
Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA G.R No. 76633

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS POEA
G.R. No. 76633 166 SCRA 533 October 18, 1988
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF LABOR AND

EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN D. SACO, respondents.v
Facts:
The petitioner challenge the decision of Philippine Overseas Employment Administration POEA on the
principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case of Vitaliano Saco as he was not an
overseas worker.
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo,
Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the
complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been
filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after
considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant.
The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of the
Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its international flights, are not considered
overseas workers.
Moreover, the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA
to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an
exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
Issues:
Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 2 has violated the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power.
Discussions:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power:

1. Completeness test – the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to
do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test – there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is
not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
Rulings:
No. There was no principles violated. The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in
Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. … “The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as
hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of
the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).”
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What
can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall
be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot
be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable
to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called
the “power of subordinate legislation.”
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by
“filling in’ the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This
is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations
have the force and effect of law.
Jaworski v. PAGCOR G.R. No. 144463

DOCTRINES:
A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to corporations. It is a privilege
of public concern which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public
control and administration, either by the government directly, or by public agents, under such
conditions and regulations as the government may impose on them in the interest of the public.
The grantee must not perform its activities arbitrarily and whimsically but must abide by the limits
set by its franchise and strictly adhere to its terms and conditionalities.

NATURE OF THE CASE:
A petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks to nullify the “Grant of Authority and Agreement
for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming,” that was executed by PAGCOR.
FACTS:
The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), respondent, is a government
owned and controlled corporation existing under Presidential Decree 1869 that gives authority to
establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement, recreation, including sports, gaming
pools, and other forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance.
Its board of directors approved an instrument denominated as “Grant of Authority and Agreement
for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming”, which granted Sports and Games and
Entertainment Corporation (SAGE) the authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting station in
PGCOR’s casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service local and international
bettors, provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards and procedures are
established to ensure the integrity and fairness of the games.
Jaworski, petitioner, a member of the senate and chairman of the Senate COmmittee on Games,
Amusement and Sports, files this case seeking the nullity of the grant of authority given by
PAGCOR to SAGE.
Petitioners contention:
1) PAGCOR is not authorized under its legislative franchise to operate gambling on the
internet for the simple reason that the said decree could not have possibly contemplated
internet gambling since at the time of the enactment, the internet was not yet inexistent
and gambling activities.
a) That the internet necessarily transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines, and to operate such activity contravenes the limitation in PAGCOR’s
franchise under Sec 14, PD. no. 1869.
2) Internet gambling services does not fall under any of the categories of the authorized
gambling activities enumerated under Sec 10 of PD no 1869 and that internet gambling
does not fall within the commonly accepted definition of gambling casinos, clubs, or other
recreation or amusement places as these terms refer to a physical structure in real space
where people intend to bet or gamble go and play games of chance authorized by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not PAGCOR has the right to vest another entity (SAGE), with the authority
to operate internet gambling.
RULING:
The court held that PAGCOR has acted beyond the limits of its authority when it passed on
or shared its franchise to SAGE.

While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator's and/or management contracts,
it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a
veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR cannot delegate its power in view
of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, in as much as there is nothing in
the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so. Hence, in this case, SAGE has
to obtain a separate legislative franchise and not "ride on" PAGCOR's franchise if it were to legally
operate on-line Internet gambling. The grant of franchise is a special privilege that constitutes a
right and a duty to be performed by the grantee. The grantee must not perform its activities
arbitrarily and whimsically but must abide by the limits set by its franchise and strictly adhere to
its terms and conditionalities. Given that PAGCOR has no authority to grant such authority, it has
exercised beyond the limits provided by the legislature.
Abakada v. Purisima G.R. No. 166715
People v. Maceren G.R. No. L-32166
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN

G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977
FACTS:
This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh
water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (ANR)
and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the
Fisheries Commission (FC).
On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino
and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of
Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 when the
five accused, in the morning of March 1, 1969, resorted to electro fishing in the waters of
Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz using electric current, which destroy any aquatic animals
within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace" (Criminal Case No.
5429).

Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution
appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal (Civil Case
No. SC-36). Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries,
promulgated by the Secretary of ANR and the Commissioner of Fisheries is valid.
RULING:
No. The court held that the Secretary of ANR and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded
their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 94 and 84-1since the law does
not clearly prohibit electro fishing.
Section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance"
in fishing. Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or
poisonous substance in fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more than
five thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five years.
Hence, the administrative agencies are powerless to penalize it because of the lack of any
legal basis.
Had the law making body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect
could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Administrative regulations
adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot be extended to amend or expand the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries 164171

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY vs. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES
G.R. No. 164171 , February 20, 2006
Pen: J. Ynares-Santiago , En Banc
FACTS: on December 12, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through Executive

Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, issued EO 156, entitled "Providing for a comprehensive
industrial policy and directions for the motor vehicle development program and its
implementing guidelines."

Said executive issuance prohibits the importation into the country, inclusive of the Special
Economic and Freeport Zone or the Subic Bay Freeport (SBF or Freeport), of used motor
vehicles, subject to a few exceptions.
The issuance of EO 156 spawned three separate actions for declaratory relief before
Branch 72 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, all seeking the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Article 2, Section 3.1 of said executive order. The cases were filed
by herein respondent entities, who or whose members, are classified as Subic Bay
Freeport Enterprises and engaged in the business of, among others, importing and/or
trading used motor vehicles.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 2, Section 3.1 of Executive Order No. 156 (EO 156)
unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court finds that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is void insofar as it is made
applicable to the presently secured fenced in former Subic Naval Base area as stated in
Section 1.1 of EO 97-A. Pursuant to the separability clause of EO 156, Section 3.1 is
declared valid insofar as it applies to the customs territory or the Philippine territory
outside the presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area as stated in
Section 1.1 of EO 97-A. Hence, used motor vehicles that come into the Philippine territory
via the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area may be stored, used or traded
therein, or exported out of the Philippine territory, but they cannot be imported into the
Philippine territory outside of the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area.
Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to
promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. It is lodged
primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may
also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking
bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay. Such delegation confers upon the
President quasilegislative power which may be defined as the authority delegated by
the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended
to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy.
To be valid, an administrative issuance, such as an executive order, must comply with

the following requisites: (1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature; (2) It
must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; (3) It must be within
the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and (4) It must be reasonable. Contrary
to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, EO 156 actually satisfied the first requisite of
a valid administrative order. It has both constitutional and statutory bases.

Anent the second requisite, that is, that the order must be issued or promulgated in
accordance with the prescribed procedure, it is necessary that the nature of the
administrative issuance is properly determined. As in the enactment of laws, the general
rule is that, the promulgation of administrative issuances requires previous notice and
hearing, the only exception being where the legislature itself requires it and mandates
that the regulation shall be based on certain facts as determined at an appropriate
investigation. This exception pertains to the issuance of legislative rules as distinguished
from interpretative rules which give no real consequence more than what the law itself
has already prescribed; and are designed merely to provide guidelines to the law which
the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing. A legislative rule, on the other hand,
is in the nature of subordinate legislation, crafted to implement a primary legislation.
We hold that the importation ban runs afoul the third requisite for a valid administrative
order. To be valid, an administrative issuance must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits
of the authority conferred. It must not supplant or modify the Constitution, its enabling
statute and other existing laws, for such is the sole function of the legislature which the
other branches of the government cannot usurp.
The proscription in the importation of used motor vehicles should be operative only
outside the Freeport and the inclusion of said zone within the ambit of the prohibition is
an invalid modification of RA 7227. Indeed, when the application of an administrative
issuance modifies existing laws or exceeds the intended scope, as in the instant case,
the issuance becomes void, not only for being ultra vires, but also for being unreasonable.
Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy G.R. No. 124360

I. THE FACTS
Petitioners assailed Section 5(b) and Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180, the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of
1996.
Section 5(b) of the law provided that “tariff duty shall be imposed . . . on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent
(3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%) . . .” On the other hand, Section15
provided that “[t]he DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of
crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation
to the US dollar is stable . . .”
Petitioners argued that Section 5(b) on tariff differential violates the provision of the Constitution requiring every law
to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. They also contended that the phrases “as far as
practicable,” “decline of crude oil prices in the world market” and “stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar”

are ambivalent, unclear and in concrete since they do not provide determinate or determinable standards that can guide
the President in his decision to fully deregulate the downstream oil industry.
Petitioners also assailed the President’s E.O. No. 392, which proclaimed the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry in February 1997. They argued that the Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the depletion
of the OPSF fund as a factor in the implementation of full deregulation.
Finally, they asserted that the law violated Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition
II. THE ISSUES
1. Did Section 5(b) violate the one title-one subject requirement of the Constitution?
2. Did Section 15 violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power?
3. Was E.O. No. 392 arbitrary and unreasonable?
4. Did R.A. No. 8180 violate Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in
restraint of trade and unfair competition?
III. THE RULING
[The Court GRANTED the petition. It DECLARED R.A. No. 8180 unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372 void.]
1. NO, Section 5(b) DID NOT violate the one title-one subject requirement of the Constitution.
As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title-one subject rule. [T]he title need not mirror,
fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in
the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the
method and means of carrying out the general subject. [S]ection 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the
subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway
prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported petroleum.
2. NO, Section 15 DID NOT violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power.
Two tests have been developed to determine whether the delegation of the power to execute laws does not involve
the abdication of the power to make law itself. We delineated the metes and bounds of these tests in Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc. VS. POEA, thus:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out
the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to
prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

xxx xxx xxx
Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress
expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless of the
occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion
to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation.
The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section
15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President --- he is to time it as far as practicable when the
prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso
in relation to the US dollar is stable.
3. YES, E.O. No. 392 was arbitrary and unreasonable.
A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors to be considered by
the Department of Energy and the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining, and (2) the time when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US
dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF as a factor to be given weight by the Executive
before ordering full deregulation. On the contrary, the debates in Congress will show that some of our legislators
wanted to impose as a pre-condition to deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund must not be in deficit. We therefore
hold that the Executive department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it considered
the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The misappreciation of this extra factor cannot be justified on
the ground that the Executive department considered anyway the stability of the prices of crude oil in the world market
and the stability of the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar. By considering another factor to hasten full
deregulation, the Executive department rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. 8180.
The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it
has no power to make laws. To cede to the Executive the power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to transgress
the principle of separation of powers. The exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the
delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency. In the cases at bar, the Executive co-
mingled the factor of depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors of decline of the price of crude oil in the world
market and the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On the basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to
determine the weight given by the Executive department to the depletion of the OPSF fund. It could well be the
principal consideration for the early deregulation. It could have been accorded an equal significance. Or its
importance could be nil. In light of this uncertainty, we rule that the early deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes
a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.
4. YES, R.A. No. 8180 violated Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.
[I]t cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly
at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to
the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various
capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the
tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the
entry of new players. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building
refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them
will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field.
The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries
puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them

with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our
downstream oil industry is an idle dream.
The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that will give a firm monopoly profits in the future.
The monopoly profits will never materialize, however, if the market is flooded with new entrants as soon as the
successful predator attempts to raise its price. Predatory pricing will be profitable only if the market contains
significant barriers to new entry.
As afore discussed, the 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement are significant barriers which discourage
new players to enter the market. Considering these significant barriers established by R.A. No. 8180 and the lack of
players with the comparable clout of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX, the temptation for a dominant player to engage
in predatory pricing and succeed is a chilling reality. Petitioners’ charge that this provision on predatory pricing is
anti-competitive is not without reason.
Gerochi v. Department of Energy G.R. No. 159796
Department of Health v. Philip Morris Philippines G.R. No. 202943

FACTS:
Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing Inc. (PMPMI), by virtue of Article 116 of RA 7394
applied for a sales promotion permit through BFAD (now, FDA) for its Gear Up Promo. When more than
fifteen (15) days elapsed without the BFAD formally acting upon the application, PMPMI inquired about
its status. PMPMI was only verbally informed of the existence of a Memorandum issued by DOH
prohibiting tobacco companies from conducting any tobacco promotional activities in the country. PMPMI
filed another application for a sales promotional permit, this time for its Golden Stick Promo, which the
BFAD refused; pursuant to a directive of the BFAD Director that all permit applications for promotional
activities of tobacco companies will no longer be accepted. PMPMI filed an administrative appeal before
the DOH Secretary, assailing the BFAD’s denial of its Gear Up Promo and Golden Stick Promo
applications. PMPMI maintained that under RA 9211, promotion is not prohibited but merely restricted,
and that while there are specific provisions therein totally banning tobacco advertising and sponsorships,
no similar provision could be found banning promotion. It also insisted that the denial of its promotional
permit applications was tantamount to a violation of its right to due process as well as their right to property.
DOH ruled that the intent and purpose of RA 9211 was to completely ban tobacco advertisements,
promotions, and sponsorships, as promotion is inherent in both advertising and sponsorship. Aggrieved,
PMPMI elevated the matter to the CA. CA granted the petition and nullified the decision of the DOH. It
ruled that the DOH is bereft of any authority to enforce the provisions of RA 9211 in view of the creation

of the Inter-Agency Committee-Tobacco (IAC-Tobacco) under Section 29 of the said law, which shall have
the “exclusive power and function to administer and implement the provisions of [RA 9211] x x x”. Thus,
the CA ruled that the DOH wrongfully arrogated unto itself the authority given to the IAC-Tobacco to
administer and implement the provisions of RA 9211, which includes regulation of tobacco promotions.
ISSUE:
WON DOH has the authority to rule on the case
HELD:
The Court finds that RA 9211 impliedly repealed the relevant provisions of RA 7394 with respect
to the authority of the DOH to regulate tobacco sales promotion. The Court notes that both laws separately
treat “promotion” as one of the activities related to tobacco: RA 7394 defines “sales promotion” under
Article 4 (bm), while RA 9211 speaks of “promotion” or “tobacco promotion” under Section 4 (l). The
Court has judiciously scrutinized the above definitions and finds that there is no substantial difference
between the activities that would fall under the purview of “sales promotion” in RA 7394, as well as those
under “promotion” in RA 9211, as would warrant a delineation in the authority to regulate its conduct. In
fact, the techniques, activities, and methods mentioned in the definition of “sales promotion” can be
subsumed under the more comprehensive and broad scope of “promotion.”
The Court agrees with the CA, that it is the IAC-Tobacco and not the DOH which has the primary
jurisdiction to regulate sales promotion activities. As such, the DOH’s ruling, including its construction of
RA 9211 (i.e., that it completely banned tobacco advertisements, promotions, and sponsorships, as
promotion is inherent in both advertising and sponsorship), are declared null and void, which, as a necessary
consequence, precludes the Court from further delving on the same. As it stands, the present applications
filed by PMPMI are thus remanded to the IAC-Tobacco for its appropriate action.
SM Land v. Bases Conversion Development Authority G.R. No.

203655
GMA Network v. COMELEC G.R. No. 205357
FACTS: Assailed in these petitions are certain regulations promulgated by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) relative to the conduct of the 2013 national and local elections dealing with political advertisements.
Specifically, the petitions question the constitutionality of the limitations placed on aggregate airtime allowed to
candidates and political parties, as well as the requirements incident thereto, such as the need to report the same, and
the sanctions imposed for violations.
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution) limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties
for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180)
minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of
the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their
right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Comelec resolution is valid.
RULING : No. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 introduced a radical departure from the previous COMELEC
resolutions relative to the airtime limitations on political advertisements. This essentially consists in
computing the airtime on an aggregate basis involving all the media of broadcast communications
compared to the past where it was done on a per station basis. Thus, it becomes immediately obvious that
there was effected a drastic reduction of the allowable minutes within which candidates and political parties
would be able to campaign through the air. The question is accordingly whether this is within the power of
the COMELEC to do or not. The Court holds that it is not within the power of the COMELEC to do so.
a. Past elections and airtime limits

The authority of the COMELEC to impose airtime limits directly flows from the Fair Election Act (R.A. No.
9006 [2001])32 - one hundred (120) minutes of television advertisement and one-hundred· eighty (180)
minutes for radio advertisement. For the 2004 elections, the respondent COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 652033 implementing the airtime limits by applying said limitation on a per station basis.
Such manner of determining airtime limits was likewise adopted for the 2007 elections, through Resolution
No. 7767. In the 2010 elections, under Resolution No. 8758,36 the same was again adopted. But for the
2013 elections, the COMELEC, through Resolution No. 9615, as amended by Resolution No. 9631, chose
to aggregate the total broadcast time among the different broadcast media xxx
It does appear that the COMELEC did not have any other basis for coming up with a new manner of
determining allowable time limits except its own idea as to what should be the maximum number of minutes
based on its exercise of discretion as to how to level the playing field. The same could be encapsulized in
the remark of the COMELEC Chairman that "if the Constitution allows us to regulate and then it gives us
the prerogative to amplify then the prerogative to amplify you should leave this to the discretion of the
Commission."
b. COMELEC is duty bound to come up with reasonable basis for changing the interpretation and
implementation of the airtime limits
There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily authorized to enforce
election laws but it cannot exercise its powers without limitations - or reasonable basis. It could not simply
adopt measures or regulations just because it feels that it is the right thing to do, in so far as it might be
concerned. It does have discretion, but such discretion is something that must be exercised within the
bounds and intent of the law. The COMELEC is not free to simply change the rules especially if it has
consistently interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever it has to change the rules,
the same must be properly explained with sufficient basis.

c. The COMELEC went beyond the authority granted it by the law in adopting "aggregate" basis in
the determination of allowable airtime
The Court does not agree. It cannot bring itself to read the changes in the bill as disclosing an intent that
the COMELEC wants this Court to put on the final language of the law. If anything, the change in language
meant that the computation must not be based on a "per day" basis for each television or radio station. The
same could not therefore lend itself to an understanding that the total allowable time is to be done on an
aggregate basis for all television or radio stations. Clearly, the respondent in this instance went beyond its
legal mandate when it provided for rules beyond what was contemplated by the law it is supposed to
implement. As we held in Lakin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections:
The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, has neither the authority nor
the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs the
COMELEC issued for that purpose should always be in accord with the law to be implemented, and should
not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law
they intend to carry out.
Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under legislative
authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying
the law's general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs, because an
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
Romulo Mabanta Law Office v. HDMF G.R. No. 131082

Facts: Pursuant to Section 19 1 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742, petitioner Romulo,
Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De Los Angeles (hereafter PETITIONER), a law firm, was exempted
for the period 1 January to 31 December 1995 from the Pag-IBIG Fund coverage by respondent Home
Development Mutual Fund (hereafter HDMF) because of a superior retirement plan.
On 1 September 1995, the HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7742,
issued Board Resolution No. 1011, Series of 1995, amending and modifying the Rules and Regulations
Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As amended, Section 1 of Rule VII provides that for a company to be entitled
to a waiver or suspension of Fund coverage, it must have a plan providing for both provident/retirement
and housing benefits superior to those provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund.
On 16 November 1995, PETITIONER filed with the respondent an application for Waiver or Suspension of
Fund Coverage because of its superior retirement plan. 4 In support of said application, PETITIONER
submitted to the HDMF a letter explaining that the 1995 Amendments to the Rules are invalid. 5

In a letter dated 18 March 1996, the President and Chief Executive Officer of HDMF disapproved
PETITIONER's application on the ground that the requirement that there should be both a provident
retirement fund and a housing plan is clear in the use of the phrase "and/or," and that the Rules
Implementing R.A. No. 7742 did not amend nor repeal Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 but merely implement
the law.
Issue: WON the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742, specifically
Section I, Rule VII on Waiver and Suspension is valid.
Ruling: NO. In China Banking Corp. v. The Members of the Board of Trustees of the HDMF. 16 We held in
that case that Section 1 of Rule VII of the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A.
No. 7742, and HDMF Circular No. 124-B prescribing the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing
Application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No.
7742, are null and void insofar as they require that an employer should have both a provident/retirement
plan and a housing plan superior to the benefits offered by the Fund in order to qualify for waiver or
suspension of the Fund coverage. In arriving at said conclusion, we ruled:
The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words "and/or." It is accordingly ordinarily held that
the intention of the legislature in using the term "and/or" is that the word "and" and the word "or" are to
be used interchangeably.
In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995
Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that employers should have both
provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for exemption from the
Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board subsequently abolished
that exemption through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such amendment
and subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the delegated power of the
Board. The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not consistent with
the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law,
but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. 21 Only Congress can repeal or amend
the law.
NPC v. Pinatubo Commercial G.R. No. 176006
FACTS: NPC Circular No. 99-75 dated October 8, 1999 set the guidelines in the "disposal of scrap
aluminum conductor steel-reinforced or ACSRs in order to decongest and maintain good housekeeping in
NPC installations and to generate additional income for NPC." Items 3 and 3.1 of the circular provide:

“3. QUALIFIED BIDDERS 3.1 Qualified bidders envisioned in this circular are partnerships or corporations
that directly use aluminum as the raw material in producing finished products either purely or partly out of
aluminum, or their duly appointed representatives. These bidders may be based locally or overseas.”
In April 2003, NPC published an invitation for the pre-qualification of bidders for the public sale of its scrap
ACSR cables. Respondent Pinatubo Commercial, a trader of scrap materials such as copper, aluminum,
steel and other ferrous and non-ferrous materials, submitted a pre-qualification form to NPC. Pinatubo,
however, was informed in a letter that its application for pre-qualification had been denied. Pinatubo asked
for reconsideration but NPC denied it.
Pinatubo then filed a petition in the RTC for the annulment of NPC Circular No. 99-75. Pinatubo argued that
the circular was unconstitutional as it violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution, and ran counter to the government policy of competitive public bidding.
The RTC upheld Pinatubo's position and declared items 3 and 3.1 of the circular unconstitutional. The RTC
ruled that it was violative of substantive due process because, while it created rights in favor of third parties,
the circular had not been published. It also pronounced that the circular violated the equal protection clause
since it favored manufacturers and processors of aluminum scrap vis-à-vis dealers/traders in the purchase
of aluminum ACSR cables from NPC. Lastly, the RTC found that the circular denied traders the right to
exercise their business and restrained free competition inasmuch as it allowed only a certain sector to
participate in the bidding.
In this petition, NPC insists that there was no need to publish the circular since it was not of general
application. It was addressed only to particular persons or class of persons, namely the disposal
committees, heads of offices, regional and all other officials involved in the disposition of ACSRs.
ISSUES: 1. Whether NPC Circular No. 99-75 must be published – No.

2. Whether NPC Circular No. 99-75 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause –
No.
RULING: 1. No. Tañada v. Tuvera stressed the need for publication in order for statutes and administrative
rules and regulations to have binding force and effect.
Tañada, however, qualified that: Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
In this case, NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be published since it was merely an internal rule or
regulation. It did not purport to enforce or implement an existing law but was merely a directive issued by
the NPC President to his subordinates to regulate the proper and e􀁉cient disposal of scrap ACSRs to
quali􀁉ed bidders. Thus,
NPC Circular No. 99-75 defined the responsibilities of the different NPC personnel in the disposal, pre-
quali􀁉cation, bidding and award of scrap ACSRS.
2. No. Items 3 and 3.1 met the standards of a valid classification. Indeed, as juxtaposed by the RTC, the
purpose of NPC Circular No. 99-75 was to dispose of the ACSR wires. As stated by Pinatubo, it was also
meant to earn income for the government.

Items 3 and 3.1 clearly did not infringe on the equal protection clause as these were based on a reasonable
classification intended to protect, not the right of any business or trade but the integrity of government
property, as well as promote the objectives of RA 7832. Traders like Pinatubo could not claim similar
treatment as direct manufacturers/processors especially in the light of their failure to negate the rationale
behind the distinction.
De Jesus v. COA G.R. No. 109023
Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association G.R. No. 111953
Facts:
The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) was created on 11 July 1974, by virtue of PD 505. On 23 December
1975, PD 857 was issued revising the PPA’s charter. Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and
supervision of pilots and the pilotage profession, the PPA promulgated PPA-AO-03-85 2 on 21 March 1985,
which embodied the “Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and
Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports.” These rules mandate, inter alia, that aspiring pilots must be holders of
pilot licenses and must train as probationary pilots in outports for 3 months and in the Port of Manila for 4
months. It is only after they have achieved satisfactory performance that they are given permanent and
regular appointments by the PPA itself to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless
sooner removed by reason of mental or physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager. Harbor pilots in
every harbor district are further required to organize themselves into pilot associations which would make
available such equipment as may be required by the PPA for effective pilotage services. In view of this
mandate, pilot associations invested in floating, communications, and office equipment. In fact, every new
pilot appointed by the PPA automatically becomes a member of a pilot association and is required to pay a
proportionate equivalent equity or capital before being allowed to assume his duties, as reimbursement to
the association concerned of the amount it paid to his predecessor.
Subsequently, then PPA GM Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO 04-92 7 on 15 July 1992, whose avowed
policy was to “instill effective discipline and thereby afford better protection to the port users through the
improvement of pilotage services.” This was implemented by providing therein that “all existing regular
appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain
valid up to 31 December 1992 only” and that “all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts
shall, henceforth, be only for a term of 1 year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation
by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.” On 12 August 1992, the United Harbor
Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-
AO 04-92 before the DOTC, but they were informed by then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that “the
matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPA’s administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of
Directors as its governing body.” Meanwhile, on 31 August 1992, the PPA issued Memorandum Order 08-
92 8 which laid down the criteria or factors to be considered in the reappointment of harbor pilots viz.: (1)
Qualifying Factors: safety record and physical/mental medical exam report and, (2) Criteria for Evaluation:
promptness in servicing vessels, compliance with PPA Pilotage Guidelines, number of years as a harbor

pilot, average GRT of vessels serviced as pilot, awards/commendations as harbor pilot, and age. The
Associations reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO 04-92, but
Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors
of the PPA. Compas appealed the ruling to the Office of the President (OP), reiterating his arguments before
the DOTC. On 23 December 1992, the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the
implementation of PPA-AO 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that said administrative order was
issued in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots, and it, along with its
implementing guidelines, was intended to restore order in the ports and to improve the quality of port
services. On 17 March 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato
C. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier. He concluded that
PPAAO 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and, for all intents and purposes, was not the act of Dayan, but of
the PPA, which was merely implementing Section.6 of PD No .857, mandating it “to control, regulate and
supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district.”
Consequently, the Associations filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages, before Branch 6 of the RTC Manila (Civil Case
93- 65673). On 6 September 1993, the trial court rendered judgment holding that the PPA, DOTC, and OP
have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and
arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA Administrative Order 04-92 including all its implementing
Memoranda, Circulars and Orders, declaring that PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing
Circulars and Orders are null and void. From this decision, the PPA, DOTC and OP elevated their case to
the Supreme Court on certiorari.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, and affirmed the assailed decision of the court a quo dated 6
September 1993, without pronouncement as to costs.
Issue:
Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
and in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA Administrative Order 04-92
including all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders;
Held:
No. PPA GM Dayan presumed to have acted in accordance with law. The Associations’ insinuation that
then PPA GM Dayan was responsible for the issuance of the questioned administrative order may have
some factual basis; after all, power and authority were vested in his office to propose rules and regulations.
The trial court’s finding of animosity between him and the former might likewise have a grain of truth. Yet
the number of cases filed in court between Associatons and Dayan cannot certainly be considered the
primordial reason for the issuance of PPA-AO 04-92. In the absence of proof to the contrary, Dayan should
be presumed to have acted in accordance with law and the best of professional motives. In any event, his
actions are certainly always subject to scrutiny by higher administrative authorities.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. CA G.R. No. 119761
FACTS:

RA 7654 was enacted by Congress on June 10, 1993 and took effect July 3, 1993. It amended
partly Sec. 142 (c) of the NIRC1. Fortune Tobacco manufactured the following cigaretter brands: Hope,
More and Champion. Prior to RA 7654, these 3 brands were considered local brands subjected to an ad
valorem tax of 20 to 45%. Applying the amendment and nothing else, the 3 brands should fall under Sec
142 (c) (2) NIRC and be taxed at 20 to 45%.
However, on July 1, 1993, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued Revenue

Memorandum Circular37-93 which reclassified the 3 brands as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a
foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. The reclassification was before RA 7654 took effect.
In effect, the memo circular subjected the 3 brands to the provisions of Sec 142 (c) (1) NIRC
imposing upon these brands a rate of 55% instead of just 20 to 45% under Sec 142 (c) (2) NIRC. There
was no notice and hearing. CIR argued that the memo circular was merely an interpretative ruling of the
BIR which did not require notice and hearing.
Issue: Whether or not RMC 37-93 was valid and enforceable.
Held:
No; lack of notice and hearing violated due process required for promulgated rules. Moreover, it
infringed on uniformity of taxation / equal protection since other local cigarettes bearing foreign brands had
not been included within the scope of the memo circular.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the memo was not a mere interpretative rule but a legislative
rule in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the
details thereof. Promulgated legislative rules must be published.
On the other hand, interpretative rules only provide guidelines to the law which the administrative
agency is in charge of enforcing.
BIR, in reclassifying the 3 brands and raising their applicable tax rate, did not simply interpret RA
7654 but legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. BELLOSILLO separate opinion: the administrative
issuance was not quasi-legislative but quasijudicial. Due process should still be observed of course but use
Ang Tibay v. CIR.
One of the powers of administrative agencies like the Bureau of Internal Revenue, is the power to
make rules. The necessity for vesting administrative agencies with this power stems from the
impracticability of the lawmakers providing general regulations for various and varying details pertinent to
a particular legislation.
The rules that administrative agencies may promulgate may either be legislative or interpretative.
The former is a form of subordinate legislation whereby the administrative agency is acting in a legislative
capacity, supplementing the statute, filling in the details, pursuant to a specific delegation of legislative
power.
It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its
applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what
the law itself has already prescribed.
When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means
that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or
increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected
a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and
effect of law.
*Part of the case where in “delegation” was mentioned.

Under, HERMOSISIMA, Dissenting

The questioned Circular embodies an interpretative ruling of petitioner Commissioner which as such does
not require notice and hearing.
The theory which underlies the empowerment of administrative agencies like the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, is that the issues with which such agencies deal ought to be decided by experts, and not be a
judge, at least not in the first instance or until the facts have been sifted and arranged.
One of the powers of administrative agencies like the Bureau of Internal Revenue, is the power to
make rules. The necessity for vesting administrative agencies with this power stems from the
impracticability of the lawmakers providing general regulations for various and varying details pertinent to
a particular legislation. The rules that administrative agencies may promulgate may either be
legislative or interpretative. The former is a form of subordinate legislation whereby the
administrative agency is acting a legislative capacity, supplementing the statute, filing in the details,
pursuant to a specific delegation of legislative power. Interpretative rules, on the other hand, are "those
which purport to do no more than interpret the statute being administered, to say what it means."
Investigatory Powers
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion G.R. No 139465

FACTS:
Department of Justice (DOJ) received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. a request for the extradition
of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. for violation of Conspiracy to Commit Offense, Attempt to Evade Tax,
Fraud by Wire, Radio, or Television, False Statement, and Election Contribution in Name of Another.
During the evaluation process of the extradition, the private respondent, requested the petitioner, Secretary of
Justice, to furnish him copies of the extradition request from the U.S. government, that he be given ample time to
comment regarding the extradition request against him after he shall have received copies of the requested papers,
and to suspend the proceeding in the meantime.
The petitioner, Secretary of Justice denied the request in consistent with Art. 7 of the RP – US Extradition Treaty
which provides that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the U.S. in any proceedings arising from
an extradition request. The Secretary also pointed out that since its evaluation of the aforementioned documents are
not preliminary investigation nor a kin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases, and that they merely determine the
procedural procedures and requirements under the treaty between US and the Philippines, the constitutional rights of
the accused are therefore not available. The Secretary also added that the DOJ is in no position to hold in abeyance
any proceedings in connection with the extradition request.
The private respondent filed with the RTC against the petitioner Hon. Ralph Lantion (presiding judge RTC Manila
Branch 25) a mandamus, a certiorari, and a prohibition to enjoin the petitioner, the Secretary of DFA, and NBI from
performing any acts directed to the extradition of the respondent, for it will be a deprivation of his rights to due process
of notice and hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and whether or not the DOJ’s acts constitutes violation of the right to due process.

RULING:
1st Issue:
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file the
extradition petition after the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs. It is the DFAl who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their sufficiency, and under
Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense
is a military offense which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in
Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition
papers.
The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority, one abdicating its powers
and the other enlarging its commission. The Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor
General, filed a manifestation that it is adopting the instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message that if
it were to evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow private respondent to participate in the process of
evaluation.
Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the Department of Foreign Affairs
thoroughly reviewed the extradition request and supporting documents and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment
that the request and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law. The Secretary of Justice, eminent as he
is in the field of law, could not privately review the papers all by himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of
attorneys. How then could the DFA Secretary or his undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritative
determination?
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui
generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial
functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the completeness
and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting
documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is
politically motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non- military penal legislation.
Hence, said process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding
conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b)
determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts
proved. Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one of the determinative powers
of an administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law,
1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the
activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by
means of accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit.,
p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or
tool in an administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is
indispensable to prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an
investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to
investigating the facts and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether an
administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise
of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose
for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and
if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial
discretion and judgment.

The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition
documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State
and the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the
law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial
and not final. The body has no power to determine whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of
the court. The body's power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court.
2nd Issue:
Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an
administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially
criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the
deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for
criminal law enforcement. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make available to a respondent in an administrative
case or investigation certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions.
Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral arguments, there are rights formerly
available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to an earlier stage in the proceedings, such as the
right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination

Montemayor v. Bundalian G.R. No. 149335
Facts:
Edillio C. Montemayor assails the Decision of the Office of the President which
ordered his dismissal as Regional Director of the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH) for unexplained wealth, as a result of an investigation
conducted by the Philippine Commission against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC)
which arrived at the conclusion that the real property he had acquired in
California, U.S. was unlawfully acquired for it was manifestly out of proportion
to his salary.
His dismissal originated from the unverified complaint of the private respondent,
Luis Bundalian addressed to the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A which were later on indorsed to the PCAGC for investigation.
Montemayor, represented by counsel, submitted his counter-affidavit before the

PCAGC alleging that the real owner of the subject property was his sister-in-law
Estela Fajardo. He likewise pointed out that the charge against him was the
subject of similar cases filed before the Ombudsman which was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
The PCAGC conducted its own investigation of the complaint. While petitioner
participated in the proceedings and submitted various pleadings and documents
through his counsel, private respondent-complainant could not be located as his
Philippine address could not be ascertained.
After the investigation, the PCAGC, in its Report to the Office of the President,
concluded that as petitioner’s acquisition of the subject property was manifestly
out of proportion to his salary, it has been unlawfully acquired. Thus, it
recommended petitioner’s dismissal from service.
Issue: Whether or not he was denied due process in the investigation before the
PCAGC?
Ruling:

No, the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity
to explain one’s side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment
is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.
In the case at bar, the petitioner cannot argue that he was deprived of due
process just because he failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant,
the PCAGC exerted efforts to notify the complainant of the proceedings but his
Philippine residence could not be located. The petitioner’s active participation in
every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural
deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the due process requirement. He
cannot now be allowed to challenge the procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the
investigation.
Patranco South Express Inc. v Board of Transportation G.R. No.

49664-67
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order
seeking to annul the order of public respondent Board of Transportation dated January 4, 1979.
On August 5, 1971, the then Public Service Commission granted certificates of public
convenience to private respondent Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. (BLTB) for the
operation of twelve (12) bus units on the Pasay City — Legaspi City line (Case No. 70-5749); six
(6) bus units on the Pasay City — Bulan, Sorsogon line (Case No. 70-5750), and ten (10) bus
units on the Pasay City — Sorsogon line (Case No. 70-5751) (pp. 59-64, Rollo).
On April 4, 1975, petitioner Pantranco South Express, Inc. (PANTRANCO) filed a complaint
against BLTB before public respondent Board of Transportation (BOT), docketed as Case No.
75-31-C, charging it with abandonment of services on said lines from August, 1971 to April, 1975
and praying for the cancellation of BLTB’s certificates of public convenience (pp. 69-70, Rollo).
On March 24, 1976, in Cases Nos. 70-5749, 70-5750 and 70-5751, PANTRANCO filed an urgent
petition charging BLTB with abandoning said services from March, 1975 to March, 1976 and
reiterating its prayer for the cancellation of the certificates of public convenience (pp. 77-78,
Rollo).

BLTB did not file any written answer either to the complaint in Case No. 75-31-C or to the urgent
petition in Cases Nos. 70-5749, 70-5750, and 70-5751. Rather, in a Motion dated July 26, 1978,
BLTB, referring to hearings before the BOT on March 24, 1977 and April 13, 1977, alleged (pp.
126-128, Rollo):
(a) Respondent actually registered under PUB denomination all the twenty eight (28) buses
authorized for operation under the certificates sought to be cancelled (Annex ‘A’);
(b) The following supervening factors which are beyond Respondent’s control however, arose
and prevented Respondent from operating the lines at issue:
(1) The gasoline crises starting 1971;
(2) The destructive big floods in 1972 and 1974;
(3) The general troubled conditions of peace and order in 1971 and 1972 leading to the declaration
of martial law;
(4) Starting 1973 and on to 1974,1975 and 1976 the nearly prohibitive cost of units and spare
parts (if available at all), the higher costs of operations and acute tire shortages particularly in
1974;
(5) All these, which are of general public knowledge and known to the Board, brought the whole
land transportation industry in what might be termed as in extremis condition causing the
bankruptcy of many operators, big and small; and
(6) Complainant Pantranco South Express, Inc. was not spared the ill effects of these adverse
conditions to the extent that up to the present it has not registered all the buses required for its
regular bus operations (Annex ‘B’, ‘B-1’).

"5. At the said hearings also, Respondent prayed that these incidents in these proceedings be
considered and decided in the light of present conditions which are:
(a) The certificates of public convenience of Respondent are still valid;
(b) Respondent is willing and desirous to operate (sic) the said certificates;
(c) Respondent has the capability to operate, in fact, has ready the full twenty-eight (28) buses
needed for full operation of the authorized services;
(d) Complainant is not operating all its authorized bus services for lack of sufficient rolling stock;
(e) The need for the services sought to be cancelled is patent, in fact, urgent at the present time;
and
(f) That the public interest is paramount against other considerations such as the incidents in
these cases."
On January 4, 1979, the BOT issued an order to respondent to operate within fifteen (15) days
from date hereof the whole complement of twenty-eight (28) units authorized under the said
certificates, utilizing for the purpose such units presently authorized as RESERVES and inform
the Board within ten (10) days from commencement of operation, the makes and motor numbers
of the units to be operated for each line and the case numbers under which they are authorized
for appropriate entry in the records of the above-entitled cases, and orders the fine of P10,000.00
imposed above to be paid to this Board within ten (10) days from receipt by it of a copy of this
Order and declares the consolidated complaints filed in the above-entitled cases closed and
terminated.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the non-cancellation of BLTB's certificates of public convenience by the BOT is
valid.
RULING:
"Judged by the foregoing standards, this Board declares the evidence of the complainant to be
sadly lacking in elements that would qualify the respondent’s failure to operate as wilful and
contumacious. True the respondent did not operate on its certificate from the time it was granted
on August 4, 1971 up to the present. It had not justified its non-operation from said date up to
September 2, 1972. But on September 2, 1972, the respondent justified its non-operation by
writing to the Board, that because of unfinished portions of the road it could not render the service
authorized by the Board to be rendered. The Board never overruled the Respondent.
"Public interest will better be served if respondent is allowed to operate the service authorized in
its certificate of public convenience. To cancel these certificates at a time when the clamor and
demand for such service have been increasing day to day, prodded by the people’s desire to avail
of the excellent road conditions, which in turn conduces to fast and convenient travel, would be
to negate and turn back the clock of progress which has been seeping steadily and constantly to
the long neglected vast communal area that is the Bicol Region. To authorize the operation of
these services will complement the government’s multi-purpose development effort to hasten the
Socio-Economic growth of these areas, notable among which are the Philippines-Japan
Friendship Highway, of which the routes covered by applicant/respondent’s certificates traverse
and the Bicol River Basin Development Project, a program designed to tap the rich natural
resources of the region."
There can be no dispute that the law (Section 16 (n) of the Public Service Act) gives to the BOT
(successor of the Public Service ommission) * ample power and discretion to decree or refuse
the cancellation of a certificate of public convenience issued to an operator as long as there is
evidence to support its action, as held by this Court in a long line of cases, wherein it was even
intimated that in matters of this nature so long as the action is justified this Court will not substitute
its discretion for that of the BOT. The BOT, in refusing to cancel the certificates of public
convenience of BLTB, relied on these pieces of evidence; (1) the letter of BLTB dated September
18, 1972; (2) reports/complaints from the general public; (3) reports of its fieldmen; and (4) its
own observations acquired thru inspection trips, all of which form part of its records. As We have
ruled before, the BOT is particularly a fact-finding body whose decisions on questions regarding
certificates of public convenience are influenced not only by the facts as disclosed by the evidence
in the case before it but also by the reports of its field agents and inspectors that are periodically
submitted to it (see La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Mercado, G.R. No. L-19120,

November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 343). Likewise, the BOT has the power to take into consideration
the result of its own observation and investigation of the matter submitted to it for decision, in
connection with other evidence presented at the hearing of a case (Manila Yellow Taxicab Co.,
Inc., Et. Al. v. N. & B. Stables Co., Inc., 60 Phil. 851 citing Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc., Et. Al.
v. Danon, 58 Phil. 75; Manila Electric Co. v. Balagtas, 58 Phil. 429).
Taking into consideration BLTB’s letter dated September 18, 1972, it acted in good faith when it
did not immediately operate on those lines and not because of a design to prejudice public
interest. Certificates of public convenience involve investment of a big amount of capital, both in
securing the certificate and in maintaining the operation of the lines covered thereby, and mere
failure to operate temporarily should not be a ground for cancellation, especially as when, in the
case at bar, the suspension of the service was directly caused by circumstances beyond the
operator’s control (Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. F.F. Halili, Et Al., 95 Phil. 694). In the
absence of showing that there is willful and contumacious violation on the part of the utility
operator, no certificate of public convenience may be validly revoked (Manzanal v. Ausejo, Et Al.,
G.R. No. L-31056, August 4, 1988, 164 SCRA 36). More importantly, what cannot be ignored is
that the needs of the public are paramount, as elucidated by the BOT in its order. In the exercise
of its power to grant or cancel certificates of public convenience, the BOT is guided by public
necessity and convenience as primary considerations (see Dizon v. Public Service Commission,
Et Al., G.R. No. L-34820, April 30, 1973, 50 SCRA 500).
Apparently, PANTRANCO’s purpose in instituting the proceedings for cancellation of BLTB’s

certificates of public convenience is to remove it (BLTB) as a competitor in the business in which
they are both engaged (see Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. F.F. Halili, Et Al., supra), which is
detestable. Experience has demonstrated that healthy competition always redounds to the benefit
of the commuters and the development of transportation as a whole.
The petition is hereby DISMISSED. The order of the Board of Transportation dated January 4,
1979 is AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued on January 15, 1979 is LIFTED.
Carmelo V. Ramos G.R. No. L-17778

Facts:

The Mayor of Manila issued an E.O. creating a committee the investigate the anomalies involving
the license inspectors and other personnel of the License Inspection Division of the Office of the
City Treasurer and of the License and Permits Division of the office of the Mayor. He Named
Jesus L. Carmelo as chairman of the said committee.
In a statement given to the investigators of the Office of the Mayor, Armando Ramos, a private
citizen working as a bookkeeper in the Casa de Alba, admitted having misappropriated sums of
money given to him by the owner of Casa de Alba for the payment of the latter’s taxes and that
he us used to entertain certain employees in the City Treasurer’s office. With the information, the
committee issued subpoenas to Ramos, in connection with an administrative case against
Crisanta Estanislao but however, Ramos refused to appear.
Claiming that Ramos’ refusal to appear tended to impede, obstruct or degrade the administrative
proceedings, the petitioner filed in the Court of Fist Instance of Manila a petition to declare
Armando Ramos in contempt.
The lower court held that there is no law empowering committees created by municipal mayors
to issue subpoenas and demand that witnesses testify under oath. And to compel Ramos to
confirm this statement in the administrative case against certain employees in the Office of the
City Treasurer would be to compel him to give testimony that could be used against him in a
criminal case for estafa of which the owner of Casa de Alba was the offended party. From that
decision, the petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.
The petitioner invokes Sec. 580 of the Revised Administrative code which provides for Powers
incidental to taking testimony of Administrative Authorities.
ISSUE:
The main issue in this case is WON the power, if any, of committee, like the committee of which
petitioner is the chairman, to subpoena witnesses to appear before it and to ask for their
punishment in case of refusal?
HELD:
The rule is that Rule 64 of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior courts and does
not comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies like the one in this
case, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as
is done in paragraph 2 of Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides as follows:
Powers incidental to taking of testimony. — When authority to take testimony or evidence is

conferred upon an administrative officer or upon any nonjudicial person, committee, or other body,
such authority shall be understood to comprehend the right to administer oaths and summons

witnesses and shall include authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena
duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as
apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character.
One who invokes this provision of the law must first show that he has "authority to take testimony
or evidence" before he can apply to the courts for the punishment of hostile witnesses. There is
nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor creating the committee about such a grant of
power. All that the order gives to this body is the power to investigate anomalies involving certain
city employees. SC does not agree with the petitioner that a delegation of such power to
investigation implies also a delegation of the power to take testimony or evidence of witnesses
whose appearance may be require by the compulsory process of subpoena. Furthermore, it is
doubtful whether the provisions of section 580 of the Administrative Code are applicable to the
City of Manila as these pertain to national bureaus or offices of the government. Even granting
that the Mayor has the implied power to require the appearance of witnesses before him, the rule,
is that the Mayor can not delegate this power to a body like the committee of the petitioner.
Carino v. Commission of Human Rights G.R. No. 96681

Facts:
Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of MPSTA and ACT undertook "mass concerted
actions" after the protest rally without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the
granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions"
consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable
assembly. Secretary of Education issued a return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal and a memorandum
directing the DECS officials and to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply. After
failure to heed the order, the CHR complainant (private respondents) were administratively charged and
preventively suspended for 90 days. After failure to heed the order, the CHR complainant (private
respondents) were administratively charged and preventively suspended for 90 days. The private
respondents moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by the Supreme
Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order. The motion was
denied. The respondent staged a walkout. The case was eventually decided ordering the dismissal of Esber
and suspension of others. The petition for certiorari in RTC was dismissed. Petition for Certiorari to the
Supreme Court was also denied. Respondent complainant filed a complaint on the Commission of Human
Rights alleging they were denied due process and dismissed without due notice. The CHR issued an order
to Cariño to appear and enlighten the Commission so that they can be accordingly guided in its investigation
and resolution of the matter. Sec. Cariño filed a petition to Supreme Court for certiorari and prohibition
whether the CHR has the jurisdiction to try and decide on the issue regarding denial of due process and
whether or not grievances justify their mass action or strike.
Issue: Whether or not the CHR has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide,
hear or determine, certain specific types of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or
political rights? – No

Held:
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claims of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence
and ascertaining therefrom the facts of the controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such,
the faculty of receiving evidence must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively.
The Constitution clearly grants the CHR the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations. But it
cannot try and decide cases (or hear or determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies
do. To investigate is not to adjudicate.
‘Investigate’ means to examine, explore, inquire, or delve or probe into, research on, study. The purpose
of investigation is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the
notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy.
Hence, the CHR, merely having the power to ‘investigate’ cannot and should not “try and resolve the merits”
(adjudicate) the matters involved in the Striking Teachers case as it has announced it has means to do;
and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the
teachers, their human rights has been transgressed.
These matters are within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being in the scope of the
disciplinary powers granted to him by the Civil Service Law.
Evangelista v. Jarencio G.R. No L-29274

Facts: Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, the
President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations
(PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an
investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power
to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence
relevant to the investigation.
Petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando

Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding
him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending
therein.
Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968 with the Court
of First Instance of Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and assailed its legality.

Issue: Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct
of fact-finding investigations.
Held: It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering,
the organization and the analysis of evidence. Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not
only for rulemaking, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for
determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than
illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. An administrative agency may be
authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in
proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial
nature may be taken and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory
nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate
bodies and make recommendations for actions.
We recognize that in the case before us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order
No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer oaths, and
take testimony relevant to the investigation" with the authority "to require the production of documents under
a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as
apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character.".
Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not
adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a
complaint. It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of
law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully
authorized purpose. The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge,
but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies.
There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn statements
implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous transactions fall within
the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando
Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in possession, is reasonably relevant to the investigations.
Quasi-Judicial or Adjudicatory Powers
Midland Insurance v. IAC G.R. No. 71905

G.R. No. 71905 August 13, 1986 MIDLAND INSURANCE CORPORATION
vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS:
On October 1, 1984, a judgment was rendered by the Insurance Commission in favor of complaint-
appellee, Sisenando Villareal, and against herein petitioner Midland Insurance Corporation. Petitioner

received a copy of the decision on October 5, 1984 and it filed a motion for reconsideration of said
judgment on October 17, 1984. This motion was denied in an Order dated October 26, 1984.
On November 7, 1984, petitioner filed with the Insurance Commission its notice of appeal from the
subject decision to respondent Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC).
Petitioner's appeal was initially-accepted by the IAC as can be gleaned from the letter-advice dated
February 8, 1985, notifying petitioner's counsel to file appellant's brief. However, a Motion to Dismiss
appeal dated March 1, 1985 was filed by the complainant-appellee on the ground that the petitioner
herein, as the appellant failed to perfect its appeal within the reglementary period. Despite the
opposition thereto interposed by petitioner Midland Insurance Corporation, the Respondent IAC, on
August 14, 1985 granted the stated Motion to Dismiss on the ground that by said court's computation
of the elapsed period from the date of receipt by herein petitioner of the decision of the Insurance
Commission to the time the notice of appeal was filed before said Commission and notice of appeal
and manifestation submitted to the IAC on December 5, 1984, it would appear that petitioner's appeal
was belatedly made.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner filed its motion with the period prescribed by law?
RULING:
Petitioner herein is correct in maintaining that its appeal was timely filed. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Insurance Commission and advice of such denial was received by
petitioner on October 30, 1984. As petitioner would then have ten (10) days from October 30, 1984 or
until November 9, 1984, its appeal was well within the ten day period within which an appeal can be
made to the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court.
Respondent IAC fell into error because it failed to consider and apply the pivotal Section 2 of R.A.
5434, which recites that "in case a motion for reconsideration is filed within that period of fifteen (15)
days, then within ten (10) days from Notice or publication, when required by law, of the resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration ... ." Respondent's court's failure to do so led to its erroneous
conclusion.
PRINCIPLES:
Section 39 of B.P. Blg. 129, in conjunction with Section 19(a) of the Interim Rules, fixes a uniform
fifteen (15) day period for appeal from notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment or decision
of any court Section 22(c) of the Interim Rules, however, applies in particular to appeals to the
Intermediate Appellate Court from quasi-judicial bodies. Said Section 22(c) explicitly refers to the
provisions of R.A. 5434, of which Section 2 thereof, had already been above cited. There is no
inconsistency between said section and B.P. 129 or its implementing guidelines. B.P. 129 may not be
said to have repealed said provision of R.A. 5434 for the Interim Rules even expressly refer to said
Section 2 of R.A. 5434. Said Section 2 should, therefore, be applied.

Section 2 of R.A. No. 5434 which allows an additional ten (10) days from notice of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration does not extend the period for appeal but merely furnishes an automatic
ten-day allowance in the event that a motion for reconsideration is interposed within the appeal period.
In other words, this particular provision becomes operative only if a motion for reconsideration is filed
during the fifteen-day period. The period for appeal remains untouched by Section 2 of R.A. 5434.
Sandoval v. COMELEC G.R. No. 13384
Ang Tibay v. Commission on Internal Revenue G.R. No. L-46496
Civil Service Commission v. Lucas G.R. No. 127838
Carbonell v. CSC G.R No. 187689

CARBONEL vs CSC
GR No. 187689
September 07, 2010
FACTS:
Clarita Carbonel was an employee of BJMP Makati. She lost the original copy of her Career Service
Professional Certificate of Rating. Hence she was directed to accomplish a verification slip. However the
CSC noticed that Carbonel's personal and physical appearance was entirely different from the picture of
the examinee attached to the application form and the picture seat plan. It was also discovered that the
signature affixed on the application form was different from that appearing on the verification slip.
She was formally charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Falsification of Official
Documents by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. IV. Carbonel admitted to the accusation
by stating that she paid a fixer for her to obtain the career certificate.
The penalty of dismissal from the service, with all its accessory penalties, was imposed on her.
Petitioner appealed, but the CSC dismissed the same for having been filed almost three years from receipt
of the CSCRO IV decision. The CSC did not give credence to petitioner's explanation that she failed to
timely appeal the case because of the death of her counsel.

Petitioner faults the CSC's finding because it was based solely on her uncounseled
admission taken during the investigation by the CSCRO IV. She claims that her right to due process
was violated because she was not afforded the right to counsel when her statement was taken.
ISSUE:
W/N CSC violated Carbonel’s right to due process because she was not afforded the right to
counsel when her statement was taken?
RULING:
NO. It is true that the CSCRO IV, the CSC, and the CA gave credence to petitioner's uncounseled
statements and, partly on the basis thereof, uniformly found petitioner liable for the charge of dishonesty,
grave misconduct, and falsification of official document.
However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is
meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph
(2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but
not to those made in an administrative investigation
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be similar to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that, under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may
not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioner's capacity to
represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel.
The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are
conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures
against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government
service.

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