APPLICATION OF HIGH-SPEED PEER-TO-PEER COMMUNICATIONS FOR
PROTECTION AND CONTROL
A. P. Apostolov
ALSTOM T&D Protection & Control
USA
1. INTRODUCTION
The electric power industry is in the process of
intensive integration of Intelligent Electronic Devices
(IEDs) in substations and power systems. The success of
this effort is to a great extent a function of the
development of a universal platform that will allow
microprocessor based protection and control devices to
interoperate over the substation local area network or the
utility wide area network.
Microprocessor based multifunctional protective relays
are the preferred IEDs in today’s substation integration
or substation automation systems. However, the process
of relay integration is slowed down by the fact, that each
relay manufacturer typically uses a proprietary
communications protocol and user interface software
Interoperability between protective relays from
different manufacturers in the substation becomes a
necessity in order to achieve substation level
interlocking, protection and control functions and
improve the efficiency of microprocessor based relays
applications.
Substation Integration and Automation are becoming
one of the tools that can help a utility to achieve reduced
installation, maintenance and operations costs. This is
possible because of the integration of microprocessor
based devices, particularly protective relays, into
Substation or even Power System Integration Systems.
Protection functions based on exchange of signals
between multiply protection devices exist to day in the
form of wiring between outputs and inputs of the
different IEDs. The goal is to replace such an expensive
hardwired system with exchange of signals between the
relays over the SLAN.
The biggest obstacle in this integration process is the
fact that Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) from
different manufacturers or even from the same vendor
use different communication protocols and different user
Dr. Alexander Apostolov, ALSTOM T&D P&C, 2950 Bentley Ave., Unit 4, Los Angeles, CA 90064, USA
interfaces for real time data acquisition, data archiving,
substation control and fault records extraction. This to a
great extent reduces the benefits of integration because
of the need for additional hardware, such as protocol
converters, software (multiple user interface programs)
and increased engineering and training costs. The
industry is currently in the process of developing a
universal platform that will allow a “plug-and-play”
technology to replace today’s proprietary devices.
This requires a significant joint effort by experts, who
until recently came from completely different fields such
as power system protection, metering, information
systems, communications, energy control systems, etc.
The only solution to this problem is the object-oriented
approach to the client-server and peer-to-peer
communications between IEDs in the substation and the
power system. The development of user friendly graphical
interface to allow the configuration of the protective
device to send and receive control signals over the
network is required as well.
2. INTEGRATED SUBSTATION PROTECTION
AND CONTROL SYSTEM
A simplified diagram of a typical Integrated Substation
Protection and Control Systems is shown on Fig. 1.
It consist of a series of devices interconnected through
one or more Ethernet networks. Such a system has a
hierarchical structure with distributed intelligence and
different level of complexity:
At the bottom of the integrated system are the
multifunctional protective Intelligent Electronic
Devices(IED). Their primary function is to protect
different substation and power system elements such as
transformers, buses, capacitor banks, transmission and
distribution lines.
The protective IEDs however perform this basic
function only when there is a fault, which is an event
with very low probability. At the same time they are
devices with significant processing power and The table below includes the common components
intelligence. This allows their use as the lower level of used to facilitate the GOOSE Class Object.
the hierarchical data acquisition, control, monitoring and Considering the importance of the functions performed
fault recording system. using GOOSE messages, UCA defines very strict
At the next level are Intelligent Electronic Devices that performance requirements. The idea is that the
provide additional digital and analog interface with the implementation of high-speed peer-to-peer
substation environment and at the same provide communications should be equal to or better than what is
protection and control functionality at the bay level in the achievable by existing technology. Thus the total peer-
substation. In the case of an Ethernet based substation to-peer time should not exceed 4 ms [1].
integration architecture both the individual substation Another important requirement for the GOOSE
equipment IEDs and the Bay Controller IEDs are messages is very high reliability. Since the messages are
connected to the same physical LAN. The hierarchy in
not confirmed, but multicasted, and considering the
this case is functional.
importance of a message such as Initiate Breaker Failure
At the top of the multilevel integrated protection and
Protection or Fault in Reverse Direction, there has to be a
control system in the substation is the substation
mechanism to ensure that the receiving IEDs will receive
computer, which provides the Human Machine Interface
with the different IEDs in the substation. It also supports the message and operate as expected.
alarm and event reporting, data archiving, analysis,
monitoring, etc. functions. The advantages of such Table 1 GOOSE
architecture include reduced wiring, improved reliability, structure
better overall protection and control functionality. Common Components Required for GOOSE
The peer-to-peer communications in an integrated Name Description Data Type
substation protection and control system are based on Sending Sending IED IDENT IDENT
what is defined as a GOOSE [1]. This is a Generic IED
Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) and it is t GOOSE Timestamp BTIME6
based upon the asynchronous reporting of an IEDs SqNum Message Sequence INT16U
digital outputs status to other peer devices enrolled to Number
receive it during the configuration stages of the StNum Event Sequence Number INT16U
substation integration process (Fig. 4). It is used to HoldTim Time to Wait before RS INT16U
replace the hard wired control signal exchange between BackTim Time since Event INT16U
IEDs for interlocking and protection purposes and, PhsID Identifies Faulted Phases INT16U
consequently, is mission sensitive, time critical and must DNA Protection DNA BSTR64
be highly reliable. UserSt User defined Bitstring, BSTR256
The associated IEDs receiving the message use the used in bit pairs
contained information to determine what the appropriate
protection response is for the given state. The decision of
To achieve a high level of reliability, messages will be
the appropriate action to GOOSE messages and the
repeated as long as the state persists. To maximize
action to take should a message time out due to a
communication failure is determined by local dependability and security, a message will have a time to
intelligence in the IED receiving the GOOSE message. It live which will be known as “hold time”. After the hold
can be used for Breaker Failure Protection to trip the time expires the message (status) will expire unless the
adjacent breakers or to provide distribution or same status message is repeated or a new message is
transmission bus protection based on GOOSE messages received prior to the expiration of the hold time.
from the feeder protection IEDs. The repeat time for the initial GOOSE message will be
short and subsequent messages have an increase in repeat
MAINTENANCE
SCADA
and hold times until a maximum is reached. The GOOSE
Local Control Computer (OPTIONAL) Master

HMI RCC
message contains information (Table 1) that will allow
MMS CLIENT
the receiving IED to know that a message has been
Printer
LCC FRAD
missed, a status has changed and the time since the last
ROUTER

(ALTERNATE)
WAN
status change.
• • • FRAD
In order to achieve high speed performance and at the
FRAD same time reduce the network traffic during severe fault
ETHERNET
HUB A • • • • •
ETHERNET conditions, the GOOSE message has been designed
HUB B
based on the idea to have a single message that conveys
• • •
SYMMETRY
• • • all required protection scheme information regarding an
IED
A1 A2 A3 An
IED
B1 B2 B3 Bn
individual protection IED. It represents a state machine
that reports the status of the devices in the IED to its
Fig. 1 Typical UCA substation integration system peers. To allow further customization of the GOOSE
topology
messages, individual applications can map other status
points to the User Defined bit pairs UserSt.
High-speed peer-to-peer communications can be
implemented in different kinds of distributed bus
protection schemes as a function of the substation
configuration and the type of protected bus.
An example for the use of GOOSE messages in
distribution protection is a blocking scheme used to
provide protection for faults on a distribution bus. For a
fault on any distribution feeders the feeder relay will
send a blocking GOOSE message to the relay at the low
side of the transformer. If the fault is on the bus, none of
the distribution relays will operate and the transformer
relay will not receive any blocking signal. It will
determine that this is a distribution bus fault and will
send a GOOSE message to trip the transformer breaker
and clear the fault.
Another example can be a transmission bus protection
scheme based on the exchange of directional signals
between the individual protective IEDs and the
transmission bus bay controller IED described below.
3. DISTRIBUTED BUS PROTECTION
The protection and control in substations is distributed
in nature by the fact that each protective relay is
designed in general to provide primary protection of an
individual substation equipment such as transmission and
distribution lines, transformers, capacitor banks, etc.
The only substation equipment that requires a
centralized form of protection is the busbar.
Transmission buses are typically protected by bus
differential protection relays. They require current
signals from each primary equipment connected to the
bus to be available at the central location of the bus
differential protection. The scheme becomes much more
complicated and expensive if the current transformer
ratios are different. Things get even worse if the bus
differential protection is used in a substation where the
bus configuration may change.
Fig. 2 Distributed bus protection during line fault
The concept of Distributed Intelligence in protection is
very well illustrated by a distributed bus protection. It
uses advanced high speed directional detection
algorithms based on superimposed components of the
currents and voltages calculated by multiple protective
relays connected to the substation LAN (Fig. 2 and 3)
In case of a fault on any of the protected elements, one
or more IEDs will see a fault in the forward direction
(Fig. 2). Each of the relays protecting transmission lines
or transformers, or installed on tie breakers connected to
the protected bus will send a GOOSE message indicating
the detection of a fault, combined with the fault direction
determined by the relay, In this case one or more relays
will detect a forward fault and the rest will see a reverse
fault, indicating to the bay controller IED that this is an
external to the distributed bus protection fault.
If the fault is on the bus, all IEDs will see a reverse
fault or no fault (if connected to a weak source), i.e. no
IED will see a forward fault (Fig. 3).
Fig. 3 Distributed bus protection during bus fault
The bay controller IED has to be programmed to
subscribe to GOOSE messages from all IEDs with high
speed directional detection elements connected to the
protected bus. In case of a fault, the distributed bus
protection function in the bay controller IED monitors
the GOOSE messages coming from the individual relays
included in the distributed bus protection function of the
system. If all messages indicate reverse or no-fault
condition and none gives a forward fault direction, the
bus protection function identifies a bus fault and sends a
communication message to trip all breakers connected to
the bus.
4. DISTRIBUTION BUS PROTECTION
Because of the high cost and the increased
requirements for maintenance, in many cases bus
differential protection is not installed on distribution or
subtransmission buses. As a result, bus faults are cleared
by backup relays with longer fault clearing times. This
becomes a significant power quality problem because of
the increased duration of deep voltage sags.
This problem is easily resolved by a distributed
distribution bus protection. This application is again
based on the high speed peer-to-peer GOOSE
communications described above.
 In case of a fault on any of the protected distribution
feeders, one of the feeder IEDs will see a fault in the
forward direction (Fig. 4). However, if the fault is on the
bus (Fig. 5), no feeder protection IED will see a fault (we
assume that the distribution feeders are not connected to
a remote source), i.e. only the transformer, or incomer
protection IED will see a fault.
In case of a distribution feeder fault, a distributed bus
protection function in a bay controller IED or a
transformer protection IED monitors the GOOSE
messages coming from the individual relays included in
the distributed protection function of the distribution bus.
Fig. 4 Distribution bus protection during feeder fault
If there are no messages that indicate distribution
feeder fault condition and none gives an out of service
indication, the bus protection function identifies a bus
fault and sends a communication message to trip the
transformer breaker connected to the bus. A small time
delay is required in order to ensure that all feeder relays
have had sufficient time to detect the fault and send the
GOOSE message if they detect a fault on the feeder they
protect.
Fig. 5 Distribution bus protection during bus fault
All relays protecting feeder equipment connected to the
bus act in this application as the sending IEDs, while the
bay controller or the transformer relay is the receiving
IED.
The peer to peer communications based distribution
bus protection operating time is based on the operating
time of the fault detectors in the distribution feeder
relays, the safety margins and the time for sending,
receiving and processing the GOOSE message by the
receiving IED. We can assume that a typical
microprocessor based feeder protection relay will detect
a feeder fault condition in about 1.5 cycles.
The time for transmission of the communication
message results in the addition of 0.25 cycle (4-5 ms).
The time to process the GOOSE message (we can
assume a time of 0.5 cycle in the relay performing the
distribution bus protection function) ensures a total worst
case maximum operating time of 2.5 cycles. The typical
operating time is expected to be about 2 cycles.
The benefit of the peer-to-peer communications based
distributed bus protection is that it provides fast fault
clearance for distribution bus faults without the need for
any additional protection equipment (if the function is
implemented in a bay controller IED). It replaces a high
or low impedance transmission bus protection device and
in some cases may eliminate the need for addition or
replacement of current transformers.
5. SYMPATHETIC TRIP SCHEME
Another example of high-speed communications
application for protection in substations is the so called
Sympathetic Trip Scheme.
Fig. 6 Sympathetic Trip Scheme
In case of a fault on a distribution feeder in a substation
with predominantly motor load, the voltage sag caused
by the fault and the following clearing of the fault will
result in a load inrush condition that may lead to the
undesired tripping of unfaulted feeders. In order to
prevent this, the relay that detects the fault and issues the
trip signal to clear it will have to send at the same time a
GOOSE message to all other relays connected to the
distribution bus (Fig. 6) to block them for a certain time
in a manner similar to the Cold Load Pickup logic of
distribution feeder relay. Actually, the Trip signal itself
can be considered as a blocking signal for all other relays
on the bus.
 In conventional systems this will require physical relay
outputs to be wired with inputs of all the other relays
connected to the distribution bus. Multicasting the Trip
(or Block) signal from the relay protecting the faulted
distribution feeder saves all the required wiring. The only
requirement is that all relays connected to other feeders
on the same distribution bus will have to subscribe to
receive GOOSE messages from all other IEDs connected
to the segment of the distribution LAN.
This will require all relays connected to the same
distribution bus to subscribe for the Trip or the Block
message from all other protection IEDs on the same bus.
6. BREAKER FAILURE PROTECTION
Breaker Failure Protection is a very important function
in an integrated substation protection and control system.
It can be designed in two different ways - as a built-in
function in the protection IED that detected the fault and
issued the trip signal or as a function in another IED that
initiates the Breaker Failure Protection when it sees the
Trip signal from the relay protecting the faulted power
system device.
Fig. 7 Breaker Failure Protection
Fig. 7 shows an example of a Breaker Failure
Protection scheme based on an external device.
The performance of the different elements of the
distributed breaker failure protection scheme is as
follows:
The relay will detect a fault condition on the protected
line and based on the coordination or whatever else
setting requirements will issue a trip signal in order to
clear the fault. This can be a GOOSE message with the
Trip bit pair indicating the operation of the Trip Output
function of the IED. The bay controller that implements
the distributed breaker failure function will subscribe to
this message, and as soon as it is received will start the
breaker failure timer. If the breaker fails to trip, the BFR
will indicate a breaker failure and will send a GOOSE
message to the substation LAN to trip adjacent breakers
in order to clear the fault.
In some cases the BFR function in the bay controller
can also send a Trip GOOSE to the network that will
attempt to re-trip the faulted feeder breaker through a
different physical connection or another breaker IED
connected to the substation LAN.
7. UNDERFREQUENCY LOAD SHEDDING
There are two main methods for underfrequency load
shedding in substations:
Distributed - when each distribution feeder is equipped
with a simple load-shedding function that trips its
associated circuit breaker in an attempt to restore the
balance between generation and load. Typically these
relays will require no peer-to-peer communications with
the exception when the breaker operation is controlled by
a breaker IED. The underfrequency function is usually a
simple frequency element.
A more advanced underfrequency load shedding
scheme is based on a multifunctional voltage/frequency
relay that combines measurements of the frequency, rate
of change of frequency and the average rate of change of
the frequency. They are combined in a programmable
scheme logic with under voltage elements, that allows
the development of a very sophisticated load shedding
scheme.
Fig. 8 Underfrequency Load Shedding
As soon as the underfrequency load shedding function
detects that there is an unbalance in the system that can
be controlled by load shedding, it will send a GOOSE
message to the network with a bit pair set in order to
indicate which group of loads has to be shed.
Individual feeder protection IEDs will have to
subscribe to their load shedding group bit pair and as
soon as they see this change of state in the multicasted
GOOSE message, they will trip their associated breaker.
8. ADAPTIVE LOAD SHEDDING
Centralized load-shedding schemes in the substation
can use high-speed-peer-to-peer signals to trip a selected
group of breakers in the substation if they receive a load-
shedding command from the electric power system
remedial action schemes during wide spread power
system disturbances. In this case the systems or different
parts of the system are not separated, so the changes in
the frequency are not significant enough to result in the
operation of the underfrequency load shedding scheme.
The Adaptive Load Shedding function is located at the
substation controller. It continuously monitors the
loading of the individual feeders in the substation and
calculates the optimal grouping of different sets of
feeders in such a way, that when a load shedding request
is received for a specific amount of load from the
Remedial Action or other special protection scheme, it
will multicast a GOOSE message that will result in the
tripping of the breakers of the feeders in a predefined
group.
Fig. 9 show a centralized Adaptive Load-Shedding
scheme based on high speed peer-to-peer
communications.
The load-shedding request is received from a higher
level of the power system protection and control
hierarchy and includes the required amount of load to be
shed in the substation.
The control signal is received through a router from the
utility wide area network by a communications IED
connected to the substation local area network.
Fig. 9 Centralized Adaptive Load Shedding
Based on the command the communications IED will
send a GOOSE message to the Substation Controller.
Multiple bit pairs from the User Defined group of the
DNA are used to specify the amount of load that will be
shed.
The load-shedding optimization algorithm runs every
time when there is a change in the load on any of the
distribution feeders included in the load-shedding
scheme. This procedure is repeated for each amount of
load that might be requested by the remedial action or
other special protection scheme.
As soon as the control signal is received, the substation
will pickup the load-shedding group of feeders that as
closely as possible matches the load-shedding request
and will send a GOOSE message indicating which
feeders will be operated.
The distribution protection IEDs will have to be
configured to subscribe to this GOOSE message and to
monitor a specific bit pair that indicates that the feeder
needs to be tripped.
9. CONCLUSIONS
Substation Integration and Automation are becoming
one of the tools that can help a utility to achieve reduced
installation, maintenance and operations costs. This is
possible because of the integration of microprocessor
based devices, particularly protective relays, into
Substation or even Power System Integration Systems.
Interoperability between protective relays from
different manufacturers in the substation becomes a
necessity in order to achieve substation level
interlocking, protection and control functions and
improve the efficiency of microprocessor based relays
applications.
High speed peer-to-peer communications between
IEDs connected to the substation LAN based on
exchange of GOOSE messages can successfully be used
for different protection and control applications such as
the protection of distribution buses, adaptive protection
or load-shedding in substations with varying
configuration.
Such systems provide some significant advantages over
conventional centralized systems used to perform the
same functions in the substations:
• Reduced wiring, installation, maintenance and
commissioning costs
• Easy adaptation to changing bus configuration
in the substation
Peer-to-peer communications messages indicating
change of status of substation breakers that affect the
levels of ground currents for faults on transmission or
distribution lines can be used to adapt the relay settings
in order to optimize the ground overcurrent protection
performance.
Centralized load-shedding schemes in the substation
can use high-speed-peer-to-peer signals to trip a selected
group of breakers in the substation if they receive a load-
shedding command from the electric power system
remedial action schemes during wide spread power
system disturbances.
Testing of high speed peer-to-peer based protection and
control systems presents new challenges to protection
engineers and requires strict methodology, dedicated
tools, understanding of the integration strategy and
modern project management.
Reference: :
1. Generic Object Models for Substation and
Feeder Equipment (GOMSFE), Version 0.91
2. Substation Integrated Protection, Control and
Data Acquisition, Phase 1, Task 2, Requirements
Specification, Preliminary Report, Version 1.0