KANT’S NON-CONSEQUENTIALIST ETHICS: DO YOUR DUTY

Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe…
the starry heavens above and the moral law within. (Immanuel Kant)

For the consequentialist, the rightness of an action depends entirely on the effects of that action
(or of following the rule that governs it). Good effects make the deed right; bad effects make the
deed wrong. But for the nonconsequentialist , the rightness of an action can never be measured
by such a variable, contingent standard as the quantity of goodness brought into the world.
Rightness derives not from the consequences of an action but from its nature. An action is right
or wrong not because of what it produces but because of what it is.

The German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) sought to make reason the
foundation of morality. For him reason alone leads us to the right and the good. Therefore to
discover the true path we need not appeal to utility, religion tradition, authority, desires or
intuition. We need only heed the dictates of reason, for reason informs us of the moral law.
Because of each person’s capacity for reason, he or she is a sovereign in the moral realm, a
supreme judge of what morality demands, and what morality demands is enshrined in the moral
law.

Good Will

In his most celebrated work in moral philosophy entitled The Groundwork to the
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant aims to lay out the fundamental rational character of moral thought
and action. He begins with an argument that material benefits and personal talents may be used
well or badly and hence cannot constitute the fundamental principle of good and evil. However,
wealthy or talented we may be, such benefits can be abused. Great wealth can deliberately be
squandered on worthless trivia or used to corrupt and belittle others. High levels of intelligence
can be employed to evil ends, as when criminals exploit their mastery of electronics or complex
financial systems. Material goods, natural talents and acquired skills cannot be the fundamental
standard. What can it be?

According to Kant, it cannot also be the goal to which wealth and talent are put because,
however we carefully plan our actions, it is impossible to guarantee their outcome. If we have a
good intention in what we try to do, but “by a particularly unfortunate fate or the niggardly-
provision of a step-motherly nature” we are unable to accomplish the end in view, the good will
that we had would still “sparkle as a jewel in its own right, as something that had full worth in
itself” (Kant, Foundations to the Metaphysics of Morals). The following examples will make
this clear:

Example 1. Suppose someone works for an international charity, collecting money and
organizing supplies of medicines for refugee camps. In the wake of a great disaster, she makes a
Herculean effort and manages to fund and dispatch massive quantity of much needed medicine.
Through no fault of hers, however, the storage facilities fail and the medicines become
contaminated. Unfortunately, unaware of their poor condition, the aide workers nonetheless
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administer them to the refugees. The result is that the death rate in the camps rises to a level far
higher than it would have done if no medicines at all had been sent. This is, of course, a great
tragedy. Yet, even if the charity worker feels guilty, she is not actually responsible for this
terrible outcome. The real fault must be laid at the door of “a particularly unfortunate fate or the
niggardly-provision of a step-motherly nature,” and her efforts towards an end that failed to
materialize, would “still sparkle as a jewel . . . that had full worth in it.”

Example 2. Kant would make the same point with respect to the reverse kind of case.
Suppose I maliciously recommend to someone I secretly loathe that he should invest his few
savings in what I believe to be a hopeless commercial venture. As it happens, a series of
unpredictable events turns the venture into an outstanding success. He becomes a very wealthy
man who devotes much of his wealth to charitable causes. By this devious route, my evil
intention has produced great benefit to him and to others. Nevertheless, I cannot claim good
outcome to my credit, and the mere fact that it happened does not mitigate any of the wickedness
of my original action.

Motive and outcome or consequences, then, need to be separated. What matters most is
It is not successful action that matters ultimately. This is because, in the the motive behind the
first example, the unfortunate consequences did nothing to sully the fine act not its outcome.
nature of the motive, and in the second example, the beneficial results did
nothing to alter its evil character. Thus, it seems to be the motive behind an action (what Kant
calls “will”), rather than the success or failure of that action, that is all important. So we have to
look into the motive for us to determine the moral worth of the act.

Motive. The charity worker discussed above can fail to bring about her good intentions
yet remain, so to speak, morally unscathed. But if we were to discover that her reason for
attempting the relief work in the first place had nothing to do with the welfare of those involved
but was rather a way of trying to win personal fame and glory, this would seriously undermine
the moral merits of what she was doing. Such motive completely destroys the moral worth of
her actions. Moreover, the moral merit and demerit attached to actions are not to be based on
feelings or inclinations of the doer of the action since feelings and inclinations cannot be
commanded, whereas action can. They just come to us. You cannot make yourself glad to see
someone, but you can nonetheless welcome them. In other words, whatever your feelings, it is
still up to you to decide whether or not to act on them. We cannot be held responsible for what
we feel, which just come to us, but with what we do with what we feel. It is action not sentiment
that determines moral worth.
What is right ought
And what matters fundamentally is that people should will to do to be done simply
what is right because it is right. What is right ought to be done simply
because reason recognizes it to be the right thing to do. Whether or not because it is right.
their natural inclinations support or oppose this and whether their good intentions come off or
not are both irrelevant. The first (inclination) is irrelevant because we cannot command our
feelings; the second is irrelevant because we cannot completely control the world about us. The
only thing wholly within our control, and hence the only thing for which we can be praised or
blamed from a moral point of view, is the will. If a person does what is right simply because he
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like doing that kind of action (that is, his inclinations lead him in that direction) or because doing
it serves his self-interest, there is nothing morally admirable about him.

Reason, Duty, and Goodwill. Having a good will is a necessary condition for being a
good person, and it is a sufficient condition. This is why Kant says that it is only a good will
that can be unqualifiedly good, and that the unqualifiedly good will is doing your duty for duty’s
sake. But what is the individual person’s duty? A duty implies an ought to be done. It is an
imperative for action that originates from the rational will.

For Kant, man as a rational being acts for a reason. Man therefore is a rational will, i.e.,
his is a will guided or determined by reason. Such is the nature of man. To be true to his nature
as a rational will his actions must be guided by a rational principle in the form of a moral
principle, rule or law. Man has to set up valid absolute moral principles or rules to guide his
actions basing solely on his rationality without reference to any supernatural being or by
empirical evidence (absolute here means unquestionable, positive, certain and unconditional.)
Such rational principles that are directives for his actions are commands of reason of which
man as a rational being ought to obey. As commands of reason, the moral laws are sacred
(inviolable), and man’s attitude towards it man must be that of reverence.

Man ought to respect his rational nature. It is his moral obligation to self. Self-respect
is shown by reverence for the moral principle/rule/law formulated by his own reason; and
reverence for the law is self-respect. Thus, man has the moral duty to act out of respect or act out
of reverence for the moral rule irrespective of inclinations, circumstances and consequences.

The inner moral worth of the action of man, therefore, is

Good will means striving
to be found in the moral law and in his reverence for it. Even if an
individual were unable to carry out what duty required of him, he with all one’s power and
must be judged from the moral point of view, to be a good person determination to do what is
as long as he “summoned all efforts to do his duty.” Goodwill right, that is, performing the
does not have to be understood as simply wishing well or having duty of acting out of
good intentions. It means rather striving with all one’s power and reverence for the moral rule.
determination to perform the duty of acting out of reverence for
the moral rule, or the duty of acting as a matter of moral principle. And the attitude of the person
of good will is that of having a deep sense of the binding obligation to act out of reverence for
the moral rule.

How do we go about setting up this set of rational principles or moral rules that will
determine our action? According to Kant, before we about to make a moral decision, we must
ask first, “What is the moral rule authorizing this act I am about to perform?” Then, we have to
formulate a maxim. A maxim is a personal rule we follow whenever we do something. For
Kant, every action implies a general rule or maxim, which is a description of what and why we
do something as shown in the diagram below:

Humans as rational beings Each “reason” can be stated as Each MAXIM states
ACT for REASONS. a rule. This rule is called 1) WHAT the action is, &
MAXIM 2) WHY it is being done.
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Certain conditions must be satisfied by a personal rule, a maxim, if it is to be a valid moral rule.
It has to pass the test of the supreme principle, the ultimate criterion of morality, which, for Kant,
is an a priori moral law—the categorical imperative.
Hypothetical and Categorical Imperatives

Practical reason intends to come up with a conclusion about what ought to be done in the here
and now (e.g., you ought to study before leaving). The conclusions of practical reason as
imperatives (directives about what to do) come in two different types. The first is the
hypothetical imperative, the force of which depends on our having the appropriate desire as
shown:

“If you want to run in the marathon, you ought to start training.”(Hypothetical
imperative)

As shown above, the imperative for action, the ‘ought to do’ (which in this case is training), is
conditioned on the strength of the desire (to run in the marathon). In contrast, categorical
imperatives do not rest upon any hypothetical conditions (expressed in the if clause). Their
logical force or strength holds irrespective of individual desires.

“You ought to visit your neighbor in hospital, because you promised to.”
“But I don’t want to.”
“Whether you want to or not, you ought to keep your promise.” (Categorical imperative)

A hypothetical imperative therefore is an expression of a Hypothetical Imperative

command which is conditional on inclinations or purposes. It is a takes the form, Do this in
conditional directive which advises us what ought to be done if a order to achieve that,
desired goal is to be achieved. By contrast, categorical imperative
is an unconditional directive that prescribes actions to be done while Categorical
because of the moral worth of the maxim and not for the sake of Imperative simply says,
some consequence that may result. It is not of the form ‘Do this in Do this.
order to achieve that’, but simply ‘Do this’.
Overriding principles take
With the discovery of categorical imperatives, Kant precedence over other
thought, we have reached the heart of morality. Categorical
considerations.
imperatives transcend our wants and desires by presenting us with
rational principles of action in the light of which those desires are to be assessed. Philosophers
usually express this by saying that such principles of conduct are overriding, that is, they take
precedence over other sorts of consideration when we are deciding what to do.

In fact, this idea of overriding principles of conduct fits rather well with a view that many
people have about morality, namely that it is a more important dimension to human behavior that
any other. If we show that some proposal is likely to be unprofitable or unpopular, we are
providing reasons against it, but we are not providing overriding reasons, because considerations
of profit and mere popularity should not take precedence over what is morally required of us.
The profit motive is a rational one to have, but it must take second place to honesty. In short
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moral integrity requires us to give second place to popularity, profitability, convenience, and all
sorts of personal advantage.
The First Formulation of Categorical Imperative: Universality Principle

Act only on the maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will
that it should become a universal law.

A maxim for Kant is a personal rule that states the reason a person in a certain situation
has for doing what she or he plans to do. A maxim would “become a universal law” if every
person in a similar situation choose to do the same thing for the same reason.

Examples may help to clarify the meaning of Kant’s principle. One such example is on
promise-making. A man has the opportunity to borrow money with a promise to repay, though
he knows that in fact he will never be able to repay it. He is nonetheless tempted, a promise that
he cannot keep, but he asks himself whether this would be morally right. He thus has to establish
a universal rule that states that, “Everyone who is in want of money shall borrow money and
promise to repay it although he knows he can never do so.” But once it becomes a universal law
of nature, it will immediately lead to the collapse of the institution of promise-making, since
lenders would know that the money would not be repaid and would refuse to lend. Not only
does it make promise-making impossible, it also renders impossible borrowing money which is
the reason for promising. The maxim, hence, is self-defeating. It contradicts itself, and fails to
pass the categorical imperative test. Thus, making a promise that one knows will be broken is
morally wrong.

Another is that of a prosperous man who sees many others around him in poverty and
hardship, but says, “What concern is that of mine? I have no desire to contribute to the welfare
of the needy, and should I fall on hard times, I have no intention of calling upon others myself.”
This anti-charity maxim (personal rule) can be universalized without contradiction of reason. It
is possible to imagine a world where everyone is uncharitable. Yet, it is impossible to will that,
through your will, such a world come into existence. For then you would have robbed yourself
of the help and sympathy of others which you are likely to have when times get hard. In this
example a person’s reason for acting then must be “reversible”: One must be willing to have all
others use those reasons even against oneself. There is an obvious similarity, then, between the
categorical imperative and the so-called golden rule: “Do unto others as you would have them
do unto you.”

The first formulation of the categorical imperative, then, incorporates two criteria for
determining moral right and wrong—universalizability and reversibility. Principle of
Universality, and Principle of Autonomy of the Will underlie these two criteria.

Principle of Universality: Universalizability without Contradiction of Reason. One

essential characteristic of morality is that it is a duty to action, an unconditional categorical
imperative to act. This command proceeds from the rational will. As proceeding from the
rational will categorical imperative is an unconditional exigency or demand of reason. Since it is
the unconditional demand of reason itself, it must be universal, i.e., applicable to all human
beings, and capable of validation in all cases. Morality then is essentially an imperative for
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action capable of universal validation. In other words, my action is moral insofar as I can say
that any human being in my place should act in the same way.

Moreover, as demand of reason, it must not contain logical contradiction. That is, it must
not contradict the very meaning or nature of the act as shown in the first example. Nor must it
contradict and, thus, defeat the very reason for acting once applied universally.

Principle of Autonomy of the Will: Reversibility or Universal Acceptability. Man as a

rational agent has autonomy of the will, which refers to his capacity as a rational agent to
prescribe to himself what he must do. An autonomous will, therefore, is a self-directive will.
This capacity may be viewed as an individual’s power to give or withhold his assent concerning
the reasons that are proposed for doing a certain kind of action. Whatever reasons of a moral
kind are suggested, by oneself or by others, as reasons for acting with respect to a given
situation, one’s autonomous will must make the final decision to accept or to reject those reasons
as one’s own.

If a rule of conduct were imposed upon by a person by someone else’s will (for instance,
by the will of the State, by the will of parents, or by God’s will, it could not be a moral rule
unless it is recognized by the person himself as validly binding upon him. Absence of such
recognition would mean that he sees himself as being manipulated by others and pressured,
coerced or forced to obey their will. He would not think of himself as under a moral duty to obey
the rule. He would conform to it out of self-interest as a way of avoiding unpleasant
consequences of disobedience. So for a maxim to qualify as a universal rule of morality it must
be capable of providing a moral reason for acting which the person can freely subscribe to. The
person then can voluntarily decide to use the rule as an action guide in his own life.

Moreover, though a person does freely choose to follow a certain rule as an action guide
in his own life, this rule would not still be a moral rule unless it is adopted by the person in a
specific way—he must commit himself to it as a normative principle of conduct. This means the
moral agent recognizes of the rule as validly binding upon him. To accept a rule in this manner is
to make a deep commitment of one’s whole self with respect to all future actions that might fall
under the rule. It is only when he accepts a set of rules in this manner can the rules operate as
moral principles in his life. And a rule accepted this way ceases to be merely an external rule
imposed by other wills but a rule he imposes to himself. It is a rule that proceeds from his
rational will since he recognizes the moral rule as binding upon him only to the extent that it
expresses what he accepts as a valid moral reason for doing what it tells him to do. For if he does
not accept such reasons, he would not think of himself as morally obligated to comply with the
rule. It is his own will—not anyone else’s—which is the source of his obligation to follow the
rule. In other words, he is prescribing the rule to himself; he is his own legislator. But if the rule
binds him as a rational being and not as an individual with a unique personality, it binds
everyone else as a rational being—again disregarding their individual personalities (this is
implied when we say no one is above the law). Thus is prescribing the rule to himself, he is
prescribing it to everyone. By imposing upon himself an obligation to follow it, he imposes the
same obligation upon all others. (This explains the moral indignation of honest students against
those who cheat during exams, or of a hardworking man against the corrupt government
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officials, or of those who remain faithful in relationships to acts of infidelities. We want others
to adhere to the same moral standard we live by).

Since the moral rule proceeds from the rational will, it is thus a universal law which man
as rational will legislate himself. Morality hence is not a matter of rules imposed upon man by
some external force or authority. It is man himself as rational will acting in conformity with the
immanent unconditional exigencies of reason itself, in view of the end or ends posited or
demanded by reason. As a rational will, then, we can say that man is or should be his own law.
Kant calls this the law of autonomy. Morality therefore only demands what man ought to demand
of himself and of others as rational will.

And if all men were to prescribe rules binding upon themselves, each would be a
sovereign because he would be a creator of the rules, and each would be subject because he
would be under an obligation to obey the rules. Furthermore, the duty for one member of such a
rule-governed community would be a duty for everyone else, since the same rule would
prescribe to everyone equally. No one would be exempt from the obligation to obey, and no one
would have rules imposed against his (rational) will. Each would therefore have the same worth
as a person. There would be no inferiors or superiors. No individual and no group would have
special privileges, that is, privileges not granted to everyone alike. No one would be permitted to
use another merely as a means to his own ends, since no one would be willing to set up a rule
allowing others to use him merely as a means to their ends. In such a community of rational
beings, the autonomy of the will is the ground of individual worth. This is Kant’s vision of the
community of all moral beings, a community that includes everyone whose conduct falls within
the scope of the Categorical Imperative. He calls this community a kingdom of ends. This leads
us to the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative.

The Second Formulation of Categorical Imperative: Principle of Humanity as Ends

“Act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other,
never merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end.”

This statement of the categorical imperative reflects Kant’s view of the status of rational
beings, or persons. Persons have intrinsic value and dignity because they, unlike the rest of
creation, are rational agents who are free to choose their own ends, legislate their own moral
laws, and assign value to things in the world. As a moral being that possesses dignity and infinite
intrinsic worth the human is an end in himself/herself.

Persons not only have the intrinsic worth – they also have equal intrinsic worth. Each
rational being has the same inherent value as every rational being. This equality of value cannot
be altered by, and has no connection to social and economic status, racial and ethnic
considerations, or the possession of prestige or power. Any two persons are entitled to the same
moral rights, even if one is rich, wise, powerful and famous – and the other is not.

Thus, to treat a person as an end is to recognize him/her as having unconditional worth. Such
recognition means among other things that one act toward the other in such a way as always to
respect the other’s autonomy as a self-directed agent, thinker and valuer. This means that human
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beings have an equal dignity that sets them apart from things such as tools or machines. Thus,
when a person is treated as if he were a thing having only conditional worth his very autonomy is
violated. For then he is being used for purposes that he has not chosen for himself or willingly
accepted as purposes of his own. In exploiting or manipulating a person is not only getting him
to do what one wants him to do; one is also refusing to take into consideration the person’s
subjectivity, i.e., the person’s own thoughts and feelings about the matter. This implies further
that persons should not be manipulated, deceived, or otherwise unwillingly exploited to satisfy
the self-interest of another. They should not be treated as objects incapable of free choice.

To reiterate since people are by nature free, rational and equal, we treat them merely as
means if we do not respect these attributes – if for example, interfere with people’s right to
make informed choices by lying to them, inhibit their free and autonomous action by enslaving
or coercing them, or violate their equality by discriminating against them. For Kant, lying or
breaking a promise is wrong because to do so is to use people merely as a means to an end,
rather than as an end in themselves. Moreover, we also do not treat them as ends when we fail
to extend needed help to another person thereby limiting what that person is free to choose to do.

Hence, “treating humanity as an end” means that everyone should treat each human being
as a being whose existence as a free rational person should be promoted. For Kant, this means
only two things:
a) Respect each person’s freedom by treating people only as they have freely consented
to be treated beforehand;
b) Develop each person’s capacity to freely choose the aims to pursue.

Kant’s second version of the categorical imperative can then be expressed in the following
principle:

An action is morally right for a person if, and only if, in performing the action, the person
does not use others merely as a means for advancing his or her own interests, but also
respect and develop their capacity to choose freely for themselves.

The second formulation of the categorical imperative, according to Kant, is really

equivalent to the first. The first version says that what it is morally right for me must be morally
right for others: Everyone is of equal value. If this is so, then no person’s freedom should be
subordinated to that of others so that the person is used merely to advance the interests of others.
Because I am of value, I cannot sacrifice myself to mere self-interest. This, of course, is what the
second version of the categorical imperative requires. Both formulations come down to the
same thing: People are to treat each other as free and equal in the pursuit of their interests.

Ground of the Categorical Imperative. The source and ground of the categorical
imperative and, thus, the ground of morality is man as a rational will, as freedom. Man as a
freedom, as a spiritual being belongs to a human community, governed by the laws of
universality, law of autonomy, law of man as an end in himself. These are the very laws of
men’s being as rational wills. But what can explain the unconditional and categorical nature and
absoluteness of moral imperatives? If he must be true to himself as reason and freedom, he must
follow the laws of universality, autonomy and kingdom of ends; he must follow, thus, the various
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formulations of the categorical imperative. Hence, the necessity of respecting and upholding
one’s human dignity and nature as reason and freedom explains the unconditional and
categorical nature of moral imperatives.

But why must man unconditionally and absolutely be true to himself as a reason and
freedom? Why should he not choose to forsake his calling to be true to himself as reason and
freedom?

Evaluation

Weakness of Kant’s Duty Ethics:

Conflict of Duties. One significant problem with Kant’s ethical system is that Kant does
not provide a way of resolving conflict of duties and moral rules. For instance, he argued that
one should not break a promise since it would lead to inconsistency or contradiction of reason.
Also, Kant reasoned, you cannot universalize the rule: “Never break promises except when it is
inconvenient for you to keep them” because promises then would have no meaning.

Suppose, however, that not breaking a promise would result in someone being seriously
injured or even killed. According to Kant, we have to keep the promise, and because
consequences do not matter, an innocent person would simply have to be hurt or killed. But
which is, in fact, more important: keeping a promise or preventing an innocent person from
being injured or killed? Kant does not tells us how to choose between conflicting duties so as to
obey different but equally absolute rules. We have a duty to protect the innocent from being
injured or killed and a duty not to break promises, but which takes precedence when the two
duties conflict? A defender of Kant, however, counters this criticism by holding that Kant’s
categorical imperative is intended to tell us how conflicting duties and moral rules should be
balanced against each other. How will the Categorical Imperative do that?

Humans Have Different Rationalities. Kant also made the wrong assumption that all
rationalities are the same and are using the same logic. This is due to the fact that his exposure
was only to European culture of his time. He was not aware of pluralism of cultures, and thus, of
rationalities. Considering the differences of rationalities one cannot simply craft a law on his
own and be universally applied. Formulating a law would demand constant dialoguing with
people who will be subjected to the law.

Strengths:

Interior Motives. Kant’s categorical imperative captures some fundamental aspects of

our moral views. One is that it gives importance to interior motives. Unlike the principle of
utilitarianism, Kant’s categorical imperative focuses on a person’s interior motivations and not
on the consequences of external actions. Moral right and wrong, according to Kantian theory,
are distinguished not by what a person accomplishes, but by the reasons the person has for the
action. A person’s action has “moral worth” only to the degree that it is also motivated by a
sense of “duty,” that is, a belief that it is the right way for all persons to behave.
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Universal aspect of morality and laws and Impartiality. Kant’s first version of the
categorical imperative rests firmly on universality. Frequently, for example, we say to a person
who has done something wrong or who is about to do something wrong: “How would you like it
if he did that to you?” Or “How would you like it if you were in her place?” thereby invoking
something like reversibility. Or we may ask, “What if everybody did that?” and thereby invoke
universality – the notion that the moral law applies to all persons in relevantly similar situations.
It thus enshrines impartiality as essential to moral life. Impartiality requires that the moral law
applies to everyone in the same way, that no one can claim a privileged moral status.

A Basis for Moral Rights. Furthermore, the ethical theory developed by Kant provides a
satisfactory foundation for moral rights. Kant has stressed the correlation between right and
duty. Kant conceives moral right as the “moral capacity to bind others” (the etymological
meaning of the Greek word for duty, deon, literally means “that which binds”). Kant’s view on
rights draws heavily on the ideas of autonomy, dignity and respect for persons. He attempts to
show that there are certain moral rights and duties that all human beings possess regardless of
any utilitarian benefits that the exercise of those rights and duties may provide for others. This is
seen in his moral principle called categorical imperative that requires that everyone should be
treated as a free person equal to everyone else. That is, everyone has a moral right to such
treatment, and everyone has the correlative duty to treat others in this way.

How to Make a Kantian Decision

1. First formulate a maxim, which states the act and the reason for doing the act. (It would
be better if the situation is stated. For universality implies also that anybody who will be
in your situation would accept your reason for doing the act, and will do the same thing
as you do.)
2. Reformulate the maxim in such a way that it can become a universal moral rule.
3. Make the 3-fold test of the Categorical Imperative
a. Test of Universalizability
 Self-contradiction?
 Self-defeating when universalized?
b. Test of Autonomy of Wills or Test of Reversibility
 Do you want others to use your own reason against you? (or do you want the
maxim to be applied to you?)
c. Test of Humanity (whether one’s own humanity or others’)
 Respect for freedom/autonomy?
4. Help develop the freedom of the other?
5. Make a conclusion/judgment.
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Denise, Theodore, Nicholas White, and Sheldon Peterfreund. Great Traditions in Ethics. 10th ed.
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Pub., 2002.
Graham, Gordon. Theories of Ethics. New York: Routledge, 2011.
Rosenstand, Nina. The Moral of the Story (An Introduction to Ethics), 3rd ed., California:
Mayfield Publishing Company, 2000.
Thiroux, Jacques P. and Keith Krasemann, Ethics (Theory and Practice), 11th ed., Pearson
Education, Inc., New Jersey, 2012.
Vaughn, Lewis. Doing Ethics: Moral Reasoning and Contemporary Issues. New York: W.W.
Norton and Company, 2008.
Velasquez, Manuel G., Business Ethics (Concepts and Cases), 6th ed., Singapore: Pearson
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