Notes on Theory of Proportionate Reason

Nemesio S. Que, SJ

The theory of proportionate reason is another form of ideological ethics that has been put
forward by some Catholic moralists. The theory seeks to reduce ethical decisions to a single
fundamental principle of proportion - "An action is morally good if the pre-moral values that it
promotes outweigh the premoral disvalues it promotes; otherwise it is morally evil." More
simply, "proportionate reason discerns whether there is sufficient reason to justify the premoral
evil."1

Kenneth Overberg defines "premoral values or disvalues" thus –

Premoral values or disvalues are physical, psychological, or social values considered prior to
their moral evaluation. Thus, nutritious food is a human value, yet morally considered it is a
disvalue for a person who needs to diet. Also - the notion of premoral evil or good is the
result of human finitude, i.e., all our human actions contain features that either enhance or
restrict our humanity and the potential for human goodness and growth. Because of these
premoral/ontic evils, we are not able to realize all the values open to us in any one action
without causing or tolerating some degree of premoral/ontic evil.

Premoral evil is destructive of some aspect of who we are, of what it means to be truly
human. Premoral evil makes us less fully human. Therefore, such things as suffering,
ignorance, sickness and death can be considered premoral evil. Such realities are damaging or
destructive, at least in a physical sense, of the human person. But these realities remain
premoral evil until all the necessary conditions are considered. (Moral evil is premoral evil
which is done without a sufficient reason.)2

Now if we examine very carefully the many instances where the occurrence of evil is judged
acceptable in human action, one decisive element stands out: at the heart of the analyses is
proportionate reason.

This concept of proportionate reason is very difficult to comprehend; it is however very easy to
misunderstand and so misuse it. Thus it might be good to mention some notes to help us avoid
misconceptions concerning proportionality:

First, we must note that there is an objective difference between a merely "good" reason and a
truly proportionate one. Second, a proportionate reason is not to be identified only with the
intention or end of a moral agent.3 Third, proportionate reason is not convertible with the notion
of "better results" or "net good." This is a common mistake - one that makes proportionate
reason look very much like utilitarianism. Finally, the concept of proportionate reason is not
reducible to a simple numerical calculus.

Moralists usually employ the principle of proportionate reason in cases where basic goods are in
conflict (e.g., life vs. truth). These cases require a complex and subtle moral reasoning. But when
proportionate reason is used in these cases, the following criteria must be fulfilled:

1
Charles E. Curran, The Catholic Moral Tradition Today (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1999), 156.
2
Kenneth Overberg, SJ, Conscience in Conflict (Cincinnati, Ohio: St. Anthony Messenger Press, 1991), 37.
3
The intention is the internal or formal element of the moral action. It is also called the "end" or that which we are after in doing what we
do, the whole purpose of our action. The intention gives personal meaning to the action.

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First criterion: We must see to it that the value at stake or that we want to promote is at least
equal to the value sacrificed. Put negatively, an action does not have proportionate reason if a
lesser value is preferred to a higher value. The evil aspect of the act should never outweigh the
good aspect. The value sought or at least preserved should be maximized. This criterion is
sometimes called the "principle of best service."

This first criterion demands of us that we make an honest and careful appraisal of the moral
situation. Hence, we must be able to ask "what" and 'why" questions. The first question seeks
definition of terms and concepts used, facts, etc. The second question seeks motivation behind
actions or decisions made.

For example: The prisoners of Gestapo during World War II who took their lives rather than be
tortured and drugged into revealing secrets that would lead to the death of many more and to the
possible collapse of the national security of their countries.

Second criterion: We must also make sure that there is an essential link between the evil and
good aspects of the action and if the evil is really necessary since there is no alternative way of
attaining the good that must be obtained. Evil in this case is an effect of the action and a means to
the good desired.

This second criterion focuses on the "How, in what manner, and by what means" aspect of
moral decision-making. It focuses on the fact that in many cases, there is really no other way to
resolve the moral issue except the "evil" way, that is, if we are to arrive at the good or preserve
the value. This is also sometimes referred to as the "principle of last resort" — we have
exhausted all possible alternatives.

For example: Sometimes, the abortion of the fetus is intrinsically and inescapably connected with
the saving of the mother's fife. That is, there is in the very nature of the case no other way of
saving the mother. There is thus an essential link between the means and the end. In a case like
this, one's intention is really to save the mother's life. Such can be a compelling reason for the
abortion.

On the other hand, there are no such compelling reasons for aborting a fetus just because and
only because it is not convenient for the girl to be pregnant at this time.

Third Criterion: A third criterion requires that the value being sought not be undermined in the
long run by the contemplated action. Negatively, an action has no proportionate reason if the
manner of protecting the good will undermine this good in the long run. This criterion is
founded on the fact that all human goods and values are somehow connected with one another.

This criterion asks the question "What if?" It tries to find forseeable consequences and effects.
The truth behind this requirement is that there often is a tension and contradiction between
short and long term consequences, between individual and social dimensions. What may relieve
an individual temporarily could create ruinous and sometimes irreparable damages on the social
level in the long run. Thus, a truly human way of dealing with moral situations includes paying
attention to all possible consequences for both individual and social dimensions, both short and
long terms.

Consider, for example, a situation where a judge contemplates and finally decides to frame and
execute an innocent man to stop a rioting mob intent on lynching several people for a crime they
did not commit. Our moral sensitivities are brutalized because while it is true that the angry mob

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is pleased (in the short run), we also sense that taking the life of an innocent man in these
circumstances will, in the long run, bring about a situation where lives will be rendered
vulnerable to a judicial system that has ceased to rule according to justice. If innocent people are
sacrificed even for good ends, the legal system would certainly suffer.

Conclusion: In the use of proportionate reason, it is important to be able to distinguish

between "premoral evil" and "moral evil." A proper distinction leads to the understanding and so
proper use of proportionate reason that -

to intend premoral evil as an end is always wrong. You cannot inflict pain on another human
being as an end in itself. Intending premoral evil as a means is morally acceptable if there is a
proportionate reason. Then, to inflict pain that is necessary to cure an illness would be
acceptable.4

Richard McCormick says that the theory of proportionate reason must be exercised with due
caution and tentativeness because by its very nature, it appeals not to the usual way of cognition
but to a certain connatural and prediscursive component to moral judgment that cannot be
adequately subjected to analytic reflection.5 There is something that comes to us immediately and
in an intuitive prediscursive way, prior to an adequate moral analysis, that springs from a delicate
moral sensitivity. Reflective analysis reinforces what one grasps in this intuitive manner.

Given this intuitive character of discerning by way of the theory of proportionate reason, it must
be engaged in the spirit of discernment, i.e., an inner connaturality with what is good, and inner
connaturality with God which springs from fidelity to a fundamental commitment to Him. We
are not simply concerned here with a rational (read: logical) analysis of the situation but with a
reasoning heart.

Addendum:

Epikeia is the interpretation of the human law not according to its letter but according to its spirit
in those border cases which have not been sufficiently taken into consideration by positive law.
One assumes in all fairness that the lawgiver does not will to impose such a burden in altogether
singular circumstances. For example, if the minimum wage is too low, epikeia allows the employer
to pay more than the law provides.

Epikeia maintains the superiority of the unwritten intrinsic law in human nature over the
codified norms of positive law. It is, however, an exceptional thing and may only be employed
with prudent discretion.6

4
Curran, Catholic Moral Tradition, 157.
5
The clarification of proportionate reason in contemporary discussions owes much to Richard A. McCormick. See "A Commentary on
Commentaries" in Doing Evil to Achieve Good, ed. Richard A. McCormick and Paul Ramsay, Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1978.
6
Karl H. Peschke, Christian Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 82 ff.