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Western Style, Chinese Pop: Jay Chou's
Rap and Hip-Hop in China1
Anthony Fung
Jay Chou or in Chinese Zhou Jielun, is undeniably the most popular Chinese
singer in a number of Chinese communities. His glittering career is reflected
by his record sales and by the popularity of his concerts. In 2004, his album
Qilixiang, or Jasmine, released by Sony Music, excelled in Taiwan, Hong Kong,
and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Despite overwhelming piracy in
Taiwan?which has reduced the recording industry to 5 to 10 percent from its
heyday?as a Taiwan singer, Jay produced an album that sold a record 300,000
copies. In Hong Kong, his album surpassed local albums with sales of 50,000
units. In China the official figure reached 2.6 million units, a stunning figure
that no other Chinese artist has attained. In 2005, his album Chopin of No
vember continued this record of success with sales of 2.5 million units in Asia.
His charismatic vigor, avant-garde image, and mercantile potential are not only
recognized in Chinese societies; the World Music Awards in September 2004
held in Las Vegas acknowledged him, based on his high record sales, as the most
popular Chinese singer.
The significance of the Jay Chou story lies in its implications as a successful
marketing model for China and beyond to the larger Asia market. Why would a
Taiwan-born 25-year-old singer?without flaunting a connection to China or
the West?culturally and commercially sweep China with his style, persona, and
image and do so while China is actively agonizing over the Taiwanese indepen
dence issue? What kind of cultural strategies did Jay Chou embrace to surmount
the various political, economic, and cultural constraints involved in the Chinese
market? Illustrating how Jay Chou navigates these structural limits and the po
litical agenda of popular culture is valuable. Theorizing a framework for how
popular culture cuts across geopolitical spaces and surmounts cultural barriers
is not only beneficial for marketing of other culture products, but also sheds
light on the ideologies of evolving Chinese popular culture.
This paper thus illustrates how Jay Chou's music production has wittingly strat
egized to construct images and products that can be both locally and nationally
assimilated into Chinese culture and nationally accepted as a "prototype" prod
uct?a product whose political standard has been authoritatively acknowledged
? 2008 by the University of Texas Press, P.O. Box 7819, Austin, TX 78713-7819
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70 Asian Music: Winter/Spring 2008
by the state. The study is based on three years of ethnographic study of Jay's fans,
fan clubs, and performance in China, as well as on in-depth interviews with the
various production agents and media in different Chinese cities. In this paper I
describe, from the production side, Jay Chou as an icon and his image-making
and marketing strategies. From the audience's point of view, I explore how Jay
Chou has been reconstituted from being a "foreign" singer (in the eyes of the
PRC) into a Chinese artist.
The study of popular music and stardom can be quite murky and some even
see it as trivial. Popular Culture is often conceived as the culture of the com
mon people or mass culture functioning only to entertain and lacking in seri
ousness vis-?-vis critical and political implications in relation to the state and
civic society (Modleski 1986). However, contemporary cultural studies (Storey
2003, Cullen 2000) have demonstrated that societies have consistently invented
popular culture that reflects not only ideologies of the day, but also in effect
manufactures, manipulates, and distorts popular culture politically as a source of
nationalism, socially as a representation of daily life, economically as a product
of transnational corporations, and through the forces of the political economy
of globalization.
As for popular music, melody, rhythm, beat, harmony, lyrics, and timbre are not
simply creating form and aesthetic. Each of these elements are actually embed
ded with a semiotics of meaning that can create a sense of community, crystallize
imaginary identities, and create sentimental adventures for the audience (McClary
and Walser 1990). While all these reinforcing, complementary or contradictory
realms are worth unpacking, understanding these elements in relation to political,
economic, and cultural contexts is even more important. Thus, rather than just
deconstructing complex musical art forms per se, this paper considers popular
music production in relation to the demands of the state.
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Fung: Western Style, Chinese Pop 71
between the ideology of popular culture with the national ideology seems the
key to success. Under the nationalistic imperative of closed states, the authori
ties institutionalize their ideology in practices that dictate the economy and
sometimes ignore market demand (Frey 1984). This may well be the case with
the PRC: despite the people's desire to consume western goods and the fact that
the foreign investment that accompanies this consumption may also benefit
the economy, the state would rather defend its ideological agenda than allow
alternative and liberal values to infiltrate society. Thus, popular music that is
allowed to operate in China first has to meet the regime's political agenda before
it is circulated to the public. Jay Chou's and other foreign pop stars' success in
marketing in China is possible only after the PRC evaluates the potential impact
of popular music and a star's image on its people, considering the revolutionary
power and the possibility of popular culture being used to westernize, globalize,
and pervert China in some way.
What should be emphasized here is that the leadership of the PRC is not just
passively filtering the inflow of foreign popular culture. To fine-tune popular
culture they exercise power through different regulations and political censorship
and by using rewards or economic sanctions and co-option. Popular culture in
modern China, as we have already seen, plays a crucial role in the political forma
tion of the state. For example, Chang-Tai Hung (1996) found that popular culture
in China played a major role in galvanizing public support for the Sino-Japanese
war in 1937-1945, and, for the Communists, popular culture was refashioned into
a socialist propaganda instrument creating lively symbols of peasant heroes and
joyful images of village life under their rule. I also found (2003) that Andy Lau's
entry to motherland China required him to morph into a pan-Chinese icon that
was politically acceptable in China. For the PRC, the economic viability of any
popular star is always secondary to issues of political stability.
On the other hand, even under the looming presence of political control, cor
porations should not only be regarded as passive agents bowing to state interests.
Transnational corporations, as always, behave and function with a calculative
and capitalistic agenda. For these corporations, the solution to the "China chal
lenge" is to self-adjust and conform, to a degree, with the requirements of state
ideology. Such corporations must devise an optimal marketing strategy so that
their product minimizes potential antagonism with the national culture.
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72 Asian Music: Winter/Spring 2008
need approval from society, parents, and teachers. However, ironically, this "cool"
generation is in fact passionate and strong-willed at heart; they value relationships
with friends and want to be trusted by parents. But psychologically they desper
ately need a space of their own to escape parental control and supervision (Fung
2004). Jay provides an image this generation can identify with in their struggle
for identity. Often wearing a cap and lowering his head, Jay seemingly possesses a
shy, quiet, and introverted character and appears unduly reticent about his own
ideas and opinions. Like other successful stars, Jay's songs are full of romance, as
in Shiny Stars (2000) and Simply Love (2001). But, on the one hand, Jay's songs
are utterly representative of youth defiance, insolence, and non-compliance. For
example, in Second Class of Year 3 (2003), Jay sings:
As expressed in this song, the cool generation knows that their stubbornness
and refusal to abide by rules or traditions will naturally result in their rejec
tion and hence their loneliness. What they call for is not a direct and sturdy
resistance and challenge to adulthood, but merely the forgiveness of their
"merciful father" or parents for their independent actions.
This last song also hints, on the other hand, to young people's hidden desire
to maintain relationships with parents and develop intimacy in friendships.
Consumption of popular products, including Jay Chou, is an avenue for the cool
generation to crystallize their peer network?a phenomenon also seen in the
West (Skelton and Valentine 1997). In a study about the relationship between
cool culture and cell phone branding in China, Jing Wang (2005) a researcher
and marketer at the Beijing office of a transnational advertising agency, dem
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Fung: Western Style, Chinese Pop 73
onstrated that music as entertainment serves to maintain the social and inter
personal network for cool youth in China. Thus, the cool generation embraces
new technologies and fashion, not only because psychologically they are curious,
creative, and independent, but also because they need to build communities
around these products with their peers.
On the whole, Jay's persona serves as a model of this cool image, not being
remote enough to alienate parents outright, but distinct enough to appear inde
pendent and defiant to young people. This cool image has captured the attention
of international corporations who aspire to market their products in China to
the new generation. For example, Pepsi uses Jay as their spokesperson in the
Chinese market. Both Pepsi and Jay symbolize the desires and individualistic
pursuits of this new generation. For the audience, the consumption of such
products also enhances the formation of their own communities across China,
especially in the form of fan clubs (for example see jaycn.com and jay family,
which are Jay's two biggest fan clubs in China).
Given his huge popularity among the new generation, the question remains: why
would the authorities continue to allow this semi-foreign, Taiwan-born artist to
be a popular icon capable of swaying an entire generation? As mentioned earlier,
the Chinese authorities prioritize political concern over economic consideration
when they make relevant cultural policy. Jay, therefore, must culturally and po
litically fit into the agenda for the country. His success lies in his capacity to
sublimate himself into an icon of Chineseness while maintaining his popular
and commercial fa?ade, i.e., his cool image. Paradoxically, his most popular
songs trigger the audience's emotions in a celebration of Chinese tradition and
values, including conscientiousness, tolerance, and reservedness. His Chinese
ness can be explicated on two levels.
First, as a cultural icon he sells his cool image in concerts or on MTV. He per
forms in a rhythm and blues style, but within this western form, he has inserted
Chinese melodies, themes, and rhythms. His song Dong Feng Po (East Wind,
2003) features a typical Chinese melody performed in R&B style; its instrumen
tation also creates a Chinese atmosphere with a Chinese pipa. In the lyrics, Jay
expresses sadness and loneliness subtly, similar to traditional Chinese poetry.
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74 Asian Music: Winter/Spring 2008
One footstep forward. Remember one left fist and right fist
Those who incite me will be in danger. It once appeared.
(Kungfu is like) a cigarette which I have never smoked but is with me. It is always
besides me.
(lyrics by Fang Wenshan)
In the song Jay reminisces about legendary Bruce Lee who fought the Japanese
and publicly declared in his classic movie The Chinese Connection (1972) that
Chinese are not the "Sick Men of Asia." To the global Chinese audience and
other audiences overseas, the kungfu movies from Shaw Brothers and Bruce
Lee's productions in Hollywood epitomize martial arts as a symbol of the Chi
nese. This symbol is therefore exploited as connecting to a Chineseness. In fact,
more than once Jay has indicated publically that his song can be equated with
Chinese kungfu.
Jay's performance on stage also connects with a sense of Chineseness. Quite
often, without overwhelming the modern, cool image, he hybridizes the cool
outlook with Chinese conventionality. In a nasty 3 degree Celsius outdoor con
cert at the Shanghai Stadium December 12,2003, for example, while perform
ing Shuang Jie Gun and Dong Feng Po, Jay slam-dunked a basketball on stage.
Though his clothing was wide-sleeved with loose pants in a western hip-hop
style at a previous concert, at the Guangzhou concert in December 2003, he was
dressed in a Chinese robe bespangled with shinny golden dragons. These per
formances'suggest that while the state is now more receptive to various foreign
cultural forms, such as elements of hip-hop or R&B, commercially, a complete
adoption of western style would not be wise. Jay, rather, successfully brings
western musical forms to the Chinese audience, but also evokes the national
culture of the PRC.
The second level of Jay's Chineseness lies in his construction as a "safe" icon
for society. Jay is not heroic, quite the contrary. As an icon of the cool genera
tion, he is obliged to be skeptical and critical. Jay's songs often address a wide
range of social issues from macro issues, such as expressing anti-war sentiment
(e.g. The Last Battle, 2002 and The Hymn of Anti-War, 2004) or environmental
protection (Farmland, 2003) to micro problems, such as domestic violence
(Baba, I Come Back, 2001) or the generation gap (Grandma, 2004). Particularly
touching is The Last Battle in which the lyrics describe the melancholy of a
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Fung: Western Style, Chinese Pop 75
soldier embracing the dead body of a fellow combatant. Baba, I Come Back,
on the other hand, depicts a horrible scene of a drunken father beating his
wife as in the following:
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76 Asian Music: Winter/Spring 2008
Jay's preeminence as a popular icon in China. Once this official status was be
stowed on Jay, the political thresholds that normally constrain foreign culture
were subsequently removed. At this point a popular culture star was given the
unique privilege of further expanding his market with the compliments of and
through the state's apparatus.
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Fung: Western Style, Chinese Pop 77
in the local media, mainly in newspapers ( Wuhan Evening Post, Chutan Met
ropolitan Daily, Chutan Gold Daily, and Changjiang Daily) and a few television
and radio stations ( Wubei TV, Wuhan TV, Chutan Music Radio, Radio Wuhan
Radio, and Radio Hubei), was mainly on China Mobile and not Jay Chou. Of
course, there are drawbacks to this kind of concert promotion. Because of the
mismatch between Jay Chou's fans and the mobile users, some of the atten
dants at the concert were not core fans. In fact, according to my observation,
the enthusiasm of the audience at the Xinhualu Stadium in Shanghai was not
as intense as it was in other cities.
It is a matter of fact that the state has strict control over foreign culture in
China. In October 1997, the State Council headed by Primer Li Peng, instated
the Regulation of Management of Performance Operations for non-state artists,
performance organizers, investors, and managers of performance sites. The new
regulation aimed to control the technical aspects of the performance to ensure
safety, copyright protection, and proper taxation. The regulation also allowed
control over content and the management of the shows. The law states clearly
that a live performance should not gainsay state policy and social order and
delimit values and behaviors (e.g. sex, violence, etc.) that could possibly per
vert people's minds. It also declares clearly that no foreign joint venture should
be allowed to run concerts or rely on foreign investment. Only government
approved groups could manage the concerts and ensure "security."
There are actually many local rules that foreign companies could not possibly
handle, especially the custom of giving tickets away to state, police, and stadium
officials. For Jay Chou's concert in Shanghai, for example, out of the 80,000 seats
in the Shanghai Stadium only 43,000 bona fide tickets were sold. In addition
to space allocated for the complex stage that takes 200 people to assemble, the
promoter had to relinquish 10 percent of tickets to sponsors and to the Security
Guard, the Fire Department, and related departments. In essence, this practice
allowed the government indirect control over the foreign production.
When we look broadly at China's control over popular culture, we see that as
late as 2003 there were still barriers for Taiwan artists. A few privileged groups
were limited to twelve concerts from Hong Kong-Taiwan artists every year. In
vestors had to partner with a privileged company to get a license (called a Piwen)
from the Ministry of Culture before they could promote concerts and sell tickets.
Concerts featuring artists from western countries bear an even higher risk. The
western artists Wham in the '80s, and Bj?rk and Ricky Martin in the '90s per
formed in China, but did so to promote their nations' images. Tickets were given
away free and not sold. However, other groups such as Aceofbase and Roxette
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78 Asian Music: Winter/Spring 2008
attempted to have commercially viable concerts but in the end made very little
money. The Suede concert organized by Modernsky, an indie record company,
also ran into problems over ticket sales.
Given the high risk of marketing foreign artists in China, organizers best
promote concerts with corporate sponsorship. However, because of the specific
political economy in China, the collaboration must incorporate commercial and
state concerns. According to Fanli, the organizer of Jay's concert in Shanghai,
they are a huge risk. In October 2003, the investor Zhen Long Performance
Company in Shanghai risked RMB8 million (around US$1 million), mainly
covering the RMB4 million (around US$500,000) charge for Jay Chou's produc
tion company for organizing the concert. However, being a second tier perfor
mance company, they had no authority to deal with overseas clients; they had
to partner with the first-tier Shanghai East Asia Performance company which
could apply for a license.
Besides a commercial partner, the organizer had to rely largely on the Chinese
media for promotion. Yet, all the media in Shanghai are de facto state-owned and
placed under the Shanghai Media Group (SMG). The concert could enjoy vast
publicity, but every performance and entertainer has to get the tacit approval
of the state, a condition that only happens when the ideologies of the singers do
not contradict with that of the authorities.
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Fung: Western Style, Chinese Pop 79
Notes
1 This paper was fully supported by a grant from the Research Grant Council of Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region. (Project no. CUHK4274/ 03H)
References
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80 Asian Music: Winter/Spring 2008
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