Rights and Obligations of Spouses

 
Art. II, Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

Art. XIII, Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution

Women

SECTION 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working
conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will
enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation.

Art. 11(2), Revised Penal Code

Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability:

2. Any one who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or
legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and
those consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites
prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the
revocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second
requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this Art. are present and that the person defending be
not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.

Art. 753, New Civil Code

Article 753. When a donation is made to several persons jointly, it is understood to be in equal shares,
and there shall be no right of accretion among them, unless the donor has otherwise provided.

The preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to donations made to the husband and wife jointly,
between whom there shall be a right of accretion, if the contrary has not been provided by the donor.
(637)

Art. 2035 (4), New Civil Code

Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

(1) The civil status of persons;

(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (1814a)

Arts. 68-73, Family Code

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support. (109a)

Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall
decide.

The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are
other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the
same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (110a)

Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such
support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence
thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of
said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties. (111a)

Art. 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The
expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70. (115a)

Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts
which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may
apply to the court for relief. (116a)

Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without
the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.

In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:

(1) The objection is proper; and

(2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to
the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse
who has not obtained consent.

The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith. (117a)

Art. 101, Family Code

Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved
spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the
absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations.

A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The
spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information
as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (178a)

Art. 128, Family Code

Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligation to the family, the aggrieved
spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the
conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations.

A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The
spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information
as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (167a, 191a)

Art. 198, Family Code

Art. 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for declaration
of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, the
obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the
court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of
such order. (292a)

RA 11210, Expanded Maternity Leave Law

The maternity leave benefit in the Philippines was recently extended from 60 days to 105 days through
a new law – RA 11210, known as the 105-Day Expanded Maternity Leave Law. 

The policy rationale behind this new law is to “protect and promote the rights and welfare of working
women taking into account their maternal functions, and to provide an enabling environment in which
their full potential can be achieved.”

Who is covered? 

The law applies to all covered female workers in Government and in the private sector, including those
in the informal economy, regardless of civil status or legitimacy of the child, in the instances of a birth,
miscarriage or emergency termination.   

RA 11210 provides that, to be eligible for maternity benefit from the Social Security System or SSS, an
employee must have paid at least 3 monthly SSS contributions in the 12 month period immediately
preceding the semester of the birth, miscarriage or termination. An employee must also notify her
employer of the pregnancy and expected date of birth.
The law also includes benefits for fathers: up to 7 days of the 105 days allocated to women for
maternity leave may be transferred to fathers, effectively raising the length of paid paternity leave
(under RA 8187) to a potential 15 days.

R.A. No. 8187 - Rules on Paternity Leave (RA 8187)

Male employees in the private sector are entitled to a paternity leave under the following conditions:

The new father must be legally married to the mother of the newborn child
He is an employee at the time of birth or miscarriage
He is cohabiting with his wife at the time she gives birth or suffers a miscarriage
He has applied for paternity leave within a reasonable time from the expected date of delivery of his
pregnant wife or within such period as provided by company rules or by collective bargaining
agreement
His wife has given birth or suffered a miscarriage
Non conversion to cash: If the employee does not avail of the paternity leave, this benefit is not
convertible to cash nor is it cumulative.

Usage AFTER delivery: While application of paternity leave must be made before the delivery, it can
only be used AFTER the delivery of the child, unless company rules allow prior usage.

Duration of paternity leave: 7 Calendar days with full pay, consisting of basic pay and mandatory
allowances.

Limits: This benefit is applicable to the first four (4) deliveries of the spouse of the employee with
whom he is cohabiting.

Ilusorio vs. Bildner, et al., G.R. Nos. 139789 & 139808, May 12, 2000

FACTS: Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old, possessed extensive property valued at millions of
pesos. For many years, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He
was married to Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon,
Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and
board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse,
Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo
City.

In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with his wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city.
The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdosed Potenciano which
caused the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for
guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health,
poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio,
Potenciano did not return to Antipolo and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati.
In March 1999, petitioner Erlinda filed with Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have the
custody of her husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her
husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.

HELD: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the
rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such
petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The
illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.

Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty
that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under
medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern
his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of
visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.

The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit
a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to
do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond
judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the
sheriffs or by any other process.

In short, even if the law recognizes coverture (spouses to live together) as among the obligations of
spouses, the Court cannot issue an order to compel one spouse to live with the other spouse if such
spouse refuses to do so.

Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997

Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of
habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.

PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

Marriage Settlements
 
Arts. 75-81, Family Code

Art. 74. The property relationship between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order:

(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;

(2) By the provisions of this Code; and
(3) By the local custom. (118)
Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute
community, conjugal partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any other regime. In the
absence of a marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute
community of property as established in this Code shall govern. (119a)

Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made before
the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136. (121)

Art. 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be in writing, signed by the parties
and executed before the celebration of the marriage. They shall not prejudice third persons unless they
are registered in the local civil registry where the marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper
registries of properties. (122a)

Art. 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage may also execute his or her marriage
settlements, but they shall be valid only if the persons designated in Article 14 to give consent to the
marriage are made parties to the agreement, subject to the provisions of Title IX of this Code. (120a)

Art. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by a person upon whom a sentence of civil
interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be indispensable for
the guardian appointed by a competent court to be made a party thereto. (123a)

Art. 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property relations of the
spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of the
marriage and their residence.
This rule shall not apply:
(1) Where both spouses are aliens;
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the Philippines
and executed in the country where the property is located; and
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting property
situated in a foreign country whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic validity. (124a)

Art. 81. Everything stipulated in the settlements or contracts referred to in the preceding articles in
consideration of a future marriage, including donations between the prospective spouses made therein,
shall be rendered void if the marriage does not take place. However, stipulations that do not depend
upon the celebration of the marriages shall be valid. (125a) 

Art. 22 (7), Family Code

Art. 22. The marriage certificate, in which the parties shall declare that they take each other as
husband and wife, shall also state:
xxx

(7) That the parties have entered into marriage settlement, if any, attaching a copy thereof. (67a)
WHAT GOVERNS PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES:

1. Marriage settlement – future spouses may agree upon the regime of Absolute Community of
Property, Conjugal Partnership of Gains, complete separation of property or any other regime or
mixture of the aforesaid regime not contrary to law

2. Family Code – if there is no marriage settlement or when the regime agreed upon therein is void, the
default system of Absolute Community of Property (ACP) shall govern

3. Local customs

REQUISITES OF A VALID MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT:

1. In writing
2. Signed by the parties
3. Executed before the celebration of marriage
4. To fix the terms and conditions of their property relations
5. If a party executing the settlement needs parental consent, the parent/guardian whose consent is
needed must be made a party to the agreement
6. If the party executing the settlement is under civil interdiction or any other disability, the guardian
appointed by the court must be made a party to the settlement
7. Registration (to bind 3rd persons) NOT APPLICABLE: 1. When both are aliens, even if married in
the Phils. 2. As to extrinsic validity of contracts 3. Contrary stipulation

Under Philippine law, marriage is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences and
incidents are governed by law in the Family Code of the Philippines, otherwise known as Executive
Order No. 209 (which took effect on 3 August 1988 and repealed the pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code on Marriage (Republic Act 386) which became effective on 30 August 1950).

As a rule, marriage is governed by rules established by law and cannot be made inoperative by
stipulation of the parties. Divorce itself is not recognized in the Philippines (although Nullity
proceedings are common) but there are provisions for the division of matrimonial property. The parties
may enter into a pre-nuptial agreement to fix their property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by the Family Code (Article 1, Family Code). Pre-nuptial agreements are otherwise
known as “marriage settlements” under the Family Code. They are also known as “ante-nuptial
contracts”. When the parties, as future spouses, enter into a pre-nuptial agreement, it is the binding law
between them and the Family Code is supplementary. In the absence of a pre-nuptial agreement, it is
only then that the provisions of the law and local custom apply. In short, the pre-nuptial agreement
takes precedence in the determination of the property relations between the husband and the wife.
Therefore, the regime of absolute community of property provided by law in the Family Code is
subsidiary to the will of the future spouses as embodied in their pre-nuptial agreement.

A pre-nuptial agreement is conditional upon the marriage of the parties and becomes effective from the
moment of celebration of the marriage. Therefore, it is an accessory to the marriage and governed by
the same principle of invariability once entered into by the parties. In the Philippines, it is still
uncommon amongst the general population to enter into a pre-nuptial agreement prior to marriage and
it is more usual be governed by the regime of absolute community of property as provided by law. Pre-
nuptial agreements are generally entered into where there is a significant age disparity between the
parties, when there is a wide difference between the wealth or indebtedness between the parties, and
where one party has been married before and there is a desire to protect the children of the former
marriage. Like any ordinary contract, the pre-nuptial agreement must be entered into voluntarily
between the future spouses. It becomes binding between the husband and wife and cannot be
changed while the marriage is existing unless there is an application to the Court to set aside the
agreement on grounds similar to that of a petition for separation of property such as in case of
abandonment of the spouse without just cause or failure to comply with his or her obligations to the
family. The contract can be set aside on the grounds of lack of consent, fraud, coercion, mistake,
undue influence or bad faith. Thus, the law provides the grounds for a judicial separation of property. A
pre-nuptial agreement may only be altered after the dissolution of marriage provided it will not prejudice
creditors of either spouse whose share would be reduced as a consequence of the change of property
regime.

Formalities

In order to be valid between the parties, a pre-nuptial agreement should be in writing, but in order to be
effective against third persons, it must be in a public instrument, that is, notarized by a duly appointed
notary public, and recorded in the Registry of Property for the Protection of Creditors and in the local
civil registry. Any modification to the pre-nuptial agreement must follow the same formality and since it
is an accessory to the marriage, it must be executed before the celebration of marriage. To avoid any
type of fraud, mistake, coercion, undue influence, misrepresentation or concealment of assets which
can be a ground to nullify the pre-nuptial agreement, a full disclosure statement of all assets and
monies is advisable.

Contents of the Agreement

In a pre-nuptial agreement, all assets and properties along with the value of each asset should be
included. It may also include a provision that deals with the apportionment of wages, commissions,
inherited property, life insurance benefits, pension plans, medical or health insurance benefits,
educational plans, administration of property, and payment of taxes. Likewise, it is desirable to include
a mediation or arbitration clause to provide alternative ways of resolving disputes without going to
court. Further, in the event of litigation, a provision on venue in case an annulment action is
commenced should be included.

Void Agreements

If one stipulation in the pre-nuptial agreement is void, it does not nullify the entire agreement which
may contain several stipulations. As a general rule, the future spouses are free to stipulate anything
subject to the limitations of freedom to contract, i.e., the stipulations of contracts should not be contrary
to “law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.” In general stipulations in a pre-nuptial
agreement which would be void include, those contrary to the nature and purpose of marriage, to the
liberty and rights of individuals, or in general, to morals and good customs;, those which violate legal
provisions of a prohibitory or mandatory character, those which are derogatory to the authority of the
spouses in the family, or in general and those contrary to the public order or public policy. In the case
of a void pre-nuptial agreement, the law provides that the parties be governed by the regime of
absolute community of property.

Governing Law

Where the spouses are both Filipino citizens or when only one is a Filipino citizen and the other is a
foreigner, their property relations shall be governed, firstly, by their pre-nuptial agreement where they
may stipulate what laws shall govern their property relations. If there is no such stipulation, the laws of
the Philippines shall apply regardless of where they live and where the marriage is celebrated. The
laws of the Philippines, however, will not apply with respect to property located outside the Philippines,
whether the pre-nuptial agreement is entered into in the Philippines or in the country where the
property is located. Article 16 of the Civil Code provides: “Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.” In short, the location of the property determines
the jurisdiction to be applied as to the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of the contract. Conclusion The law
on pre-nuptial agreements in the Philippines places a premium on the liberty of the future spouses’
ability to agree on their property relations within the limits allowed by law. The philosophy would seem
to be that, since marriage is a special contract of permanent union, it is the parties who are in the best
position to agree on how to make their union last. Prenuptial agreements are seen, contrary to the UK
and many other jurisdictions, as a means to keep the parties together, not a convenient mechanism for
division of property once the parties are apart.

Marriages before the effectivity of Family Code – default property regime is conjugal partnership of
gains

Delizo vs. Delizo 69 SCRA 218

Facts: Nicolas Delizo married Rosa Villasfer in 1981. She died in 1907. He then married Dorotea de
Ocampo, which lasted 46 years (1911-1957) until Nicolas’ death. The act of partition was filed by
Nicolas’ two children from his first marriage, and the heirs of his other deceased child (also from the
first marriage).

Issue: To which CPG does the Caanawan lands belong to (1st or 2nd marriage)?
Note: Point of contention was Caanawan lands in Nueva Ecija. Other lands belong to second
marriage.

Lower court divided the properties in the following way:

a. ½ 3 children of first marriage

b.¼ Dorotea
c. ¼ children of both marriage (divided in 13 parts)

The lower court is of the opinion that it was Dorotea and Nicolas who cultivated the land. Hence, the
fruits of the land should go to the second marriage.
The Court of Appeals disagrees. According to the CA, there was no proof that the property is owned
by second marriage since the testimony of Dorotea not persuasive. Also, one witness, Moises Patricio,
places the acquisition of the properties when first wife Rosa was still alive.

Dorotea elevated the case to SC. According to her, Canaawan properties were not part of first
marriage’s CPG as lands were homesteads. First marriage had possessory rights, but second
marriage had exclusive right over it as it was during the second marriage that it was registered
pursuant to Act 926.

Same Issue: To which CPG does the Caanawan lands belong to (1st or 2nd marriage)?

Held: Property belongs to the CPG of the 2 nd marriage as land was only registered during second
marriage.

Under Act 926, which was then the applicable law, the right of the homesteader to the patent does not
become absolute until after he has complied with all the requirements of the law. One of the most
important requirements is that the "person filing the application shall prove by two credible witnesses
that he has resided upon and cultivated the land for the term of five years immediately succeeding the
time of filing the application aforesaid, and shall make affidavit that no part of said land has been
alienated or encumbered ***" (Section 3 of Act 926, italics supplied) Prior to the fulfillment of such
requirement, the applicant has no complete equitable estate over the homestead which he can sell and
convey, mortgage or lease.  Until a homestead right is established and registered under Section 3 of
Act 926, there is only an inchoate right to the property and it has not ceased to be a part of the public
domain and, therefore, not susceptible to alienation as such.

Conversely, when a "homesteader has complied with all the terms and conditions which entitled him to
a patent for a particular tract of public land, he acquires a vested interest therein and has to be
regarded an equitable owner thereof."  The decisive factor, therefore, in the determination of whether a
parcel of land acquired by way of homestead is conjugal property of the first or the second marriage, is
not necessarily the time of the issuance of the homestead patent but the time of the fulfillment of the
requirements of the public land law for the acquisition of such right to the patent.

As testified to by Lorenzo Delizo, his brother, Nicolas Delizo, and the latter's wife, Rosa Villasfer,
arrived in Barrio Caanawan, San Jose, Nueva Ecija, from Barrio Ungag, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, during
the year 1905. It was during that same year that Pedro Salvador and Mauricio Salvador, who were then
the cabecillas, were distributing lands to homesteaders in Barrio Caanawan. Nicolas Dacquel, Mariano
Antolin and Francisco Pascua must have received their respective homesteads from the same officers
of the government that same year, considering that their respective homesteads are all adjacent to the
homestead of Nicolas Delizo, and according to the evidence, this was the time when the homesteads
in that barrio were parceled out to the new settlers. Indeed, the Homestead Act was then of recent
vintage, having been enacted by the Philippine Commission by authority of the United States
Government, only on October 7, 1903.
Considering that Nicolas Dacquel must have been in possession of his homestead for barely a year
when he transferred his rights in 1906, Mariano Antolin for about two years with respect to his
homestead in 1907, and Francisco Pascua for about three years in 1908 as regards to his homestead,
at the time of their respective conveyances to Nicolas Delizo, it is, therefore, obvious that not one of
them could have complied with the requirements of Act No. 926 to entitle any one of them to the
issuance of a homestead patent before they sold or assigned their rights to Nicolas Delizo.

The law was quite specific, that "No certificate shall be given or patent issued for the land applied
for until the expiration of five years from the date of the filing of the application; and if, at the expiration
of such time or at any time within three years thereafter, the person filing such application shall prove
by two credible witnesses that he has resided upon and cultivated the land for the term of five years 
immediately succeeding the time of filing the application aforesaid, and shall make affidavit that no part
of said land has been alienated or encumbered, and that he has borne true allegiance to the
Government of the United States and that of the Philippine Islands, then, upon payment of a fee of ten
pesos, Philippine currency, to such officer as may be designated by law as local land officer, or in case
there be no such officer then to the Chief of the Bureau of Lands, he shall be entitled to a patent."
(Section 3, Act No. 926, italics supplied). Having neither legal nor equitable title thereon, what was
transferred by them to Nicolas Delizo were, therefore, not rights of ownership, but inchoate rights as
applicants for homesteads over portions of the public domain. Similarly, having received the
homestead only in 1905, Nicolas Delizo could not have perfected his rights thereon by the completion
of the five-year occupancy and cultivation requirement of the law, in 1909. Buttressing the conclusion
that Nicolas Delizo could not have perfected his rights to the four homesteads before 1909 is the
specific limitation imposed by section 3 of Act No. 926 which provides that "No person who is the
owner of more than sixteen hectares of land in said Islands or who has had the benefits of any
gratuitous allotment of sixteen hectares of land since the acquisition of the Islands by the United
States, shall be entitled to the benefits of this chapter."

The foregoing sufficiently show that the Appellate Court erred in holding that the entire Caanawan
properties belong to the conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Rosa Villasfer. Considering,
however, that about twenty (20) hectares were cultivated and rendered productive during the period
from 1905 to 1909, justice and equity demand that the rights to said properties be apportioned to the
parties in proportion to the extent to which the requirements of the public land laws had been complied
with during the existence of each conjugal partnership.

PRINCIPLE: Deciding factor where homestead belongs to time of registration NOT when homestead
patent is issued as registration is the only time all requirements have been fulfilled.

After the effectivity of Family Code – default property regime is absolute community of property

Uy vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 579

Facts: Teodoro Jardeleza, petitioner, filed a petition in the matter of the guardianship of Dr. Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr., upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the latter spouse was about
to be sold. The petitioner averred therein that the present physical and mental incapacity of Dr. Ernesto
Jardeleza Sr. prevent him from competently administering his properties, in order to prevent the loss
and dissipation of the Jardeleza’s real and personal assets, there was a need for a court-appointed
guardian to administer said properties. Gilda Jardeleza, respondent, filed a petition regarding the
declaration of incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr., assumption of sole powers of administration of
conjugal properties and authorization to sell the property. She alleged that her husband’s medical
treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up and that she needs to sell one piece of real
property and its improvements. She prayed for authorization from the court to sell said property.

RTC of Iloilo City rendered its decision, finding that it was convinced that Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. was
truly incapacitated to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties. However, Teodoro
filed his opposition to the proceedings being unaware and not knowing that a decision has already
been rendered on the case. He also questioned the propriety of the sale of the lot and its
improvements thereon supposedly to pay the accumulated financial obligations and hospitalization.

Issue: Whether or not Gilda Jardeleza may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal
property.

Ruling: The CA, which the SC affirmed, ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr., the
procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family Code are not
applicable. Because he was unable to take care of himself and manage the conjugal property due to
illness that had rendered him comatose. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship
proceeding under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.

Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:

ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either
or both offerors.

Brigido Quiao vs. Rita Quiao, et al., G.R. No 176556, 4 July 2012

FACTS: Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent) contracted marriage in 1977. They had
no separate properties prior to their marriage. During the course of said marriage, they produced four
children. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting with another
woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the legal separation of the
parties pursuant to Article 55. Save for one child (already of legal age), the three minor children remain
in the custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.

The trial court held that properties acquired by the spouses shall be divided equally between them
subject to the respective legitimes of their children. However, Brigido’s share of the net profits earned
by the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par. 9 of Article
129 of the FC.

A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the trial court. By
2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.

After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to define “Nets
Profits Earned.” In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes “the remainder of the properties of
the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.”

Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that NET PROFIT
EARNED shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC. However, it later
reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.

#1 ISSUE: Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the couple’s property
relations.

HELD: Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of exchange of martial
vows, the operative law was the New Civil Code and since they did not agree on a marriage
settlement, the property relations between them is the system of relative community or the conjugal
partnership of gains. Under this property relation, “the husband and wife place in a common fund the
fruits of their separate property and the income from their work and industry. The husband and wife
also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.

#2 ISSUE:
What is the meaning of “net profits earned” by the conjugal partnership for purposes of forfeiture under
Article 63 of the Family Code?

HELD:
The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of the separate properties of the
spouses and the products of their labor and industry. The petitioner inquires the meaning of “net
profits” earned by the conjugal partnership for purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized under
Article 63 of the Family Code. He insists that since there is no other provision under the Family Code,
which defines “net profits” earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation, then Article 102 of
the Family Code applies.

Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the property relations of the parties. Moreover, as to the
definition of “net profits,” we cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly
provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and
Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits “shall be the increase in value
between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
the market value at the time of its dissolution.” Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to
both the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code.

Toda, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 78583-84, March 26, 1990

FACTS:

Benigno Toda, Jr. and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda were married on June 9, 1951 and were blessed with
two children. Individual differences and the alleged infidelity of Benigno, however, marred the conjugal
union thereby prompting Rose Marie to file on December 18, 1979 in the former Court of First Instance
of Rizal, as Civil Case No. 35566, a petition for termination of conjugal partnership for alleged
mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds against Benigno.

After hearings were held, the parties in order to avoid further "disagreeable proceedings," filed on April
1, 1981 a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of conjugal partnership under Article 191 of
the Civil Code, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 9478, which was consolidated with the aforesaid
civil case no. 35566. This petition which was signed by the parties on March 30, 1981, embodied a
compromise agreement allocating to the spouses their respective shares in the conjugal partnership
assets and dismissing with prejudice the said Civil Case No. 35566, CA-G.R. No. 11123-SP of the
Court of Appeals and G.R. No. 56121 of this Court. The said petition and the compromise agreement
therein were approved by the trial court in its order of June 9, 1981.

Thereafter, several orders were issued by the lower court pertaining to the interpretation and
implementation of the compromise agreement
ISSUE: When does the compromise agreement become effective? Can the parties agree to
dissolve/modify the marriage settlement?
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in support of the decision of the Court of Appeals that the compromise
agreement dissolving the property regime of the spouses became effective only on June 9, 1981, the
date it was approved by the trial court, and not on March 30, 1981 when it was signed by the parties.
Under Article 134 of the Family Code “in the absence of express declaration in the marriage
settlements, the separation of property between the spouses during the marriage shall not take place
save in virtue of a judicial order”. Hence, the separation of property is not effected by mere execution
of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It,
therefore, becomes effective only upon judicial approval, without which it is void. Furthermore, Article
137 of the said code explicitly provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the
issuance of a decree of separation of properties.
In short, the property regime of the spouses cannot be changed by mere agreement. The same, to be
effective, must be submitted to the court for approval.
DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE

DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS

Before Marriage

General Rule: Future spouses cannot donate to each other more than 1/5 of their present property
(excess shall be considered void)

Requisites:
1. Made before celebration of marriage
2. In celebration of marriage
3. In favor of one or both future spouses

Exception: If they are governed by ACP – then they can donate to each other (Article 84, Family Code)

During Marriage

General Rule: Spouses cannot donate to each other, directly or indirectly (donations made by spouses
to each other during the marriage are VOID)

Ratio:
1. To protect unsecured creditors from being defrauded
2. To prevent stronger spouse from imposing upon the weaker one the transfer of the latter’s property
to the former
3. To prevent indirect modification of the marriage settlement

Exception: 1. Moderate gifts on the occasion of any family rejoicing 2. Donation mortis causa

• Applied to common law spouses (Art. 87)

GROUNDS TO REVOKE DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS: (Art. 86, FC)

1. Marriage is not celebrated or is judicially declared void ab initio

2. Marriage without the needed parental consent
3. Marriage is annulled and donee is in bad faith
4. If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied with
5. In legal separation and donee is the guilty spouse
6. Donee commits acts of ingratitude such as: a. If the donee commits an offense against the person,
honor or property of the donor, his wife, or his children under his parental authority b. If the donee
imputes to the donor any criminal offense or any act involving moral turpitude, unless the crime was
committed against the donee himself, his wife, or his children under his authority c. If the donee unduly
refuses to support the donor when he is legally or morally bound to give such support
 
Art. 44, Family Code

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab
initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of
the other are revoked by operation of law. (n)

Arts. 81-87, Family Code

Art. 82. Donations by reason of marriage are those which are made before its celebration, in
consideration of the same, and in favor of one or both of the future spouses. 

Art. 83. These donations are governed by the rules on ordinary donations established in Title III of
Book III of the Civil Code, insofar as they are not modified by the following articles. 

Art. 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community of property, they
cannot donate to each other in their marriage settlements more than one-fifth of their present property.
Any excess shall be considered void.

Donations of future property shall be governed by the provisions on testamentary succession and the
formalities of wills. 

Art. 85. Donations by reason of marriage of property subject to encumbrances shall be valid. In case of
foreclosure of the encumbrance and the property is sold for less than the total amount of the obligation
secured, the donee shall not be liable for the deficiency. If the property is sold for more than the total
amount of said obligation, the donee shall be entitled to the excess. 

Art. 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor in the following cases:

(1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab initio except donations made in the
marriage settlements, which shall be governed by Article 81;
(2) When the marriage takes place without the consent of the parents or guardian, as required by law;
(3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee acted in bad faith;
(4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse;
(5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied with;
(6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as specified by the provisions of the Civil Code
on donations in general.

Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during
the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the
occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband
and wife without a valid marriage. 

Locquiao Valencia, et al. vs. Locquiao, et al. G.R. No. 122134, October 3, 2003
Facts: The cases involve a parcel of land that was owned by the spouses Heminigildo and Raymunda
Locquiao. The spouses Heminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao died on December 15, 1962 and January
9,1968 respectively, leaving six surviving heirs.

On May 22, 1944, the spouses executed a deed of donation denominated as Inventario Ti Sagut in
favor of their son, respondent Benito Locquiao and his fiancé at the time, respondent Tomasa Mara.
The deed of donation was executed due to their son’s upcoming marriage with Tomasa Mara which
took place on June 4, 1994. The said deed pertains to the donation of 4 parcel lands, a male cow and
third of the conjugal home of the spouses.

The respondent spouses registered this deed of donation with the Office of the Register of
Deed of Pangasinan on May 15, 1970 to transfer the said properties into their name. On May 15,
1970, with the permission of the Benito and Tomasa, one of the surviving heir petitioner Romana
Valencia took possession and cultivated the subject land. Her daughter Constancia Valencia, who is
also a petitioner, then took possession of the land in 1977. A Deeds of Partition with Recognition of
Rights and a Deed of Compromise Agreement were implemented due to disagreements between the
surviving heirs of Heminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao. Sometime in 1983, the petitioner filed an
annulment of title against the respondents. The case was dismissed by the Trial Court. The
respondents in return filed a complaint to eject Constancia from their property which was granted by
the trial court. The petitioners countered with another complaint for the annulment of transfer certificate
against the respondent. The RTC dismissed this case and it was further affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

In invoking the Old Civil Code, the petitioner asserts that donation received by the respondents
is not valid because there was a lack of public instrument that transcribes the respondents’
acceptance.

ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT THE DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS IS VALID.

Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public
instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described. However, Article 1330 of the
same Code provides that acceptance is not necessary to the validity of such gifts.  In other words, the
celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance with the
prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias  under the Old Civil Code.
Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides that the form of
donations propter nuptias are regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2 of the New
Civil Code, which contains the Statute of Frauds, requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder
need be in writing only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance is
not necessary for the validity of these donations.  Thus, implied acceptance is sufficient.
Therefore, the Old Civil Code applies to the case at bar since the donation propter nuptias was
executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. The decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY
SYSTEM OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY: The property regime of the spouses in the absence of a
marriage settlement or when the marriage is void. This is so because it is more in keeping with Filipino
culture.

GENERAL RULE: The community property consists of all the property owned by the spouses at the
time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.

EXCEPTIONS: Exclusions from Community Property:

1. Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former
marriage and its fruits and income
2. Property for personal and exclusive use except jewelry
3. Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title, except when the donor, testator, or grantor
expressly provides otherwise

• No waiver of rights allowed during the marriage except in case of judicial separation of property. The
waiver must be in a public instrument.

Arts. 88-104, Family Code

Art. 88. The absolute community of property between spouses shall commence at the precise moment
that the marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the
community regime at any other time shall be void. (145a)

Art. 89. No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute community of property during the
marriage can be made except in case of judicial separation of property.

When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of property, or after the marriage has been
dissolved or annulled, the same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be recorded as provided
in Article 77. The creditors of the spouse who made such waiver may petition the court to rescind the
waiver to the extent of the amount sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. (146a)

Art. 90. The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the absolute community of property between the
spouses in all matters not provided for in this Chapter. (n) 

Section 2. What Constitutes Community Property

Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community
property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the
marriage or acquired thereafter. (197a)

Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits as well as
the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they
shall form part of the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However, jewelry shall form part of the
community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a
former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property. (201a)

Art. 93. Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the community, unless it is
proved that it is one of those excluded therefrom. (160)chan robles virtual law library 
 
Section 3. Charges and Obligations of the Absolute Community

ADMINISTRATION OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY:

General Rule: It shall belong to both spouses

Exceptions:
1. In cases of disagreement, husband’s decision shall prevail • Wife can go to court within 5 years
2. In case one spouse is incapacitated or unable to participate in the administration of the common
properties, other spouse may assume sole powers. • These powers do not include: a. disposition and
b. encumbrance • Any encumbrance is void if without the written consent of the other spouse.

Rules on Game of Chance: LOSS: Borne by the loser spouse and shall not be charged to the
community property WINNINGS: Form part of the community property

CHARGES UPON THE ACP:

1. Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that
it benefited the family
2. Debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by designated administrator spouse, both
spouses, or by one with the consent of the other
3. Taxes, liens, charges and expenses upon community property
4. Support of spouses, their common children and legitimate children of either spouse
5. Expenses of litigation between spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless
6. Ante-nuptial debts which redounded to the benefit of the family
7. Taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of
either spouse used by the family
8. Expenses for professional or vocational course
9. Other ante-nuptial debts, support of illegitimate child, and liabilities for crime or quasi-delicts in
absence of separate property
10. Donated or promised to common legitimate children for profession, vocational course or self
improvement • If the community property is insufficient to cover all these liabilities, except those falling
under (9), spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.

• Administration of community property belongs to both- Dispute: husband prevails - If the wife decides
to go to court, must do so within 5 years from the contract • Both spouses must approve any
dispositions or encumbrances, and consent of the other spouse must be in writing - Otherwise, brought
to court and the court will give the authority, if proper - If one spouse acts without the consent of the
other or without court approval, such disposition/encumbrance is void. However, the transaction shall
be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the 3rd person which may
be perfected as a binding contract upon acceptance by the spouse or court approval.

TERMINATION OF ACP/CPG:
1. Death of either spouse
2. Decree of legal separation
3. Annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage
4. Judicial separation of property during marriage

PROCEDURE FOR DISSOLUTION OF ACP:

1. Inventory of all properties a. Inventory of community property b. Inventory of separate property of the
wife c. Inventory of separate property of the husband

2. Debts and obligation of ACP are paid

3. Remainder of the separate properties of the spouses are returned to the owner

4. Net remainder of the ACP is divided equally between husband and wife

5. Presumptive legitimes of children are delivered

6. Adjudication of conjugal dwelling and custody of common children

Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:

(1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and legitimate children of either spouse;
however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on
Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for
the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that
the family may have been benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs, upon the community
property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during marriage upon the separate property of
either spouse used by the family;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional or vocational course, or
other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate
children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or
other activity for self-improvement;
(9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under paragraph (7) of this Article, the
support of illegitimate children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a
crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-
spouse, the payment of which shall be considered as advances to be deducted from the share of the
debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the community; and
(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless.
If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, except those falling under
paragraph (9), the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties. (161a, 162a, 163a, 202a-205a) 

Art. 95. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or
any other kind of gambling, whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and
shall not be charged to the community but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the community
property. (164a) 
 
Section 4. Ownership, Administrative, Enjoyment and Disposition of the Community Property

Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court
by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (206a)

Art. 97. Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest in the community property. (n)

Art. 98. Neither spouse may donate any community property without the consent of the other.
However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the
community property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress. (n) 
 
Section 5. Dissolution of Absolute Community Regime

Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (175a)

Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute
community except that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not
have the right to be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial
authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a
summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate
property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (178a)

Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations
to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of
property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community, subject to such
precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property
relations.

A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling
without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three
months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall
be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (178a) 

Section 6. Liquidation of the Absolute Community Assets and Liabilities

Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and
the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of
insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of
them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which
shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was
agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share
provided in this Code. For purpose of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with
Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market
value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at
the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance
with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling
and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the
common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have
chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the court
shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. (n)
Art. 103. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the community property shall be liquidated in
the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the community
property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If
upon the lapse of the six months period, no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance
involving the community property of the terminated marriage shall be void.

Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing
requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property
relations of the subsequent marriage. (n)

Art. 104. Whenever the liquidation of the community properties of two or more marriages contracted by
the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective capital,
fruits and income of each community shall be determined upon such proof as may be considered
according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which community the existing properties
belong, the same shall be divided between the different communities in proportion to the capital and
duration of each. (189a) 

Valdes vs. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City, et al., G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996

FACTS: Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971 and they begot five
children. On 22 June 1992, Antonio Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. After hearing the parties
following the joinder of issues, the trial court, in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition,
thereby declaring their marriage null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code and also directed both
parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Art. 147 of the
Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Art. 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.

Consuelo Gomez sought for a clarification in the decision and asserted that the Family Code
contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without
marriage.

On May 5, 1995 an order by the RTC made the following clarification: Article 147 of the Family
Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and
will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their  'family home' and all their
other properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned
in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall
apply.

In addressing specifically, the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court
said: "Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and
respondent shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
 The petitioner filed for reconsideration but was denied so he appealed, arguing that: (1) Article 147
of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated;
(2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition
of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage
declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses; (3) Assuming arguendo that
Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of
a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.

ISSUE: Whether or not Art 147 of the Family Code is the correct law governing the disposition of
property.

RULING: Yes. In a void marriage such as those falling under Article 36, FC, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Art 147 of the Family Code.

"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live
exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and
in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however,
are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to
the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid
marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall
be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.
Petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal
shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common
by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to
Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the
liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes
recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. In all other
cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the
one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other,
between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the
ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family
Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of
the Family Code on the "family home”, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of
the spouses. Therefore, the decision of the RTC are affirmed.
Conjugal Partnership of Gains
 
SYSTEM OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF GAINS

The spouses contribute the following to a common fund:

1. Proceeds, products, fruits and income of separate properties of spouses
2. Everything acquired by spouses through their efforts
3. Everything acquired by spouses through chance

EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY IN CPG:

1. That brought into the marriage as his/her own
2. That acquired during the marriage gratuitously
3. That acquired by redemption, barter or exchange with exclusive property 4. That purchased with
exclusive money of spouse

WHAT CONSTITUTES CPG:

1. Fruits of conjugal property due or received during the marriage and net fruits of separate property
2. Those acquired through occupation
3. Livestock in excess of what was brought to the marriage
4. Those acquired during the marriage with conjugal funds
5. Share in hidden treasure
6. Those obtained from labor, industry, work or profession of either or both spouse
7. Those acquired by chance

Rules in Cases of Improvement of Exclusive Property:

1. Accession – if the cost of the improvement of the plus value is equal to or less than the value of the
principal property at the time of the improvement, the entire property remains the exclusive property of
the spouse
2. Reverse Accession – if the cost of the improvement and the plus value is more than the value of the
principal property at the time of the improvement, the property becomes conjugal (subject to
reimbursement)

CHARGES UPON CPG:

1. Debts and obligations contracted by one without the consent of the other to the extent that the family
benefited
2. Debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by administrator- spouse, both spouses or one
with the consent of the other
3. Taxes, liens, charges, expenses upon conjugal property
4. Support of the spouses, their common children and legit children of either spouse
5. Expenses of litigation
6. Ante-nuptial debts to extent family benefited
7. Taxes and expenses for mere preservation of separate property
8. Expenses for professional, vocational or self-improvement courses of either spouse
9. Value of what is donated or promised to common legit children for professional, vocation or self
improvement courses

PROCEDURE FOR DISSOLUTION OF CPG:

1. Inventory of all property
2. Amounts advanced by CP as payment for personal debts and obligations of either spouse are
credited
3. Reimbursement for use of exclusive funds
4. Debts and obligations of the CP are paid
5. Remains of exclusive properties are returned
6. Indemnify loss of deterioration of movables belonging to either spouse used for the benefit of the
family
7. Net remainder of conjugal property is divided equally
8. Delivery of children’s presumptive legitimes
9. Adjudication of conjugal dwelling and custody of children

NOTES: •

Property bought on installments paid partly from exclusive funds of the spouses and partly from
conjugal funds:
a. If full ownership is vested before the marriage – it shall belong to the buyer spouse
b. If full ownership was vested during the marriage – it shall belong to the conjugal partnership
• The separate properties shall be solidarily and subsidiarily liable for the obligations if the community
or conjugal properties are insufficient
• The ACP shall also be liable for ante-nuptial debts, support of illegitimate children, and liabilities
incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict in case of insolvency of the exclusive
property of the debtor-spouse. Payment advanced by the ACP, subject to deduction from the share of
the debtor-spouse
• The conjugal partnership property shall likewise be liable for the payment of the personal debts of
either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family.

Arts. 105-133, Family Code

Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal
partnership gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter
shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established
between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired
in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n)

Art. 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife place in a common
fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by
either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance, and, upon dissolution of the marriage or of
the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be divided equally
between them, unless otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements. (142a)
Art. 107. The rules provided in Articles 88 and 89 shall also apply to conjugal partnership of gains. (n)

Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all
that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their
marriage settlements. (147a) 
 
Section 2. Exclusive Property of Each Spouse

Art. 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;
(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title;
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange with property belonging to
only one of the spouses; and
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband. (148a)

Art. 110. The spouses retain the ownership, possession, administration and enjoyment of their
exclusive properties.
Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the administration of his or her exclusive property to
the other by means of a public instrument, which shall be recorded in the registry of property of the
place the property is located. (137a, 168a, 169a)

Art. 111. A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of his or her
exclusive property, without the consent of the other spouse, and appear alone in court to litigate with
regard to the same. (n)

Art. 112. The alienation of any exclusive property of a spouse administered by the other automatically
terminates the administration over such property and the proceeds of the alienation shall be turned
over to the owner-spouse. (n)

Art. 113. Property donated or left by will to the spouses, jointly and with designation of determinate
shares, shall pertain to the donee-spouses as his or her own exclusive property, and in the absence of
designation, share and share alike, without prejudice to the right of accretion when proper. (150a)

Art. 114. If the donations are onerous, the amount of the charges shall be borne by the exclusive
property of the donee spouse, whenever they have been advanced by the conjugal partnership of
gains. (151a)

Art. 115. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities, usufructs and similar benefits shall be
governed by the rules on gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be proper in each case. (n) 
 
Section 3. Conjugal Partnership Property

Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless
the contrary is proved. (160a)

Art. 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties:

(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether
the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the spouses;
(3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the common
property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse;
(4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the law awards to the finder or owner of the
property where the treasure is found;
(5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or hunting;
(6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in excess of the number of each kind
brought to the marriage by either spouse; and
(7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings from gambling or betting. However, losses
therefrom shall be borne exclusively by the loser-spouse. (153a, 154a, 155, 159)

Art. 118. Property bought on installments paid partly from exclusive funds of either or both spouses and
partly from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or buyers if full ownership was vested before the
marriage and to the conjugal partnership if such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either
case, any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the
owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership. (n)

Art. 119. Whenever an amount or credit payable within a period of time belongs to one of the spouses,
the sums which may be collected during the marriage in partial payments or by installments on the
principal shall be the exclusive property of the spouse. However, interests falling due during the
marriage on the principal shall belong to the conjugal partnership. (156a, 157a)

Art. 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate
property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both
spouses shall pertain to the conjugal partnership, or to the original owner-spouse, subject to the
following rules:
When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership and any resulting increase in
value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one
of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the
property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained
in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be vested upon the reimbursement, which
shall be made at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. (158a)
Section 4. Charges Upon and Obligations of
the Conjugal Partnership

Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse;
however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on
Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent
of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that
the family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal
partnership property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property
of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other
activity for self-improvement;
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate
children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or
other activity for self-improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. (161a)

Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded
to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines
and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse,
may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding
Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should
be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for
what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned. (163a)

Art. 123. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance or in betting, sweepstakes,
or any other kind of gambling whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the
conjugal partnership property. (164a) 
 
Section 5. Administration of the Conjugal Partnership Property

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court
by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)

Art. 125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership property without the consent of the
other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from
the conjugal partnership property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family
distress. (174a) 
 
Section 6. Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership Regime

Art. 126. The conjugal partnership terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (175a)

Art. 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of conjugal
partnership, except that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not
have the right to be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial
authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the separate property of both spouses
shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon petition in a
summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate
property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. (178a)

Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligation
to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of
property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to
such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property
relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling
without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three
months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall
be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. (167a, 191a) 
 
Section 7. Liquidation of the Conjugal Partnership Assets and Liabilities

Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal partnership and
the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and obligations of
either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of
property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by
law in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. In
case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with
their separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of
them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of movables
used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid
to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be
divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in
the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as
provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition in
accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall,
unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of
the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have
chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court
shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. (181a, 182a, 183a, 184a,
185a)

Art. 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be
liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal
partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased
spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or
encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing
requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property
relations of the subsequent marriage. (n)

Art. 131. Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties of two or more marriages
contracted by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the
respective capital, fruits and income of each partnership shall be determined upon such proof as may
be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which partnership the existing
properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different partnerships in proportion to the
capital and duration of each. (189a)

Art. 132. The Rules of Court on the administration of estates of deceased persons shall be observed in
the appraisal and sale of property of the conjugal partnership, and other matters which are not
expressly determined in this Chapter. (187a)
Art. 133. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the
children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered;
but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents
pertaining to them. (188a) 
 
When does Conjugal Partnership of Gains commence and apply

PNB vs. Quintos, 46 PHIL 370

FACTS: PNB seeks to recover from the defendants the sum of P31,785.96, the amount of an alleged
overdraft against them and in favor of the plaintiff bank, with interest thereon at 8% per annum from
October 1, 1922. On August 21, 1920, the defendant, Mr. Angel Ansaldo, in his answer to a letter of
the bank addressed to him or to his wife, his codefendant Margarita Q. de Ansaldo, stated, that the
balance in his current account in favor of said bank in the sum of P33,558.45 on July 31, 1920, had
been examined by him and found correct. This balance with the interest due from the said date up to
September 30, 1922, amounted to P41,212.05 and after deducting the credit and deposits from August
1, 1920, to September 30, 1922, which amount to P9,426.09, there remains a balance of P31,785.96,
payment of which is claimed in the complaint.

On April 2, 1921 and July 22, 1922, a complaint was filed requiring Mr. Ansaldo to pay his debt.
The Defendant argue that the nature of the obligation sued on, maintaining that the same is not
solidary by nature because there is nothing that expressly determines said character, and therefore it
binds only those who have contacted the same to their share in said obligation

However, Art 1408 of the Civil Code, states that all the debts and obligations contracted during
the marriage by the husband, as well as those incurred by the wife in those cases in which she may
legally bind the partnership, are chargeable to the conjugal partnership, thus Margarita, the wife, is part
of the obligation as her husband as the legal manager of the conjugal partnership is liable for debt.

The trial court rendered judgment sentencing the defendants to pay the plaintiff bank the sum
of thirty-one thousand seven hundred eighty-five pesos and ninety-six centavos (P31,785.96), with
interest thereon at the rate of 8% per annum from October 1, 1922, until full payment. In case of failure
to pay, let the certificates of shares be sold, and if the proceeds of the sale of said shares are not
sufficient to cover the whole amount of the debt, let an execution issue against any property of the
conjugal partnership of the defendants and, in default thereof, against the private property of each of
them, sufficient to cover the whole amount of the balance that may be remaining unpaid.

A motion was raised alleging thedebt is not chargeable to the conjugal partnership and not to
the private property of the spouses, and much less to the private property of Margarita Quintos de
Ansaldo. In said document it does not clearly appear that the signers were husband and wife, although
there is proof in the record tending to show their civil status as husband and wife. Nor does it appear in
the said document that the signers have bound themselves solidarily to pay the debt owing to plaintiff.
 Conjugal property is liable for the debt they incurred as husband and wife. Conjugal partnership
begins existing at celebration of marriage as confined to properties stated in Art 1401 of CC; (a) Those
acquired by onerous (heavy obligations) title during the marriage at the expense of the common
property whether the acquisition is made for the community or for only one of them; (b)those obtained
by the industry, salary or labor of the spouses or any of them; (c) the fruits, rents or interest received or
accruing during the marriage, from the common or the private property of each of the spouses.
Conjugal partnership DOES NOT merge the properties they acquired before. The rest of the property
that the spouse acquired before their marriage is separate from the conjugal partnership and it
guaranteed by absolute separation of capitals.

ISSUE: There can be no doubt that the property pledged being insufficient, the property of the conjugal
partnership is liable for this obligation in accordance with article 1408 of the Civil Code, because the
same was contracted by the spouses during the marriage; but in default of property of the conjugal
partnership (article 1401), what is the liability of the spouses as to the private property (article 1396) of
each of them?

RULING: The liability if joint, not solidary. Under New Civil Code ( Art. 1698) it states that partners
are not solidarily liable with respect to the debt of the partnership. The New Civil Code (Art. 1137) also
provides that solidarity will exist only when it is expressly determined. Meaning, a partner cannot be
solidarity liable for the debts of the partnership, because there is no legal provision imposing such
burden up on one. And it is now held that properties of the conjugal partnership of the defendants are
liable for the debt to the plaintiff, and in default thereof, they are jointly liable for the payment thereof.
The account that the contract of pledge signed by the defendants does not show that they have
contracted a solidary obligation, it is our opinion, and so decide, that the properties given as pledge
being insufficient, the properties of the conjugal partnership of the defendants are liable for the debt to
the plaintiff, and in default thereof, they are jointly liable for the payment thereof.

No presumption of conjugality

Metrobank vs. Jose Tan et al. G.R. No. 163712, November 30, 2006

FACTS: The petitioners Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) and its Vice President
Rogelio T. Uy (Uy), the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Misamis Oriental issued a Sheriff’s Notice of
Sale setting on April 17, 1998 the sale at public auction of four mortgaged parcels of land. The said
lands were being auctioned by the petitioners due to the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage
belonging to respondents Jose Tan and Eliza Tan. A day before the scheduled public auction of the
mortgaged properties or on April 16, 1998, respondent spouses Jose B. Tan and Eliza Go Tan filed a
complaint against petitioners, along with Albano L. Cuarto, Sheriff IV of the Office of the Provincial
Sheriff of Misamis Oriental, for removal of cloud on the title in question and injunction.
In support of their petition, Respondent Eliza Go Tan allege that she never gave her consent or
conformity to encumber the title in question. Also, respondent Jose B. Tan had already fully paid the
obligations secured by the mortgages annotated as Entries No. 14275, 146789, and 174644. Lastly,
mortgages registered as Entry No. 213699, 246959 and any mortgages prior to that registered as Entry
No. 213699 was not executed and signed by Jose Tan.
The petitioner in return alleged that the respondents and their two sons obtained a single credit
line from the defendant bank. The credit line increased from time to time until it reached P40milliion.
The mortgage constituted on the four lots, TCT No. T-53267 included, was for the entire credit line and
not for any particular availment or for a determinate portion of the credit. As such, the mortgage will be
discharged and the four lots released only upon the termination of the line, which means full payment
of the entire loan which plaintiffs never did. petitioners further alleged that the deeds of real estate
mortgage, promissory notes, and credit line agreements bore the signature of respondent Jose B. Tan
either for himself or as attorney-in-fact of his son Ariel Tan and, in one of them, his wife-co-respondent
Eliza Go Tans signature appeared.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents will have to be subjected to the mortgages issued by
Metropolitan Bank even if they did not give consent to that transaction.
Held: All document-exhibits of petitioners which are original copies bear the signature of respondent
Jose B. Tan, however, as solidary co-debtor of his sons Rey John Tan and Ariel Tan. In the absence of
proof, nay allegation, that the signatures of respondent Jose B. Tan on the abovementioned
documents were forged, this uphold their genuineness.
In any event, lack of respondent Eliza Go Tan’s consent to the mortgage covering the title in question
would not render the encumbrance void under the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code.
For proof is wanting that the property covered by the title is conjugal that it was acquired during
respondents’ marriage which is what would give rise to the presumption that it is conjugal property.
There is no presumption of conjugality. The statement in the title that the property is registered in
accordance with the provisions of Section 103 of the Property Registration Decree in the name
of JOSE B. TAN, of legal age, married to Eliza Go Tan does not prove or indicate that the property
is conjugal. To prove whether or not the property is conjugal, evidence of when the property was
acquired must be introduced. It is the time when the property was acquired, not when it was registered
in the name of the spouses, that will determine the nature of the property.
What constitutes conjugal partnership

PNB vs. Court of Appeals 158 SCRA 435

FACTS: Donata Montemayor, through her son, Salvador M. Vitug, mortgaged to the PNB several
parcels of land to guarantee the loan granted by the PNB to Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani in
the amount of P40,900.00. Donata also mortgaged in favor of PNB certain properties covered by TCT
Nos. 2887 and 2888 to guarantee the payment of the loan account of her son Salvador Vitug in the
amount of P35,200.00, which mortgage was duly registered in the Register of Deeds of Pampanga.
 The above-mentioned TCTs covering said properties were all in the name of Donata, of legal
age, Filipino, widow and a resident of Lubao, Pampanga at the time they were mortgaged to PNB.
Salvador Vitug failed to pay his account so the bank foreclosed the mortgaged properties covered by
TCT Nos. 2887 and 2888. They were sold at public auction on May 20, 1968 in which the PNB was the
highest bidder. The titles thereto were thereafter consolidated in the name of PNB. Likewise, Salvador
Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani failed to settle their accounts with the PNB so the latter foreclosed the
properties covered by TCT No. 2889 which were sold at public auction and likewise PNB was the buyer
thereof.
On August 30, 1968, a certificate of sale was issued by the Register of Deeds covering said
properties in favor ofthe PNB. When the title of the PNB was consolidated a new title was issued in its
name. PNB sold the properties covered by TCT Nos. 2887 and 2888 — Pampanga to Jesus M. Vitug,
Anunciacion V. de Guzman, Prudencia V. Fajardo, Salvador Vitug and Aurora V. Gutierrez in those
names the corresponding titles were issued.

During the lifetime of Clodualdo Vitug he married two times. His first wife was Gervacia Flores
with whom he had 3 children, namely, Victor, Lucina and Julio all surnamed Vitug. Victor now dead is
survived by his 5 children. Juan Vitug is also dead and is survived by his only daughter Florencia Vitug.
The second wife of ClodualdoVitug was DonataMontemayor with whom he had 8 children.

On May 12,1958, Donata executed a contract of lease of Lot No. 24, which is covered by TCT
No. 2887-R in favor of her children Pragmacio and Maximo. By virtue of a general power of attorney
executed by Donata Montemayor on Sept. 19, 1966 in favor of Pragmacio Vitug, the latter executed a
contract of lease on Sept. 19, 1967 of the said lot in favor of Maximo Vitug. Pragmacio Vitug and
Maximo Vitug filed an action for partition and reconveyance with damages in the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga against Marcelo Mendiola, special administrator of the intestate estate of Donata
Montemayor who died earlier, Jesus Vitug, Sr., Salvador, Natalia, Prudencia, Anunciacion, all
surnamed Vitug, Antonio, Francisco, Aurora, Pedro, Honorio, Corazon, Anselmo, Benigno, Eligio Jesus
and Luz, all surnamed Fajardo and the PNB.

The subject of the action is 30 parcels of land which they claim to be the conjugal property of
the spouses Donata Montemayor and Clodualdo Vitug of which they claim a share of 2/11 of 1/2
thereof. They assailed the mortgage to the PNB and the public auction of the properties as null and
void. They invoked the case of Vitug vs. Montemayor,L-5297 decided by this Court on Oct. 20, 1953
which is an action for partition and liquidation of the said 30 parcels of land wherein the properties were
found to be conjugal in nature.

On September 15, 1975, the lower court dismissed the complaint against the plaintiffs so they
appeal to the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the presumption of conjugality of properties acquired by the spouses during
coverture provided for in Article 160 of the Civil Code apply to property covered by a Torrens certificate
of title in the name of the widow.
RULING: No. When the subject properties were mortgaged to the PNB they were registered in the
name of Donata Montemayor, widow. Relying on the torrens certificate of title covering said properties
the mortgage loan applications of Donata were granted by the PNB and the mortgages were duly
constituted and registered in the office of the Register of Deeds.

In processing the loan applications of Donata Montemayor, the PNB had the right to rely on
what appears in the certificates of title and no more. On its face the properties are owned by Donata
Montemayor, a widow. The PNB had no reason to doubt nor question the status of said registered
owner and her ownership thereof. Indeed, there are no liens and encumbrances covering the same.
The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely
upon the face of the torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except
when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man make such inquiry.

Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In
this case, it appears on the face of the title that the properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor
when she was already a widow. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and
there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an
indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Article
160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of
innocent third parties are involved. Moreover, as correctly held by the lower court. Pragmacio and
Maximo Vitug as occupants and lessees of the property in question cannot now dispute the ownership
of their mother over the same who was their lessor. Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and set aside and another decision is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint
and ordering private respondents

Cuenca vs. Cuenca, 168 SCRA 335

FACTS: Private respondents Restituto Cuenca and Meladora Cuenca filed a complaint for recovery of
real property and damages against the petitioners before the then Court of First Instance of Davao del
Norte. The case was docketed as Civilcase no. 1240. Civil Case No. 1240 had for its subject matter
parcels of land which were claimed by- two sets of families. Private respondents Restituto Cuenca and
Meladora Cuenca claimed ownership over the subject parcels of land on the ground that they are the
legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon, both deceased, owners of the subject
parcels of land. They alleged that some of the parcels are paraphernal property of Maria while all the
others are conjugal properties of Maria and Agripino They also alleged that Agripino Cuenca and
Engracia Basadre were not legally married because at the time they lived together Agripino was
married to a certain Jesusa Pagar.
On the other hand, the petitioners (defendants below) denied the legitimacy of the marriage between
Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon as well as the legitimacy of the plaintiffs as children of the
couple. They claimed that Agripino Cuenca and their mother Engracia Basadre were legally married
and that they are the legitimate children of the couple. They contend that the subject parcels of lands
are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia.

After trial, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. The lower court dismissed the
complaint.

The private respondents appealed the decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court.
On November 26, 1984, the appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court. It
rendered a decision in favor of the private respondents

ISSUE: Are the properties of Meladora Cuenca and Restituto Cuenca conjugal in character?

HELD: No, the presumption of conjugality of properties acquired during the marriage cannot arise.

After considering the evidence of both parties, in sum, We find convincing evidence to show that
Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon were legally married with Restituto Cuenca and Meladora
Cuenca as their issues; that Maria Bangahon brought properties into her marriage; that the couple
acquired properties during the marriage. Therefore, upon the dissolution of the conjugal relationship by
the death of spouses Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon, one half goes to Agripino Cuenca which
portion after the death of Agripino Cuenca goes to his alleged third wife, Engracia Basadre-Cuenca
together with the plaintiffs as forced heirs of Agripino Cuenca (Arts. 185 & 189, New Civil Code).

Accordingly, the appellate court declared Engracia Basadre as surviving spouse. There was, therefore
no need to prove the legality of marriage between petitioners Engracia Basadre and Agripino Cuenca
much less to prove the legitimacy of the other petitioners who are undoubtedly the children of Agripino
and Engracia.

The petitioners also alleged the finding of newly discovered evidence to prove that the subject parcels
of land were conjugal properties of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre. These consist of
eight (8) sketch maps obtained on December 27, 1984 from the Regional Office of the Bureau of Lands
in Cagayan de Oro City "after extensive research." The petitioners alleged that these parcels were
surveyed for Agripino Cuenca and approved when Agripino Cuenca was already married to Engracia
as indicated in the documents, hence, there is the presumption that these are conjugal properties and
therefore petitioners have hereditary rights over these properties.

Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife,".
In the case at bar, the documents sought to be presented as newly discovered evidence do not show
that the claims to the subject parcels consisting of homestead lands were perfected during the
marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre. The perfection of the homestead claims
is considered the time of acquisition of the properties.

Moreover, the documents show that 5 of the 8 parcels covered by the documents are titled in the name
of either respondent Meladora Cuenca or respondent Restituto Cuenca. The presumption cannot
prevail "when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are
involved. Under the circumstances of this case, the non-applicablility of the presumption should also be
upheld.

Zulueta vs. PAN AM 49 SCRA 1

FACTS: Petitioner Rafael Zulueta and his family were passengers of respondent Pan-American
Airways bound to Manila from Wake Island. Before the plane took off, Rafael got off the plane to relieve
himself. It took a full hour before he came back, which caused the trip substantial delay. As a
consequence, an altercation happened between him and the airplane captain. The heated argument
prompted the captain to order the crew that Rafael and his family to be off-loaded from the plane.

Because of the humiliation and embarrassment, they filed an action for damages. The court ordered
the airline to pay moral damages in the amount of P700, 000.

ISSUE: Whether the amount of money collected as a result of litigation forms a part of conjugal
partnership.

RULING: The defense assails the last part of the decision sought to be reconsidered, in which relying
upon Article 172 of our Civil Code, which provides that "(t)he wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership
without the husband's consent, except in cases provided by law," and it is not claimed that this is one
of such cases. We denied a motion, filed by Mrs. Zulueta, for the dismissal of this case, insofar as she
is concerned - she having settled all her differences with the defendant, which appears to have paid
her the sum of P50,000 therefor - "without prejudice to this sum being deducted from the award made
in said decision." Defendant now alleges that this is tantamount to holding that said compromise
agreement is both effective and ineffective.

In both cases, it was merely held that the presumption under Article 160 of our Civil Code, to
the effect that all property of the marriage belong to the conjugal partnership, does not apply unless it is
shown that it was acquired during marriage. In the present case, the contract of carriage was
concededly entered into, and the damages claimed by the plaintiffs were incurred, during marriage.
Hence, the rights accruing from said contract, including those resulting from breach thereof by the
defendant, are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Zulueta. The fact that
such breach of contract was coupled, also, with a quasi-delict constitutes an aggravating circumstance
and cannot possibly have the effect of depriving the conjugal partnership of such property rights.
 Indeed, our Civil Code, like the Spanish Civil Code, favors the system of conjugal partnership
of gains. Accordingly, the former provides that, "in the absence of marriage settlements, or when the
same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains shall govern the
property relations between" the spouses. Hence, "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."

Moral damages have arisen from inter alia, a contract was breached when the airline off-loaded
the family from the flight that they have paid for and the airline has agreed to service them. This falls
under those acquired by onerous title during the marriage. Hence, the rights accruing from such
contracts including those from breach thereof are presumed to belong to the partnership.

Mendoza vs. Reyes 124 SCRA 335

Facts: Julia R. Reyes and Ponciano S. Reyes were married in 1915. They bought from Gregorio
Araneto two lots using money loaned from RFC. A deed of sale was executed by Araneta with Julia de
Reyes’ name and signature over the caption ‘vendee’ and those of Ponciano under the phrase: “with my
marital consent”. Then a Transfer Certificates of Title were issued in the name of “JULIA REYES
married to PONCIANO REYES”. Also, the mortgage contracts with RFC were duly annotated in the
title.

Consequently, the spouses built a house on the lots and a camarin, which they leased to a school
first then to the Mendoza spouses for ten years. The contract of the lease was signed by Julia as lessor
with the marital consent of Ponciano. Despite the good rentals, the Reyes spouses failed to pay DBP,
the successor of RFC, of their remaining balance, which prompted the spouses to seek for extension of
five years.

On March 3, 1961, while Ponciano was absent, attending his farm at Arayat, Pampanga, Julia sold
the questioned lots, together with their improvements to the appellees Mendozas for the sum of 80,
000.00 without the consent of Ponciano.

Issue: WON the 2 lots in questioned are under the conjugal partnership property of the Reyes’ spouse.

Held: Yes. The SC affirmed the decision of the CA

Ratio: Article 153 and 160 of the civil code provides what properties are belonging to the conjugal
partnership property. The court was once ruled that "it is sufficient to prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage in order that the same may be deemed conjugal property." There is no
question that the disputed property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage. Furthermore the
funds used to buy the lot and build the improvements were all obtained by the spouses from the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and under Article 161 of the Civil Code, all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband and the wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the
partnership. Property acquired during marriage was registered in the name of the husband alone does
not affect its conjugal nature; neither does registration in the name of the wife. Any person who buys
land registered in the married name of the wife is put on notice about its conjugal nature.

The property is conjugal and the deed of sale is null and void with respect to one-half share of
Ponciano. The law states that, conjugal partnership property consists of that which was acquired by
onerous title during marriage at the expense of the common funds, whether the acquisition is for the
partnership or for only one of the spouses. Evidence shows that the funds use for the acquisition of
property came from loans obtained by spouses.           

Belcodero vs. Court of Appeals 227 SCRA 303

FACTS: This case involves the question of ownership over a piece of land acquired by a husband
while living with a paramour and after having deserted his lawful wife and children. The property had
been bought by the husband on installment basis prior to the effectivity of the Civil Code of 1950 but
the final deed, as well as the questioned conveyance by him to his common law spouse, has ensued
during the latter Code's regime. Now, of course, we have to likewise take note of the new Family Code
which took effect on 03 August 1988. The husband, Alayo D. Bosing, married Juliana Oday on 27 July
1927, with whom he had three children, namely, Flora, Teresita, and Gaido. In 1946, he left the
conjugal home, and he forthwith started to live instead with Josefa Rivera with whom he later begot
one child, named Josephine Bosing, now Josephine Balcobero

On 23 August 1949, Alayo purchased a parcel of land on installment basis from the Magdalena Estate,
Inc. Alayo died on 11 march 1967. About three years later, or on 17 September 1970, Josefa and
Josephine executed a document of extrajudicial partition and sale of the lot in question, which was
there described as "conjugal property" of Josefa and deceased Alayo. On 30 October 1980, Juliana
(deceased Alayo's real widow) and her three legitimate children filed with the court a quo an action for
reconveyance of the property

The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's order
for reconveyance but reversed the decision on the award for damages

ISSUE: WON the land acquired by a husband while living with a paramour is conjugal property.

RULING: Yes.

The decision appealed from in the instant petition for review on certiorari is AFFIRMED

The property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife
Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407), " all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This presumption has not been convincingly
rebutted.
Alayo's letter, dated 06 October 1959, to Magdalena Estate, Inc., merely authorized the latter to have
title to the property transferred to her name. More importantly, she implicitly recognized Alayo's
ownership when, three years after the death of Alayo, she and Josephine executed the deed of
extrajudicial partition and sale in which she asserted a one-half (1/2) interest in the property in what
may be described as her share in the "conjugal partnership" with Alayo, plus another one-fourth (1/4)
interest as "surviving widow," the last one-fourth (1/4) going to Josephine as the issue of the deceased.
Observe that the above adjudication would have exactly conformed with a partition in intestacy had
they been the sole and legitimate heirs of the decedent.
As regards the property relation between common-law spouses, Article 144 of the Civil Code merely
codified the law established through judicial precedents under the old code (Margaret Maxey vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45870, 11 May 1984). In both regimes, the co-ownership rule had more than
once been repudiated when either or both spouses suffered from an impediment to marry (Jeroniza vs.
Jose, 89 SCRA 306). The present provisions under Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code did
not much deviate from the old rules; in any case, its provisions cannot apply to this case without
interdicting prior vested rights (Article 256, Family Code).

Embrado vs. Court of Appeals 233 SCRA 335

FACTSL Lucia Embrado, who was already married to petitioner Oreste Torregiani, bought LOT NO.
564 in her name alone. The document provided that even though the deed was prepared and signed
on 2 July 1946, the effects of the document would retroact to the 15th day of April 1941, the date the lot
and its improvements were actually sold to Lucia C. Embrado. Embrado sold the lot described as her
own paraphernal property to her adopted daughter, Eda Jimenez. Eda sold the lot to to Cimafranca
and Salimbagat. Torregiani instituted in the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of
Zamboanga del Norte an action for declaration of nullity of contract, annulment of sales, reconveyance
and damages alleging that he did not consent to the sale, which consent was necessary because Lot
564 was conjugal property.

ISSUE: WON the property is exclusive of Lucia Embrado or conjugal property of both Embrado anf
Torregiani.

HELD: The court agrees with respondent court that Lot 564 was originally the paraphernal property of
Lucia. Because Lucia and the original owners agreed in 1941 for its purchase and sale, ownership was
already acquired by Lucia at that moment.

Under Art. 1496 of the Civil Code, “ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the
moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other
manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee,” and
under Art. 1498, “(w)hen the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary
does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.”
In the case at bar, the Venta Definitiva over Lot 564 in favor of Lucia Embrado was executed by the
Carpitanoses on 2 July 1946 when her marriage to petitioner Oreste Torregiani was already subsisting.
Although ownership was acquired during the marriage and hence presumed conjugal, the presumption
of conjugality was successfully overcome by the terms of the Venta Definitiva which contains a positive
assertion of exclusive ownership, which was duly supported by the testimony of Matias Carpitanos, one
of the original sellers of the lot.

However, it is a fact that there is a construction in 1958 of a residential/commercial building on said lot
a part of which was leased to third persons and another part serving as the conjugal dwelling. Although
there is no evidence on the source of funds used, it is presumed to be conjugal funds.

The second paragraph of Art. 158 of the Civil Code provides that “[b]uildings constructed, at the
expense of the partnership, during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain
to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.”
Under this article, the land becomes conjugal upon the construction of the building without awaiting
reimbursement before or at the liquidation of the partnership upon the concurrence of two conditions, to
wit: (a) the construction of the building at the expense of the partnership; and, (b) the ownership of the
land by one of the spouses. The conditions have been fully met in the case at bench. Thus, even if Lot
564 was originally the paraphernal property of Lucia as evident from the “Venta Definitiva”, the same
became conjugal upon the construction of the residential/commercial building in 1958.