LEGAL SEPARATION:

LAWS INVOLVED:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if
pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or
abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.

For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall include a child by nature or by adoption. (9a)

Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds:
(1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of;
(2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or act complained of;
(3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or act constituting
the ground for legal separation;
(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
(5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of legal separation; or
(6) Where the action is barred by prescription. (100a)

Art. 57. An action for legal separation shall be filed within five years from the time of the occurrence of the
cause. (102)

Art. 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the
filing of the petition. (103)

Art. 59. No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court has taken steps toward the reconciliation of the
spouses and is fully satisfied, despite such efforts, that reconciliation is highly improbable. (n)

Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment.

In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. (101a)

Art. 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately
from each other.

The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a
third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator
appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court.
(104a)

Art. 62. During the pendency of the action for legal separation, the provisions of Article 49 shall likewise apply
to the support of the spouses and the custody and support of the common children. (105a)

Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not
be severed;
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the
offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of
Article 43(2);
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the
provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by
intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the
innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law. (106a)

Art. 64. After the finality of the decree of legal separation, the innocent spouse may revoke the donations
made by him or by her in favor of the offending spouse, as well as the designation of the latter as beneficiary
in any INSURANCE POLICY, EVEN IF SUCH DESIGNATION BE STIPULATED AS
IRREVOCABLE. The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the registries of property in the places
where the properties are located. Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good faith before the
recording of the complaint for revocation in the registries of property shall be respected. The revocation of or
change in the designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take effect upon written notification thereof to the
insured.
The action to revoke the donation under this Article must be brought WITHIN FIVE YEARS FROM THE
TIME THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION BECOME FINAL. (107a)

Art. 65. If the spouses should RECONCILE, a corresponding joint manifestation under oath duly signed by
them shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation. (n)

Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences:
(1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever stage;
and
(2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, UNLESS THE
SPOUSES AGREE TO REVIVE THEIR FORMER PROPERTY REGIME.The court's order
containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. (108a)
Art. 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding Article shall be
executed under oath and shall specify:
(1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime;
(2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse; and
(3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each.

The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for
legal separation, with copies of both furnished to the creditors named therein. After due hearing, the court shall,
in its order, take measure to protect the interest of creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper
registries of properties.
The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not
notified, unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's claim.

CASES:
Pacete vs Cariaga

Facts: Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the marriage
between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for LEGAL
SEPARATION (BETWEEN ALANIS AND PACETE), accounting and separation of property. In her
complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato; that they had
a child named Consuelo;

...that Pacete subsequently contracted in 1948 a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in North
Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only on 1979;

...that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land,
fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his
name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other "dummies;" that Pacete ignored
overtures for an amicable settlement; and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he
evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. 

The defendants were each served with summons on 15 November 1979. They filed a motion for an extension
of twenty (20) days from 30 November 1979 within which to file an answer. The court GRANTED the
motion.

On 18 December 1979, appearing through a new counsel, the defendants filed a second motion for an
extension of another thirty (30) days from 20 December 1979. On 07 January 1980, the lower court granted
the motion but only for twenty (20) days to be counted from 20 December 1979 or until 09 January 1980.

Likely still unaware of the court order, the defendants, on 05 February 1980, again filed another motion
(dated 18 January 1980) for an extension of "fifteen (15) days counted from the expiration of the 30-day
period previously sought" within which to file an answer. The following day, or on 06 February 1980, the court
DENIED THIS LAST MOTION ON THE GROUND THAT IT WAS "FILED AFTER THE ORIGINAL
PERIOD GIVEN . . . AS FIRST EXTENSION HAD EXPIRED."

Issue: Whether or not RTC of Cotabato City gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners' motion for
extension of time to file their answer on the decree of legal separation. 

Ruling: Petition is granted. The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to
possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed
intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate. 

It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That other remedy, whether
principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance,
with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted. 

An action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing
of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court
should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
 SAMSON T. SABALONES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-
SABALONES, respondents.

As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive tours of duties,
petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, the
administration of some of their conjugal, properties for FIFTEEN YEARS.
Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and their
children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and belonging to the
conjugal partnership.
Private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that the
house in Greenhills was being occupied by her and their six children and that they were depending for
their support on the rentals from another conjugal property, a building and lot in Forbes Park which was
on lease to Nobumichi Izumi.
In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the liquidation of their
conjugal properties, with FORFEITURE OF HER HUSBAND'S SHARE THEREIN BECAUSE OF HIS
ADULTERY. She also prayed that it ENJOIN the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants of
the Forbes Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal properties.

After trial, Judge Mariano M. Umali, found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous marriage on
October 5, 1981, with Thelma Cumareng. The court thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the
forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was NOT
ENTITLED TO SUPPORT FROM HIS RESPONDENT WIFE.
This decision was appealed to the respondent court. The respondent wife filed a motion for the issuance of a
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION to enjoin the petitioner from interfering with the
administration of their properties in Greenhills and Forbes Park. She alleged inter alia that he had harassed
the tenant of the Forbes Park property by informing him that his lease would not be renewed. She also
complained that the petitioner had disposed of one of their valuable conjugal properties in the United States
in favor of his paramour, to the prejudice of his legitimate wife and children.
After hearing, the Court of Appeals, in an order dated April 7, 1992, GRANTED THE PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION.
The petitioner now assails this order, arguing that since the law provides for a joint administration of the
conjugal properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the other
because no right will be violated. In support of this contention, he cites Art. 124 of the Family Code
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the HUSBAND'S DECISION SHALL PREVAIL, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the
date of the contract implementing such decision.
He further notes that the respondent court failed to appoint an administrator of the conjugal assets as mandated
by Art. 61 of the Code, thus:
Art. 61 After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately
from each other.
 The court, in the ABSENCE OF A WRITTEN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SPOUSES,
SHALL DESIGNATE EITHER OF THEM OR A THIRD PERSON TO ADMINISTER THE
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OR CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY. The administrator
appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of
Court.
RULING OF COURT: We agree with THE RESPONDENT COURT that pending the appointment of an
administrator over the whole mass of conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified in allowing the wife to
continue with her administration. It was also correct, taking into account the evidence adduced at the hearing,
in enjoining the petitioner from interfering with his wife's administration pending resolution of the appeal.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was implicit in
the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also
disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals
when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge.
The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the things
subject of the action or the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff
respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit.
In her motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the respondent wife alleged that the petitioner's
harassment of their tenant at Forbes Park would jeopardize the lease and deprive her and her children of
the income therefrom on which they depend for their subsistence. The private respondent also complained
that on June 10, 1991, the petitioner executed a quitclaim over their conjugal property in Apple Valley, San
Bernardino, California, U.S.A., in favor of Thelma Cumareng, to improve his paramour's luxurious lifestyle to
the prejudice of his legitimate family.
These allegations, none of which was refuted by the husband, show that the injunction is necessary to protect
the interests of the private respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal assets.
Let it be stressed that the injunction has NOT PERMANENTLY INSTALLED the respondent wife as the
administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue administering the
properties in the meantime without interference from the petitioner, pending the express designation of the
administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. It is so ordered.

FROILAN C. GANDIONCO, petitioner, vs. HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA, as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, and TERESITA S.
GANDIONCO, respondents.

On 29 May 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental a complaint against petitioner FOR LEGAL SEPARATION, on the GROUND OF
CONCUBINAGE, with a petition for support and payment of damages.
On 13 October 1986, private respondent also filed with the Municipal Trial Court, General Santos City, a
complaint against petitioner for concubinage, which was docketed on 23 October 1986 as CRIMINAL CASE
On 14 November 1986, application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite, pending a decision
in the action for legal separation, was filed by private respondent in the civil case for legal separation. The
respondent judge, as already stated, on 10 December 1986, ORDERED THE PAYMENT OF SUPPORT
PENDENTE LITE.
ISSUE 1: Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto, such
as, application for support pendente lite, SHOULD BE SUSPENDED IN VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL
CASE FOR CONCUBINAGE filed against him the private respondent. In support of his contention, petitioner
cites Art. III. Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states:

SEC. 3. Other Civil action arising from offenses. — Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the
civil action to ENFORCE THE CIVIL LIABILITY arising from the offense as contemplated in the first
Section 1 hereof, the following rules shall be observed:
(a) After a criminal action has been commenced the pending civil action arising from the same offense
SHALL BE SUSPENDED, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered.
The civil action for legal separation, grounded as it is on concubinage, it is petitioner's position that such civil
action arises from, or is inextricably tied to the criminal action for concubinage, so that all proceedings
related to legal separation will have to be suspended to await conviction or acquittal for concubinage in the
criminal case.
RULING OF COURT 1: Petitioner's contention is not correct.

Sec. 1 of Rule 107 of the then provisions of the Rules of Court on criminal procedure

(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly
waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately;
(b) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action;
(c) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found until final judgment in
the criminal proceeding has been rendered ... (Emphasis supplied)

The provisions last quoted did not clearly state, as the 1985 Rules do, that the civil action to be suspended, with
or upon the filing of a criminal action, is one which is "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense".
In other words, in view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for
legal separation, based on concubinage, MAY PROCEED AHEAD OF, OR SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH, a
criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising
from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such
civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as,
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from
inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others.

The governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which refers to "civil actions to
enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" as contemplated in the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule
111-which is a civil action "for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged." Sec. 1, Rule 111,
(1985) is specific that it refers to civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged. Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107 simply referred to "Civil action arising from the offense."

As earlier noted this action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, in the main, but is aimed at the
conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to each other, within the contemplation of Articles 7 to
108, of the Civil Code."
ISSUE 2: Petitioner also argues that his conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before the
action for legal separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for legal separation is his alleged
offense of concubinage.

RULING OF COURT 2: decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof
by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. 3 NO CRIMINAL PROCEEDING OR
CONVICTION IS NECESSARY.

ISSUE 3: Petitioner lastly seeks to have the respondent Judge disqualified from hearing the case, as the grant of
supportpendente lite and the denial of the motion to suspend hearings in the case, are taken by the petitioner as a
disregard of applicable laws and existing doctrines, thereby showing the respondent Judge's alleged manifest
partiality to private respondent.

RULING OF COURT 3: Petitioner's contention is without merit. Divergence of opinions between a judge
hearing a case and a party's counsel, as to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to
disqualify the judge from hearing the case, on the ground of bias and manifest partiality. This is more so, in this
case, where we find the judge's disposition of petitioner's motions to be sound and well-taken.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972

CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ,
petitioner-appellant,vs.
EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY,
respondent-appellee.
REYES J.B.L.,J.:
 
DOCTRINE:
 An action for legal separation is purely personal. Being personal in character, the DEATH OF ONE
PARTY TO THE ACTION CAUSES THE DEATH OF THE  ACTION ITSELF.The right to the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the
profits earned by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy from
the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of theoffending spouse made
by the innocent one,are all rights and disabilities that are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses
and by their nature, such claims and disabilities are not assignable or transmissible.

FACTS:

Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio . She alleged that they
were married civilly on 9/21/1934 and had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943when her
husband abandoned her. They had no child.

She prayed for the issuance of a decree which would order defendant Eufemio to be deprived of his share
of the conjugal partnership profits

EUFEMIO alleged affirmative and special defenses and counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity
ab initio o f   h i s   m a r r i a g e   w i t h   C a r m e n
b e c a u s e   o f   h i s   p r i o r   a n d   s u b s i s t i n g   m a r r i a g e , celebrated according to Chinese law and customs,
with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
During trial, petitioner CARMEN DIED IN A VEHICULAR ACCIDENT on May 1969.

Eufemio moved to DISMISS THE PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION ON 2 GROUNDS that the:
(1) petition for legal separation was filed beyond the 1-year period provided for in Article
102 of the Civil Code; and 
(b)death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.

Counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz

Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the case and stated that the motion to dismiss and the motion for substitution had to be
resolved on the question of whether or not the plaintiff's cause of action has survived, whichthe court resolved
in the negative.

Petitioner filed a petitioner for
r e v i e w   o f   t h e   o r d e r   o f   d i s m i s s a l ,   b u t   t h e   o r d e r   o f   d i s m i s s a l   w a s affirmed.

ISSUES:
Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate theaction? –YES

RULING: An action for legal separation involves nothing more than the bed-and-
board separation of thespouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes in

Article 100 allows only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation and in
Article 108 ,by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even
rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of
oneparty to the action causes the death of the action itself.
 
 
Changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree
of legal separation. Hence, they cannot survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree

 AN ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION IS ABATED BY THE DEATH OF THE PLAINTIFF, even i
f property rights areinvolved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the
decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality
of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation.

Regarding Eufemio’s petition for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is
apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be no
further interest in CONTINUING THE SAME AFTER HER DEMISE, THAT
AUTOMATICALLY DISSOLVED THE QUESTIONED UNION

KIAM V. ONG

Ong Eng Kiam, AKA William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were married on July 13, 1975 at
the San Agustin Church in Manila. They have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now
all of the age of majority.
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family
Code[4] alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly
abusive conduct.[5]

Lucita claimed that: soon after three years of marriage, she and William quarreled almost every day, with
physical violence being inflicted upon her; William would shout invectives at her like “putang ina mo”, “gago”,
“tanga”, and he would slap her, kick her, pull her hair, bang her head against concrete wall and throw at her
whatever he could reach with his hand; the causes of these fights were petty things regarding their children or
their business; William would also scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle
of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box
her; on December 9, 1995, after she protested with William’s decision to allow their eldest son Kingston to go
to Bacolod, William slapped her and said, “it is none of your business”;

On December 14, 1995, she asked William to bring Kingston back from Bacolod; a violent quarrel ensued and
William hit her on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and arms; when William hit her on the stomach and
she bent down because of the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave
the house; she then went to her sister’s house in Binondo where she was fetched by her other siblings and
brought to their parents house in Dagupan; the following day, she went to her parent’s doctor, Dr. Vicente
Elinzano for treatment of her injuries.[6]

William for his part DENIED that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife, used insulting language against
her, or whipped the children with the buckle of his belt.

On January 5, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby RENDERED DECREEING THE LEGAL

SEPARATION OF PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT, WITH ALL THE LEGAL EFFECTS
ATTENDANT THERETO, PARTICULARLY THE DISSOLUTION AND LIQUIDATION OF
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTIES, for which purpose the parties are hereby ordered
to submit a complete inventory of said properties so that the Court can make a just and proper division,
such division to be embodied in a supplemental decision.
SO ORDERED.

William appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC decision. In its Decision dated October 8, 2001, the
CA found that the testimonies for Lucita were straightforward and credible and the ground for legal separation
under Art. 55, par. 1 of the Family Code, i.e., physical violence and grossly abusive conduct directed against
Lucita, were adequately proven.

Hence the present petition where William claims that:

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING CLEAR
EVIDENCE THAT THE PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION WAS INSTITUTED BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF REMOVING FROM PETITIONER THE CONTROL
AND OWNERSHIP OF THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES AND TO TRANSFER THE SAME TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S FAMILY.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING CLEAR
EVIDENCE REPUDIATING PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S CLAIM OF REPEATED PHYSICAL VIOLENCE
AND GROSSLY ABUSIVE CONDUCT ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.[13]

Petitioner filed a Reply, reasserting his claims in his petition,[16] as well as a Memorandum where he averred
for the first time that SINCE RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF ABANDONMENT, THE PETITION FOR
LEGAL SEPARATION SHOULD BE DENIED FOLLOWING ART. 56, PAR. (4) OF THE FAMILY
CODE.[17] Petitioner argues that since respondent herself has given ground for legal separation by abandoning
the family simply because of a quarrel and refusing to return thereto unless the conjugal properties were placed
in the administration of petitioner’s in-laws, NO DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION SHOULD BE
ISSUED IN HER FAVOR.

RULING OF COURT: We resolve to deny the petition.

It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The rule finds more stringent application where the CA upholds the findings of fact of the trial court. In
such instance, this Court is generally bound to adopt the facts as determined by the lower courts.

William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in order for her side of
the family to gain control of the conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing to destroy his reputation by
filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her siblings could control the properties he worked hard
for.

As aptly stated by the RTC,

...it would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of relationship, abandon the comforts
of her home and be separated from her children whom she loves, if there exists no cause, which is
already beyond her endurance.

The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and label him as a wife-
beater and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a smear on his
reputation then it would not be because of Lucita’s decision to seek relief from the courts, but because he gave
Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.

As correctly observed by the trial court, William himself admitted that there was no day that he did not quarrel
with his wife, which made his life miserable, and he blames her for being negligent of her wifely duties and for
not reporting to him the wrongdoings of their children.

Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal
separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal
separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment
referred to by the Family Code is abandonment WITHOUT JUSTIFIABLE CAUSE for more than one year.
[40] As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute
abandonment contemplated by the said provision.

LUIS MA. ARANETA, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, as judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VI and EMMA BENITEZ ARANETA, Respondents

The main action was brought by Petitioner against his wife, one of the Respondent herein, for legal separation
on the GROUND OF ADULTERY.

After the issues were joined Defendant therein filed an OMNIBUS PETITION to secure
 custody of their three minor children,
 a monthly support of P5,000 for herself and said children, and the return of her passport,
 to enjoin Plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her,
 and to have Plaintiff therein pay for the fees of her attorney in the action.
 Plaintiff opposed the petition, denying the misconduct imputed to him and alleging that Defendant had
abandoned the children;
 alleging that conjugal properties were worth only P80,000, not one million pesos as alleged by
Defendant; denying the taking of her passport or the supposed vexation, and contesting her right to
attorney’s fees.

Plaintiff prayed that as the petition for custody and support cannot be determined without evidence, the
parties be REQUIRED TO SUBMIT THEIR RESPECTIVE EVIDENCE. He also contended that
Defendant is not entitled to the custody of the children as she had abandoned them and had committed adultery,
that by her conduct she had become unfit to educate her children.

As to the claim for support, Plaintiff claims that there are no conjugal assets and she is not entitled to
support because of her infidelity and that she was able to support herself.

The Respondent judge resolved the omnibus petition.

Upon refusal of the judge to reconsider the order, Petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari against said
order and for mandamus to compel the Respondent judge to require the parties to submit evidence before
deciding the omnibus petition.

RULING OF COURT: We granted a writ of preliminary injunction against the order.

The main reason given by the judge, for refusing Plaintiff’s request that evidence be allowed to be introduced
on the issues, is the prohibition contained in Article 103 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
“ART. 103. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed
since the filing of the petition.”
It may be noted that since more than six months have elapsed since the filing of the petition the question
offered may not be allowed. It is, however, believed that the reasons for granting the preliminary injunction
should be given that the scope of the article cited may be explained.

It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently intended as a
COOLING OFF PERIOD to make possible reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances
against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one another, and the lawmaker
has imposed the period to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient,
necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the
determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the
circumstances. (Article 105, Civil Code.) The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the
court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank in
justice may be caused.

Thus the determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect and force provided it does not go to
the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. That is, EVIDENCE NOT AFFECTING THE
CAUSE OF THE SEPARATION, LIKE THE ACTUAL CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN, the means
conducive to their welfare and convenience during the pendency of the case, these SHOULD BE ALLOWED
that the court may determine which is best for their custody.

The writ prayed for is hereby issued and the Respondent judge or whosoever takes his place is ordered to
proceed on the question of custody and support pendente lite in accordance with this opinion. The court’s order
fixing the alimony and requiring payment is reversed. Without costs.
 JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent.

Action for legal separation by Jose de Ocampo against his wife Serafina, on the ground of ADULTERY.
The COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA ECIJA DISMISSED it. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding there was confession of judgment, plus condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription.

We granted certiorari to consider the application of articles 100 and 101 of the New Civil Code, which for
convenience are quoted herewith:

ART. 100.—The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been
no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal
separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation
shall cause the dismissal of the petition.

ART. 101.—No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a STIPULATION OF FACTS
OR BY CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT.

In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting
attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not
fabricated.

The record shows that on July 5, 1955, the complaint for legal separation was filed. As amended, it described
their marriage performed in 1938, and the commission of adultery by Serafina, in March 1951 with Jose
Arcalas, and in June 1955 with Nelson Orzame.

Because the defendant made no answer, the court defaulted her, and pursuant to Art. 101 above. The fiscal
examined the defendant under oath, and then reported THERE WAS NO COLLUSION.

In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining
illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas.

Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June
1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said
city defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952,
when defendant had finished studying her course, SHE LEFT PLAINTIFF AND SINCE THEN THEY HAD
LIVED SEPARATELY.

On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the
name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which
defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action.

RULING OF COURT 1: The Court of Appeals held that the husband's right to legal separation on account of
the defendant's adultery with Jose Arcalas HAD PRESCRIBED, because his action was not filed within one
year from March 1951 when plaintiff discovered her infidelity. (Art. 102, New Civil Code) We must agree
with the Court of Appeals on this point.

As to the adultery with Nelson Orzame, the appellate court found that in the night of June 18, 1955, the husband
upon discovering the illicit connection, expressed his wish to file a petition for legal separation and
defendant readily agreed to such filing. And when she was questioned by the Fiscal upon orders of the court,
she reiterated her conformity to the legal separation even as she admitted having had sexual relations with
Nelson Orzame.

Interpreting these facts virtually to mean a confession of judgment the Appellate Court declared that under Art.
101, legal separation could not be decreed. As we understand the article, it does not exclude, as evidence, any
admission or confession made by the defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation
upon a confession of judgment.

We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home (after the latter had left
him in 1952) constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. It will be remembered
that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had discovered her dates with other men.
Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return.

Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendant could not
have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the moment her
husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk.

Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the appealed decision
and DECREE A LEGAL SEPARATION BETWEEN THESE SPOUSE, all the consequent effects. Costs of
all instances against Serafina Florenciano. So ordered.

ANTONIO MACADANGDANG, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS; HONORABLE

ALEJANDRO E. SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Davao, 16th
Judicial District, Sala 1, Tagum, Davao del Norte; FILOMENA GAVIANA, MACADANGDANG; and
ROLANDO RAMA, respondents.

From the records, it appears that respondent Filomena Gaviana and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang
contracted marriage in 1946. From a humble buy-and-sell business and sari-sari store operation in Davao
City, the spouses moved to Mawab Davao del Norte where, through hard work and good fortune, their small
business grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill business,
abaca stripping, real estate and others. They were blessed with six children. With their established businesses
and accumulated wealth, their once simple life became complicated and their relationship started to suffer
setbacks. BOTH ACCUSED EACH OTHER OF INDULGING IN EXTRAMARITAL RELATIONS.
Married life for them became so intolerable that they separated in 1965 when private respondent left for Cebu
for good. When she returned to Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband. Then
and there, she decided to take the initial action.

On April 28, 1971, private respondent (plaintiff therein) instituted a complaint for legal separation in the Court
of First Instance of Davao.

The trial court handed down its decision, the dispositive portion of which states thus:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the legal separation of plaintiff and the defendant,
xxx with all the legal effects attendant thereto, particularly THE DISSOLUTION AND
 LIQUIDATION OF THE CONJUGAL COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY. Since there is no
complete list of the community property which has to be divided, pending the dissolution of the conjugal
property, the defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff P10,000.00 for her support, for any way he had
been disposing some of the properties or mortgaging them without sharing the plaintiff any part of the
fruits or proceeds thereof until the court can appoint an administrator, as prayed for by plaintiff in a
separate petition, who will take over the administration and management of all the conjugal
partnership properties, and act as guardian of the minor children; to protect said properties from
dissipation, and who will submit a complete inventory of said properties so that the Court can make a
just division, such division to be embodied in a supplemental decision.

On October 23, 1973, petitioner filed his second motion for reconsideration praying therein that the orders of
September 20, 1973 and October 13, 1973 be reconsidered by not proceeding with the appointment of an
administrator of the conjugal properties of the parties [p. 137, rec].

Respondent Judge denied the aforesaid second motion for reconsideration in his order of November 19, 1973,
reiterating therein his ruling that the decree of legal separation had become final.

The COURT OF APPEALS, in its resolution of December 21, 1973, ruled that the questioned January 4, 1973
decision of the lower court had become final and, consequently, the appointment of an administrator was
valid and that the petition was not sufficient in substance, since the applicable law and jurisprudence afford the
petitioner no valid cause to impugn the three questioned orders. The appellate court accordingly dismissed the
petition.

On February 6, 1980, counsel for petitioner, through a NOTICE OF DEATH AND MOTION TO DISMISS,
informed this Court that petitioner Antonio Macadangdang died on November 30, 1979 and as a consequence
thereof, this case and Civil Case No. 109 of the Court of First Instance of Davao have BECOME MOOT AND
ACADEMIC.

In effect, private respondent agrees with petitioner's counsel that her husband's death has rendered the instant
petition moot and academic.

Issue: Did petitioner's death on November 30, 1979 render the case moot and academic?

RULING OF COURT: WE do not find merit in petitioner's submission that the questioned decision had not
become final and executory SINCE THE LAW EXPLICITLY AND CLEARLY PROVIDES FOR THE
DISSOLUTION AND LIQUIDATION OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS OF THE
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY as among the effects of the final decree of legal separation.

Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:

2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community of property shall be dissolved
and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the profits earned by the
partnership or community, without prejudice to the provisions of article 176;

The aforequoted provision mandates the dissolution and liquidation of the property regime of the spouses upon
finality of the decree of legal separation. SUCH DISSOLUTION AND LIQUIDATION ARE NECESSARY
CONSEQUENCES OF THE FINAL DECREE. This legal effect of the decree of legal separation ipso facto
or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of, the judgment decreeing legal separation—for the purpose
of determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.

The death on November 30, 1979 of herein petitioner who was declared the guilty spouse by the trial court,
before the liquidation of the conjugal property is effected, poses a new problem which can be resolved simply
by the application of the rules on intestate succession with respect to the properties of the deceased
petitioner.

Thus, the rules on dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains under the aforecited
provisions of the Civil Code would be applied effective January 4, 1973 when the decree of legal separation
became final. Upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with the law governing the effects of the final
decree of legal separation, the law on intestate succession should take over in the disposition of whatever
remaining properties have been allocated to petitioner. This procedure involves details which properly
pertain to the lower court.

The properties that may be allocated to the deceased petitioner by virtue of the liquidation of the conjugal
assets, shall be distributed in accordance with the laws of intestate succession in Special Proceedings No. 134.
WHEREFORE, THIS PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED, WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER'S
ESTATE.