Torts Midterms Digests

TORTS
CASE
DIGESTS
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST
College of Law
Summer Class A.Y. 2021-2022

Contributors:

1. Alba, Crisencio III
2. Alumno, Nathaniel
3. Ecleo, Ann Camille
4. Edem, Mariz
5. Esteban, Emmanuel
6. Dela Rosa, Aser
7. Katigbak, Althea Marie
8. Ledonio, Jaclyn
9. Manabat, Eric
10. Mila, Kevin
11. Omar, Naif
12. Sariego, Roselle Niña Christine
13. Villanueva, Karl Matthew

Atty. JEFFREY G. GALLARDO

Professor
TORTS CASE DIGESTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE CONCEPT OF QUASI-DELICT

Elements: Page
1 Barredo v. Garcia, 73 Phil 607 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2 Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3 Tayag v. Alcantara, 98 SCRA 723 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4 Baksh v. CA, 219 SCRA 115 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

5 Dulay v. CA, 243 SCRA 220 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6 Garcia v. Florido, 52 SCRA 420 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Distinctions
Quasi-delict v. Delict
7 Barredo v. Garcia, 73 Phil 607 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8 Cruz v. CA, 282 SCRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

9 People v. Ligon, 152 SCRA 419 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10 Philippine Rabbit v. People, 471 Phil 415 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Quasi-delict v. Breach of contract

11 Cangco v. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil 768 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
12 Far East v. CA, 241 SCRA 671 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
13 Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
14 PSBA v. CA, 205 SCRA 729 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
15 Syquia v. CA, 217 SCRA 624 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
16 Calalas v. Sunga, 332 SCRA 356 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

NEGLIGENCE
Concept of Negligence
17 Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil 809 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

18 Abrogar v. Cosmos Bottling, 807 Phil 317 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
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Standard of Conduct
o Ordinary prudent person
19 Cacho v. Manahan, G.R. No. 203081, January 17, 2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
20 Corinthian Gardens v. Spouses Tanjanco, 578 Phil 712 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

o Children
21 Taylor v. Manila Railroad, 16 Phil 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
22 Jarco Marketing v. CA, 378 Phil 991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

23 Del Rosario v. Manila, 57 Phil 478 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
24 Ylarde v. Aquino, 163 SCRA 697 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
o Experts/Professionals
25 Culion v. Philippine, 55 Phil 129 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
26 US v. Pineda, 37 Phil 456 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
27 BPI v. CA, 216 SCRA 51 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

o Intoxication
28 Wright v. Manila Electric, 28 Phil 122 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
o Insanity
29 US v. Baggay, 20 Phil 142 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
§ Degrees of Negligence
30 Marinduqe v. Workmen’s, 99 Phil 48 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
§ Proof of Negligence
Res ipsa loquitur
31 Ramos v. CA, 321 SCRA 584 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
32 Batiquin v. CA, 258 SCRA 334 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
33 DM Consunji v. CA, 357 SCRA 249 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
34 Child Learning Center v. Tagario, 512 Phil 618 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
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§ Defenses
Plaintiff’s Negligence
35 Manila Electric v. Remonquillo, 99 Phil 117 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

36 PLDT v. CA, GR No 57079, 178 SCRA 94 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Contributory Negligence
37 Genobiagon v. CA, 178 SCRA 422 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
38 Rakes v. Atlantic, 7 Phil 359 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
39 Philippine Bank of Commerce v. CA, 269 SCRA 695 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Fortuitous Event
40 Juntilla v. Funtanar, 136 SCRA 624 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

41 Hernandez v. COA, 179 SCRA 39 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
42 Gotesco Investment v. Chatto, 210 SCRA 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
43 National Power v. CA, 222 SCRA 415 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

44 Southeastern College v. CA, 354 Phil 434 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Assumption of Risk
45 Ilocos Norte v. CA, 179 SCRA 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

46 Afialda v. Hisole, 85 Phil 67 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Due diligence
47 Ramos v. Pepsi, 19 SCRA 289 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
48 Metro Manila v. CA, 223 SCRA 521 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Prescription
49 Kramer v. CA, 178 SCRA 518 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
50 Allied Banking v. CA, 178 SCRA 526 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
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1. FAUSTO BARREDO vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO
G.R. No. L-48006, July 8, 1942

J. Bocobo

Doctrine:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of
a business or enterprise, and the negligent acts are committed while the servant is engaged in his
master’s employment as such owner. In order to be exempt from civil liability, the owner or master
should have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of his/her employees.
Facts:
A collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela
guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy
Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. The court in the criminal case
granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. Severino Garcia and
Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila
against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla.
The CFI and the CA ruled in their favor. The CA ruled that the liability imposed upon the Barredo is
not a civil obligation arising from a felony or misdemeanor, but an obligation imposed in article 1903
of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision of his employee.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff may bring a separate civil action against Fausto Barredo under
article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Fontanilla.
Ruling:
Yes. In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he
had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held primarily
liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the
plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed
negligence — which he did not overcome — under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of
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Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's
criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The
plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so
doing, they were acting within their rights. It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff chooses
the more expeditious and effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had
just been released, and besides, he was probably without property which might be seized in enforcing
any judgment against him for damages.
It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is no proof that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. In fact, it is shown he was careless in
employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and
speeding — violation which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be
public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of
the Civil Code.

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2. PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO vs. REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as
father
G.R. No. L-2480, May 26, 1977
J. Barredo

Doctrine:
Art. 2177 of the Civil Code: responsibility for fault or negligence is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Revised Penal Code.
Facts:
Spouses Pedro and Patricia Elcano filed a complaint for damages against the respondent
Reginald Hill, a minor, married and at the same time of the occurrence, his father Marvin Hill, with
who he was living and getting subsistence, for killing the son of the plaintiffs, Agapito. A criminal
complaint was instituted against him for the death of their son. The Court of First instance of Quezon
City because there was no criminal act and the intent to kill was not present, coupled with a mistake.
The complaint for damages was filed based on Article 2180 of the New Civil Code for culpa aquiliana.
Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his son’s acquittal in the criminal case and that his civil
liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor
by reason of his marriage. A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendants and the CFI denied the
motion, the motion for reconsideration, as well, as the petitioner’s action for recovery of damages
was also dismissed. The petitioner appealed before the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the action for quasi-delict is barred by the acquittal of Hill in the Criminal
case?

2. Whether or not the 2nd and last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code may be applied
against Marvin Hill, notwithstanding that the undisputed fact at the time of the occurrence,
Reginald, though a minor, who was living with and getting subsistence from his father, was
already legally married.

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Ruling:
1. No. The Supreme Court said that the present civil action for damages is not barred by the
acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case. There was no distinction as regards to the proof
that was required in a criminal case and in a civil case. An accused is found guilty in a
criminal case through proof beyond reasonable doubt and, in a civil case, preponderance
of evidence is already sufficient to make the defendant pay for damages. A civil case for
damages on the basis of quasi-delict independently institutes from a criminal act. The
acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case does not extinguish his liability for quasi-
delict and that the acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

2. Yes. Article 2180 may still be applied under Atty. Marvin Hill. Under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, the obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Although
parental authority is terminated upon the emancipation of a child, emancipation by
marriage is not absolute. In the instant case, Reginald Hill is still living with his father and
getting subsistence from him during the alleged crime in question occurred. Reginald was
still subservient to and dependent on his father, this situation is not unusual. However, in
as much as it is evident that Reginald is now of legal age, as a matter of equity, the liability
of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

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3. HEIRS OF PEDRO TAYAG, SR., vs. HON. FERNANDO S. ALCANTARA, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS
LINES, INC. and ROMEO VILLA Y CUNANAN
G.R. No. L-50959, July 23, 1980
J. Concepcion Jr.

Doctrine:
Acquittal in a criminal case is not a bar to prosecution in a civil action for damages based on
quasi-delict against the driver and operator.
Facts:
The petitioners, heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr., filed with the CFI-Tarlac, presided over by the
respondent Judge, a complaint for damages against the private respondents Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. and Romeo Villa y Cunanan.
The heirs alleged that in the afternoon of September 2, 1974, while Pedro Tayag Sr. was riding
on a bicycle along MacArthur Highway at Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac on his way home, he was bumped and
hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus, driven by Romeo Villa, as a result of which he sustained injuries which
caused his instantaneous death.
On October 25, 1977, the respondent Judge rendered a decision, acquitting the accused
Romeo Villa of the crime of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground that
the petitioners have no cause of action against them the driver of the bus having been acquitted in
the criminal action. The petitioners opposed the motions since their cause of action is not based on
crime but on quasi-delict. However, the response judge also dismissed the civil case.
Hence, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, to annul and set aside the order of
respondent Judge, claiming that the latter acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and for with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed order, and that there is no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except thru the present petition.
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Issue:
Whether the acquittal in a criminal case bars the prosecution in a civil action for damages
based on quasi-delict.

Ruling:
No. The Court cited Article 31 of the New Civil Code which states that when the civil action is
based on an obligation not arising from the act or commission complained of as a felony such civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.
Evidently, the above quoted provision of the Civil Code refers to a civil action based, not on
the act or omission charged as a felony in a criminal case, but one based on an obligation arising from
other sources, like quasi delict.
The Court ruled that all the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present,
namely:
1. an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent;

2. damage caused by the said act or commission;
3. direct causal relation between the damage and the act or omission; and
4. no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.

The Court also noted that the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi delict the acquittal of the driver,
respondent Villa, of the crime charged in the Criminal Case is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil
Case for damages based on quasi-delict.

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4. GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES
G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993
J. Davide, Jr

Doctrine:
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
Facts:
Private respondent Marilou Gonzales filed with the trial court a complaint for damages
against petitioner Gasheem Shookat Baksh, for the alleged violation of their agreement to get
married.
Gonzales is a twenty-two year old, single Filipina. Petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian
citizen, and is an exchange student taking a medical course in Dagupan City. The latter courted and
proposed to marry Gonzales, and she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married.
They therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester.
Petitioner allegedly forced her to live with him; she was a virgin before she began living with
him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner’s attitude towards her started to change; he
maltreated and threatened to kill her.
Petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him
anymore. It turns out that petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages,
reimbursement for actual expenses, attorney’s fees and costs.
Petitioner thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the
private respondent; that he neither forced her to live in his apartment nor did he maltreat her.
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After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered a
decision favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages
and attorney’s fees.
On appeal, respondent CA affirmed in toto the trial court’s ruling.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to a cause of action under Article 21 of the
New Civil Code.
Ruling:
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for
the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books.
In the light of the purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man’s
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury
to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter.
It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner’s “fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue
and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
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promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant’s part that made plaintiff’s
parents agree to their daughter’s living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage.”
In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every
single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction.
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5. MARIA BENITA A. DULAY IN BEHALF OF THE MINOR CHILDREN KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH ET

AL. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO ET AL.
G.R. No. 108017, April 3, 1995
J. Bidin

Doctrine:
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by
law" but also acts criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Facts:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay
occurred at the “Big Bang Sa Alabang,” Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno
Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in
behalf of her minor children, filed an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and private
respondents Safeguard and/or Superguard, alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. Respondent
Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a valid cause of
action. Superguard claimed that Torzuela’s act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties,
and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil
liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.
Superguard further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Article
2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability
under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In
addition, the respondent argued that petitioners’ filing of the complaint is premature considering
that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer’s
subsidiary liability. Respondent Safeguard also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as
defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees. Petitioners opposed
both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their
liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. Respondent judge declared that the complaint was
one for damages founded on crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code
as distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict.
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Issue:
Whether or not Torzuela’s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict

actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that “whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.”
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope
of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is
the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which
are voluntary and intentional.
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by
law" but also acts criminal in character; whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed,
if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary.
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6. GERMAN C. GARCIA et al. vs HON. MARIANO M. FLORIDO et al.

G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973
J. Antonio

Doctrine:
By the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned
their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them
in the present civil case. As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private
respondents to the former has ceased to be involved in the criminal action. An offended party loses
his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil
action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil
action. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared.
Facts:
On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital,
together with his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired
and boarded a PU car owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by
respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose
of attending a conference.
At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway,
said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc.
and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained
various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization.
Petitioners filed an action for damages against the private respondents alleging that both
drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their respective
vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of
traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car.
Private respondents Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, filed a motion to dismiss. The
principal argument advanced in said motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of action
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because 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was
charged in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police for "double serious and less serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence", and that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil
action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated,
pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil action
is premature, because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after
final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala guilty of negligence.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for damages sustaining the arguments of respondents,
Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, and declared that whether or not "the action for damages
is based on criminal negligence or civil negligence known as culpa aquiliana in the Civil Code or tort
under American law" there "should be a showing that the offended party expressly waived the civil
action or reserved his right to institute it separately" and that "the allegations of the complaint in
culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations"
and because of the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and
severally liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages, the Court is of the opinion that the
action was not based on "culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict."
Issue:
Whether Garcia et al. can still file a civil action for quasi-delict despite having a criminal
action.
Ruling:
Yes. The essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New
Civil Code are present, namely:
a) act or omission of the private respondents
b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger
bus No. 25 by Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car
c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by as a result of the collision
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d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or
negligence of private respondents
e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties
The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for
the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners.
It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil
liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-
delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code.
In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action
instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal
action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused.
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages,
petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case,
and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case.
As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former
has ceased to be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to
intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or
expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For
by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared.
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7. FAUSTO BARREDO vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-48006, July 8, 1942
J. Bocobo

Doctrine:
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by
means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a
penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, and include all acts in which "any king
of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law
produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game
laws, and infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.
Facts:
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and
Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven
by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and
one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days
later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was
convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision
correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil
action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case.
Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action
in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate
Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila
awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2, 000 plus legal interest from the date of the
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complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1, 000
with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla’s
negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high
speed.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the
Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against
Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case. The
gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus: ... We cannot agree to the defendant's
contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon him in this action is not a civil obligation arising
from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article
1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or
employee.
Issue:
Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus
making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer
of Pedro Fontanilla
Ruling:
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad
enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-
delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence
under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that
makes the "confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of
scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising
from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual.
The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime
under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-
contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
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Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by
means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a
penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of
fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law
produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game
laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.
The Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence.
If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not
punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution
of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to
persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence — even the slightest — would
have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay
in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant
can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Thirdly,
to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver
and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow
a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and
their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees
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should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or
employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and
employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel
and patrimonial safety of others.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana,
there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility
arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910
of the Civil Code.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
defendant-petitioner.
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8. DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA UMALI

G.R. No. 122445, November 18, 1997
J. Francisco

Facts:
Dr. Ninevetch Cruz is a surgeon at Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital. Lydia on the
other hand is her patient and found out that Lydia has “myoma in her uterus and needed an
immediate operation which Dr. Cruz scheduled in her Clinic. On the day of the operation, Lydia's
daughter noticed how untidy the hospital was. Because of the condition of the clinic Rowena
(daughter of Lydia) asked that the operation be postponed but Lydia said that Dr. Cruz told her she
must be operated as scheduled.
The operation ensued, Lydia's family waited outside the operating room and during the
operation they were asked to buy tagamet ampules. Later they were asked to buy blood for Lydia at
a blood bank. After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed them that the operation was
finished. The operating staff then went inside the petitioner’s clinic to take their snacks. Some thirty
minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked
Rowena and the other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not able
to comply with petitioner’s order as there was no more type “A” blood available in the blood bank.
Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena then
noticed her mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath.
Apparently, the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena’s husband together with the driver
of the accused had to go to the San Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh
supply of oxygen as soon as it arrived. 16 But at around 10:00 o’clock P.M. she went into shock and
her blood pressure they were again asked to buy blood but the blood bank already ran out of type A.
They also saw Lydia gasping for breath as the oxygen supply had ran out so they had to go and buy
oxygen for Lydia again. Later that night, Lydia went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to
60/50. Lydia was brought to the San Pablo Hospital however the doctors were not able to save her.
She was announced dead at 3:00 AM the following day. Petitioner and her anesthesiologist were
charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.
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The MTC, RTC, and the CA all found petitioner guilty (anesthesiologist was acquitted) on the
ground that the clinic was untidy and they lack the needed facilities like blood and oxygen which are
essential for the continuity of the operations they undertake.
Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide as a consequence

of medical malpractice is supported by the evidence on record.
Ruling:
No. The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act;
(2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that
material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
The 4th element is lacking in the case at bar. The material damage was not proved to be the result of
the reckless imprudence. In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be
proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach and
the resulting death of his patient. As shown by the experts presented by both parties, the death of
Lydia may have been caused by DIC (clotting defect). Therefore, the cause of death cannot be
attributed to petitioner's fault or negligence. Furthermore, whether or not a physician has committed
an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to
the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar
circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the
present state of medical science. In the case at bar, no physician was asked to testify to show the
standard care that needed to be observed given the present circumstances. Therefore, the conviction
is not supported by the evidence.
Court finds the petitioner civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali, for while a conviction of
a crime requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required to
establish civil liability. The petitioner is a doctor in whose hands a patient puts his life and limb. For
insufficiency of evidence this Court was not able to render a sentence of conviction but it is not blind
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to the reckless and imprudent manner in which the petitioner carried out her duties. A precious life
has been lost and the circumstances leading thereto exacerbated the grief of those left behind. The
heirs of the deceased continue to feel the loss of their mother up to the present time and this Court is
aware that no amount of compassion and commiseration nor words of bereavement can suffice to
assuage the sorrow felt for the loss of a loved one. Certainly, the award of moral and exemplary
damages in favor of the heirs of Lydia Umali are proper in the instant case.
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9. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO LIGON y TRIAS and FERNANDO GABAT y
ALMERA
G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987
J. Yap
Doctrine:
It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability.
While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. The judgment of
acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the
facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Facts:
On October 23, 1983, the accused, Fernando Gabat (Gabat), was riding in a 1978 Volkswagen
Kombi owned by his father, Antonio Gabat, and driven by the other accused, Rogelio Ligon (Ligon).
The Kombi was coming from Espana Street going towards the direction of Quiapo. Fernando Gabat
was seated beside the driver, in the front seat by the window on the right side of the Kombi. At the
intersection ofQuezon Boulevard and Lerma Street before turning left towards the underpass at C.M.
Recto Avenue, the Kombi had to stop as the traffic light was red. While waiting for the traffic light to
change, Fernando Gabat beckoned a cigarette vendor, Jose Rosales y Ortiz (Rosales), the victim, to
buy some cigarettes from him. Rosales approached the Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of
cigarettes. While this transaction was occurring, the traffic light changed to green, and the Kombi
driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved forward. Rosales clung to the window of the Kombi but
apparently lost his grip and fell down on the pavement. Rosales was rushed by some bystanders to
the Philippine General Hospital, where he was treated for multiple physical injuries and was confined
thereat until his death on October 30, 1983. In an autopsy, it was stated that the cause of death of
Rosales was "pneumonia hypostatic, bilateral, and secondary to traumatic injuries of the head."
The prosecution claimed that Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales and moved
loose the latter's hand from the window of the Kombi, resulting in the latter falling down and hitting
the pavement. The defense, however, claims that as the vehicle sped onward, the cigarette box which
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was squeezed between the right arm of Gabat and the window frame fell inside the Kombi. Rosales
then ran beside the vehicle and clung to the windowsill of the moving vehicle. Gabat testified that
when he saw the cigarette vendor clinging on the side of the front door, he told Ligon to veer to the
right in order that Rosales could get off at the sidewalk. However, Gabat declared, that Ligon said that
it could not be done because of the moving vehicular traffic. Then, while the vehicle slowed down and
Ligon was maneuvering to the right in an attempt to go toward the sidewalk, Rosales lost his grip on
the window frame and fell to the pavement of Quezon Boulevard. Gabat allegedly shouted at Ligon to
stop but Ligon replied that they should go on to Las Pinas and report the incident to the parents of
Gabat, and later they would come back to the scene of the incident. However, while the Kombi was
speeding along Dewey Boulevard, it was blocked by the taxi of Prudencio Castillo and a jeep driven
by policemen. Gabat and Ligon were brought to police headquarters, but neither of them executed
any written statement.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused who was acquitted from any criminal liability is free from any
civil liability.
Ruling:
It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability.
While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal
of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the
Code Commission as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil
liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless
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Instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of
the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil
responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot
be demanded. This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and
civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are
separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One
is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages
suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article
1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil
action arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not
thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine
upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable
doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance
of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also
punishable by the criminal law? For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the
reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible
source of injustice a cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or
wronged.
In the instant case, we find that a preponderance of evidence exists sufficient to establish the
facts from which the civil liability of Gabat arises. On the basis of the trial court's evaluation of the
testimonies of both prosecution and defense witnesses at the trial and applying the quantum of proof
required in civil cases, we find that a preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his act and
omission with fault and negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the
damage done. Gabat's wilfull act of calling Rosales, the cigarette vendor, to the middle of a busy street
to buy two sticks of cigarettes set the chain of events which led to the death of Rosales.
Through fault and negligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent the driver from moving forward
while the purchase was completed; (2) failed to help Rosales while the latter clung precariously to
the moving vehicle, and (3) did not enforce his order to the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced
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in the driver's act of speeding away, instead of stopping and picking up the injured victim. These
proven facts taken together are firm bases for finding Gabat civilly liable under the Civil Code for the
damage done to Rosales.
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10. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 147703, April 14, 2004
J. Panganiban

Doctrine:
It is further clarified that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Facts:
Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment and to pay damages. The court ruled that in the event of the insolvency of
accused, petitioner shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. The judgment against accused
had become final and executory, due to the dismissal of its appeal since the accused thereon had
jumped bail, remaining at-large. The CA ruled among others: that the institution of a criminal case
implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense, that allowing the employer to
dispute independently the civil liability would amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment, that the civil
liability, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employer’s
subsidiary civil liability thereby becomes conclusive and enforceable.
Issue:
Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-
employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
Ruling:
It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu
proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. This rule is based on the
rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond. 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution. When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
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charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly
instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil
liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution
on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.
Although the right of appeal. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court
may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail.
It is because when an accused has absconded, they already lose their standing (right to appeal) in
court.
It is further clarified that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Note however that what is deemed instituted
in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime or delict per
se, but not those subsidiary liabilities of employers arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-
contracts. Hence in the case, the Courts clarified that the subsidiary liability of the employer
encompasses a different rule (Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code) wherein such civil liability of
employers may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction of the employee.
Although employers can be held as with separate interest, their liability should be viewed as
mere subsidiary, they cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
With the civil liability of the accused now regarded as final and executory, the subsidiary liability of
the petitioner now accrues, even without express pronouncement of courts of such subsidiary
liability.
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To allow employers the right of appeal, is in effect enabling them to amend, nullify or defeat
a final judgment rendered by a competent court. The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to
and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee.
Hence, the decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon
the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to its amount,
for the liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.

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11. JOSE CANGCO vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO.

G.R. No. L-12191, October 14, 1918
J. Fisher

Facts:
Jose Cangco was an employee as a clerk in Manila Railroad. On January 20, 2015 when he was
riding the train and is about to alight, he stepped into a watermelon in a stairway that caused bodily
injury on him and laceration. At that time, it was about between 7pm and 8pm. The light was dimmed
that caused the petitioner not to notice the watermelon on the floor. Thereafter, he sued the herein
defendant appellee for damages resulting in the negligence of its employee on leaving a watermelon
on the said floor causing him to be injured. According to the defendant, it is his contributory
negligence that causes him to fall.
Issue:
Whether Manila Railroad Company is liable for negligence
Ruling:
Yes. Manila Railroad Company is liable for the injury that the plaintiff had caused. It cannot
be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks
on the platform in the manner above stated. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is
liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own
contributory negligence.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to
carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains. That duty, being
contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that
the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the
negligent conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its
contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and
proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to
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wait until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting.
On the issue of contributory negligence, it may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the
train had come to a full stop before alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could not have
occurred. Defendant contends, that it is negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a moving
train. The court is of the opinion that this proposition is too badly stated and is at variance with the
experience of every-day life. In this particular instance, that the train was barely moving when
plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six meters from the
place where he stepped from it. Thousands of person alight from trains under these conditions every
day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company has kept its platform free from dangerous
obstructions. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in
alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a
safe alighting place.
In considering the situation thus presented, it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was,
as we find, ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on
the platform existed; and as the defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to
afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in
the absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear. The place,
as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a failure upon the part
of the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were by any
possibility concede that it had right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the placing
of them adequately so that their presence would be revealed.
Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it
was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would
have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in
performing such act — that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly — the age,
sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the
passenger, and should be considered.

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12. FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS and CLARITA S.
LUNA
G.R. No. 108164, February 23, 1995
J. Vitug

Doctrine:
Distinction between quasi-delict and breach of contract: 2176 of the Civil Code provides that
whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done.
Breach of contract gives rise to an action for specific performance or rescission of contract. It
may also be the cause of action in a complaint for damages filed in pursuant to Article 1170 of the
Civil Code.
Facts:
Luis Luna has a FAREAST CARD issued by Far East Bank and Trust Company with a
supplemental card issued to Clarita S. Luna. Clarita lost her credit card and informed Far East. She
submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of this nature, the bank would record the lost card, along with
the principal card, as “Hot Card” or “Cancelled Card” in its master file.
When Luis had lunch for a close friend at a restaurant in a hotel, the card was not honored
then Luis was forced to pay in cash so he felt embarrassed. Luis Luna demanded from Far East the
payment of damages. The vice president of the bank, expressed the bank’s apologies to Luis in a letter.
A letter was also sent to the restaurant to assure that Luis was “very valued clients” of Far East. The
hotel wrote back to say that the credibility of Luis had never been “in question”. Still evidently feeling
aggrieved Luis filed a complaint for damages. RTC found Far East liable and ordered to pay Luna. The
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not this is an action for quasi-delict.
Ruling: The court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause
for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort
even where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant (Phil. Airlines vs.
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Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 143; Singson vs. Bank of Phil. Islands, 23 SCRA 1117; and Air France vs.
Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155). This doctrine unfortunately cannot improve Luna’s case for it can aptly
govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort
independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-dialect can be deemed to underlie the breach
of a contract) can be stated thusly: WHERE, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an
act of omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are
contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-dialect provisions to the case. Here, Luna’s
damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act
or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an
independent actionable tort.
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13. AIR FRANCE vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-21438, September 28, 1966
J. Sanchez

Doctrine:
There is a Quasi Delict if an act constitutes breach of contract of carriage. Hence, may recover
damages.
Facts:
Plaintiff Rafael Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was the owner of the first class ticket issued
by Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., it was a round trip airplane
ticket from Manila to Rome. But at Bangkok, the Manager of Airline forced plaintiff to vacate ‘first
class’ seat which he was occupying. Based on the statement of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento,
there was a ‘white man’ who, the Manager alleged had a better right to the seat. When asked to
vacate his ‘first class’ seat, the plaintiff refused, and told the Manager that his seat would be taken
over his dead body. A commotion ensued, and, according to Cuento, many of the Filipino
passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Casrrascoso was
having a hot discussion with the manager. Upon urging by the other Filipino passengers, Mr.
Carrascoso reluctantly vacated his first class seat. The latter felt embarrassed. Hence, Mr.
Carrascoso filed a case for damages.
However, Air France argued that the issuance of the first-class ticket was no guarantee that
the passenger would be accommodated in the first-class seat.
Issue:
Whether or not Air France is liable for the payment of damages based on breach of
contract
Ruling:
Yes, Air France is liable. The evidence shows that Air France violated its contract of
transportation with plaintiff in bad faith.
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There was bad faith when Air France’s employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
seat and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. A contract of carriage between Air France
and Mr. Carrascoso are present in the case at bar, thus, Air France has the duty to make sure that Mr.
Carrascoso will be in a first class seat.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that the issuance of a first class
ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first class seat. Such claim is simply
incredible.
Passengers have a right to be treated by the carrier’s employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. The any rude or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against
the carrier.
Petitioner’s contract with Carrascoso, is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carasscoso’s action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the
petitioner-air carrier-a case of quasi-delict.
Damages are proper. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the Court
ample to power to grant exemplary damages-in contracts and quasi-contracts. The only condition is
that defendant should have “acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner”. The manner of ejectment of Mr. Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal
precept. And this is in addition to moral damages.
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14. PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION et al. vs COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ et al.
G.R. No. 84698, February 4, 1992
J. Padilla

Doctrine:
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that pupils or students of the educational institution
should have caused the damage. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
establishes the rule of in loco parentis. It had been stressed that Article 2180 plainly provides that it
is the students who must have caused the damage before the educational institution can be held liable
for quasi-delict.
Facts:
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 caused the death of a certain Carlos Bautista, a third-
year commerce course student of Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA), while on the
second-floor premises of the PSBA. The parents of the deceased then filed a suit in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. It was established that
the assailants were not members of the school’s academic community but were elements from
outside the school.
The suit sought to adjudge PSBA and its officers for the victim's untimely demise due to their
alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during
and after the attack on the victim.
Petitioners [Defendants a quo] moved to dismiss the suit alleging that since they are
presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against
them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are
beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article; but were denied by the trial court.
A subsequent motion for reconsideration was similarly dealt with and upon appeal to the
court of appeals, the CA affirmed the trial court's orders. Hence, this petition.

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Issue:
Whether or not PSBA may be held liable under quasi-delicts.
Ruling:
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that pupils or students of the educational institution
should have caused the damage. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
establishes the rule of in loco parentis. It had been stressed that Article 2180 plainly provides that it
is the students who must have caused the damage before the educational institution can be held liable
for quasi-delict.
In the case at bar, the assailants were not students or pupils of PSBA but were elements from
outside the school. Hence, PSBA and its school authorities cannot be held liable under Article 2180.
Further, because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between
the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. When an academic
institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting
in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him
with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school’s academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and
order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
In the circumstances obtained in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the
contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former’s negligence in
providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there
be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation
only.
As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondents'
complaint, the record is bereft of all the material facts. Obviously, at this stage, only the trial court
can make such a determination from the evidence still to unfold.
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Should the act which breaches the contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Article 21
as ruled in the Air France case, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting quasi-delict. The
contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school
cannot exist independently on the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set
out in Article 21.
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15. JUAN J. SYQUIA et al. vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and THE MANILA
MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY, INC.
G.R. No. 98695, January 27, 1993
J. Campos, Jr.

Doctrine:
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay,
and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
Facts:
The complaint alleged among others, that pursuant to a Deed of Sale executed between
plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia and defendant-appellee, the former, father of deceased Vicente Juan
J. Syquia authorized and instructed defendant-appellee to inter the remains of deceased in the Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery. The contract mentions that the coffin should be placed in a sealed concrete
vault to protect the remains of the deceased from different elements. During the transfer, it was
discovered that there was a hole in the concrete vault which caused damaged to the coffin because of
the flooding and the deceased was covered with filth.
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages arising from quasi – delict or breach of contract
against Manila Memorial Park for failure to deliver a sealed and defect free concrete vault. In their
defense, MMPCI claims that the boring of the hole was necessary to prevent the vault from floating
when water fills the grave. The RTC and the CA ruled in favor of the respondents. Aggrieved,
petitioner went to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of tort.
Ruling:
No. With respect to herein petitioners' averment that private respondent has committed
culpa aquiliana, the Court of Appeals found no negligent act on the part of private respondent to
justify an award of damages against it. Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, we find no reason to disregard the
respondent's Court finding that there was no negligence.
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In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery,
Inc., entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care" on August 27,
1969. That agreement governed the relations of the parties and defined their respective rights and
obligations. Hence, had there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa
contractual as provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay,
and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
Petitioners claim that private respondent breached its contract with them as the latter held
out in the brochure it distributed that the lot may hold single or double internment underground in
sealed concrete vault." Petitioners claim that the vault provided by private respondent was not
sealed, that is, not waterproof. Consequently, water seeped through the cement enclosure and
damaged everything inside it. However, there was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate
of Perpetual Care and in the Rules and Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. that
the vault would be waterproof. Private respondent's witness, Mr. Dexter Heuschkel, explained that
the term "sealed" meant "closed." On the other hand, the word "seal" is defined as any of various
closures or fastenings that cannot be opened without rupture and that serve as a check against
tampering or unauthorized opening." The meaning that has been given by private respondent to the
word conforms to the cited dictionary definition. Moreover, it is also quite clear that "sealed" cannot
be equated with "waterproof". Well settled is the rule that when the terms of the contract are clear
and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the
stipulation shall control. Contracts should be interpreted according to their literal meaning and
should not be interpreted beyond their obvious intendment.
Except for the foreman's opinion that the concrete vault may float should there be a heavy
rainfall, from the above-mentioned explanation, private respondent has exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault which would have
resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave filling the same with earth.
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16. VICENTE CALALAS VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA AND FRANCISCO
SALVA
G.R. No. 122039, May 31, 2000
J. Mendoza
Doctrine:
The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, as its the
source of the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is
premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
Facts:
On August 23 of 1989, Eliza Sunga took a passenger jeepney that was owned and operated by
Vicente Calalas. The jeepney was already filled with passengers so she was given an extension seat
by the conductor of the jeepney driver which was a wooden stool at the rear end of the vehicle. On
the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, as Sunga was seated at the rear end of the jeepney,
a passenger was about to go down the jeep. Unfortunately, an Isuzu truck that was driven by a certain
Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped to the left rear end of the jeepney which in
which the caused injury to Sunga.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas on the ground of
breach of contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a
common carried. On the other hand, Calalas filed a third-party complaint against Salva, who owns the
truck.
The Regional Trial Court found Francisco Salva guilty and absolved Vicente Calalas from
liability holding that it was the truck owner who is responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of
another case (Civil Case No. 3490), that was filed by Calalas against Salva and Berena, based on the
principle of quasi-delict wherein the same court held Salva and Verena were held jointly liable to
Calalas for the damage of his jeepney.
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The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found Calalas liable to Sunga for violation of the
contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence
required by the Civil Code. It also dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and it adjudged
Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the decision in the case for quasi-delict between Calalas on one hand and
Salva and Verena on the other hand, is res judicata to the issue on this case.
2. Whether or not the respondent carrier is responsible for the injury caused to its passenger
when the accident was caused by another vehicle.
3. Whether or not the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso
forfuito.
4. Whether or not the respondent passenger is entitled to the moral passenger.
Ruling:
1. No. The Supreme Court said that the principle of res judicata applied in this case does not
apply because a party in a previous case was never a party in the previous one. The issues in Civil
Case No. 3490 and in the present case are not the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether
or not Salva and his driver Verena were held liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to the
petitioner’s jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in the other case is whether the petitioner is liable
on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra
contractual, as its the source of the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or
culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
2. Yes. The Supreme Court said that the liability of the petitioner arises from its negligence in
the performance of his contractual obligation or breach of contract of carriage. Article 1756 of the
Civil Code provides that common carrier are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently in cases of death or injuries to its passengers unless they prove that they have observed
extraordinary diligence in accordance with Article 1733 and 1755. This provision necessarily shifts
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to the common carrier the burden of proof because it is now the duty of the petitioner to prove that
he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. The petitioners, in this case, failed
to prove that he observed was not properly parked and he took more passengers than the allowed
seating capacity.
3. No. The extension seat given by the conductor is not an implied assumption risk on the part
of the passenger. A caso forfuito is an event that which could not be foreseen, or which it might be
foreseen, was inevitable. The following requisites must be present:
a. That the cause of the breach is independent of the obligor’s will;
b. That the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable;
c. That the event is such as to render it impossible for the obligor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner, and;
d. That the obligor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor.
The petitioner should have foreseen the danger in parking his jeepney with its body protruding two
meters into the highway.
3. No. As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a
breach of contract for it is not one of the enumerable items mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the
death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in
the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.

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17. AMADO PICART vs. FRANK SMITH, JR.,

G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918
J. Street

Doctrine:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated
as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Facts:
On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he
had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the
defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his
approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive
blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the
road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed
by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against
the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did
this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. As the automobile
approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine.
In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the
pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance
away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed.
When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other
side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in
so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and
turned its body across the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its
rider was thrown off with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died.
The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required
medical attention for several days.
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From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has appealed.
Issue:
Whether Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done.
Ruling:
Yes. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty
either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge,
to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision.
Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated
as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law.
The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that standard.
A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized
that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen
harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances
the law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already
stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were
not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff
by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair
chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
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18. ROMULO ABROGAR and ERLINDA ABROGAR vs COSMOS BOTTLING COMPANY and
INTERGAMES, INC.
G.R. No. 164749, March 15, 2017
J. Bersamin

Doctrine:
The defense of assumption of risk presupposes: (1) that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of
the danger; (2) that he understood and appreciated the risk from the danger; and (3) that he
voluntarily exposed himself to such risk.
Facts:
To promote the sales of "Pop Cola", defendant Cosmos, jointly with Intergames, organized an
endurance running contest billed as the "1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon" scheduled to be held on June
15, 1980. The organizers plotted a 10-kilometer course starting from the premises of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa through public roads and streets, to end at the Quezon Memorial Circle.
Plaintiffs' son Rommel applied with the defendants to be allowed to participate in the contest and
after complying with defendants' requirements, his application was accepted and he was given an
official number. Consequently, on June 15, 1980 at the designated time of the marathon, Rommel
joined the other participants and ran the course plotted by the defendants. As it turned out, the
plaintiffs' further alleged, the defendants failed to provide adequate safety and precautionary
measures and to exercise the diligence required of them by the nature of their undertaking, in that
they failed to insulate and protect the participants of the marathon from the vehicular and other
dangers along the marathon route. Rommel was bumped by a jeepney that was then running along
the route of the marathon on Don Mariano Marcos Avenue (DMMA for brevity), and in spite of
medical treatment given to him at the Ospital ng Bagong Lipunan, he died later that same day due to
severe head injuries.
The RTC observed that the safeguards allegedly instituted by Intergames in conducting the
marathon had fallen short of the yardstick to satisfy the requirements of due diligence as called for
by and appropriate under the circumstances; that the accident had happened because of inadequate
preparation and Intergames' failure to exercise due diligence.
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The respondents could not be excused from liability by hiding behind the waiver executed by
Rommel and the permission given to him by his parents because the waiver could only be effective
for risks inherent in the marathon, such as stumbling, heat stroke, heart attack during the race, severe
exhaustion and similar occurrences; that the liability of the respondents towards the participants
and third persons was solidary, because Cosmos, the sponsor of the event, had been the principal
mover of the event, and, as such, had derived benefits from the marathon that in turn had carried
responsibilities towards the participants and the public; that the respondents' agreement to free
Cosmos from any liability had been an agreement binding only between them, and did not bind third
persons; and that Cosmos had a cause of action against Intergames for whatever could be recovered
by the petitioners from Cosmos
Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in reversing the RTC Decision, (and) in holding that
respondent Intergames was not negligent considering that:
a. Respondent Intergames failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in
the conduct of the marathon in that it did not block off from traffic the marathon route;
and
b. Respondent Intergames' preparations for the race, including the number of marshal
during the marathon, were glaringly inadequate to prevent the happening of the injury to
its participants.
2. whether the doctrine of assumption of risk was applicable to the fatality

Ruling:
1. Yes. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury. Under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, it consists of the "omission of
that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the person, of the time and of the place. The Civil Code makes liability for
negligence clear under Article 2176, and Article 20.

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2. In this case, appellant Romulo Abrogar himself admitted that his son, Rommel Abrogar,
surveyed the route of the marathon and even attended a briefing before the race. Consequently,
he was aware that the marathon would pass through a national road and that the said road
would not be blocked off from traffic.

And considering that he was already eighteen years of age, had voluntarily participated in the
marathon, with his parents' consent, and was well aware of the traffic hazards along the route,
he thereby assumed all the risks of the race.

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19. LINDA CACHO et al. vs. GERARDO MANAHAN, DAGUPAN BUS CO., INC., AND RENATO DE
VERA DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME R. M. DE VERA CONSTRUCTION,
G.R. No. 203081, January 17, 2018
J. Martirez

Doctrine:
Extraordinary diligence must be observed in case of a common carrier.
Facts:
Bismark Cacho figured in a vehicular accident along the national highway in Alaminos,
Pangasinan. He was driving then a Nissan Sentra, which collided with a Dagupan Bus traversing the
opposite lane. The collision caused damage to both vehicles which resulted to the death of Bismark
Cacho and injuries to the three passengers inside the car.
Cacho’s heirs, his wife and children, instituted a complaint for damages against the driver of
the bus and the bus company, along with a certain Renato de Vera, the owner of De Vera Construction.
The complaint alleged that the bus swerved to the opposite lane because it tried to avoid a pile of
boulders placed by the construction company as they are contracted to do some work on the bridge.
Dagupan Bus claimed that the bus was at a full stop when Cacho bumped the bus at full speed
and Cacho had to swerve to the other lane of the road because of the scattered rocks in his lane. In
their cross-claim, Dagupan Bus argued the proximate cause of the accident was because of negligence
of De Vera’s Construction by leaving boulders of rocks on both sides of the road and posed imminent
danger to vehicles passing by.
De Vera claimed that he ensured the safety of the road and blamed Cacho for reckless driving
which caused the collision with the bus.
The Trial Court found Dagupan Bus and De Vera jointly liable for damages. It found out that
the bus was traversing at 80-100 kph speed passing a narrow bridge. With the judicial notice of the
court that the bridge is narrow, it also found out that De Vera is negligent in placing boulders at the
side of a narrow bridge placing motorist in danger.
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The Appellate Court reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found out that there was enough
road space for the Nissan Sentra to pass against the more narrow space on the side of the road where
the bus were. They also consider the size of the vehicles against the road space where they stated
that Cacho could easily avoided the bus if not for his negligence.
The heirs of Cacho elevate the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not there is negligence on part of Dagupan Bus.
Ruling:
Negligence on part of Manahan (driver of Dagupan Bus) was established with photograph
evidence showing that the front portion of the bus was already occupying the other side of the road
upon collision. By occupying the other side of the road, it was found out that the Manahan was driving
at a high speed. By driving a relatively huge vehicle passing a narrow bridge, he should more be
prudent and careful with his driving and, as a common carrier, he should observed extraordinary
diligence for the safety of his passengers. As he was found negligent while performing his duties, the
presumption that his employer is also guilty of negligence as the latter did not observe the diligence
in selection of his employees.
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20.CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSOCIATION, INC., vs.

SPOUSES REYNALDO and MARIA LUISA TANJANGCO, and SPOUSES FRANK and TERESITA
CUASO,
G.R. No. 160795, June 27, 2008
J. Nachura

Doctrine:
What is the degree of diligence that must be observed by a homeowner’s association with
respect to their subdivision?
Facts:
Sps. Tanjangco owns Lots 68 and 69 located at Corinthian Gardens in Quezon City. Sps. Cuaso
owns Lot 65 which is adjacent to the Tanjangco’s. Before the construction of the latter’s house, they
hire the services of Engr. De Dios, who was referred by Corinthian to them, to conduct survey to their
property. Sps. Cuaso employed C.V. Paraz to construct their house. During the construction,
Corinthian periodically inspects the construction to determine compliance. Unfortunately, after the
construction was finished, it was found that the builder encroached part of Lot 69 owned by the
Tanjancos.
The Tanjancos demanded for the demolition of the perimeter fence which encroached their
property but the Cuasos refused to heed, prompting the former to file suit against the latter for
Recovery of Possession with Damages.
The Cuasos filed a third-party complaint against Corinthian, C.V. Paraz and Engr. De Dios for
their failure to exercise diligence in performing their duties.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of the Tanjancos and found out that the perimeter wall encroach
the property of the latter. However, the court also ruled that the Cuasos were builders in good faith
and gave them option to buy the encroached portion. As to C.V. Perez, the court found out that it is
grossly negligent in not taking into account the boundaries of Cuaso’s lot. The Third-Party Complaint
was dismissed. Dissatisfied, all parties appealed to Court of Appeals.
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The Appellate Court found out that the Cuasos acted in bad faith for land grabbing the portion
of lot of the Tanjancos. The court allowed the Tanjancos to exercise their right to demand demolition.
Further, the court also ordered the Cuasos to pay monthly rentals for the encroached property. The
court also order for the payment of damages. On Third-Party Complaint, Corinthian, C.V. Perez and
Engr. De Dios were all found negligent of their duties. Corinthian filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied by the court.
Issue:
Whether or not Corinthian can be held liable for damages for their negligence.
Ruling:
Corinthian’s negligence is contributory to the damage suffered by the Tanjancos when the
Cuasos encroached the former’s property. Corinthian failed to exercise the requisite in insuring that
the Cuasos abide by it Rules and Regulation.
Corinthian cannot be allowed to justify its negligence by claiming its approval of the Cuaso’s
building plan was only limited to a so-called “table inspection” and not the actual measurement. Since
the approval of the so-called “table approval” is tainted with negligence, it is also necessary attach
Corinthian.
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21. David Taylor Vs. The Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company,
G.R. No. L-4977, March 22, 1910
J. Carson

Doctrine:
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence
on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it
would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question
of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own
acts and their consequences.
Facts:
September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon, David Taylor, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical
engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training
in mechanics with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to
the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and
promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. After leaving the power house where they
had asked for Mr. Murphy, they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where
the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. They found some twenty or thirty
brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground.
These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each
has attached to it 2 long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity.
They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a
considerable explosive power.
The boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried
them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and they went
to Manuel's home. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps, trust the ends of the
wires into an electric light socket - no result, break the cap with a stone – failed, opened one of the
caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches and David
held the cap while Manuel applied a
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lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three.
Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened
and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded.
David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right
eye to such an extent as to necessitate its removal by the surgeons. Trial Court held Manila Electric
Railroad And Light Company liable.
Issue:
Whether the elements of quasi-delict to make Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company
liable.
Ruling:
NO. In order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
a.) Damages to the plaintiff

b.) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts
it must respond, was guilty.
c.) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
While the entry upon the property without express invitation or permission would not have
relieved Manila Electric from responsibility for injuries incurred, without other fault on his part, if
such injury were attributable to his negligence, the negligence in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received. Cutting open the detonating cap and
putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries
inflicted. Manila Electric is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. Two years before the
accident, David spent 4 months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland transports. Later he
took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About
a month after his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in that
employment for 6 months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more than
average intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and physically than most boys of 15. The
series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by Jessie who
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even ran away. True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the
explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did
not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less
dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly
produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he
exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or
anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence
on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it
would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question
of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own
acts and their consequences. He was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified
him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would
have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by
him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so
that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act
of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the
proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.
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22. JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION et al. vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CONRADO C. AGUILAR and CRISELDA R. AGUILAR
G.R. No. 129792, December 21, 1999
J. Davide, Jr.

Doctrine:
In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted
without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same presumption
and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen
years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment.
Facts:
Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City.
Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's branch manager, operations
manager, and supervisor, respectively. Private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth
Aguilar
In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH were at the 2nd floor of Syvel's
Department Store, Makati City. CRISELDA was signing her credit card slip at the payment and
verification counter when heard a loud thud. She looked behind her and saw her daughter ZHIENETH
on the floor, her body pinned by the bulk of the store's gift-wrapping counter/structure. ZHIENETH
was crying and screaming for help. ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center
where she was operated on. The next day ZHIENETH lost her speech. She died fourteen (14) days
after the. She was six years old.
Private respondents demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of all expenses which
they had incurred. However, petitioners refused to pay which prompted private respondents to file
a complaint for damages.
Petitioners denied any liability for the injuries and consequent death of ZHIENETH. They
claimed that CRISELDA was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter by allowing
her to freely roam around in a store filled with glassware and appliances. ZHIENETH too, was guilty
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of contributory negligence since she climbed the counter, triggering its eventual collapse on her.
Petitioners also emphasized that the counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong support; it
never fell nor collapsed for the past fifteen years since its construction.
Petitioners sought the dismissal of the complaint and the award of damages maintaining that
it observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection, supervision and control of its
employees. The other petitioners likewise raised due care and diligence in the performance of their
duties and countered that the complaint was malicious for which they suffered besmirched
reputation and mental anguish.
Th trial court dismissed the complaint and counterclaim after finding that the preponderance
of the evidence favored petitioners. It ruled that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter on
ZHIENETH was her act of clinging to it. In absolving petitioners from any liability, the trial court
reasoned that the counter was situated at the end or corner of the 2nd floor as a precautionary
measure hence, it could not be considered as an attractive nuisance.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, however, decided in favor of private respondents and
reversed the appealed judgment. It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a
structurally dangerous counter.
Petitioners now seek the reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision and the reinstatement of
the judgment of the trial court.
Issues:
(1) Whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence
(2) In case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable to private respondents for
maintaining a defective counter or to CRISELDA and ZHIENETH for failing to exercise due and
reasonable care while inside the store premises
Ruling:
1. An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the

defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without
any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly
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through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by
the person to whom it happens." On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate
the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do. Negligence is "the failure to observe, for the protection of the
interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury."
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other.
Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused
by fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by
common prudence.
The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case
of Plicart v. Smith, thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence.
We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no accident and that ZHIENETH's death
could only be attributed to negligence.
Petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the danger
posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the
situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and
ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners
miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family.
2. Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors
children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. In his
book, former Judge Cezar S. Sangco stated:
In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have
acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability.
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The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case
of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has
acted with discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and
required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under
nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence;
and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the
case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one, under our
law. The rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively
presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Even if we attribute contributory negligence to Zhieneth and assume that she climbed over
the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter
was stable and sturdy. The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court
of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal otherwise.
Criselda too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially, Zhieneth held on
to her mother’s waist, later to the latter's hand. Criselda momentarily released the child's
hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At the time Zhieneth was pinned
down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping
counter was just four meters away from Criselda. The time and distance were both significant.
Zhieneth was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon
us. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do
anything; the counter just fell on her.

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23. JULIAN DEL ROSARIO vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY

G.R. No. L-35283, November 5, 1932
J. Street
Doctrine:
It is doubtful whether contributory negligence can properly be imputed to the deceased,

owing to his immature years and the natural curiosity which a child would feel to do something out
of the ordinary, and the mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of a companion of the age of
8 years does not, in our opinion, alter the case.
Facts:
This action was instituted by Julian del Rosario for the purpose of recovering damages from
the Manila Electric Company for the death of his son, Alberto del Rosario, resulting from a shock from
a wire used by the defendant for the transmission of electricity. The accident occurred on Dimas-
Alang Street, in the municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal.
Jose Noguera, who had charge of a tienda nearby, first noticed that the wire was burning and
its connections smoking. As soon as Noguera took cognizance of the trouble, he stepped into a garage
which was located nearby and asked Jose Soco, the timekeeper, to telephone the Malabon station of
the Manila Electric Company that an electrical wire was burning at that place. Soco received answer
from the station to the effect that they would send an inspector. Information was received by the
company's servant at the time stated. From the testimony of Demetrio Bingao, one of the witnesses
for the defense, it is clear that the end of the wire was on the ground shortly after 3 p.m.
At 4 p. m. the neighborhood school was dismissed and the children went home. Among these
was Alberto del Rosario, of the age of 9 years, who was a few paces ahead of two other boys. His
companion, Jose Salvador, happened to be the son of an electrician and his father had cautioned him
never to touch a broken electrical wire, as it might have a current. Jose therefore stopped Saturnino,
telling him that the wire might be charged but Alberto, no doubt feeling that he was challenged in the
matter, put out his index finger and touch the wire. He immediately fell face downwards, exclaiming
"Ay! madre". The end of the wire remained in contact with his body which fell near the post. A crowd
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soon collected, and someone cut the wire and disengaged the body. Upon being taken to St. Luke's
Hospital the child was pronounced dead.
Issue:
Whether or not the presumption of negligence on the part of the company has been overcome.
Ruling:
The Court is of the opinion that the presumption of negligence on the part of the company
from the breakage of this wire has not been overcome. Furthermore, when notice was received at the
Malabon station at 2.25 p. m., but more than an hour and a half passed before anyone representing
the company appeared on the scene, and in the meantime this child had been claimed as a victim.
It is doubtful whether contributory negligence can properly be imputed to the deceased,

owing to his immature years and the natural curiosity which a child would feel to do something out
of the ordinary, and the mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of a companion of the age of
8 years does not, in our opinion, alter the case. But even supposing that contributory negligence could
in some measure be properly imputed to the deceased, — a proposition upon which the members of
the court do not all agree, — yet such negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in
this case, not having been the determining cause of the accident. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific
Co., 7 Phil., 359.)
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24. FEDERICO YLARDE and ADELAIDA DORONIO vs.

EDGARDO AQUINO, MAURO SORIANO and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988
J. Gancayco

Facts:
Soriano is the school principal; Aquino and Banez were teachers in this school. Novelito
Ylarde is a student [deceased] & Federico is his father.
Gabaldon Primary School, an academic school, was littered with several huge concrete blocks
[around one ton each] which were remnants of an old school shop which was destroyed in WWII.
Banez [teacher] realized that these stones were huge hazards so he started burying them, and he was
able to bury 10 blocks by himself. A fellow teacher Aquino decided to help, so he gathered 18 students
and ordered them to dig a hole where a 1-ton stone could be buried. The following day, he called 4 of
these students to continue digging. When the hole was 1m 40cm deep, Aquino alone continued
digging while the students remained inside the pit, throwing out loose soil. They got out of the hole
when the depth was right. Aquino left the children to level the loose soil around the hole because he
went to see Banez (who was 30 meters away) to get a key to the school workroom to get rope. He
allegedly told the children not to touch the stone.
After Aquino left, 3/4 kids jumped inside the pit, Ylarde included. The remaining kid jumped on
top of the block, causing it to slide downwards. 2 were able to get out but Ylarde wasn’t able to do so,
and so the block pinned him to the wall in a standing position. He sustained injuries and three days
later, Ylarde died. His parents filed a suit for damages against Aquino and Soriano [principal], but the
RTC dismissed the complaint for the following reasons:
Digging done is in line with Work Education subject
Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person
Ylarde’s death was due to his own reckless imprudence
CA affirmed RTC. Petitioners base their action against Aquino [teacher] on NCC 2176 for his
alleged negligence that caused Ylarde’s death, while the action against the principal was based on
NCC 2180
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Issues:
(1)Whether or not Soriano is liable for damages under Art. 2180.
(2) Whether or not Aquino is liable for damages under Art. 2176.
Ruling:
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic
school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students while in a school of arts and
trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held liable. It was held in Amadora vs. Court of
Appeals that:
Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for
the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the
first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it
is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other
words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is
technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon
of reddendo singula sinquilis 'teachers' should apply to the words "pupils and students' and 'heads of
establishments of arts and trades to the word "apprentices."
Hence, applying the said doctrine to this case, we rule that private respondent Soriano, as
principal, cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and not
a school of arts and trades. Besides, as clearly admitted by private respondent Aquino, private
respondent Soriano did not give any instruction regarding the digging.
From the foregoing, it can be easily seen that private respondent Aquino can be held liable
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his
supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their
persons. However, as earlier pointed out, petitioners base the alleged liability of private respondent
Aquino on Article 2176 which is separate and distinct from that provided for in Article 2180.
It is very clear that private respondent Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when
he: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged
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ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very
hazardous task; (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging,
knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil
who by chance may go to the perilous area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation
when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place where he
would not be able to check on the children's safety; and (5) left the children close to the excavation,
an obviously attractive nuisance.
The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a dangerous site
has a direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but natural
for the children to play around. Everything that occurred was the natural and probable effect of the
negligent acts of private respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the child Ylarde would not have died
were it not for the unsafe situation created by private respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of
all the pupils concerned to real danger.
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25. CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO., INC., vs. PHILIPPINE MOTORS CORPORATION
G.R. No. L-32611, November 3, 1930
J. Street
Doctrine:
In this connection it must be remembered that when a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to
exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.
Facts:
The plaintiff and defendant are domestic corporations; and at the time of the incident with
which we are here concerned, H.D. Cranston was the representative of the plaintiff in the City of
Manila. At the same time the plaintiff was the registered owner of the motor schooner Gwendoline,
which was used in the fishing trade in the Philippine Islands.
In January, 1925, Cranston decided, if practicable, to have the engine on

the Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner, expecting thereby to effect
economy in the cost of running the boat. He therefore made known his desire to McLeod & Co., a firm
dealing in tractors, and was told by Mc Kellar, of said company, that he might make inquiries of the
Philippine Motors Corporations, which had its office on Ongpin Street, in the City of Manila.
Cranston accordingly repaired to the office of the Philippine Motors Corporation and had a
conference with C.E. Quest, its manager, who agreed to do the job, with the understanding that
payment should be made upon completion of the work. The Philippine Motors Corporation was at
this time engaged in business as an automobile agency, but, under its charter, it had authority to deal
in all sorts of machinery engines and motors, as well as to build, operate, buy and sell the same and
the equipment therof. Quest, as general manager, had full charge of the corporations in all its
branches.
Upon preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest came to the conclusion that the principal
thing necessary to accomplish the end in view was to install a new carburetor, and a Zenith
carburetor was chosen as the one most adapted to the purpose. In the course of the preliminary work
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upon the carburetor and its connections, it was observed that the carburetor was flooding, and that
the gasoline, or other fuel, was trickling freely from the lower part to the carburetor to the floor. This
fact was called to Quest's attention, but he appeared to think lightly of the matter and said that, when
the engine had gotten to running well, the flooding would disappear.
After preliminary experiments and adjustments had been made the boat was taken out into
the bay for a trial run at about 5 p.m. or a little later, on the evening of January 30,1925. The first part
of the course was covered without any untoward development, other than he fact that the engine
stopped a few times, owing no doubt to the use of an improper mixture of fuel. In the course of the
trial Quest remained outside of the engine compartment and occupied himself with making distillate,
with a view to ascertaining what proportion of the two elements would give best results in the engine.
As the boat was coming in from this run, at about 7:30 p.m. and when passing near Cavite, the
engine stopped, and connection again had to be made with the gasoline line to get a new start. After
this had been done the mechanic, or engineer, switched to the tube connecting with the new mixture.
A moment later a back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into
the carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass of flames,
which the members of the crew were unable to subdue. They were therefore compelled, as the fire
spread, to take to a boat, and their escape was safely effected, but the Gwendoline was reduced to a
mere hulk. The salvage from, the wreck, when sold, brought only the sum of P150. The value of the
boat, before the accident occurred, as the court found, was P10,000.
Issue:
Whether the loss of the boat, Gwendoline was chargeable to the negligence and lack of skill
of Quest.
Ruling:
Yes. A study of the testimony lead the court to the conclusion that the loss of this boat was
chargeable to the negligence and lack of skill of Quest. Ordinarily a back fire from an engine would
not be followed by any disaster, but in this case the leak along the pipe line and the flooding of the
carburetor had created a dangerous situation, which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of this
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nature, would have taken precautions to avoid. The back fire may have been due either to the fact
that the spark was too advanced or the fuel improperly mixed.
In this connection it must be remembered that when a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to
exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. The
proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors,
but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats. For this reason,
possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not
convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire. But a person skilled in that particular
sort of work would, we think have been sufficiently warned from those circumstances to cause him
to take greater and adequate precautions against the danger. In other words Quest did not use the
skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats.
There was here, in our opinion, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent inadvertence
to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have
resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have
occurred but for Quest's carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was
accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from blame.
We therefore see no escape from the conclusion that this accident is chargeable to lack of skill
or negligence in effecting the changes which Quest undertook to accomplish; and even supposing that
our theory as to the exact manner in which the accident occurred might appear to be in some respects
incorrect, yet the origin of the fire in not so inscrutable as to enable us to say that it was casus
fortuitus.
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26. THE UNITED STATES vs. SANTIAGO PINEDA

G.R. No. L-12858, January 22, 1918
J. Malcolm
Doctrine:
The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs. Bearing these
general principles in mind, and remembering particularly the care and skill which are expected of
druggist, that in some jurisdictions they are liable even for their mistake and in others have the
burden placed upon them to establish that they were not negligent. A plea of accident and mistake
cannot excuse for they cannot take place unless there be wanton and criminal carelessness and
neglect.
In view of the tremendous an imminent danger to the public from the careless sale of poisons
and medicines, we do not deem it too rigid a rule to hold that the law penalizes any druggist who
shall sell one drug for another whether it be through negligence or mistake.
Facts:
Santiago Pineda, the defendant, is a registered pharmacist of long standing and the owner of
a drug store located Calle Santo Cristo, city of Manila.
One Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription obtained
from Dr. Richardson, and which on other occasions Santos had given to his horses with good results,
at Pineda's drug store for filling.
Santos, under the belief that he had purchased the potassium chlorate which he had asked
for, put two of the packages in water the doses to two of his sick horses. Another package was mixed
with water for another horse, but was not used. The two horses, to which had been given the
preparation, died shortly afterwards.
Santos, thereupon, took the three remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for
examination. Drs. Peña and Darjuan, of the Bureau of Science, on analysis found that the packages
contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate. At the instance of Santos, the two chemists
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also went to the drug store of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed
was found to be barium chlorate. (Barium chlorate, it should be noted, is a poison; potassium chlorate
is not.) Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses, and found that death
was the result of poisoning.
Issue:
Whether the accused is negligent and is thus guilty of infraction of Act No. 597, section 17, as
amended
Ruling:
Yes. The druggist is responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he sells.
Under the other conception, in which the proof of negligence is considered as material, where
a customer calls upon a druggist for a harmless remedy, delivery of a poisonous drug by mistake by
the druggist is prima facie negligence, placing the burden on him to show that the mistake was under
the circumstances consistent with the exercise of due care.
The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs. The vendor and the
vendee do not stand at arm’s length as in ordinary transactions. An imperative duty is on the druggist
to take precautions to prevent death or serious injury to anyone who relies on his absolute honesty
and peculiar leaning. The nature of drugs is such that examination would not avail the purchaser
anything. It would be idle mockery for the customer to make an examination of a compound of which
he can know nothing. Consequently, it must be that the druggist warrants that he will deliver the drug
called for.
In civil cases, the druggist is made liable for any injury approximately resulting from his
negligence.
Bearing these general principles in mind, and remembering particularly the care and skill
which are expected of druggist, that in some jurisdictions they are liable even for their mistake and
in others have the burden placed upon them to establish that they were not negligent, it cannot be
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that the Philippine Legislature intended to use the word "fraudulent" in all its strictness.
A plea of accident and mistake cannot excuse for they cannot take place unless there be
wanton and criminal carelessness and neglect.
In view of the tremendous an imminent danger to the public from the careless sale of poisons
and medicines, we do not deem it too rigid a rule to hold that the law penalizes any druggist who
shall sell one drug for another whether it be through negligence or mistake.
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27. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS et al.
G.R. No. 102383, November 26, 1992
J. Gutierrez, Jr.

Doctrine:
According to Article 2179 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines: “When the plaintiff's own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
Facts:
A phone call to BPI’s money department was made by a woman who identified herself as
Eligia G. Fernando, owner of a money market placement as evidenced by a promissory note with a
maturity date of November 11, 1981.
The caller wanted to preterminate the placement, but Reginaldo Eustaquio, the Dealer
Trainee who received the call and who happened to be alone in the trading room at the time, told her
that trading time was over for the day.
Eustaquio conveyed the request for pretermination to the officer who before had handled
Eligia G. Fernando’s account but Eustaquio was left to attend the pretermination process.
The caller followed up with Eustaquio, by phone again, on the pretermination of the
placement. Although not familiar with the voice of the real Eligia G. Fernando, Eustaquio made certain
that the caller was the real Eligia G. Fernando by verifying that the details the caller gave about the
placement tallied with the details in the ledger/folder of the account.
Neither Eustaquio nor Bulan who originally handled Fernando’s account, nor anybody else at
BPI, bothered to call up Fernando to verify the request for pretermination.
Eustaquio, thus, proceeded to prepare the requested pretermination as required by office

procedure. From his desk, the papers, following the processing route, passed through the position
analyst, securities clerk verifier clerk and documentation clerk, before the two cashier’s checks, both
payable to Eligia G. Fernando, covering the preterminated placement, were prepared.
The same caller called again to give delivery instructions that instead of the delivering the checks to
her office at Philamlife, she would send her niece, Rosemarie Fernando, to pick them up.
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It was, in fact Rosemarie Fernando who got the two checks from the dispatcher, as shown by
the delivery receipt. Actually, as it turned out, the same impersonated both Eligia G. Fernando and
Rosemarie Fernando. Although the checks represented the termination proceeds of Eligia G.
Fernando's placement, the dispatcher failed to get or to require the surrender of the promissory note
evidencing the placement. There is also no showing that Eligia G. Fernando's purported signature on
the letter requesting the pretermination and the latter authorizing Rosemarie Fernando to pick up
the two checks, both of which letters were presumably handed to the dispatcher by Rosemarie
Fernando, was compared or verified with Eligia G. Fernando's signature in BPI's file.
The story's scene now shifted when a woman who represented herself to be Eligia G.
Fernando applied at CBC's Head Office for the opening of a current account.
The application form shows the signature of "Eligia G. Fernando", "her" date of birth, sex, civil
status, nationality, occupation ("business woman"), tax account number, and initial deposit of
P10,000.00. This final approval of the new current account is indicated on the application form by
the initials of the CBC Cashier who did not interview the new client but affixed her initials on the
application form after reviewing it.
The following day, the woman holding herself out as Eligia G. Fernando deposited the two
checks in controversy. The two checks were forthwith sent to clearing by CBC and BPI cleared both
on the same day.
Two days after, withdrawals began. All withdrawals were allowed on the basis of the
verification of the drawer's signature with the specimen signature on file and the sufficiency of the
funds in the account.
When the maturity date of Eligia G. Fernado's money market placement with BPI came, the
real Eligia G. Fernando went to BPI for the roll-over of her placement. She disclaimed having
preterminated her placement. She executed an affidavit stating that while she was the payee of the
two checks in controversy, she never received nor endorsed them and that her purported signature
on the back of the checks was not hers but forged. With her surrender of the original of the
promissory note evidencing the placement which matured that day, BPI issued her a new promissory
note to evidence a roll-over of the placement.
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Investigation of the fraud led to the filing of criminal actions for "Estafa Thru Falsification of
Commercial Documents" against four employees of BPI and the woman who impersonated Eligia G.
Fernando.
BPI returned the two checks in controversy to CBC for the reason "Payee's endorsement
forged". CBC, in turn, returned the checks for reason "Beyond Clearing Time".
RTC ruled in favor of CBC and ordered BPI to pay CBC.
CA affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not it was BPI or CBC’s negligence which was the proximate cause of the payment
of the forged checks by an impostor?
Ruling:
The proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by an impostor was due to the
negligence of petitioner BPI. Nevertheless, the negligence of the employees of CBC should be taken
also into consideration.
The test by which by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may
be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence.
Petitioner BPI's reliance on the doctrine of last clear chance to clear it from liability is not
well-taken. CBC had no prior notice of the fraud perpetrated by BPI's employees on the
pretermination of Eligia G. Fernando's money market placement. Moreover, Fernando is not a
depositor of CBC. Hence, a comparison of the signature of Eligia G. Fernando with that of the impostor
Eligia G. Fernando, which respondent CBC did, could not have resulted in the discovery of the fraud.
Applying the doctrine of proximate cause, petitioner BPI's contention that CBC alone should
bear the loss must fail. The gap of one (1) day between the issuance and delivery of the checks bearing
the impostor's name as payee and the impostor's negotiating the said forged checks by opening an
account and depositing the same with respondent CBC is not controlling. It is not unnatural or
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unexpected that after taking the risk of impersonating Eligia G. Fernando with the connivance of BPI's
employees, the impostor would complete her deception by encashing the forged checks. There is
therefore, greater reason to rule that the proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by an
impostor was due to the negligence of petitioner BPI. This finding, notwithstanding, we are not
inclined to rule that petitioner BPI must solely bear the loss. Due care on the part of CBC could have
prevented any loss.
The Court cannot ignore the fact that the CBC employees closed their eyes to the suspicious
circumstances of huge over-the-counter withdrawals made immediately after the account was
opened. The opening of the account itself was accompanied by inexplicable acts clearly showing
negligence.
Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. By the very nature of their work
the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far
greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. For obvious reasons, the banks are expected to
exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Both banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in
the encashment of the forged checks by an impostor. Both banks were not able to overcome the
presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. It was the gross
negligence of the employees of both banks which resulted in the fraud and the subsequent loss.
The Court applies Article 2179 of the Civil Code to the effect that while respondent CBC may
recover its losses, such losses are subject to mitigation by the courts.

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28. E. M. WRIGHT vs. MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. & LIGHT CO.

G.R. No. L-7760, October 1, 1914
J. Moreland

Doctrine:
One’s state of intoxication is generally irrelevant in the determination of his negligence, but
it is a factor that may be considered. Therefore, drunkenness is not Negligence per se.
Facts:
Defendant, Manila Electric is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street railway in

the city of Manila. Wright’s residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which defendant’s tracks
run. In order to enter his premises from the street, Wright must cross defendant’s tracks.
On that night, Wright drove home in a Calesa and in crossing the tracks to enter the premises
of his residence; the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell. Thus, resulting in a sudden stop and
threw Wright from the vehicle, which caused him injuries.
On the location where Wright crossed the tracks, the rails were above-ground, and the ties
upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground,
making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the street.
Manila Electric admitted that it was negligent in maintaining its tracks, but it also claimed
that Wright was also negligent in because the latter was intoxicated to such an extent that he was
unable to take care of himself properly, and such intoxication was the primary cause of the accident.
The trial court held that both parties were negligent, but that plaintiff’s negligence was not as
great as defendant’s. It awarded Wright damages.
Issue:
Whether or not Wright was negligent by reason of intoxication.

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Ruling:
No. Intoxication is not negligence per se. Here, a horse crossing the railroad tracks with not
only the rails but a portion of the ties themselves above-ground, stumbling by reason of the unsure
footing and falling, the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel, is
sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what his condition. Also, the conclusion that
if he had been sober he would not have been injured is not warranted by the facts as found. It is
impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions
described.
To conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober man would not have fallen while a
drunken man did, is a mere guesswork and is not given credence by the Supreme Court because it’s
just a presumption that a sober man could have avoided such accident. Therefore, it having been
found that the plaintiff was not negligent.
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29. THE UNITED STATES vs. BAGGAY, JR.

G.R. No. 6659, September 1, 1911
J. Torres

Doctrine:
Civil liability accompanies criminal liability. Every person criminally liable for a crime or
misdemeanor is also civilly liable for reparation of damage and for indemnification of the harm done.
The persons who are civilly liable for acts committed by a lunatic or imbecile are those who have
them under their authority, legal guardianship or power, unless they prove that there was no blame
or negligence on their part.
Facts:
On the 4th of October, 1909, several persons were assembled in the defendant’s [Baggay’s]
house in the township of Peñarrubia, Abra, Province of Ilocos Sur, for the purpose of holding a song
service called "buni" according to the Tinguian custom, when he, the non-Christian Baggay, without
provocation suddenly attacked the woman Bil-liingan with a bolo, inflicting a serious wound on her
head from which she expired immediately; and with the same bolo he likewise inflicted various
wounds on the women named Calbayan, Agueng, Quisamay, Calapini, and on his own mother, named
Dioalan.
For this reason, a complaint for murder was filed against bagay for the death of the woman.
This cause was instituted separately from the other, No. 1109, for lesiones (injuries).
The RTC in its ruling held that Baggay was suffering from mental aberration and was exempt
from criminal liability but obliged to indemnify the heirs of the murdered woman, Bil-liingan, in the
sum of P1,000, to pay the costs in the case and to be confined in an institution for the insane until
further order of the court. On appeal, the court declared the appeal out of order and dismissed it.
Hence, counsel for Baggay resorted to this court with a petition praying that a writ be issued
directing judge Chanco, to admit the appeal and forward it, at the same time annulling all action taken
for execution of the judgments rendered in the causes for murder and for lesiones.
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Issues:
(1) Whether or not an insane person, exempt from criminal liability can still be civilly liable.
(2) Can the heirs of Baggay be held civilly liable?
Ruling:
Baggay can still be held civilly liable. Likewise, the heirs of Baggay may also be held civilly
liable.
Civil liability accompanies criminal liability. Every person criminally liable for a crime or
misdemeanor is also civilly liable for reparation of damage and for indemnification of the harm done.
Civil liability may arise from acts ordinarily punishable under the penal law, although the law
has declared their perpetrators exempt from criminal liability. Such is the case of a lunatic or insane
person who, in spite of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable condition of his deranged
mind, is still reasonably and justly liable with his property for the consequences of his acts, even
though they are performed unwittingly. His fellows ought not to suffer for the disastrous results of
his harmful acts in spite of his unfortunate condition.
Law and society are under obligation to protect him during his illness and so when he is
declared to be liable with his property for reparation and indemnification, he is still entitled to the
benefit of what is necessary for his decent maintenance, but this protection does not exclude liability
for damage caused to those who may have the misfortune to suffer the consequences of his acts.
Article 17 of the Penal Code states:
Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also

civilly liable
Article 18 of the same code says:
The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, and

10 of article 8 does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced, subject to the following:
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(1) In cases 1, 2, and 3, the persons who are civilly liable for acts
committed by a lunatic or imbecile, or a person under 9 years of age,
or over this age and under 15, who has not acted with the exercise of
judgment, are those who have them under their authority, legal
guardianship or power, unless they prove that there was no blame or
negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having them under his authority, legal

guardian, or power, if such person be insolvent, the said lunatics,
imbeciles, or minors shall answer with their own property, excepting
that part which is exempted for their support in accordance with the
civil law.
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30. MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS, INC. vs. THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, THE HEIRS OF PEDRO MAMADOR and GERONIMO MA. COLL
G.R. No. L-8110, June 30, 1956.
J. Bengzon

Doctrine:
Violation of a rule promulgated by a Commission or board is not negligence per se, but it may
be an evidence of negligence.
Facts:
On August 23, 1951, at 6a.m. in Bo. Sumangga, Mogpog, Marinduque, the deceased Mamador
together with other laborers of the Respondent-corporation, (Marinduque Iron Mines Agents Inc.)
boarded a truck belonging to the latter, which was then driven by one Procopio Macunat, also
employed by the corporation, and on its way to their place of work at the mine camp at Talantunan,
while trying to overtake another truck on the company road, it turned over and hit a coconut tree,
resulting in the death of said Mamador and injury to the others.”
Procopio Macunat was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased. He has paid nothing however, to the latter.
Marinduque mines question the validity of the proceedings as they were not given the
opportunity to cross examine the opposing witnesses.
Also, Marinduque mines also claims respondents are barred from claiming by section 6 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Law, because (a) Macunat was prosecuted and required to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased and (b) an amicable settlement was concluded between said heirs and Macunat.
Lastly, Marinduque mines argues that the deceased violated the employer’s prohibition
against laborer riding the haulage trucks. They claim that such violation was the laborer’s “notorious
negligence” which, under the law, precludes recovery.
Issue:
WON Pedro Mamador’s act of violating the employer’s prohibition against laborers riding the
haulage truck was notorious negligence thereby precluding recovery.
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Ruling:
No. There is no doubt that mere riding on haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not
negligence, ordinarily. It couldn’t be because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. This
order of the employer (prohibition rather) couldn’t be of a greater obligation than the rule of a
Commission or board. And the referee correctly considered this violation as possible evidence of
negligence; but it declared that under the circumstance, the laborer could not be declared to have
acted with negligence. Correctly, it is believed since the prohibition had nothing to do with personal
safety of the riders.
Nevertheless, even granting there was negligence, it surely was not “notorious” negligence,
which we have interpreted to mean the same thing as “gross” negligence — implying “conscious
indifference to consequences” “pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and probably
result in injury” “utter disregard of consequences.” Getting or accepting a free ride on the company’s
haulage truck couldn’t be gross negligence, because as the referee found, “no danger or risk was
apparent.”
In the opportunity to cross-examine the opposing witness, the public defender of Boac,
Marinduque notified the company general manager, Mr. Lenze, to appear before him. The first and
second time, they did not appear. When the commission wrote the company to comment on the
sworn declaration of Ma. Coll, Marinduque mines, thru its Vice President, denied its liability under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Also, the company thru Mr. Lenze who was assisted by counsel,
was allowed to examine the records of the case and was given the opportunity to rebut the evidence.
As such, they were afforded the opportunity examine and rebut the witnesses.
Also, Petitioner’s contention that Criminal Case No. 1491 and its outcome constituted an
election by the employee (or his heirs) to sue the third person, such election having the effect of
releasing the employer. However, Criminal Case No. 1491 was not a suit for damages against the third
person, it being alleged, without contradiction that the heirs did not intervene therein and have not
so far received the indemnity ordered by the court. At any rate, we have already decided in Nava vs.
Inchausti Co. 1 that the indemnity granted the heirs in a criminal prosecution of the “other person”
does not affect the liability of the employer to pay compensation.
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As to the alleged “amicable settlement,” it consists of an affidavit wherein, for the sum of 150
pesos, Mamador’s widow promised “to forgive Macunat for the wrong committed and not to bring
him before the authorities for prosecution.” Upon making such promise — Petitioner argues — she
elected one of the remedies, (against the third person) and is barred from the other remedy (against
the employer). The contention may not be sustained, in as much as all the widow promised was to
forego the offender’s criminal prosecution. Note further that a question may be raised whether she
could bind the other heirs of the deceased.
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31. ROGELIO E. RAMOS AND ERLINDA RAMOS et al. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, DELOS SANTOS
MEDICAL CENTER et al.
G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999
J. Kapunan
Doctrine:
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of
common knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an
inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury
in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded
in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common
knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself.
Facts:
Petitioners led by Rogelio and Erlinda Ramos seek the reversal of the Court of Appeals
because it found the private respondents De los Santos Medical Center liable for damages arising
from negligence in the performance of the professional duties of Dr. Orlino Hosaka and Dra. Perfecta
Gutierrez towards petitioner Erlinda Ramos resulting in her comatose condition.
Erlinda Ramos experienced occasional pains allegedly because of stones in her gall bladder.
She was told be her doctor to undergo an operation for the removal of the stones and after some tests
and medical examinations, she was indicated fit for surgery. That was the time that she and her
husband had met Dr. Hosaka, who was recommended by Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez. Dr. Hosaka charged
a fee of P16,000.00 which was to include anesthesiologist’s fee and which was to be paid after the
operation.
One day before the operation, Erlinda was admitted to De Los Santos Medical Center, at 7:30
AM she already received preparatory injections and procedures that were administered by Dr.
Gutierrez. On the day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos was accompanied by her sister-in-law, Herlinda
Cruz, who was the dean of the College of Nursing of the Capitol Medical Center, she was there to
provide medical support. Arriving three hours late, Dr. Hosaka administered with the staff to perform
its duties and Herminda saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating Erlinda Ramos and noticed that the latter’s belly
was distending and her fingernails
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were turning blue. Dr. Hosaka issued an order to call another anesthesiologist, Dr. Calderon, who
then proceeded to successfully incubate Erlinda but raised her feet to increase blood flow to her head
and Erlinda was already in comatose and was rushed to the Intensive Care Unit at 3:00 PM and had
already incurred Php 93,542.25 since she was comatose.
Two days after the operation, Dr. Osaka explained to Erlinda’s husband Rogelio that Erlinda
was experiencing complications during the incubation and that it would not have happened if Dr.
Hosaka found a good anesthesiologist. Erlinda stayed in the ICU for a month and was released after
four months, without improvement and a very high hospital bill.
A civil case for damages was filed by Rogelio Ramos against Dr. Hosaka, Dr. Gutierrez and De
Los Santos Medical Center, on behalf of Erlinda and three of their children. The plaintiffs presented
Herminda and 1 doctor as witnesses stating that Erlinda suffered injury resulting from intubation
but the defendants relied on the expert testimony of a pulmonologist that proved that the brain
damage was a result of an allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, finding the respondents guilty of
negligence because it found Dr. Gutierrez liable for not properly intubating Erlinda and not
readministering the preparatory drugs since the operation was delayed for 3 hours; it also found Dr.
Hosaka liable for selecting Dr. Gutierrez as anesthesiologist and for arriving 3 hours late; De Los
Santos Medical Center was also liable because of doctor’s practice inside their operating room and
because it did not cancel the operation because of the delay. The Court of Appeals, reversed the
decision. The RTC says that the doctors were negligent because the comatose was a result of
improper intubation and that it should not be a need to call another anesthesiologist if everything
was alright, and that the doctors should have cancelled the procedure because of the delay.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision but failed to properly notify Rogelio’s lawyer that
caused Rogelio to seek legal assistance within only four days before the expiration of the
reglementary period. However, the Supreme Court ruled that since the notice did not reach the
Petitioner’s Legal Counsel At That Time, The Motion Was Filed On Time.

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Issues:
1. Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor be applied to this case?
2. Whether or not the negligence of the respondents caused the unfortunate comatose
condition of petitioner Erlinda Ramos?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Supreme Court said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitory is appropriate at this
case at bar.
According to the Supreme Court, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is defined as "the thing or
the transaction speaks for itself." The phrase "res ipsa loquitur'' is a maxim for the rule that the fact
of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference
or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff's prima facie case, and present a question
of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.
Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management
of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence,
in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from or was caused by the
defendant's want of care.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of
common knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an
inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury
in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded
in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common
knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself.
Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.
Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be
satisfactorily shown:
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1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the "control of instrumentality" which
caused the damage. Such element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the
defendant. In order to have the benefit of the rule, a plaintiff, in addition to proving injury or damage,
must show a situation where it is applicable, and must establish that the essential elements of the
doctrine were present in a particular incident.
We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. As will hereinafter be
explained, the damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation
presents a case for the application of res ipsa loquitur.
2. The Supreme Court said that as for the hospital itself, the Court ruled that for cases of
medical negligence, there must be an existing employer-employee relationship that must exist
between the hospitals and as well as their physicians, both attending and visiting.
The hospital failed to supervise its functions over the physicians and its solidarily responsible for the
condition of Erlinda together with the doctors.
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32. DR. VICTORIA L. BATIQUIN and ALLAN BATIQUIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES
QUEDO D. ACOGIDO and FLOTILDE G. VILLEGAS
G.R. No. 118231, July 5, 1996
J. Davide, Jr.
Doctrine:
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or inference that
defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that the instrumentality causing injury was in
defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinary does not happen in
absence of negligence.
Facts:
In September 21, 1988, Dr. Batiquin, with the assistance of Dr. Doris Teresita Sy and O.R.
Nurse Arlene Diones and some student nurses performed a simple caesarean section on Mrs. Villegas
at the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital in Dumaguete City. After leaving the Hospital Mrs. Villegas
began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. The abdominal pains and fever
kept on recurring and bothered Mrs.Villegas no end despite the medications administered by Dr.
Batiquin.
When the pains became unbearable and she was rapidly losing weight, she consulted Dr. Ma.
Salud Kho at the Holy Child’s Hospital in Dumaguete City on January 20, 1989. Blood test shown that
Mrs. Villegas had an infection inside her abdominal cavity. Thereafter, Dr. Kho suggested to Mrs.
Villegas to submit to another surgery to which the latter agreed. When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen
of Mrs. Villegas she found a "foreign body" looked like a piece of a"rubber glove” and which “rubber-
drain is also like". It could have been a torn section of a surgeon's gloves or could have come from
other sources. And this foreign body was the cause of the infection of the ovaries and consequently
of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas after her delivery.
The piece of rubber allegedly found was not presented in court, and Dr. Kho testified that she
sent it to a pathologist in Cebu City for examination.
The trial court held in favor of the petitioners herein.
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The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals reviewed
the entirety of Dr. Kho's testimony and, even without admitting the private respondents'
documentary evidence, deemed Dr. Kho's positive testimony to definitely establish that a piece of
rubber was found near private respondent Villegas's uterus.
Issue:
Whether Dr. Batiquin is liable for damages for alleged negligence.
Ruling:
Yes. The SC affirmed the decision of CA. The rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore. Res ipsa
loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was
negligent, which arises upon proof that the instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's
exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinary does not happen in absence of
negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence whereby negligence of the alleged wrongdoer may
be inferred from the mere fact that the accident happened provided the character of the accident and
circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in the absence of negligence it would not
have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under the management and
control of the alleged wrongdoer.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence
which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes
a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely
a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts and
circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of
proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall
be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty
of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved,
direct evidence is absent and not readily available.
In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. First, the entire
proceedings of the caesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light,
the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of
the foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas's body, which, needless to say, does
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not occur unless through the intersection of negligence. Second, since aside from the caesarean
section, private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused the
offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only have been
a by-product of the caesarean section performed by Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed
to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private respondent
Villegas's abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.
A physician is bound to serve the interest of his patients "with the greatest of solicitude, giving
them always his best talent and skill." Through her tortious conduct, the petitioner endangered the
life of Flotilde Villegas, in violation of her profession's rigid ethical code and in contravention of the
legal standards set forth for professionals, in general, and members of the medical profession, in
particular.
The trial court failed to recognize that the assertions of Drs. Batiquin and Sy were denials or
negative testimonies. Well-settled is the rule that positive testimony is stronger than negative
testimony. Of course, as the petitioners advocate, such positive testimony must come from a credible
source, which leads us to the second assigned error.
Dr. Kho was frank throughout her turn on the witness stand. Furthermore, no motive to state
any untruth was ever imputed against Dr. Kho, leaving her trustworthiness unimpaired. The trial
court's following declaration shows that while it was critical of the lack of care with which Dr. Kho
handled the piece of rubber, it was not prepared to doubt Dr. Kho's credibility, thus only supporting
our appraisal of Dr. Kho's trustworthiness.
Considering that we have assessed Dr. Kho to be a credible witness, her positive testimony
[that a piece of rubber was indeed found in private respondent Villega's abdomen prevails over the
negative testimony in favor of the petitioners.
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33. D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA J. JUEGO

G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001
J. Kapunan

Doctrine:
Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily
available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does
not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the
injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury
suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured.
Facts:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji,
Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. The victim was rushed to the Rizal Medical
Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Jose A. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo were performing their work as
carpenters at the elevator core of the 14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board
a platform made of channel beam (steel) with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to
its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely
inserted to connect the chain block with the platform got loose causing the whole platform assembly
and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core, Tower D of the building under
construction thereby crushing the victim of death, save his two (2) companions who luckily jumped
out for safety.
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a
complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The RTC rendered a
decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in
toto
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Issue:
Whether or not, the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur should apply so as the presume negligence?

Ruling:
All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a
reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises.
There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down from the 14th floor of a building to the
basement while he was working with appellant’s construction project, resulting to his death. The
construction site is within the exclusive control and management of appellant. It has a safety
engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control of
the situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would occur therein are peculiarly
within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On the other hand, the appellee is not in a
position to know what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where
evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the person injured.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing
work in a construction site unless someone is negligent thus, the first requisite for the application of
the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its
paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and
management of appellant thus the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was
attributed to the appellee’s deceased husband thus, the last requisite is also present. All the requisites
for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present.
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34. CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC. AND SPOUSES EDGARDO L. LIMON AND SYLVIA S. LIMON
VS. TIMOTHY TAGARIO
G.R. No. 150920, November 25, 2005
J. Azcuna

Doctrine:
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to
warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant's negligence; (2) the
accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management
or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
Facts:
This petition started with a tort case filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati by Timothy
Tagorio and his parents, Basilio R. Tagorio and Herminia Tagorio. Timothy was a Grade IV student at
Marymount School, an academic institution operated and maintained by Child. In the afternoon of
March 5, 1991, between 1 and 2 p.m., Timothy entered the boy's comfort room at the third floor of
the Marymount building to answer the call of nature. He, however, found himself locked inside and
unable to get out. Timothy started to panic and so he banged and kicked the door and yelled several
times for help. When no help arrived he decided to open the window to call for help. In the process
of opening the window, Timothy went right through and fell down three stories. Timothy was
hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious multiple physical injuries.
An action under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was filed by respondents against the CLC, the
members of its Board of Directors, namely Spouses Edgardo and Sylvia Limon, Alfonso Cruz, Carmelo
Narciso and Luningning Salvador, and the Administrative Officer of Marymount School, Ricardo Pilao.
In its defense, CLC maintained that there was nothing defective about the locking mechanism of the
door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence. CLC further maintained that
it had exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of a family to ensure the safety, well-being
and convenience of its students.
After trial, CLC and Spouses Limon to pay respondents. On September 28, 2001, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision in toto.
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Issue:
Whether or not CLC was negligent.
Ruling:
YES. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the accident was of such character as
to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant's negligence; (2)
the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the
accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured. Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their school toilets
are at all times in working condition. The fact that a student had to go through the window, instead
of the door, shows that something was wrong with the door.
In this case, CLC's liability is under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of its
own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors are properly maintained. Timothy climbed out of the
window because he could not get out using the door, negates petitioners' other contention that the
proximate cause of the accident was Timothy's own negligence. The injuries he sustained from the
fall were the product of a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening cause that
originated from CLC's own negligence.
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35. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. SOTERO REMONQUILLO ET AL.

G.R. No. L-8328 , May 18, 1956
J. Montemayor

Facts:
Efren Magno went to the house of his stepbrother, Antonio Penaloza, to repair a “media agua”
located at the window below the third story of the house. Standing on the said “media agua”, Magno
received from his son a galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion. Upon turning around, the
galvanized iron sheet made contact with an uninsulated wire of the Manila Electric Company while
holding the said iron sheet, causing his electrocution and eventual death. Prior to his death, a similar
incident but less tragic consequence happened upon the construction of Penaloza’s house as a piece
of wood happened to made contact with the said uninsulated wire. During that time, Manila Electric
Company moved one end of the wire farther from the house by means of a brace, but leaving the
other end where it was.
The widow and children of Efren Magno filed a suit for damages against the Manila Electric
Company. The trial court decided in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. The appellate
court affirmed the decision of the trial court with modification as to the amount of attorney’s fees
being reduced.
Issue:
Whether or not Manila Electric Company is liable for damages.
Ruling:
The petitioner cannot be held liable for damages. Although there is a city ordinance
prescribing the distance between the wires from any building, it was the fault of the owner of the
house when constructing the said “media agua” as the prescribed distance was not followed,
therefore violating the ordinance pertaining to its construction. The company cannot be held liable
as they are not expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal construction which reduced the
distance between their wires and said construction. As to the uninsulated wire, the contention of
the company that there was no available insulation at that time and if there was, it is still in
experimental stage, was unrefuted.
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36. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES
ANTONIO ESTEBAN and GLORIA ESTEBAN
G.R. No. L-57079 September 29, 1989
J. Regalado

Doctrine:
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the
existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be
affirmatively established by competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of
action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested, otherwise
his action must fail.
Facts:
Private respondent spouses Esteban filed an action for damages against petitioner
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT, for brevity) for the injuries they sustained in
the evening of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench,
an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system.
The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench
which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs.
As a result of the accident, respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs
and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the respondent husband suffered cut lips.
Also, the windshield of the jeep was shattered.
PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by
respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence. They also alleged that L.R. Barte and
Company (Barte, for short), an independent contractor which undertook the construction of the
manhole and the conduit system, should be held responsible.
Accordingly, PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte alleging that, under the
terms of their agreement, PLDT should in no manner be answerable for any accident or injuries
arising from the negligence or carelessness of Barte or any of its employees. In its answer, Barte
claimed that it was not aware nor was it notified of the accident involving respondent spouses and
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that it had complied with the terms of its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and
appropriate standard signs in the vicinity of the work site, with barricades at both ends of the
excavation and with red lights at night along the excavated area to warn the traveling public of the
presence of excavations.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents. On appeal, the CA
reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the complaint of the private respondents.
Issue:
Whether there is negligence on the part of Antonio Esteban.
Ruling:
Yes. The court find no error in the findings of the respondent court in its original decision
that the accident which befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent
Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT.
Findings show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only
contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the
accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The
perils of the road were known to the private respondents. By exercising reasonable care and
prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act,
even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of petitioner.
The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only
purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site.
The private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of
knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but
the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound.
Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to
avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of
Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost every day and had knowledge of the presence and
location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger, hence
he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.
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A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the
existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be
affirmatively established by competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of
action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested, otherwise
his action must fail.
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37. GREGORIO GENOBIAGON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-40452, October 12, 1989
J. Griño-Aquino
Doctrine:
The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused. "The
defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless
imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own
negligence.
Facts:
A rig driven by appellant bumped an old woman who was crossing T. Padilla St., Cebu City, at
the right side of T. Padilla Market. As appellant's vehicle was going so fast not only because of the
steep down-grade of the road, but also because he was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him, the
appellant's rig bumped the old woman, who as a consequence, fell at the middle of the road. The
appellant continued to drive on, but a by-stander, one Vicente Mangyao, who just closed his store in
market in order to celebrate the coming of the New Year, and who saw the incident right before him,
shouted at the appellant to stop. He ran after appellant when the latter refused to stop.
The appellant went back to the place where the old woman was struck by his rig. The old
woman was unconscious, and the food and viands she was carrying were scattered on her body. The
victim was then loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital where she died three hours later (Exh.
C). The findings after an autopsy are as follows: Contusion with Hematoma Left, Frontal and Occipito-
Parietal Regionas Fracture Occipito-Parietal Bone Cerebral Hemorrhage. The deceased was an
eighty-one-year old woman named Rita B. Cabrera. (pp. 31-32, Rollo.)
Petitioner was charged with homicide thru reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu (Crim. Case No. V7855). The trial court found petitioner guilty of the felony charged and
sentenced him to "suffer an indeterminate penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor as minimum
to one (1) year, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum, to indemnify
the heirs of Rita Banzon Cabrera the sum of P6,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
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insolvency, not to exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty and to pay the costs" (p. 3, Appellant's Brief, p.
56, Rollo).
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 09949-CR)which,on October

10,1974,conviction of the accused but increased his civil liability to P12,000.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred:
1. in not finding that the reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate cause of
the accident which led to her death;
2. in not acquitting the petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt; and
3. in unjustly increasing the civil liability of the petitioner from P6,000.00 to

P12,000.00, although the circumstances of the victim and the accused (petitioner) do
not warrant such increase.
RULING:
The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused. "The
defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless
imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own
negligence (People vs. Orbeta, CA-G.R. No. 321, March 29, 1947)." (People vs. Quinones, 44 O.G. 1520).
The petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals unjustly increased his civil liability to
P12, 000, is devoid of merit. The prevailing jurisprudence in fact provides that indemnity for death
in homicide or murder is P30, 000 (People vs. De la Fuente, [1983]126 SCRA 518; People vs. Centeno,
130 SCRA 198). Accordingly, the civil liability of the petitioner is increased to P30, 000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed with modification as to the civil liability of
the petitioner which is hereby increased to P30, 000. Costs against petitioner.
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38. MH. RAKES vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY
G.R. No. 1719, January 23, 1907

Facts:
This case involves an action for damages filed by the plaintiff employee, M.H. Rakes against
The Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company. Rakes was working in the company’s yard and they were
transporting heavy iron rails from the barge in the harbour back to defendant’s yard by using cars.
The cars were pulled by rope from the front and other workers are pushing the cars from
behind. There were no sideguards installed on the sides of the cars but the rails were secured by
ropes. The track where the cars move were also weakened by a previous typhoon. It was alleged that
Atlantic’s foreman was notified of said damage in the tracks but the same were left unrepaired. While
the cars were being moved and when it reached the depressed portion of the track, and while Rakes
was beside one of the cars, the ropes gave in and the rails slipped thereby crushing his leg and causing
it to be amputated. Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf in lower courts and he won; he was awarded 5,000 pesos
for damages ($2,500). Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically
ordered their workers to be walking only before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars
because the cars have no side guards to protect them in case the rails would slip.
In order to charge the defendant with negligence, it was necessary to show a breach of duty
on its part in failing either to properly secure the load on iron to vehicles transporting it, or to
skillfully build the tramway or to maintain it in proper condition, or to vigilantly inspect and repair
the roadway as soon as the depression in it became visible. It is upon the failure of the defendant to
repair the weakened track, after notice of its condition, that the judge below based his judgment.
In respect of the second charge of negligence against the plaintiff, the judgment below is not
so specific. While the judge remarks that the evidence does not justify the finding that the car was
pulled by means of a rope attached to the front end or to the rails upon it, and further that the
circumstances in evidence make it clear that the persons necessary to operate the car could not walk
upon the plank between the rails and that, therefore, it was necessary for the employees moving it to
get hold upon it as best they could, there is no specific finding upon the instruction

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Issues:
Whether Rakes contributory negligence enough to exonerate defendant from liability.
Ruling:
No. The plaintiff’s lack of caution in continuing to work is not of a gross nature as to constitute
negligence on his part. Further, nothing in the evidence shows that plaintiff did or could see the
displaced timber underneath. Plaintiff had worked on the job for less than two days. Where plaintiff
contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of the determining factors, he cannot recover. Where,
in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount
that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less the sum deemed a
suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed
in this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the company
and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all
the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the
prohibition before the starting of this particular load.
On this contradiction of proof The Court think that the preponderance is in favor of the
defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being made known to the workmen. If so,
the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury
as a proximate, although not as its primary cause Rakes contributory negligence can be inferred from
the fact that he was on the side of the cars when in fact there were orders from the company barring
workers from standing near the side of the cars. His disobedient to this order does not bar
his recovery of damages though; the Supreme Court instead reduced the award of damages from
5,000 pesos to 2,500 pesos.
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39. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE, Now Absorbed By PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL

INTERNATIONAL BANK Et Al., vs COURT OF APPEALS, ROMMEL'S MARKETING CORP., et al.
G.R. No. 97626, March 14, 1997
J. Hermosisima, Jr.

Doctrine:
The doctrine of "last clear chance" or "supervening negligence" is when the negligent act of
one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose
fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to
avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof.
Facts:
Private respondent Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintained two (2) separate
current accounts with the Pasig Branch of Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC, now PCIB). RMC makes
current account deposits in the ordinary course of business through deposit slips prepared and
signed by the depositor (or its agent), indicating there with the current account number to which the
deposit is to be credited, the name of the depositor or current account holder, the date of the deposit,
and the amount of the deposit either in cash or checks.
However, it was alleged that the sum of P304, 979.74 representing various deposits was
never credited to RMC’s account, and were instead deposited to the account of Bienvenido Cotas,
husband of RMC’s employee, Irene Yabut.
During this period, petitioner bank had been regularly furnishing monthly statements to the
respondent, but it had never been the practice of RMC to check these statements of account reposing
complete trust and confidence on petitioner bank.
To deviate RMC’s checks to her husband’s account, Irene Yabut accomplishes two (2) copies
of the deposit slip, an original and a duplicate. On the duplicate copy was written the account number
of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank. Despite this, PBC's teller, Azucena
Mabayad, validates and stamps both slips. This went on in a span of more than one (1) year without
the private respondent's knowledge.
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Upon RMC’s later discovery of this, it demanded, later sued the petitioner bank by filing a
collection suit.
Issue:
What is the proximate cause of the loss, to the tune of P304, 979.74, suffered by the private
respondent RMC — petitioner bank's negligence or that of private respondent's?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court sided with the private respondent and held that the proximate cause of
the loss was the negligent act of the bank, thru its teller Ms. Azucena Mabayad, in validating the
deposit slips, despite the fact that one of the deposit slips was not completely accomplished.
The Supreme Court quoted Art. 2176 of the Civil Code that “Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict“
Further, it quoted the case of Picart v. Smith that “Negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do.”
The test to determine the existence of negligence asks the question, “Did the defendant in
doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.” Negligence had
been ascribed when the bank's teller validated, officially stamped and signed all the deposit slips,
without proper validation, she failed to observe this very important procedure. Further, the bank
itself was negligent when the bank’s manager testified thereof that he never came to know that blank
deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's validation procedures. It is gross, wanton,
and inexcusable negligence in the appellant bank's supervision of its employees. Hence, the Supreme
Court held that it was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of the
petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was the proximate cause of
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the loss suffered by the private respondent, and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest
employee, as insisted by the petitioners.
Further, the Supreme Court quoted the doctrine of "last clear chance" or "supervening
negligence" This doctrine was applied with both parties being negligent. But when the negligent act
of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose
fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to
avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof.
In this case, it is the petitioner bank, through its teller, who had the last clear opportunity to
avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation
procedure. Further, the degree of diligence ought to be exercised by banks is more than that of a good
father of a family, considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks
are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care.
The Supreme Court however reduced the penalty ascribing Article 2179 of the New Civil
Code. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
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40. ROBERTO JUNTILLA vs. CLEMENTE FONTANAR, FERNANDO BANZON and BERFOL CAMORO
G.R. No. L-45637 May 31, 1985
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Doctrine:
A caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics: (1) The cause of the
unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation,
must be independent of the human will. (2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which
constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. (3) The
occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner. And (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the
injury resulting to the creditor
Facts:
The plaintiff was a passenger of the public utility jeepney driven by defendant Berfol Camoro.
It was registered under the franchise of defendant Clemente Fontanar but was actually owned by
defendant Fernando Banzon. When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire exploded
causing the vehicle to turn turtle. In the process, the plaintiff who was sitting at the front seat was
thrown out of the vehicle. Upon landing on the ground, the plaintiff momentarily lost consciousness.
Petitioner filed Civil Case for breach of contract with damages before the City Court of Cebu
City against Clemente Fontanar, Fernando Banzon and Berfol Camoro.
The respondents filed their answer, alleging inter alia that the accident that caused losses to
the petitioner was beyond the control of the respondents taking into account that the tire that
exploded was newly bought and was only slightly used at the time it blew up.
The Civil Court of Cebu rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. The CFI Cebu reversed
the judgment of the City Court of Cebu upon a finding that the accident in question was due to a
fortuitous event

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Issue:
Whether the accident was due to a fortuitous event.
Ruling:
NO. The conclusions of the Court of First Instance of Cebu are based on a misapprehension
of overall facts from which a conclusion should be drawn. The reliance of the Court of First Instance
on the Rodriguez case is not in order. Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event
and gives rise to no liability for negligence, citing the rulings of the Court of Appeals in Rodriguez v.
Red Line Transportation Co., CA G.R. No. 8136, December 29, 1954, and People v. Palapad, CA-G.R.
No. 18480, June 27, 1958. These rulings, however, not only are not binding on this Court but were
based on considerations quite different from those that obtain in the case at bar. The appellate court
there made no findings of any specific acts of negligence on the part of the defendants and confined
itself to the question of whether or not a tire blow-out, by itself alone and without a showing as to
the causative factors, would generate liability.
In the case at bar, there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents. The
records show that the passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a ditch immediately after its
right rear tire exploded. The evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was running at a very fast
speed before the accident. We agree with the observation of the petitioner that a public utility jeep
running at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up. There
is also evidence to show that the passenger jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident. The
petitioner stated that there were three (3) passengers in the front seat and fourteen (14) passengers
in the rear.
While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the tire
were still visible, this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. No
evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that
precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause
accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused by too much air pressure
injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of
the accident.
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In Lasam v. Smith (45 Phil. 657), we laid down the following essential characteristics of caso
fortuito: In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso fortuito presents the
following essential characteristics: (1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of
the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will. (2) It
must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it
must be impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. And (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not
independent of the human will. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver
or because of mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to
overload their vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures
to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times.

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41. TEODORO M. HERNANDEZ vs. THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 71871, November 6, 1989
J. Cruz

Doctrine:
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides that no person shall be responsible for those events
which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were inevitable. A fortuitous event under
Article 1174 may either be an “act of God,” or natural occurrences such as floods or typhoons, storms,
earthquakes or other cataclysmic events; or an “act of man,” such as riots, strikes, wars, governmental
prohibitions, robbery, etc.
Facts:
Petitioner Teodoro Hernandez was the OIC disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach Project.
On that unfortunate day, he encashed all the checks for the salaries and wages of the workers.
However, it took him until afternoon so he opted on going home for the night as it would be more
practical than heading straight to Ternate. On his way to Marilao, he was robbed. He tried to chase
after the robbers and caught up with one of them. He requested to be relieved from money
accountability and the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority indorsed it to the
Regional Director of COA, until it reached the COA Chairman who denied the request stating that
Hernandez was negligent.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner Hernandez was negligent.
Ruling: No. As for Hernandez’s choice between Manila, Bulacan, and ternate, and Cavite, one could
easily agree that the former was the safer destination, being nearer, and in view of the comparative
hazards in the trips to two places. It is true that the petitioner miscalculated, but the Court feels he
should not be blamed for that. The decision he made seemed logical at that time and was one that
could be expected of a reasonable and prudent person. And if, as it happened, the two robbers
attacked him in broad daylight in the jeep while it was on a busy highway, and in the presence of
other passengers, it cannot be said that all this was the result of his imprudence and negligence. This
was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by the said provisions, something that could not have
been reasonably foreseen although it could have happened, and did.
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42. GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION vs. GLORIA E. CHATTO and LINA DELZA CHATTO
G.R. No. L-87584, June 16, 1992
J. Davide. Jr.,

Doctrine:
An accident would not have happened if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises
a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the owner.
Facts:
In the case at bar, Gloria E. Chatto and her 15-year old daughter Lina Delza E. Chatto, are the
respondents. It was afternoon of June 4, 1982 when respondents went to see the movie “Mother
Dear” at Suprema I Theater owned by herein petitioner Gotesco Investment Corporation. It was ten
(10) minutes after entering the theatre, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The whole theatre was
covered with darkness, respondents managed to crawl in order to get out the theatre and walked in
the nearby FEU hospital to seek for help. They were confined and treated for one (1) day.
The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital for more test and treatment, Gloria
confined from June 5 to June 19 while Line was from June 5 to June 11. However, due to continuous
pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, Gloria went to Illinios, USA in July 1982 for further
treatment. Hence, they filed a suit against Gotesco Investment Corporation for damages.
The petitioner, Gotesco Investment Corporation alleged that the collapse of the ceiling was
happened because of force majeure. It also contended that the theatre did not suffer from any
structural or construction defect.
Issue:
Whether or not the contention of petitioner Gotesco Investment Corporation are proper.
Ruling:
No, the collapsed of the ceiling was not a force majeure. Petitioner’s very owned witness to
Mr. Jesus Lim Ong was impliedly held incompetent because he is not an engineer, but an architect
who had not even passed the licensure examination, his statement that he did not know the reason
why the ceiling collapsed did not equate to force majeure. A significant finding of the Trial court
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which was affirmed by the Supreme Court, that the reason of the collapsed was due to construction
defects. The building was constructed four (4) years ago, and no evidence showing that there was an
inspection or maintenance prior to the collapsed. The defects could have been discovered if the
owner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises through regularly
inspection.
Even the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer
and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were
no defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling, considering that no testimony was
offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all. Hence, petition was denied.
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42. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ET AL. vs THE COURT OF APPEALS, GAUDENCIO C.

RAYO, ET AL.,
G.R. Nos. 103442-45. May 21, 1993.
J. Davide, Jr.,

Doctrine:
If a person’s negligence concurs with an act of God, the whole event is humanized and the
person causing damage to another cannot exempt himself from liability.
Facts:
This present controversy traces its beginnings to four (4) separate complaints for damages
filed against the NPC and Benjamin Chavez before the trial court. The plaintiffs therein, now private
respondents, sought to recover actual and other damages for the loss of lives and the destruction to
property caused by the inundation of the town of Norzagaray, Bulacan on 26-27 October 1978.
National Power Corporation (NPC) maintains a hydroelectric plant in the Angat River,
Benjamin Chavez was the plant supervisor. Meanwhile Rayo et al were residents of Norzagaray,
Bulacan.
On the evening of October 26, 1978, NPC allegedly caused the inundation of a town in
Norzagaray when it released water through the spillways of the Angat Dam at the height of typhoon
“Kading” as the Dam’s water level went beyond the maximum limit. The flooding resulted in the
drowning of the members of the household of Rayo, together with their animals; their properties
were also washed away. The release of water was made despite NPC’s knowledge of the impending
typhoon, as early as October 24 and its monitoring of the water level.
In its answer, NPC argued that it exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the operation
and maintenance of the hydroelectric plant; that it exercised the diligence of a good father in the
selection of its employees; written notices/ warning were sent to the different municipalities of
Bulacan; that the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event
or force majeure and are in the nature and character of damnum absque injuria, among others.

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Issue:
Whether or not the NPC may be exempt from liability by way of the fortuitous event
Ruling:
The SC held that NPC cannot invoke the force majeure or the act of God doctrine to exempt
itself from liability since it was not entirely free from fault – one of the requisites for the application
of Art. 1174 CC, to wit: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will
of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such
as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor
must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.
If upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding
fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as
provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot
escape liability. The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must
be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are to be excluded
from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be
considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether it be from active
intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were, and
removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God.
As held in this case, the unholiness of the hour, the extent of the opening of the spillways, and
the magnitude of the water released resulting in the inundation even of areas 1 km away from the
Angat river bank are circumstances leading to the conclusion of NPC’s negligence. Further, NPC was
duly warned of the typhoon as its coming was published in headlines of a newspaper of national
circulation. There were also radio announcements regarding the same. Yet NPC maintained a water
level beyond maximum despite its knowledge of the safe level. From October 24, until the Dam’s
water release on the evening of October 26, the water level was maintained at maximum with very
little opening of the spillways. The “early warning notice” given by NPC were also found insufficient:
1) it did not prepare or warn the residents of the volume of water to be released, they should have
been advised to evacuate, and 2) it was not given to the proper municipal officials for dissemination,
but rather to a policeman.
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44. SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUANITA DE JESUS VDA. DE
DIMAANO et al.
G.R. No. 126389, July 10, 1998

J. Purisima

Doctrine:
Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation,
or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible
for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
Facts:
Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay City, while petitioner
owns a four-storey school building along the same College Road. Due to a powerful typhoon “Saling”,
petitioner’s building was ripped off and blown away, landing on, and destroying portions of the
roofing of private respondent’s house. After the passing of the typhoon, an ocular inspection was
conducted to which they recommended that the fourth floor of the subject school building be
declared as a “structural hazard”
Respondents then filed a complaint at the RTC for damages based on culpa aquiliana. They
argue that the damage to their house rendered it uninhabitable and as such, they sought to recover
from the petitioner actual, moral, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. On the other hand,
petitioners argue that the typhoon was an act of God and beyond human control. As such, they cannot
be held liable for damages as there was no negligence on their part.
The RTC, giving credence to the ocular inspection report, ruled in favor of the respondents,
and awarded them actual, and moral damages and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
RTC decision but reduced the award of moral damages. Hence, petitioners appealed at the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the damage on the roof of respondents was due to a fortuitous event.

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Ruling:
YES. Under Article 1174 of the New Civil Code:
Art 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
There was no question that the typhoon was a fortuitous event. However, to be exempt from
any liability, there should be no human participation amounting to a negligent act. Nevertheless, a
person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of
fault or negligence causative of his injury or loss. Negligence must be affirmatively established by
competent evidence, not merely by presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact.
In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no investigation was conducted to
determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of petitioner's school building. Private respondents
did not even show that the plans, specifications, and design of said school building were deficient and
defective. Neither did they prove any substantial deviation from the approved plans and
specifications. Nor did they conclusively establish that the construction of such building was basically
flawed.
On the other hand, petitioner elicited from one of the witnesses of private respondents, city
building official Jesus Reyna, that the original plans and design of petitioner's school building were
approved prior to its construction. They also secured a certificate of occupancy after the construction
of the building. Further, the same city official gave the go-signal for the repairs without any deviation
from the original design and authorized the use of the entire fourth floor of the same building, which
proves that it does not suffer from any structural defect. They also have shown proof of annual
maintenance inspection and repair were regularly conducted. Also, the city building official admitted
that since 1974, no complaint regarding any defect on the structure has ever been lodged. As such,
there was no clear and convincing evidence of negligence or fault from the petitioner.
Hence, the Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the case in favor of the petitioners.
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45. THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.
G.R. No. L-53401, November 6, 1989
J. Paras
Doctrine:
Acts of God – When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant
to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own
negligent conduct or omission.
Facts:
On the evening of June 28, 1967 until the early morning of June 29, 1969, Typhoon Gening
buffeted Ilocos Norte. After the typhoon had abated and the floodwaters began to subside, the
deceased, Isabel Lao Juan, ventured out of the house of her son-in-law Antonio Yabes and proceeded
to the Five Sisters Emporium located at Guerrero Street, Laoag City, to look after the merchandise
that might have been damaged. With the floods being waist-deep on Guerrero Street, Aida Bulong
and Linda Alonzo Estavillo followed Lao Juan, they were following the deceased who was walking 5
to 6 meters behind and suddenly it screamed and sank into the water. Aida and Linda attempted to
help the deceased but they were dissuaded by fear from doing so, because on the spot where the
deceased sank, there was an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in the snake-like fashion
in the waters. Upon shouting for help, Ernesto Dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio Yabes to
try to go to the decease, however, at 4 meters away from the deceased, he turned back at shouting
because the water was grounded. When Ernesto Dela Cruz informed Antonio Yabes that his mother-
in-law had been electrocuted, he acted immediately, they requested that the police ask the people of
Ilocos Norte Electric Company to cut the electric current. While the floodwater was subsiding and the
lights inside the house were out indicating that the electric current had already been turned off.
Antonio Yabes instructed his boys to fish for the body of the deceased which was recovered 2 meters
from an electric post.
At about 4am of the same day, the Power plant Engineer, Antonio Juan, of the National Plant
Corporation at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed that there were fluctuations in their electric
meter which indicated abnormalities including grounded and short-circuited lines. He then decided
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to make an inspection and, on the way, the lines were grounded and disconnected. The electric lines
were hanging from the posts to the ground, but, since he could not see any lineman of the INELCO, he
decided to go to the INELCO office located at Rizal Street, the Engineer saw an electric wire of 39
meters long across the street with the other was seeming to play with the current of the water and
upon reaching the INELCO Office there was no lineman therein because it was still closed, so he
returned to the NPC Compound.
Upon learning that Isabel Lao Juan had already died, he passed by the house of the deceased
and tried to revive it. Proceeding to the INELCO Office, he met two lineman and he went on a third
inspection, this time, the dangling wire was no longer there. Following the request of the relatives of
the deceased, Dr. Jovencio Castro examined the body at 8 am of June 29, 1967 and the skin was
grayish because of death by electrocution.
The defendant presented the testimonies of its officers and employees that sought to prove
that on that and even before the day of Isabel Lao Juan’s death, that there was no defect in any of the
electric service system of INELCO that might constitute a hazard to life and property and he service
lines, devices and equipment of INELCO were newly-installed and round the clock check ups are
being conducted. While is it that there was a strong typhoon that struck Ilocos Norte, only a few
known places in Laoag were reported to have suffered damaged electric lines.
According to witnesses, including a certain Fabico Abijero, he testified that on the morning of
June 29, 1967, there was no broken wires near the vicinity and what he saw were people fishing out
the body of Isabel Lao Juan. Dr. Antonio Briones testifies that the presence of the elongated burns
that was found in the left palm of the deceased is not sufficient to establish her death by electrocution
and that the burns caused by electricity are more or less round in shape and with points of entry and
exit. Had the deceased held the lethal wire for a long time, the laceration in her palm would have been
bigger and the injury more massive.
An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the respondent and in the answer of
INELCO, it stated that the deceased could have only die either by drowning or by electrocution due
to negligence attributable only to herself and not to INELCO. The deceased caused the installation of
a burglar deterrence by connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate and the fence made
of steel matting, thus, charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch was turned on.
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Thus, INELCO concludes that it might have been turned on by the deceased when she tried opening
the gate.
The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of INELCO and dismissed the complaint but awarded
P25000 in moral damages and attorney’s fees of P45000. The CA set aside the CFI decision and
ordered INELCO to pay actual damages of P30229.45, compensatory damages of P50000, exemplary
damages of P10000, attorney’s fees of P3000, plus the cost of the suit.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the deceased died of electrocution?
2. Whether or not INELCO is liable of the death of the deceased?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Supreme Court said that the wounds from electrocution, derived from the
photographed burnt wounds on the left palm undoubtedly point to the fact that the deceased had
clutched a live wire of the INELCO. According to Dr. Castro, he described that the wounds were first
degree burns and electrically charged. INELCO’s theory that the deceased was electrocuted upon
opening her steel gate was only a mere speculation and was not backed by evidence. This theory must
have been proven by the party to prove his own affirmative allegations.
2. The Supreme Court said that while is it that floods and typhoons are considered as Acts of
God, it was not eventually the direct cause of the victim’s death, it was through the intervention of
INELCO’s negligence that took place. The defendant INELCO called to the witness-stand its electrical
engineer, chief lineman, and lineman to show exercise of extraordinary diligence and to negate the
charge of negligence. However, in times of calamities, extraordinary diligence requires that a
supplier of electricity is in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil
life or limb. Given the fact that there were no men manning the office at the time of the calamity, it
states that INELCO was negligent in seeing to it that there will be no harm done to the general public
and that the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or
proportionate to the danger.
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46. MARGARITA AFIALDA vs. BASILIO HISOLE and FRANCISCO HISOLE

G.R. No. L-2075, November 29, 1949
J. Reyes

Doctrine:
The owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for
damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent
or at fault.
Facts:
The now deceased, Loreto Afialda, was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of
their carabaos. While tending the animals, he was gored by one of them and later died as a
consequence of his injuries. The mishap was due neither to his own fault nor to force majeure; and
that plaintiff is his elder sister and heir depending upon him for support.
Before filing their answer, defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of a
cause of action, and the motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiff has taken this appeal.
Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under article 1905 (now 2183) of the Civil Code, which reads:
The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may
cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away.
This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure or from the
fault of the person who may have suffered it.
Issue:
Whether the owner of the animal is liable when damage is caused to its caretaker.
Ruling:
No. The lower court took the view that under the above-quoted provision of the Civil Code,
the owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage
caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at
fault under article 1902 of the same code. Claiming that the lower court was in error, counsel for
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plaintiff contends that the article 1905 does not distinguish between damage caused to the caretaker
and makes the owner liable whether or not he has been negligent or at fault.
For authority, counsel cites the following opinion which Manresa quotes from a decision of
the Spanish Supreme Court. This opinion, however, appears to have been rendered in a case where
an animal caused injury to a stranger or third person. It is therefore no authority for a case like the
present where the person injured was the caretaker of the animal. The distinction is important. For
the statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for "any damages it may
cause," and this for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the
animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage.
In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who
was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal
from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under
those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and
for which he must take the consequences.
In a decision of the Spanish Supreme Court, cited by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 12,
p. 578), the death of an employee who was bitten by a feline which his master had asked him to take
to his establishment was by said tribunal declared to be "a veritable accident of labor" which should
come under the labor laws rather than under article 1905 of the Civil Code. The present action,
however, is not brought under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there being no allegation that,
among other things, defendant's business, whatever that might be, had a gross income of P20,000. As
already stated, defendant's liability is made to rest on article 1905 of the Civil Code. But action under
that article is not tenable for the reasons already stated. On the other hand, if action is to be based on
article 1902 of the Civil Code, it is essential that there be fault or negligence on the part of the
defendants as owners of the animal that caused the damage. But the complaint contains no allegation
on those points.
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PLACIDO C. RAMOS AND AUGUSTO L. RAMOS VS. PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO, ANDRES
BONIFACIO
G.R. No. L-22533, February 9, 1967
J. BENGZON, J.P

Doctrine:
Due should not be satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's license; he
should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his experience
and record of service.

Facts:
On May 10, 1958, there was a collision between the car of Placido Ramos and a tractor-truck
and trailer of PEPESI-COLA. Said car was at the time of the collision driven by Augusto Ramos, son
and co-plaintiff of Placido. PEPSI-COLA's tractor-truck was then driven by its driver and co-defendant
Andres Bonifacio.

After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment on April 15, 1961, finding Bonifacio
negligent and declaring that PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently proved its having exercised the due
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Not satisfied with this decision, the
defendant’s appealed to the Court of Appeals. Said Court, affirmed the trial court's judgment insofar
as it found defendant Bonifacio negligent, but modified it by absolving defendant PEPSI-COLA from
liability, finding that, contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, PEPSI-COLA sufficiently proved due
diligence in the selection of its driver Bonifacio.

Issue:
Does PEPSI-COLA exercised due diligence in the selection of its employee

Ruling:
Such being the case, there can be no doubt that PEPSI-COLA exercised the required due
diligence in the selection of its driver. As ruled by this Court in Campo vs. Camarote, "In order that the
defendant may be considered as having exercised all diligence of a good father of a family, he should
not be satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's license; he should have carefully
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examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his experience and record of service."
It is not surprising that appellants thus confine their arguments to this aspect of due diligence, since
the record - as even appellants' brief reflects in quoting in part the testimony of PEPSI-COLA's witness
would show sufficient evidence to establish due diligence in the supervision by PEPSI-COLA of its
drivers, including Bonifacio. The matter of whether or not PEPSI-COLA did act to ratify the negligent
act of its driver is a factual issue not proper herein.

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48. METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 104408, June 21, 1993,
J. Regalado

Doctrine:
Due diligence in the supervision of employees, on the other hand, includes the formulation of
suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions
intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through
his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case
of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of
and beneficial to their employer.
Facts:
At about six o'clock in the morning of August 28, 1979, plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio
boarded as a paying passenger a public utility jeepney with plate No. D7 305 PUJ Pilipinas 1979, then
driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his co-defendant Victorino Lamayo, bound for her
work at Dynetics Incorporated located in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, where she then worked as a
machine operator earning P16.25 a day. While the passenger jeepney was travelling at (a) fast clip
along DBP Avenue, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila another fast moving vehicle, a Metro Manila Transit
Corp. (MMTC, for short) bus bearing plate no. 3Z 307 PUB (Philippines) "79 driven by defendant
Godofredo C. Leonardo was negotiating Honeydew Road, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila bound for its
terminal at Bicutan. As both vehicles approached the intersection of DBP Avenue and Honeydew
Road they failed to slow down and slacken their speed; neither did they blow their horns to warn
approaching vehicles. As a consequence, a collision between them occurred, the passenger jeepney
ramming the left side portion of the MMTC bus. The collision impact caused plaintiff-appellant Nenita
Custodio to hit the front windshield of the passenger jeepney and (she) was thrown out therefrom,
falling onto the pavement unconscious with serious physical injuries. She was brought to the Medical
City Hospital where she regained consciousness only after one (1) week. Thereat, she was confined
for twenty-four (24) days, and as a consequence, she was unable to work for three and one half
months (31/2).
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Defendants denied all the material allegations in the complaint and pointed an accusing finger
at each other as being the party at fault. Further, herein petitioner Metro Manila Transit Corporation
(MMTC), a government-owned corporation and one of the defendants in the court a quo, along with
its driver, Godofredo Leonardo, contrarily averred in its answer with cross-claim and
counterclaim3 that the MMTC bus was driven in a prudent and careful manner by driver Leonardo
and that it was the passenger jeepney which was driven recklessly considering that it hit the left
middle portion of the MMTC bus, and that it was defendant Lamayo, the owner of the jeepney and
employer of driver Calebag, who failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees and should thus be held solidarily liable for damages caused to the MMTC bus through the
fault and negligence of its employees.
Defendant Victorino Lamayo, for his part, alleged that the damages suffered by therein
plaintiff should be borne by defendants MMTC and its driver, Godofredo Leonardo, because the
latter's negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the accident and that MMTC failed to exercise
due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.
Trial court, in its decision of August 1, 1989, found both drivers of the colliding vehicles
concurrently negligent for non-observance of appropriate traffic rules and regulations and for failure
to take the usual precautions when approaching an intersection. As joint tortfeasors, both drivers, as
well as defendant Lamayo, were held solidarily liable for damages sustained by plaintiff Custodio.
Defendant MMTC, on the bases of the evidence presented was, however, absolved from liability for
the accident on the ground that it was not only careful and diligent in choosing and screening
applicants for job openings but was also strict and diligent in supervising its employees by seeing to
it that its employees were in proper uniforms, briefed in traffic rules and regulations before the start
of duty, and that it checked its employees to determine whether or not they were positive for alcohol
and followed other rules and regulations and guidelines of the Bureau of Land Transportation and of
the company. CA reversed with respect to MMTC – held it liable as well Hence present petition by
MMTC o MMTC claims that it has sufficient evidence: testimony of Garbo (Training Officer) and
Bautista (Transport Supervisor) to show that they exercised proper diligence.
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Issue:
Whether or not MMTC is liable
Ruling:
YES. In civil cases, the degree of evidence required of a party in order to support his claim is
preponderance of evidence, or that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and
credible than that of the other party. It is, therefore, incumbent on the plaintiff who is claiming a right
to prove his case. Corollarily, defendant must likewise prove own allegation to buttress its claim that
it is not liable. Whether or not the diligence of a good father of a family has been observed by
petitioner is a matter of proof which under the circumstances in the case at bar has not been clearly
established. It is not felt by the Court that there is enough evidence on record as would overturn the
presumption of negligence, and for failure to submit all evidence within its control, assuming the
putative existence thereof, petitioner MMTC must suffer the consequences of its own inaction and
indifference.
The case falls under Articles 2176 and 2177, in relation to Article 2180. MMTC is sued as
Leonardo’s employer o Basis of responsibility of employer: arises by virtue of a presumption juris
tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made responsible under the article, derived from
their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from
causing damage.
Negligence is imputed to them by law, unless they prove the contrary. Where the injury is due
to the concurrent negligence of the drivers of the colliding vehicles, the drivers and owners of the
said vehicles shall be primarily, directly and solidarily liable for damages and it is immaterial that
one action is based on quasi-delict and the other on culpa contractual, as the solidarily of the
obligation is justified by the very nature thereof. Due diligence in the supervision of employees, on
the other hand, includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of
employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and
persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of
necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure
the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer.
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49. ERNESTO KRAMER, JR. and MARIA KRAMER v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TRANS-ASIA
SHIPPING LINES, INC.,
G.R. No. L-83524 October 13, 1989
J. Gangayco

Doctrine:
Article 1146 of the Civil Code states that an action based upon a quasi-delict must be
instituted within four (4) years from the day when the alleged quasi-delict is committed.
Facts:
F/B Marjolea, owned by the petitioners, figured in an accident with M/V Asia Philippines
while navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. As a result of the incident, F/B Marjolea sank,
taking its fish catch. The captains of both ships filed their respective marine protest before the Board
of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard, and later concluded that the loss of F/B Marjolea
was attributable to the negligence of the employees who were onboard M/V Asia Philippines. After
nearly four (4) years, petitioners filed an action for damages against private respondent. The private
respondent filed for the dismissal of the case on the ground of prescription. Petitioners contends that
the collision have peculiarities which the Board of Marine Inquiry can resolve. And, as such, the filing
of the protest tolled the prescriptive period and it only accrued upon the release of the Decision of
the board.
The trial court found out that the argument of the plaintiffs are tenable, hence, the statute of
limitations cannot constitute a bar to the filing of the case. Private respondent elevate the matter to
the Court of Appeals, which reversed the findings of the trial court, stating that the action being asked
for by the Kramers happened on the precise time when damages were inflicted and sustained by
Trans-Asia Pacific. The Court of Appeals also stated that any decision may be rendered by the Board
of Marine Inquiry, although helpful, does not bind the court.
Issue:
Whether or not the action for damages of the Kramers is proper.
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Ruling:
Article 1146 of the Civil Code states that an action based upon a quasi-delict must be
instituted within four (4) years from the day when the alleged quasi-delict is committed. The Kramers
need not wait for the result of the decision of the Board to file action for damages. In Espanol vs.
Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, this Court held as follows-
The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3
elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to
respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative
of the right of the plaintiff ... It is only when the last element occurs or takes place
that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen ... .
From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the
last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative
of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises.
It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels
the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved
party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry
that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action
for damages. The ruling in Vasquez does not apply in this case. Immediately after the collision the
aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners,
agents or personnel of the other vessel.
Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. The
collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages was filed iii court only on May 30, 1
985, was beyond the four (4) year prescriptive period.
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50. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND JOSELITO Z. YUJUICO
G.R. No. L-85868, October 13, 1989
J. Gancayco
Doctrine:
Action for damages arising from the quasi-delict or alleged tortious interference" should be
filed within four (4) years from the day the cause of action accrued. The prescriptive period must be
reckoned from the date when the cause of action arises from the act or omission violative of the right
of a party.
Facts:
On April 1, 1976, private respondent Joselito Z. Yujuico (Yujuico) obtained a loan from the
General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand pesos
(P500,000.00), payable on or before April 1, 1977 evidenced by promissory note issued by Yujuico
in favor of GENBANK. At the time private respondent incurred the obligation, he was then a ranking
officer of GENBANK and a member of the family owning the controlling interest in the said bank.
On March 25,1977, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued Resolution No. 675
forbidding GENBANK from doing business in the Philippines and ordered the liquidation of
GENBANK.
It appears that in a Memorandum of Agreement dated May 9, 1977 executed by and between
Allied Banking Corporation (ALLIED) and Arnulfo Aurellano as Liquidator of GENBANK, ALLIED
acquired all the assets and assumed the liabilities of GENBANK, which includes the receivable due
from private respondent under the promissory note.
Upon failing to comply with the obligation under the promissory note, petitioner ALLIED,
filed a complaint against private respondent for the collection of a sum of money before the CFI of
Manila.
Private respondent, then defendant in the court below, filed a Motion to Admit
Amended/Supplemental Answer and Third-Party Complaint. Private respondent sought to implead
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the Central Bank and Arnulfo Aurellano as third-party defendants. It was alleged in the third-party
complaint that by reason of the tortious interference by the Central Bank with the affairs of
GENBANK, private respondent was prevented from performing his obligation under the loan such
that he should not now be held liable thereon.
The RTC denied the admission of the third- party complaint but admitting private
respondent's amended/supplemental answer. The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the RTC
and ordered the same to admit the proposed third-party complaint.
Hence this Petition. It is the position of petitioner that the cause of action alleged in the third-
party complaint has already prescribed. Being founded on what was termed as tortious interference,"
petitioner asserts that under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delict the action
against third-party defendants should have been filed within four (4) years from the date the cause
of action accrued
Issue:
Whether the cause of action under the third-party complaint prescribed?
Ruling:
Yes. There can be no question in this case that the action for damages instituted by private
respondent arising from the quasi-delict or alleged tortious interference" should be filed within four
(4) years from the day the cause of action accrued.
In the case of Español vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, this Court ruled that
it is from the date of the act or omission violative of the right of a party when the cause of action
arises and it is from this date that the prescriptive period must be reckoned. Thus, while technically
the third party complaint in this case may be admitted as above discussed, however, since the cause
of action accrued on March 25, 1980 when the Monetary Board ordered the General Bank to desist
from doing business in the Philippines while the third party complaint was filed only on June 17,
1987, consequently, the action has prescribed. The third party complaint should not be admitted.

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TORTS

Atty. JEFFREY G. GALLARDO

THE CONCEPT OF QUASI-DELICT

1 Barredo v. Garcia, 73 Phil 607 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

4 Baksh v. CA, 219 SCRA 115 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

8 Cruz v. CA, 282 SCRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Quasi-delict v. Breach of contract

17 Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil 809 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

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20 Corinthian Gardens v. Spouses Tanjanco, 578 Phil 712 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

22 Jarco Marketing v. CA, 378 Phil 991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

27 BPI v. CA, 216 SCRA 51 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

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35 Manila Electric v. Remonquillo, 99 Phil 117 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

40 Juntilla v. Funtanar, 136 SCRA 624 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

43 National Power v. CA, 222 SCRA 415 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

45 Ilocos Norte v. CA, 179 SCRA 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

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1. FAUSTO BARREDO vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO

G.R. No. L-48006, July 8, 1942

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1. an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent;

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On appeal, respondent CA affirmed in toto the trial court’s ruling.

Hence, the instant petition.

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5. MARIA BENITA A. DULAY IN BEHALF OF THE MINOR CHILDREN KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH ET

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Whether or not Torzuela’s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict

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6. GERMAN C. GARCIA et al. vs HON. MARIANO M. FLORIDO et al.

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a) act or omission of the private respondents

c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by as a result of the collision

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e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties

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7. FAUSTO BARREDO vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.

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8. DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA UMALI

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Whether or not the conviction of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide as a consequence

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11. JOSE CANGCO vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO.

Whether Manila Railroad Company is liable for negligence

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Whether or not this is an action for quasi-delict.

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14. PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION et al. vs COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

Whether or not PSBA may be held liable under quasi-delicts.

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