TORTS CASE DIGESTS

TORTS CASE
DIGESTS

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST
College of Law
Summer Class A.Y. 2021-2022

Contributors:

1. Alba, Crisencio III
2. Alumno, Nathaniel
3. Ecleo, Ann Camille
4. Edem, Mariz
5. Esteban, Emmanuel
6. Dela Rosa, Aser
7. Katigbak, Althea Marie
8. Ledonio, Jaclyn
9. Manabat, Eric
10. Mila, Kevin
11. Omar, Naif
12. Sariego, Niña Christine
13. Villanueva, Karl Matthew

Atty. JEFFREY G. GALLARDO

Professor

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 TORTS CASE DIGESTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

CAUSATION
§ Proximate Cause
Cases:
51 Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil 181 9
52 Fernando v. CA, 208 SCRA 714 11
53 Pilipinas Bank v. CA, 234 SCRA 435 13

§ Remote Cause
Cases:
54 Gabeto v. Araneta, 42 Phil 252 15
55 Urbano v. IAC, 241 Phil 1 17

§ Concurrent Cause
Cases:
56 Far East Shipping v. CA, 357 Phil 703 19
57 Sabido v. Custodio, 124 PHIL 516 22

§ Tests
Cases:
58 Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil 181 25
59 Philippine Rabbit v. IAC, 189 SCRA 158 27

§ Cause v. Condition
Cases:
60 Phoenix Construction v. IAC, 148 SCRA 353 30
61 Rodrigueza v. Manila Railroad, 42 Phil 351||| 33

§ Efficient Intervening Cause
Cases:
62 McKee v. IAC, 211 SCRA 517 35
63 Teague v. Fernandez, 51 SCRA 181 38
64 Urbano v. IAC, 241 Phil 1 41

§ Last Clear Chance
Cases:
65 Bustamante v. CA, 193 SCRA 603 44
66 Pantranco v. Baesa, 179 SCRA 384 46
67 Canlas v. CA, 383 Phil 315 48
68 Consolidated Bank v. CA, 457 PHIL 688 51

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LIABILITY
§ Possessor of Animals
Case:
69 Vestil v. IAC, 179 SCRA 47 53

§ Things thrown or falling from a building
Case:
70 Dingcong v. Kanaan, 72 Phil 14 55

§ Death/Injuries in the course of employment
Case:
71 Afable v. Singer Sewing Machine, 58 Phil 39 57

§ Strict Liability/Product Liability
Case:
72 Coca-cola v. CA, 227 SCRA 293 59

§ Interference with Contractual Relations
Cases:
73 Gilchrist v. Cuddy, 29 Phil 542 61
74 So Ping Bun v. CA, (120554) (September 21, 1999) 64

§ Liability of Local Government Units
Case:
75 Guilatco v. City of Dagupan, (61516) 171 SCRA 382 67

PERSONS LIABLE
§ The Tortfeasor
Cases:
76 Worcester v. Ocampo, 22 Phil 42 70
77 Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai, 135 PHIL 400||| 72
78 Luna v. IAC, 135 SCRA 242 75

§ Vicarious Liability
§ Parents
Cases:
79 Exconde v. Capuno, 101 Phil 843 77
80 Rodriguez-Luna v. IAC, 135 SCRA 242 79
81 Libi v. IAC, 214 SCRA 16 81
82 Tamargo v. CA, 209 SCRA 518 83
83 Cuadra v. Monfort, 35 SCRA 160 85
§ Teachers and Heads of Institutions
Cases:

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84 Mercado v. CA, 108 Phil 414 87

85 Palisoc v. Brillantes, 41 SCRA 548 90
86 St Francis v. CA, 272 Phil 173||| 93
87 PSBA v. CA, 205 SCRA 729 96
88 Soliman v. Tuazon, 209 SCRA 47 98
89 St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos, 426 PHIL 878 100
90 Ylarde v. Aquino, 163 SCRA 697 102

§ Owners and Managers of Establishments
Case:
91 Philippine Rabbit v. Phil American, 63 SCRA 231 104

§ Employers
Cases:
92 Castilex v. Vasquez, 378 PHIL 1009 105
93 NPC v. CA, 355 PHIL 642 110
94 Light Rail Transit v. Navidad, 397 SCRA 75 112
95 Valenzuela v. CA, 253 SCRA 303 113
96 Philtranco v. CA, 273 SCRA 562 115
97 Filamer v. IAC, 212 SCRA 637 117

§ State
Cases:
98 Merrit v. Government, 34 Phil 311 119
99 Fontanilla v. Maliaman, 194 SCRA 486 123
100 City of Manila v. Teotico, 22 SCRA 267 126
101 Republic v. Palacio, 23 SCRA 899 128

§ Others
Cases:
102 Araneta v. Joya, 57 SCRA 59 130
103 Lanuzo v. Ping and Mendoza, 100 SCRA 205 132
104 Malipol v. Tan, 55 SCRA 202 134

TORTS WITH INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION

§ Violation of Civil and Political Rights
Cases:
105 Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 160 Phil 991 136
106 Aberca v. Ver, 243 Phil 735 138
107 MHP Garments v. CA, 236 SCRA 227 141
§ Defamation, Fraud, Physical Injuries
Cases:

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108 Marcia v. CA, 205 Phil 147 144

109 Madeja v. Caro, 211 Phil 469 146
110 MVRS v. Islamic, 396 SCRA 210 147
111 Salta v. De Veyra, 202 Phil 527 150
112 Capuno v. Pepsi Cola, 121 Phil 638||| 153
113 Corpus v. Paje, 139 Phil 429 155
114 Dulay v. CA, GR No 108017 (1995) 157

INTENTIONAL TORTS

§ Abuse of Rights
Cases:
115 Velayo v. Shell, 100 Phil 186 159
116 Albenson v. CA, G.R. No. 88694. January 11, 1993. 161
117 Amonoy v. Gutierrez, 351 SCRA 731 163
118 BPI v. CA, 296 SCRA 260 165

§ Acts contra bonus mores
Cases:
119 Ruiz v. Secretary, GR No. L-15526 (1963) 168
120 Bunag v. CA, 211 SCRA 441 171
121 Constantino v. Medez, GR No 5722 (1992) 173
122 Quimiguing v. Icao, 34 SCRA 132 175
123 Pe v. Pe, GR No. L-17396 (1962) 176
124 Tanjanco v. Santos, G.R. No. L-18630 178

§ Malicious Prosecution
Cases:
125 Lao v. CA, 325 SCRA 694 180
126 Que v. IAC, 169 SCRA 137 183
127 Drilon v. CA, 270 SCRA 211 186
§ Public Humiliation
Cases:
128 Patricio v. Leviste, G.R. No. 51832 (1989) 189
129 Grand Union v. Espino, G.R. No. L-48250 (1979) 191


§ Unjust Dismissal
Cases:
130 Singapore Airlines v. Paño, 122 SCRA 671 (1983) 193
131 Medina v. Castro-Bartolome, G.R. No. L-59825 (1982) 116 SCRA 597 194

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OTHER TORTS
§ Dereliction of Duty
132 Amaro v. Samanguit, L-14986 July 31, 1962 195

§ Unfair Competition

§ Violation of Human Dignity and Privacy
Cases:
133 St Louis v. CA,133 SCRA 179 (November 14, 1984) 192
134 Concepcion v. CA, 324 SCRA 85 (January 31, 2000) 199

DAMAGES

§ Definition and Concept
Cases:
135 People v. Ballesteros, 285 SCRA 438 201
136 Custodio v. CA, 253 SCRA 483 203
137 Heirs of Borlado v. CA, G.R. 114118 (2001), 363 SCRA 753 206

§ Damnum Absque Injuria
Cases:
138 Board of Liquidators v. Heirs of Kalaw, 20 SCRA 987 208
139 Custodio v. CA 211

§ Kinds of Damages
Actual or Compensatory
Case:
140 Algarra v. Sandejas, 27 Phil 284 214

o Kinds Page
Cases:
141 PNOC v. CA, 297 SCRA 402 216
142 Integrated Packing v. CA, 333 SCRA 170 218

o Certainty
Cases:
143 DBP v. CA, GR No. 118367 (1998) 220
144 Fuentes v.CA, 323 Phil 508 (1996) 222

o Damage to property
Case:
145 PNOC v.CA, supra 223

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o Personal Injury and Death
Cases:
146 Ramos v. CA, 380 SCRA 467 226
147 Gatchalian v. Delim, 203 SCRA 126 228

o Attorney’s Fees
Case:
148 Quirante v. IAC, G.R. No. 73886, 169 SCRA 769 (January 31, 1989) 230

o Interest
Case:
149 Crismina Garments v. CA, 304 SCRA 356 (March 9,1999) 231

o Mitigation of Liability
Case:
150 Cerrano v. Tan, 38 Phil 392 233

Moral
o Proof and Proximate Cause
Cases:
151 Miranda-Rabaya v. Carbonell, 95 SCRA 672 236
152 Del Rosario v. CA, 267 SCRA 58 240
153 Raagas v. Traya, 22 SCRA 839 241
154 Enervida v. Dela Torre 55 SCRA 339 243

o Cases where allowed
Cases:
155 Francisco v. GSIS, 7 SCRA 577 247
156 Expert Travel v. CA, G.R. No. 130030 249

o Unfounded Suits
Cases:
157 Mijares v. CA, 271 SCRA 558 250
158 Dela Pena v. CA, 231 SCRA 456 252
159 J Marketing v. Sia, 285 SCRA 580 254
160 Cometa v. CA, 301 SCRA 459 256
161 Triple Eight v. NLRC, 299 SCRA 608 258

o Taking of Life
Cases:
162 Kierulf v. CA, 269 SCRA 433 260
163 Miranda-Ribaya v. Carbonell, 95 SCRA 672 264

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164 Francisco v. GSIS, 7 SCRA 577 267

165 Expert Travel v. CA, G.R. No. 130030 (1999) 270
166 J Marketing v. Sia, 285 SCRA 580 272
167 Cometa v. CA, 301 SCRA 459 273
168 Triple Eight v. NLRC, 299 SCRA 608 275
169 People v. Pirame, 327 SCRA (2000) 277

o Factors in determining amount
Cases:
170 PNB v. CA, 266 SCRA 136 278
171 Philippine Airlines v. CA, 275 SCRA 621 280
172 Lopez v. Pan American, 16 SCRA 431 282
173 Producer’s Bank v. CA, GR No 111584, 365 SCRA 326 284

o Who may recover
Cases:
174 ABS-CBN v. CA, G.R. No. 128690, 301 SCRA 572 (Jan. 21, 1999) 286
175 National Power v. Philipp Brothers, G.R. No 126204, 369 SCRA 629 (Nov. 20, 2001) 288

Nominal
Cases:
176 Ventanilla v. Centeno, 1 SCRA 215 290
177 Armovit v. CA, 184 SCRA 476 294

Temperate
Cases:
178 People v. Singh, 360 SCRA 404 297
179 People v. Plazo, 350 SCRA 433, 161 SCRA 208 (May 9, 1988) 300

Exemplary or Corrective
Cases:
180 PNB v. CA, 256 SCRA 44 302
181 Del Rosario v. CA, 267 SCRA 158 304
***

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51. BATACLAN vs. MARIANO MEDINA

G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957
J. Montemayor

Doctrine:

The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or
by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events.

Facts:

Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation,
operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the
town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon.
There were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor. While the bus was
running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to
zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. The three
passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind
them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. Calls or shouts for help were
made to the houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, about ten men, one of them carrying a
lighted torch made of bamboo. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost
immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four
passengers trapped inside it

By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and on behalf of her five
minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150. The Court of First Instance of
Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the
merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire.

Issue:

Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of the passengers was the overturning of
the bus

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Ruling

The case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation
having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. There was negligence on
the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the
time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers.

The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not
the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-
passengers who were unable to leave it. The Court disagrees. A satisfactory definition of proximate
cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants
in their brief. It is as follows:

. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting
a natural and continuous chain of events…”

The Court does not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus.
What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier,
through its driver and its conductor. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in
the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline
tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, yet neither the driver nor the conductor would
appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near
the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions
particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.

The record of the case before us shows the several witnesses, passengers, in that bus,
willingly and unhesitatingly testified in court to the effect that the said driver was negligent. In the
public interest the prosecution of said erring driver should be pursued, not only as a matter of justice,
but for the promotion of the safety of passengers on public utility buses.

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52. SOFIA FERNANDO et al., vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CITY OF DAVAO
G.R. No. 92087, May 8, 1992
J. Medialdea

Doctrine:
To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another, a claimant
must establish the relation between the omission and the damage. He must prove under Article 2179
of the New Civil Code that the defendant’s negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred.

Facts:
On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a
requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer’s Office for the re-emptying of the
septic tank in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued to different persons for the said re-emptying of
the septic tank of the public market where Feliciano Bascon eventually won the bidding. Being the
winning bidder, he signed the purchase order. However, it appeared that the other bidder Bertulano
and his other four companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose
Fajardo Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank. They entered the septic tank and proceeded to re-
empty the same without the consent of proper authorities. The heirs of the five deceased filed an
action for damages before the trial court which dismissed the case.
From the said decision of the Lower Court, petitioners appealed to the Intermediate Appellate
Court (CA), which reversed and set aside the decision of the Trial Court. Anchoring their decision that
the Constitution and the law intends to protect the plight of the poor and the needy, the ignorant and
the indigent is more entitled to social justice.
Both Parties filed a separate motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals granted Davao
City’s MR and reversed its prior Decision.

Issue:
1. Is the respondent Davao City guilty of negligence in the case at bar?
2. If so, is such negligence the immediate and proximate cause of deaths of the victims
hereof?

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Ruling:
No. To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another, a
claimant must establish the relation between the omission and the damage. He must prove under
Article 2179 of the New Civil Code that the defendant’s negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred (Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186). Proof of such
relation of cause and effect is not an arduous one if the claimant did not in any way contribute to the
negligence of the defendant. However, where the resulting injury was the product of the negligence
of both parties, there exists a difficulty to discern which acts shall be considered the proximate cause
of the accident.

In the case at bar, it would appear that an accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic
tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers. The accident in the case at bar occurred
because the victims on their own and without authority from the public respondent opened the septic
tank. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been
cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks.
The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is
presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take
precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident.

Hence, the circumstances lead the Court to conclude that the proximate and immediate cause
of the death of the victims was due to their own negligence. Consequently, the petitioners cannot
demand damages from the public respondent.

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53. PILIPINAS BANK vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FLORENCIO REYES
G.R. No. 105410, July 25, 1994
J. Reyes

Doctrine:
By the very nature of the work of the bank involving money imbued with public interest and
trust, the bank is expected to be careful and prudent in handling the account of its client. Failure to
observe due diligence or extraordinary diligence is actionable.

Facts:
Florencio Reyes, herein respondent, made a purchase from Winner Industrial Corporation
and certain Vicente Tui for shoe materials and rubber shoes. Florencio Reyes issued post-dated
checks in favor of the seller amounting to the real cost of materials. Subsequently, Florencio Reyes
instructed Robert Santos to deposit the payment in the bank in favor of the sellers. Before the deposit,
he inquired from the teller the current account number of Florencio Reyes to complete the deposit
slip he was accomplishing. He was informed that it was "815" and so this was the same current
account number he placed on the deposit slip below the depositor's name Reyes.

Noting that the account number coincided with the name Florencio, Efren Alagasi, then
Current Account Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank, thought it was for Florencio Amador who owned the
listed account number. He, thus, posted the deposit in the latter's account not noticing that the
depositor's surname in the deposit slip was Reyes. When the check was presented by the seller for
the encashment, it was dishonored for lack of sufficient funds. Florencio Reyes then immediately
went to the bank to fix the problem and instituted a suit against Pilipinas Bank.

Issue:
Whether or not the bank is negligent for failure to reflect the amount in the real owner

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court, citing Article 2179 of the New Civil Code opined that it must be
established that private respondent's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury. The concept of proximate cause is well defined in our corpus of jurisprudence as "any cause
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the result complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which it ought to have

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been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the injury complained of
or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable consequence. “In the case
at bench, the proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of the petitioner's employee in
erroneously posting the cash deposit of a private respondent in the name of another depositor who
had a similar first name.

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54. CONSOLACION GABETO vs. AGATON ARANETA

G.R. No. 15674, October 17, 1921
J. Street

Doctrine:
A remote cause is one that is removed or separate from the proximate cause of an injury. If
the injuries suffered by a person admitted to a hospital after being hit by a truck are aggravated by
MALPRACTICE, the malpractice is a remote cause of injury to that person. The fact that the cause of
an injury is remote does not relieve a defendant of liability for the act or omission, but there may be
an APPORTIONMENT of liability between the defendants.

Facts:
This civil suit was instituted by Mrs. Consolacion Gabeto, widow of the deceased Proceso
Gayetano against Agaton Araneta, herein defendant. It was on August 4, 1918 when Proceso Gayetano
and his friend named Basilio Ilano hailed into the calesa owned and operated by Julio Pagnaya bound
to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma in the same city. They have successfully hopped in and the calesa starts
to run when herein Agaton Araneta stepped out into the street, and laying his hands on the reins,
stopped the horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called this calesa
first.

The driver replied that he did not hear Araneta, that is the reason why the driver accepted
Gayetano’s request to transport them. Since Araneta pulled the reins of the bridle and at that time,
the bridle was old and rusty, it was a chance for the horse to get free. The horse, being in distress at
that time, started to run at full speed on a street in which Gayetano was left in there by his friend that
resulted in his death.

Issue:
Whether or not Araneta Gayetano can be held liable?

Ruling:
No. The court is not impressed with the testimony of the driver of calesa and the friend of the
deceased. It is therefore evident that the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the middle of the
street was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or
proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of the horse, the

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driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and the defendant cannot
be charged with liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter.

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55. FILOMENO URBANO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988
J. Gutierrez, Jr

Doctrine:
A remote cause is one that is removed or separate from the proximate cause of an injury. If
the injuries suffered by a person admitted to a hospital after being hit by a truck are aggravated by
MALPRACTICE, the malpractice is a remote cause of injury to that person. The fact that the cause of
an injury is remote does not relieve a defendant of liability for the act or omission, but there may be
an APPORTIONMENT of liability between the defendants.

Facts:
On October 23, 1980 at around 8:00am, Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his rice field in
San Fabian, Pangasinan. To his surprise, his palay was soaked with water from the irrigation. Out of
curiosity, he went to the upper portion of the field and checked who was responsible for the opening
of irrigation. There, he saw Marcelo Javier. The same person admitted that he is the one who opened
the irrigation that caused the flooding on the field of Urbano. Then, Urbano, being pissed, gets the
bolo and strikes the palm of Javier. Unsatisfied, he chased Javier and struck again on his legs. An
amicable settlement proceeded since Urbano paid the medical expenses of Javier.

On November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the hospital due to lockjaw and convulsion and
died immediately. The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the
healing wound in his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was
found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for
a new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the deceased
catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not Filomeno Urbano should be held liable
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court. The Court is of the opinion
that should Javier die due to the hacking of Urbano, then Javier would have died two or three days

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later. But the death of Javier occurred twenty-two days after the hacking incident. The Court further
contended that there is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent
infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause
of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be
made of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote
cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though
such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion.

If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."

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56. FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS
AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 130150; October 1998
J. Regalado

Doctrine:
As a general rule, negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of
an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than
plaintiffs, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce
injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being
sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which
the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the
person injured.

Facts:
M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived
at the Port of Manila and was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space.
Gavino, who was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots’ Association to conduct the docking
maneuvers for the safe berthing, boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed
himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of
Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the
quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind
was ideal for docking maneuvers. When the vessel reached the landmark, one-half mile from the pier,
Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier,
Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the
bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as
expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew
members. After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern.
Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast.
Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the “full-astern”
code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel
rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier as well as the vessel.

Issue:

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(1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the damage
caused by the vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence?

(2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by the concurrent
negligence of the master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage?

Ruling:
(1) Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the
command and navigation of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with
her navigation. He becomes the master pro hac vice and should give all directions as to speed, course,
stopping and reversing anchoring, towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot is employed in a
place where pilotage is compulsory, it is his duty to insist on having effective control of the vessel or
to decline to act as pilot. Under certain systems of foreign law, the pilot does not take entire charge
of the vessel but is deemed merely the adviser of the master, who retains command and control of
the navigation even in localities where pilotage is compulsory. It is quite common for states and
localities to provide for compulsory pilotage, and safety laws have been enacted requiring vessels
approaching their ports, with certain exceptions, to take on board pilots duly licensed under local
law. The purpose of these laws is to create a body of seamen thoroughly acquainted with the harbor,
to pilot vessels seeking to enter or depart, and thus protect life and property from the dangers of
navigation. Upon assuming such office as a compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally
accepted high standards of care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill
and knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters over which his license extends
superior to and more to be trusted than that of the master. He is not held to the highest possible
degree of skill and care but must have and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded by the
circumstances, and usually shown by an expert in his profession. Under extraordinary circumstances,
a pilot must exercise extraordinary care. In this case, Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to such strict
standard of care and diligence required of pilots in the performance of their duties. As the pilot, he
should have made sure that his directions were promptly and strictly followed.

(2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less
responsible for the allision. The master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the presence
of a pilot. A perusal of Capt. Kabankov’s testimony makes it apparent that he was remiss in the
discharge of his duties as master of the ship, leaving the entire docking procedure up to the pilot,

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instead of maintaining watchful vigilance over this risky maneuver. The owners of a vessel are not
personally liable for the negligent acts of a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty law, the fault or
negligence of a compulsory pilot is imputable to the vessel and it may be held liable therefor in rem.
Where, however, by the provisions of the statute the pilot is compulsory only in the sense that his fee
must be paid, and is not in compulsory charge of the vessel, there is no exemption from liability. Even
though the pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was not the sole cause of the injury, but the
negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the owners are liable. But the liability of the
ship in rem does not release the pilot from the consequences of his own negligence. The master is not
entirely absolved of responsibility with respect to navigation when a compulsory pilot is in charge.
Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners are liable
for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the
vessel. As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are
liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason of her negligent
management or navigation.

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57. SABIDO AND LAGUNDA V CUSTODIO, ET AL

G.R. No. L-21512, August 31, 1966
C.J. Concepcion

Doctrine:
“According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts
or omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination,
the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it is impossible to determine
in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even
though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted
from the acts of the other tortfeasor.

Facts:
In Barrio Halang, , two trucks, one driven by Mudales and belonging to Laguna-Tayabas Bus
Company, and the other driven by Lagunda and owned by Prospero Sabido, going in opposite
directions met each other in a road curve. Custodia, LTB bus passenger who was riding on the running
board as truck was full of passengers, was sideswiped by the truck driven by Lagunda. As a result,
Custodio was injured and died.

To avoid any liability, Lagunda and Sabido throw all the blame on Mudales. However,
Makabuhay, widow of Custodio, testified that the 6 x 6 truck was running fast when it met the LTB
Bus. And Lagunda had time and opportunity to avoid the mishap if he had been sufficiently careful
and cautious because the two trucks never collided with each other. By simply swerving to the right
side of the road, the 6 x 6 truck could have avoided hitting Custodio.

The sideswiping of the deceased and his two fellow passengers took place on broad daylight
at about 9:30 in the morning of June 9, 1955 when the LTB bus with full load to passengers was
negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and sliding downward a slope, whereas the six by six truck was
climbing up with no cargoes or passengers on board but for three helpers, owner Sabido and driver
Lagunda (tsn. 308-309, Mendoza). LTB passengers had testified to the effect that the 6 x 6 cargo truck
was running at a fast rate of speed. Driver Lagunda admitted that three passengers rode on the
running board of the bus when his vehicle was still at a distance of 5 or 7 meters from the bus. Despite
the presence of a shallow canal on the right side of the road which he could pass over with ease,

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Lagunda did not avert the accident simply because to use his own language the canal "is not a passage
of trucks.

Based upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Laguna and the Court of Appeals
concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. — hereinafter referred to as the carrier — and its driver
Mudales (none of whom has appealed), had violated the contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio,
whereas petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict, by reason of which all of them
were held solidarity liable.

Issue:
(1)Whether or not petitioners were guilty of negligence
(2) Whether or not petitioners should be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its driver?

Ruling:
(1) YES. The views of the Court of Appeals on the speed of the truck and its location at the
time of the accident are in the nature of findings of fact, which we cannot disturb in a petition for
review by certiorari, such as the one at bar. At any rate, the correctness of said findings is borne out
by the very testimony of petitioner Lagunda to the effect that he saw the passengers riding on the
running board of the bus while the same was still five or seven meters away from the truck driven by
him. Indeed, the distance between the two vehicles was such that he could have avoided sideswiping
said passengers if his truck were not running at a great speed.

Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, in its execution, of the
negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of the
death of Agripino Custodio. In fact, the negligence of the first two would not have produced this result
without the negligence of petitioners' herein. What is more, petitioners' negligence was the last, in
point of time, for Custodio was on the running board of the carrier's bus sometime before petitioners'
truck came from the opposite direction, so that, in this sense, petitioners' truck had the last clear
chance.

(2) YES. Where the carrier bus and its driver were clearly guilty of contributory
negligence for having allowed a passenger to ride on the running board of the bus, and where the
driver of the other vehicle was also guilty of contributory negligence, because that vehicle was

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running at a considerable speed despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of
being close to its right side of the road, it was driven on its middle portion thereof and so near the
passenger bus coming from the opposite as to sideswipe a passenger on its running board, the
owners of the two vehicles are liable solidarily for the death of the passenger, although the liability
of one arises from a breach of contract, whereas that of the other springs from a quasi-delict. Where
the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting
independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to
a third person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury,
either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire
injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor.

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58. SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN vs. MARIANO MEDINA

G.R No. L-10126, October 22, 1957
Montemayor, J.

Doctrine:
The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or
by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury
to some person might probably result therefrom.

Facts:

Midnight of September 13, 1952, Medina Transportation operated and owned by the
defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, the bus no. 30 with 18
passengers, including the conductor and the driver, Medina’s regular chauffer, Condrado Saylon. On
that same day, while the bus was traversing Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle
began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some
of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled
out, while other passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and
another woman, Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. After half an hour, ten
men came, presumably the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help
set it on fire. When fire started, consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside. It
would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and spreading over the body of the
bus and the ground under and around it. That same day, the charred bodies of the four passengers
inside the bus were removed and duly identified one of them as Juan Bataclan. Hence, by reason of
the death of Juan Bataclan, his widow filed a suit for damages.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a causal relationship between the damage and the negligence of
the defendant.

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Ruling:
The court ruled that the case involved a breach of contract of transportation for hire, also
there was negligence on the part of the defendant. As the evidence shows that at the time of the blow
out the bus was speeding.

Hence, there was a causal relationship between the damage and the negligence of herein
defendant, thus, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier,
through its driver and its conductor. The damage suffered by the plaintiff was because of the
proximate cause, when the overturning of the bus, that when the vehicle turned not only on its side
but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected;
that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by
the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it
was dark, the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and that said rescuers should innocently
approach the vehicle to extend to aid. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be
expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers and the call for outside help. Hence, the proximate cause was the negligence of the
defendant which resulted to the damages occurred by herein plaintiff.

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59. PHIL. RABBIT BUS LINES V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 66102-04, 30 August 1990, 189 Scra 158
Medialdea, J.:

Doctrine:

It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor
in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen
the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable.

Facts:

On December 24, 1966, several passengers boarded the jeepney owned by spouses Isidro
Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo at Dau, Pampanga bound for
Pangasinan for P24.00.

Upon reaching Tarlac, the right rear wheel of the jeepney detached causing it to run in an
unbalanced position. The driver Manalo stepped on the brake, causing the jeepney to make a U-turn,
invading and eventually stopping on the opposite lane of the road (the jeepney’s front faced the south
(from where it came) and its rear faced the north (towards where it was going). The jeepney occupied
and blocked the greater portion of the western lane, which is the right of way of vehicles coming from
the north.

Petitioner Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines claims that almost immediately after the sudden U-turn the
bus bumped the right rear portion of the jeep. Defendants, on the other hand, claim that the bus
stopped a few minutes before hitting the jeepney. Either way, as a result of the collision, three
passengers of the jeepney (Catalina Pascua, Erlinda Meriales and Adelaida Estomo) died while the
other jeepney passengers sustained physical injuries. A criminal complaint was filed against the two
drivers for Multiple Homicide. The case against delos Reyes (driver of Phil. Rabbit) was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence. Manalo (jeepney driver) was convicted and sentenced to suffer
imprisonment.

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Manalo was convicted of Multiple Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries. Manalo did not
appeal. Three Civil Cases for Damages docketed 1136; 39-40 was filed anchored on the contractual
liability of the jeepney owner and Philippine Rabbit’s liability based on quasidelict.

Trial court decided against the jeepney operator as well as the joint liability of his Insurance
Agency for Actual and Moral Damages. The Trial Court based its decisions on the following: (1)
Testimony of passenger Pascua alleging that the driver was running really fast. (2) Unrebutted
testimony of Police Inspector on the sharp angle track marks of the jeep; the observation of the skid
marks. (3) Manalo’s Conviction on the Criminal Complaint (4) Application of Res Ipsa Loquitor,
attesting to the collision happening on the right of way of the bus.

CA reversed decision. It ordered Plaintiff bus operator and driver to pay jointly and severally
the damages awarded. It based its decisions primarily on 1) the doctrine of last clear chance. 2)
presumption of the responsibility of the vehicle on the rear end to avoid collision with the vehicle in
front. 3) the substantial test concluding Bus driver negligent by not trying to avoid accident and being
the physical force causing the injury and death of passengers.

Issue:
Who is liable for the death and injuries suffered by the passengers of the jeepney?

Ruling:
The court ruled for the IAC decision to be set aside. The Trial Court decision is Reinstated
with Modification that only the Operator (Mangune and Carreon) and the Insurance Company are
liable for the victims and/ or the heirs. The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the
carrier in Breach of Contract as provided in Article 2180; to make driver jointly and severally liable
is to make the carrier’s liability a personal one and not explicit.

The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the jeepney operator for failure to
exercise precautions needed. The carrier is presumed to have been at fault unless it is caso fortuito
or that he has observed extra-ordinary diligence as provided in Articles 1733,55-56. Negligence was
proven based on the testimony-evidences adduced by the trial court.

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Relatively, the doctrine of Last clear chance cannot be applied. The principle about “the last
clear” chance, would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding
vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and
its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.

In relation, the substantial factor test is testing whether the actor’s conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about harm to another. The fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have
foreseen the extent of harm or manner in which the event occurred does not prevent his liability.
However, this test does not apply. The court does not fault Reyes for not having avoided such since
no other options are available to him. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed
when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming such
calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways. The other lane even
though empty was narrow and covered with tall grass which would indicate that it was not passable.
The wheels of the bus were also clear of the roadway except the outer left that hit the jeep. This
clearly shows the attempt to avoid hitting the jeepney. That it was not successful in fully clearing the
Mangune jeepney as its (Rabbit's) left front hit said jeepney must have been due to limitations of
space and time. To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too much from him. Aside from
the time element involved, there were no options available to him.

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60. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL vs. THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO
G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
Feliciano, J:

Doctrine:
The negligence of the truck driver is not a “passive and static condition” but an indispensable
and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would
have not occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector
devices.

Facts:
Private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home in Makati, from a cocktails-and-
dinner meeting with his boss. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot
or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his car, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when
his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and
thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck,
owned by Phoenix, was parked on the right-hand side of General Lacuna Street, facing the oncoming
traffic. The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to
stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights, nor any
so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The
dump truck was driven home by petitioner Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his
employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning, Dionisio
claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left, but it was too late, and his car
smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries
including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.

Dionisio filed an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, claiming that
the proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump
truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered
that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of
the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass.

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The Trial Court ruled in favor of Dionisio and ordered Phoenix and Carbonel to pay Dionisio
actual damages, moral damages, attorney’s fees and the cost of suit. On appeal, the Intermediate
Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s decision but modified the award of damages.

Issue:
WON the dump truck driver’s negligence was only a “passive and static condition” and
respondent’s negligence was an efficient intervening cause and must be regarded as the proximate
cause of the accident.

Ruling:
No. The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful
or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked. The collision of Dionisio's car with the
dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.

The negligence of the truck driver is not a “passive and static condition” but an indispensable
and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would
have not occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector
devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone
driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held
responsible. the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others
similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's
negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of
causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the
juris vinculum of liability.

In the United States, Professors and Keeton made a discussion about cause and condition:
Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of
the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has
created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said
not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary
antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite
impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as
is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before.

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"Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is
now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of
case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of
apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the
distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and
the character of the intervening cause.

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61. REMIGIO RODRIGUEZ, ET AL. vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY

G.R. No. L-15688, November 19, 1921
Street, J.:

Doctrine:
The circumstance that Rodrigueza's house was partly on the property of the defendant
company and was an antecedent condition that may in fact have made the disaster possible, but that
circumstance cannot be imputed to him as contributory negligence destructive of his right of action,
because that condition was not created by himself. He is not a trespasser in the beginning as he was
there even before the rail track was made.

Facts:
The defendant Railroad Company operates a line through the district of Daraga in the
municipality of Albay, as one of its trains passed over said line, a great quantity of sparks was emitted
from the smokestack of the locomotive, and fire was thereby communicated to four houses nearby
belonging to the four plaintiffs respectively, and the same were entirely consumed. All of these houses
were of light construction with the exception of the house of Remigio Rodrigueza, which was of
strong materials, though the roof was covered with nipa and cogon. The fire occurred immediately
after the passage of the train, and a strong wind was blowing at the time. It does not appear either in
the complaint or in the agreed statement whose house caught fire first, though it is stated in the
appellant's brief that the fire was first communicated to the house of Remigio Rodrigueza, from
whence it spread to the others.

An action for damages was instituted by Rodrigueza and three others in the Court of Instance
of Albay. According to their complaint, the defendant Railroad Company was negligent in relation to
the origin of said fire, raising various points of negligence on how they conduct their business. On the
other hand, the Manila Railroad Company rested their defense on the ground that Remigio
Rodrigueza’s house stood partly within the limits of the land owned by the defendant company. They
argue that when the railroad track was laid, they asked Rodrigueza to remove the exposed parts of
his house from the railroad track. However, Rodrigueza did not comply with the suggestion and
instead changed the material of his main roof to nipa. As such, it is contended by the defendant that
there was contributory negligence on the part of Rodrigueza in having his house partly on the
premises of the Railroad Company.

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Upon hearing the case, the trial court ruled in favor of Rodrigueza and against the defendant
Railroad company.

Issue:
WON the condition of Rodrigueza’s house contributed to the accident

Ruling:
No. The circumstance that Remigio Rodrigueza's house was partly on the property of the
defendant company and therefore in dangerous proximity to passing locomotives was an antecedent
condition that may in fact have made the disaster possible, but that circumstance cannot be imputed
to him as contributory negligence destructive of his right of action, because, first, that condition was
not created by himself; secondly, because his house remained on this ground by the toleration, and
therefore with the consent of the Railroad Company; and thirdly, because even supposing the house
to be improperly there, this fact would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it.

The circumstance that the defendant company, upon planting it's line near Remigio
Rodrigueza's house, had requested or directed him to remove it, did not convert his occupancy into
a trespass, or impose upon him any additional responsibility over and above what the law itself
imposes in such a situation. In this connection it must be remembered that the company could at any
time have removed said house in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, but it elected not to
do so.

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62. MCKEE V. IAC

G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992
J. Davide

Doctrine:

Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence
of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by
the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of
the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is
considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof.

Facts:

Around 9 to 10 in the morning of January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur
Highway, between Angeles and San Fernando Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between an
international cargo truck, Loadstar, owned by Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo, driven by Galang,
and a ford escort car driven by Jose Koh, it resulted to deaths of Jose Koh, Ki Koh Mckee, and Loida
Bondoc, and it resulted to physical injuries to George Koh Mckee, Christopher Koh Mckee and Araceli
Koh Mckee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.

Before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with 200 caravans of rice weighing
about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando, Pampanga and it
was already bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City
from San Fernando, Pampanga.

When the Ford Escort was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge,
two boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the same lane of the car moving
back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back.

Jose Koh blew the horn of the car and swerved to the left, entered the lane of the truck; he
then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes, and thereafter attempted to return to
his lane. But before he could do so, his car collided with the truck and the collision occurred in the
same lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, of the said bridge.

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As a result of the accident, two civil cases were filed for damages for the death and physical
injuries were sustained by the victims boarding the Ford Escort, as well as a criminal case filed
against Galang. During the trial, evidence was presented showing that the driver of the truck was
speeding resulted in the skid marks it caused at the scene of the accident and the lower court found
Galang guilty in the criminal case, but the civil case was dismissed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Galang and reversed the decision
in the civil cases filed, and it ordered the payment of damages for the death and physical injuries of
the McKee Family and on the motion for reconsideration filed, it reversed its previous decision and
ruled in favor of the owners of the truck.

Issue:

Whether or not the owner and driver of the truck were responsible for the collision?

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court said applying the test of negligence and the facts obtaining the case,
it is manifested that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary
prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from
where they were even if this would mean they will enter the opposite lane. Avoiding such peril would
be the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several
meters away and could very well slow down, and moving to the side of the road and giving way to
the oncoming car. Moreover, under the Emergency rule, the Supreme Court defines it as the one who
suddenly finds himself in a place of danger and is required to act without time to consider the best
means possible that may be adopted in order to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence because if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have
been a better method unless the emergency in which he finds himself in is brought about by his own
negligence. With the sudden intrusion of the two boys into the lane of the car, the Supreme Court said
that Jose Koh found the best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting the two boys and
applying the test of negligence it is clear that Jose Koh is not guilty of it.

In any case, assuming arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his negligence
was because of the proximate cause of the collision. Galang’s negligence is apparent in the records
because according to the former, he himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles or 48

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kilometers per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only
30 kilometers per hour.

The Supreme Court explains Article 2185 of the New Civil Code, that a person driving a
vehicle is presumed negligent at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Even
if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds its application in this case.

Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence
of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by
the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of
the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is
considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof. Applying the foregoing doctrine,
it is not difficult to rule that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to
avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck
driver, Tayag and Manalo are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for
the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their
employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible
defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage,
which they failed to do.

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63. TEAGUE V. FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. L-29745, June 4, 1973
J. Makalintal

Doctrine:

"The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote
as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in
the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to
prevent."

Facts:

The Realistic Institute is located on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building, a two-story,
semi-concrete edifice located at the corner of Quezon Boulevard and Soler Street in Quiapo, Manila
was owned and operated by Mercedes Teague. The said floor was unpartitioned and had a total area
of about 400 square meters, and although it had only one stairway, of about 1.50 meters in width, it
had eight windows, each of which was provided with two fire-escape ladders and the presence of
each of said fire-exits was indicated on the wall.

On October 24, 1955, at around 4 pm, a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials located
about 10 meters away across the street of the institute. Upon seeing the fire, some students of the
Realistic Institute shouted Fire, Fire, and thereafter, there was already panic. Four instructresses and
six assistant instructresses of the Institute were present and they, together with the registrar, tried
to calm down about 180 students at that time.

The panic, however, could not be subdued and the students, with the exception of the few
who made use of fire escapes kept on rushing and pushing their way through the stairs, and because
of that, it caused a stampede. While is it that no part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. After the
panic was over, four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-appellants, were
found dead and several others injured because of the stampede. The brothers and sisters of the
deceased filed an action for damages against Mercedes M. Teague as owner and operator of Realistic
Institute.

The Court of First Instance found the defendant and dismissed the case. This was reversed by
the Court of Appeals and it held that the petitioner was negligent and such negligence was due to the

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proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based primarily on
the fact that the provision of Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been
complied with in connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi Building. The alleged
violation of the ordinance consistent with the fact that the second story of the Gil-Armi building had
only one stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2 meters each, because at that time
that there was a fire the owner of the building had a second stairway under construction.

The petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death of Lourdes Fernandez
because of the following reasons:

1. Violation of ordinance;

2. Fire at a neighboring place;

3. Shouts of fire! fire!

4. Panic in the institute;

5. Stampede;

6. Injuries and death.

As it is projected that the violation of the ordinance was only a remote cause and it cannot be the
basis of liability since there is an intervention on the number of independent causes which
produced the injury that was complained of. The petitioner asserts that the events of fire, panic,
and stampede were independent causes with no causal connection at all with the violation of the
ordinance.

Issue:

Whether or not the neglect of respondents to comply with the ordinance is the proximate or
remote cause of the incident and that the numerous events that occurred were sufficient
intervening causes to support the fact that the failure of respondents to comply with the
Ordinance was only the remote cause of the death/injuries of the students?

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Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court said that it agrees with the petitioner when it says that “the events
of fire, panic, and stampede were independent causes with no causal connection at all with the
violation of the ordinance”. The weakness in the argument springs from a faulty juxtaposition of the
events, which formed a chain and resulted in the injury. While it is true that the petitioner’s non-
compliance with the ordinance in question was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of
time, in a sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the building. But the violation, at the
case at bar, is a continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a
specific situation that would pose a danger to the occupants of the building. That situation was undue
overcrowding in case it should become necessary to evacuate the building, which, it could be
reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under emergency conditions if there was only one
stairway available. While it is true that in this particular case there would have been no overcrowding
in the single stairway if there had not been a fire in the neighborhood which caused the students to
panic and rush headlong for the stairs in order to go down. But it was precisely such contingencies
or events that the authors of the ordinance had in mind, for under normal conditions one stairway
would be adequate for the occupants of the building.

According to American Jurisprudence: "The general principle is that the violation of a statute
or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency
if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the
statute or ordinance was intended to prevent."

In order to consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does
not portray the situation in its true perspective because it would be more accurate to say that the
overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance
intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one. Under the doctrine
of the cases cited by the respondents: the principle of proximate cause applies to such violation.

Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA.

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64. FILOMENO URBANO versus HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
J. Gutierrez, Jr.

Doctrine:
“A prior and remote cause cannot be made of an action if such remote cause did nothing more
than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition
or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And, if an independent negligent act or defective condition
sets into operation, the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause”.

Facts:
In the morning of October 23, 1980, Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield located at about
100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier in San Fabian, Pangasinan. He found that the
place where he stores his palay was flooded with water that came from the irrigation canal nearby
which overflowed. He saw Javier and Emilio Erfe near the irrigation canal and asked who was
responsible in opening it. Javier answered in the affirmative. Urbano got angry and he demanded that
Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel ensued between them happened which resulted to hacking
of Javier with a bolo by Urbano. Javier sustained injury in his right palm resulting from the hacking
of Urbano. Emilio, together with his family members brought Javier to their house and reported the
matter to their Barangay Captain, and later to the barrio councilman, which in turn, advise them to
report the matter to the police. As suggested by a police officer, they went to a physician for the
treatment of the wound. Upon the intercession of the barrio councilman, Javier and Urbano
settled their differences. Urbano pay the medical expenses incurred by Javier.

On November 14, twenty-two (22) days after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital
for having lockjaw and convulsions. It was later found out that his condition was due to tetanus toxin,
which is the cause of this death the next day.

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Urbano was later charged with Homicide and later found guilty and ordered to pay indemnity
to the family of Javier.

Issue:
Whether or not the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the
latter’s death.

Ruling:
There is efficient intervening cause to warrant the acquittal of Urbano of Homicide.

As ruled by the Supreme Court, “A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is "that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred." And more
comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."

If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by the tetanus germs at
the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause
of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or
more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more
than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible
conclusion is that at the time of Javier’s wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of
tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier’s wound could have been inflicted
with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier’s death, his
wound could have been inflicted by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but no 20 to 22 days before he died.

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The medical findings, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time
of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime of Homicide.

There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection,
for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier’s
death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. “A prior and remote cause cannot be made of an
action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion
by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and
the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition
except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And, if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation, the instances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate
cause”.

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65. EMMA ADRIANO BUSTAMANTE vs CA

G.R. No. 89880 February 6, 1991
J. Medialdea

Doctrine:
The doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed
him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery. A person
who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent
acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident.

Facts:
On April 20, 1983, a collision between a gravel and sand truck driven by Edilberto Montesiano
and owned by Federico del Pilar and a Mazda passenger bus driven by Ricardo Susulin and along the
national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite. The left side portion of the body of the truck sideswiped the
left side wall of the passenger bus. As a result, several passengers were thrown out of the bus and
died as a result of their sustained injuries.

Before the collision, both vehicles were approaching each other. About thirty (30) meters
away, the driver of the passenger bus saw that the front wheels of the truck were wiggling and
observed that the truck was hearing towards his lane. Not minding the circumstances, as he thought
the driver was merely joking, he changed gear to give more power to the bus which was ascending to
the inclined part of the road in order to overtake the hand tractor being pushed along the shoulder
of the highway. While the bus was nearly able to overtake the tractor, and the truck approaching the
bus, the two vehicles sideswiped each other.

The trial court found that due to the negligence of both drivers, they were ordered to pay
solidarily to the heirs of the victims. The appellate court granted the appeal of del Pilar and
Montesiano, reversing the decision of the trial court. Hence, the appeal of the heirs of the victims.

Issue:
Whether or not the last clear chance can be applied, making the bus negligent in failing to
avoid the collision with the truck and his act in proceeding to overtake the hand tractor was the
proximate cause of the collision.

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Ruling:
The Court is convinced that the respondent Court committed an error of law in applying the
doctrine of last clear chance as between the defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit between
the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased
passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles.

The doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed
him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery.

A person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding
the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in
law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.

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66. PANTRANCO V. BAESA

G.R. Nos. 79050-51 November 14, 1989
J. Cortes

Doctrine:
The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the negligence of a claimant does not
preclude recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant
notwithstanding his negligence. The doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case.
Facts:
On June 12, 1981, at approximately 7:00 o'clock in the morning, spouses Ceasar and Marilyn
Baesa and their three children, along with spouses David Ico and Fe Ico, their son Erwin Ico and seven
other persons, were onboard a passenger jeepney on their way to Malalam River, Isabela, to have a
picnic in celebration of spouses Baesa’s fifth wedding anniversary. David Ico was driving. Upon
reaching the highway, the jeepney turned right at a speed of about 20 KPH. A speeding PANTRANCO
bus from Aparri, on-route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney's lane while negotiating a curve, and
collided with it. David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa and two of their children, died
while the rest of the passengers sustained injuries. The jeepney is extensively damaged. The driver
of the bus went into hiding, and has never been seen since.
Maricar Baesa through her guardian and Fe O. Ico filed separate actions for damages arising
from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO. The other victims settled with Bus Company. PANTRANCO,
aside from pointing to the late David Ico's alleged negligence as the proximate cause of the accident,
invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver, Ambrosio Ramirez.
The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Baesa.
Issue:
Whether PANTRANCO can invoke the defense of Last Clear Chance?
Ruling:
No. Petitioner claims the driver of the jeepney had the last clear chance to avoid the collision
and hence, was negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence the opportunity
to avoid the harm. The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the negligence of a
claimant does not preclude recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter,
by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant
notwithstanding his negligence. The doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case.

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For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who had the last opportunity
to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have
been aware of it. In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the
impending danger. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane,
he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have
assumed that the bus driver will return to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approach from the
opposite direction. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at the time of the accident
the Pantranco bus was speeding towards Manila. At the time David Ico must have realized that the
bus was not returning to its own lane, it was already too late to swerve the jeepney to his right to
prevent an accident.
Thus, even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before the
actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it. This Court has held that the last clear chance
doctrine "can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the
injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been
discovered"
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that the negligence of petitioner’s driver in
encroaching into the lane of the incoming jeepney and in failing to return the bus to its own lane
immediately upon seeing the jeepney coming from the opposite direction was the sole and proximate
cause of the accident without which the collision would not have occurred. There was no supervening
or intervening negligence on the part of the jeepney driver which would have made the prior
negligence of petitioner’s driver a mere remote cause of the accident.

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67. CANLAS V. CA
G.R. No. 112160, February 28, 2000
J. Purisima

Doctrine:
The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family; in
keeping with their responsibility to exercise the necessary care and prudence in dealing even on a
registered or titled property. The business of a bank is affected with public interest, by reason of
which the bank would be denied the protective mantle of the land registration law, accorded only to
purchasers or mortgagees for value and in good faith.

Facts:
Osmundo S. Canlas, and private respondent, Vicente Mañosca, decided to venture in business
and to raise the capital needed therefor. Canlas then executed a Special Power of Attorney
authorizing the Manosca to mortgage two parcels of land situated in San Dionisio, Paranaque, Metro
Manila.

Subsequently, Osmundo Canlas agreed to sell the said parcels of land to Vicente Mañosca, for
and in consideration of P850,000.00 (500k as downpayment). Thus, Osmundo Canlas delivered to
Vicente Mañosca the transfer certificates of title of the parcels of land involved. Vicente Mañosca, as
his part of the transaction, issued two postdated checks in favor of Osmundo Canlas in the amounts
of P40,000.00 and P460,000.00, respectively, but it turned out that the check covering the bigger
amount was not sufficiently funded.

Mañosca was granted a loan by the respondent Asian Savings Bank (ASB) in the amount of
P500,000.00, with the use of subject parcels of land as security, and with the involvement of the
impostors who introduced themselves as the Canlas spouses. When the loan it extended was not paid,
respondent bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage.
Canlas then informed the bank that the mortgage was without their authority. Canlas also
asked that the auction sale be cancelled or held in abeyance. But respondents Maximo C. Contreras
and Asian Savings Bank proceeded with the scheduled auction sale.

The trial court annulled the subject deed of mortgage.
Asian Savings Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the trial court.

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Issue:
Whether they are not entitled to relief because they were negligent and therefore must bear
the loss

Ruling:
NO. The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family;
in keeping with their responsibility to exercise the necessary care and prudence in dealing even on a
registered or titled property. The business of a bank is affected with public interest, by reason of
which the bank would be denied the protective mantle of the land registration law, accorded only to
purchasers or mortgagees for value and in good faith.

In the case under consideration, from the evidence on hand it can be gleaned unerringly that
respondent bank did not observe the requisite diligence in ascertaining or verifying the real identity
of the couple who introduced themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. It is
worthy to note that not even a single identification card was exhibited by the said impostors to show
their true identity; and yet, the bank acted on their representations simply on the basis of the
residence certificates bearing signatures which tended to match the signatures affixed on a previous
deed of mortgage to a certain Atty. Magno, The bank did not require the impostors to submit
additional proof of their true identity.

Under the doctrine of last clear chance, where both parties are negligent but the negligent act
of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had
the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the
consequences arising therefrom.

Assuming that Osmundo Canlas was negligent in giving Vicente Mañosca the opportunity to
perpetrate the fraud, by entrusting to latter the owner's copy of the transfer certificates of title of
subject parcels of land, it cannot be denied that the bank had the last clear chance to prevent the
fraud, by the simple expedient of faithfully complying with the requirements for banks to ascertain
the identity of the persons transacting with them.

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For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking institutions, whose business is
impressed with public interest, respondent Asian Savings Bank has to bear the loss sued upon.

Other ISSUES:
In ruling for respondent bank, the Court of Appeals concluded that the petitioner Osmundo Canlas
was a party to the fraudulent scheme of Mañosca – that Canlas connived with Manosca when Canlas
did not say who he really when he was introduced by Manosca as “ Leonardo Rey” and that Canlas
was with Manosca when the loan was released.

As well explained by Canlas, he just did not want to embarrass Mañosca, so that he waited for the end
of the meeting to correct Mañosca. Also, the loan security was not a topic in the meeting.

The execution of the deeds of mortgages constituted by Mañosca on subject pieces of property of
petitioners were made possible not by the Special Power of Attorney executed by Osmundo Canlas
in favor of Mañosca but through the use of impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses
Angelina Canlas and Osmundo Canlas. It cannot be said therefore, that the petitioners authorized
Vicente Mañosca to constitute the mortgage on their parcels of land.

While it is true that Osmundo Canlas was with Vicente Mañosca when the latter submitted the
documents needed for his loan application, and when the check of P200,000.00 was released, the
former did not know that the collateral used by Mañosca for the said loan were their (Canlas
spouses') properties. Osmundo happened to be with Mañosca at the time because he wanted to make
sure that Mañosca would make good his promise to pay the balance of the purchase price of the said
lots out of the proceeds of the loan.

Settled is the rule that a contract of mortgage must be constituted only by the absolute owner on the
property mortgaged; a mortgage, constituted by an impostor is void. Considering that it was
established indubitably that the contract of mortgage sued upon was entered into and signed by
impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas, the
Court is of the ineluctible conclusion and finding that subject contract of mortgage is a complete
nullity.

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68. CONSOLIDATED BANK VS CA

G.R. No. 138569. September 11, 2003
Carpio, J.:

Doctrine:
The negligence of the bank is classified as Culpa contractual AND NOT Culpa Aquilana, and
therefore, the Last clear chance doctrine is inapplicable.
Facts:
Diaz has a savings account with Consolidated Bank (the predecessor of Solidbank). In 1991,
Diaz, through its cashier, Macaraya, filled up a savings (cash) deposit slip for PhP900.00 and check
deposit slip for PhP50.00. Macaraya instructed the firm’s messenger, Ismael Calapre, to deposit the
money with Solidbank. Macaraya also gave Calapre the Solidbank passbook. Calapre went to
Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the passbook. Since the transaction
took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the passbook
with Solidbank.

When Calapre returned to Solidbank to retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that
“somebody got the passbook.” Calapre went back to L.C. Diaz and reported the incident to Macaraya.
Macaraya, together with Calapre, went to Solidbank. When Macaraya asked for the passbook, Teller
No. 6 told her that someone got the passbook but she could not remember to whom she gave it to.
Failing to g retrieve the passbook, Macaraya returned to LC Diaz and reported the matter. The next
day, L.C. Diaz’ CEO, Luis Diaz, called up the bank to stop any transaction involving the stolen passbook.
Diaz learned that an unauthorized withdrawal of 300,000 was made on same day the passbook was
stolen. The withdrawal slip bore the signatures of authorized signatories, who denied signing the
same.

A certain Noel Tamayo received the PhP300,000. In 1992, Diaz demanded from Solidbank the
return of his money. The trial court ruled in favor of the bank, saying that possession of the passbook
raises the presumption of ownership and payments made upon production of the passbook shall
have the same effect as if made to the depositor. Noel Tamayo, at the time of the withdrawal, had
possession of the passbook and the withdrawal slip which bore signatures matching the specimen
signatures in the bank. The trial court, using the rules on contractual obligations, said that the bank
acted with care and observed the rules on savings account when it allowed the withdrawal ,
concluding that Diaz’s negligence was the proximate cause of the loss. The Court of Appeals reversed,

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saying that the teller of the bank should have been more careful in allowing the withdrawal

Issue:
Is the last clear chance doctrine applicable in this case?

Ruling:
Accordingly, the negligence of the bank is classified as Culpa contractual AND NOT Culpa
Aquilana, and therefore, the Last clear chance doctrine is inapplicable. Because of a bank’s nature of
business, a fiduciary relationship is deemed written into every deposit agreement. This imposes a
higher degree of diligence than “a good father of a family”. While this does not convert the contract
into a trust agreement, the law requires of banks a higher standard of integrity and performance in
complying with its obligations under the contract

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69. VESTIL VS IAC

G.R. No. 74431 November 6, 1989
J. Cruz

Doctrine:
ART. 2183 states “The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility
shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person
who has suffered damage.”

Facts:
Theness Tan Uy was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of Purita and Agustin
Vestil in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita. Thenese was rushed to the
Hospital, where she was treated for "multipte lacerated wounds on the forehead" and administered
an anti-rabies vaccine. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted a week later due to
"vomiting of saliva."

On August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia.Theness
developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and asphyxia broncho-
pneumonia, a complication of rabies, which ultimately caused her death. The Uys sued for damages,
alleging that the Vestils were liable as the possessors of the dog that bit and eventually killed their
daughter. The Uys claim that the Vestils are liable for the death of Theness, since they own the dog
that bit her. While the Vestils contend that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, and
that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness.

Issue:
Whether or not the Vestils are liable for the damage caused by the dog.

Ruling:
The Vestils’ contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog
is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal
should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that the
dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her.

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The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury.
As for the belated allegations that Theness provoked the dog, the Vestils forget that the deceased was
only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might
have done to the animal. There is evidence showing that Theness and her family regularly went to
the house of the Vestils once or twice a week. The Court finds that the link between the dog bites and
the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. The obligation imposed by Article
2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the
possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle
of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for
the damage which such animal may cause

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70. JOSE DINGCONG vs. HALIM KANAAN, NASRI KANAAN, y MICHAEL KANAAN
G.R. No. L-47033, April 25, 1941
J. Acancena

Doctrine:
The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages
caused by things thrown or falling from the same. (Art. 2193 of the New Civil Code)

Facts:
The brothers Loreto and Jose Dingcong leased the upper story of the house of Emilia Saenz in
Iloilo City wherein they established and operated the Central Hotel. Plaintiffs on the other hand were
the lessee of the ground floor of the same building which they used as a general merchandise store,
American Bazaar. The defendant Francisco Echevarria occupied, by payment of P30 a month, the
fourth No. 10 of said hotel. About eleven o'clock on the night of September 19, 1933, when Echevarria
retired to bed, he left the faucet open unobtrusively on an ordinary basin without drainage. As the
pipes of the hotel at that time were under repair, when at midnight the water discharged through the
pipes, scattered on the floor, piercing and wetting the articles and warnings on the ground in the
establishment "American Bazaar," causing a lost, which the Court of First Instance estimated at
P1,089.61. The judge dismissed the case as far as Loreto Dingcong for having passed away, and
condemn Francisco Echevarria, acquitting Jose Dingcong. The plaintiffs appealed this decision as
soon as Jose dingcong acquitted him. The Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of the Court of First
Instance, declared Jose Dingcong liable.

Issue:
Whether or not Jose Dingcong is liable for damages.

Ruling:
Jose Dingcong being co-owner and manager of the hotel, with full possession of the highs of
the house, must respond for the damages caused by the things that were thrown or fell of the same
(article 1910 of the Civil Code). Francisco Echevarria was a guest of the hotel and was the one who,
by his negligence, left the faucet open, allowed the water of the pipe to flow down the floor and seep
into the ground, wetting the articles and goods of the plaintiffs. Jose Dingcong, on the other hand, did
not practice the diligence of a good father of family to prevent this damage, although he knew that
they could be caused by the repair of the pipes, since, presumably, Echavarria could use the faucet.

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Provided some container with drainage, and if only put under it a basin that, when filled, caused the
water to spread on the floor. The decision appealed is confirmed, with the costs to the appellant.

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71. JUSTA AFABLE vs. SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY

G.R. No. L-36858, March 6, 1933
J. Vickers

Doctrine:
An employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that
befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment, because such an accident DOES
NOT arise out of and in the course of his employment.

Facts:
Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine Company in the
district of San Francisco del Monte, outside of the limits of the City of Manila, and he was supposed
to be residing in his district according to the records of the company. On the afternoon of Sunday,
November 16, 1930, Leopoldo Madlangbayan while riding a bicycle was run over and fatally injured
at the corner of O'Donnel and Zurbaran streets in the City of Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano
Sumoay. It appears that Madlangbayan had moved to Teodora Alonso Street in Manila without
notifying the company, and that at the time of his death he was returning home after making some
collections in San Francisco del Monte. According to the practice of the company, if collectors made
collections on Sunday they were required to deliver the amount collected to the company the next
morning. The widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan brought the present action to recover
from the defendant corporation under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act. No. 3812.

Issue:
Whether or not the heirs of Leopoldo recover from the corporation considering the nature of
his employment and the manner of the injury?

Ruling:
NO. The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and in pursuance of
his employment. At the time that he was over by the truck Leopoldo Madlangbayan was not in the
pursuance of his employment with the defendant corporation, but was on his way home after he had
finished his work for the day and had left the territory where he was authorized to take collections
for the defendant. The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen
to an employee while in the course of the employment", and as a general rule an employee is not
entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to

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or returning from his place of employment, because such an accident does no arise out of and in the
course of his employment.

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72. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MS. LYDIA
GERONIMO
G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993
J. DAVIDE, JR.,

Doctrine:
The vendee’s remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects
of or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil
Code. The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and
an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing
contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict,
liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict.

Facts:
Private respondent Lydia L. Geronimo was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland
Canteen located in Dagupan City, an enterprise engaged in the sale of soft drinks (including Coke and
Sprite) and other goods to the students of Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public.

Sometime in August 1989, some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and
Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances or particles;
she then went over her stock of softdrinks and discovered the presence of some fiber-like substances
in the contents of some unopened Coke bottles and a plastic matter in the contents of an unopened
Sprite bottle; she brought the said bottles for examination and was informed that the samples she
submitted "are adulterated." As a consequence of the discovery of the foreign substances in the
beverages, her sales of soft drinks severely plummeted and not long after that she had to lose shop
on 12 December 1989 prompting her to file a complaint for damages against the petitioner but was
rebuffed by the latter.

The petitioner insists that the complaint’s primary legal basis for private respondent's cause
of action is not Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict — for the complaint does not ascribe
any tortious or wrongful conduct on its part — but Articles 1561 and 1562 thereof on breach of a
seller's implied warranties under the law on sales. It contends the existence of a contractual relation
between the parties (arising from the contract of sale) bars the application of the law on quasi-delicts
and that since private respondent's cause of action arose from the breach of implied warranties, the

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complaint should have been filed within six months room delivery of the soft drinks pursuant to
Article 171 of the Civil Code.

Issue:
Whether the cause of action involved is quasi-delict.

Ruling:
Yes, the public respondent's cause of action is found on quasi-delict, supported by the
allegations in the complaint, more particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the
reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public
consumption."

The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects
of or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil
Code.

The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud, in
which case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable. Under the law on obligations,
responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations and any waiver of an action for
future fraud is void. Responsibility arising from negligence is also demandable in any obligation, but
such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. Those guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay in the performance of their obligations and those who in any manner contravene
the tenor thereof are liable for damages.

The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and
an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing
contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict,
the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts which breaks the contract
may also be a quasi-delict.

Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual
relations.

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73. C. S. GILCHRIST vs. E. A. CUDDY, ET AL., JOSE FERNANDEZ ESPEJO and MARIANO
ZALDARRIAGA
G.R. No. L-9356, February 18, 1915
J. Trent

Doctrines:

1. Liability of a third party for interfering with a contract between others rests not only if the
interference was malicious but also in cases where the only motive for interference by the third
party was the desire to make a profit to the injury of one of the parties of the contract.

2. Article 1902 of the Civil Code provides that a person who, by act or omission, causes damages to
another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage done. There is
nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of a tortfeasor that
he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damages.

Facts:

Respondent Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar. On the 24th of April he rented it to C.
S. Gilchrist for a week for P125, and it was to be delivered on the 26th of May. A few days prior to this
Cuddy sent the money back to Gilchrist, which he had forwarded to him in Manila, saying that he had
made other arrangements with his film. The other arrangement was the rental to these defendants
Espejo and his partner for P350 for the week and the injunction was asked by Gilchrist against these
parties from showing it for the week beginning the 26th of May.

It appears from the testimony in this case that Cuddy willfully violated his contract, he being
the owner of the picture, with Gilchrist because the defendants had offered him more for the same
period.

During the trial on the permanent injunction, Mr. Espejo admitted that he knew that Cuddy
was the owner of the film. He was trying to get it through his agents Pathe Brothers in Manila, and
the Pathe Brothers in Manila advised this man on two different occasions not to contend for this film
Zigomar because the rental price was prohibitive and assured him also that he could not get the film
for about six weeks.

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Letters between appellants and Pathe Brothers in Manila showed conclusively that
appellants knew they had to get this film from Cuddy and that the agent in Manila could not get it, but
Mr. Espejo made Cuddy an offer himself and Cuddy accepted it because he was paying about three
times as much as he had contracted with Gilchrist for.

The CFI of Ilo-Ilo dismissed their cross-complaint upon the merits for damages against the
plaintiff and issued a mandatory and a preliminary injunction. Hence this appeal.

The Court ruled that the right on the part of Gilchrist to enter into a contract with Cuddy for
the lease of the film must be fully recognized and admitted by all. That Cuddy was liable in an action
for damages for the breach of that contract, there can be no doubt.

Issue:

Were the appellants are liable for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy,
they not knowing at the time the identity of one of the contracting parties

Ruling:

Yes. Here, The appellants, Espejo and Zaldarriaga, claim that they had a right to do what they
did basing on the believed ground that there was no valid and binding contract between Cuddy and
Gilchrist and that, therefore, they had a right to compete with Gilchrist for the lease of the film, the
right to compete being a justification for their acts.

The court mentioned that the ground on which the liability of a third party for interfering
with a contract between others rests, is that the interference was malicious. However, citing a
contrary view taken by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Angle vs. Railway Co.
(151 U. S., 1) where in this case, the only motive for interference by the third party in that case was
the desire to make a profit to the injury of one of the parties of the contract. There was no malice in
the case beyond the desire to make an unlawful gain to the detriment of one of the contracting parties.

In the case at bar the only motive for the interference with the Gilchrist — Cuddy contract on
the part of the appellants was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. There
was no malice beyond this desire; but this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for
interfering with that contract and causing its breach.

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The liability of the appellants arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations,
as they were under no such obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. So that
if the action of Gilchrist had been one for damages, it would be governed by chapter 2, title 16, book
4 of the Civil Code. Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or omission, causes
damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage done.
There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of a tortfeasor
that he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damages. In fact, the chapter wherein
this article is found clearly shows that no such knowledge is required in order that the injured party
may recover for the damage suffered.

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74. SO PING BUN vs. COURT OF APPEALS, TEK HUA ENTERPRISES CORP. and MANUEL C. TIONG
G.R. No. 120554 September 21, 1999
J. Quisumbing

Doctrine:
The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the
part of the third person of the existence of contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without
legal justification or excuse.

Facts:
Tek Hua Trading Co, through its managing partner, So Pek Giok, entered into lease
agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. (DCCSI). Subjects of four (4) lease contracts were
premises located in Soler Street, Binondo, Manila. Tek Hua used the areas to store its textiles.

When the contracts expired, the parties did not renew the contracts, but Tek Hua continued
to occupy the premises. In 1976, Tek Hua Trading Co. was dissolved. Later, the original members of
Tek Hua Trading Co. including Manuel C. Tiong, formed Tek Hua Enterprising Corp., herein
respondent corporation. So Pek Giok, managing partner of Tek Hua Trading, died in 1986. So Pek
Giok's grandson, petitioner So Ping Bun, occupied the warehouse for his own textile business,
Trendsetter Marketing.

Lessor DCCSI sent letters addressed to Tek Hua Enterprises, informing the latter of the 25%
increase in rent. Enclosed in these letters were new lease contracts for signing. DCCSI warned that
failure of the lessee to accomplish the contracts shall be deemed as lack of interest on the lessee's
part, and agreement to the termination of the lease. Private respondents did not answer any of these
letters. Still, the lease contracts were not rescinded.

Private respondent Tiong sent a letter to petitioner to vacate premises but petitioner refused
to vacate. Petitioner requested formal contracts of lease with DCCSI in favor of Trendsetter
Marketing. So Ping Bun claimed that after the death of his grandfather, So Pek Giok, he had been
occupying the premises for his textile business and religiously paid rent. DCCSI acceded to the
petitioner's request. The lease contracts in favor of Trendsetter were executed.

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Private respondents pressed for the nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and
petitioner. They also claimed damages. The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents, annulling
the four Contracts of Lease. On appeal by So Ping Bun, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a correct interpretation of the applicable law on tortious conduct,
particularly unlawful interference with contract

Ruling:
Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the recompense
or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. 6 One becomes liable in an action for damages for
a non-trespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if (a) the
other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with, (b) the
invasion is substantial, (c) the defendant's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and (d) the
invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general
negligence rules.

The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the
part of the third person of the existence of contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without
legal justification or excuse. Petitioner's Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease
contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the latter's
property right. The three elements of tort interference above-mentioned are present in the instant
case.

Where there was no malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse behind one's
conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a
malicious interferer. In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI
to lease the warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of the respondent corporation. Though
petitioner took interest in the property of respondent corporation and benefited from it, nothing on
record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him.

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Lastly, the recovery of attorney's fees in the concept of actual or compensatory damages, is
allowed under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. The petition is hereby
DENIED.

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75. FLORENTINA A. GUILATCO vs. CITY OF DAGUPAN, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 61516 March 21, 1989
J. Sarmiento

Doctrine:

The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians
from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows: Article 2189.
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered
by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other public works under their control or supervision.

Facts:

Plaintiff, a Court Interpreter of Branch III, CFI--Dagupan City, while she was about to board a
motorized tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under the control and
supervision of the City of Dagupan) accidentally fell into a manhole causing her right leg to be
fractured. She had to be hospitalized, operated on, confined, at first at the Pangasinan Provincial
Hospital for a period of 16 days. She also incurred hospitalization, medication and other expenses to
the tune of P 8,053.65 or a total of P 10,000.00 in all, as other receipts were either lost or misplaced.
From the time of the mishap on July 25, 1978 up to the present, plaintiff has not yet reported for duty
as court interpreter, as she has difficulty of locomotion in going up the stairs of her office, located
near the city hall in Dagupan City. She earns at least P 720.00 a month consisting of her monthly
salary and other means of income, but since July 25, 1978 up to the present she has been deprived of
said income as she has already consumed her accrued leaves in the government service.

Doctors confirmed beyond shadow of any doubt the extent of the fracture and injuries
sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the mishap. Patrolman Claveria, De Asis and Cerezo
corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff regarding the mishap and they have confirmed the
exist+ence of the manhole (on the sidewalk along Perez Blvd.

Defendant Alfredo Tangco, City Engineer of Dagupan City and admittedly ex-officio Highway
Engineer, City Engineer of the Public Works and Building Official for Dagupan City, admitted the
existence of said manhole along the sidewalk in Perez Blvd. He also admitted that said manhole (there
are at least 11 in all in Perez Blvd.) is owned by the National Government and the sidewalk on which

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they are found along Perez Blvd. are also owned by the National Government. But as City Engineer of
Dagupan City, he supervises the maintenance of said manholes or drainage system and sees to it that
they are properly covered, and the job is specifically done by his subordinates, Mr. Santiago de Vera
(Maintenance Foreman) and Engr. Ernesto Solermo also a maintenance Engineer. In his answer
defendant Tangco expressly admitted in par. 7-1 thereof, that in his capacity as ex-officio Highway
Engineer for Dagupan City he exercises supervision and control over National roads, including the
Perez Blvd. where the incident happened.

On appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan, the appellate court reversed the lower court
findings on the ground that no evidence was presented by the plaintiff- appellee to prove that the
City of Dagupan had "control or supervision" over Perez Boulevard.

Issue:

Whether or not control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists, in
effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with article 2189 of the Civil Code.

Ruling:

The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians
from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows:

Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control
or supervision.

It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or
municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is
exercised over the defective road or street.

In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is
exercised through the City Engineer. The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out,
construction and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the

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use thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board . Thus the charter clearly indicates that the city
indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located.

The charter only lays down general rules regulating the liability of the city. On the other hand
article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from "defective streets, public buildings and
other public works."

Alfredo G. Tangco "(i)n his official capacity as City Engineer of Dagupan, as Ex- Officio
Highway Engineer, as Ex-Officio City Engineer of the Bureau of Public Works, and, last but not the
least, as Building Official for Dagupan City, receives a monthly compensation This function of
supervision over streets, public buildings, and other public works pertaining to the City Engineer is
coursed through a Maintenance Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer.

There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or supervision over the
public works in question. Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner under article 2198 of the
Civil Code is clear.

The petition is GRANTED.

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76. DEAN C. WORCESTER vs. MARTIN OCAMPO, TEODORO KALAW, LOPE K. SANTOS, FIDEL A.
REYES, FAUSTINO AGUILAR et al.,
G.R. No. 5932, February 27, 1912
J. Johnson

Doctrine:
As a general rule, the term "joint tortfeasors" includes all persons who command, instigate,
promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who
approve of it, after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same
extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves

Facts:
The defendants are twelve persons designated by name in the complaint and alleged therein
to be the owners, directors, writers, editors, and administrators of a certain daily newspaper known
as 'El Renacimiento' and 'Muling Pagsilang,' which defendants, as well as the plaintiff, are residents
of the city of Manila, Philippine Islands. While the petitioner is a member of the Civil Commission of
the Philippine Islands, and Secretary of the Interior of the Insular Government.

The petitioner alleged that for a long time the defendants had been maliciously persecuting
and attacking the petitioner in said newspaper, until at last, with the malicious intention of injuring
the plaintiff, who then was and still is a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and
Secretary of the Interior in the Government of the Philippines, they attacked the integrity and reviled
the reputation of the plaintiff, not only as a private citizen, but also as an official of the Government
of the Philippine Islands; and with the object of exposing him to the disgust, contempt, and ridicule
of the public by writing an Article entitled “Bird of Prey” . Said article was said to be malicious
defamation and false libel which is injurious to the petitioner.

The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the Petitioner and found that Martin Ocampo,
Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe
Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, jointly and severally liable to Dean Worcester.
From said decision the defendants appealed assailing the validity of the decision of the lower
court particularly rendering a judgment that the respondents are jointly and severally liable against
Dean Worcester.

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Issue:
Whether or not the defendants, regardless of their participation in the commission of the
actual tort are jointly and severally liable as joint tortfeasors.

Ruling:
If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff or person injured, has his election to sue
all or some of the parties jointly, or one of them separately, because the tort is in its nature a separate
act of each individual. It is not necessary that the cooperation should be a direct corporeal act, for, to
give an example, in a case of assault and battery committed by various persons, under the common
law all are principals. So, also is the person who counsels, aids or assists in any way the commission
of a wrong. Under the common law, he who aided or assisted or counseled, in any way, the
commission of a crime, was as much a principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual tort.

Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done,
if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner
as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves

Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The person
injured may sue all of them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damage caused
by all, and all together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that
the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any
excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as compared with that of the others.
Joint tortfeasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot be apportioned among them,
except among themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying
an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the full amount.

Hence, the lower court committed no error in rendering a joint and several judgments against
the defendants and allowing an execution against their individual property.

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77. MARCIAL CAEDO et al., vs. YU KHE THAI AND RAFAEL BERNARDO
G.R. No. L-20392, December 18, 1968
J. Yatco

Doctrine:
The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree,
necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as
are professional drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and instead hire
other persons to drive for them precisely because they are not trained or endowed with sufficient
discernment to know the rules of traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different
situations that are continually encountered on the road.

Facts:
A car accident occurred Highway 54 (now EDSA) Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his
way from his home in Quezon City to the airport, where his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a
plane for Mindoro. With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the
opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel,
taking the owner from his Parañaque home to Wack Wack for his regular round of golf. The two cars
were traveling at fairly moderate speeds, considering the condition of the road and the absence of
traffic—the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and the Cadillac at approximately 30 to 35 miles
(48 to 56 kilometers). Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the
Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a carretela owned by a certain Pedro Bautista. The carretela
was towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right
side and held at the other end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista.

Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own Lane; he slackened his speed, judged the distances in
relation to the carretela and concluded that the Cadillac would wait behind. Bernardo, however,
decided to take a gamble—beat the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with the carretela,
or else squeeze in between them in any case.

Because of the accident, Caedo and his family members were injured. They filed a suit for
recovery of damages from the defendants. The CFI Rizal rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendants, Yu Khe Thai and Rafael Bernardo.

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The RTC decided against the defendants Yu Khe Thai and Rafael Bernardo.

Issue:
Whether or not Yu Khe Thai is solidarily liable for the damages caused by his driver being the
owner of the Cadillac.

Ruling:
No. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who
was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he has been found guilty of reckless driving or violating
traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months (Art. 2184, Civil Code). Under
the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle
who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due
diligence. The rule is not new, although formulated as law for the first time in the new Civil Code.

It was expressed in Chapman v. Underwood (1914), 27 Phil. 374. The basis of the master's
liability in civil law is not respondeat superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory
is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely
correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or
damage.

The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree,
necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as
are professional drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and instead hire
other persons to drive for them precisely because they are not trained or endowed with sufficient
discernment to know the rules of traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different
situations that are continually encountered on the road.

The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency
either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor
vehicle. The test of his negligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which
the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as
perception is concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be

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fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another.
Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers
by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be
effectively proscribed.

In the case at bar, there was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He
had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of the presence of the
carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not
constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at that
distance, he could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left
side in spite of the fact that another car was approaching from the opposite direction. The time
element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks
involved and warn the driver accordingly.

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78. FELINA RODRIGUEZ-LUNA, JOSE R. LUNA and ROBERTO R. LUNA, JR vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, JOSE E. DELA ROSA and LUIS DELA ROSA
G.R. No. L-62988, February 28, 1985
J. Abad Santos

Doctrine:
In computing the unearned net earnings of the deceased, it must be proved by the medical
records by the licensed physician through testimony and should not be based solely on the time the
deceased is currently doing.

Facts:
This is a petition for review filed by the heirs of the deceased name Roberto Luna who was
killed on January 18, 1970 while riding a go-kart in San Juan Metro Manila. The accident took place
when the deceased was driving as a form of sports when it crashed into the Toyota vehicle of Luis
dela Rosa, a 13 year old with no license. The trial court ruled in favor of the herein petitioner ordered
Luis dela Rosa to pay the heirs amounting to Php 1,650,000.00 unearned net earnings of the
deceased, Php12,000.00 for compensatory damages, Php50,000.00 for the loss of companionship,
and lastly, Php 50,000.00 for the attorneys fee

Aggrieved, the dela Rosas appealed to the appellate court in which it reduced the unearned
net earnings of the deceased to Php 450,000.00 contending that the deceased Roberto Luna is
habitually engaged in the racing go-kart and the same implies the assumption of risk of peril. Thus,
the originally 30 years of life expectancy of the deceased amounting to Php 1,650,000.00 was
significantly reduced by the appellate court to 10 years life expectancy amounting to Php 450,000.00.
The rest had been adopted in toto.

Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court is correct in reducing the damages awarded by the trial
court

Ruling:
No. The appellate court is not correct in reducing the amount awarded by the trial court. The
go-kart racing is a form of sports in which it is the racing of a slow-moving vehicle. Reducing the life
expectancy below 20 years is inequitable. Further proved by the physician of the deceased who has

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been monitoring his health testified that based on the medical records of the deceased, the life
expectancy’s computation of the deceased will be more or less 30 years. Wherefore, the Supreme
Court reinstated the decision of the trial court.

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79. SABINA EXCONDE Vs. DELFIN CAPUNO

G.R. No. L-10134, June 29, 1957
J. Bautista Angelo

Doctrine:
Parents are expected to take care of their children with utmost diligence especially when he
is a minor. Should the minor child/ren incurred damage against another person or property, the
father will become subsidiarily liable incurred by his child/ren.

Facts:
Dante Capuno is a 15-year-old student enrolled in Balintawak Elementary School. Sometime
in March 1949, Dante attended a boy scout parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal. As a group of students
are on the way to their destination, Dante requested their jeepney driver to let him drive in which
the driver nodded. The driver of the jeepney was then seated at the other side and let Dante, a minor,
drive the said vehicle.

While on the way, the jeepney then turned turtle causing an accident resulting in 2 persons
dead named Amado Ticzon and Isidro Caperina. He was then charged with reckless imprudence
resulting in double homicide. One of the deceased students mother named Sabina Exconde, filed a
suit against the father of Dante named Delfin Capuno for damages for the death of her son Isidro
Caperina

Issue:
Whether or not the father of Dante Capuno can be held liable

Ruling:
Yes. Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question
jointly and severally with his son Dante because at the time the latter committed the negligent act
which resulted in the death of the victim, he was a minor and was then living with his father, and
inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the civil liability of the father is evident.

And so, the plaintiff contends, the lower court erred in relieving the father from liability.
Citing the Spanish Civil Code of Article 1903 and now Article 2180 of the New Civil Code under

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paragraph 2 states that: The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible
for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

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80. RODRIGUEZ-LUNA v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. L-62988 February 28, 1985
J. Abad Santos

Doctrine:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who
live in their company.

Facts:
The petitioners are the heirs of Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a vehicular collision. The
collision took place at the go-kart practice area in Greenhills, San Juan. Those involved were the go-
kart driven by the deceased, a business executive, and a Toyota car driven by Luis dela Rosa, a minor
of 13 years who had no driver's license.

In a suit for damages brought by the heirs of Luna against Luis dela Rosa and his father Jose
dela Rosa, the Court of First Instance of Manila sentenced the defendants, jointly and severally, to the
plaintiffs the sum of P1,650,000.00 as unearned net earnings of Luna, P12,000.00 as compensatory
damages, and P50,000.00 for the loss of his companionship, (May 22,1979)

CA: modified; defendants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the sum
of Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P450,000.00) as unearned net earnings of Roberto R. Luna
(June 19,1981)

The instant case is the separate appeal of the Lunas to set aside modification of CA and
petition be given due course.

Resolution:
1.the private respondents are hereby ordered to PAY to the petitioners within thirty (30)
days from notice the following amounts adjudged against them: P450,000.00 for unearned net
earnings of the deceased
2. Still to be resolved shall be the following: whether the award for unearned net earnings
shall be increased to P1,650,000.00;

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3. Respondents failed to pay the amounts and when required to explain they said that they
had no cash money. Accordingly, this Court directed the trial court to issue a writ of execution but the
execution yielded only a nominal amount

4. In the meantime, Luis dela Rosa is now of age, married with two children, and living in
Madrid, Spain with an uncle but only casually employed. It is said: "His compensation is hardly
enough to support his family. He has no assets of his own as yet.

Issue:
Whether or not Jose, the father, should be primarily or subsidiary liable with his son, Luis.

Ruling:
Yes. Jose is primarily liable. The private respondents invoke Elcano vs. Hill, where it was held
that Article 2180 of the Civil Code applied to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by
marriage of Reginald Hill, his son but since Reginald had attained age, as a matter of equity, the
liability of Atty. Hill had become merely a subsidiary to that of his son. It is now said that Luis dela
Rosa, is now married and of legal age and that as a matter of equity the liability of his father should
be subsidiary only.

We are unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law in this case because to do so will not
serve the ends of justice. Luis dela Rosa is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine courts.
Moreover, he does not have any property either in the Philippines or elsewhere. In fact his earnings
are insufficient to support his family.

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81. LIBI V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 70890,18 September 1992
REGALADO, J

Doctrine:
It should be emphasized that paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 2180 of the Civil Code were not
rendered ineffective by the Family Code. The provisions remain effective subject to the modifications
resulting from the operation of the provisions of the Family Code. Thus, the provisions with respect
to parents in the second paragraph of Article 2180 is modified by Article 221 of the Family Code by
removing the alternative qualification of the liability of the father and the mother.

Facts:
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until the former broke up with the latter
after she found out the Wendell were irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell wanted reconciliation but
was not granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to threats. One day, they were found dead from
a single gunshot wound each coming from the same gun. The parents of Julie herein private
respondents filed a civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages. Trial court
dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence but was set aside by CA.

Issue:
Whether or not the parents should be held liable for such damages.

Ruling:
Yes. The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from
criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who
live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent such damages.

Under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the
responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. For
civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in
accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as modified.

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Since the parents failed to establish in its defense, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent such damage, the court held that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-delict of
their minor children is primary and not subsidiary.

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82. MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC
G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992
Feliciano, J.

Doctrine:
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious
liability or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person
is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom
he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a
natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental
authority — which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child.

Facts:
On October 20, 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, who is a 10 year old minor, shot Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in Jennifer's death. Subsequently,
Jennifer’s natural parent spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo together with the adopting parent
of Jeniffer petitioner Macario Tamargo files a civil complaint for damages against respondent
spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living at the
time of the tragic incident.

December 10, 1981, prior to the incident, spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a
petition for adoption to the minor Adelberto Bundoc. Thus, the petition for adoption was granted
on November 18, 1982 that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.

Issue:
Whether or not the effects of adoption be given retroactive effect so as to make the
adopting parents the indispensable parties in a case filed against their adopted child.

Ruling:
The Court does not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption
so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents
had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive effect may perhaps be given
to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some
benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that
parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them
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with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have
prevented since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the
child Adelberto, it would be unfair and unconscionable.

Court ruled that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents, were
indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by the petitioners.
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83. MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her father ULISES P. CUADRA, ET. AL., vs.
ALFONSO MONFRONT
G.R. NO. L-24101, September 30, 1970
J. Makalintal

Doctrine:
An innocent prank uncommon among children at play and which no parent, however careful,
would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any
mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably
on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to the parents.

Facts:
A civil suit instituted by the parents of Maria Teresa Cuadra against Alfonso, the father of
Maria Teresa Monfort. Here, minors Maria Teeresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort, were
classmates. Sometime in 1962, their teacher assigned them, together with other three classmates to
weed the grass in the school premises. Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband, and she
jokingly said aloud that she had found an earthworm and to frighten Maria Teresa Cuadra she threw
the object to the latter which hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, Cuadra rubbed the injured
part and treated it with some powder, her eye became swollen and she told the incident to her
parents, who subsequently brought her to the doctor for some treatment, which resulted in a surgical
operation two times. However, despite such treatment Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost her right
eye sight.

Issue:
Whether or not Alfonso Monfort, father of Maria Teresa will be held liable for incident
happened in school premises.

Ruling:
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant, Alfonso
Monfort could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way
remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which
caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she
was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far
as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among

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children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate
much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the
child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could
be attributed to her parents.

The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that
befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to compensate her suffering, the obligation has no
legal sanction enforceable in court, but only the moral compulsion of good conscience.

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84. CIRIACO L. MERCADO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, MANUEL QUISUMBING, JR., et al

G.R. No. L-14342. May 30, 1960.
J. Labrador

Doctrine:
Article 2180 of the new Civil Code which provides that "teachers or heads of establishments
of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody", applies to an institution of arts and traders and not to any
academic institution and contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher,
such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersede those of the parents. In these
circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the
father and mother to the teacher, and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil.

Facts:
Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. is the son of his co- plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda
and Manuel L. Quisumbing, while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L.
Mercado.

Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School
on Kanlaon, Quezon City. On February 22, 1956, Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr.
quarrelled over a ‘pitogo’ [an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank]. As a result, Augusto
wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of razor.

The facts of record clearly show that it was Augusto Mercado who started the aggression.
Undeniably, the ‘pitogo’ belonged to Augusto Mercado but he lent it to Benedicto P. Lim and in turn
Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi. Renato was not aware that the ‘pitogo’ belonged to Augusto.
Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. was likewise unaware that the ‘pitogo’ belonged to Augusto. He thought it
was the ‘pitogo’ of Benedicto P. Lim, so that when Augusto attempted to get the ‘pitogo’ from Renato,
Manuel, Jr. told him not to do so because Renato was better at putting the chain into the holes of the
‘pitogo’. However, Augusto resented Manuel, Jr.’s remark and he aggressively pushed the latter. The
fight started then. After Augusto gave successive blows to Manuel, Jr. and the latter was clutching his
stomach which bore the brunt of Augusto’s anger, Augusto seeing that Manuel, Jr. was in a helpless
position, cut him on the right check with a piece of razor.

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Private respondents then went to court asking for moral damages on account of a) the wound
inflicted by Augusto Mercado (2,000), and b) moral damages due to the mental anguish of seeing
their son wounded (3,000).

Although originally dismissed by the CFI of Manila, on appeal, judgment was rendered in
favor of respondents, ordering petitioner to pay P2,000 as moral damages and P50 as medical
expenses. Petitioner argues that since the infliction of the wound occurred in a Catholic School
(during recess time), through no fault of the father, petitioner herein, the teacher or head of the
school should be held responsible instead of the latter. Further, they claim that the award of moral
damages was excessive.

Issue:
Whether or not the teachers/ school authorities should be held liable?

Ruling:
As to the first issue, the Supreme Court held in Exconde vs. Capuno and Capuno that
responsibility over the child’s actions must pass to the teacher. However, this provision only applies
to an institution of arts and trades not to an academic educational institution. Further, upon reading
the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it would seem that the clause "so long as they
remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher,
such that control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. Such a
situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours
and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over. Similarly, paragraph 2 of said
article, which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children,
cannot apply. The claim of petitioner that responsibility should pass to the school must, therefore, be
held to be without merit.

As to the amount of moral damages, the Court held that while moral damages included
physical suffering, the decision of the court below does not declare that any of the cases specified in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which moral damages may be recovered, has attended or occasioned
the physical injury. The only possible circumstance in the case at bar in which moral damages are
recoverable would be if a criminal offense or a quasi-delict has been committed.

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It does not appear that a criminal action for physical injuries was ever presented. Further, the
offender was nine years old and did not appear to have acted with discernment when he inflicted the
physical injuries on Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. Further, even if we assume that the CA considered
Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed moral damages, the facts found by said court
indicate that Augusto's resentment, was occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried to intervene
in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get "his pitogo from Renato." It is, therefore, apparent
that the proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or
negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy.

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85. SPOUSES MOISES P. PALISOC AND BRIGIDA P. PALISOC VS. ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES AND
TEODOSIO V. VALENTON ET AL.
G.R. No. L-29025 (October 4, 1971)
J. Teehankee

Doctrine:
The court holds that the phrase used in Article 2180, “so long as the students remain in
their custody” means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the
pupil or student who commits the tortuous act must live and board in the school.

The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils
and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, in loco parentis to a certain
extent to their pupils and students and are called upon to “exercise reasonable supervision over the
conduct of the child.”

Facts:
Deceased Dominador Palisoc and defendant Virgilio Daffon were automotive mechanics
students at the Manila Technical Institute (MTI). In the afternoon of March 10, 1966 during recess,
Desiderio Cruz [ another classmate] and Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc
was merely looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a
foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc
a strong flat blow on the face, followed by other fist blows to the stomach. Palisoc retreated, but
Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block causing
him to fall face downward. Thereafter, Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was administered
to him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained
consciousness and later died.

The parents of Dominador filed an action for damages against (1) Virgilio, (2) Valenton, the
head/president of MTI, (3) Quibule who was the teacher in charge at the time of the incident, and
(4) Brillantes who is a member of the board of directors and former sole proprietor of MTI.

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Trial ensued, with the trial court giving credence to Cruz’s version of the incident. The trial
court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. It held
that "The act of Daffon in giving the deceased strong fist blows in the stomach which ruptured his
internal organs and caused his death falls within the purview of this article of the Code."

The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the
Manila Technical Institute, holding that Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not apply, as decided in
Mercado v. CA. Defendant Daffon was ordered to pay a) 6,000 for the death of Palisoc, b) 3,375 as
actual and compensatory damages, c) 5,000 as moral damages, d) 10,000 for loss of earning capacity
and e) 2,000 as attorney’s fees. Hence the appeal/ petition.

Issue:
Whether or not defendants-school officials shall be held jointly and severally liable with
defendant Daffon?

Ruling:
The head/president and teacher of MTI (Valenton and Quibule respectively) were held liable
jointly and severally with the Virgilio for damages. No liability attaches to Brillantes as a mere
member of the MTI board of directors. Similarly, MTI may not be held liable since it had not been
properly impleaded as party defendant.

The judgment of the appellate court was modified, while claim for compensatory damages
was increased in accordance with recent jurisprudence and the claim for exemplary damages denied
in the absence of gross negligence on the part of the said defendants.

The court holds that the phrase used in Article 2180, “so long as the students remain in
their custody” means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the
pupil or student who commits the tortuous act must live and board in the school. The dicta in the
cases of Mercado as well as in Exconde v. Capuno on which it relied are deemed to have been set
aside.

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The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils
and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, in loco parentis to a certain
extent to their pupils and students and are called upon to “exercise reasonable supervision over the
conduct of the child.”

In this case, the unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students
could have been avoided, had said defendants complied with their duty of providing adequate
supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from
harm.

Since Valenton and Quibule failed to prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage, they cannot likewise avail of the exemption to the liability.

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86. ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL et al. vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DR. ROMULO
CASTILLO and LILIA CADIZ
G.R. No. 82465, February 25, 1991
J. Paras

Doctrine:
Employers can’t be held liable for the negligence of his employee as the teachers were not in
an actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened not within the school premises,
not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely
private affair, a picnic. Mere knowledge by the principal of the planning of the picnic by the students
and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding
of the same.

Facts:
Parents of Ferdinand Castillo did not allow him to join the school picnic because of short
notice. However, he was allowed by his parents to bring food to the teachers for the picnic. However,
because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach.

While on the beach, one of the female teachers was drowning. Some of the students, including
Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. He was
pronounced dead on arrival at Mt. Canned General Hospital.

Due to the incident, Ferdinand’s parents, spouses Castillo, filed a complaint for damages
against the St. Francis High School, its owners, its principal, and the teachers contending that the
death of their son was due to the failure of the petitioners to exercise proper diligence of a good father
of the family in preventing their son’s drowning.

The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents and ordered petitioner teachers to pay actual
damages, moral damages, attorney’s fees and cost of the suit. They were remiss on their duty on the
standard required by law under such circumstances. On the other hand, the case against the school,
its owners, and principal were dismissed as the trial court cannot find sufficient evidence showing
that the picnic was a school sanctioned one. There was no evidence of their consent to the picnic and
in fact they did not join it. As such, there was no application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

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On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision as regards the school and principal
and held them liable under Article 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. They ruled that the school
principal had knowledge of the picnic even from its planning stage and had even been invited to
attend the affair; and yet he did not express any prohibition against undertaking the picnic, nor did
he prescribe any precautionary measures to be adopted during the picnic.

Issue:
WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants which will warrant the award of
damages to the plaintiffs.

Ruling:
No. In the case of the employer, they can’t be held liable for the negligence of his employee as
the teachers were not in an actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened not
within the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and students
were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened
while some members of the I-C class of St. Francis High School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach.
This picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic
is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular activity. Mere
knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the students and their
teachers does not in any way or in any manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the
same. The application therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by any
jurisprudence.

In the case of the teachers, no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to
warrant the award of damages to the respondents-spouses. Petitioners Connie Arquio the class
adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the
picnic.

In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E.
instructors and scout masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming. Moreover,
even respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that "the defendants had life savers especially

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brought by the defendants in case of emergency." The records also show that both petitioners Chavez
and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save the child.

While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent to their son to join the picnic,
this does not mean that the petitioners were already relieved of their duty to observe the required
diligence of a good father of a family in ensuring the safety of the children. But in the case at bar,
petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the required diligence. Hence, the claim for
moral or exemplary damages becomes baseless.

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87. PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION et al vs. COURT OF APPEALS et al

G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992
J. Padilla

Doctrine:
Article 2180 plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils
or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students
while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for the
assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.

Facts:
A stabbing incident caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises
of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompting the parents of the deceased to
file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate
officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third-year commerce course at the PSBA.
It was established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic community but
were elements from outside the school.

Defendants sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably sued
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as
jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond
the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article.

The trial court dismissed the motion to dismiss the defendants. On appeal, the CA also
dismissed the motion for reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether PSBA and its officers are liable under Article 2180.


Ruling:
No. Article 2180 plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by
pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or
students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for,

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as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school
could be made liable. The circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between
the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not govern. When an academic institution
accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to
provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary
tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants
to abide by the school’s academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or “built-in” obligation of providing their
students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge. The school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and
order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.

There is yet no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached
through the former’s negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial
court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to
a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school
would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of
the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a
condition sine qua non to the school’s liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist
independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article
21 of the Civil Code

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88. SOLIMAN V. TUAZON

G.R. No. 66207, May 18, 1992
J. Feliciano

Doctrine:

Under Article 2180 of the NCC, employers shall be held liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry. Also, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades shall be held liable for damages caused by their pupils, their students or apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody.

Facts:

On August 13, 1982, Maximino Soliman Jr., a regular student od Republic Central Colleges
(RCC), was inside its campus ground and premises taking his morning classes. Jimmy B. Solomon,
who was on a said date and hour in the premises of the said school grounds performing his duties
and obligations as a duly appointed security guard under the employment, supervision and control
of R.L. Security Agency, Inc., headed by Mr. Benjamin Serrano, shot Soliman on the abdomen with a
.38 caliber revolver, a deadly weapon, which ordinarily such wound sustained would have caused the
plaintiffs death were it not for the timely medical assistance given to him.

Soliman filed a civil complaint for damages against private respondent Republic Central
Colleges, the R.L. Security Agency, Inc. and Jimmy B. Solomon, a security guard. The RCC filed a motion
dismiss, arguing that there was no cause of action against it, and that it is free from liability because
the RCC was not the employer of the security guard charged, Jimmy Solomon, and hence was not
responsible for any wrongful of Solomon. They also argued that Article 2180, 7th paragraph, of the
Civil Code did not apply, since the said paragraph holds teachers or apprentices, while security guard
Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the school. The court granted the motion to
dismiss.

The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the judge. Hence this instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or Not RCC is liable for damages?

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Ruling:

Yes, but it has to be noted that the Republic Central Colleges is not liable under Article 2180,
paragraph 5 of the Civil Code. RCC was not the employer of Jimmy Solomon. The employer of Jimmy
Solomon was the R. L. Security Agency., while the school was the client or customer of the R.L.
Security Agency, Inc. It is settled that where the security agency, its recruits, hires and assigns the
work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen.
The liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer
agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency.

Likewise, the RCC is not liable under Article 2180, paragraph 7 since there is no question that
Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges, he being in fact an
employee of the R.L. Security Agency, Inc. However, it does not follow that the RCC could not be held
liable any other basis in law.

Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, it has to be noted that employers shall be held liable
for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. Also, teachers
or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be held liable for damages caused by their pupils,
their students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

Solomon was neither a pupil nor a student of Republic Central Colleges. Hence, this provision
with regard to the liability of teachers and heads is also not available to make Republic liable for
damages.

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89. ST. MARY’S ACADEMY V. CARPITANOS

G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002
J. Pardo

Doctrine:

Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over
a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody:

1. The school, its administrators, and teachers; 2. the individual, entity, or institution engaged in child
care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity, or institution.

Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising
special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor under their supervision, instruction, or custody.

Facts:

This case is about St Mary’s Academy’s liability for damages arising from an accident but
resulted in the death of a student who had joined a campaign to visit the public schools in Dipolog
City to solicit for enrollees. February 13 to 20, 1995, St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted
an enrollment drive for school year 1995 – 1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the
visitation of schools from where, its prospective enrollees, were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos was
part of the campaigning group. Sherwin, along with other high school students rode a Mitsubishi jeep
owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, in Larayan, Dapitan City.
The jeepney that was driven by James Daniel II, who was then fifteen (15) years old and was a student
of the same school. The jeep turned turtle and Sherwin died.

Spouses William and Lucia Carpitanos filed a case against James Daniell II and his parents,
James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy
before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City. The RTC rendered judgment holding St. Mary’s
Academy liable for damages and was ordered to pay damages to the complainants, and the Daniels’
subsidiarily liable. James Daniel II and Villanueva were absolved of liability.

Issue:

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Whether or not St. Mary’s Academy liable for damages?

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court said that there was no finding that the act or omission considered
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence, must have a causal
connection to the accident.

Spouses Daniel and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the
negligence of the petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep. There was no evidence that St. Mary’s Academy allowed James
Daniel II to drive the jeep of the respondent Vicencio Villanueva but it was Ched Villanueva who had
custody, control, and possession of the jeep.

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90. FEDERICO YLARDE and ADELAIDA DORONIO versus EDGARDO AQUINO, MAURO SORIANO
and COURT OF APPEAL
G. R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988
J. Gangayco

Doctrine:
Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

Facts:
Mariano Soriano was the principal of Gabaldon Primary School in Pangasinan while Edgardo
Aquino was a teacher therein. The school had several concrete blocks which were remnants of the
old school shop destroyed in World War II. Aquino decided to help clear the area. After the class, he
gathered 18 of male students, aged 10-11 years and ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete
block in order to make a hole where the stone can be buried. He recalled 4 of the 18 students the
following day to complete the excavation. When the hole was enough to accommodate the concrete
block, Aquino, together with the 4 students, got out of the hole. Aquino left the students to level the
loose soil where he went to see another teacher for the key of the school workroom to get some rope.
Before leaving, he instructed the students not to touch the stone. However, after Aquino left, 3 of the
students playfully jumped the pit. Then, without any warning, the 4th student jumped on top of the
concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Noveliton, Ylarde, one of the 3 students
was pinned to the wall which led to his death 3 days after. The parents of Ylarde filed a suit for
damages against both Aquino (the teacher) and Soriano (the principal).

Issue:
Whether or not Aquino and Soriano can be held liable for damages?

Ruling:
Only Aquino can be held liable.

Under paragraph 7, Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that “teachers or heads of
establishment of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

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As the teacher in charge of the children, he is negligent in supervision over them and failed to
take necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons. His failure to leave his pupils in
such a dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of Ylarde.

As for Soriano, he cannot be held liable.

Here, Soriano, as the school principal, cannot be held liable for the reason that he is the head
of an academic school and not school of arts and trades. It is also clear in the facts of the case that
Soriano did not give any instruction to Aquino regarding the digging; therefore he does not have any
participation in the digging.

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91. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and FELIX PANGALANGAN vs PHIL-AMERICAN
FORWARDERS , INC., et al
G.R. No. L-25142 March 25, 1975
J. Aquino

Doctrine:
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed
or in the occasion of their functions.

Facts:
Fernando Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck owned by Phil-American Forwarders,
managed by Archimedes Balingit, along the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck
bumped into the bus driven by Felix Pangalangan and owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. As a
result, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged, therefore could not be used for 79
days, depriving the company of supposed earnings.

In his defense, Balingit counters that he is not the employer of Pineda.

The trial court sustained the defense of Balingit, and the case against him was dismissed

Issue:
Whether or not Balingit can be sued for damages?

Ruling:
Balingit cannot be sued for damages.

Paragraph 4, Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that “the owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their function.

Here, the term “manager” used in the above-quoted article is used in the sense of employer.
Balingit, as a manager of the corporation, is still regarded as an employee or dependent of his
employer, Phil-American Forwarders Inc.

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92. CASTILEX vs. VASQUEZ

G.R. No. 132266 December 21, 1999
CJ. Davide

Doctrine:
The phrase "even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry" found in the
fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged
in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the
scope of his assigned task

Facts:
At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez (son of respondents Vicente and
Luisa Vasquez), was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. He was traveling
counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or
goggles. He was also only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time.

Benjamin ABAD was a manager of petitioner CASTILEX Industrial Corporation, registered
owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. ABAD drove the said company car out of
a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow
of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St.

In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of ABAD collided with each other
causing severe injuries to the former. ABAD brought Vasquez to CEBU DOCTORS' HOSPITAL where
he died. A Criminal Case was filed against ABAD but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to
prosecute.

An action for damages was then commenced by respondents against ABAD and petitioner
CASTILEX. Trial court ruled in favor of private respondents and ordered ABAD and to pay jointly and
solidarily respondents. Petitioner CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision. Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and petitioner CASTILEX liable but held
that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not solidary" with the former. Hence, CASTILEX
filed the instant petition.

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Issue:
Whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent
operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

Ruling:

No. Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply
to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the
business of “manufacturing and selling furniture” it is therefore not covered by said provision.
Instead, the fourth paragraph should apply

SC: Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase "even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be
interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or
industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned
task

Distinctions between 4th and 5th paragraph of Art 2180 of CC:
1. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not
engaged in any business or industry.
2. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of
the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses
negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task.
3. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included.
4. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or
industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even
though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions

Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or industry,
an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks.
But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff

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must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned
task when the tort complained of was committed

Whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the
scope of his assigned tasks.

ABAD: testified that at the time of the incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle,
registered under the name of petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some
snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner.

TC and CA: that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his
assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances.

SC: do not agree with TC and CA. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time
of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent
operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or
scope of his employment.

American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of
an employee in the use of an employer's motor vehicle:

It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a
place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the
scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer

In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or
concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some
special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place
where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he
uses his employer's motor vehicle

In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or
concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some

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special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place
where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he
uses his employer's motor vehicle

However, even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in
going to or from work in his employer's vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence where
at the time of the accident, the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is
pursuing a personal errand of his own. An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for
the latter's personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee's
negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use

Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he
has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he
has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent
operation of the vehicle during the return trip

In the case, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the petitioner's office. After,
he went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña, 7km away from petitioner's place of business. A
witness for the private respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente Osmeña is a "lively
place" even at dawn because Goldie's Restaurant and Back Street were still open and people were
drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts littered the place. At the Goldie's
Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the
restaurant that the incident in question occurred

ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with
his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988,
way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD's working day had ended; his overtime work had
already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for
prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no connection to petitioner's business; neither
had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal
purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position

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Since no evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him,
petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, petitioner is relieved of vicarious liability for the
consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle

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93. NPC vs CA
G.R. No. 11912, August 14, 1998
J. Romero

Doctrine:
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an
alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury
caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer.
Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an
employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be
used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.

Facts:

On July 22, 1979, a convoy of 4 dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC)
left Marawi city bound for Iligan city. Unfortunately, enroute to its destination, one of the trucks
driven by a certain Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident
resulted in the death of three (3) persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries
to seventeen other passengers.

On June 10, 1980, the heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against National Power
Corporation (NPC) and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO). When defendant PHESCO filed its answer
to the complaint it contended that it was not the owner of the dump truck which collided with the
Toyota Tamaraw but NPC. Moreover, it asserted that it was merely a contractor of NPC with the main
duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latter's projects. On the other hand, NPC denied
any liability and countered that the driver of the dump truck was the employee of PHESCO.

Issue:

Between NPC and PHESCO, who is the employer of Ilumba which would be liable for damages
to the victims?

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Ruling:

Before we decide who the employer of Ilumba is, it is evidently necessary to ascertain the
contractual relationship between NPC and PHESCO. Was the relationship one of employer and job
(independent) contractor or one of employer and "labor only" contractor?

Job (independent) contracting is present if the following conditions are met: (a) the
contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account
under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and
direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work
except to the result thereof; and (b) the contractor has substantial capital or investments in the form
of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials which are necessary in the
conduct of his business. Absent these requisites, what exists is a "labor only" contract under which
the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who
is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly
employed by him. Taking into consideration the above distinction and the provisions of the
"Memorandum of Understanding" entered into by PHESCO and NPC, we are convinced that PHESCO
was engaged in "labor only" contracting.

Under this factual milieu, there is no doubt that PHESCO was engaged in "labor-only"
contracting vis-à-vis NPC and as such, it is considered merely an agent of the latter. In labor-only
contracting, an employer-employee relationship between the principal employer and the employees
of the "labor-only" contractor is created. Accordingly, the principal employer is responsible to the
employees of the "labor-only" contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the
principal employer. Since PHESCO is only a "labor-only" contractor, the workers it supplied to NPC,
including the driver of the ill-fated truck, should be considered as employees of NPC. After all, it is
axiomatic that any person (the principal employer) who enters into an agreement with a job
contractor, either for the performance of a specified work or for the supply of manpower, assumes
responsibility over the employees of the latter.

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94. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT VS NAVIDAD

G.R. No. 145804 February 6, 2003
J. Vitug

Doctrine:
A common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is
burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers

Facts:
Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token"
(representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks,
Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding
or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however,
was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or
how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train,
operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and
he was killed instantaneously. Nicanor’s widow filed a complaint for damages against Junelito
Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent
for the death of her husband. The trial court rendered decision holding Prudent and Escartin jointly
and severally liable. On appeal, the CA exonerated Prudent from any liability and, instead, held the
LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable.

Issue:
Whether LRTA liable?

Ruling:
Yes. Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its
business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in
ensuring the safety of passengers. The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and
its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure
to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to
ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the
services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common
carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.

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95. VALENZUELA VS CA
G.R. No. 115024 February 7, 1996
J. Kapunan

Doctrine:
The relationship in question is not based on the principle of respondeat superior, which holds
the master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately
falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of his employees.

Facts:
Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela, was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon,
heading towards the direction of Manila. Suddenly, she noticed something wrong with her tires; she
stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit
help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she
cannot reach her home in that car's condition, she parked along the sidewalk. She was standing at the
left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she
was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in
the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral
damages in the amount of P1 million, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and other
medical and related expenses amounting to a total of P180,000.00, including loss of expected
earnings. After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found defendant
Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The
trial court likewise held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and severally liable for
damages pursuant to Article 2180.

Issue:
1. Whether or not, the petitioner is guilty of contributory negligence?
2. Whether or not, respondent’s employer, Alexander Commercial Inc, is liable for the acts of its
employee?

Ruling:
1. The SC ruled that the Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory negligence. Valenzuela did

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exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have
contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her
lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard
was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions.

2. The SC ruled that the relationship in question is not based on the principle of respondeat
superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the
liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of
the family in the selection and supervision of his employees

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96. PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC. and ROGACIONES MANILHIG vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and HEIRS OF THE LATE RAMON ACUESTA
G.R. No. 120553, June 17, 1997
J. Davide Jr.

Doctrine:
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed
or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.

Facts:
The victim Ramon A. Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle, along the Gomez Street of
Calbayog City. Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No. 4025 with plate
No. EVA-725 driven by defendant Rogasiones Manilhig y Dolira was being pushed by some persons
in order to start its engine. As the bus was pushed, its engine started thereby the bus continued on
its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A. Acuesta who was still riding on his
bicycle was directly in front of the said bus. As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and
suddenly, its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine, thereby the subject
bus bumped on the victim Ramon A. Acuesta who, as a result thereof fell and, thereafter, was run over
by the said bus. The trial court rendered judgment holding Philtranco and Manilhig jointly and
severally liable. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not Philtranco and Manilhig were solidarily liable.

Ruling:
Yes. This case is an action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 and 2180 of
the Civil Code against petitioner Manilhig and his employer, petitioner Philtranco, respectively. These
articles pertinently provide: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter. Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not

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only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The
owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused
by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion
of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. The court consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public
service vehicle, like petitioner Philtranco, for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is
primary, direct, and joint and several or solidary with the driver. As to solidarity, Article 2194
expressly provides: Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-
delict is solidary. Since the employer's liability is primary, direct and solidary, its only recourse if the
judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who
committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. Article 2181 of
the Civil Code provides: Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or
employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.

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97. FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT et al

G.R. No. 75112, August 17, 1992
J. Gutierrez Jr.

Doctrine:
The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption
of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of
the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage.

Facts:
Kapunan, Sr. an 82 year old retired teacher, was struck by a jeepney owned by Filamer
Christian Institute and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha. Kapunan was hospitalized for 20
days. He thus instituted a criminal case against Funtecha alone, who was convicted for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Thereafter, pursuant to his reservation, Kapunan
instituted a civil case for damages against Funtecha and Filamer and its president. The RTC and the
CA found Filamer, the school, liable for damages. Hence, this petition. Filamer contends that it is not
civilly liable because Funtecha was not its employee, as he was only a working scholar assigned to
clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day. Filamer anchors
its contention on Section 14, Rule X of Book III of the Labor Code,, which excludes working scholars
from the employment coverage as far as substantive labor provisions on working conditions, rest
periods, and wages is concerned.

Issue:
Is Filamer, Funtecha’s employer, liable?

Ruling:
Yes. In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house,
Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his
enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended
by the petitioner school. Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in
taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the
petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his
janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the
presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the

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interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury
or damage.

The fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the scope of his
janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris
tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the
supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required
diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.

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98. E. MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

G.R. No. L-11154, March 21, 1916
J. Trent

Doctrine:
The Government is only liable for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act
as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903.

Facts:
Plaintiff Merrit was riding on a motorcycle going toward the western part of Calle Padre
Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour, upon crossing
Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General
Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing
the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance
and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of
the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which
movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the
post place there. By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured.

The collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital
was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.

As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of
the Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages
resulting therefrom.

Act No. 2457, an Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the
Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.

Issue:
Whether the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunity from
suit.
Ruling:

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All admit that the Insular Government cannot be sued by an individual without its consent. It
is also admitted that the instant case is one against the Government to which the same consents
voluntarily.

The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital
and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of
said collision, . . . ." These were the two questions submitted to the court for determination. The Act
was passed "in order that said questions may be decided."

The Court have "decided" that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur,
who was at the time an employee of the defendant, and the court have also fixed the amount of
damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision.

In determining the scope of this act, the court said:

Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted
liability on the part of the state for the acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands
just as it would stand between private parties. It is difficult to see how the act does, or
was intended to do, more than remove the state's immunity from suit. It simply gives
authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the
estate. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in
the disposition of the suit shall depart from well-established principles of law, or that
the amount of damages is the only question to be settled. The act opened the door of
the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question of liability, but left the suit
just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity from suit. If the
Legislature had intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so long and to
declare liability on the part of the state, it would not have left so important a matter to
mere inference, but would have done so in express terms. (Murdock Grate Co. vs.
Commonwealth, 152 Mass., 28; 24 N.E., 854; 8 L. R. A., 399.)

It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to
any cause not previously recognized.

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Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:

The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not
when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it
pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article
shall be applicable.

The Supreme Court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:

That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to
another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15,
Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the
act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. It follows therefrom that the
state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered
by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the
discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even
negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of
public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must
presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of
service serves the general weal and that of private persons interested in its operation.
Between these latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature governed
by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person
capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. (Supreme Court of Spain,
January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)

Therefore, the Government is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special
agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the
ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in
this instance.

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Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages
above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its
employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called
upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.

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99. SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA AND VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE
INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION
G.R. No. L-55963 December 1, 1989

NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, appellant, vs. SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and
VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, appellees.
G.R. No. L-61045 December 1, 1989

J. Paras

Doctrine:
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent.; but not when
the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be applicable.

The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:
1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special
agents only.
2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it
becomes liable as an ordinary employer.

Facts:
On August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and operated by respondent National
Irrigation Administration, a government agency, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee
of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein
petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of
the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City
Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial
Hospital where he died. Petitioners-spouses filed a complaint for damages against respondent NIA in
connection with the death of their son resulting from the aforestated accident.

The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioners and directed respondent National
Irrigation Administration to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners.

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Respondent National Irrigation Administration’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

Respondent National Irrigation Administration thus appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals
where it filed its brief for appellant in support of its position. Instead of filing the required brief in the
aforecited Court of Appeals case, petitioners filed the instant petition with this Court.

Issue:
Whether the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees is legally
proper in a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict which resulted in the death of the son of
herein petitioners.

Ruling:
Yes. Art. 2176 thus provides:
Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing cotractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter

Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even the though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent.; but not when
the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be applicable.

The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:
3. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special
agents only.
4. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it
becomes liable as an ordinary employer.

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In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the tortious
acts or conduct of its special agent.

Under the aforequoted paragrah 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for
acts done through special agents. The State's agent, if a public official, must not only be specially
commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said official's usual
governmental functions. If the State's agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to perform
non-governmental functions, then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be
held liable as such for its agent's tort. Where the government commissions a private individual for a
special governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning of the provision.

The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising proprietary
functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601.

Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere
agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it
now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver-
employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as
such, it becomes answerable for damages.

This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the
part of respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is the negligence of supervision.

Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they were
travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed
to caution and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city. Under the
situation, such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without
even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped, thus showing
imprudence and reckelessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group.

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100. CITY OF MANILA vs. GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-23052, January 29, 1968
C.J. Concepcion

Doctrine:

Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to
attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have
either "control or supervision" over said street or road.

Facts:

Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a
"loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town As he stepped down from
the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch
basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking
his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom,
impairing his vision, several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manholeIn
addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh,
the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella
region. These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him
in the hospital, required further medical treatment.

Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint for damages against the
City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. As stated
in the decision of the trial court, and quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals,

At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public accountant, a businessman and a
professor at the University of the East. He held responsible positions in various business
firms. Because of the incident, he was subjected to humiliation and ridicule by his business
associates and friends. During the period of his treatment, plaintiff was under constant fear
and anxiety for the welfare of his minor children since he was their only support.

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The defense presented evidence, oral and documentary, to prove that the Storm Drain
Section, Office of the City Engineer of Manila, received a report of the uncovered condition of
a catchbasin at the corner of P. Burgos and Old Luneta Streets, Manila, on January 24, 1958,
but the same was covered on the same day.

The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered the aforementioned decision sustaining the
theory of the defendants and dismissing the amended complaint, without costs. On appeal taken by
plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the
City of Manila) or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines

Ruling:

It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a
special law and the Civil Code a general legislation. Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a
particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the
death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision." In
other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the
object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since
the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive
thereon.

At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality
from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or
municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue
were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control
or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409.

The decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed.

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101. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. PERFECTO R. PALACIO et al

G.R. No. L-20322, May 29, 1968
J. J.B.L. Reyes

Doctrine:

It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction, embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, that the State is liable only for torts caused by its special agents, specially
commissioned to carry out the acts complained of outside of such agent's regular duties. There being
no proof that the making of the tortious inducement was authorized, neither the State nor its funds
can be made liable therefor.

Facts:

Ildefonso Ortiz instituted in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the Handong
Irrigation Association, Inc., a corporation with principal place of business in Libmanan, Camarines
Sur, and the Irrigation Service Unit, an office or agency under the Department of Public Works and
Communications, to recover possession, with damages, of a 958 square meter-lot located in Handong,
San Juan, Libmanan, Camarines Sur, which the Irrigation Association allegedly entered and occupied,
at the instance of its co-defendant. For failure to appear and answer the complaint, therein defendant
Irrigation Service Unit was declared in default.

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, moved for the dismissal of the
complaint, claiming that defendant Irrigation Service Unit has no juridical personality to sue and be
sued.

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, filed with the lower court
an urgent motion to lift the order of garnishment, for the reason that the funds subject matter thereof
are public funds and exempt from attachment or execution. Upon denial of this motion, as well as of
the motion for reconsideration of said denial, the Solicitor General commenced the present certiorari
and prohibition proceeding in the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court sustained the propriety of the disputed garnishment-order, and
dismissed the Government's petition, on the basis of the finding by the trial court that the Irrigation
Service Unit, is engaged in a private business of purchase and sale of irrigation pumps and systems.

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By thus engaging in private business, the Government, through the Irrigation Service Unit, had
actually consented to the suit. Hence, the present petition for review filed by the Republic of the
Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not the pump irrigation trust fund, deposited with the Philippine National Bank
in the account of the Irrigation Service Unit, may be garnished to satisfy a money-judgment against
the latter.

Ruling:

It is apparent that this decision of the Court of Appeals suffers from the erroneous assumption
that because the State has waived its immunity, its property and funds become liable to seizure under
the legal process. This emphatically is not the law.

To allow the levying under execution of the ISU funds would amount to diverting them from
the purpose originally contemplated by the P.I.U.S. Bilateral Agreement, and would amount to a
disbursement without any proper appropriation as required by law.

A second infirmity of the decision under appeal originates from its ignoring the fact that the
initial complaint against the Irrigation Service Unit was that it had induced the Handong Irrigation
Association, Inc., to invade and occupy the land of the plaintiff Ildefonso Ortiz. The ISU liability thus
arose from tort and not from contract; and it is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction, embodied
in Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that the State is liable only for torts caused by its
special agents, specially commissioned to carry out the acts complained of outside of such agent's
regular duties. There being no proof that the making of the tortious inducement was authorized,
neither the State nor its funds can be made liable therefor.

The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is reversed and set aside, and the order of
garnishment issued by the Sheriff of Manila on the Pump Irrigation Trust Fund in the account of the
Irrigation Service Unit, with the Philippine National Bank, is hereby declared null and void.

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102. LUIS MA. ARANETA vs. ANTONIO R. DE JOYA

G.R. No. L-25172, May 24, 1974
J. Castro

Doctrine:
Contractual employee may be guilty of tort against the company. The existence of a contract
between the parties constitutes no bar to the commission of a tort by one against the other and the
consequent recovery of damages.

Facts:
Sometime in November 1952 the respondent, then general manager of the Ace Advertising,
proposed to the board of directors that an employee, Ricardo Taylor, be sent to the United States to
take up special studies in television. The board, however, failed to act on the proposal. Nevertheless,
in September 1953 the respondent sent Taylor abroad. J. Antonio Araneta, a company director,
inquired about the trip and was assured by the respondent that Taylor's expenses would be defrayed
not by the company but by other parties. This was thereafter confirmed by the respondent in a
memorandum.

Taylor was still receiving salaries while he is abroad through checks and vouchers. The other
checks were signed by either the respondent, or Vicente Araneta (company treasurer) who put up
part of the bill connected with Taylor's trip and also handed him letters for delivery in the United
States. The Ace Advertising disbursed P5,043.20, all told, on account of Taylor's travel and studies.

On August 23, 1954 the Ace Advertising filed a complaint with the court of first instance of
Manila against the respondent for recovery of the total sum disbursed to Taylor, alleging that the trip
was made without its knowledge, authority or ratification. The respondent, in his answer, denied the
charge and claimed that the trip was nonetheless ratified by the company's board of directors, and
that in any event under the by-laws he had the discretion, as general manager, to authorize the trip
which was for the company's benefit.

Both Araneta’s disowned any personal liability, claiming that they signed the checks covering
part of the travel expenses and payroll in good faith since they were approved by de Joya. The trial
court ruled that de Joya was liable for the amount disbursed by the company but dismissed the third-
party complaint, while the Court of Appeals held that according to the facts of the case, the two

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Araneta’s were also privy to the unauthorized disbursement of the corporate moneys jointly with the
appellant.

Issue:
Whether the petitioner is guilty of a quasi-delict.

Ruling:
Yes. His allegations of good faith were not substantiated and established. In fact, as vice-
president of the company, Luis Araneta remained passive concerning the unauthorized disbursement
of corporate funds and approved three of the payroll checks for Taylor’s salary. Luis Araneta
evidently neglected to perform his duties as an officer of the firm.

The fact that he even approved thrice payroll checks for the payment of Taylor's salary,
demonstrate quite distinctly that the petitioner neglected to perform his duties properly, to the
damage of the firm of which he was an officer. The fact that he was occupying a contractual position
at the Ace Advertising is of no moment. The existence of a contract between the parties, as has been
repeatedly held by this Court, constitutes no bar to the commission of a tort by one against the other
and the consequent recovery of damages.

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103. FELIX LANUZO vs. SY BON PING and SALVADOR MENDOZA

G.R. No. L-53064, September 25, 1980
J. Melencio-Herrera

Doctrine:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

Facts:
On July 24, 1969, while Salvador Mendoza was driving the truck along the national highway
in the Barrio of San Ramon, Nabua, Camarines Sur, and because of his reckless negligence, he rammed
into the residential house and store of plaintiff. As a result, the house and store were completely razed
to the ground causing damage to plaintiff in the total amount of P13,000.00. Plaintiff averred that by
reason thereof he became destitute as he lost his means of livelihood from the store which used to
give him a monthly income of P300.00.

The trial Court rendered a default judgment in plaintiff’s favor saying that Sy Bon Ping and
Mendoza were jointly and severally liable to pay Lanuzo P 13,000.00 as damages and P 300.00,
representing Lanuzo’s monthly income, until the entire P 13,000.00 has been paid in full.

Issue:
Whether the employer Sy Bon Ping is solidarily liable for the damages to Lanuzo.

Ruling:
Yes. For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned and operated by his
employer, the driver, Salvador Mendoza, is primarily liable under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. On
the other hand, the liability of his employer, Sy Bon Ping, is also primary and direct under Article
2180 of the same Code. x x x For failure of the appellant Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal presumption
of his negligence in the selection and supervision of his employee, he is likewise responsible for the
damages caused by the negligent act of his employee (driver) Salvador Mendoza, and his liability is
primary and solidary.

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But although the employer is solidarity liable with the employee for damages, the employer
may demand reimbursement from his employee (driver) for whatever amount the employer will
have to pay the offended party to satisfy the latter’s claim.

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104. PRIMA MALIPOL et.al., vs. LILY LIM TAN and ERNESTO LABSAN
G.R. No. L-27730, January 21, 1974
J. Zaldivar

Doctrine:
In a quasi-delict case, in case of an accident caused by the driver, it is incorrect to say that the
employer is only subsidiarily liable. In the case at bar, the Supreme Court ruled that such an accident
renders the employer primarily and directly liable.

Facts:
On February 6, 1965, Pantaleon Malijan was walking with his friend named Leonardo Amante
in Barrio San Felix, Santo Tomas, Batangas when suddenly a gasoline tanker driven by herein
defendant Ernesto Labsan hit Pantaleon causing him severe injuries. He was brought to San Pablo
Hospital where he died on the same night. The cause of his death according to the physician was
“possible traumatic cerebral hemorrhage due to vehicular accident.”

The family of the deceased, who were unable to arrange their amicable settlement with the
driver and herein employer of the gasoline tanker Lily Lim Tan, filed a suit for damages against the
two. During the trial in the lower court, the herein defendants were declared default for not having
filed their answer within the reglementary period. Motion to lift the default was likewise denied.
Hence, they appealed to the appellate court contending that it was the defendant’s lawyers fault for
not having the answer filed on time. It was later on revealed that the legal counsel for the defendants
declared suicide.

Issue:
Whether or not employer Lily Lim Tan can be held subsidiarily liable.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that in the case at bar, the defendant driver was not sued in
criminal aspect that will hold his employer subsidiarily liable. The herein defendants were sued
purely on a civil aspect - a tort case to be exact. Hence, in case of quasi-delict suit, employers are held
to be primarily and directly liable against the plaintiffs. Under Article 218 of the Civil Code, now
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code which deals with quasi-delicts, the liability of the owners and

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managers of an establishment or enterprise for damages caused by their employees is primary and
direct, not subsidiary.

The employer, however, can demand from his employee reimbursement of the amount which
he paid under his liability. 10 The employer, appellant Lily Lim Tan, must be held primarily and
directly, not subsidiarily, liable for damages awarded in the decision of the lower court. This is, of
course, without prejudice to the right of appellant Lily Lim Tan to demand from her co-appellant
Ernesto Labsan reimbursement of the damages that she would have to pay to appellees.

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105. DELFIN LIM and JIKIL TAHA vs. FRANCISCO PONCE DE LEON and ORLANDO MADDELA
G.R. No. L-22554, August 29, 1975
J. Martin

Doctrine:
Violation of one’s constitutional right has corresponding civil action pursuant to Article 32 of
the New Civil Code. This provision is an independent civil action that may proceed ahead pending
action from a criminal case. Moreover, the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or
magistrate and in no other officer, such as provincial fiscal, in this case, has the authority to issue
such.

Facts:
On April 29, 1961, Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya of Brooke's Point, Palawan
a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later, it was alleged by Alberto that Jikil, the former
seller, that Jikil took away his motor launch forcibly and filed a complaint before the provincial office
of the prosecutor of Palawan. The fiscal’s office then prepared information for robbery and forced
intimidation against Jikil Taha. The information was prepared and signed by herein fiscal-appellee
Francisco Ponce de Leon.

Pending the trial, the herein fiscal wrote a letter to the police station commander of the same
municipality named Orlando Maddela to seize the said subject matter for it is corpus delicti of the
case. Orlando at first hesitated. Forcing the provincial fiscal to write again on the second time. This
was the time when the police station commander seized the subject matter of the case. On July 15,
1962, plaintiff appellant Delfin Lim pleaded with Orlando Maddela to return the motor launch but
the latter refused.

Likewise, on September 20, 1962, Jikil Taha through his counsel made representations with
Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return the seized property to plaintiff appellant Delfin Lim but Fiscal Ponce
de Leon refused, on the ground that the same was the subject of a criminal offense. Since all efforts
have been exhausted leaving no alternatives left, Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha filed a complaint for
damages against the fiscal alleging that on July 6, 1962 Orlando Maddela entered the premises of
Delfin Lim without a search warrant and then and there took away the hull of the motor launch
without his consent; that he affected the seizure upon order of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knew fully
well that his office was not vested with authority to order the seizure of a private property

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Issue:
Whether or not the fiscal has the authority to issue orders for searches and seizures.

Ruling:
No. The fiscal does not have the power or authority to issue search warrants for purposes of
searches or seizures. This power is only vested to the judges only. The Fiscal invoked R.A. 732 that
broadened the powers of the fiscal. However, such provision does not mention that the fiscal has the
authority to issue warrants. Good faith is not also a defense when one’s constitutional right is
violated. Thus, the Court a quo is not persuaded by the contention of the fiscal.

With regard to the station commander, Maddela, the Court absolved him from the charges.
For the Court appreciated his actions that he hesitated to follow the command of the fiscal knowing
he does not have any authority to issue such an order. However, it was observed that the fiscal wrote
to the station commander again the second time around that forced him to follow the order. Madella
had been pressured by his superior to do an act, in which he would not do it in the first place.

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106. ABERCA VS. VER

G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
J. Yap

Doctrine:
Article 32 of the Civil Code renders any public officer or employee or any private individual
liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated
therein. The doctrine of respondeat superior has been generally limited in its application to principal
and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship
exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates.

Facts:
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights
and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known
as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver “to conduct pre-emptive strikes
against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT
plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila,”

Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided
several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these
raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging
to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some
period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were
interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated
them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain
incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs
constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and
incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being
previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.

A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General
Estelito Mendoza, alleging among others that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the
circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the

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writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action,
defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties.

Issue:
(1). Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil
action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights
and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution

(2). If such action for damages may be maintained, may a superior officer under the notion of
respondeat superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the
person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?

Ruling:
(1). NO. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy
petitioners’ right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations
of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or
detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention
through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

(2). YES. Article 32 of the Civil Code renders any public officer or employee or any private
individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as
enumerated therein. The doctrine of respondeat superior has been generally limited in its application
to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such
relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates. Be that as it may,
however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of
an officer or employee or person ‘directly’ or “indirectly” responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly
responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has
also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.

By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution 5
acquires added meaning and a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance
or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to

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answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights
and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the
widely held perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible
for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be go naive to expect that
violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should
nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who
are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.

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107. MHP GARMENTS VS CA

G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994
J. Puno

Doctrine:
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is NOT necessary
therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main
purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights.

Facts:
In February 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies,
badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum Agreement, MHP was given the authority to "undertake
or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other
scouting supplies." Sometime in October 1983, MHP received information that private respondents
were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority. Larry de Guzman (“Larry”),
an employee of MHP, was then tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report
to the Philippine Constabulary (PC).

On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., Larry, Captain Renato M. Peñafiel, and 2 other
constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina
Public Market. WITHOUT any warrant, they seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits
on display at respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private
respondents. Receipts were issued for the seized items and the items were then turned over to MHP
for safekeeping.

A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents but
during its pendency, Larry exacted from respondent Lugatiman P3,100.00 in order to be dropped
from the complaint. However, after the preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal
dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents and ordered the return of the seized
items. The seized items were not immediately returned despite demands. Private respondents had
to go personally to petitioners' place of business to recover their goods, and even then, not all the
seized items were returned and the other items returned were of inferior quality.

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Private respondents filed a civil case for sums of money and damages against MHP and Larry
(note: the PC officers were not sued for damages). The RTC ruled in favor of the private respondents
which was later on affirmed by CA.

Issue:
(1).Whether or not CA err in imputing liability for damages to petitioners who did not effect
the seizure.
(2).Whether or not CA err in finding that the seizure was done in a tortious manner but
penalized the petitioners who did not commit the act of confiscation?

Ruling:
(1). NO. While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team should have been included
in the complaint for violation of the private respondents' constitutional rights, still, the omission will
not exculpate petitioners. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized
the goods of private respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the
seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and
seizure. In the case at bench, the search and seizure were clearly illegal. There was no probable cause
for the seizure.

The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did
not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by and apparently
assenting thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves.

In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, we ruled for the recovery of damages for violation of
constitutional rights and liberties from public officer or private individual. The very nature of Article
32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is NOT necessary therefore that there should be malice
or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the
effective protection of individual rights.

In, Aberca vs. Ver, the court held that in Art. 32, the law speaks of an officer or employee or
person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties
of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for
damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or

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injury caused to the aggrieved party… it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that
Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for
the transgression joint tortfeasors.

(2). NO. The respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents. Petitioners
were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable
search and seizure:

FIRST, They instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to
undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies.

SECOND, Under Letter of Instruction No. 1299, petitioners miserably failed to report the unlawful
peddling of scouting goods to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines for the proper application of a
warrant.

THIRD, If petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a third-party complaint
against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief, in respect of respondents' claim for
Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages. Again, they did not.

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108. MAXIMO MARCIA et al vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FELARDO PAJE, and VICTORY LINER, INC.
G.R. No. L-34529, January 27, 1983
J. Relova

Doctrine:
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might
arise did not exist. Thus, His acquittal is not due to non-existence of the crime from which civil liability
might arise, but because he was not, in the eyes of the court, sufficiently identified as the perpetrator
of the crime.

Facts:

On December 23, 1956, a collision happened in the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga where
a passenger bus operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee,
private respondent Felardo Paje, it was stated that the latter did not see the upcoming jeep, driven
by deceased Clemente Marcia, the jeep came very fast at the center of the road and out of its lane,
which the passenger of the bus shouted to bring the bus to the side in order to avoid collision, thus
Paje brought the bus to the right shoulder of the road, however Marcia lost its control and veered
sharply to the right shoulder of the road and crashed into the bus which resulted to Marcia’s death
and physical injuries to the other herein petitioners.

Issue:
Whether or not the acquittal in the criminal case would result in the dismissal in the civil
case.

Ruling:
In the case at bar, the Court ruled that the injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged
to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent
civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith. Furthermore, his acquittal is not
due to non-existence of the crime from which civil liability might arise, but because he was not, in the
eyes of the court, sufficiently identified as the perpetrator of the crime.

ART. 33 of the Civil Code states that “In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the

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criminal action may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.”

The charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide and physical injuries suffered by Edgar
Marcia and Renato Yap. They are not one of the three (3) crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil
Code and, thus, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.

Therefore, it was only proper that the court dismiss the civil case against Paje and Victory
Liner, Inc.

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109. CARMEN L. MADEJA vs. HON. FELIX CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON
G.R. No. L-51183, December 21, 1983
Abad Santos, J.

Doctrine:
The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless
the offended party reserves his right to institute it separately.

Facts:
A criminal case was pending against Dr. Eva A. Japzon, she was accused of homicide through
reckless imprudence for the death of the husband of Carmen L. Madeja, that according to the latter it
was because of appendectomy done by Dr. Japzon. However, while the criminal case was still
pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages as she alleged that her husband died
because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon.

Issue:
Whether or not the civil case proceed independently of the criminal case.

Ruling:
The Court ruled that a civil action may be filed independently of the criminal action, even if
there has been no reservation made by the injured party, the law itself makes such reservation.

Under Rule 111, Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32,
33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the
criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.

Therefore, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may proceed independently
of the criminal action against her.

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110. MVRS PUBLICATION vs. ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003
Bellosillo, J.:

Doctrine:

Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that
the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or
class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the
defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need
be. Consequently, as a prerequisite to recovery, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove as part of
his prima facie case that the defendant (1) published a statement that was (2) defamatory (3) of and
concerning the plaintiff.

Facts:
Bulgar, a local tabloid, published an article in 1992 about the Muslim’s practical customs
stating:
“ALAM BA NINYO?
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi
kinakain ng mga Muslim?
Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito
kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa
tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila
ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na
tinatawag nilang ‘Ramadan’."

Thereafter, Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines filed a complaint alleging the libelous
statement as insulting and damaging because words alluding to pig as the God of Muslims were with
intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult, and disparage the Muslims and Islam.

MVRS contended however, that they did not mention respondents as the object of the article,
thus not entitled to damages. In defense, the article was only an expression of their belief or opinion.

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The RTC dismissed their case because there was no cause of action. The plaintiffs were not
specifically identified for defamation. In 1998, the CA reversed the decision. Hence, this review.

Issue:
Whether or not this is an action for defamation (libel) or an emotional distress tort action?

Ruling:
The Supreme court ruled that there is no cause of action for defamation.

Defamation means the offense of injuring a person’s character fame or reputation through
false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem,
respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the
plaintiff. It is the publication of anything which is injurious to the good name or reputation of another
or tends to bring him into disrepute. And where defamation is alleged to have been directed at a
group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to
every individual in that group or class, or sufficiency specific so that each individual in the class or
group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the
action separately, if need be.

The statements published by petitioners in the instant case did not specifically identify nor
refer to any particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous
publication. Respondents can scarcely claim to having been singled out for social censure pointedly
resulting in damages.

The action likewise is not for emotional distress.

An emotional distress tort action is personal in nature. It has no application in the instant
case since no particular individual was identified in the disputed article. Also, the purported damage
caused by the article, assuming there was any, falls under the principle of relational harm which
includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form of defamation; as distinguished
from the principle of reactive harm which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the
form of an infliction of emotional distress. In their complaint, respondents clearly asserted an alleged
harm to standing of Muslims in the community, especially to their activities in propagating their faith

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in metro manila and in other non-Muslim communities in the country. It is thus beyond cavil that the
present case falls within the application of the relational harm’s principle of tort actions for
defamation, rather than the reactive harm principle on which the concept of emotional distress
properly belongs.

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111. SALTA V. DE VEYRA

202 Phil 527, September 30, 1982
J. De Castro

Doctrine:
The court held that the filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is
fully warranted under the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code. If petitioner's civil liability is,
as alleged in the complaint, based on negligence, apart from the averment of fraud, then the civil
action can be maintained regardless of the outcome of the criminal action.

Facts:
Amayra Salta was employed as branch manager of the Philippine National Bank (PNB). As
such, his duty was to grant loans or to recommend the granting of loans, depending on the the amount
of the loan applied for. In the performance of this particular duty, he is supposed to exercise care and
prudence, and with utmost diligence, observe the policies, rules and regulations of the bank.

PNB filed two civil complaints against Salta charging him of indiscriminately granting certain
loans in a manner characterized by negligence, fraud, and manifest partiality, and upon securities not
commensurate with the amount of the loans. The two civil cases were assigned to two different salas
of the Court of First Instance of Manila. At the same time, the bank caused to be filed, a criminal case,
based on the same acts.

Petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case on the ground that the elements of the crime
charged were not proven. Based on his acquittal petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss in each of the
two civil cases. The two presiding judges in the separate civil cases took diametrically opposing
views. One judge denied his motion and the other granted it. Hence, these petitions by the Philippine
National Bank in one case and by Salta in the other.

Issue:
Whether or not the motion to dismiss the civil cases should be affirmed or denied.

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Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the order denying the motion to dismiss issued in Civil Case No.
79583 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (G. R. No. L-37733), while the order granting a similar
motion in Civil Case No. 88343 of the same court (G. R. No. L-38035) is reversed. The two (2) cases
were remanded to their respective courts of origin for proper further proceedings.

The court held that the filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is
fully warranted under the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code.

The criminal case is for the prosecution of an offense the main element of which is fraud, one
of the kinds of crime mentioned in the aforecited provision. Based on the same acts for which the
criminal action was filed, the civil actions very clearly alleged fraud and negligence as having given
rise to the cause of action averred in the complaints. It needs hardly any showing to demonstrate this
fact, which petitioner disputes, particularly as to the sufficiency of the allegation of fraud in the civil
complaints. Definitely, the following allegation in the complaints unmistakably shows that the
complaints do contain sufficient averment of fraud: "13. That there was fraud committed by the
defendant in granting the aforesaid loans which rendered him liable for his acts, which fraud is
positively and easily identifiable in the manner and scheme aforementioned."

That there is allegation of negligence is also unmistakably shown when the complaint states
that "the defendant as manager of Malolos Branch, in gross violation of the bank rules and
regulations, and without exercising necessary prudence, x x x extended a number of credit
accommodations x x x." On this allegation of negligence alone, the civil case may be maintained as an
entirely independent action from the criminal case.

Further, The ruling in the case of PNB vs. Bagamaspad,[7] involving the same respondent
herein, and also against its branch manager, unerringly charts the course to be followed in the final
resolution of these cases. Thus

"The trial court based in the civil liability the appellants herein on the
provisions of Article 1718 and 1719 of the Civil Code, defining and
enumerating the duties and obligations of an agent and his liability for
failure to comply with such duty. x x x. A careful study and

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consideration of the record, however, convinces us and we agree with

the trial court that the defendants-appellants have not only violated
instructions of the plaintiff Bank, including things which the bank
wanted done or not done, all of which were fully understood by them,
but they (appellants) also violated standing regulations regarding the
granting of loans; and what is more, thru their carelessness, laxity and
negligence, they allowed loans to be granted to persons who were not
entitled to secure loans."

If petitioner's civil liability is, as alleged in the complaint, based on negligence, apart from the
averment of fraud, then on the strength of the aforesaid ruling, the civil action can be maintained
regardless of the outcome of the criminal action.

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112. VICTORIA G. CAPUNO and JOSEPHINE G. CAPUNO vs. PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF
THE PHILIPPINES and JON ELORDI
G.R. No. L-19331, April 30, 1965
J. Makalintal

Doctrine:
The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing death. In other
words, the civil action for damages could have been commenced by appellants immediately upon the
death of their decedent and the same would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action
for homicide through reckless imprudence

Facts:
The case arose from a vehicular collision which occurred in Apalit, Pampanga. Involved were
a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. The collision
proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras.

Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga. While the criminal case was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses
and their heirs filed a civil action, also for damages, in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac against the
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi (civil case No. 838). Included in the
complaint was a claim for indemnity in the sum of P2,623.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs
of Capuno under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Parties in Civil Case No. 838 entered into a "Compromise and Settlement." For P290,000.00
the Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages, including the claim for reimbursement of the sum of
P2,623.00 previously paid to the heirs of Capuno "under the Workmen's Compensation Act." The
Court approved the compromise and accordingly dismissed the case.

Judgment on the criminal case was decided where the accused Elordi was acquitted of the
charges against him. Prior to that, appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. This action was dismissed, hence, the appeal
at the Supreme Court.

Issue:

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WON the plaintiffs may file a civil action independent of the criminal action pursuant to
Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code.

Ruling:
Yes. Pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.

The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing death. In other
words, the civil action for damages could have been commenced by appellants immediately upon the
death of their decedent, Cipriano Capuno, on January 3, 1953, and the same would not have been
stayed by the filing of the criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence. But the
complaint here was filed only on September 26, 1958, or after the lapse of more than five years. Thus,
the action of the appellants is already barred by virtue of prescription.

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113. LAURA CORPUS et al. vs. FELARDO PAJE and VICTORY LINER TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.
G.R. No. L-26737, July 31, 1969
J. Capistrano

Doctrine:
As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in
Article 33 of the Civil Code, there is no independent civil action for damages that may be instituted in
connection with said offense. Hence, homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence
comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his
civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party reserved his
right to institute a separate civil action.

Facts:
A passenger bus of the Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., driven by Felardo Paje, collided
within the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the
latter's death and in physical injuries to two other persons.

An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence was filed against Felardo Paje in the Court First Instance of Pampanga. The heirs of
Clemente Marcia reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for damages.

The accused, Felardo Paje, was found guilty of the crime charged in the information. He
appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. While defendant's appeal was pending
decision in the Court of Appeals, Clemente Marcia's heirs, namely, his widow, Laura Corpus, and their
minor children, instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a separate civil action for damages
based upon the criminal act of reckless imprudence against Felardo Paje and the Victory Liner
Transportation Co., Inc., defendants, praying that said defendants be ordered to pay jointly and
severally the amounts of damages claimed by the plaintiffs. On November 9, 1962, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its decision in the appeal of Felardo Paje reversing the appealed judgment and
acquitting the appellant after finding that the reckless imprudence charged against him did not exist,
and that the collision was a case of pure accident. Later on, the defendants filed in the civil action a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the acquittal by the Court of Appeals
of the defendant Felardo Paje in the criminal action. The motion was denied.

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The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. As such, a direct appeal
to the Supreme Court was made by the plaintiffs.

Issue:
WON the acquittal of the defendant Paje by the CA in the criminal action on the ground that
the reckless imprudence or criminal negligence charged against him did not exist and that the
collision was a case of pure accident, was a bar to the civil action for damages for the death of
Clemente Marcia, which action was based upon the same criminal negligence of which the defendant
Felardo Paje was acquitted in the criminal action.

Ruling:
Yes. Criminal negligence, that is, reckless imprudence, is not one of the three crimes
mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes the institution of an independent civil
action, that is, of an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, which shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderance of evidence.
It is to be borne in mind that the charge against Felardo Paje was for reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide, and not for homicide and physical injuries.

As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in
Article 33 of the Civil Code, there is no independent civil action for damages that may be instituted in
connection with said offense. Hence, homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence
comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his
civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party reserved his
right to institute a separate civil action. In the language of the Rules of Court (Rule 111, Sec. 3) the
extinction of the criminal action by acquittal of the defendant on the ground that the criminal act
charged against him did not exist, necessarily extinguished also the civil action for damages based
upon the same act.

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114. DULAY V. CA
G.R. No. 108017, April 3, 1995
J. Bidin

Doctrine:

The Supreme Court said that the term physical injuries have already been construed to
included bodily injuries that lead to death. It is not the crime of physical injuries that were defined in
the Revised Penal Code and it includes not only physical injuries but also homicide – whether it’s
consummated, frustrated, or attempted. In this case, because Torzuela is charged with homicide, then
a civil action based on Article 33 must be filed against it.

Facts:

On December 7, 1988, there was an alteration between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon
Dulay that occurred at the “Big Bang Sa Alabang”, in Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which
Benigno Torzuela, is a security guard on duty at “Big Bang Sa Alabang”, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon
Dulya. The Petitioner Maria Benita Dulay, the widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own
behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and
private respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc, and/or Superguard Security Corp.,
alleged employers of defendants Torzuela. The respondent Superguard filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the complaint does not validly state a cause of action. Superguard claims that
Torzuela’s act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties and that since the alleged act of
shooting was committed with deliberate intent, the civil liability is governed by Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Superguard further alleges that the complaint for damages based on negligence under Article
2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the complaint filed by the petitioners, cannot lie, because the
liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code. The respondents argued that the filing of the petitioners of the complaint is premature because
the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is an example of condition sine qua non for the
employer’s subsidiary liability. Safeguard filed a motion praying that it be removed as a defendant on
the ground that Torzuela is not one of their employees. Petitioners opposed both motions and stated
that their cause of action against the private respondent is based on their liability under Article 2180
of the Civil Code.

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Issue:

1. Whether or not Benigno Torzuela’s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict
that is actional under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code?

2. Whether or not Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries that are intentionally
committed; and

3. Whether or not the liability or respondents is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code

Ruling:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court citing the provisions of Article 2176, wherein it says that:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

The Court explains that it only covers acts committed with negligence, but also acts that are voluntary
and intentional.

2. No. The Supreme Court said that the term physical injuries have already been construed to
included bodily injuries that lead to death. It is not the crime of physical injuries that were defined in
the Revised Penal Code and it includes not only physical injuries but also homicide – whether it’s
consummated, frustrated, or attempted. In this case, because Torzuela is charged with homicide, then
a civil action based on Article 33 must be filed against it.

3. No. The Supreme Court explaining the applications of Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, says
that the liability of an employer under this provision is direct and immediate and that it is not
conditioned upon the prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the
insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that
it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees.

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115. VELAYO V. SHELL

G.R. No. L-7817, October 31, 1956
J. Felix

Doctrine:

Article 21 of the New Civil Code. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

Facts:

Before the year 1948, Commercial Air lines owed Php 170,000.00 to Shell Company of the
Philippine Islands. Commercial Islands offered its C-54 planes as a payment to Shell Company, but
Shell at that time declined as it thought that CALI had sufficient funds to pay its debt. In 1948,
however, Commercial Air lines were going to be bankrupt so it already called upon its creditors for
an informal meeting, wherein in that meeting, the creditors agreed to appoint representatives to
work in a working committee that would determine how each creditor should be paid. They also
agreed not to file a suit against Commercial Air lines but Commercial Air lines did reserve it will file
insolvency proceedings in case the assets will not be enough to pay its creditors. Shell Company was
represented by Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald to the three men working committee. Later on, this
committee convened on how the assets of CALI will be divided amongst its creditors. Fitzgerald sent
a telegraph message to Shell and said that it is assigning its credit in the amount of Php 79,440.00,
which effectively collected the indebtedness of Commercial Air Lines to Shell.

The case arises when Alfredo M. Velayo instituted this case on December 17, 1948, against
Shell Company for the purpose of securing from the Court a writ of injunction restraining Defendant,
its agents, servants, attorneys, and solicitors from prosecuting in and for the County of San
Bernardino in the Superior Court of the State of California, U.S.A. against the insolvent Commercial
Air Lines, Inc., begun by it in the name of the American corporation Shell Oil Company, Inc., and as an
alternative remedy, in case the purported assignment of Defendant’s alleged credit to the American
corporation Shell Oil Company, Inc.

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Issue:

Whether or not by reason of said betrayal of public trust and confidence, the defendant may
be made under the law to answer for the damages considering there was no law violated?

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court said that the basis will be Article 21 of the New Civil Code. Art. 21.
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage”. The Supreme Court cites the
Code Commission in commenting on this article, says the following:

“Thus, at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.

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116. ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., JESSE YAP and BENJAMIN MENDIONA vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and EUGENIO S. BALTAO
G.R. No. 88694 January 11, 1993
J. Bidin

Doctrine:
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties.

Facts:
Petitioner Albenson delivered to Guaranteed Industries in Sta. Mesa, Manila, mild steel plates.
As payment, Albenson was given a Pacific Banking Corp. check drawn against E.L. Woodworks.

When the check was presented, it was dishonored for the reason “Account Closed''. Petitioner traced
the origin of the dishonored check and discovered in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
that the president of Guaranteed Industries was one Eugenio S. Baltao. Albenson also learned that
E.L. Woodworks is a single proprietorship business registered in the name of Eugenio Baltao.
Additionally, upon verification from Pacific Bank, the signature appeared in the check was one of
Eugenio Baltao. After learning this, petitioner made an extra-judicial demand to Baltao to replace
and/or make good of the check.

Bantao denied that he issued the check and further alleged that Guaranteed was a defunct
entity, hence, could not have transacted business with Albenson.

Albenson filed a case against Eugenio Baltao in the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. Fiscal Sumaway
filed an Information for Batas Pambansa 22 against Eugenio Baltao. However, Provincial Fiscal Castro
reversed the Resolution of Fiscal Sumaway.

For the unjust filing of the criminal case by Albenson, Baltao filed a case for damages against
Albenson.
The trial court finds in favor of Baltao. It decides that the check drawn was against E.L.
Woodworks and not of Guaranteed. The trial court also noted that it is possible that Eugenio Baltao
III, and not Eugenio Baltao, was the one transacting with Albenson.

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The appellate court affirmed the decision with modifications as to the damages.

Issue:
Whether or not Albenson can be held liable for damages under Art. 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code or the principle of abuse of right.

Ruling:
The Court held in the negative.

Petitioner Albenson could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. What
prompted the petitioner to file the case for Violation of Batas Pambansa 22 against Eugenio Bantao
was their failure to collect the amount as payment to them due on a bounced check which they
honestly believed was issued to them by Eugenio Bantao.

Respondent Bantao, however, did nothing to clarify the case of mistaken identity at first.
Instead, he waited in ambush and therefore pounced on the hapless petitioner at a time he thought
was propitious by filing a case for damages.

There is no proof of malicious design on part of Albenson to vex or humiliate respondent
Bantao by instituting the criminal case against him.

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117. SERGIO AMONOY vs. SPS. JOSE GUTIERREZ and ANGELA FORNIDA
G.R. No. 140420 February 15, 2001
J. Panganiban

Doctrine:
The principle of Damnum Absque Injuria does not apply when there is an abuse of a person's
right, or when the exercise of this right is suspended or extinguished pursuant to a court order.

Facts:
Amonoy was the counsel of the successors of the deceased Julio Cantolos for the settlement
of the latter’s estate. In January 1965, the lots were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso
Formilda. On January 20, 1965, Pasamba and Formilda executed a deed of real estate mortgage on
the said two lots adjudicated to them, in favor of Amonoy to secure the payment of his attorney’s fees.
But on August 6, 1969, after the taxes had been paid, the claims settled and the properties
adjudicated, the estate was declared closed and terminated. When Pasamba and Formilda passed
away, Formilda was succeeded by the spouses Gutierrez. On January 21, 1970, Amonoy filed for the
closure of the two lots alleging the non-payment of attorney’s fees. The herein respondents denied
the allegation, but judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy.

Still, for failure to pay attorney’s fees, the lots were foreclosed. Amonoy was able to buy the
lots by auction where the house of the spouses Gutierrez was situated. On Amonoy’s motion of April
24, 1986, orders were implemented for the demolition of structures in the said lot, including the
respondents’ house. On September 27, 1985, David Formilda petitioned to the Supreme Court for a
TRO for the suspension of the demolition, which was granted, but the houses have already been
demolished. A complaint for damages was filed by respondents, which was denied by RTC but
granted by CA, thus this case.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Amonoy was liable for damages to
the respondents.

Ruling:
Petitioner’s contention lacks merit.

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Petitioner invokes that it is well-settled that the maxim of damage resulting from the
legitimate exercise of a person’s rights is a loss without injury — damnum absque injuria — for which
the law gives no remedy, saying he is not liable for damages. The precept of Damnum Absque Injuria
has no application in this case. Petitioner did not heed the TRO suspending the demolition of
structures. Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outset, their
continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably,
his actions were tainted with bad faith.

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the
performance of one’s duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone
his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. This must be observed. Clearly then, the demolition
of respondents’ house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an
unlawful exercise of such right. The petition is denied. The decision of CA is affirmed.

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118. BPI vs CA
G.R. No. 120639 September 25, 1998
J. Kapunan

Doctrine:
To find the existence of an abuse of right Article 19 the following elements must be present
(1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.

Facts:
Atty. Marasigan was a complimentary member of BPI Express Card Corp. and a holder of
credit card. Their contractual relations went on smoothly until his statement of account for October
1989 amounting to P8,987.84 was not paid in due time. The plaintiff admitted having inadvertently
failed to pay his account for the said month because he was in Quezon province attending to some
professional and personal commitments.

He was informed by his secretary that BPI was demanding immediate payment of his
outstanding account, was requiring him to issue a check for P15,000.00 which would include his
future bills, and was threatening to suspend his credit card. Plaintiff issued Far East Bank and Trust
Co. Check No. 494675 in the amount of P15,000.00, postdated December 15, 1989 which was
received on November 23, 1989 by Tess Lorenzo, an employee of the defendant. On November 28,
2989, defendant served plaintiff a letter by ordinary mail informing him of the temporary suspension
of the privileges of his credit card and the inclusion of his account number in their Caution List.

Confident that he had settled his account with the issuance of the postdated check, plaintiff
invited some guests on December 8, 1989 and entertained them at Café Adriatico. When he presented
his credit card to Café Adriatico for the bill amounting to P735.32, said card was dishonored. One of
his guests, Mary Ellen Ringler, paid the bill by using her own credit card a Unibankard. Marasigan
filed a complaint for damages against petitioner. The trial court ruled for private respondent, finding
that herein petitioner abused its right in contravention of Article 19 of the Civil Code. The CA affirmed
the decision.
Issue:
Whether private respondent can recover moral damages arising from the cancellation of his
credit card by petitioner credit card corporation

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Ruling:
NO. The Court granted the petition. Under the terms and conditions of the credit card, signed
by the private respondent, any card with outstanding balances after thirty (30) days from original
billing/statement shall automatically be suspended. By his own admission private respondent no
payment within thirty days for his billing/statement dated 27 September 1989. Neither did he make
payment for his original billing/statement dated 27 October 1989. Consequently as early as 28
October 1989 thirty days from the non-payment of his billing dated 27 September 1989, petitioner
corporation could automatically suspend his credit card.
Indeed, there was an arrangement between the parties, wherein the petitioner required the
private respondent to issue a check worth P15,000.00 as payment for the latter's billings. However
we find that the private respondent was not able to comply with this obligation.
As the testimony of private respondent himself bears out, the agreement was for the immediate
payment of the outstanding account.
As agreed upon by the parties, on the following day, private respondent did issue a check for
P15,000.00. However, the check was postdated 15 December 1989. Settled is the doctrine that a
check is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by
itself operate as payment.
Thus, the issuance by the private respondent of the postdated check was not effective
payment. It did not comply with his obligation under the arrangement with Miss Lorenzo. Petitioner
corporation was therefore justified in suspending his credit card.
Finally, we find no legal and factual basis for private respondent's assertion that in canceling the
credit card of the private respondent, petitioner abused its right under the terms and conditions of
the contract.
To find the existence of an abuse of right Article 19 the following elements must be present
(1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.
As early as 28 October 1989, petitioner could have suspended private respondent's card
outright. Instead, petitioner allowed private respondent to use his card for several weeks. Petitioner
had even notified private respondent of the impending suspension of his credit card and made special
accommodations for him for setting his outstanding account. As such, petitioner cannot be said to
have capriciously and arbitrarily canceled the private respondent's credit card.

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We do not dispute the findings of the lower court that private respondent suffered damages
as a result of the cancellation of his credit card. However, there is a material distinction between
damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm
which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or
harm was not the results of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne
by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does
not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that the plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complaints, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant
owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person
causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was
injured in contemplation of law. The same was absent in the case. It was petitioner's failure to settle
his obligation which caused the suspension of his credit card and subsequent dishonor at Café
Adriatico. He cannot now pass the blame to the petitioner for not notifying him of the suspension of
his card.

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119. RUIZ V. SECRETARY
G.R. No. L-15526, December 28, 1963
J. Paredes

Doctrine:
It may be added, however, that this article also envisions a situation where a person has a
legal right, and such right is violated by another in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy; it presupposes losses or injuries, material or otherwise, which one may suffer as a
result of said violation.

Facts:
On September 11, 1950, a contract was executed between the defendant Allied Technologists,
Inc. (corporation, for short), and the Republic of the Philippines, for the construction of the Veterans
Memorial Hospital. Ruiz and Herrera were stockholders and officers of the corporation. The
construction of the hospital was terminated in 1955.

Civil cases were filed by same plaintiffs herein. Civil Case No. 26601 was also dismissed on September
13, 1955. On appeal, this Court reversed the order of dismissal, under the impression that the real
controversy was confined merely between defendant Panlilio (architect) and plaintiffs Ruiz and
Herrera over the 15% of the contract price, which was retained by the Department of National
Defense. The retention of the 15% of the contract price in the sum of P34,740.00 was made to answer
for any claim or lien that might arise, in the course of the construction. The last case, however, was
remanded to the court of origin, for further proceedings.

Panlilio and the corporation stated that the amount retained by the Department of National
Defense was already paid to defendant corporation, as sought for by the plaintiffs in their complaint.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, for being already academic and moot.

Plaintiffs-appellants insisted upon a hearing in order to establish their right to be recognized

as two of the three architects of the hospital, the latter should not have ordered the dismissal of the
entire case but should have ordered only the striking out of the moot portion of appellants' first cause
of Appellants further argue in their brief that they base their cause of action on article 21, New Civil
Code.

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Issue:

Whether or not the cause of the action of the plaintiff was Article 21 of the New Civil Code.

Ruling:

No. The order appealed from is affirmed. The appeal has no merit. But appellants invoke
Article 21 of the Civil Code, which states —

Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages.

They contended that the word "injury" in the said article, refers not only to any indeterminate
right or property, but also to honor or credit. It may be added, however, that this article also envisions
a situation where a person has a legal right, and such right is violated by another in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy; it presupposes losses or injuries, material or otherwise,
which one may suffer as a result of said violation. The pleadings do not show that damages were ever
asked or alleged, in connection with this case, predicated upon the article aforecited. And under the
facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, one cannot plausibly sustain the contention that the
failure or refusal to extend the recognition was an act contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy.

Others:

A cursory reading of pars. 18 and 19 of the amended complaint with injunction and prayers (1) and
(2) thereof, reveals that appellants' first cause of action is composed of two parts, as follows:

(a) A judicial declaration or recognition that appellants Ruiz and Herrera, together with appellee
Panlilio, were the architects of the Veterans Hospital; and

(b) An injunction restraining the appellee government officials paying their co-appellee Panlilio the
sum retained by the former, as per stipulation contained in the contract for the construction of the
hospital because "they will not only be deprived of the monetary value of the services legally due
them, but that their professional prestige and standing will be seriously impaired".lawphil.net

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As appellants admitted, they no longer consider the Secretary and other officials of the Department
of National Defense, as parties-defendants in the case, said officials can no longer be compelled to
recognize the appellants, Ruiz and Herrera, as co-architects with appellee Panlilio of the Veterans
Hospital. And, as the amount retained by the Department on the contract price, which retention was
authorized by the contract, was, as sought by the appellants, already paid to the Allied Technologists,
Inc., there is nothing more for the trial court to decide, even without first ruling on the special
defenses of appellees Panlilio and the corporation.

Moreover, by discarding the Secretary and other officials of the Department of National Defense, as
parties-defendants, appellants could not expect the trial court to order them to recognize and declare
appellants as co-architects in the construction of the hospital. And this must be so, because the
construction agreement expressly provides that the architect being contracted by the Government
was appellee Pablo Panlilio.

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120. BUNAG VS CA
G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992
J. Regalado

Doctrine:
The time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the
civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith
of such promise

Facts:
Conrado Bunag, Jr. and Zenaida Cirilo, after reaching a hotel/motel and having sexual
intercourse, went to Pamplona in Las Piñas, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21
days, even filing an application for a marriage license in Cavite. Bunag, Jr., however, withdrew the
application on October 1, 1973. Cirilo’s version of the case recites that she and Bunag were lovers.
She also states was brought to the hotel/motel against her will where Bunag succeeded in raping her,
and that thereafter, she was allowed to go home only after they were married. They then went to
Bunag’s grandmother’s house in Las Piñas where they lived as husband and wife, but on September
29, 1973, Bunag left and never returned, bringing Cirilo humiliation and shame because of Bunag’s
deception. This was corroborated by Cirilo’s uncle, Vivencio, who added that Bunag’s father, Bunag,
Sr. wanted to settle things and have the couple wed. Bunag, Jr., on the other hand, insists that he did
not rape Cirilo. In fact, he and Cirilo had plans to elope and get married. However, due to bitter
disagreements over money and threats to his person, Bunag, Jr. broke off the engagement..

Issue:
Whether Bunag, Jr. correct in asserting that since the action involved breach of promise to
marry, the trial court erred in awarding damages?

Ruling:
The high Court held that while it is true that in this jurisdiction, the time-honored rule that
an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to
recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. Article 21 was
adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for

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human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. Under the prevailing circumstances, the
acts of Bunag, Jr. in forcibly abducting Cirilo and having carnal knowledge with her against her will,
and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to renege on such
promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, constitute acts contrary to morals and good
customs.

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121. CONSTANTINO VS MENDEZ

G.R. No. 57227. May 14, 1992.
J. Bidin

Doctrine:
Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse was not a product of voluntariness and
mutual desire.

Facts:
Amelita Constantino worked as a waitress at Tony’s Restaurant in Sta. Cruz, Manila. It was
here where she met Ivan Mendez. Following their first meeting, Mendez invited her to dinner at the
Hotel Enrico. While dining, Mendez professed his love for Constantino. Constantino asked to be
brought home, to which Mendez agreed, on the pretext of getting something in return. Promising to
marry her, Mendez succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Constantino, then after confessing
that he was a married man. This continued on to the months of September and November.
Constantino eventually got pregnant, and asked for help from Mendez to support the child, but this
plea fell on deaf ears. Constantino was forced to leave her work as a waitress, as a result. This
prompted Constantino to file for acknowledgment, support and the payment of actual, moral and
exemplary damages. In response, Mendez denied having sexual relations with Constantino and
prayed for the dismissal of the case. He further prayed for the payment of exemplary damages and
litigation expense including attorney's fees for the filing of the malicious complaint

Issue:
Is Amelita Constantino entitled to damages in this case?

Ruling:
The high Court ruled in the negative. Amelita's claim for damages, which is based on Articles
19 and 21 of the Civil Code, sits on the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she
surrendered her virginity. The high Court, however, agrees with the Court of Appeals that mere
sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery of damages. Damages could only be awarded if
sexual intercourse was not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time Amelita met
Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, she was already 28 years old and admitted that she was attracted to Ivan.
Her attraction is the reason why she surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived
because of a promise of marriage, she could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when

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she was informed after their first sexual contact sometime in August, 1974, that he was a married
man. Her declaration that in the months of September, October and November, 1974, they repeated
their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage was the
moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.

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122. CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA
CABILIN vs. FELIX ICAO
G.R. No. 26795, July 31, 1970
J. Reyes, J.B.L.

Doctrine:
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own
for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her
complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and
confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse
with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she
became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying.
Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees. Duly summoned,
defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the
child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and
dismissed the complaint.
Issue:
May an action for support be filed for an unborn child?
Ruling:
Yes. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its
own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of
the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to
dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet
unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored
by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of
the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854,
Civil Code.

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123. CECILIO PE, ET AL vs. ALFONSO PE

G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962
J. Bautista Angelo

Doctrine:

The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that
he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.

Facts:

Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory
in Gasan Marinduque who was treated like a son by Cecilio Pe, one of the petitioners. Cecilio
introduced Alfonso to his children and was given access to visit their house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita,
24 year old single, daughter of Cecilio. The defendant frequented the house of Lolita sometime in
1952 on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Eventually they fell in
love with each other. Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove Alfonso
deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita’s affection. The case on moral damages was
dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolita’s family on the ground of moral, good custom and
public policy due to their illicit affair.

Ruling:

The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any
other conclusion than that it was he who seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love
with him, as shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he
wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's
family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a
member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love
affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain

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of events than that Alfonso, through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of
Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is
indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an
injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as
contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.

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124. APOLONIO TANJANCO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS
G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966
J. REYES, J.B.L.

Doctrine:
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and
the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal
lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction

Facts:
From December, 1957, the defendant (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the
plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that "defendant expressed and professed his undying
love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in
consideration of defendant's promise of marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's
pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly until December 1959, through his protestations of love
and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of
which the latter conceived a child; that due to her pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and
social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc.; that thereby
plaintiff became unable to support herself and her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to marry
plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, and social humiliation. Plaintiff prayed to compel the defendant to recognize the unborn
child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her support and that of her baby, plus moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees.

Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action.

Plaintiff Santos appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter held with the lower court that
no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its support, but
decreed that the complaint did state a cause of action for damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The Court of Appeals entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and
directing the court of origin to proceed with the case.

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Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a promise to
marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether damages ,may be recovered from a breach of promise to marry.

Ruling:
The court finds this case meritorious.

It has been ruled in the Us v. Buenaventura case that —
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If
she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there
is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart
from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which
are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately
submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).

The facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a
woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is voluntariness
and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because
of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his
embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of
marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to
fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and
no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in
dismissing the complaint.

The dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions may correspond
to the child of the plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if any. On that point, this Court makes no
pronouncement, since the child's own rights are not here involved.

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125. ANDRES LAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ASSOCIATED ANGLO-AMERICAN TOBACCO
CORPORATION and ESTEBAN CO
G.R. No. 47013 February 17, 2000
ESTEBAN CO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ANDRES LAO
G.R. No. 60647 February 17, 2000
THE ASSOCIATED ANGLO-AMERICAN TOBACCO CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
ANDRES LAO, JOSE LAO, and TOMAS LAO
G.R. No. 60958-59 February 17, 2000

J. Purisima

Doctrine:

Malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for damages brought by one against
whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and
without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit or other proceeding in favor
of the defendant therein. The fact of termination of the criminal prosecution, civil suit or legal
proceeding maliciously filed and without probable cause, should precede the complaint for malicious
prosecution. Such a complaint states a cause of action if it alleges: (a) that the defendant was himself
the prosecutor or at least instigated the prosecution; (b) that the prosecution finally terminated in
the acquittal of the plaintiff; (c) that in bringing the action the prosecutor acted without probable
cause, and (d) that the prosecutor was actuated by malice, i.e., by improper and sinister motives.

Facts:

These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
revolve around discrepant statements of accountability between a principal and its agent in the sale
of cigarettes.

On April 6, 1965, The Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation (Corporation for

brevity) entered into a "Contract of Sales Agent" with Andres Lao. Under the contract, Lao agreed to
sell cigarettes manufactured and shipped by the Corporation to his business address in Tacloban City.
Lao would in turn remit the sales proceeds to the Corporation. For his services, Lao would receive
commission depending on the kind of cigarettes sold, fixed monthly salary, and operational
allowance. Lao was performing outstanding for the first couple of years, however, in February 1968
and until about seven (7) months later, Lao failed to accomplish his monthly sales report. When Lao
was summoned for an accounting, it was established that Lao's liability amounted to P525,053.47.

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Ching Kiat Kam allowed Lao to continue with the sales agency provided Lao would reduce his
accountability to P200,000.00, the amount secured by the mortgage.

Subsequently, the Corporation discovered that Lao was engaging in the construction business
so much so that it suspected that Lao was diverting the proceeds of his sales to finance his business.
The Corporation sent Ngo Kheng to supervise Lao's sales operations in Leyte and Samar. Ngo Kheng
discovered that, contrary to Lao's allegation that he still had huge collectibles from his customers,
nothing was due the Corporation from Lao's clients. From then on, Lao no longer received shipments
from the Corporation which transferred its vehicles to another compound controlled by Ngo Kheng.
Shipments of cigarettes and the corresponding invoices were also placed in the name of Ngo Kheng.

Andres, Jose and Tomas Lao brought a complaint for accounting and damages with writ of
preliminary injunction against the Corporation. The CFI of Tacloban City, came out with its decision
ordering Lao to pay the corporation 167,745.20. The Corporation appealed the decision praying for
re-computation of the obligation of Lao.

The CA however reversed the CFI decision ordering the corp. to pay Lao actual, moral and
exemplary damages as well as to reimburse Lao’s overpayment.

During the pendency of the civil action, the corporation filed a criminal case for estafa against
Lao. Subsequently, before the acquittal of Lao or before the termination of the case, Lao filed a tort
action for malicious prosecution against the Corp. The court ruled in favor of Lao declaring that the
estafa case was filed without probable cause and with malice and orders the corporation and Esteban
Co to jointly and severally pay the Laos.

Issue:
Whether the Corp. is liable for malicious prosecution?

Ruling:

No. Complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution and/or on Articles 20 and 21
should have been dismissed for lack of cause of action and therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the decision of the trial court of origin.

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Malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for damages brought by one against
whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and
without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit or other proceeding in favor
of the defendant therein. The fact of termination of the criminal prosecution, civil suit or legal
proceeding maliciously filed and without probable cause, should precede the complaint for malicious
prosecution. Such a complaint states a cause of action if it alleges: (a) that the defendant was himself
the prosecutor or at least instigated the prosecution; (b) that the prosecution finally terminated in
the acquittal of the plaintiff; (c) that in bringing the action the prosecutor acted without probable
cause, and (d) that the prosecutor was actuated by malice, i.e., by improper and sinister motives.

The circumstance that the estafa case concluded in respondent Lao's acquittal during the
pendency of the complaint for malicious prosecution did not cure the defect of lack of cause of action
at the time of filing of the complaint.

A reading of the complaint reveals that it is founded on the mere filing of the estafa charge
against respondent Lao. As such, it was prematurely filed and it failed to allege a cause of action.
Should the action for malicious prosecution be entertained and the estafa charge would result in
respondent Lao's conviction during the pendency of the damage suit, even if it is based on Articles 20
and 21, such suit would nonetheless become groundless and unfounded. To repeat; that the estafa
case, in fact, resulted in respondent Lao's acquittal would not infuse a cause of action on the malicious
prosecution case already commenced and pending resolution.

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126. MAGTANGGOL QUE vs. THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and NICOLAS
G.R. No. L-66865 January 13, 1989
J. Cruz

Facts:

When Magtanggol Que, the herein petitioner, filed a complaint for estafa against private
respondent Antonio Nicolas for issuance of several checks which were subsequently dishonored
when presented for encashment. The charge was dismissed for lack of merit, the investigating fiscal
holding that the controversy was an accounting matter that did not necessarily involve deceit on the
part of Nicolas. Nicolas filed his own complaint for damages against Que, this time in the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, for what he claimed was his malicious prosecution by the latter. In his
counterclaim, he averred that Nicolas had maliciously filed the complaint in Bulacan although he was
a resident of Caloocan City; that the private respondent was really indebted to him in any 4 case; and
that it was he who had suffered damages as a result of the unwarranted suit.

The private respondent ordered from the petitioner certain amounts of canvass strollers
which were delivered to and accepted by Nicolas, who issued five checks therefore to Que. The total
face value of the cheeks was P7,600.00. Payment thereof was subsequently stopped by Nicolas and
Que was unable to encash them. Nicolas explained later that he had ordered the "stop payment"
because of defects in the articles sold which despite his requests Que had not corrected. Que for his
part argued that the allegedly defective articles were never returned to him until after he had filed
the charge for estafa and that Nicolas had earlier merely ignored his complaints about the dishonored
checks.

The original decision written by the late Judge Benigno M. Puno held in favor of the plaintiff.
The finding was that the defendant had acted maliciously in filing the estafa charge and in alleging
that the plaintiff had issued the dishonored checks with deceit aforethought.

In his appeal, the private respondent contended that the amended decision rendered by Judge
Fernandez was null and void because the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case when the petitioner
filed his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal. In the amended decision Judge
Fernandez reversed the original decision awarding damages to the private respondent.

Issue:

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Whether or not Judge Fernandez had the authority to reverse the decision of Judge Puno but
whether or not the reversal was correct

Ruling:

A study of the appealed amended decision shows that it was not arbitrarily reached by Judge
Fernandez. On the contrary, the detailed assessment of the facts in light of the pertinent laws shows
that the conclusions of the trial court were the result of a careful study of the record, as befitted a
judge who was in effect reviewing the verdict of a colleague. In our view, the private respondent has
not shown that Judge Fernandez committed any reversible error when on the basis of his own
appraisal of the case he found for the petitioner and reversed the original decision of Judge Puno.

This Court had already stressed that "one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously
instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause." In the case at bar, it is indisputable
that the five checks issued by the private respondent had been dishonored and that the drawer had
failed to make them good despite the protests of the petitioner. Nicolas had merely ignored him.

The presence of probable cause signifies as a legal consequence the absence of malice. It is
evident that the petitioner was not motivated by ill feeling but only by an anxiety to protect his his
rights when he filed the criminal complaint for estafa with the fiscal's office.

As the Court has held: To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated
deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the
mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution 24 (Italics supplied.)

We agree with the petitioner that the mere dismissal of the criminal complaint by the fiscal's
office did not create a cause of action because the proceedings therein did not involve an exhaustive
examination of the elements of malicious prosecution.

The acts of the petitioner and the private respondent have in the view of the Court been far
from exemplary. The petitioner could have exercised a little more diligence in ascertaining the facts
before filing the criminal complaint in the fiscal's office and provoking all this legal conflict. The
private respondent, on the other hand, exhibited an undue belligerence that naturally excited the

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suspicions of the petitioner and later exacerbated their relations when he filed bis own complaint in
Bulacan instead of Caloocan City.

In the exercise of its discretion, the Court denies both parties their respective claims for
damages and holds that each of them must bear the financial consequences of bis own acts, including
the litigation expenses. The damages awarded in the original and amended decisions are all
disallowed.

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127. FRANKLIN M. DRILON et al vs. COURT OF APPEALS et al

G.R. No. 106922, April 20, 2001
J. De Leon, Jr.

Facts:

After the unsuccessful December 1989 coup d' etat, the Department of Justice, then headed
by petitioner Franklin Drilon, referred to the Special Composite Team of Prosecutors (Team of
Prosecutors, for brevity), a letter-complaint from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI, for
brevity) requesting for the investigation of private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile for his alleged
participation in the said coup attempt.

The Team of Prosecutors issued a subpoena to private respondent with an order to submit
his counter-affidavit to the letter-complaint. Instead of filing his counter-affidavit, private respondent
filed a Petition for Summary Dismissal of the charge against him. Private respondent sent "cautionary
letters" to all judges in Quezon City, Manila, Makati and Pasay City requesting that he be apprised of
any information which may be filed against him and that he be given the opportunity to personally
witness the raffle of the case against him. Said notice also appeared in several newspapers of general
circulation.

The Team of Prosecutors filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on Information
charging private respondent with the complex crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder.
The Team of Prosecutors likewise filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City an Information
charging, among others, private respondent with the offense of obstruction of justice for harboring
an alleged felon under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Private respondent was later arrested and
detained. After a petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed before this Court entitled Enrile v.
Salazar5, we granted private respondent's provisional liberty upon posting of a cash bond.

Private respondent on August 20, 1990 filed a Complaint for damages. The complaint
basically accuses the petitioners of bad faith in filing the information for rebellion complexed with
murder and frustrated murder.

The petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure of the Complaint to state a cause of action.
They claimed that there was no allegation of any actionable wrong constituting a violation of any of

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the legal rights of private respondent. In addition, they put up the defense of good faith and immunity
from suit.

Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner Trampe, in his own behalf and in his own behalf and
in behalf of his co-petitioners, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court alleging that the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion
to dismiss. On June 29, 1992, respondent appellate court dismissed the petition and the subsequent
motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether the allegations in the complaint sufficiently plead a cause of action to hold the
petitioners liable for damages

Ruling:

Complaint for malicious prosecution states a cause of action if it alleges: 1) that the defendant
was himself the prosecutor or that at least he instigated the prosecution; 2) that the prosecution
finally terminated in the plaintiff's acquittal; 3) that in bringing the action the prosecutor acted
without probable cause; and, 4) that the prosecutor was actuated by malice, i.e., by improper and
sinister motives.25

We have no reason to depart from our ruling in the said Drilon case. It is our view and we
hold that private respondent's complaint fails to state a cause of action to hold the petitioners liable
for malicious prosecution.

First, the complaint for damages was filed long before private respondent's acquittal in the rebellion
charge thereby rendering the subject action premature. Second, there are no factual allegations in
the complaint that can support a finding that malice and bad faith motivated the petitioners in filing
the information against private respondent. Allegations of bad faith, malice and other related words
without ultimate facts to support the same are mere conclusions of law that are not deemed admitted
in a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action.

One cannot be held liable for allegedly maliciously instituting a prosecution where there is
probable cause. Otherwise stated, a suit for malicious prosecution will lie only in cases where a legal

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prosecution has been carried on without probable cause. The reason for this rule is that it would be
a very great discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of suspicion,
were liable to be sued at law when their indictment miscarried.

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128. RAFAEL PATRICIO vs. THE HONORABLE OSCAR LEVISTE, JUDGE, CFI CAPIZ, BRANCH II,
and BIENVENIDO BACALOCOS
G.R. No. 51832, April 26, 1989
J. Padilla

Doctrine:
The act of hitting the petitioner on the face is contrary to morals and good customs, and
caused the petitioner mental anguish, moral shock and wounded feelings, and social humiliation,
hence, an award of moral damages is warranted.
Facts:
Petitioner Rafael Patricio is a priest who was appointed Director General of the 1976
Religious and Municipal Town Fiesta of Pilar, Capiz.
During the Municipal Town Fiesta, in an event petitioner together with two (2) policemen
were posted near the gate of the public auditorium to check on the assigned watchers of the gate.
Private respondent Bienvenido Bacalocos, President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Pilar,
Capiz and a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, who was in a state drunkenness and standing near
the same gate together with his companions, struck a bottle of beer on the table causing an injury on
his hand which started to bleed. Then, he approached petitioner in a hostile manner and asked the
latter if he had seen his wounded hand, and before petitioner could respond, private respondent,
without provocation, hit petitioner’s face with his bloodied hand. As a consequence, a commotion
ensued and private respondent was brought by the policemen to the municipal building.
Petitioner filed a criminal complaint for slander by deed was filed however it was dismissed.
Fr. Patricio then filed a complaint for damages which was decided in his favor on April 18, 1978
resulting in the award of moral damages of P 10,000, exemplary damages of P 1,000 and attorney’s
fees of 2,000. Fr. Patricio filed for a motion of execution of judgement on June 9, 1978, but was
informed that such could not be done as a pending motion for reconsideration was apparently filed.
Fr. Patricio then replied that the filing of said motion was without notice to him nor was there proof
of service, thus the case had become final and unappealable. Bacalocos replied stating that a copy of
the motion had been served by ordinary mail to the petitioner.
Fr. Patricio then filed this petition for review on certiorari, contending that he had not been
served notice of the motion for reconsideration, nor was there proof of such service, that the sending
of the copy of said motion by regular mail did not cure said defect and finally that actual damages
need not be proven before moral damages are given. Bacalocos replied that the order of the court a
quo worked to inform Fr. Patricio of the motion and gave the latter opportunity to be heard; curing

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the defect. Bacalocos also reasoned those moral damages cannot be given as his act of slapping the
priest was an accident cause by drunkenness and is absent of any bad faith.
Issue:
Whether herein respondent is liable to pay Fr. Patricio for damages.
Ruling:
Yes. There is no question that moral damages may be recovered in cases where a defendant’s
wrongful act or omission has caused the complainant physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similar injury. An award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified or analogous to those
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. x x x Private respondent’s contention that there was no
bad faith on his part in slapping petitioner on the face and that the incident was merely accidental is
not tenable. It was established before the court a quo that there was an existing feud between the
families of both petitioner and private respondent and that private respondent slapped the petitioner
without provocation in the presence of several persons. The act of private respondent in hitting
petitioner on the face is contrary to morals and good customs and caused the petitioner mental
anguish, moral shock, wounded feelings and social humiliation. Private respondent has to take full
responsibility for his act and his claim that he was unaware of what he had done to petitioner because
of drunkenness is definitely no excuse and does not relieve him of his liability to the latter.
The fact that no actual or compensatory damage was proven before the trial court, does not
adversely affect petitioner’s right to recover moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded in
appropriate cases referred to in the chapter on human relations of the Civil Code (Articles 19 to 36),
without need of proof that the wrongful act complained of had caused any physical injury upon the
complainant. It is clear from the report of the Code Commission that the reason underlying an award
of damages under Art. 21 of the Civil Code is to compensate the injured party for the moral injury
caused upon his person.

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129. GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET INC. and NELIA SANTOS FANDINO vs. JOSE J. ESPINO and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-48250, December 28, 1979
J. Guerrero

Doctrine:
Petitioners willfully caused loss or injury to private respondent in a manner that was contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy. It is against morals, good customs and public policy to
humiliate, embarrass and degrade the dignity of a person. Everyone must respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons (Article 26, Civil Code).
And one must act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.
Facts:
Jose J. Espino. Jr., a civil engineer and an executive of Procter and Gamble Philippines, Inc,
together with his wife and two daughters went to shop at South Supermarket in Makati. Finding a
cylindrical "rat tail" file which he needed for his hobby, he picked it up and held it fearing it might get
lost because of its tiny size.
While shopping, they saw the maid of Jose's aunt so as he talked, he placed the rat tail in his
breast pocket partly exposed. At the check-out counter, he paid for their purchases worth P77 but
forgot to pay the file.
As he was exiting the supermarket, he was approached by Guard Ebreo regarding the file in
his pocket. He quickly apologized saying "I'm Sorry" and he turned towards the cashier to pay. But
he was stopped and instead was brought to the rear of the supermarket when he was asked to fill out
an Incident Report labeling him as "Shoplifter".
Espino stated on the report that he put the item in his pocket as he was talking with his helper
while in the store and that he merely forgot to present it to the cashier. Espino was then led into the
Supermarket and the report was given to Nelia Santos-Fandino who was seated at a desk beside the
first checkout counter. Nelia after reading the report remarked that this was another case of theft, to
which Espino explained that he merely forgot the ”rat tail” in his pocket and that he had the intention
to pay for it. Neilia then replied to the effect that that was the same thing all shoplifters say when they
are caught. This was done while people were lining up and paying for the items they shopped. Espino
was then made to pay a fine of 5 pesos, which Nelia reasoned was a prize for the guard who
apprehended him. Espino then paid the fine and was made to line up at the cashier to pay for the
item. As he waited in line he was stared at and people were talking about him. Extremely humiliated
by the incident he immediately left the premises after paying.

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Espino filed a complaint on October 8, 1970 founded on article 21 in relation to article 2219
of the New Civil Code and prayed for damages. The CFI of Pasig, Rizal dismissed the complaint; but
the Court of Appeals reversed the Lower Court’s Decision.
Issue:
Whether the act of apprehending and humiliating Espino in such a manner would render the
supermarket liable?
Ruling:
Yes. The false accusation charged against the private respondent after detaining and
interrogating him by the uniformed guards and the mode and manner in which he was subjected,
shouting at him, imposing him a fine, threatening to call the police and in the presence and hearing
of many people at the Supermarket which brought and caused him humiliation and embarrassment,
sufficiently rendered the petitioners liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article
2219 of the Civil Code. We rule that under the facts of the case at bar, petitioners willfully caused loss
or injury to private respondent in a manner that was contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy. It is against morals, good customs and public policy to humiliate, embarrass and degrade the
dignity of a person. Everyone must respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons (Article 26, Civil Code). And one must act with justice, give everyone his
due and observe honesty and good faith (Article 19, Civil Code).
In the case at bar, there is no question that the whole incident that befell respondent had
arisen in such a manner that was created unwittingly by his own act of forgetting to pay for the file.
It was his forgetfulness in checking out the item and paying for it that started the chain of events
which led to his embarrassment and humiliation, thereby causing him mental anguish, wounded
feelings and serious anxiety. Yet, private respondent’s act of omission contributed to the occurrence
of his injury or loss and such contributory negligence is a factor which may reduce the damages that
private respondent may recover (Art. 2214, New Civil Code).

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130. SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO as Presiding Judge of Branch
XVIII, Court of First Instance of Rizal, CARLOS E. CRUZ and B. E. VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. L-47739, June 22, 1983
J. Melencio-Herrera

Doctrine:
In identifying the issue of the case, one must see to it whether the plaintiff is asking for a civil
damage cognizable by the trial courts; or labor issues that are cognizable by the labor arbiter.
Facts:
Carlos Cruz was employed as engineering officer by the Singapore Airlines LTD. He has the
opportunity to undergo a special training in his field provided that we will stay with the company for
5 years. For the assurance of the herein plaintiff, comes now B.E. Villanueva as surety to cover the
damages, expenses, and other causes that will be sustained by Cruz against the petitioner should he
breach the agreement.
Within 2 years from the 5-year agreement, Cruz filed a leave without pay before his employer
but has not yet approved. Gone for an unjustifiable number of days, the plaintiff filed a case for
damages against Cruz and Villanueva for violation of terms and conditions in their agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not case involving liquidated damages and involving employer-employee relation
is cognizable by the regular courts

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the issue in this case is cognizable by the regular courts. The
Supreme Court is not discounting the fact that although there is an employer-employee relationship,
still, the regular courts can take cognizance in the case at bar.
Petitioner’s claim for damages is grounded on the “wanton failure and refusal” without just
cause of private respondent Cruz to report for duty despite repeated notice
served upon him of the disapproval of his application for leave of absence without pay. This, couple
d with the further averment that Cruz ``maliciously and with bad faith” violated the terms and condi
tions of the conversion training course agreement to the damage of petitioner removes the present
controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code and brings it within the purview of Civil Law.

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131. ERNESTO MEDINA and JOSE G. ONG vs. HON. FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME et al
G.R. No. L-59825, September 11, 1982
J. Abad Santos

Doctrine:
In identifying the issue of the case, one must see to it whether the plaintiff is asking for a civil
damage cognizable by the trial courts; or labor issues that are cognizable by the labor arbiter.
Facts:
Ernesto Medina and Jose Ong are employees of Pepsi-cola Bottling Company. On the other
hand, Cosme de Aboitiz is the CEO of the said company. That on December 20, 1977 in the afternoon,
Cosme de Aboitiz went to the plant of the company located in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and without
any provocation, shouted and maliciously humiliated the plaintiffs with the use of the following
slanderous language and other words of similar import uttered in the presence of the plaintiffs'
subordinate employees, thus-
GOD DAMN IT. YOU FUCKED ME UP ... YOU SHUT UP! FUCK YOU! YOU ARE BOTH SHIT TO
ME! YOU ARE FIRED (referring to Ernesto Medina). YOU TOO ARE FIRED! '(referring to Jose Ong )
The cause of the anger of Cosme for is having allegedly delayed the use of promotional crowns. This
is notwithstanding the fact that petitioners are a high ranking position of the company and had
received an award of rings of loyalty.
Because of the humiliation, an action for criminal and civil action was filed against Cose de
Aboitiz and the company.

Issue:
Whether or not trial courts can take cognizance of the case despite there is an employer-
employee relationship between the plaintiffs and defendants

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the relief prayed by the herein plaintiffs contending that
their main issue for the action is because of the tortious act by the defendant and CEO Cosme de
Aboitiz. They are claiming for civil damage and thus, regular courts can take cognizance of the matter
at hand.

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132. AMARO VS. SAMANGUIT

G.R. No. L-14986, July 31, 1962
J. Makalintal

Doctrine:
Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee
refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and
other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may
be taken.

Facts:
Petitioner filed suit for damages against the chief of police. The action is predicated on
Articles 21 and/or 27 of the Civil Code. The complaint was dismissed upon appellee's motion in the
court below on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The pertinent allegations in the complaint are that appellant Jose Amaro was assaulted and
shot at near the city government building of Silay; that the following day he, together with his father
and his witnesses, "went to the office of the defendant but instead of obtaining assistance to their
complaint they were harassed and terrorized;" that in view thereof they "gave up and renounced
their right and interest in the prosecution of the crime . . . .;" that upon advice of the City Mayor given
to appellee an investigation (of said crime) was conducted and as a result the city attorney of Silay
was about to file or had already filed an information for illegal discharge of firearm against the
assailant; and that "having finished the investigation of the crime complained of, the defendant chief
of police is now harassing the plaintiffs in their daily work, ordering them thru his police to appear
in his office when he is absent, and he is about to order the arrest of the plaintiffs to take their
signatures in prepared affidavits exempting the police from any dereliction of duty in their case
against the perpetrator of the crime."

Issue:
Whether or not the Defendant is liable.

Ruling:
Yes. The facts set out constitute an actionable dereliction on appellee's part in the light of
Article 27 of the Civil Code. That appellants were "harassed and terrorized" may be a conclusion of
law and hence improperly pleaded. Their claim for relief, however, is not based on the fact of

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harassment and terrorization but on appellee's refusal to give them assistance, which it was his duty
to do as an officer of the law. The requirement under the aforesaid provision that such refusal must
be "without just cause" is implicit in the context of the allegation. The statement of appellee's
dereliction is repeated in a subsequent paragraph of the complaint, where it is alleged that "he is
about to order the arrest of the plaintiffs" to make them sign affidavits of exculpation in favor of the
policemen.

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133. ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION VS. C.A.

G. R. No L-46061, November 14, 1984
J. Aquino

Doctrine:
Article 26 provides that “every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons.” “Prying into the privacy of another’s residence”
and “meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another” and “similar acts,”
“though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief.”

Facts:
St. Louis Reality Corp. caused to be published on the December 15, 1968 Sunday Times an
advertisement featuring the house of Dr. Conrado J. Aramil. Said advertisement was entitled “Where
the Heart is”, showed a picture of Dr. Aramil’s house but with the family of Arcadio S. Acradio depicted
as the owners. It also had written text stating that the Arcadios had purchased such house in
Brookside Hills village at an affordable rate. Such was done without the permission of Dr. Aramil.
Upon seeing a reprint of the advertisement on the same paper on January 5, 1969, Dr. Aramil
immediately wrote said reality corporation stating that the latter did not obtain permission to post
his house in the advertisement and depict it as being owned by another family. Dr. Aramil explained
that it has caused him humiliation as his colleagues and friends who recognize his house or have been
to such have uttered remarks questioning the ownership of his house, his integrity, if he rented the
house from the Arcadios and even that his wife was that of another husband. He then warned the
corporation that he would pursue legal action if such acts were not explained satisfactorily to him
within one week of receipt of the letter. Said letter was received and answered by Ernesto Magtoto,
an officer of said corporation who was in charge of advertising. He immediately stopped its
publication and contacted Dr. Aramil to apologise. However no rectification or apology was ever
published. Dr. Aramil’s counsel demanded actual, moral and exemplary damages of P 110,000 from
the corporation on February 20, 1969. The corporation answered by claiming that it was an honest
mistake and that a rectification will be made. The corporation published a new advertisement on
March 18, 1969 which again portrayed the Arcadio family, but this time with their real house.
However no apology or rectification was included. This led to the filing of a complaint for damages
against the said corporation on March 29, 1969. The lower court and appellate court ruled in favor

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of Dr. Aramil; awarding him P 8,000 as actual damages, P 20,000 as moral damages and P 2,000 for
attorney’s fees.

Issue:
Whether or not case is covered by article 26 of the Civil Code.
Ruling:
Yes, the case falls under said article which warrants the award of damages to Dr. Aramil. Said
article provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind
of his neighbors and other persons". "Prying into the privacy of another's residence" and "meddling
with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another" and "similar acts", "though they may
not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other
relief". Such article was violated when the corporation released an advertisement depicting Dr.
Armil’s home to be that of another, without Dr. Aramil’s permission. Further, bad faith and negligence
was evident as the corporation refused to publish a rectification or apology despite demands The
damages awarded are proper being enunciated by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code.
Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts mentioned in Article 26.

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134. RODRIGO CONCEPTION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. NESTOR NICOLAS and ALLEM
NICOLAS
G.R. No. 120706, January 31, 2000
J. Bellosillo

Doctrine:
International Torts; Violation of Human dignity and privacy; Art. 26. — Every person
shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons.
The following and similar acts though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a
cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of another's
residence; (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another; (3)
Intriguing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of
birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

Facts:
Spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas resided in an apartment leased to them by the
owner Florence "Bing" Concepcion who joined Nestor's business venture by contributing capital on
condition that after her capital investment was returned to her, any profit earned would be divided
equally among them.
On second week of July 1985, Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the deceased husband of
Florence, angrily accosted Nestor at their apartment in the presence of his wife and children,
neighbors and friends and accused him of conducting an adulterous relationship with Florence by
shouting "Hoy Nestor, kabit ka ni Bing! x x x Binigyan ka pa pala ni Bing Concepcion ng P100,000 para
umakyat ng Baguio. Pagkaakyat mo at ng asawa mo doon ay bababa ka uli para magkasarilinan kayo
ni Bing."
To clarify matters, Nestor went with Rodrigo. But the same accusation was hurled by Rodrigo
against Nestor when they confronted Florence at the terrace of her residence.
Rodrigo called Florence reiterating his accusations and threatening to kill her should
something happen to his mother if she heard about the affair.
Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that he could no longer face his
neighbors, Florence stopped contributing capital so their business declines, not being able to meet
demands and the spouses had frequent bickerings and quarells as Allem was doubting his fidelity.
Nestor was forced to write Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of damages
which Rodrigo ignored so the spouses filed a suit for damages against him.

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Issue:
Whether or not the award of damages to private respondents, the Nicolas spouses has a basis.

Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner originally claimed that the lower courts were without legal basis to justify its
verdict as it does not fall under Arts. 26 and 2219 of Civil Code since it does not constitute libel,
slander, or any other form of defamation, nor involve prying into privacy of another’s residence or
meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relation of another. The Supreme Court rejected
the petitioner’s contention that no legal provision supports such award for damages. It is
understandable that the incident charged of petitioner was no less than an invasion of right of the
respondent, Nestor, as a person. Under this article, the rights of persons are protected, and damages
are provided for violations thereof. The violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not
exclusive but are merely examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. Due to the
incident, respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings and social humiliation as a proximate result of petitioner’s abusive, scandalous and insulting
language. As such, the Supreme Court held that the incident clearly falls under the aforementioned
articles and the person who violated those rights should be liable of the damages.

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135. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIPE BALLESTEROS, CESAR GALA and ALVIN
BULUSAN
G.R. No. 120921, January 29, 1998
J. Romero

Doctrine:
Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an
injury sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for
the breach of some duty or the violation of some right.
Facts:
The group of the victims were at the barangay hall to attend a dance namely Jerry Agliam,
Eduardo Tolentino, Carmelo Agliam, Vidal Agliam, Robert Cacal, and Ronnel Tolentino . Not long after,
they sensed hostility from the group of accused. They decided to leave, but just within 50 meters from
the dance hall, Galo fired at the owner jeep. Jerry and Eduardo died while four others were injured.
In defense, Galo claimed that he was not at the scene of the crime at that night, and the paraffin
test results that showed positive was because he smoked 8 sticks of cigarettes that night whereas
Ballesteros interposed the defense of alibi that he purchase some cigarettes, cleaned his garlic bulb
and fertilized his pepper plants with sulfate that is why he has traces of nitrates and that he had no
motive to kill. Bulusan also interposed the defense of alibi that after the dance, he went straight to
the house of Michael Viloria.
The accused were charge double murder with multiple frustrated murder and further
sentencing them to pay jointly and solidarily.

1. The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in the amount of P50,000, moral damages in the
amount of P20,000.00 and actual damages in the amount of P35,755.00, with interest;

2. The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino, compensatory damages in the amount of P50,000, moral
damages in the amount of P20,000, and actual damages in the total amount of P61,785.00, with
interest;

3. Carmelo Agliam, actual damages in the amount of P2,003.40, and moral damages in the amount of
P10,000, with interest;

4. Vidal Agliam Jr., Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino, moral damages in the amount of P5,000 each,
with interest.

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Issue:
Whether or not the trial court is correct in the award of damages.
Ruling:
Yes. The trial court was correct in the award of damages to the heirs of the victims.
Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury
sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the
breach of some duty or the violation of some right.
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for,
loss or injury sustained, whereas moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has
experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had
furthermore shown that these were the proximate result of the offender's wrongful act or omission.
In granting actual or compensatory damages, the party making a claim for such must present
the best evidence available, viz., receipts, vouchers, and the like, as corroborated by his testimony.
Here, the claim for actual damages by the heirs of the victims is not controverted, the same having
been fully substantiated by receipts accumulated by them and presented to the court. Therefore, the
award of actual damages is proper.
However, the order granting compensatory damages to the heirs of Jerry Agliam and Eduardo
Tolentino Sr. must be amended. Consistent with the policy of this Court, the amount of P50,000 is
given to the heirs of the victims by way of indemnity, and not as compensatory damages.
As regards moral damages, the amount of psychological pain, damage and injury caused to
the heirs of the victims, although inestimable, may be determined by the trial court in its discretion.
Hence, we see no reason to disturb its findings as to this matter.

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136. SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO et al vs. COURT OF APPEALS et al

G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996
J. Regalado

Doctrine:

In the instant case, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the
claim of respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In
order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is
essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was
damage or injury to the plaintiff.

The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will
lie, although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. One may
use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause
damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter’s favor. An injury or damage occasioned
thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual
resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful means.

Facts:

Respondents [originally Pacifico Mabasa] owned a parcel of land wherein a two-door
apartment was erected. The said property was surrounded by other immovables owned by
petitioners, spouses Custodio and spouses Santos. As an access to P. Burgos Street from the subject
property, there are two possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide
and is about 20 meters distant from Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in
between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width
and length from plaintiff Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru
said passageway, a less than a meter-wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length,
has to be traversed.

Petitioners constructed an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width.
Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is also

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along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said
fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. As a result, the tenants left the
apartment because there was no longer a permanent access to the public street.

Respondents then filed an action for the grant of an easement of right of way.

The trial court ordered the petitioner to give respondents a permanent access to the public
street and that in turn, the respondent will pay a sum of Php 8,000.00 to the petitioner as an
indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. On appeal by the respondent to the CA, the
decision of the trial court was affirmed, such that a right of way and an award of actual, moral and
exemplary damages were given to the respondents. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the award of damages is proper?

Ruling:

The appealed decision of respondent Court of Appeals was REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the judgment of the trial court correspondingly REINSTATED. The award for damages was not
proper.

To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong
inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage,
or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the
remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury, and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without
injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.
These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an
action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a

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breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff. There must be a concurrence of injury to
the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.

In the instant case, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the
claim of respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In
order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is
essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was
damage or injury to the plaintiff.

The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right
as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the
owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by
law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property.

At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There
was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The
fact that respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very
decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just
compensation. It was only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said
passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners
not to interfere in the exercise of said right.

The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will
lie, although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. One may
use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause
damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter’s favor. An injury or damage occasioned
thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual
resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful means.

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137. HEIRS OF SIMEON BORLADO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SALVACION VDA. DE BULAN, et.
al.,
G.R. 114118 (2001)
J. Pardo

Doctrine:

The one hundred cavans of palay was awarded as a form of damages. We cannot sustain the
award. Palay is not legal tender currency in the Philippines.

Facts:

On April 1942, A parcel of land owned by Serapio Borlado, grandfather of petitioners, was sold for
consideration to Francisco Bacero. Subsequently, On February 1948, his widow Amparo Dionisio
Vda. De Bracero, as legal guardian of her minor children, sold the lot to the Spouses Bienvenido Bulan
and Salvacion Borbon, respondents herein. The respondents had been in continuous, peaceful,
uninterrupted, adverse and exclusive possession of the lot until November 1972 when petitioners,
the heirs of Borlado forcibly entered and wrested physical possession thereof from them.

Respondents filed an ejectment suit against petitioners, which was decided in their favor. The court
ordered petitioners to vacate the land and to pay to respondents a total amount of One Thousand
One Hundred (1,100) cavans of palay as well as attorney’s fees and the cost of suit.

Instead of appealing the adverse decision to the Court of First Instance (now RTC), on 8 November
1983, petitioners filed the present case with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Roxas City. This case
was dismissed for lack of cause of action in a decision, the decretal portion of which was quoted
earlier. Thereafter, On 24 November 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming in
toto the appealed decision. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents were the owners of the lot in
question.

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Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied the petition. The issue is factual. In an appeal via certiorari, the
Court may not review the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. When supported by substantial
evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and
are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the exceptions to the rule.
Petitioner failed to prove that the case falls within the exceptions. The Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts. It is not our function to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the
evidence presented. A question of fact would arise in such event. Questions of fact cannot be raised
in an appeal via certiorari before the Supreme Court and are not proper for its consideration.

Nevertheless, as a matter of law, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in holding
petitioners liable to pay respondents one hundred (100) cavans of palay every year from 1972 until
they vacate the premises of the land in question. The one hundred cavans of palay was awarded as a
form of damages. The Court did not sustain the award citing that palay is not legal tender currency
in the Philippines.

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138. THE BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS et al vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMO M. KALAW et al

G.R. No. L-18805, August 14, 1967
J. Sanchez

Doctrine:
This is a case of damnum absque injuria. Conjunction of damage and wrong is absent. There
cannot be an actionable wrong if either one or the other is wanting.

Facts:
The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO, for short) was chartered as a non-profit
governmental organization by Commonwealth Act 518 avowedly for the protection, preservation
and development of the coconut industry in the Philippines. By 1946, NACOCO's charter was
amended [Republic Act 5] to grant that corporation the express power "to buy, sell, barter, export,
and in any other manner deal in, coconut, copra, and desiccated coconut, as well as their by-products,
and to act as agent, broker or commission merchant of the producers, dealers or merchants" thereof.
After the passage of Republic Act 5, NACOCO embarked on copra trading activities.

An unhappy chain of events conspired to deter NACOCO from fulfilling various contracts it
entered into. Four devastating typhoons visited the Philippines in the last quarter of 1947. When it
became clear that the contracts would be unprofitable, Kalaw submitted them to the board for
approval. It was not until December 22, 1947, when the membership was completed. Defendant Moll
took her oath on that date. A meeting was then held. Kalaw made a full disclosure of the situation,
apprising the board of the impending heavy losses. No action was taken on the contracts. Then, on
January 11, 1948, President Roxas made a statement that the NACOCO head did his best to avert the
losses, emphasized that government concerns faced the same risks that confronted private
companies, that NACOCO was recouping its losses, and that Kalaw was to remain in his post. Not long
thereafter, that is, on January 30, 1948, the board met again with Kalaw, Bocar, Garcia and Moll in
attendance. They unanimously approved the contracts hereinbefore enumerated.

NACOCO was able to conduct partial performance of the contract. As a result, buyers
threatened damage suits, although some of the claims were settled. However, one buyer, Louis
Dreyfus & Go. (Overseas) Ltd. sued before the Court of First Instance of Manila. These cases
culminated in an out-of-court amicable settlement when the Kalaw management was already out.
The corporation thereunder paid Dreyfus P567,024.52 representing 70% of the total claims. With

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particular reference to the Dreyfus claims, NACOCO put up the defenses that: (1) the contracts were
void because Louis Dreyfus & Co. (Overseas) Ltd. did not have license to do business here; and (2)
failure to deliver was due to force majeure, the typhoons. All the settlements sum up to
P1,343,274.52.

In 1949, NACOCO seeks to recover the total seeks to recover the above sum of P1,343,274.52
from general manager and board chairman Maximo M. Kalaw, and directors Juan Bocar, Casimiro
Garcia and Leonor Moll. It charges Kalaw with negligence under Article 1902 of the old Civil Code
(now Article 2176, new Civil Code); and defendant board members, including Kalaw, with bad faith
and/or breach of trust for having approved the contracts.

The lower court dismissed the complaint. Hence, a direct appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
WON damages should be awarded to NACOCO.

Ruling:
No. This is a case of damnum absque injuria. Conjunction of damage and wrong is absent.
There cannot be an actionable wrong if either one or the other is wanting. Kalaw is clear of the stigma
of bad faith. Were it not for the typhoons, NACOCO could have, with ease, met its contractual
obligations as stock accessibility was not a problem.

Also, Kalaw all along thought that he had authority to enter into the contracts, that he did so
in the best interests of the corporation; that he entered into the contracts in pursuance of an overall
policy to stabilize prices, to free the producers from the clutches of the middlemen. The prices for
which NACOCO contracted in the disputed agreements, were at a level calculated to produce profits
and higher than those prevailing in the local market. Kalaw's acts were not the result of haphazard
decisions either. Kalaw invariably consulted with NACOCO's Chief Buyer, Sisenando Barretto, or the
Assistant General Manager. The dailies and quotations from abroad were guideposts to him.

Of course, Kalaw could not have been an insurer of profits. He could not be expected to predict
the coming of unpredictable typhoons. And even as typhoons supervened Kalaw was not remiss in
his duty. He exerted efforts to stave off losses. He cannot be tagged with crassa negligentia or as much

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as simple negligence, would seem to be supported by the fact that even as the contracts were being
questioned in Congress and in the NACOCO board itself, President Roxas defended the actuations of
Kalaw.

Whether the business of a corporation should be operated at a loss during a business
depression, or closed down at a smaller loss, is a purely business and economic problem to be
determined by the directors of the corporation, and not by the court. It is a well-known rule of law
that questions of policy of management are left solely to the honest decision of officers and directors
of a corporation, and the court is without authority to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the
board of directors; the board is the business manager of the corporation, and so long as it acts in good
faith its orders are not reviewable by the courts."

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139. SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO et al vs. COURT OF APPEALS et al

G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996
J. Regalado

Doctrine:
There can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the
result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In order
that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but
wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.

Facts:
Pacifico Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at
Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. Mabasa was able to acquire said property
through a contract of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero as vendors last
September 1981. Said property may be described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining
to defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos Street as the point of reference, on the left side, going to
plaintiff's property, the row of houses will be as follows: That of defendants Cristino and Brigido
Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and then that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side
(is) that of defendant Rosalina Morato and then a Septic Tank. As an access to P. Burgos Street from
plaintiff's property, there are two possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one
meter wide and is about 20 meters distant from Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street. Such a path
is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3
meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters.
In passing through said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with
5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed.

As such, Pacifico Mabasa filed an easement of right of way at the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor
of him, and defendants were ordered to give permanent access ingress and egress to the public street.
Unsatisfied, Mabasa went to the Court of Appeals praying for an award of damages in his favor. The
CA ruled in Mabasa's favor and granted him an award for Actual, Moral and Exemplary damages.
Thus, petitioners went to the Supreme Court. During the pendency of the case, the original plaintiff
Pacifico Mabasa died and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse.

Issue:

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WON the award of damages is proper.

Ruling:
No. The award of damages has no substantial legal basis. A reading of the decision of the Court
of Appeals will show that the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff,
Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the
leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway.

However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover
damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong
inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage,
or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the
remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without
injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.
These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In order that the law will give redress for
an act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et
injuria.

In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim
of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right.
In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it
is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There
was damage or injury to the plaintiff.

The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right
as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the
owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by
law.

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At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There
was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The
fact that private respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very
decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just
compensation. It was only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said
passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners
not to interfere in the exercise of said right.

Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their
act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment
and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private
respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.

As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his
own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an
unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. When the owner of
property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such
as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because
the inconvenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life

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140. ALGARRA V. SANDEJAS

G.R. No. 8385, March 24, 1914
J. Trent

Doctrine:

Actual or compensatory damages include not only the loss already suffered but also the loss
of profits that may have been realized.

Facts:

Lucio Algarra was involved in a car collision because of the defendant’s negligence that
caused him to be hospitalized for 10 days, four of five days of which he could not leave his bed. Algarra
still continued to receive medical treatment after being discharged and has not reported back to work
since he was not yet entirely recovered. Algarra was not able to work since the accident because he
sells products of the distillery and earns 10 percent commission with an average of Php 50.00 per
month. Algarra had 20 regular customers which took him four years to build up and after that
accident, only 4 remained. Algarra filed a civil action for personal injuries The lower court refused to
allow him the claim for injury to his business due to his enforced absences.

Issues:

Whether or not damages can be awarded by the court to Algarra’s business?

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court said that this present case involves the actual incapacity of the
plaintiff to work for two months and the losses caused to his business because of the accident. The
damages resulted from the actual incapacity of the plaintiff to attend to his business, the Supreme
Court says, there is no question because it is to be allowed on the basis of his earning capacity, which
is on this case, Php 50 per month.

The business of the plaintiff requires immediate supervision because the profits are derived
therefrom due to his own exertions. The plaintiff could not resume his work and earn money from it
at the time the accident occurred and there was no doubt that he lost profit because of the wrongful
act of the defendant.

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Actual damages are given by the court to repair the wrong that was done and to compensate
for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. Compensatory damages simply make good or
replace the loss caused by the wrongdoing, it is to compensate the injured party caused by the
wrongdoing but it must be fair and just compensation.

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141. PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION V. CA

G.R. No. 107518, October 8, 1998
J. Romero

Doctrine:

Article 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to
as actual or compensatory damages.

Facts:

On the early morning of September 21, 1977, while fishing the boat, M/V Maria Efigenia,
owned by Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation was on its way to Navotas when it collided with the
Vessel Luzon Stevedoring Corporation Tanker Petroparcel that caused the former to sink.

The Board of Marine Inquiry conducted an investigation, through the Commandant of the
Philippine Coast Guard Simeon N. Alejandro, and it found Petroparcel to be at fault and it rendered a
decision finding the cause of the accident to be in a reckless and imprudent manner in which Edgardo
Doruelo who navigated the Petroparcel.

Maria Efigenia sued the LSC and Edgardo Doruelo and prayed that it be awarded Php
692,680.00 which is the value of the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of Maria Efigenia, as
well as interest and legal rate of attorney’s fees and insurance profits. However, during the pendency
of the case, PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation substituted LSC because it acquired
Petroparcel. The Lower court ordered PNOC to pay Php 6,438,048 in actual damages together with
attorney’s fees of Php 50,000.00.

Issues:

Whether or not the trial court erred in not basing the award given on the actual value of M/V
Maria Efigenia and its equipment when it sank in 1977?

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court said that in the present case, actual damages were proven because
of the sole testimony of the private respondents, its general manager and the pieces of documentary

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evidence. The petitioner did not object to the exhibits in terms of the time index for valuation of the
lost goods and equipment’s. A party entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss
that is actually suffered and duly proved. The Court noted that the general rule in recovering actual
damages, there must be capable proof in the amount of loss that must be proven with a reasonable
degree of certainty that has a premise on competent proof obtaining the amount thereof. The
claimant is bound to point out specific facts that afford basis for measuring compensatory damages
because the court cannot merely rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and
amount of damages as hearsay or uncorroborated testimonies.

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142. INTEGRATED PACKING CORP. vs COURT OF APPEALS and FIL-ANCHOR PAPER CO., INC.
G.R. No. 115177 June 8, 2000
J. Quisumbing

Doctrine:
Actual or Compensatory Damages may be awarded to a person as compensation or indemnity
for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.
Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury
incapable of pecuniary computation and may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant’s wrongful act for omission.

Facts:
Integrated Packing Corp. agreed to deliver to Fil-Anchor Paper Co., Inc. 3,450 reams of
printing paper. Two months later, Integrated entered into a contract with Philippine Appliance
Corporation (Philacor) to print three volumes of “Philacor Cultural Books”. Almost two months after,
only 1,097 out of the 3,450 reams of paper had been delivered by Fil-Anchor to Integrated, prompting
the latter to write a letter informing the former that delay in delivery will prejudice them.
From the period of June 5, 1980 up until July 23, 1981, Fil-Anchor was able to deliver various
quantities of paper amounting to P766,101.70. However, Integrated encountered difficulties paying
Fil-Anchor, in which the latter made a formal demand to settle their obligation. Integrated made
partial payments, which was applied to its back accounts.
Integrated entered into an additional printing contract with Philacor but it failed to comply,
prompting Philacor to demand compensation for the delay and damages it suffered.
Fil-Anchor filed a collection suit against Integrated for failure to pay the unpaid purchase
price of printing paper Integrated bought on credit.
In its Answer, Integrated denied the allegation and stated that Fil-Anchor failed to deliver the
balance of the printing paper despite demand; hence, the former suffered actual damage and the
failure to realize expected profits.
The trial court rendered judgment declaring Integrated should pay Fil-Anchor for the amount
representing the value of printing paper. However, the trial court also found the counterclaim to be
meritorious and held that because of the delay in delivery of the printing paper, Integrated could
have sold the books to Philacor and realized profit it lost from the sale. With that instance, the trial

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court also ruled that Integrated suffered a dislocation of business on account of loss of contracts and
goodwill.
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial court and ordered Integrated to
pay Fil-Anchor the sum of money representing the amount of the unpaid printing paper with legal
interest and deleted the award of compensatory damage, moral damage and attorney’s fees given to
Integrated.

Issue:
Whether or not Integrated should be awarded compensatory and moral damages.
Ruling:
The Court held in the negative.
Indemnification for damages comprehends not only the actual loss suffered, but also profits
which were failed to obtain, or compensatory damages. However, to justify a grant of actual or
compensatory damages, it is necessary to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
the competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party, the actual amount of
loss.
Here, in arriving for the award of compensatory damage to Integrated, the trial court arrived
with mere estimates or self-serving claims of unrealized profit prepared by Integrated.
The Court, in deleting the award for moral damages, concluded that Fil-Anchor cannot be held
liable against Integrated for breach of contract. Moral damage may be awarded when in a breach of
contract, the defendant acted in bad faith, or was guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith,
or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation.

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143. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA CUBA
G.R. No. 118342 January 5, 1998

LYDIA P. CUBA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and
AGRIPINA P .CAPERAL
G.R. No. 118367 January 5, 1998

J. Davide, Jr.

Doctrine:
One is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as
he has duly proved.

Facts:
Lydia Cuba is a grantee of a Fishpond Lease Agreement from the Government. For her to start
utilizing the lease agreement, she obtained loans from DBP through Deed of Assignment of the leased
rights. Cuba failed to pay her obligation on scheduled dates in accordance with the terms in the
promissory notes. With foreclosure proceedings, judicial or extra-judicial, DBP appropriated the
leasehold rights of Cuba over the fishpond. In turn, DBP executed a Deed of Conditional Sale of the
Leasehold Rights in favor of Cuba. Cuba failed to pay the amortization stipulated in the said deed.
As such, DBP sent a Notice of Rescission and took the Leasehold Rights over the fishpond.
DBP executed another Deed of Conditional Sale, this time, with Agripina Caperal to award the
Fishpond Lease Agreement.
Cuba elevated the matter to the trial court questioning the validity of the appropriation made
by DBP over the fishpond without foreclosure proceedings.
The trial court held that the appropriation made by DBP is null and void. As to damages, it
held that there is ample evidence on record to award the same.
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the validity of the appropriation made by DBP. As to
damages, it reduced the award for damages and deleted the award of compensatory damages for
failure to show evidence of the loss of profits.
Issue:
Whether or not reducing the amount for damages is tenable.

Ruling:
The Court finds that reducing the amount of actual damages is tenable.

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Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, it must be proved with reasonable

degree of certainty. It cannot be relied on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and
amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have been suffered by the
injured party and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount thereof.
Here, the alleged damages to the personal equipment and belongings was not proved by clear
evidence. It was just based on the testimonies of Cuba and her caretaker the damages incurred by
them when the DBP took possession of the fishpond in question

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144. FUENTES vs CA
G.R. No. 111692, February 9, 1996
J. Belosillo

Doctrine:
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant is liable for all damages which are the natural and
problem consequences of the act or omission complained of. To seek recovery for actual damages it
is essential that the injured party proves the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of
certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available. Courts cannot simply
rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages.

Facts:
During a benefit dance at Dump Site, Alejandro Fuentes, Jr. was witnessed by Alberto Toling
and Honorio Osok who knew him for quite some time to have stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen
with a hunting knife. Alejandro Fuentes, Jr. and his uncle Felicisimo contends that it was Zoilo
Fuentes, Jr. a.k.a "Jonie" who did it and fleed but it was dismissed because only hearsay
RTC: guilty of murder qualified by treachery and imposed on him an indeterminate prison term of
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of Malaspina the amount of
P50,000.00 and to pay P8,300.00 as actual damages plus costs. CA: Affirmed

Issue:
Whether the heirs of Malaspina should be awarded actual damages

Ruling:
NO. Affirmed with the modification that the penalty imposed should be as it is corrected to
reclusion perpetua, and the award of actual damages is deleted
The Court can only give credence to those supported by receipts and which appear to have been
genuinely expended in connection with the death of the victim. Since the actual amount was not
substantiated, the same cannot be granted

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145. PNOC vs CA
G.R. No. 107518 October 8, 1998
J. Romero

Doctrine:
Damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts
that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne proven
through sole testimony of general manager without objection from LSC

Facts:
September 21, 1977, early morning, M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by Maria Efigenia Fishing
Corporation on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila collided with the vessel Petroparcel owned by the
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC). Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard Commandant
Simeon N. Alejandro found Petroparcel to be at fault. Maria Efigenia sued the LSC and the Petroparcel
captain, Edgardo Doruelo praying for an award of P692,680.00 representing the value of the fishing
nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia XV with interest at the legal rate plus 25%
as attorney’s fees and later on amended to add the lost value of the hull less the P200K insurance
and unrealized profits and lost business opportunities.
During the pendency of the case, PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be
substituted in place of LSC as it acquired Petroparcel
Lower Court: against PNOC ordering it to pay P6,438,048 value of the fishing boat with interest plus
P50K attorney's fees and cost of suit. CA affirmed in toto

Issue:
Whether the damage was adequately proven

Ruling:
YES. Affirming with modification actual damages of P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary
bases therefor. P2M nominal damages instead. In connection with evidence which may appear to be
of doubtful relevancy or incompetency or admissibility, it is the safest policy to be liberal, not
rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant,
immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration
of the court. If they are thereafter found relevant or competent, can easily be remedied by
completely discarding or ignoring them two kinds of actual or compensatory damages:

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a. loss of what a person already possesses (daño emergente)

b. failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him

In the case of profit-earning chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of the chattel to its owner
as a going concern at the time and place of the loss, and this means, at least in the case of ships, that
regard must be had to existing and pending engagements

If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case virtually certain of profitable
employment, then nothing can be added to that value in respect of charters actually lost, for to do so
would be pro tanto to compensate the plaintiff twice over.
If the ship is valued without reference to its actual future engagements and only in the light of its
profit-earning potentiality, then it may be necessary to add to the value thus assessed the anticipated
profit on a charter or other engagement which it was unable to fulfill.

Damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts that could
afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne proven
through sole testimony of general manager without objection from LSC

Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is
to considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of
whether or not it proves an issue

Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.
In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffered, private respondent is `entitled to
nominal damages which, as the law says, is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose
of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered awarded in every obligation arising from law,
contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in every case
where property right has been invaded. Damages in name only and not in fact amount to be awarded
as nominal damages shall be equal or at least commensurate to the injury sustained by private
respondent considering the concept and purpose of such damages

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Ordinarily, the receipt of insurance payments should diminish the total value of the vessel quoted by
private respondent in his complaint considering that such payment is causally related to the loss for
which it claimed compensation.

Its failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to its increased claim for damages under the amended
complaint should not be considered as having curtailed the lower court’s jurisdiction since
the unpaid docket fee should be considered as a lien on the judgment

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146. RAMOS VS CA
G.R. No. 124354 December 29, 1999
J. Kapunan

Doctrine:
It does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden
of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. The real question,
therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual
event outside of the routine performance occurred.

Facts:
Erlinda Ramos was a robust woman except for occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains
caused by the presence of a stone in her gall bladder. She was advised to undergo an operation for
the removal of the stone in her gall bladder. She underwent a series of examinations which included
blood and urine tests which indicated she was fit for surgery. She and her husband, Rogelio, met Dr.
Hozaka, one of the defendants in this case, for the first time.
They agreed on the date of the operation and the doctor decided that she undergo a
“cholecystectomy” operation. Erlinda was admitted in the hospital and was accompanied by her
sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz. At the operating room, Cruz saw about two or three nurses and Dr.
Perfecta Gutierrez, the other defendant, who was to administer the anesthesia. Although not a
member of the hospital staff, Herminda Cruz introduced herself as the Dean of the College of Nursing
at the Capitol Medical Center and was allowed to stay inside the operating room. Hours later, Cruz,
who was inside the operating room with the patient, heard somebody say “Dr. Hosaka is already
here.” As she held the hand of Erlinda, she then saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient. She
thereafter heard Dr. Gutierrez say, “ang hirap maintubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O
lumalaki ang tiyan”.
Due to the remarks of Dr. Gutierrez, she focused her attention on what Dr. Gutierrez was doing. She
noticed a bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of Erlinda. Cruz then heard Dr. Hosaka
issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. After Dr. Calderon arrived
in the operating room, Cruz saw him trying to intubate Erlinda. Erlinda’s nailbed became bluish and
the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position.
Immediately, thereafter, Cruz went out of the operating room, and told Erlinda’s husband (her
brother) “that something wrong was happening”. Cruz immediately rushed back, and saw Erlinda
was still in trendelenburg position. On that fateful day, she saw Erlinda taken to the Intensive Care

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Unit (ICU). Erlinda stayed for about four months in the hospital and has been in a comatose condition.
When asked by the hospital to explain what happened to the patient, Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka
explained that the patient had bronchospasm. After being discharged from the hospital, she has been
staying in their residence, still needing constant medical attention, with her husband Rogelio
incurring monthly expenses. She was diagnosed to be suffering from “diffuse cerebral parenchymal
damage.” The Ramoses filed a civil case for damages against the private respondents alleging
negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondents were negligent in the care of Erlinda during the anesthesia phase
of the operation and, if in the affirmative, whether the alleged negligence was the proximate cause of
Erlinda’s comatose condition

Ruling:
YES. Private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part. Their
negligence was the proximate cause of her condition. Dr. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the
patient. She admitted that she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation. And no prior
consultations with, or pre-operative evaluation of Erlinda was done by her. She was unaware of the
physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. This is an act of exceptional negligence and professional
irresponsibility. Private respondents repeatedly hammered the view that the cerebral anoxia which
led to Erlinda’s coma was due to bronchospasm mediated by her allergic response to a drug
introduced into her system. Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred. Respondent Dr. Hosaka’s negligence can be found in his
failure to exercise the proper authority (as the “captain” of the operative team) in not determining, if
his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. No evidence on record exists to show that
Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent Dr. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does
not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at
the same time as Erlinda’s cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter’s
operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the
anesthesia delivery.

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147. GATCHALIAN VS DELIM

G.R. No. L-56487 October 21, 1991
Feliciano, J.


Doctrine:
A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or
diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and
assessable

Facts:
July 11,1973: Reynalda Gatchalian boarded Thames" mini bus at Aringay, La Union bound for Bauang,
of the same province. The bus bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road,
turned turtle and fell into a ditch.Gatchalian got injured with physical injuries on the leg, arm and
forehead Mrs. Adela Delim visited the passenger and later paid for their hospitalization and medical
expenses. She also gave transportation expense of P12 in going home from the hospital and they
were made to sign a Joint Affidavit stating that they are no longer interested to file a complaint,
criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the said Thames. Gatchalian filed in the CFI an
action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages stating that the mishap had left
her with a conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the forehead, generating mental
suffering and an inferiority complex on her part as a result, she had to retire in seclusion and stay
away from her friends. Scar diminished her facial beauty and deprived her of opportunities for
employment.

Issue:
Whether Gatchalian is entitled to damages

Ruling:
A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or
diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and
assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that
she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the
infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for

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restoration to her conditio ante. If the scar is relatively small and does not grievously disfigure the
victim, the cost of surgery may be expected to be correspondingly modest.
In view of the testimony, and the fact that a considerable amount of time has lapsed since the mishap
in 1973 which may be expected to increase not only the cost but also very probably the difficulty of
removing the scar, we consider that the amount of P15,000.00 to cover the cost of such plastic
surgery is not unreasonable moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of
the common carrier

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148. JOHN C. QUIRANTE and DANTE CRUZ vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, MANUEL C. CASASOLA, and ESTRELLITA C. CASASOLA
G.R. No. 73886, January 31, 1989
J. Regalado

Doctrine:
An attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and
the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fee only arises
when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid.
Facts:
In the case of Dr. Casasola’s claim against its erring building contractor, the trial court ruled
in favor of the former who eventually died. Here, petitioner Atty. Quirante filed a motion in the trial
court for the confirmation of his attorney’s fees. According to him, there was an oral agreement
between him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard to his attorney’s fees, as confirmed in writing by
the latter’s surviving spouse and two daughters to be computed as follows: In case of recovery of the
P120,000.00 surety bond, the attorney’s fees of the undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be
P30,000.00; In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the P120,000.00 bond, it shall
be divided equally between the Heirs of Dr. Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz. The
trial court granted the motion for confirmation despite an opposition thereto. In the petition for
review on certiorari, the respondent court (IAC) ruled that the confirmation of attorney’s fees is
premature.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Quirante is entitled of the attorney’s fees.

Ruling:
No. Since the main case from which the petitioner’s claims for their fees may arise has not yet
become final, the determination of the propriety of said fees and the amount thereof should be held
in abeyance. An attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided
and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fee only arises
when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid.

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149. CRISMINA GARMENTS, INC. vs COURT OF APPEALS and NORMA SIAPNO

G.R. No. 128721, March 9, 1999
J. Panganiban

Doctrine:
When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest
on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6%
per annum.

Facts:
During the period from February 1979 to April 1979, Crismina Garments, Inc. contracted the
services of D’Wilmar Garments, for the sewing of 20,762 pieces of assorted girls denims for P76,410.
At first, the respondent was told that the sewing of some of the pants were defective. She offered to
take them back, but then she was later told by the petitioner’s representative that it was good already
and asked her to return for her check of P76,410. However, the petitioner failed to pay her the
aforesaid amount. This prompted her to hire the services of counsel who, on November 12, 1979,
wrote a letter to the petitioner demanding payment of the aforesaid amount within ten days from
receipt thereof. On February 7, 1990, the petitioner’s vice-president-comptroller, wrote a letter to
respondent’s counsel, averring, inter alia, that the pairs of jeans sewn by her, numbering 6,164 pairs,
were defective and that she was liable to the petitioner for the amount of P49,925.51 which was the
value of the damaged pairs of denim pants and demanded refund of the aforesaid amount. On January
8, 1981, the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner with the trial court. The RTC rendered
judgment in favor of the respondent, ordering the petitioner to pay the sum of P76,140 with 12%
interest per annum. CA affirmed.

Issue:
Whether or not it is proper to impose 12% interest rate per annum for an obligation that does
not involve a loan or forbearance of money in the absence of stipulation of the parties.

Ruling:
No. The amount due in this case arose from a contract for a piece of work, not from a loan or
forbearance of money, the legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be applied. Private
respondent maintains that the twelve percent (12%) interest should be imposed, because the
obligation arose from a forbearance of money. This is erroneous. In Eastern Shipping, the Court

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observed that “forbearance” in the context of the usury law is a “contractual obligation of lender or
creditor to refrain, during a given period of time, from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay a
loan or debt then due and payable.” Using this standard, the obligation in this case was obviously not
a forbearance of money, goods or credit. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance
of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the
discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum.

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150. VIVENCIO CERRANO vs. TAN CHUCO

G.R. No. L-12907, August 1, 1918
J. Fisher

Doctrine:

Article 1106 of the Civil Code establishes the rule that prospective profits may be recovered
as damages, while article 1107 of the same Code provides that the damages recoverable for the
breach of obligations not originating in fraud (dolo) are those which were or might have been
foreseen at the time the contract was entered into.

It is equally well-settled, however, that the burden of proof rests upon the defendant to show
that the plaintiff might have reduced the damages.

Facts:

On January, 1916, the defendant, who was then the owner of casco No. 1033, rented it to the
plaintiff at a monthly rental of P70. The contract was made in Manila, and the casco was delivered to
the plaintiff in this city. There was no express agreement as regards the duration of the contract. The
rent was payable at the end of each month. Sometime during the month of May, 1916, the defendant
notified plaintiff that in the following month it would be necessary to send the casco to Malabon for
repairs. Plaintiff then informed the defendant that he would like to rent the casco again after the
repairs had been completed. Defendant indicated that he was willing to rent it, but would expect P80
a month for it.

The casco was taken to Malabon by plaintiff in June, 1916, and delivered at the shipyard
selected by defendant. The casco remained there, undergoing repairs, until the 24th of July, 1916.
About one week before the end of the repair period defendant sold the casco to Siy Cong Bieng & Co.

J. Santos, the man who had been employed by plaintiff as patron of the casco while it was in
his possession, upon hearing that it had been sold to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. went to the office of the
latter in Manila, and asked for employment in the same capacity. He received from Siy Cong Bieng &
Co. P5 on account of his wages, and was instructed by them to go to Malabon and bring the casco to
Manila, which he did, Siy Cong Bieng & Co. supplying the launch by which the casco was towed.

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Upon the arrival of the casco in Manila, however, the plaintiff, claiming that he was entitled to the
possession of the casco under his contract with the defendant induced Santos to refuse to take orders
from the new owners. Siy Cong Bieng & Co. were obliged to bring an action of replevin against Santos
for the recovery of the possession of their casco.

The sheriff took possession of the casco under a writ of replevin, but redelivered it to Santos upon
a delivery bond executed by the present plaintiff and his wife as sureties. After the casco had been in
possession of Santos for some three months, the replevin suit was submitted to the court for decision.
The court rendered a judgment and ordered the delivery of the casco to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. and for
P457.98 as damages.

Issue:

Whether the contract of rent is broken by Tan Chuco's act as proximate cause making him
liable to Cerrano for damages.

Ruling:

The Court finds that article 1581 of the Civil Code provides that when no definite agreement
has been made regarding its duration, the lease of a house is deemed to have been made from day to
day, from month to month, or from year to year, according to whether a daily, monthly, or yearly rent
is to be paid. That is to say, this article establishes the reasonable presumption that one who agrees
to pay a monthly rent intends that his tenancy is to endure for a like period, subject to indefinite tacit
renewals at the end of each month as long as the arrangement is agreeable to both parties.

The Court is of the opinion that a similar presumption arises under similar conditions with
respect to the hire of personal property, in the absence of special circumstances showing a contrary
intention.

Under the terms of his contract the defendant was bound to deliver the casco to plaintiff for
one month from the date upon which the repairs were ended, but was under no obligation to renew
the contract at the end of the month. By selling the casco to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. he broke his contract
with plaintiff and is responsible for the damages caused by his failure to give plaintiff possession of
the casco for the term of one month.

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We are of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, as damages for the breach of the
contract by the defendant, the profit which he would have been able to make had the contract been
performed. He has testified, without contradiction, that the average net profit made by him from the
casco in question during the time it was in his possession was P60 a month. During this period he
was paying rent for it at the rate of P70 a month. Under the terms of the contract now under
consideration he was to have paid P80 a month for it, which we must assume would have reduced
the profit to P50 a month.

Article 1106 of the Civil Code establishes the rule that prospective profits may be recovered
as damages, while article 1107 of the same Code provides that the damages recoverable for the
breach of obligations not originating in fraud (dolo) are those which were or might have been
foreseen at the time the contract was entered into. Applying these principles to the facts in this case,
we think that it is unquestionable that defendant must be deemed to have foreseen at the time he
made contract that in the event of his failure perform it, the plaintiff would be damaged by the loss
of the profit he might reasonably have expected to derive from its use.

As stated in Sedgwick on Damages (Ninth Ed., par. 177):

The general rule is, then, that a plaintiff may recover compensation for any gain which he can
make it appear with reasonable certainty the defendant's wrongful act prevented him from
acquiring, . . . . (See also Algarra vs. Sandejas, 27 Phil. Rep., 284, 289; Hicks vs. Manila Hotel
Co., 28 Phil. Rep., 325.)

It is equally well-settled, however, that the burden of proof rests upon the defendant to show
that the plaintiff might have reduced the damages. (Sedwick on Damages, Ninth Ed., par. 227.) In this
case the defendant has made no effort whatever to show that any other similar cascos were in fact
available to plaintiff, or the price at which he would have been able to obtain the use of one. In the
absence of evidence it will not be presumed that plaintiff could have secured another casco at the
same price had he looked for one.

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151. NICETA MIRANDA-RIBAYA and LUIS CARBONELL RIBAYA vs. MARINO BAUTISTA,
ENCARNACION BAUTISTA and the COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-49390 January 28, 1980
J. Teehankee

Doctrine:

Petitioner’s failure to use in her testimony the precise legal terms or "sacramental phrases"
of "mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings or moral shock" and the like justifies the
denial of the claim for damages. It is sufficient that these exact terms have been pleaded in the
complaint and evidence has been adduced amply supporting the averments of the complaint.

Facts:

Mrs. Niceta Miranda-Ribaya was engaged sometime in 1968 in the pawnshop business and in
the buying and selling of jewelry. Sometime prior to April 23, 1968 one of her agents, Mrs. Josefina
Roco-Robles, informed her that Defendant, a millionaire logger, was interested to buy big diamond
stones. Mrs. Ribaya accompanied by her agent, Mrs. Robles, decided to drop by the house of Mr. and
Mrs. Marino Bautista at La Salle Street, Greenhills Mandaluyong, Rizal. Mrs. Ribaya was impress by
the residence of the Bautista and included within herself that the Bautistas were millionaires as
represented by her agent, Josefina.

Mrs. Ribaya was able to sell to them the ten (10) pieces of jewelry for the price of P222,000.00.
Herein Defendant issued two (2) Equitable Banking Corporation checks, both checks postdated June
23, 1968, as payment for the jewelries. Mrs. Ribaya then executed a voucher evidencing said payment.

The next day, plaintiff went back to see defendant Marino Bautista for the purpose of
requesting the latter to break up one of the Equitable Banking amounting to P110,000.00 into
separate check. On the same day, Mrs. Ribaya again sold to the defendants four, (4) pieces of worth
P94,000.00. Defendant Bautista issued a check under Bank of America, all post dated June 23, 1968,
as payment.

Few days later, the defendants bought again three (3) pieces of jewelry from Mrs. Ribaya and
executed a Bank of America check, postdated July 17, 1968, as payment.

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When the maturity dates of the various postdated checks issued to Mrs. Ribaya as payment
arrived, Mrs. Ribaya was unable to contact the defendants, hence Mrs. Ribaya then deposited to her
account at the Continental Bank the checks in her possession. All the checks paid by the defendant
Bautista were dishonored by the bank for the reason that the accounts of the defendant were closed.

Suspecting that the Bautistas might have pawned the pieces of jewelry purchased from her,
she went to the pawnshop section of the Manila Police Department to verify her suspicion and to her
chagrin she discovered that most of the jewelry she had sold to the defendants were pledged to
various pawnshops in Manila.

Armed with this discovery she was finally able to comfort the defendant Marino Bautista with
her findings. Defendant assured Mrs. Ribaya that he would pay her their obligation in connection
with the jewelry transactions. After failing to keep these promises from week to week, Mrs. Ribaya
demanded from the defendant Marino Bautista the surrender of the pawnshop tickets covering the
pledge of the different pieces of jewelry he had obtained from her. Mrs. Ribaya was able to secure
these tickets from the defendant Bautista one by one. The pawnshop tickets were issued in the names
of the driver of the Bautista family, their secretary Gloria Duque, Mrs. Bautista, and a certain Balagot.
With these pawnshop tickets in her possession, Mrs. Ribaya was able to redeem part of the jewelry
she had delivered to the Bautistas after spending P52,900.00 for the redemption price of said jewelry
plus interest in the amount of P760.79.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioner, however, on petitioner’s
claim for moral and exemplary damages, the trial court upheld them ruling that "the evidence
adduced by the plaintiffs was insufficient to warrant its grant.

Herein petitioners interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but respondent appellate
court rejected their appeal and affirmed the appealed decision, finding that (1) as to moral damages,
petitioner (therein appellant) Niceta Ribaya had not mentioned in her testimony in the trial court
that she has suffered "mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock"; and (2)
as to exemplary damages, these damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right and it was not
prepared to disturb the lower court's exercise of discretion in this regard.

Issue:

Whether Mrs. Ribaya should be entitled to moral and exemplary damages

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Ruling:

Yes. Respondent court, from its wrong premise, then as erroneously concluded that "In order
that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental
anguish, fright and the like.

In the present case, petitioner Niceta took the witness stand and established by
uncontradicted testimony that due to respondents' deceitful and malevolent acts of defraudation, she
had suffered "extreme" anguish (without using the word anguish) and "could not sleep for three
months," since she was forced to close her pawnshop, sell some of her personal jewelries and borrow
money in order to pay off the owners of the jewelleries wrongfully gotten by respondents from her.

The finds that petitioner Niceta was misled into believing that respondent Marino Bautista
was a millionaire when she saw their residence and was told that he was in the logging business and
that he could easily pay for the jewelry because he had log shipments every two months; that all the
checks issued by him is in payment of the jewelries bounced with a note "Account Closed" or were
dishonored; that some of the pieces of jewelry were pawned on the very same day that he got them
from petitioners; that after discovering that the jewelries had been pawned with different
pawnshops, petitioner Niceta "pleaded" with respondents to give her the pawnshop tickets so that
she could redeem them and after weeks of anguished waiting and pleading, Bautista gave her the
pawnshop tickets "one by one", which were issued in the names of the driver of the Bautista family,
their secretary Gloria Duque, Mrs. Bautista and a certain Balagot; that petitioners, besides not having
been paid, had to raise P82,800.00 plus interest in redeeming the jewelries covered by the pawnshop
tickets, and were now in debt up to their heads; as a result of which petitioner Niceta suffered
"extremely" and she "could not sleep for three months."

We do not share respondent court's narrow view that petitioner Niceta's failure to use in her
testimony the precise legal terms or "sacramental phrases" of "mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings or moral shock" and the like justifies the denial of the claim for damages.

It is sufficient that these exact terms have been pleaded in the complaint and evidence has
been adduced, as cited above, amply supporting the averments of the complaint. Indeed, petitioner
Niceta vividly portrayed in simple terms the moral shock and suffering she underwent as a result of
respondents' wanton abuse of her good faith and confidence.

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Thus, petitioners' testimonial evidence to the effect that petitioner Niceta suffered
"extremely" and that for three months she could not sleep was a clear demonstration of her physical
suffering, mental anguish and serious anxiety and similar injury, resulting from respondents'
malevolent acts that show her to be clearly entitled to moral damages.

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152. VIRGILIO M. DEL ROSARIO and CORAZON PAREDES-DEL ROSARIO vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and METAL FORMING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118325 January 29, 1997
C.J. Narvasa

Facts:

MFC was engaged in the business of selling to the public roofing materials known as
"Banawe" shingles or metal tiles, and through extensive advertisements in media and in its
brochures, made representations, which included statements that the shingles are "STRUCTURALLY
SAFE AND STRONG" and that the "BANAWE METAL TILE structure acts as a single unit against wind
and storm pressure due to the strong hook action on its overlaps."

The Del Rosario Spouses instructed their contractor, Engineer Puno, to use the "Banawe"
shingles or metal tiles in the roofing of their house then under construction. MFC "acted in bad faith
and/or with gross negligence in failing to deliver the necessary accessories for the proper installation
of the structure. . . and actually installed inferior roofing materials at (private respondents')
residence, in violation of the proper installation procedure expressly specified in the former's
brochures and advertisements for installation

As a result, barely two (2) months after completion of the installation of the roof by MFC's
workers, portions thereof were blown away by the winds of typhoon "Ruping". MFC replaced the roof
free of charge, in acknowledgment of its one-year warranty on the materials and their installation.

The Del Rosarios' complaint, filed on November 21, 1990, charged MFC with a violation of
Section 3 of Act No. 3740, "An Act to Penalize Fraudulent Advertising, Mislabeling or Misbranding of
Any Product, Stocks, Bonds, etc."

The DTI rendered judgment declaring that MFC had indeed misrepresented its product
because "as the records showed," strong winds actually blew off part of the structure/roof of the Del
Rosario Spouses and the same acted in parts (instead of as a single unit) when strong winds blew, a
part remaining while another part was blown off.

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The decision of the DTI was, on appeal, affirmed in toto by the Office of the President on April
30, 1993; and the latter judgment was in turn affirmed by this Court on August 28, 1995 with a
modification solely as to the fine, which was reduced.

It appears that MFC replaced and repaired the roof free of charge, evidently acknowledging
that the damage was covered by its one-year warranty on the materials and the installation. The
repair work was observed and analyzed by the Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc., which was
engaged by the Del Rosarios to determine the cause of the destruction.

MFC however declined to concede liability for the other damages claimed by the Del Rosario
Spouses to have been caused to the interior of their home. This prompted the latter to commence a
civil action against MFC. In this suit, the spouses sought to recover from MFC, damages resulting from
the events just narrated, contending that aside from the destruction of the roof of their house, injury
was also caused to its electrical wiring, ceiling, furtures, walls, wall paper, wood parquet flooring and
furniture.

The Trial Court held the corporation liable for breach of its contract for the supply and
installation of the roofing materials in the Del Rosarios' residence. The Court of Appeals reversed the
Trial Court's judgment, It ruled that there was no privity of contract between the Del Rosarios and
MFC.

Issue:

Whether or not upon the facts established by the evidence, MFC is answerable to the Del
Rosarios for the damage caused to the latter's residence when its roof, made of shingles purchased
from and installed by the former, was blown away by a typhoon.

Ruling:

Since MFC, in bad faith and with gross negligence, infringed the express warranty made by it
to the general public in connection with the "Banawe" tiles brought to and set up in the house of the
Del Rosarios who had relied on the warranty, and thereby caused them considerable injury, the
identity of the individual who actually dealt with MFC and asked the latter to make such delivery and
installation is of little moment.

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That MFC did in truth act with bad faith, in flagrant breach of its express warranties made to
the general public and in wanton disregard of the rights of the Del Rosarios who relied on those
warranties, is adequately demonstrated by the recorded proofs. The law explicitly authorizes the
award of moral damages "in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith."28 There being, moreover, satisfactory evidence of the psychological and mental trauma
actually suffered by the Del Rosarios, the grant to them of moral damages is warranted. Over a period
of about a month. they experienced "feelings of shock, helplessness, fear, embarrassment and anger."

This Court also agrees with the Trial Court that exemplary damages are properly exigible of
MFC, "Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such damages may be imposed by way of example
or correction for the public good, While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right,
they need not be proved, although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded."31 "

The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals of June 29, 1994 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of November 18, 1991 is REINSTATED AND
AFFIRMED.

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153. MELQUIADES RAAGAS and ADELA LAUDIANO RAAGAS vs.

OCTAVIO TRAYA, MRS. OCTAVIO TRAYA and BIENVENIDO CANCILLER

G.R. No. L-20081 February 27, 1968

J. CASTRO

DOCTRINE:

Actual damages must be proved, and that a court cannot rely on "speculation, conjecture or
guesswork" as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend on actual proof that damage had
been suffered and on evidence of the actual amount.

FACTS:

The complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Leyte by the spouses Melquiades Raagas
and Adela Laudiano Raagas against Octavio Traya, his wife, and Bienvenido Canciller, alleges while
the latter was "recklessly" driving a truck owned by his co-defendants, along the public highway in
MacArthur, Leyte, the said vehicle ran over the plaintiffs' three-year old son Regino causing his
instantaneous death. The plaintiffs ask for actual damages in the sum of P10,000, moral, nominal and
corrective damages in a sum to be determined by the court, P1,000 as attorney's fees, P1,000 for
expenses of litigation, plus costs.

In their answer with counterclaim for moral and actual damages and attorney's fees, the
defendants specifically deny that Canciller was "driving recklessly" at the time of the mishap, and
assert that the truck "was fully loaded and was running at a very low speed and on the right side of
the road"; that it was the child who "rushed from an unseen position and bumped the truck so that
he was hit by the left rear tire of the said truck and died”.

The lower court rendered a judgment on the pleadings, condemning the defendants, jointly
and severally, to pay "to the plaintiffs the sum of P10,000 for the death of their child Regino Laudiano
Raagas, P2,000 for moral damages, P1,000 actual damages, P1,000 for attorney's fees, and the costs."

The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to this Court because
the issues raised are purely of law.

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ISSUE:

Whether the court a quo acted correctly when it rendered judgment on the pleadings

RULING:

It is in the view of the Supreme Court that the court erred. The plaintiffs' claim for actual,
moral, nominal and corrective damages, was controverted by the averment in the answer to the effect
that the defendants "have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations" as to such damages, "the truth of the matter being that the death of Regino Raagas
was occasioned by an unforeseen event and/or by the fault of the small boy Regino Raagas or his
parents." Such averment has the effect of tendering a valid issue. Even if the allegations regarding the
amount of damages in the complaint are not specifically denied in the answer, such damages are not
deemed admitted.

Actual damages must be proved, and that a court cannot rely on "speculation, conjecture or
guesswork" as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend on actual proof that damage had
been suffered and on evidence of the actual amount. Finally, although an allegation is not necessary
in order that moral damages may be awarded, "it is, nevertheless, essential that the claimant
satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage and its causal relation to
defendant's acts."

The preceding disquisition points up the inescapable need of a full-blown trial on the merits at
which the parties will be afforded every opportunity to present evidence in support of their
respective contentions and defenses.

The judgment on the pleadings of June 24, 1960 is set aside, and this case is hereby remanded
to the court of origin for trial on the merits.

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154. ROQUE ENERVIDA vs. LAURO DELA TORRE and ROSA DELA TORRE
G.R. No. L38037, January 28, 1974
J. Esguerra

Doctrine:
Existence of factual basis of the damage should he satisfactorily proven; Moral damages
designed to compensate actual injury and not to impose penalty on wrongdoer.
Facts:
Roque Enervida, herein petitioner, filed a complaint against spouses Lauro de la Torre and
Rosa de la Torre praying that the deed of sale executed by his deceased father, Ciriaco Enervida, over
a parcel of land covered by a Homestead Patent be declared null and void for having been executed
within the prohibited period of five years, in violation of the provision, of Section 118 of
Commonwealth Act 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Law. He further prayed that he be
allowed to repurchase said parcel of land for being the legitimate son and sole heir of his deceased
father.
Defendants herein stated that Enervida has no cause of action because his father is still alive
at the time of filing and he is not the only child of Ciriaco Enervida. He also indicated in his comment
that the sale of the property did not take place within the prohibited period provided for in Section
118 of the Public Land Law, the sale having taken place on November 20, 1957, although ratified and
acknowledged on December 3, 1957, before a Notary Public.
During the Pre-trial conference Roque Enervida admitted all the allegations of the spouses
dela Torre. In view of plaintiff’s admission of the material facts at the pre-trial conference, the
defendants’ spouses were constrained to ask for summary judgment.
The CFI ruled that petitioner has no cause of action and was prompted with malice and bad
faith in taking his action to court by alleging false statement in his complaint. The court dismissed the
case and ordered the petitioner to pay the defendants P2000 as actual moral and exemplary damages
and pay also the attorney’s fees. On appeal to Court of Appeals, it certified the case to the Supreme
Court for it involved purely question of law.


Issue:
Whether it is proper to award the defendant an actual moral and exemplary damages when
plaintiff filed unfounded civil case.
Ruling:

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No. It is true that Article 2219 also provides that moral damages may be awarded in
“analogous cases” to these enumerated, but we do not think the Code intended “a clearly unfounded
civil action or proceedings” to be one of these analogous cases wherein moral damages may be
recovered, or it would have expressly mentioned it in Article 2219, as it did in Article 2208 by
reference in Article 2219.
While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded,
the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court (Article 2216), it is, nevertheless,
essential that the claimant, satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage
(Article 2217) and its causal relation to defendant’s acts. This is so because moral damages, though
incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the
claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.

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155. TRINIDAD FRANCISCO vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

G.R. No. L-18287, March 30, 1963
J. Reyes, J.B.L.

Doctrine:
Award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code is not warranted if the breach
of contract is not malicious or fraudulent
Facts:
On 10 October 1956, the plaintiff, Trinidad J. Francisco, in consideration of a loan in the
amount of P400,000.00, out of which the sum of P336,100.00 was released to her, mortgaged in favor
of the defendant, Government Service Insurance System a parcel of land containing an area of 18,232
square meters, with twenty-one (21) bungalows, known as Vic-Mari Compound, located at Baesa,
Quezon City, payable within ten (10) years in monthly installments of P3,902.41, and with interest of
7% per annum compounded monthly.
Francis failed to comply with the mortgaged property. Because of this, GSIS extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage. Payments made by the plaintiff at the time of foreclosure amounted to
P130,000.00. The System itself was the buyer of the property in the foreclosure sale. On 20 February
1959, the plaintiff’s father, Atty. Vicente J. Francisco, sent a letter to the general manager of the
defendant corporation. offering a compromise that P30,000 which GSIS owes him be credited to
Trinidad’s unpaid monthly installments and that GSIS would take over the administration of the
mortgaged property and collect all monthly installments amounting to about P5,000 of more than 31
lots and houses until the debt is fully covered. This was approved by GSIS through Andal.
Remittances were made, totaling P698,726.10 sent by Trinidad to GSIS through Andal, all of
which were received and duly receipted for. However, GSIS sent 3 letters, all of which were signed by
Andal, asking Trinidad for a proposal for the payment of her indebtedness, since according to GSIS
the one-year period for redemption had expired. Atty. Francisco protested against the GSIS’ request
for proposal of payment because of the existence of the agreed offer dated 20 February 1959.
However, GSIS countered stating that the telegram should be disregarded in view of its failure to
express the contents of the board resolution due to the error of its minor employees in couching the
correct wording of the telegram which provides that approval of the compromise is “subject to the
condition that Mr. Vicente J. Francisco shall pay all expenses incurred by the GSIS in the foreclosure
of the mortgage.” GSIS moved for the consolidated the title to the compound in its name, and gave
notice thereof to the plaintiff and to each occupant of the compound.

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Hence, the plaintiff instituted the present suit, for specific performance and damages. After
trial, the court below found the following: (a) Declaring null and void the consolidation in the name
of the defendant, Government Service Insurance System, of the title of the VIC-MARI Compound; said
title shall be restored to the plaintiff; and all payments made by the plaintiff, after her offer had been
accepted by the defendant, must be credited as amortizations on her loan; and (b) Ordering the
defendant to abide by the terms of the contract created by plaintiff's offer and it's unconditional
acceptance, with costs against the defendant. Both parties appealed. GSIS appealed the decision of
declaring null and void the consolidation of the lots, while Trinidad appealed because the trial court
did not award the P535,000.00 damages and attorney's fees she claimed.
Issue:
Whether the trial court is correct in not awarding damages to Trinidad Francisco.
Ruling:
Yes. The equitable maxim that between two innocent parties the one who made it possible
for the wrong to be done should be the one to bear the resulting loss, applies when — as in the instant
case — a corporation allows one of its officers, now alleged to be without the proper authority, to
send a telegram binding the corporation.
Award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code is not warranted if the breach
of contract is not malicious or fraudulent. Exemplary damages are only allowed in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages.
The award of attorney’s fees is essentially discretionary with the trial court, and no abuse of
discretion is committed when the court refuses to make an award because of the absence of gross
and evident bad faith in defendant’s refusal to satisfy plaintiff’s claim, or of any of the other grounds
enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.

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156. EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC. vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and RICARDO LO
G.R. No. 130030, June 25, 1999
J. Vitug

Doctrine:
Moral damage is an award to the praying party to be assessed by court. Although incapable
of pecuniary computation, moral damages, nevertheless, must somehow be proportional to and in
approximation of the suffering inflicted.
Facts:
Expertravel and Tours Incorporated is a domestic corporation engaged in travel
arrangements for tourists. Ricardo Lo, herein respondent, is the client of Expertravel. On October 7,
1987, Expertravel issued to Ricardo Lo four round-trip plane tickets bound to Hongkong, together
with hotel accommodations and transfers, for a total cost of P39,677.20. Ricardo Lo, as a form of
payment, paid certain Miss Ma. Rocio de Vega, a chairperson and an authorized person to receive
payment from clients of Expertravel.
The payment made by Ricardo Lo was evidenced by a Monte de Piedad Check No. 291559,
dated 06 October 1987, for P42,175.20 for which Ms. de Vega, in turn, issued City Trust Check No.
417920 in favor of Expertravel for the amount of P50,000.00, with the notation "placement advance
for Ricardo Lo, etc." Per its own invoice, Expertravel received the sum on October 10, 1987. For
failure to get the ticket, Ricardo Lo filed a suit for damages against the travel and prayed for moral
damages.
Issue:
Whether or not Ricardo Lo is entitled for moral damages.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court in granting the petition of Expertravel opined that the moral damages
Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way
the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused to a person. Although
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages, nevertheless, must somehow be proportional
to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted in which if it will be going to connect it to the
suffering of Ricardo Lo is not within the ambit of the provision. Thus, the Supreme Court granted the
petition of Expertravel to delete the moral damages prayed and granted to Ricardo Lo by the trial
court and appellate court.

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157. EDITHA M. MIJARES and GLICERIO T. MIJARES, petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
METRO DRUG, INC.
G.R. No. 113558, April 18, 1997
J. Kapunan

Doctrine:
One cannot put the blame of negligence on others when he himself is negligent in the first
place.
Facts:
The spouses Mijares, herein petitioners are owners of one drugstore named Aklan Drug
located inside the Ospital ng Maynila in Metro Manila. The said drugstore is registered under the sole
proprietorship in the name of the wife. On the other hand, Metro Drug Incorporated is a domestic
corporation engaging in selling and supplying drugs. Metro Drugs is supplying drugs Aklan Drug.
They have a very good relationship until one day, miscommunication happens that leads Metro Drug
to file a suit for collection for a sum of money and damages against Aklan Drug. It was alleged by the
Metro Drugs that there is a pending collection being unpaid by the Aklan Drug.
Aklan Drug is a lessee and a cooperative drug store inside the Ospital ng Maynila. The said
drugstore is being handled by the registered owner Editha Mijares. Due to some circumstances, they
cease to lease the space inside the hospital. Thereafter, a new lessee comes into picture named
Silverio Solomon, a new owner and operating a drugstore inside the hospital as well. Metro drugstore
is still supplying drugs to the said drugstore inside the hospital. Collection is being collected
thereafter until one day, one of checks was bounced due to insufficiency of funds. This prompted
Metro Drugstore to file a suit against Aklan Drug. Aklan Drug, in defense, contended that they cease
to operate already in Ospital ng Maynila and a new owner is operating therein evidencing the
payment of the new owner. Metro drugs in return, contended that they do not care who is the owner
and their job is to only collect payment after supplying. This is notwithstanding the fact that Spouses
Mijares has informed Metro drugs the new owner therein. The trial court ruled in favor of the
spouses, CA reversed, spouses appealed to the Supreme Court


Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the decision of the trial court
Whether or not trial court is correct in awarding moral damages to the spouses

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Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the appellate court erred in reversing the decision of the
lower court. It is very obvious that the spouses have indeed communicated the new owner of the
drugstore to their former supplier (Metro drug) Notwithstanding such notification, the Metro drug
still filed a suit against Aklan drug for the very reason that they contend that they do not care who
owns the business and their job is to only collect payment from the supplied drugs. As the Supreme
Court mentioned, Metro drug is barking at the wrong tree.
With regard to the moral damage, the Supreme Court said that the trial court however erred
when it awarded moral damages in favor of petitioners. Petitioners have failed to show that the
private respondent was motivated by bad faith when it instituted the action for collection. Malicious
prosecution, both in criminal and civil cases, requires the presence of two elements, to wit: a) malice;
and b) absence of probable cause. Moreover, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted
by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initialed deliberately knowing that
the charge was false and baseless (citing Manila Gas Corporation v. CA 100 SCRA 602 [1980])

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158. DE LA PENA VS CA
G.R. No. L-81827 March 28, 1994
Bellosillo, J.

Doctrine:
It is well-settled that reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property
alleged to be erroneously titled in another's name.

Facts:
Ciriaco Reducto was occupying a 24 hectare parcel of land in Davao Del Norte for which he
filed a Homestead Application. At the same time, a certain Potenciano Nazaret likewise filed an
application for the same lot. Reducto later transferred his possessory right over the 6 hectares of the
lot to petitioner Pantaleon de la Pena. After it was ascertained in a field verification that de la Pena
had a better right to acquire the portion claimed by him being its actual occupant and cultivator, the
Director of Lands directed de la Pena to apply for the portion himself within sixty (60) days after its
survey or else "lose his preferential right thereto." However, no such application was filed.
Meanwhile, Ciriaco transferred his rights over another 1 ½ hectare portion of the lot to Michael Doble
who in turn sold his rights to Ricardo Tan (private respondent’s father). When a survey of the lot was
conducted, it was found out that the lands occupied by de la Pena was bigger by ¾ hectare than what
he actually bought and paid for from Ciriaco and the land sold to Doble’s (later acquired by Tan) was
very much smaller than what he actually bought. Although the 3/4-hectare portion was part of the
area acquired by Doble, it was de la Peña who cultivated the same without objection from Doble.
However, when Ricardo Tan acquired the lot, he built a fence to reclaim the portion, but de la Pena
kept destroying it; hence, the start of a boundary dispute. On April 1977, de la Pena then filed a
complaint for forcible entry against Tan. The MTC which ruled in favor of de la Pena concluded that
de la Pena had prior possession of the land. The decision was affirmed by the CFI. On July 1977, during
the pendency of the forcible entry case, de la Pena instituted the present action for reconveyance
with damages against Tan with the RTC. De la Pena alleged that Tan fraudulently registered the ¾
hectare portion which was actually cultivated by the former. The trial court ruled in favor of the Tan
since the disputed ¾ hectare portion was not part of the area bought and paid for by de la Pena. De
la Pena was declared a mere trespasser and planter in bad faith. His prayer for damages was likewise
denied. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court, hence this petition.

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Issue:
Whether or not the award for attorney's fees, moral damages and expenses of litigation
against the petitioner are proper.

Ruling:
It is well-settled that reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property
alleged to be erroneously titled in another's name. In the case at bench, de la Pena does not claim to
be the owner of the disputed portion. Admittedly, what he has is only a "preferential right" to acquire
ownership thereof by virtue of his actual occupation since January 1947. However, de la Pena's
possession is not one that could ripen into ownership. Title to alienable public lands can be
established through open, continuous, and exclusive possession for at least thirty (30) years. It must
be noted that the dispute regarding the 3/4-hectare portion started even before a free patent and
OCT could be issued to private respondent in 1975. As early as 1956, the controversy already began
between de la Pena and Tan's father. Hence, petitioner's possession falls short of the required period.
Not being the owner, de la Pena cannot maintain the present suit
An award for attorney's fees and moral damages on the sole basis of an action later declared
to be unfounded in the absence of a deliberate intent to cause prejudice to the other party is
improper. The right to litigate is so precious that penalty should not be charged on those who may
exercise it erroneously.

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159. “J” MARKETING CORPORATION VS SIA JR.

G.R. No. 127823. January 29, 1998
J. Francisco

Doctrine:
No damages can be charged on those who may exercise the right to litigate in good faith even
if done erroneously.

Facts:
J Marketing, herein petitioner, a company engaged in the business of appliances and
motorcycles, received on April 24, 1983 from Kawasaki Motors (Phils.) a brand new Kawasaki
motorcycle, color Blue, Mode HD-11 (1985) with Engine No. G7E-04848 and Chassis No.KG-805535.
Upon receipt, petitioner’s representative placed motorcycle in the bodega of YKS Bldg. However,
petitioner found out that the motorcycle unit was missing in the bodega and the loss immediately
reported to the police authorities specifically to the Headquarters Constabulary Highway Patrol
District. Petitioner upon tracing found the motorcycle in possession of FelicidadSia Jr., herein
respondent, who bought a motorcycle from one Renato Pelande, Jr. Petitioner’s representative went
to the house of the private respondent and examined the chassis and motor numbers of the
motorcycle and found out that the chassis and motor numbers of the motorcycle in private
respondent’s possession have been tampered to jibe with the chassis and motor numbers of the
motorcycle unit previously purchased by Renato Pelande, Jr. from petitioner. When petitioner’s
representative confronted private respondent at the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group office anent
the questionable motorcycle, private respondent refused to return the said motorcycle to petitioner
and instead told petitioner’s representative to file a case in court. Hence, petitioner filed a complaint
for replevin with damages against private respondent Felicidad C. Sia, Jr. before the Regional Trial
Court of Tacloban City, Branch 8. Private respondent filed a third party complaint against Renato
Pelande Jr., Said third party complaint was declared in default. After trial, the lower court rendered a
decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint but awarded damages and attorney’s fees to private
respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the court a quo.Hence this petition..

Issue:
Whether or not the award of damages and attorney’s fee is proper.

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Ruling:
NO. A person’s right to litigate should not be penalized by holding him liable for damages,
especially when he believes he has a rightful claim against another although found to be erroneous.
In the case at bar, petitioner filed for replevin case against private respondent because of the latter’s
own challenge that if he has a right over the motorcycle petitioner should file a case in court.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the institution of the replevin suit was tainted with gross or evident
bad faith or was done to maliciously to harass, embarrass, annoy or ridicule private respondent.
Moreover, the adverse result of an action – dismissal of petitioner’s complaint – does not per se make
an act unlawful and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. It is not a sound public policy
to place a premium on the right to litigate. No damages can be charged on those who may exercise
such precious right in good faith, even if done erroneously. Further, the award of exemplary damages
has no factual basis. It is a requisite that the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton,
fraudulent or malevolent manner - circumstances which are absent in this case. In addition,
exemplary damages cannot be awarded as the requisite element of compensatory damages was not
present. As to the attorney’s fees, an adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award thereof to
the winning party. Petitioner honestly thought that they had a good cause of action, so
notwithstanding the dismissal of their case, no attorney’s fees can be granted to private respondent.
Considering that the latter claims to be the owner of the motorcycle, petitioner was compelled to sue
him. When the former “necessarily” became a party defendant no attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses can automatically be recovered even if he should win, it is not the fact of winning alone that
entitles recovery of such items but rather the attendance of special circumstances - the enumerated
exceptions in Article 2208 of the New Civil Code. There being no bad faith reflected in petitioner’s
persistence in pursuing its case, other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of its cause,
attorney’s fees cannot be recovered as cost.

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160. REYNALDO T. COMETA and STATE INVESTMENT TRUST, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS et al
G.R. No. 124062, January 21, 1999
Mendoza, J.

Doctrine:

Lack of probable cause is an element separate and distinct from that of malice. It follows,
therefore, that one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution
where he acted with probable cause.

Facts:
In 1979, State Investment Trust, Inc (SITI), formerly State Investment House, Inc.
(SIHI) extended loans in various amounts to Guevent Industrial Development Corp. (GIDC) which the
latter failed to pay when due. For this reason, A rehabilitation plan was agreed upon wherein
GIDC mortgaged its property but it still defaulted resulting in a foreclosure sale where SITI is the
highest bidder. GIDC then filed in the RTC alleging irregularities in the foreclosure of the mortgages
and the sale of properties to petitioner SITI which ended with a compromise agreement wherein HBI
offered to purchase and SITI agreed. The RTC in its ruling and affirmed by CA, compelled SITI to
accept HBI's offer to purchase. HBI applied to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board for a
permit to develop the property submitting an affidavit by SITI president Cometa releasing the
mortgage. Cometa denied executing an affidavit as supported by the NBI's finding that it is
forged. Cometa filed a complaint for falsification of public document against HBI president Guevara.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. HBI filed a complaint for malicious prosecution against petitioners
Cometa and SITI alleging that it was filed with the sole intent of harassing and pressuring Guevara,
in his capacity as chairman of GIDC, to give in to their illicit and malicious desire to appropriate the
remaining unsold properties of GIDC. Cometa and SITI answered that the action seeks to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate and for that reason is unconstitutional and against settled public policy.
The RTC and CA denied such since it is without malice.

Issue: Whether or not Cometa and SITI should be penalized for malicious prosecution?

Ruling:
No. The Court have carefully considered the parties arguments.

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As stated in our decision in this case, a complaint for malicious prosecution states a cause of
action if it alleges the following: (1) that the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that at least the
prosecution was instituted at his instance: (2) that the prosecution finally terminated in the acquittal
of the plaintiff; (3) that in bringing the action the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4)
that the prosecutor was actuated by malice, by improper and sinister motives.
Here, probable cause for the filing of Information merely means reasonable ground for belief
in the existence of facts warranting the proceedings complained of, or an apparent state of facts found
to exist upon reasonable inquiry, which would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to
believe that the accused person has committed the crime. What is needed to bring an action in courts
is simply probable cause, not prima facie evidence. In the terminology of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, what required for bringing a criminal action is only such evidence as is sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief as to the facts of the commission of a crime and the respondents
probable guilt.
The finding of the trial court in the criminal case does not imply lack of probable cause in
bringing the case. To the contrary its findings, as shown above, clearly show that petitioners had
reasonable ground to believe that private respondent Guevarra was responsible for the forged Letter
of Undertaking which was submitted to the HLURB in connection with the application of the
Honeycomb Builders Inc for a license to sell units at the RSG Condomintum Guentville II Subdivision.
It is noteworthy that in pars. 6 to 8 of their complaint, private respondents admitted that the
properties were mortgaged to petitioner SITI. A letter of undertaking by the mortgagee was thus
needed for the issuance of a license to sell to HBI.

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161. TRIPLE EIGHT V. NLRC

G.R. No. 129584. December 3, 1998
J. Romero

Doctrine:
The rule is moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was
attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in
a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Likewise, exemplary damages
may be awarded if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent
manner.
Facts:
On August 1992, Osdana was recruited by Triple Eight Integrated Services Inc. for
employment as "Food Server" for 36 months with Gulf Catering Company (GCC) based in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for 36 months. She was required to pay P11,950 placement
fees. Subsequently, she was asked to sign a contract for a salary of $280 which was approved by
POEA.
On September 16, 1992, Osdana commenced work as staff to College of Public
Administration made to wash dishes, cooking pots, and utensils, perform janitorial work and other
tasks which were unrelated to her job designation as waitress on a 12-hour shift without overtime
pay. Because of the long hours and the strenuous nature of her work, she felt numbness and pain in
her arms so she was confined at the Ladies Villa during June 18 to August 22, 1993 for which she was
not paid her salaries
On August 22 to October 5, 1993, she worked as a Food Server and Cook at the Hota Bani
Tameem Hospital for which she was not compensated.
October 6 to October 23, 1993: She was confined at the Ladies Villa for no reason and was not
paid her salary.
On October 24, 1993, she was assigned at Oleysha University to wash dishes and do other
menial tasks at long hours.
On January 1994 and April 23, 1994, she underwent operation because of her pains and was
not given work during the period even though her doctor advised that she can do light work. She did
not receive any compensation.

On April 27, 1994, she was discharged from work without separation pay on the ground of
illness. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of Osdana,holding Triple Eight liable for US$2,499.00 as

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salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract, and US$1,076.00 as unpaid salary and salary
differential, or its equivalent in Philippine Peso and P50,000 moral damages, P20,000 exemplary
damages and 10% of the monetary award as attorney's fee. The NLRC, affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s
decision.
Thus, Triple Eight filed a petition for certiorari for awarding without legal basis.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should pay moral and exemplary damages
Ruling:
Yes, P30,000 moral damages and P10,000 exemplary damages.
With respect to the award of moral and exemplary damages, the same is likewise proper but
should be reduced. Worth reiterating is the rule that moral damages are recoverable where the
dismissal the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor,
or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Likewise, exemplary
damages may be awarded if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent
manner.
According to the facts of the case as stated by public respondent, Osdana was made to
perform such menial chores, as dishwashing and janitorial work, among others, contrary to her job
designation as waitress. She was also made to work long hours without overtime pay. Because of
such arduous working conditions, she developed Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. Her illness was such that
she had to undergo surgery twice. Since her employer determined for itself that she was no longer to
continue working, they sent her home posthaste without as much as separation pay or compensation
for the months when she was unable to work because of her illness. Since the employers deemed to
have acted in bad faith, the award for attorney’s fees is likewise upheld.
Petitioner can still claim reimbursement of contribution from it for the amounts awarded to
the illegally-dismissed employee.

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162. KIERULF V. CA
G.R. No. 99301 March 13, 1997
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Doctrine:

Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the
defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante; thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Since each case must
be governed by its own peculiar circumstances, there is no hard and fast rule in determining the
proper amount. The yardstick should be that the amount awarded should not be so palpably and
scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the
part of the trial judge. Neither should it be so little or so paltry that it rubs salt to the injury already
inflicted on plaintiffs.

Facts:

On February 28, 1987, at around 7:45 pm, the Pantranco bus driven by Jose Malanum lost
control and swerved to the left flying over the center island occupying the east-bound lane of EDSA.
The front of the bus hit the front of the Isuzu pickup driven by Legaspi and smashed to pieces thereby
inflicting physical injury to Legaspi and his passenger Lucila Kierulf. Both were then treated at the
Quezon City General Hospital. The bus also hit and injured a pedestrian who was then crossing EDSA.
Despite the impact, the bus continued to move forward and its front portion rammed against a Caltex
gasoline station, damaging its building and gasoline dispensing equipment.

The RTC ruled that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the defendant's
driver. It ordered Pantranco North Express, Incorporated to pay Lucila Kierulf, Victor Kierulf for the
damages of the Isuzu pick-up and Porfirio Legaspi. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with
modifications, adding P25,000 attorney's fees and to pay costs

Issue:

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Whether or not Lucila, Victor and Legaspi should be awarded moral damages

Ruling:

Affirmed with modification. The award of moral damages to Lucila and Legaspi is hereby
increased to P400,000.00 and P50,000.00 respectively; exemplary damages to Lucila is increased to
P200,000.00. Legaspi is awarded exemplary damages of P50,000.00

There being no conflict between the findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court that
gross negligence was the real cause of the collision, we see no reason to digress from the standard
rule.

If defendant's driver was not driving fast, was not recklessly negligent and had exercised due
care and prudence, with due respect to human life and to others travelling in the same place, the
driver could have stopped the bus the moment it crossed the island, and avoided crossing over to the
other lane and bumping against vehicles travelling in opposite direction. The defendant's driver did
not take any evasive action and utterly failed to adopt any measure to avoid injuries and damage to
others because he "lost control of the bus", which was like a juggernaut, let loose in a big crowd,
smashing everything on its path.

As held in the Rodriguez v Bethlehem case, when a person is injured to the extent that he/she
is no longer capable of giving love, affection, comfort and sexual relations to his or her spouse, that
spouse has suffered a direct and real personal loss. The loss is immediate and consequential rather
than remote and unforeseeable; it is personal to the spouse and separate and distinct from that of the
injured person. Victor's claim for deprivation of his right to consortium, although argued before
Respondent Court, is not supported by the evidence on record. His wife might have been badly
disfigured, but he had not testified that, in consequence thereof, his right to marital consortium was
affected. Clearly, Victor (and for that matter, Lucila) had failed to make out a case for loss of
consortium, unlike the Rodriguez spouse. Again, we emphasize that this claim is factual in origin and
must find basis not only in the evidence presented but also in the findings of the Respondent Court.
For lack of factual basis, such claim cannot be ruled upon by this Court at this time.

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The court deemed proper to award moral damages to Lucila for her physical sufferings,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and wounded feelings. Further, she sustained multiple injuries
on the scalp, limbs and ribs. She lost all her teeth. She had to undergo several corrective operations
and treatments. Despite treatment and surgery, her chin was still numb and thick. She felt that she
has not fully recovered from her injuries. She even had to undergo a second operation on her gums
for her dentures to fit. She suffered sleepless nights and shock as a consequence of the vehicular
accident.

Exemplary damages are designed to permit the courts to mold behavior that has socially
deleterious consequences, and its imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts
of an offender discretion of the court;

(1) They may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition, among others, to
compensatory damages, and cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending
upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant;
(2) the claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages; and
(3) the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the award would be allowed only
if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner."

The exemplary damages awarded to Petitioner Lucila is increased to P200,000.00. The fact of
gross negligence duly proven, we believe that Legaspi, being also a victim of gross negligence, should
also receive exemplary damages. Under the facts proven, the Court awards him P25,000 as exemplary
damages.

We agree with the findings of Respondent Court that Lucila's claim of loss of earning capacity
has not been duly proven. The alleged loss must be established by factual evidence for it partakes of
actual damages. A party is entitled to adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually
suffered and duly proved. Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but
must actually be shown with a reasonable degree of certainty.

Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the

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defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante; thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Since each case must
be governed by its own peculiar circumstances, there is no hard and fast rule in determining the
proper amount. The yardstick should be that the amount awarded should not be so palpably and
scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the
part of the trial judge. Neither should it be so little or so paltry that it rubs salt to the injury already
inflicted on plaintiffs.

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163. MIRANDA-RIBAYA V. CARBONELL

G.R. No. L-49390 January 28, 1980
TEEHANKEE, J.:

Doctrine:

The Supreme Court disagreed on respondent court's narrow view that petitioner Niceta's
failure to use in her testimony the precise legal terms or "sacramental phrases" of "mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings or moral shock" and the like justifies the denial of the claim
for damages. It is sufficient that these exact terms have been pleaded in the complaint and evidence
has been adduced, as cited above, amply supporting the averments of the complaint. Indeed,
petitioner Niceta vividly portrayed in simple terms the moral shock and suffering she underwent as
a result of respondents' wanton abuse of her good faith and confidence.

Facts:

Mrs. Niceta Miranda-Ribaya was engaged sometime in 1968 in the pawnshop business and in
the buying and selling of jewelry.

Sometime prior to April 23, 1968 one of her agents, Mrs. Josefina Roco-Robles, informed her
that a millionaire logger by the name of Marino Bautista was interested to buy big diamond stones.
Acting upon this information, Mrs. Ribaya accompanied by her agent, then went to the spouses
Bautista's home to sell 10 pieces of jewelry for P224,000 which was haggled down to P222,000. A
receipt was signed by Marino Bautista and he issued in exchange of 2 Equitable Banking Corporation
checks of P112,000 and P110,000. Mrs. Ribaya then issued a voucher evidencing the check payment.
On the next day, Mrs. Ribaya accompanied by Ms. Narcisa Gosioco requested the check of P110,000 to
be divided since some were owned by her. 4 checks of Bank of America with amounts of P64,000 to
Mrs. Ribaya and P34,000 to Gosioco postdated on June 23, 1968. Mrs. Ribaya also sold 4 more pieces
of jewelry for P94,000 in exchange for four checks by Bank of America. This was transacted at the
office of Mr. Bautista at Bank of Philippine Islands Building.

Then on May 15, 1968, Mrs. Ribaya wanted to replace the 3 pieces sold by her because the
owners want them back. She left it at the Bautista's residence but instead of returning the 3 pieces,

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Mr. Bautista issued her a check of P45,000 by Bank of America since the 3 pieces were already given
as gifts to bank officers.

When the maturity dates came, she tried to contact Mr. Bautista but failed because he was on
a logging concession so she deposited the checks to her account and it was dishonored due to closed
accounts. She also discovered that her jewelries were pawned to different pawnshops in Manila in
the name of the driver, secretary of the daughter of Bautista and a certain Balagot. Some of which
were pawned the same day it was bought.

Mrs. Ribaya was able to retrieve one-by-one the pawn tickets of the jewelries she sold and
other 3 tickets of jewelries not owned by her. In order to retrieve them, she had to close down her
shop. But there is still a balance of P125,460.79, excluding those of Ms. Gosioco. Mrs. Ribaya also
promised her attorney 25% of the unpaid obligation.

The RTC ruled in favor of Mrs. Ribaya for P125,460.79 plus 25% attorney's fees but did not
grant moral and exemplary damages. The court of appeals affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue:

Whether or not Mrs. Ribaya should be entitled to moral and exemplary damages.

Ruling:

Yes. Accordingly, the decision of respondent court insofar as it denies petitioners' claim for
damages is hereby set aside. In addition to the amounts awarded in the affirmed judgment of the
lower court, petitioners are further awarded moral and exemplary damages equivalent to twenty-
five per cent (25%) of the principal sum of P125,460.79 adjudged in their favor by the lower court.
With costs.

In the present case, petitioner Niceta took the witness stand and established by
uncontradicted testimony that due to respondents' deceitful and malevolent acts of defraudation, she
had suffered "extreme" anguish (without using the word anguish) and "could not sleep for three
months," since she was forced to close her pawnshop, sell some of her personal jewelries and borrow

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money in order to pay off the owners of the jewelries wrongfully gotten by respondents from her.
The evidence of record shows the magnitude of respondents' wanton, fraudulent and malevolent acts
of defraudation.

The Supreme Court disagreed on respondent court's narrow view that petitioner Niceta's
failure to use in her testimony the precise legal terms or "sacramental phrases" of "mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings or moral shock" and the like justifies the denial of the claim
for damages. It is sufficient that these exact terms have been pleaded in the complaint and evidence
has been adduced, as cited above, amply supporting the averments of the complaint. Indeed,
petitioner Niceta vividly portrayed in simple terms the moral shock and suffering she underwent as
a result of respondents' wanton abuse of her good faith and confidence.

Thus, petitioners' testimonial evidence to the effect that petitioner Niceta suffered
"extremely" and that for three months she could not sleep was a clear demonstration of her physical
suffering, mental anguish and serious anxiety and similar injury, resulting from respondents'
malevolent acts that show her to be clearly entitled to moral damages.

Petitioners having established the more damages, are entitled in addition thereto, to
exemplary damages. The wantonness and malevolence through which respondents defrauded
petitioners, deceitfully incurring and then evading settlement of their just liability certainly justifies
the award of exemplary damages by way of example and correction for the public good and also to
serve as a deterrent to the commission of similar misdeeds by others, even if the transaction were
viewed as a breach of civil contract.

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164. TRINIDAD J. FRANCISCO, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, defendant-appellant.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-18155 March 30, 1963
TRINIDAD J. FRANCISCO, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-18287 March 30, 1963
Reyes, J.B.L., J.:

Doctrine:
Breach of contract, not being malicious or fraudulent, does not warrant the award of moral
damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code.

Facts:
Plaintiff, Trinidad J. Francisco, in consideration of a loan in the amount of P400,000.00, out of
which the sum of P336,100.00 was released to her, mortgaged in favor of the defendant, Government
Service Insurance System (hereinafter referred to as the System) a parcel of land containing an area
of 18,232 square meters, with twenty-one (21) bungalows, known as Vic-Mari Compound, located at
Baesa, Quezon City, payable within ten (10) years in monthly installments of P3,902.41, and with
interest of 7% per annum compounded monthly.

Later on, the System extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage on the ground that up to that
date the plaintiff-mortgagor was in arrears on her monthly installments in the amount of P52,000.00.
Payments made by the plaintiff at the time of foreclosure amounted to P130,000.00. The System itself
was the buyer of the property in the foreclosure sale.

Atty. Vicente Francisco, plaintiffs’ father, sent a letter of request to the GSIS to which they
approved and accepted. Defendant GSIS received the amount promised but was not able to take
administration of the compound as agreed on the offer letter. However, Atty. Francisco remitted the
collection received by his daughter from the occupants to GSIS.

Then, the System sent three letters, one signed by its assistant general manager and the other
two by Andal, asking the plaintiff for a proposal for the payment of her indebtedness, since according
to the System the one-year period for redemption had expired. In his reply, Atty. Francisco protested
against the System’s request for proposal of payment as there already exists a contract generated

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from his offer letter which has already commenced. The letter was responded to by the System
countering that the plaintiff should pay the attorney’s fees, publication expenses, filing fees and
surcharge of the foreclosure done. According to the defendant, the remittances previously made by
Atty. Francisco were not sufficient to pay off her daughter's arrears, including attorney's fees
incurred by the defendant in foreclosing the mortgage, and the one-year period for redemption has
expired, said defendant consolidated the title to the compound in its name, and gave notice to the
plaintiff and to each occupant of the compound.

Hence, the plaintiff instituted the present suit, for specific performance and damages. The
defendant answered, pleading that the binding acceptance of Francisco's offer was the resolution of
the Board, and that Andal's telegram, being erroneous, should be disregarded. After trial, the trial
court found that the offer of Atty. Francisco, made on behalf of his daughter, had been unqualifiedly
accepted, and was binding, and rendered judgment as noted at the start of this opinion.

On plaintiff’s separate appeal where she prayed for an award of actual or compensatory
damages for her alleged unrealized profits due to her inability to sell the compound for the price of
P750,000.00 offered by one Vicente Alunan, which sale was allegedly blocked because the System
consolidated the title to the property in its name. Plaintiff reckons the amount of P83,333.33 by
placing the actual value of the property at P666,666.67, a figure arrived at by assuming that the
System's loan of P400,000.00 constitutes 60% of the actual value of the security. The trial court
refused to award such actual or compensatory damages because it could not determine with
reasonable certainty the difference between the offered price and the actual value of the property,
for lack of competent evidence.

Issue:
WON the plaintiff should be awarded moral damages in a breach of contract regarding the
redemption proposal without malicious intent from the defendant

Ruling:
No. There was no error in the appealed decision in denying moral damages, not only on
account of the plaintiff's failure to take the witness stand and testify to her social humiliation,
wounded feelings, anxiety, etc., as the decision holds, but primarily because a breach of contract like

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that of defendant, not being malicious or fraudulent, does not warrant the award of moral damages
under Article 2220 of the Civil Code.

There is no basis for awarding exemplary damages either, because this species of damages is
only allowed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages, none of which
have been allowed in this case, for reasons herein before discussed.

As to attorneys' fees, we agree with the trial court's stand that in view of the absence of gross
and evident bad faith in defendant's refusal to satisfy the plaintiff's claim, and there being none of the
other grounds enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, such absence precludes a recovery. The
award of attorneys' fees is essentially discretionary in the trial court, and no abuse of discretion has
been shown.

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165. EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC. vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and RICARDO LO
G.R. No. 130030 June 25, 1999
Vitug, J.:

Doctrine:
Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are designed to compensate and alleviate in
some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused to a person.
Such damages, to be recoverable, must be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission the
factual basis for which is satisfactorily established by the aggrieved party.

Facts:
Expertravel & Tours, Inc., ("Expertravel"), a domestic corporation engaged in the travel
agency business, issued to private respondent Ricardo Lo four round-trip plane tickets for Hongkong,
together with hotel accommodations and transfers, for a total cost of P39,677.20. Alleging that Lo
had failed to pay the amount due, Expertravel caused several demands to be made. Since the demands
were ignored by Lo, Expertravel filed a court complaint for recovery of the amount claimed plus
damages.

In his defense, respondent Lo explained that his account with Expertravel had already been
fully paid. The outstanding account was remitted to Expertravel through its then Chairperson, Ms.
Ma. Rocio de Vega, who was authorized to deal with the clients of Expertravel.

The trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, held that the payment made by Lo was valid
and bidding on petitioner Expertravel. Even on the assumption that Ms. de Vera had not been
specifically authorized by Expertravel, both courts said, the fact that the amount "delivered to the
latter remained in its possession up to the present, meant that the amount redounded to the benefit
of petitioner Expertravel, in view of the second paragraph of Article 1241 of the Civil Code to the
effect that payment made to a third person shall also be valid in so far as it has rebounded to the
benefit of the creditor."

Issue:
WON moral damages may be awarded for negligence or quasi-delict that did not result to
physical injury to the offended party

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Ruling:
No. Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are designed to compensate and alleviate
in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused to a person.
Such damages, to be recoverable, must be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission the
factual basis for which is satisfactorily established by the aggrieved party. An award of moral
damages would require certain conditions to be met; to wit: (1) First, there must be an injury,
whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) second, there must
be a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award
of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219. Malicious prosecution can also
give rise to a claim for moral damages. The term "analogous cases," referred to in Article 2219,
following the ejusdem generis rule, must be held similar to those expressly enumerated by the law.

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166. J MARKETING V. SIA, 285 SCRA 580

G.R. No. 127823, January 29, 1998
J. Francisco

Doctrine:

Exemplary damages cannot be awarded if the elements of compensatory damages are not
present.

Facts:

J. Marketing is a company engaged in the business of appliances and motorcycles and

received a Kawasaki motorcycle. Upon receiving the motorcycle, the petitioner’s representative
placed the motorcycle in the bodega of YKS Building but it went missing as it was sold by a certain
Renato Pelande to Felicidad Sia, Jr., whom the motorcycle was found upon reporting to the Highway
Patrol District.

The representative of the petitioner went to the house of the respondent Sia and it found out
that the chassis and motor numbers had already been tampered with and when the former
confronted the latter to return the motorcycle, it then said that it should just file a case in court
instead. The petitioner filed a case of damages with replevin.

Issues:

Whether or not there can be damages applied in this case?

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court said that the award of damages has no factual basis. It is requisite that
the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent, or malevolent manner —
circumstances which are absent in this case. In addition, exemplary damages cannot be awarded as
the requisite element of compensatory damages was not present.

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167. REYNALDO T. COMETA V. CA

G.R. No. 141855, February 6, 2001
J. Mendoza

Doctrine:

A complaint for malicious prosecution states a cause of action if it alleges: 1. that the
defendant was himself the prosecutor or that at least he instigated the prosecution: 2. that the
prosecution finally terminated in the plaintiff’s acquittal; 3. that in bringing the action the prosecutor
acted without probable cause; and 4. that the prosecutor was actuated by malice, i.e., by improper
and sinister motives.

Facts:

The petitioner State Investment Trust, Inc. extended loans in various amounts to Guevent
Industrial Development Corporation. Guevent failed to pay on the dates the loans were already due
and because of that Guevent agreed that it will mortgage several parcels of land to State Investment.
When it again defaulted, State Investment foreclosed the mortgages and acquired the properties via
bidding.

Guevent filed a case stating that there were irregularities in the foreclosure of the mortgages
and the case was eventually settled through a compromise agreement. There was a dispute that arose
concerning the interpretation of the agreement, as Honeycomb Builders, Inc. offered to purchase
from GIDC a lot covered by the agreement and GIDC agreed, however, State Investments refused to
give in the sale.

The Honeycomb builders applied for a permit to develop in the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board, when the application was granted, on the account of which the respondent
Honeycomb Builders build a condominium, the respondent applied a license to sell the units required
by HLURB together with an Affidavit of Undertaking which in effect was executed by Cometa as SITI
President.

However, Cometa denied that he executed the affidavits and the National Bureau of
Investigation said that Cometa’s signature was forged on the basis of which a complaint for
falsification of public documents was filed against Honeycomb Builders President Guevarra.
Guevarra and Honeycomb builders filed a complaint for Malicious prosecution against Cometa.

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Issues:

Whether or not the case for malicious prosecution states a cause of action?

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court said that a complaint for malicious prosecution states a cause of
action if it alleges: 1. that the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that at least he instigated the
prosecution: 2. that the prosecution finally terminated in the plaintiff’s acquittal; 3. that in bringing
the action the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and 4. that the prosecutor was actuated by
malice, i.e., by improper and sinister motives.

In this case, a mere allegation in filed in a complaint for malicious prosecution after
information was filed after the preliminary investigation and that a warrant of arrest was thereafter
issued does not by itself negate allegations in the same complaint that the prosecution was indeed
malicious. All criminal prosecutions are under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. To
sustain the petitioners' stand that there was an allegation in a complaint for malicious prosecution
that the information in the criminal case was filed after appropriate preliminary investigation
automatically negates a contrary allegation that the filing of the case was malicious would result in
the dismissal of every action for malicious prosecution.

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168. TRIPLE EIGHT INTEGRATED SERVICES, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION et al
G.R. No. 129584 December 3, 1988
J. Romero

Doctrine: Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury
incapable of pecuniary computation and may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant’s wrongful act for omission.

Facts:
Osdana was recruited by Triple Eight for employment as Food Server for 36 months with Gulf
Catering based on Saudi Arabia. In Riyadh, she was assigned to the College of Public Administration
of the Oleysha University and made to work contrary to the terms and conditions of the employment
contract. She was also made to work for 12 hours a day without overtime pay.
Because of the strenuous nature of her work, she suffered numbness and pain in her arms,
the reason why she was confined at a housing facility of Gulf Catering and during that period, she was
not paid her salaries.
After confinement, she was allowed to resume work, this time as a Food Server and a Cook at
a Hospital, where she worked seven days a week without compensation.
She was again later confined at the housing facility for no apparent reason without salary.
After her second confinement, she was re-assigned at the University wherein she worked long
hours and under harsh conditions. Because of this, she was diagnosed with Bilateral Carpal Tunnel
Syndrome.
As the pain became unbearable, she was hospitalized and underwent two surgical operations.
Based on the medical report, her condition improved and discharged from the hospital 2 days after
her operation. However, four days later, she was dismissed from work allegedly on the grounds of
illness. She was not given separation pay nor was she paid her salaries for the periods she was not
allowed to work.
Upon return to the Philippines, she sought the help of Triple Eight but to no avail. She filed a
case before the POEA. The case was referred to NLRC and assigned to a Labor Arbiter.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Odsana ordering Triple Eight to pay her salaries for the
unexpired portion of the contract, for the unpaid salary and salary differential. The Labor Arbiter also
awards the payment of moral damage as well as exemplary damages.

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The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter upon appeal of Triple Eight.

Issue:
Whether or not Odsana is entitled to moral damages.
Ruling:
The Court ruled in the affirmative.
The award of moral and exemplary likewise is proper but should be reduced.
Worth reiterating is the rule that moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the
employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.
Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal was effected in a wanton,
oppressive or malevolent manner. Since the employer is deemed to have acted in bad faith, the award
for attorney's fees is likewise upheld

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169. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIIPINES vs. TEODORICO CLEOPAS and FLORENCIO

PIRAME/FLORENCIO PIRAME
G.R. No. 121998 March 9, 2000
J. Quisumbing

Doctrine:
Moral Damages must first be proved before the court may award it.

Facts:
Pedro Torrenueva was struck with an iron pipe by Epifanio Cleopas, with a piece of wood by
Teoderico Cleopas, while being held by Florencio Pirame. This happened in the morning of March 18,
1993 which was seen by Cipriano Supero. The piece of wood used by Teoderico hit Torrenueva’s
forehead which caused the latter to fall down dead. To cover the discovery of the crime, the latter
was buried in the well near the house of Cleopas’ father, Demetrio.
The three later on charged with the crime of Murder.
Only Teodorico Cleopas and Florencio Pirame were apprehended. Epifanio Cleopas remained
at large.
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.
The lower court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty of the crime of Murder and
sentenced both with penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are also ordered to indemnify the surviving
spouse of the victim for P50,000.00 each, P23,214.00 for burial and incidental expenses and
P50,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages.
Only accused Pirame appealed the decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the surviving spouse should be awarded moral and exemplary damages.

Ruling:
The Court held in the negative.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
In this case, the widow of the victim did not testify to any mental anguish or emotional
distress which she suffered as a result of her husband’s death.

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170. PNB vs CA
G.R. No. 118357, May 6, 1997
J. Romero

Doctrine:
In view of the noninvolvement of petitioner in the alleged conspiracy to strip private
respondent of its rights over the Giporlos Project, petitioner cannot be made solidarily liable with the
MMIC for damages.

Facts:
Industrial Enterprises, Inc. (IEI) entered into a coal operating contract with the Bureau of
Energy Development (BED) with Cabarrus and then Minister of Energy Geronimo Velasco as
signatories. IEI found 3 newly-discovered coal blocks and applied it for conversion. But instead it
was awarded to Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC).
Consequently, IEI made written demands to MMIC, pursuant to the MOA, for the
reimbursement of all costs and expenses it had incurred on the project which, as of July 31, 1983, had
amounted to P31.66 million as audited by the Sycip, Gorres and Velayo Company
IEI filed a complaint alleging that MMIC acted in gross and evident bad faith in entering into the MOA
when it had no intention at all to operate the 2 coal blocks and of complying with any of its obligations
under the said agreement
July 13, 1981: MMIC entered into a Mortgage Trust Agreement in favor of PNB and
DBP. MMIC defaulted in the payment of its loan obligation.
August 15, 1984: IEI advised PNB and DBP that it had assigned to MMIC per the MOA were
still unpaid but still foreclosure sale proceeded. IEI filed a rescission of the assignment of the Giporlos
Coal Project to MMIC before the RTC impleading PNB and DBP

RTC: granted. PNB is equally guilty of bad faith because it was advised beforehand that the heavy
equipment and movable property which are part of the Giporlos Coal Project were still unpaid. MMIC
and PNB jointly and solidarily liable to pay moral damages P300,000,exemplary damages P200,000
and P200,000 attorney's fees

CA: reversed. IEI's claim against PNB for actual, consequential and moral damages including
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit, has neither legal nor factual bases.

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Issue: Whether PNB should be liable for damages.

Ruling:
NO. The Court renders petitioner solidarily liable with Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporation for damages and affirmed insofar as it nullifies the foreclosure sale of August 31, 1984.
In view of the noninvolvement of petitioner in the alleged conspiracy to strip private respondent of
its rights over the Giporlos Project, petitioner cannot be made solidarily liable with the MMIC for
damages. However, although petitioner's rights to foreclose the mortgage and to subject the
equipment of private respondent to the foreclosure sale are unassailable, we find that the foreclosure
proceedings fell short of the requirements of the law.

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171. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES VS CA

GR No. 120262, July 17, 1997
J. Regalado

Doctrine:
Assuming arguendo that the airline passengers have no vested right to these amenities in
case a flight is cancelled due to force majeure, what makes petitioner liable for damages in this
particular case and under the facts obtaining herein is its blatant refusal to accord the so-called
amenities equally to all its stranded passengers who were bound for Surigao City

Facts:
On October 23, 1988, private respondent Pantejo, then City Fiscal of Surigao City, boarded a
PAL plane in Manila and disembarked in Cebu City where he was supposed to take his connecting
flight to Surigao City However, due to typhoon Osang, the connecting flight to Surigao City was
cancelled. To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, PAL initially gave out cash
assistance of P100.00 and, the next day, P200.00, for their expected stay of two days in Cebu.
Respondent Pantejo requested instead that he be billeted in a hotel at PAL’s expense because he did
not have cash with him at that time, but PAL refused. Thus, respondent Pantejo was forced to seek
and accept the generosity of a co- passenger, an engineer named Andoni Dumlao, and he shared a
room with the latter at Sky View Hotel with the promise to pay his share of the expenses upon
reaching Surigao.

On October 25, 1988 when the flight for Surigao was resumed, respondent Pantejo came to
know that the hotel expenses of his co-passengers, one Superintendent Ernesto Gonzales and a
certain Mrs. Gloria Rocha, an auditor of the Philippine National Bank, were reimbursed by PAL. At
this point, respondent Pantejo informed Oscar Jereza, PAL’s Manager for Departure Services at
Mactan Airport and who was in charge of cancelled flights, that he was going to sue the airline for
discriminating against him. It was only then that Jereza offered to pay respondent Pantejo P300.00
which, due to the ordeal and anguish he had undergone, the latter decline.

Issue:
Whether PAL can establish the defense of force majeure.

Ruling:

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Yes. PAL can establish the defense of force majeure but it is still liable for damages. Petitioner
theorizes that the hotel accommodations or cash assistance given in case a flight is cancelled is in the
nature of an amenity and is merely a privilege that may be extended at its own discretion, but never
a right that may be demanded by its passengers. Thus, when respondent Pantejo was offered cash
assistance and he refused it, petitioner cannot be held liable for whatever befell respondent Pantejo
on that fateful day, because it was merely exercising its discretion when it opted to just give cash
assistance to its passengers.

Assuming arguendo that the airline passengers have no vested right to these amenities in
case a flight is cancelled due to force majeure, what makes petitioner liable for damages in this
particular case and under the facts obtaining herein is its blatant refusal to accord the so-called
amenities equally to all its stranded passengers who were bound for Surigao City. No compelling or
justifying reason was advanced for such discriminatory and prejudicial conduct.

More importantly, it has been sufficiently established that it is petitioner's standard company
policy, whenever a flight has been cancelled, to extend to its hapless passengers cash assistance or to
provide them accommodations in hotels with which it has existing tie-ups. In fact, petitioner's Mactan
Airport Manager for departure services, Oscar Jereza, admitted that PAL has an existing arrangement
with hotels to accommodate stranded passengers, and that the hotel bills of Ernesto Gonzales were
reimbursed obviously pursuant to that policy.

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172. LOPEZ VS PAN AMERICAN

G.R. No. L-22415 March 30, 1966
J. Bengzon, J.P.

Doctrine:
The amount of damages awarded in this appeal has been determined by adequately considering the
official, political, social, and financial standing of the offended parties on one hand, and the business
and financial position of the offender on the other. The present rate of exchange and the terms at
which the amount of damages awarded would approximately be in U.S. dollars has also been
considered.

Facts:
Sen. Fernando Lopez, his wife, son-in-law, and his daughter made reservations, through their agency,
for first class accommodations in the Tokyo – San Francisco flight of PAN-AM. PAN-AM's San
Francisco head office confirmed their reservations. Subsaquently, first class tickets were issued, with
the total fare having been previously paid. As scheduled, they left Manila and as soon as they arrived
in Tokyo, they contacted PAN-AM's Tokyo office regarding their accommodations. PAN-AM's Tokyo
office informed them that the first class seats were all already booked and that they could not take
the flight unless they took the tourist class. Due to pressing engagements in the US, they were
constrained to take PAN-AM's flight as tourist passengers. Sen. Lopez filed a suit for damages alleging
breach of contracts done in bad faith by PAN-AM out of racial prejudice against Orientals. He asked
for actual and moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees plus costs. PAN-AM asserted
that its failure to provide first class accommodations to Sen. Lopez and his family was due to honest
error of its employees.

Issue:
Whether or not the award for moral damages and exemplary damages could be increased.

Ruling:
The Court ruled in favor of Sen. Lopez and his family and increased the amounts of moral and
exemplary damages. Moral damages are recoverable in breach of contracts where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith (Art. 2220). While exemplary or corrective damages may be
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good in breach of contracts where the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner (Art. 2229,

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2232). Written contracts for an attorney's services, on the other hand, shall control the amount to be
paid unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable
Factors in determining amount for moral damages: The amount of damages awarded in this appeal
has been determined by adequately considering the official, political, social, and financial standing of
the offended parties on one hand, and the business and financial position of the offender on the other.
The present rate of exchange and the terms at which the amount of damages awarded would
approximately be in U.S. dollars has also been considered

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173. PRODUCERS BANK VS CA

G.R. No. 111584 September 17, 2001
J. Melo

Doctrine:
Moral and exemplary damages may be awarded without proof of pecuniary loss. In awarding both,
the court shall take into account the circumstances surrounding the case and assess damages
according to its discretion.

Facts:
Salvador Chua was originally a depositor of Pacific Banking Corporation. He was offered by the
manager of Producers Bank of the Philippines to transfer his account with them. The manager
assured Chua that if he was to transfer his account the latter would enjoy longer loan terms and lower
interest rates. Chua later on decided to transfer his account to Producers Bank. The amount which he
deposited into his savings account was never credited. It was discovered that the branch manager
absconded with the money of the bank’s depositors. The bank also dishonored the checks drawn by
Chua on the ground of insufficient funds despite the fact that there was a balance deposit sufficient
to cover the amount of the checks. These events prompted Chua and his wife to request for copies of
their ledgers covering their savings and current accounts. However, the bank refused to grant their
request. Due to the bank's refusal, the couple instituted an action for damages against the bank. The
bank, on the other hand, filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage which
covered Chua’s previous loan. As a result, spouses Chua’s filed a complaint for injunction and
damages, alleging that the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure was without basis and was instituted
maliciously in order to harass them.

Issue:
Are Spouses Chua entitled to moral, exemplary, and actual damages?

Ruling:
The Court held that Spouses Chua are entitled to moral and exemplary damages. Moral and
exemplary damages may be awarded without proof of pecuniary loss. In awarding both, the court
shall take into account the circumstances surrounding the case and assess damages according to its
discretion. The dishonour of Chua’s checks and the foreclosure case initiated by the bank against
Chua adversely affected his credit standing, as well as his business dealings. Obviously, the bank's

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wrongful acts caused serious anxiety, embarrassment, and humiliation to Chua. The acts of the bank
(the malicious and unwarranted application for extrajudicial foreclosure done by the bank to harass,
embarrass, annoy, and ridicule Chua, as well as the bank's failure to credit the deposit of Chua which
constituted gross negligence in the performance of the bank’s contractual obligation) were
accompanied by bad faith and done in wanton, fraudulent and malevolent manner warranting the
award of exemplary damages in favor of Chua, in accordance with Article 2232 of the Civil Code.

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174. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, REPUBLIC

BROADCASTING CORP, VIVA PRODUCTION, INC., and VICENTE DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. 128690, January 21, 1999
CJ. Davide Jr.

Doctrine:
The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because, being an
artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no
senses, It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which call be
experienced only by one having a nervous system.
Facts:
In 1990, ABS-CBN and VIVA executed a Film Exhibition Agreement whereby VIVA gave ABS-
CBN an exclusive right to exhibit some VIVA films. According to the agreement, ABS-CBN shall have
the right of first refusal to the next 24 VIVA films for TV telecast under such terms as may be agreed
upon by the parties, however, such right shall be exercised by ABS-CBN from the actual offer in
writing. Sometime in December 1991, VIVA, through Vicente Del Rosario (Executive Producer),
offered ABS-CBN through VP Charo Santos-Concio, a list of 3 film packages from which ABS-CBN may
exercise its right of first refusal. ABS-CBN, however through Mrs. Concio, tick off only 10 titles they
can purchase among which is the film “Maging Sino Ka Man” which is one of the subjects of the
present case, therefore, it did not accept the said list as per the rejection letter authored by Mrs.
Concio sent to Del Rosario. Subsequently, Del Rosario approached Mrs. Concio with another list
consisting of 52 original movie titles and 104 re-runs, proposing to sell to ABS-CBN airing rights for
P60M (P30M in cash and P30M worth of television spots). Del Rosario and ABS-CBN’s General
Manager, Eugenio Lopez III, met at the Tamarind Grill Restaurant in QC to discuss the package
proposal but to no avail. Four days later, Del Rosario and Mr. Graciano Gozon, Senior VP of Finance
of Republic Broadcasting Corporation (RBS/Channel 7) discussed the terms and conditions of VIVA’s
offer. A day after that, Mrs. Concio sent the draft of the contract between ABS-CBN and VIVA which
contained a counter-proposal covering 53 films for P35M. VIVA’s Board of Directors rejected the
counter-proposal as it would not sell anything less than the package of 104 films for P60M. After said
rejection, ABS-CBN closed a deal with RBS including the 14 films previously ticked off by ABS-CBN.
Consequently, ABS-CBN filed a complaint for specific performance with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or TRO against RBS, VIVA and Del Rosario. RTC then enjoined the latter
from airing the subject films. RBS posted a P30M counterbond to dissolve the injunction. Later on,
the trial court as well as the CA dismissed the complaint holding that there was no meeting of minds

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between ABS-CBN and VIVA, hence, there was no basis for ABS-CBN’s demand, furthermore, the right
of first refusal had previously been exercised. Hence, the present petition, ABS-CBN argued that an
agreement was made during the meeting of Mr. Lopez and Del Rosario jotted down on a “napkin”
(this was never produced in court). Moreover, it had yet to fully exercise its right of first refusal since
only 10 titles were chosen from the first list. As to actual, moral and exemplary damages, there was
no clear basis in awarding the same.

Issue:
Whether or not ABS-CBN is entitled to the award of moral damages.

Ruling:
No. Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for
actual injury suffered. and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. The award is not meant to
enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured party to obtain
means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to obviate then moral suffering he has undergone.
It is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and
should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Trial courts must then guard against the award of
exorbitant damages; they should exercise balanced restrained and measured objectivity to avoid
suspicion that it was due to passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the trial court. The award
of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because, being an artificial person and
having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses, it cannot,
therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which call be experienced only by one
having a nervous system. The statement in People v. Manero and Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB that
a corporation may recover moral damages if it "has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in
social humiliation" is an obiter dictum. On this score alone the award for damages must be set aside,
since RBS is a corporation.

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175. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC, INC

G.R. No. 126204, November 20, 2001
J. Sandoval-Gutierrez

Doctrine:
Moral damages are not, as a general rule, granted to a corporation. While it is true that
besmirched reputation is included in moral damages, it cannot cause mental anguish to a corporation,
unlike in the case of a natural person, for a corporation has no reputation in the sense that an
individual has, and besides, it is inherently impossible for a corporation to suffer mental anguish.

Facts:
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) issued invitations to bid for the supply and delivery
of 120,000 metric tons of imported coal for its Batangas Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant of which
Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc. (PHIBRO) bided and was accepted. On July 10, 1987, PHIBRO told
NAPOCOR that disputes might soon plague Australia that will seriously hamper its ability to supply
coal. On July 23 to July 31, 1987, PHIBRO informed NAPOCOR that unless a "strike-free" clause is
incorporated in the charter party or the contract of carriage, the ship owners are unwilling to load
their cargo. In order to hasten the transfer of coal, they should share the burden of the "strike-free"
clause but NAPOCOR refused. PHIBRO effected its first shipment only on November 17, 1987 which
was supposed to be on the 30th day after receipt of the letter of credit of which it received on August
6, 1987. Consequently, In October 1987: NAPOCOR once more advertised for the delivery of coal to
its Calaca thermal plant of which PHIBRO applied but was rejected since it was not able to satisfy the
demand for damages on its delay. PHIBRO filed for damages in the RTC alleging that the rejection was
tainted with malice and bad faith. After the trial, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
PHIBRO, ordering the defendant NAPOCOR to reinstate PHIBRO in the defendant National Power
Corporation’s list of accredited bidders and indemnify the same actual, moral and exemplary
damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the decision of RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not PHIBRO is entitled to the award of moral damages.

Ruling:
No. moral damages are not, as a general rule, granted to a corporation. While it is true that
besmirched reputation is included in moral damages, it cannot cause mental anguish to a corporation,

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unlike in the case of a natural person, for a corporation has no reputation in the sense that an
individual has, and besides, it is inherently impossible for a corporation to suffer mental anguish. In
LBC Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we ruled: “Moral damages are granted in recompense for
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. A corporation, being an artificial person and
having existence only in legal contemplation, has no feelings, no emotions, no senses; therefore, it
cannot experience physical suffering and mental anguish. Mental suffering can be experienced only
by one having a nervous system and it flows from real ills, sorrows, and grief’s of life – all of which
cannot be suffered by respondent bank as an artificial person.”

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176. OSCAR VENTANILLA vs. GREGORIO CENTENO

G.R. No. L-14333, January 28, 1961
J. Padilla

Doctrine:

Article 2221 of the new Civil Code provides:

Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying
the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the court, according to the
circumstances of the case.

Facts:

This is an action to recover damages claimed to have been suffered by the plaintiff due to the
defendant's neglect in perfecting within the reglementary period his appeal from an adverse
judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in civil case No. 18833, attorney's fees
and costs

Plaintiff retained the service of Atty. Gregorio Centeno to represent him and prosecute an
action for the recovery of P4,000.00 together with damages. Decision unfavorable to the plaintiff was
received by Atty. Gregorio Centeno on July 21, 1955, and a notice of appeal was filed by Atty. Centeno
on July 25, 1955.

On July 30, 1955, Atty. Centeno wrote to the plaintiff the letter, enclosing copies of the
decision and that notice of appeal. Plaintiff Oscar Ventanilla after receiving the letter and copy of the
decision went to see Atty. Centeno in his office. Plaintiff, however, did not leave with Atty. Centeno at
that time the amount for the appeal bond.

About the middle of Aug. 1955, Atty. Centeno wrote a letter to the plaintiff enclosing therein
forms for an appeal bond. The plaintiff Ventanilla, however, decided to file a cash appeal bond of
P60.00. He went to the office of Atty. Centeno but was informed by the clerk, Leonardo Sanchez, that

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Atty. Centeno was in Laguna. Plaintiff then issued the as appeal bond and delivered the same to
Leonardo Sanchez with instruction to give the same to Atty. Centeno upon his arrival.

On August 17, Atty. Centeno prepared the motion for extension of time to file the record on
appeal which was filed only on August 20, 1955. Atty. Centeno returned to Manila and went to his
office. He cash the check and then went to the office of the Clerk of Court to file the appeal bond.
According to Atty. Centeno it was not accepted because the period of appeal had already expired, and
that it was only at that time he came to know that the period of appeal had expired.

After trial, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant,
ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of P200 as nominal damages and the costs.

The appellant claims that the trial court erred in not ordering the appellee to pay him actual
or compensatory, moral, temperate or moderate, and exemplary or corrective damages; in ordering
the appellee to pay the appellant only the sum of P200, and not P2,000 as nominal damages; and in
not ordering the appellee to pay the appellant the sum of P500 as attorney's fee.

Issue:

Whether the appellant is entitled to actual or compensatory, moral, temperate or moderate,

and exemplary or corrective damages.

Ruling:

No. Article 2199 of the new Civil Code provides:

Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only

for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred
to as actual or compensatory damages.

He who claims actual or compensatory damages must establish and prove by competent
evidence actual pecuniary loss. The appellant's bare allegation that by reason of the appellee's
indifference, negligence and failure to perfect within the reglementary period his appeal from an
adverse judgment, by not paying the appeal bond of P60, he lost his chance to recover from the
defendants therein the sum of P4,000 and moral and actual damages, which he could have recovered

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if the appeal had duly been perfected, indicates that his claim for actual or compensatory damages is
highly speculative. Hence he is not entitled to such damages.

The appellant claims that he suffered mental anguish upon learning that his appeal had not
been perfected within the reglementary period due to the appellee's negligence; serious anxiety upon
learning that his adversary had won by a mere technicality; besmirched reputation for losing the
opportunity to substantiate his claim made while testifying in open court that he was entitled to
collect the sum of P4,000 and damages from the defendants in civil No. 18833; and wounded feelings
for the appellee's failure to remain faithful to his client and worthy of his trust and confidence.

Moral damages are recoverable only when physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shocks, social humiliation, and similar
injury are the proximate result of a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries, quasi-delicts
causing physical injuries, seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage,
illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest, illegal search, libel, slander or any other form of defamation,
malicious prosecution, disrespect for the dead or wrongful interference with funerals, violation of
specific provisions of the Civil Code on human relations, and willful injury to property.

Since the appellant's cause of action for recovery of moral damages is not predicated upon
any of those specifically enumerated, the trial court did not err in declining to award moral damages
to him.

Concerning temperate or moderate damages claimed by the appellant, considering that he is

not entitled to actual or compensatory damages but has been awarded nominal damages by the trial
court, such award precludes the recovery of temperate or moderate damages, and so the trial court
did not err in refusing to award temperate or moderate damages to the appellant.

As regards exemplary or corrective damages also claimed by the appellant, since it cannot be
recovered as a matter of right and the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated, if
the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner, the trial
court has judiciously, wisely and correctly exercised its discretion in not awarding them to the
appellant.

Relative to the sufficiency of the sum of P200 as nominal damages awarded by the trial court
to the appellant, article 2221 of the new Civil Code provides:

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Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated
or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the court, according to the
circumstances of the case.

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177. DR. HERMAN ARMOVIT, DORA ARMOVIT and JACQUELINE ARMOVIT vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, and NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC
G.R. No. 88561, April 20, 1990
J. Gangayco

Doctrine:

The deletion of the nominal damages by the appellate court is well-taken since there is an
award of actual damages. Nominal damages cannot co-exist with actual or compensatory damages.

Facts:

In October 1981, the petitioners decided to spend their Christmas holidays with relatives and
friends in the Philippines, so they purchased from private respondent, (Northwest Airlines, Inc.)
three (3) round trip airline tickets from the U.S. to Manila and back. Each ticket of the petitioners
which was in the handwriting of private respondent's tickets sales agent contains the following entry
on the Manila to Tokyo portion of the return flight:

from Manila to Tokyo, NW flight 002, date 17 January, time 10:30 A.M. Status, OK.

On their return trip from Manila to the U.S. scheduled on January 17, 1982, petitioner arrived
at the check-in counter of private respondent at the Manila International Airport at 9:15 in the
morning, which is a good one (1) hour and fifteen (15) minutes ahead of the 10:30 A.M. scheduled
flight time recited in their tickets. Petitioners were rudely informed that they cannot be
accommodated inasmuch as Flight 002 scheduled at 9:15 a.m. was already taking off and the 10:30
A.M. flight time entered in their plane tickets was erroneous.

Previous to the said date of departure petitioners re-confirmed their reservations through
their representative Ernesto Madriaga who personally presented the three (3) tickets at the private
respondent's Roxas Boulevard office. The departure time in the three (3) tickets of petitioners was
not changed when re-confirmed. The names of petitioners appeared in the passenger manifest and
confirmed as Passenger Nos. 306, 307, and 308, Flight 002.

Herein petitioner Dr. Armovit protested in extreme agitation that because of the bump-off he
will not be able to keep his appointments with his patients in the U.S. Petitioners suffered anguish,

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wounded feelings, and serious anxiety day and night of January 17th until the morning of January
18th when they were finally informed that seats will be available for them on the flight that day.

Because of the refusal of the private respondent to heed the repeated demands of the
petitioners for compensatory damages arising from the aforesaid breach of their air-transport
contracts, petitioners were compelled to file an action for damages in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.

The Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. However, upon appeal, the CA
modified the decisions of the RTC deleting the award of moral damages considering petitioner did
not take the witness stand to testify on their "social humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety" and
the breach of contract was not malicious or fraudulent.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner is entitled to moral damages.

Ruling:

Yes. The petition is impressed with merit.

The appellate court observed that private respondent was guilty of gross negligence not only
in the issuance of the tickets by the erroneous entry of the date of departure and without changing
or correcting the error when the said three (3) tickets were presented for re-confirmation.
Nevertheless it deleted the award of moral damages on the ground that petitioners did not take the
witness stand to testify on "their social humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, and that the
breach of contract was not malicious or fraudulent." The Court disagrees.

In Air France vs. Carrascoso, 9 Lopez vs. Pan American World Airways, and Zulueta vs. Pan
American World Airways, 11 this Court awarded damages for the gross negligence of the airline which
amounted to malice and bad faith and which tainted the breach of air transportation contract.

The gross negligence committed by private respondent in the issuance of the tickets with
entries as to the time of the flight, the failure to correct such erroneous entries and the manner by
which petitioners were rudely informed that they were bumped off are clear indicia of such malice

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and bad faith and establish that private respondent committed a breach of contract which entitles
petitioners to moral damages.

The appellate court observed that the petitioners failed to take the witness stand and testify
on the matter.1âwphi1 It overlooked however, that the failure of the petitioner to appear in court to
testify was explained by them. The assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983
following the year they were bumped off caused a turmoil in the country. This turmoil spilled over to
the year 1984 when they were scheduled to testify. However, the violent demonstrations in the
country were sensationalized in the U.S. media so petitioners were advised to refrain from returning
to the Philippines at the time.

Nevertheless, Atty. Raymund Armovit, brother of petitioner Dr. Armovit, took the witness
stand as he was with the petitioners from the time they checked in up to the time of their ultimate
departure. He was a witness when the check-in officer rudely informed the petitioners that their
flight had already taken off, while petitioner Dr. Armovit remonstrated that their tickets reflected
their flight time to be 10:30 A.M.; that in anger and frustration, Dr. Armovit told the said check-in-
officer that he had to be accommodated that morning so that he could attend to all his appointments
in the U.S.; that petitioner Jacqueline Armovit also complained about not being able to report for work
at the expiration of her leave of absence;

No doubt Atty. Raymund Armovit's testimony adequately and sufficiently established the
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation that petitioners suffered upon having been
bumped off. However, considering the circumstances of this case whereby the private respondent
attended to the flight of the petitioners, taking care of their accommodations while waiting and
boarding them in the flight back to the U.S. the following day, the Court finds that the petitioners are
entitled to moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 each.

Nevertheless, the deletion of the nominal damages by the appellate court is well-taken since
there is an award of actual damages. Nominal damages cannot co-exist with actual or compensatory
damages.

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178. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BALWINDER SINGH, GURMOK SINGH, DALVIR SINGH,
DIAL SINGH, AMARJIT SINGH, MOHINDER SINGH, MALKIT SINGH DHILLON, JOHINDER SINGH
and KULDIP SINGH, BALWINDER SINGH, MALKIT, SINGH, MOHINDER SINGH and DALVIR
SINGH,

G.R. No. 129782 June 29, 2001

J. BUENA

DOCTRINE:

The best evidence to substantiate income earned by foreigners while in the Philippines is the
payment of taxes with the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Absent such proof, bare allegation is
insufficient. Nevertheless, considering that the definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, and
the fact of loss has been established, appellants shall pay the heirs of Surinder Singh temperate
damages in the amount of P200,000.00.

FACTS:

These four (4) appellants, who are Indian nationals, were charged with murder and
frustrated murder along with their six (6) compatriots, namely: Gurmok, Dalvir, Dial, Johinder, Kuldip
and Amarjit Singh. Only these four (4) appellants were prosecuted because the rest of their co-
accused are at-large, except for Dial Singh, who died while under detention.

At around 7:30 in the morning while he was cleaning his motorbike in front of the Mendiola
Apartment in Barangay Canlalay, Biñan, Laguna, Dalvir, Balwinder, Gurmok, Jarnail, Amarjit,
Mohinder, Dial, Kuldip- all surnamed Singh-Johander Singh Dhillon, and Malkit Singh Dhillon arrived,
shouting foul remarks in their native language and demanding Surinder Singh to come out of the
apartment. When all these things were going on, private complainant Dilbag Singh tried to stop them
but Balwinder Singh stabbed him on the left side of his back. Gurmok Singh likewise stabbed him
with a bolo, but he was not hit as he was able to move to one side. After that, the ten (10) accused
Indians left. Surinder Singh was pronounced dead on arrival.

A "resolution on reinvestigation"6 resulted in the filing of two (2) Informations – for Murder
and Frustrated Murder – against all ten (10) Indian nationals After trial, appellants were convicted

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of the crime charged. Due to the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed in murder, the case went to
the Supreme Court for appeal.

ISSUES:

1. The court a quo erred in sanctioning errors and irregularities of procedure which resulted
in denial of due process to accused-appellants.

2. The court a quo erred in accepting the prosecution’s version of the incident which gave rise
to these cases, overlooking the testimonies of the three (3) unbiased witnesses thereto.

3. The court a quo erred in awarding excessive damages against accused-appellants.

RULING:

First error

According to appellants, an irregularity attended the admission of the amended Informations.

They claim that the prosecution failed to conduct a preliminary investigation for the upgraded crime
of murder and frustrated murder. This claim lacks basis.

Evidence on record reveals that when private complainants filed a motion for re-investigation to
upgrade the charge to murder and frustrated murder, in the course thereof, the prosecutor who
handled the reinvestigation18 conducted another preliminary investigation.

In hearing the petition for bail, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence
of guilt is strong. Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that the burden of
proof in bail application lies in the prosecution. In bail proceedings, the prosecution must be given
ample opportunity to show that the evidence of guilt is strong. While the proceeding is conducted as
a regular trial, it must be limited to the determination of the bailability of the accused. It should be
brief and speedy, lest the purpose for which it is available is rendered nugatory. While the
prosecution tarried too long, such fact did not amount to a denial of due process because bail is
granted only "where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent,"21 which is not
attendant in this case.

Second error

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Appellants fault the trial court in accepting the prosecution’s version. This Court is convinced
that appellants are guilty of the crime charged. Appellants Dalvir Singh admitted stabbing the
deceased and wounding Dilbag Singh, which was claimed to have been caused while grappling for
the possession of the knife. This version invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence.

Third error

In Criminal Case No. 8682 for frustrated murder, the trial court awarded private complainant
Dilbag Singh the amount of P16,000.00 representing his hospitalization and medical expenses, and P
30,000.00 as attorney’s fees. For his hospitalization and medical expenses, the receipts submitted to
support said claim amounted only to P370.50. In Criminal Case No. 8683 for murder, the following
amount of actual damages were duly proven – P16,500.00 funeral expenses39 and air ticket/freight
of the cadaver – $600.27.40 The amount of P400.00 for hospitalization expenses should be deleted for
not being supported by evidence.

The best evidence to substantiate income earned by foreigners while in the Philippines is the
payment of taxes with the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Absent such proof, bare allegation is
insufficient. Nevertheless, considering that the definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, and
the fact of loss has been established, appellants shall pay the heirs of Surinder Singh temperate
damages in the amount of P200,000.00.

The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed subject to the following modifications.

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179. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDISON PLAZO

G.R. No. 120547 January 29, 2001
J. QUISUMBING

Doctrine:
In lieu of actual damages, temperate damages under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code may be
recovered where it has been shown that the victim's family suffered some pecuniary loss but the
amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty.

Facts:
Leonor Fabula went out of her house in May-anao, Tigaon, Camarines Sur to buy sugar at a
nearby store. When she reached the store, she saw appellant boxing her son Romeo Fabula and
banging his head on the post of the store, while asking him why he told the police about his brother
and the location of appellant's house. Appellant caught up with Romeo and stabbed him at the back
causing Romeo to fall on the ground. Appellant continued to stab Romeo in the upper and lower chest
area. Leonor continued shouting for help and eventually someone came to help. However, when she
saw her son no longer moving, she told the people not to touch or move him because she was going
to the Poblacion of Tigaon to get a policeman.

The policemen brought the body to the Municipal Building where the Municipal Health
Officer, Dr. Constancio Tam, conducted an autopsy. Appellant was charged with the crime of murder.
On arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. After trial, the trial court
rendered its decision12 finding appellant guilty of the crime of murder.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder

Ruling:
While the information alleged the attendance of the qualifying circumstances of treachery
and evident premeditation, these were not proven by the prosecution's evidence. Circumstances
which qualify criminal responsibility must in no case rest upon mere presumptions, no matter how

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reasonable or probable, but must be based on facts of unquestioned existence. It is settled that
circumstances which qualify killing to murder must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself.35

In the absence of any circumstance which would qualify the crime to murder, we find that
appellant should be found liable only for the crime of homicide.

Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of homicide is reclusion
temporal. There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the penalty of reclusion temporal
should be imposed in its medium period.39 Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the minimum
of the indeterminate sentence should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision
mayor.

The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity. However, the
award of actual damages in the amount of P15,712.00 was based solely on the bare assertions of the
mother of the victim. The Court can only grant such amount for expenses if they are supported by
receipts.40 In the absence thereof, no actual damages can be awarded. However, in lieu of actual
damages, temperate damages under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code may be recovered where it has been
shown that the victim's family suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved
with certainty. We find the award of P15,000.00 as temperate damages reasonable. Moral damages
cannot be awarded in the absence of any evidence to support its award.42

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180. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LORETO TAN
G.R. No. 108630, April 2, 1996
J. Romero

Doctrine:
Jurisprudence has set down the requirements for exemplary damages to be awarded: 1. they
may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the
claimant’s right to them has been established; 2. they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their
determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the
claimant; 3. the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
Facts:
Loreto Tan owned a parcel of land near the national highway in Mandalagan, Bacolod City
which is subject of expropriation by the government. After negotiation proceedings. Tan filed a
motion dated May 10, 1978 requesting issuance of an order for the release to him of the expropriation
price of P32,480.00. The Trial Court required PNB to issue a check for payment of the said land to
Tan.
PNB’s Asst. Branch Manager, Juan Tagamolilia, issued managers check for the said amount
and delivered it to Sonia Gonzaga without Tan’s knowledge. As a consequence, Tan demanded the
payment from PNB which refused on the ground that they had already paid the same based on the
SPA allegedly executed in her favor by Tan. Tan therefore executed an affidavit contending that he
had never executed such SPA nor authorized Gonzaga to receive it. PNB, on the other hand, failed to
produce the SPA as directed by the court. The TC ruled against the PNB. CA affirmed the same but
deleted the award of P5, 000.00 for exemplary damages and P5, 000.00 for attorney’s fee
Issue:
Whether the payment of exemplary damages and attorney’s fee are proper.
Ruling:
No. the award of exemplary damages, we agree with the appellate court that the same should
be deleted. Under Art. 2232 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded if a party acted in
a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. However, they cannot be
recovered as a matter of right; the court has yet to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.
Jurisprudence has set down the requirements for exemplary damages to be awarded:
1. they may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after
the claimant’s right to them has been established;

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2. they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the
amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant;
3. the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or
malevolent manner.

In the case at bench, while there is a clear breach of petitioner’s obligation to pay private
respondents, there is no evidence that it acted in a fraudulent, wanton, reckless or oppressive
manner. Furthermore, there is no award of compensatory damages which is a prerequisite before
exemplary damages may be awarded. Therefore, the award by the trial court of P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages is baseless

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181. VIRGILIO M. DEL ROSARIO and CORAZON PAREDES DEL ROSARIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and METAL FORMING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118325, January 29, 1997
CJ. Narvasa

Doctrine:
While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they need not be proved,
although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before
the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded.”
“Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a
deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.”
Facts:
Spouses Del Rosario through their contractor Engineer Puno purchased metal shingles
believing their representation that it is durable and “STRUCTURALLY SAFE AND STRONG" and that
the “BANAWE METAL TILE” structure acts as a single unit against wind and storm pressure due to
the strong hook action on its overlaps”. However, after two (2) months after completion of the
installation, portions of the roof of the Del Rosarios were blown away by strong wind brought about
by typhoon “Ruping.'"
Because of the incident the Spouses del Rosario filed complaint, filed on November 21, 1990,
charged MFC with a violation of Section 3 of Act No. 3740, “An Act to Penalize Fraudulent Advertising,
Mislabeling or Misbranding of Any Product, Stocks, Bonds, etc.
DTI rendered judgment declaring that MFC had indeed misrepresented its product and was
sentenced to pay an “administrative fine of P10,000.00" (within ten [10] days from finality of the
decision), otherwise its “business name and registration ** would be deemed suspended and its
establishment closed until the fine was fully paid.
MFC filed an appeal before the Office of the President which affirmed the DTI’S decision with
modification as to the fine, which was reduced to Php 5,000.
MFC replaced the roof free of charge, in acknowledgment of its one-year warranty on the
materials and their installation. The del Rosarios hired Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc. to make
the replacement. They aske MFC for other payments, MFC however declined to concede liability for
the other damages claimed by the Del Rosario Spouses to have been caused to the interior of their
home. This prompted the latter to commence a civil action against MFC on April 16, 1990 in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. RTC favored Spouses Del Rosario Actual damage P1,008,003, Moral

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Damages P500,000, Exemplary Damages P300,000 and Attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation P150,000
The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts Decision holding there is no privity between the
Spouses Del Rosario and MFC.

Issue:
Whether the Spouses Del Rosario must be paid with damages.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court also agrees with the Trial Court that exemplary damages are properly exigible
of MFC, “Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such damages may be imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good. While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter
of right, they need not be proved, although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate
or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded." “Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or
impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially
deleterious actions."
However, the same statutory and jurisprudential standards just mentioned dictate reduction of the
amounts of moral and exemplary damages fixed by the Trial Court. There is, to be sure, no hard and
fast rule for determining what would be a fair amount of moral (or exemplary) damages, each case
having to be governed by its attendant particulars. Generally, the amount of moral damages should
be commensurate with the actual loss or injury suffered.
In another case involving strikingly analogous facts decided in 1994, Geraldez vs. C.A, where no actual
damages were adjudicated but moral and exemplary damages in similar amounts (P500,000.00 and
P300,000.00, respectively) were awarded by the Trial Court, as in this case, this Court reduced the
amount of moral damages to P100,000.00 and of exemplary damages to P50,000.00. The Court sees
no reason to adopt a different treatment in the case at bar, and accordingly reduces the moral
damages from P500,000.00 to P100,000.00, and the exemplary damages from P300,000.00 to
P50,000.00.

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