The Theological Virtues in Thomas Aquinas

Thomas defines a theological virtue as a good habit “of the mind, by which we live righteously,

of which no one can make a bad use, which God works in us without us” (ST I-II.55.4, arg. 1).

Thomas portrays three theological virtues (faith, hope and charity), and depicts two ways in

which these virtues are to be arranged: according to their “order of generation, and order of

perfection” (ST I-II.62.4).

With regards to the order of generation, the first theological virtue is faith, which

approaches God as “Divine Truth” (ST I-II.64.4). Therefore, its proper end “is the union of the

human mind” with God (ST II-II.3.2, arg. 1). Accordingly, faith is constituted “as an act of the

intellect” (ST II-II.4.2) and, as such, “faith is the perfection of the intellect” (ST II-II.4.4).

Additionally, faith is caused by God in the person through her will, because “the will moves the

intellect and the other powers of the soul to the end” (ST II-II.2.2, ad. 4). In this sense, to

believe “is an act of the intellect assenting to the Divine truth at the command of the will

moved by the grace of God” (ST II-II.2.9). According to Thomas, a person has faith in three

senses:

1) “to believe in a God” (ST II-II.2.2). This is the material object of faith: its content.

Owing to the complexity of the human intellect, which operates “by synthesis and

analysis” (ST II-II.1.2), faith includes many contents, which Thomas summarizes in “God’s

existence, and His providence over the salvation of man” (ST II-II.1.7).

2) “to believe God”, who “is the medium on account of which we assent to such and

such a point of faith” (ST II-II.2.2). This is the formal object of faith.
 3) “to believe in God,” as the end of the human will. In this sense “the intellect is moved

by the will” towards God as “First Truth” (ST II-II.2.2).

Through faith, “we come to know that we are able to obtain eternal life, and that for this

purpose the Divine assistance is ready for us” (ST II-II.17.6). This knowledge allows us to move,

trustworthily, towards God as our end. In this sense, “hope tends to its end with certainty, as

though sharing in the certainty of faith” (ST II-II.18.4). Accordingly, faith generates the

theological virtue of hope, which is the movement of the person towards God as her “future

good, difficult but possible to obtain” (ST II-II.17.1). Through hope, the person expects to attain

eternal happiness in the future. Hope also has to do with the present time, because the person

hopes to receive, here and now, God’s help to attain her end. Hope, then, “attains God by

leaning on His help in order to obtain the hoped for good” (ST II-II.17.2). God, in this regard, is

both the “final” and the “efficient cause” of hope (ST II-II.17.4). Hope, finally, “denotes a

movement towards that which is not possessed” (ST I-II.67.4). Throughout this movement, the

person relies in God’s continuous assistance. In this sense, Thomas states that hope approaches

God “according to the immensity of His omnipotence and loving kindness” (ST I-II.64.4).

By the hope to attain her goal, the person “is encouraged to love God and obey His

commandments” and, in this way, “hope leads to [the theological virtue of] charity” (ST II-

II.17.8). In charity, God “communicates His happiness to us” (ST II-II.23.1). In this sense, “charity

is the friendship of man for God.” This friendship is based in “benevolence,” with which “we

love someone so as to wish good to him,” and in “mutual love” (ST II-II.23.1). Charity, therefore,

is the attainment, in this life and in a limited (human) way, of the goal known through faith and

pursued through hope: “fellowship in everlasting happiness.” This fellowship is “a gratuitous

gift,” which is poured “in us … by the infusion of the Holy Ghost, Who is the love of the Father

and the Son, and the participation of Whom in us is created charity” (ST II-II.24.2). Through

charity, then, the person, who is finite, participates “of the infinite charity which is the Holy

Ghost” (ST II-II.27.7). Charity, in this regard, is subject to increase infinitely during this life,

because its cause, God, is infinite. The fulfillment of charity will be achieved only in patria.

Charity can be portrayed, then, as the perfect and progressive increase in union of the person

with her eternal goal, beginning with God’s initiative and continued by God’s assistance (cfr. ST

II-II.24.7, ST II-II.24.8, ST II-II.24.9).

The “measure and rule” of charity is “God’s goodness” (ST I-II.64.4). In this way, “God is

loved by charity for His own sake” (ST II-II.23.5). Through charity, the person is able to live “for

God” (ST II-II.17.6, ad. 3). Our love towards God, consequently, extends our love towards the

neighbor, as our love for them “is a participation of Divine charity” (ST II-II.23.2, ad. 1)

Now, with regards to the order of perfection, charity is the first virtue. This means that

charity brings hope and faith to their perfection. Accordingly, hope without charity “regards

directly one’s own good,” whereas through charity a person “can hope for another’s eternal

life, inasmuch as he is united to him by love” (ST II-II.17.3). Additionally, without charity, hope

implies “a certain distance” between the person and God, since “hope is of what is not

possessed” (ST I-II.66.6). This distance makes the journey of the person a difficult one (ST II-

II.17.1). Through charity, on the other hand, the person experiences the attainment of her

supernatural goal in the present. In charity, the person initiates a movement of continuous

growth in her union with God. This movement, which is hope’s movement perfected by charity,
makes the journey not “arduous” but enjoyable (ST II-II.23.6, ad. 3). Our friendship with God,

therefore, is what perfects our hope, “because we hope chiefly in our friends” (ST II-II.17.4).

Through faith without charity the people approach God only “in so far as we derive from

Him the Knowledge of truth,” and not for God’s own sake (ST II-II.23.6). Moreover, faith

without charity is “lifeless faith,” which “is duly perfect on the part of the intellect,” but not “as

regards the will” (ST II-II.4.5). This is because “every right movement of the will proceeds from a

right love” (ST I-II.65.4). Accordingly, the assent of faith towards the Divine Truth is imperfect

without charity, because the will which commands the intellect to assent to the Divine Truth is

not “directed to the good” (ST II-II.5.2). This definition encompasses a wide range of believers:

both the faith of demons and the faith of prophets are portrayed in this category (ST II-II.6.2,

ad. 3). In the case of demons, for example, “the intellect is convinced that it ought to believe

what is said, though that conviction is not based on objective evidence” (ST II-II.5.2). Because of

this condition, although “lifeless faith is a gift of God” (ST II-II.6.2), it is not, properly speaking, a

virtue; “because the nature of virtue requires that by it, we should not only do what is good,

but also that we should do it well” (ST I-II.65.4). Only through charity, “which is the form of

faith,” is the will “directed to a good end,” producing a “living faith” (ST II-II.4.5). The theological

virtue of faith, then, “works through charity” (ST II-II.4.3, s. c.).

In conclusion, according to the order of generation, properly speaking, solely charity is a

theological virtue. In this sense, faith and hope are gifts of God, which do not suffice to make a

human act virtuous. This imperfection of faith and hope, however, should not be attributed to

God, who bestows the gifts, but to the person who receives them. This is because, without

charity, the person’s good “is appraised with respect to … human reason” and not according to
“the Divine Law” (ST I-II.63.2). Conversely, although “charity is not excluded from the reason…,

charity is regulated, not by the reason, as human virtues are, but by God’s wisdom” (ST II-

II.24.3, ad. 2). God, in this sense, creates charity as the form of the soul, making God the rule of

the person’s actions. This is why “charity is the form of the virtues” (ST II-II.23.8). Through

charity, the Divine Law becomes the rule of the soul, through which the human operations are

directed to their supernatural end, making them virtuous. In charity, God perfects hope and

faith in the soul. These, working through charity, fully unfold their gifts.

Evaluation:

Thomas’s account of the theological virtues forms part of a masterful work which intends to

portray the complex reality of grace, where the infinite essence of God enters into the world.

To accomplish this goal, Thomas utilizes the compelling distinction between “order by

generation and order by perfection.” In this way, Thomas resembles the different degrees of

participation of humanity in the Divine nature without compromising God’s eternal essence.

Another important distinction is the one between faith and hope without charity (and,

therefore, not being theological virtues), and faith and hope as theological virtues. This

distinction is helpful to portray a unitary vision of the human being, because it stresses the

unity of the theological virtues in charity, which serves as the axis to understand the

relationship between God and the human being, and to acknowledge the person’s process of

sanctification. All in all, in his account of the theological virtues, Thomas presents a systematic

exposition of his theology, and provides Catholic theology with an invaluable resource for

understanding and conveying the Christian faith.